Infomotions, Inc.Leviathan / Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679



Author: Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679
Title: Leviathan
Publisher: Project Gutenberg
Tag(s): soveraign; naturall; soveraign power; moses; christ; wealth; god; bee; kingdome; civill soveraign
Contributor(s): Richter, Jean Paul, 1847-1937 [Translator]
Versions: original; local mirror; HTML (this file); printable
Services: find in a library; evaluate using concordance
Rights: GNU General Public License
Size: 214,247 words (longer than most) Grade range: 16-19 (graduate school) Readability score: 44 (average)
Identifier: etext3207
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Title: Leviathan

Author: Thomas Hobbes

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Notes on the E-Text.
This E-text was prepared from the Pelican Classics edition of Leviathan,
which in turn was prepared from the first edition. I have tried to
follow as closely as possible the original, and to give the flavour
of the text that Hobbes himself proof-read, but the following differences
were unavoidable.

Hobbes used capitals and italics very extensively, for emphasis,
for proper names, for quotations, and sometimes, it seems, just because.

The original has very extensive margin notes, which are used
to show where he introduces the definitions of words and concepts, to give
in short the subject that a paragraph or section is dealing with, and to
give references to his quotations, largely but not exclusively biblical.
To some degree, these margin notes seem to have been intended to serve
in place of an index, the original having none. They are all in italics.

He also used italics for words in other languages than English, and there
are a number of Greek words, in the Greek alphabet, in the text.

To deal with these within the limits of plain vanilla ASCII,
I have done the following in this E-text.

I have restricted my use of full capitalization to those places
where Hobbes used it, except in the chapter headings, which I have
fully capitalized, where Hobbes used a mixture of full capitalization
and italics.

Where it is clear that the italics are to indicate the text is quoting,
I have introduced quotation marks.  Within quotation marks I have
retained the capitalization that Hobbes used.

Where italics seem to be used for emphasis, or for proper names,
or just because, I have capitalized the initial letter of the words.
This has the disadvantage that they are not then distinguished
from those that Hobbes capitalized in plain text, but the extent
of his italics would make the text very ugly if I was to use an
underscore or slash.

Where the margin notes are either to introduce the paragraph subject,
or to show where he introduces word definitions, I have included them
as headers to the paragraph, again with all words having initial capitals,
and on a shortened line.

For margin references to quotes, I have included them in the text,
in brackets immediately next to the quotation. Where Hobbes included
references in the main text, I have left them as he put them,
except to change his square brackets to round.

For the Greek alphabet, I have simply substituted the nearest
ordinary letters that I can, and I have used initial capitals
for foreign language words.

Neither Thomas Hobbes nor his typesetters seem to have had many
inhibitions about spelling and punctuation. I have tried to reproduce
both exactly, with the exception of the introduction of quotation marks.

In preparing the text, I have found that it has much more meaning
if I read it with sub-vocalization, or aloud, rather than trying
to read silently.  Hobbes' use of emphasis and his eccentric
punctuation and construction seem then to work.


Edward White  edwud@telus.net
Canada Day 2002







                                      1651
                                   LEVIATHAN
                                by Thomas Hobbes
LEVIATHAN
OR
THE MATTER, FORME, & POWER
OF A COMMON-WEALTH
ECCLESIASTICAL
AND
CIVILL

By Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury.


Printed for Andrew Crooke,
at the Green Dragon
in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1651.



TO
MY MOST HONOR'D FRIEND
Mr. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN
of GODOLPHIN


HONOR'D SIR.

Your most worthy Brother Mr SIDNEY GODOLPHIN, when he lived,
was pleas'd to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me,
as you know, with reall testimonies of his good opinion, great in
themselves, and the greater for the worthinesse of his person.
For there is not any vertue that disposeth a man, either to the
service of God, or to the service of his Country, to Civill Society,
or private Friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his
conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion,
but inhaerent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature.
Therefore in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to your
selfe, I humbly Dedicate unto you this my discourse of Common-wealth.
I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on
those that shall seem to favour it.  For in a way beset with those that
contend on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other side for too
much Authority, 'tis hard to passe between the points of both unwounded.
But yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance the Civill Power, should
not be by the Civill Power condemned; nor private men, by reprehending
it, declare they think that Power too great.  Besides, I speak not
of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those
simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their
noyse defended those within it, not because they were they, but there)
offending none, I think, but those without, or such within
(if there be any such) as favour them.  That which perhaps may most offend,
are certain Texts of Holy Scripture, alledged by me to other purpose
than ordinarily they use to be by others.  But I have done it with due
submission, and also (in order to my Subject) necessarily; for they are
the Outworks of the Enemy, from whence they impugne the Civill Power.
If notwithstanding this, you find my labour generally decryed, you may
be pleased to excuse your selfe, and say that I am a man that love
my own opinions, and think all true I say, that I honoured your Brother,
and honour you, and have presum'd on that, to assume the Title
(without your knowledge) of being, as I am,

Sir,

Your most humble, and most obedient servant,
Thomas Hobbes.

Paris APRILL 15/25 1651.



THE CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS


THE FIRST PART


OF MAN


INTRODUCTION

1.  OF SENSE

2.  OF IMAGINATION

3.  OF THE CONSEQUENCES OR TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS

4.  OF SPEECH

5.  OF REASON AND SCIENCE

6.  OF THE INTERIOUR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS, COMMONLY CALLED
THE PASSIONS; AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED

7.  OF THE ENDS OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE

8.  OF THE VERTUES, COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUALL, AND THEIR
CONTRARY DEFECTS

9.  OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

10.  OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR, AND WORTHINESSE

11.OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS

12.  OF RELIGION

13.  OF THE NATURALL CONDITION OF MANKIND AS CONCERNING THEIR
FELICITY AND MISERY

14.  OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURALL LAWES, AND OF CONTRACT

15.  OF OTHER LAWES OF NATURE

16.  OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED


THE SECOND PART


OF COMMON-WEALTH


17.  OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A COMMON-WEALTH

18.  OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION

19.  OF SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION; AND OF
SUCCESION TO THE SOVERAIGN POWER

20.  OF DOMINION PATERNALL, AND DESPOTICALL

21.  OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS

22.  OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT, POLITICALL, AND PRIVATE

23.  OF THE PUBLIQUE MINISTERS OF SOVERAIGN POWER

24.  OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A COMMON-WEALTH

25.  OF COUNSELL

26.  OF CIVILL LAWES

27.  OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS

28.  OF PUNISHMENTS, AND REWARDS

29.  OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO THE DISSOLUTION OF
A COMMON-WEALTH

30.  OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVERAIGN REPRESENTATIVE

31.  OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE



THE THIRD PART


OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH


32.  OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITIQUES

33.  OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY, AND INTERPRETERS
OF THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.

34.  OF THE SIGNIFICATION, OF SPIRIT, ANGELL, AND INSPIRATION
IN THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE

35.  OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD,
OF HOLY, SACRED, AND SACRAMENT

36.  OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS

37.  OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE

38.  OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNALL LIFE, HEL,
SALVATION, THE WORLD TO COME, AND REDEMPTION

39.  OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE WORD CHURCH

40.  OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD, IN ABRAHAM, MOSES,
THE HIGH PRIESTS, AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH

41.  OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR

42.  OF POWER ECCLESIASTICALL

43.  OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR MANS RECEPTION INTO THE KINGDOME OF HEAVEN



THE FOURTH PART

OF THE KINGDOME OF DARKNESSE


44.  OF SPIRITUALL DARKNESSE FROM MISINTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

45.  OF DAEMONOLOGY, AND OTHER RELIQUES OF THE RELIGION OF THE GENTILES

46.  OF DARKNESSE FROM VAINE PHILOSOPHY, AND FABULOUS TRADITIONS

47.  OF THE BENEFIT PROCEEDING FROM SUCH DARKNESSE; AND TO WHOM
IT ACCREWETH



48.  A REVIEW AND CONCLUSION



THE INTRODUCTION


Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governes the world) is
by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated,
that it can make an Artificial Animal.  For seeing life is but a
motion of Limbs, the begining whereof is in some principall part within;
why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves
by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life?
For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings;
and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body,
such as was intended by the Artificer?  Art goes yet further,
imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man.
For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH,
or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man;
though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose
protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty
is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body;
The Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution,
artificiall Joynts; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seat
of the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty)
are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and
Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi
(the Peoples Safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things
needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory;
Equity and Lawes, an artificiall Reason and Will; Concord, Health;
Sedition, Sicknesse; and Civill War, Death.  Lastly, the Pacts and
Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first made,
set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let Us Make Man,
pronounced by God in the Creation.

To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider

First the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both which is Man.

Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is made; what are the Rights
and just Power or Authority of a Soveraigne; and what it is that
Preserveth and Dissolveth it.

Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-Wealth.

Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness.

Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late,
That Wisedome is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men.
Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can
give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to shew what
they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one
another behind their backs.  But there is another saying not of late
understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another,
if they would take the pains; and that is, Nosce Teipsum, Read Thy Self:
which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either
the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors;
or to encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour towards
their betters; But to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts,
and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another,
whosoever looketh into himselfe, and considereth what he doth,
when he does Think, Opine, Reason, Hope, Feare, &c, and upon what grounds;
he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions
of all other men, upon the like occasions.  I say the similitude
of Passions, which are the same in all men, Desire, Feare, Hope, &c;
not the similitude or The Objects of the Passions, which are the things
Desired, Feared, Hoped, &c: for these the constitution individuall,
and particular education do so vary, and they are so easie to be kept
from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted and
confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting,
and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts.
And though by mens actions wee do discover their designee sometimes;
yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing
all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered,
is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived,
by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads,
is himselfe a good or evill man.

But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly,
it serves him onely with his acquaintance, which are but few.
He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himselfe, not this,
or that particular man; but Man-kind; which though it be hard to do,
harder than to learn any Language, or Science; yet, when I shall have
set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another,
will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himselfe.
For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.





PART 1    OF MAN




CHAPTER 1

OF SENSE


Concerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first Singly,
and afterwards in Trayne, or dependance upon one another.
Singly, they are every one a Representation or Apparence,
of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us;
which is commonly called an Object.  Which Object worketh on
the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body; and by diversity
of working, produceth diversity of Apparences.

The Originall of them all, is that which we call Sense; (For there
is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally,
or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.)  The rest are
derived from that originall.

To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to
the business now in hand; and I have els-where written of
the same at large.  Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method,
I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which
presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly,
as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing,
and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other
strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain,
and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure,
or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which endeavour
because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without.  And this Seeming,
or Fancy, is that which men call sense; and consisteth, as to the Eye,
in a Light, or Colour Figured; To the Eare, in a Sound; To the Nostrill,
in an Odour; To the Tongue and Palat, in a Savour; and to the rest
of the body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and such other qualities,
as we discern by Feeling.  All which qualities called Sensible,
are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions
of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversly.  Neither in
us that are pressed, are they anything els, but divers motions;
(for motion, produceth nothing but motion.)  But their apparence to
us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming.  And as pressing, rubbing,
or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the Eare,
produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce
the same by their strong, though unobserved action,  For if those
Colours, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause them,
they could not bee severed from them, as by glasses, and in Ecchoes
by reflection, wee see they are; where we know the thing we see,
is in one place; the apparence, in another.  And though at some
certain distance, the reall, and very object seem invested with
the fancy it begets in us; Yet still the object is one thing,
the image or fancy is another.  So that Sense in all cases,
is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as I have said)
by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of externall things
upon our Eyes, Eares, and other organs thereunto ordained.

But the Philosophy-schooles, through all the Universities of Christendome,
grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine;
and say, For the cause of Vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth
on every side a Visible Species(in English) a Visible Shew, Apparition,
or Aspect, or a Being Seen; the receiving whereof into the Eye, is Seeing.
And for the cause of Hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth
an Audible Species, that is, an Audible Aspect, or Audible Being Seen;
which entring at the Eare, maketh Hearing.  Nay for the cause of
Understanding also, they say the thing Understood sendeth forth
Intelligible Species, that is, an Intelligible Being Seen;
which comming into the Understanding, makes us Understand.
I say not this, as disapproving the use of Universities: but because
I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth, I must
let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended
in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant Speech is one.



CHAPTER II

OF IMAGINATION


That when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it,
it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of.
But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion,
unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same,
(namely, that nothing can change it selfe,) is not so easily assented to.
For men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themselves:
and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain,
and lassitude, think every thing els growes weary of motion,
and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether
it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find
in themselves, consisteth.  From hence it is, that the Schooles say,
Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve
their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing
appetite, and Knowledge of what is good for their conservation,
(which is more than man has) to things inanimate absurdly.

When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els
hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant,
but in time, and by degrees quite extinguish it: And as wee see
in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rowling
for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion, which is
made in the internall parts of a man, then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c.
For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain
an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it.
And this is it, that Latines call Imagination, from the image made
in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses.
But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies Apparence, and is as proper
to one sense, as to another.  Imagination therefore is nothing but
Decaying Sense; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures,
as well sleeping, as waking.

Memory
The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion
made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light
of the Sun obscureth the light of the Starres; which starrs do no
less exercise their vertue by which they are visible, in the day,
than in the night.  But because amongst many stroaks, which our eyes,
eares, and other organs receive from externall bodies, the predominant
onely is sensible; therefore the light of the Sun being predominant,
we are not affected with the action of the starrs.  And any object being
removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain;
yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us,
the Imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voyce
of a man is in the noyse of the day.  From whence it followeth,
that the longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense of any object,
the weaker is the Imagination.  For the continuall change of mans body,
destroyes in time the parts which in sense were moved: So that the
distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us.
For as at a distance of place, that which wee look at, appears dimme,
and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as Voyces grow weak,
and inarticulate: so also after great distance of time, our imagination of
the Past is weak; and wee lose( for example) of Cities wee have seen,
many particular Streets; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances.
This Decaying Sense, when wee would express the thing it self,
(I mean Fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I said before;
But when we would express the Decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading,
old, and past, it is called Memory.  So that Imagination and Memory,
are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.

Much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience.
Againe, Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly
perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times;
The former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was
presented to the sense) is Simple Imagination; as when one imagineth
a man, or horse, which he hath seen before.  The other is Compounded;
as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another,
we conceive in our mind a Centaure.  So when a man compoundeth the
image of his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man;
as when a man imagins himselfe a Hercules, or an Alexander,
(which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of Romants)
it is a compound imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind.
There be also other Imaginations that rise in men, (though waking)
from the great impression made in sense; As from gazing upon the Sun,
the impression leaves an image of the Sun before our eyes a long
time after; and from being long and vehemently attent upon
Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake)
have the Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes: which kind of
Fancy hath no particular name; as being a thing that doth not
commonly fall into mens discourse.

Dreams
The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call Dreams.
And these also (as all other Imaginations) have been before,
either totally, or by parcells in the Sense.  And because in sense,
the Brain, and Nerves, which are the necessary Organs of sense,
are so benummed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action
of Externall Objects, there can happen in sleep, no Imagination;
and therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the agitation of
the inward parts of mans body; which inward parts, for the connexion
they have with the Brayn, and other Organs, when they be distempered,
do keep the same in motion; whereby the Imaginations there formerly made,
appeare as if a man were waking; saving that the Organs of Sense
being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can master
and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a Dreame must needs
be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts.
And hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard matter, and by many
thought impossible to distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming.
For my part, when I consider, that in Dreames, I do not often,
nor constantly think of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that
I do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming,
as at other times; And because waking I often observe the absurdity
of Dreames, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking Thoughts;
I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not;
though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.

And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward
parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams.
And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare,
and raiseth the thought and Image of some fearfull object
(the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the
inner parts to the Brain being reciprocall:) and that as Anger
causeth heat in some parts of the Body, when we are awake;
so when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts causeth Anger,
and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy.
In the same manner; as naturall kindness, when we are awake
causeth desire; and desire makes heat in certain other parts
of the body; so also, too much heat in those parts, while wee sleep,
raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shewn.
In summe, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking Imaginations;
The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and when we Dream,
at another.

Apparitions Or Visions
The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking thoughts,
is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept:
which is easie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts;
and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth,
without the circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes,
as one that noddeth in a chayre.  For he that taketh pains,
and industriously layes himselfe to sleep, in case any uncouth and
exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream.
We read of Marcus Brutes, (one that had his life given him by Julius
Caesar, and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murthered him,)
how at Phillipi, the night before he gave battell to Augustus Caesar,
he saw a fearfull apparition, which is commonly related by Historians
as a Vision: but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge
to have been but a short Dream.  For sitting in his tent, pensive and
troubled with the horrour of his rash act, it was not hard for him,
slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him;
which feare, as by degrees it made him wake; so also it must needs make
the Apparition by degrees to vanish: And having no assurance that he slept,
he could have no cause to think it a Dream, or any thing but a Vision.
And this is no very rare Accident: for even they that be perfectly awake,
if they be timorous, and supperstitious, possessed with fearfull tales,
and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe
they see spirits and dead mens Ghosts walking in Churchyards;
whereas it is either their Fancy onely, or els the knavery of such persons,
as make use of such superstitious feare, to pass disguised in the night,
to places they would not be known to haunt.

From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies,
from vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of
the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, nymphs,
and the like; and now adayes the opinion than rude people have of Fayries,
Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches.  For as for Witches,
I think not that their witch craft is any reall power; but yet that
they are justly punished, for the false beliefe they have, that they can
do such mischiefe, joyned with their purpose to do it if they can;
their trade being neerer to a new Religion, than to a Craft or Science.
And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been
on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use
of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such inventions
of Ghostly men.  Neverthelesse, there is no doubt, but God can make
unnaturall Apparitions.  But that he does it so often, as men need
to feare such things, more than they feare the stay, or change,
of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change,
is no point of Christian faith.  But evill men under pretext
that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing
when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; It is the part
of a wise man, to believe them no further, than right reason makes
that which they say, appear credible.  If this superstitious fear
of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams,
false Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which,
crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much
more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.

And this ought to be the work of the Schooles; but they rather nourish
such doctrine.  For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are),
what they receive, they teach: some saying, that Imaginations rise
of themselves, and have no cause: Others that they rise most commonly
from the Will; and that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man,
by God; and evill thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are
powred (infused) into a man, by God; and evill ones by the Divell.
Some say the Senses receive the Species of things, and deliver them to
the Common-sense; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the Fancy,
and the Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the Judgement,
like handing of things from one to another, with many words making
nothing understood.

Understanding.
The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other creature indued
with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes,
is that we generally call Understanding; and is common to Man and Beast.
For a dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating of
his Master; and so will many other Beasts.  That Understanding which
is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely his will; but his
conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the names
of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech:
And of this kinde of Understanding I shall speak hereafter.



CHAPTER III

OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAYNE OF IMAGINATIONS


By Consequence, or Trayne of Thoughts, I understand that succession
of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from
Discourse in words) Mentall Discourse.

When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after,
is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be.  Not every Thought
to every Thought succeeds indifferently.  But as wee have no Imagination,
whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts;
so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we
never had the like before in our Senses.  The reason whereof is this.
All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the Sense:
And those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense,
continue also together after Sense: In so much as the former comming
again to take place, and be praedominant, the later followeth,
by coherence of the matter moved, is such manner, as water upon a plain
Table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger.
But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes
one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to passe in time,
that in the Imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what
we shall Imagine next; Onely this is certain, it shall be something
that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.

Trayne Of Thoughts Unguided
This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts.
The first is Unguided, Without Designee, and inconstant; Wherein there is
no Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow,
to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion:
In which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one
to another, as in a Dream.  Such are Commonly the thoughts of men,
that are not onely without company, but also without care of any thing;
though even then their Thoughts are as busie as at other times,
but without harmony; as the sound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld
to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play.  And yet in this
wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it,
and the dependance of one thought upon another.  For in a Discourse
of our present civill warre, what could seem more impertinent,
than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman Penny?
Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest enough.  For the Thought of the
warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his Enemies;
The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Christ;
and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price
of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question;
and all this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick.

Trayne Of Thoughts Regulated
The second is more constant; as being Regulated by some desire,
and designee.  For the impression made by such things as wee desire,
or feare, is strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of
quick return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep.
From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce
the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that,
the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come
to some beginning within our own power.  And because the End,
by the greatnesse of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our
thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way:
which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men
this praecept, which is now worne out, Respice Finem; that is to say,
in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing
that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.

Remembrance
The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of
an effect imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it:
and this is common to Man and Beast.  The other is, when imagining
any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can
by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it,
when wee have it.  Of which I have not at any time seen any signe,
but in man onely; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the
nature of any living creature that has no other Passion but sensuall,
such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger.  In summe, the Discourse
of the Mind, when it is governed by designee, is nothing but Seeking,
or the faculty of Invention, which the Latines call Sagacitas,
and Solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect,
present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause.
sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time,
wherein hee misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place,
and time to time, to find where, and when he had it; that is to say,
to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin
a method of seeking.  Again, from thence, his thoughts run over
the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion
might make him lose it.  This we call Remembrance, or Calling to mind:
the Latines call it Reminiscentia, as it were a Re-Conning
of our former actions.

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof
his is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof,
in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell;
or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man
should run over the alphabet, to start a rime.

Prudence
Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then
he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof
one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions.
As he that foresees what wil become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has
seen follow on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts,
The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes.
Which kind of thoughts, is called Foresight, and Prudence,
or Providence; and sometimes Wisdome; though such conjecture,
through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious.
But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of
things past, than another; by so much also he is more Prudent,
and his expectations the seldomer faile him.  The Present onely
has a being in Nature; things Past have a being in the Memory onely,
but things To Come have no being at all; the Future being but a
fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past,
to the actions that are Present; which with most certainty is done
by him that has most Experience; but not with certainty enough.
And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation;
yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption.  For the foresight
of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him
by whose will they are to come.  From him onely, and supernaturally,
proceeds Prophecy.  The best Prophet naturally is the best guesser;
and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters
he guesses at: for he hath most Signes to guesse by.

Signes
A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily,
the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have
been observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed,
the lesse uncertain is the Signe.  And therefore he that has most
experience in any kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at
the Future time, and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more
prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to
be equalled by any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit:
though perhaps many young men think the contrary.

Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from beast.
There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which
is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

Conjecture Of The Time Past
As Prudence is a Praesumtion of the Future, contracted from
the Experience of time Past; So there is a Praesumtion of things Past
taken from other things (not future but) past also.  For he that hath
seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come
into civill warre, and then to ruine; upon the sights of the ruines
of any other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses
have been there also.  But his conjecture, has the same incertainty
almost with the conjecture of the Future; both being grounded
onely upon Experience.

There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally
planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it,
but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses.
Those other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which
seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and encreased by study and
industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline;
and proceed all from the invention of Words, and Speech.  For besides
Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man
has no other motion; though by the help of Speech, and Method,
the same Facultyes may be improved to such a height, as to
distinguish men from all other living Creatures.

Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite.  Therefore there is no Idea,
or conception of anything we call Infinite.  No man can have in
his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive the ends,
and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing,
but of our own inability.  And therefore the Name of GOD is used,
not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his
greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him.
Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived
first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought,
representing any thing, not subject to sense.  No man therefore
can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place;
and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided
into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another
place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one,
and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have,
or can be incident to Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit
(without any signification at all,) from deceived Philosophers,
and deceived, or deceiving Schoolemen.



CHAPTER IV

OF SPEECH


Originall Of Speech
The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the
invention of Letters, is no great matter.  But who was the first that
found the use of Letters, is not known.  He that first brought them into
Greece, men say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia.
A profitable Invention for continuing the memory of time past,
and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant
regions of the Earth; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a
watchfull observation of the divers motions of the Tongue, Palat,
Lips, and other organs of Speech; whereby to make as many differences
of characters, to remember them.  But the most noble and profitable
invention of all other, was that of Speech, consisting of Names or
Apellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts;
recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another
for mutuall utility and conversation; without which, there had been
amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace,
no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves.  The first author
of Speech was GOD himselfe, that instructed Adam how to name such
creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth
no further in this matter.  But this was sufficient to direct him
to adde more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should
give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by degrees,
as to make himselfe understood; and so by succession of time,
so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for;
though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of.
For I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which,
directly or by consequence can be gathered, that Adam was taught
the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies,
Relations; much less the names of Words and Speech, as Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative, Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive,
all which are usefull; and least of all, of Entity, Intentionality,
Quiddity, and other significant words of the School.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity,
was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man
was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language.
And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts
of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that
now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need
(the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time
grew every where more copious.

The Use Of Speech
The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse,
into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words;
and that for two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the
Consequences of our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory,
and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words
as they were marked by.  So that the first use of names, is to serve
for Markes, or Notes of remembrance.  Another is, when many use
the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order,)
one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter;
and also what they desire, feare, or have any other passion for.
and for this use they are called Signes.  Speciall uses of Speech
are these; First, to Register, what by cogitation, wee find to be
the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present
or past may produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts.
Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained;
which is, to Counsell, and Teach one another.  Thirdly, to make known
to others our wills, and purposes, that we may have the mutuall help
of one another.  Fourthly, to please and delight our selves, and others,
by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

Abuses Of Speech
To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses.
First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy
of the signification of their words; by which they register for their
conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves.
Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense
than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others.
Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not.
Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature
hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns,
and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech,
to grieve him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged
to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence
of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names,
and the Connexion of them.

Names Proper & Common
Universall
Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter,
John, This Man, This Tree: and some are Common to many things;
as Man, Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name,
is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of
all which together, it is called an Universall; there being nothing
in the world Universall but Names; for the things named, are every one
of them Individual and Singular.

One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude
in some quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name
bringeth to mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.

And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent;
the larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent,
comprehending each other reciprocally.  As for example, the Name Body
is of larger signification than the word Man, and conprehendeth it;
and the names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending
mutually one another.  But here wee must take notice, that by a Name
is not alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely word; but sometimes
by circumlocution many words together.  For all these words,
Hee That In His Actions Observeth The Lawes Of His Country,
make but one Name, equivalent to this one word, Just.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter
signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of
things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences
of Appellations.  For example, a man that hath no use of Speech
at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,)
if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles,
(such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation
compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equall
to those two right angles that stand by it.  But if another triangle
be shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know
without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be
equall to the same.  But he that hath the use of words, when he observes,
that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides,
nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but onely to this,
that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all,
for which he named it a Triangle; will boldly conclude Universally,
that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever;
and register his invention in these generall termes, Every Triangle Hath
Its Three Angles Equall To Two Right Angles.  And thus the consequence
found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred,
as a Universall rule; and discharges our mentall reckoning,
of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind,
saving the first; and makes that which was found true Here, and Now,
to be true in All Times and Places.

But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing
so evident as in Numbering.  A naturall foole that could never learn
by heart the order of numerall words, as One, Two, and Three,
may observe every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one,
one, one; but can never know what houre it strikes.  And it seems,
there was a time when those names of number were not in use;
and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands,
to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence
it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in any Nation,
and in some but five, and then they begin again.  And he that
can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himselfe,
and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be able to add,
and substract, and performe all other operations of Arithmetique.
So that without words, there is no possibility of reckoning of Numbers;
much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things,
the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being
of man-kind.

When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Affirmation;
as thus, A Man Is A Living Creature; or thus, If He Be A Man,
He Is A Living Creature, If the later name Living Creature,
signifie all that the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation,
or consequence is True; otherwise False.  For True and False are
attributes of Speech, not of things.  And where Speech in not,
there is neither Truth nor Falshood.  Errour there may be,
as when wee expect that which shall not be; or suspect what has not been:
but in neither case can a man be charged with Untruth.

Seeing then that Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names
in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise Truth, had need to
remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly;
or els he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs;
the more he struggles, the more belimed.  And therefore in Geometry,
(which is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow
on mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words;
which settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them
in the beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires
to true Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors;
and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down;
or to make them himselfe.  For the errours of Definitions multiply
themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into
absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning
anew from the beginning; in which lyes the foundation of their errours.
From whence it happens, that they which trust to books, do as they
that cast up many little summs into a greater, without considering
whether those little summes were rightly cast up or not; and at last
finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds,
know not which way to cleere themselves; but spend time in fluttering
over their bookes; as birds that entring by the chimney, and finding
themselves inclosed in a chamber, flitter at the false light of
a glasse window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in.
So that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of Speech;
which is the Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions'
lyes the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets;
which make those men that take their instruction from the authority
of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the
condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true Science are above it.
For between true Science, and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in
the middle.  Naturall sense and imagination, are not subject to absurdity.
Nature it selfe cannot erre: and as men abound in copiousnesse of language;
so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary.  Nor is it possible
without Letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or
(unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs)
excellently foolish.  For words are wise mens counters, they do but
reckon by them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by
the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other
Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

Subject To Names
Subject To Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered
in an account; and be added one to another to make a summe;
or substracted one from another, and leave a remainder.  The Latines
called Accounts of mony Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio:
and that which we in bills or books of account call Items,
they called Nomina; that is, Names: and thence it seems to proceed,
that they extended the word Ratio, to the faculty of Reckoning in
all other things.  The Greeks have but one word Logos, for both Speech
and Reason; not that they thought there was no Speech without Reason;
but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of reasoning they called
syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of
one saying to another.  And because the same things may enter into
account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew that diversity)
diversly wrested, and diversified.  This diversity of names may be
reduced to foure generall heads.

First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as Living,
Sensible, Rationall, Hot, Cold, Moved, Quiet; with all which names
the word Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some
accident or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for Being Moved,
for Being So Long, for Being Hot, &c; and then, of the name of
the thing it selfe, by a little change or wresting, wee make a name
for that accident, which we consider; and for Living put into account
Life; for Moved, Motion; for Hot, Heat; for Long, Length, and the like.
And all such Names, are the names of the accidents and properties,
by which one Matter, and Body is distinguished from another.
These are called Names Abstract; Because Severed (not from Matter, but)
from the account of Matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies,
whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is Seen by us,
we reckon not the thing it selfe; but the Sight, the Colour, the Idea
of it in the fancy: and when any thing is Heard, wee reckon it not;
but the Hearing, or Sound onely, which is our fancy or conception
of it by the Eare: and such are names of fancies.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names,
to Names themselves, and to Speeches: For, Generall, Universall,
Speciall, Oequivocall, are names of Names.  And Affirmation,
Interrogation, Commandement, Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration,
and many other such, are names of Speeches.

Use Of Names Positive
And this is all the variety of Names Positive; which are put to mark
somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man,
as Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies,
the Properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.

Negative Names With Their Uses.
There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to signifie
that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words
Nothing, No Man, Infinite, Indocible, Three Want Foure, and the like;
which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning;
and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of
any thing; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not rightly used.

Words Insignificant
All other names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts.
One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by Definition;
whereof there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men,
and pusled Philosophers.

Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations
are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an Incorporeall Body,
or (which is all one) an Incorporeall Substance, and a great number more.
For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which
it is composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all.
For example if it be a false affirmation to say A Quadrangle Is Round,
the word Round Quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a meere sound.
So likewise if it be false, to say that vertue can be powred,
or blown up and down; the words In-powred Vertue, In-blown Vertue,
are as absurd and insignificant, as a Round Quadrangle.  And therefore
you shall hardly meet with a senselesse and insignificant word,
that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names.  A Frenchman seldome
hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole, but by the name
of Verbe often; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more, but that
one is Latin, the other French.

Understanding
When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts
which the words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained
and constituted to signifie; Then he is said to understand it;
Understanding being nothing els, but conception caused by Speech.
And therefore if Speech be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,)
then is Understanding peculiar to him also.  And therefore of absurd
and false affirmations, in case they be universall, there can be
no Understanding; though many think they understand, then, when they
do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.

What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and
Passions of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak
when I have spoken of the Passions.

Inconstant Names
The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please,
and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with
the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common
discourses of men, of Inconstant signification.  For seeing all names
are imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all our affections
are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently,
we can hardly avoyd different naming of them.  For though the nature of
that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it,
in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion,
gives everything a tincture of our different passions.  And therefore
in reasoning, a man bust take heed of words; which besides the
signification of what we imagine of their nature, disposition,
and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of Vertues,
and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth Feare;
and one Cruelty, what another Justice; one Prodigality, what another
Magnanimity; one Gravity, what another Stupidity, &c.  And therefore
such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination.  No more can
Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous,
because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not.



CHAPTER V.

OF REASON, AND SCIENCE.


Reason What It Is
When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing els but conceive a summe totall,
from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from Substraction
of one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,)
is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts,
to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one
part, to the name of the other part.  And though in some things,
(as in numbers,) besides Adding and Substracting, men name other
operations, as Multiplying and Dividing; yet they are the same;
for Multiplication, is but Addition together of things equall;
and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as often as we can.
These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to
all manner of things that can be added together, and taken
one out of another.  For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and
substract in Numbers; so the Geometricians teach the same in Lines,
Figures (solid and superficiall,) Angles, Proportions, Times,
degrees of Swiftnesse, Force, Power, and the like;  The Logicians
teach the same in Consequences Of Words; adding together Two Names,
to make an Affirmation; and  Two Affirmations, to make a syllogisme;
and Many syllogismes to make a Demonstration; and from the Summe,
or Conclusion of a syllogisme, they substract one Proposition,
to finde the other.  Writers of Politiques, adde together Pactions,
to find mens Duties; and Lawyers, Lawes and Facts, to find what
is Right and Wrong in the actions of private men.  In summe, in what
matter soever there is place for Addition and Substraction,
there also is place for Reason; and where these have no place,
there Reason has nothing at all to do.

Reason Defined
Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,)
what that is, which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it
amongst the Faculties of the mind.  For Reason, in this sense,
is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the
Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the Marking and
Signifying of our thoughts; I say Marking them, when we reckon
by our selves; and Signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our
reckonings to other men.

Right Reason Where
And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors
themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any
other subject of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most
practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions;
Not but that Reason it selfe is always Right Reason, as well as
Arithmetique is a certain and infallible art: But no one mans Reason,
nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie;
no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great
many men have unanimously approved it.  And therfore, as when
there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their
own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator,
or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their
controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided,
for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also
in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think themselves
wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge;
yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other
mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men,
as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion,
that suite whereof they have most in their hand.  For they do nothing els,
that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them,
to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies:
bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it.

The Use Of Reason
The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe,
and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first
definitions, and settled significations of names; but to begin
at these; and proceed from one consequence to another.  For there can
be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those
Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred.
As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up
the summs of all the bills of expence, into one sum; and not regarding
how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account;
nor what it is he payes for; he advantages himselfe no more,
than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every
of the accountants skill and honesty; so also in Reasoning of
all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors,
and doth not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning,
(which are the significations of names settled by definitions),
loses his labour; and does not know any thing; but onely beleeveth.

Of Error And Absurdity
When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done
in particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing,
wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely
to follow upon it;) if that which he thought likely to follow,
followes not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it,
hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR; to which even the most
prudent men are subject.  But when we Reason in Words of generall
signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is false;
though it be commonly called Error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY,
or senseless Speech.  For Error is but a deception, in presuming
that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past,
or not to come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable.
But when we make a generall assertion, unlesse it be a true one,
the possibility of it is unconceivable.  And words whereby
we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd,
insignificant, and Non-sense.  And therefore if a man should
talk to me of a Round Quadrangle; or Accidents Of Bread In Cheese;
or Immaterial Substances; or of A Free Subject; A Free Will;
or any Free, but free from being hindred by opposition, I should not
say he were in an Errour; but that his words were without meaning;
that is to say, Absurd.

I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell
all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any
thing whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it,
and what effects he could do with it.  And now I adde this other
degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the
consequences he findes to generall Rules, called Theoremes,
or Aphorismes; that is, he can Reason, or reckon, not onely in number;
but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted
from another.

But this priviledge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the
priviledge of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject,
but man onely.  And of men, those are of all most subject to it,
that professe Philosophy.  For it is most true that Cicero sayth
of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be
found in the books of Philosophers.  And the reason is manifest.
For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from
the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use;
which is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose
Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.

Causes Of Absurditie
The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method;
in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that is,
from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account,
without knowing the value of the numerall words, One, Two, and Three.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations,
(which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations
being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion,
and unfit connexion of their names into assertions.  And therefore

The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving
of names of Bodies, to Accidents; or of Accidents, to Bodies;
As they do, that say, Faith Is Infused, or Inspired; when nothing
can be Powred, or Breathed into any thing, but body; and that,
Extension is Body; that Phantasmes are Spirits, &c.

The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the Accidents
of Bodies Without Us, to the Accidents of our Own Bodies;
as they do that say, the Colour Is In The Body; The Sound Is In The Ayre, &c.

The fourth, to the giving of the names of Bodies, to Names,
or Speeches; as they do that say, that There Be Things Universall;
that A Living Creature Is Genus, or A Generall Thing, &c.

The fifth, to the giving of the names of Accidents, to Names and Speeches;
as they do that say, The Nature Of A Thing Is In Its Definition;
A Mans Command Is His Will; and the like.

The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures,
in stead of words proper.  For though it be lawfull to say, (for example)
in common speech, The Way Goeth, Or Leadeth Hither, Or Thither,
The Proverb Sayes This Or That (whereas wayes cannot go,
nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth,
such speeches are not to be admitted.

The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up,
and learned by rote from the Schooles, as Hypostatical, Transubstantiate, Consubstantiate, Eternal-now, and the like canting of Schoole-men.

To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall
into any absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account;
wherein he may perhaps forget what went before.  For all men
by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles.
For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to
persist in it, when another detects his error to him?

Science
By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory,
borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence is;
but attayned by Industry; first in apt imposing of Names;
and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding
from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connexion
of one of them to another; and so to syllogismes, which are the
Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge
of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand;
and that is it, men call SCIENCE.  And whereas Sense and Memory are
but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable;
Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one
fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do,
we know how to do something els when we will, or the like,
another time; Because when we see how any thing comes about,
upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come
into our power, wee see how to make it produce the like effects.

Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have
attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures,
for the possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come.
And the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a
little way, as in numbring to some degree; yet it serves them
to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves,
some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience,
quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to severall ends; but specially
according to good or evill fortune, and the errors of one another.
For as for Science, or certain rules of their actions, they are
so farre from it, that they know not what it is.  Geometry they have
thought Conjuring: but for other Sciences, they who have not been
taught the beginnings, and some progresse in them, that they may see
how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children,
that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women,
that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition
with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning,
or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd
generall rules.  For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set
men so farre out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking
for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather
causes of the contrary.

To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by
exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity;
Reason is the Pace; Encrease of Science, the Way; and the Benefit
of man-kind, the End.  And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse
and ambiguous words, are like Ignes Fatui; and reasoning upon them,
is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end,
contention, and sedition, or contempt.

Prudence & Sapience, With Their Difference
As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience.
For though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both;
yet the Latines did always distinguish between Prudentia and
Sapientia, ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science.
But to make their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose
one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity
in handling his armes; and another to have added to that dexterity,
an acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be offended by
his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability of
the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to
Sapience; both usefull; but the later infallible.  But they that
trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly,
are like him that trusting to the false rules of the master of fence,
ventures praesumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills,
or disgraces him.

Signes Of Science
The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain.
Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach
the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously
to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer
to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must.
Signes of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience,
and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible.
But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to
proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgement, and be guided by
generall sentences read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions,
is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry.
And even of those men themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth,
love to shew their reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in
their domestique affaires, where their particular interest is concerned;
having Prudence enough for their private affaires: but in publique
they study more the reputation of their owne wit, than the successe
of anothers businesse.



CHAPTER VI

OF THE INTERIOUR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS; COMMONLY CALLED
THE PASSIONS.  AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED.


Motion Vitall And Animal
There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them:
One called Vitall; begun in generation, and continued without
interruption through their whole life; such as are the Course
of the Bloud, the Pulse, the Breathing, the Concoctions, Nutrition,
Excretion, &c; to which Motions there needs no help of Imagination:
The other in Animal Motion, otherwise called Voluntary Motion;
as to Go, to Speak, to Move any of our limbes, in such manner as
is first fancied in our minds.  That Sense, is Motion in the organs
and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things
we See, Heare, &c.; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same
Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first
and second Chapters.  And because Going, Speaking, and the like
Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of
Whither, Which Way, and What; it is evident, that the Imagination is
the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion.  And although
unstudied men, doe not conceive any motion at all to be there,
where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in,
is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder,
but that such Motions are.  For let a space be never so little,
that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one
is part, must first be moved over that.  These small beginnings
of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking,
speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly
called ENDEAVOUR.

Endeavour
Appetite  Desire
Hunger  Thirst  Aversion
This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it,
is called APPETITE, or DESIRE; the later, being the generall name;
and the other, oftentimes restrayned to signifie the Desire of Food,
namely Hunger and Thirst.  And when the Endeavour is fromward
something, it is generally called AVERSION.  These words Appetite,
and Aversion we have from the Latines; and they both of them
signifie the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring.
So also do the Greek words for the same, which are orme and aphorme.
For nature it selfe does often presse upon men those truths,
which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature,
they stumble at.  For the Schooles find in meere Appetite to go,
or move, no actuall Motion at all: but because some Motion they
must acknowledge, they call it Metaphoricall Motion; which is but
an absurd speech; for though Words may be called metaphoricall;
Bodies, and Motions cannot.

That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE; and to HATE
those things, for which they have Aversion.  So that Desire,
and Love, are the same thing; save that by Desire, we alwayes signifie
the Absence of the object; by Love, most commonly the Presence
of the same.  So also by Aversion, we signifie the Absence; and by Hate,
the Presence of the Object.

Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of food,
Appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more properly
be called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies;) and
some other Appetites, not many.  The rest, which are Appetites of
particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects
upon themselves, or other men.  For of things wee know not at all,
or believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try.
But Aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us;
but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Contempt
Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to Contemne:
CONTEMPT being nothing els but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart,
in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that
the Heart is already moved otherwise, by either more potent objects;
or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation;
it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him
the same Appetites, and aversions: much lesse can all men consent,
in the Desire of almost any one and the same Object.

Good  Evill
But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it,
which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate,
and Aversion, evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable.
For these words of Good, evill, and Contemptible, are ever used
with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing
simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and evill,
to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from
the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or,
(in a Common-wealth,) From the Person that representeth it;
or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by
consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.

Pulchrum  Turpe
Delightfull  Profitable
Unpleasant  Unprofitable
The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach
to those of Good and Evill; but are not precisely the same;
And those are Pulchrum and Turpe.  Whereof the former signifies that,
which by some apparent signes promiseth Good; and the later,
that, which promiseth evill.  But in our Tongue we have not so
generall names to expresse them by.  But for Pulchrum, we say in
some things, Fayre; in other Beautifull, or Handsome, or Gallant,
or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for Turpe, Foule, Deformed,
Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require;
All which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els,
but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and evill.
So that of Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise,
that is Pulchrum; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called
Jucundum, Delightfull; and Good as the Means, which is called Utile,
Profitable; and as many of evill: For evill, in Promise, is that
they call Turpe; evill in Effect, and End, is Molestum, Unpleasant,
Troublesome; and evill in the Means, Inutile, Unprofitable, Hurtfull.

Delight  Displeasure
As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (As I have sayd before)
onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence;
to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill,
Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from
the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the real effect there
is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite,
or Aversion, to, or from the object moving.  But the apparence, or sense
of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.

Pleasure  Offence
This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it
Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion,
and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight,
were not improperly called Jucunda, (A Juvando,) from helping or
fortifying; and the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from hindering,
and troubling the motion vitall.

Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good;
and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evill.
And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied
with some Delight more or lesse; and all Hatred, and Aversion,
with more or lesse Displeasure and Offence.

Pleasures Of Sense
Pleasures Of The Mind
Joy  Paine  Griefe
Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present;
And those may be called Pleasures Of Sense, (The word Sensuall,
as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place
till there be Lawes.)   Of this kind are all Onerations and Exonerations
of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing,
Smell, Tast, Or Touch; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds
from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things
in the Sense Please or Displease: And these are Pleasures Of The Mind
of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called JOY.
In the like manner, Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE;
others, in the Expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEFE.

These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate,
Joy, and griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified.
As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from
the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire.
Secondly, from the object loved or hated.  Thirdly, from the
consideration of many of them together.  Fourthly, from the Alteration
or succession it selfe.

Hope
For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.

Despaire
The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.

Feare
Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.

Courage
The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistance, COURAGE.

Anger
Sudden Courage, ANGER.

Confidence
Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.

Diffidence
Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.

Indignation
Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same
to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.

Benevolence
Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY.
If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.

Covetousnesse
Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used alwayes in signification
of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one
anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed,
or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are sought.

Ambition
Desire of Office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also in
the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Pusillanimity
Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; And fear of
things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.

Magnanimity
Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.

Valour
Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.

Liberality
Magnanimity in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY

Miserablenesse
Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE, MISERABLENESSE; or PARSIMONY;
as it is liked or disliked.

Kindnesse
Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.

Naturall Lust
Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURAL LUST.

Luxury
Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is Imagination of
Pleasure past, LUXURY.

The Passion Of Love
Jealousie
Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved,
THE PASSION OF LOVE.  The same, with fear that the love is not
mutuall, JEALOUSIE.

Revengefulnesse
Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact
of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.

Curiosity
Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living
creature but Man; so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason;
but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the
appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance,
take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind,
that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable
generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any
carnall Pleasure.

Religion  Superstition
True Religion
Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined
from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, superstition.
And when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.

Panique  Terrour
Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE TERROR;
called so from the fables that make Pan the author of them;
whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first,
some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example;
every one supposing his fellow to know why.  And therefore this Passion
happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Admiration
Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to man,
because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Glory  Vaine-glory
Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability,
is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which,
if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions,
is the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others,
or onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it,
is called VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a
well-grounded Confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of
power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.

Dejection
Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection of mind.

The Vaine-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing
of abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident
to young men, and nourished by the Histories or Fictions of
Gallant Persons; and is corrected often times by Age, and Employment.

Sudden Glory  Laughter
Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called LAUGHTER;
and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them;
or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison
whereof they suddenly applaud themselves.  And it is incident most to them,
that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced
to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections
of other men.  And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others is a
signe of Pusillanimity.  For of great minds, one of the proper workes is,
to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely
with the most able.

Sudden Dejection  Weeping
On the contrary, Sudden Dejection is the passion that causeth
WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some
vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and they are most
subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are
Women, and Children.  Therefore, some Weep for the loss of Friends;
Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made to
their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation.  But in all cases, both
Laughter and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away.
For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.

Shame  Blushing
Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability is SHAME,
or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and consisteth
in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men,
is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable:
in old men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late,
not commendable.

Impudence
The Contempt of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Pitty
Griefe, for the calamity of another is PITTY; and ariseth from
the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe;
and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this
present time a FELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for Calamity arriving
from great wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty;
and for the same Calamity, those have least Pitty, that think
themselves least obnoxious to the same.

Cruelty
Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which
men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune.
For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens' great harmes,
without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Emulation  Envy
Griefe, for the success of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or other
good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to
equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joyned with Endeavour to
supplant or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.

Deliberation
When in the mind of man, Appetites and Aversions, Hopes and Feares,
concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good
and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded,
come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an
Appetite to it, sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be
able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole sum
of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Feares, continued till the thing be
either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.

Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because
manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to
be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such
Deliberation vaine.  But of things impossible, which we think possible,
we may Deliberate; not knowing it is in vain.  And it is called
DELIBERATION; because it is a putting an end to the Liberty we had
of doing, or omitting, according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.

This alternate succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Feares
is no less in other living Creatures than in Man; and therefore
Beasts also Deliberate.

Every Deliberation is then sayd to End when that whereof they
Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then
wee retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our
Appetite, or Aversion.

The Will
In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately
adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that
wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing.
And Beasts that have Deliberation must necessarily also have Will.
The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the Schooles,
that it is a Rationall Appetite, is not good.  For if it were,
then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason.  For a Voluntary Act
is that, which proceedeth from the Will, and no other.  But if in stead
of a Rationall Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from
a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I
have given here.  Will, therefore, Is The Last Appetite In Deliberating.
And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to
do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to do; yet that is
properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary;
because the action depends not of it, but of the last Inclination,
or Appetite.  For if the intervenient Appetites make any action Voluntary,
then by the same reason all intervenient Aversions should make
the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action should be
both Voluntary & Involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their
beginning from Covetousness, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites
to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning
from Aversion, or Feare of those consequences that follow the omission,
are Voluntary Actions.

Formes Of Speech, In Passion
The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed,
are partly the same, and partly different from those, by which we
express our Thoughts.  And first generally all Passions may be
expressed Indicatively; as, I Love, I Feare, I Joy, I Deliberate,
I Will, I Command: but some of them have particular expressions
by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be
when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the Passion
they proceed from.  Deliberation is expressed Subjunctively;
which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their
consequences; as, If This Be Done, Then This Will Follow;
and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that
Reasoning is in generall words, but Deliberation for the most part
is of Particulars.  The language of Desire, and Aversion,
is Imperative; as, Do This, Forbear That; which when the party
is obliged to do, or forbear, is Command; otherwise Prayer;
or els Counsell.  The language of Vaine-Glory, of Indignation,
Pitty and Revengefulness, Optative: but of the Desire to know,
there is a peculiar expression called Interrogative; as, What Is It,
When Shall It, How Is It Done, and Why So?  Other language of
the Passions I find none: for Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like,
do not signifie as Speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

These forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary
significations of our Passions: but certain signes they be not;
because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them,
have such Passions or not.  The best signes of Passions present,
are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions,
and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.

Good And Evill Apparent
And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised
by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the
action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof
dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences,
of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end.  But for so
far as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences be greater
than the evill, the whole chain is that which Writers call Apparent
or Seeming Good.  And contrarily, when the evill exceedeth the good,
the whole is Apparent or Seeming Evill: so that he who hath by Experience,
or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences,
Deliberates best himself; and is able, when he will, to give the
best counsel unto others.

Felicity
Continual Successe in obtaining those things which a man from
time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering,
is that men call FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life.
For there is no such thing as perpetual Tranquillity of mind,
while we live here; because Life itself is but Motion, and can never
be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense.
What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him,
a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys, that now are
as incomprehensible, as the word of School-men, Beatifical Vision,
is unintelligible.

Praise  Magnification
The form of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse
of anything is PRAISE.  That whereby they signifie the power and
greatness of anything is MAGNIFYING.  And that whereby they signifie the
opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called
Makarismos, for which we have no name in our tongue.  And thus much
is sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the
passions.


CHAPTER VII

OF THE ENDS OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE


Of all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last
an End, either by attaining, or by giving over.  And in the chain of
Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.

Judgement, or Sentence Final
Doubt
If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts
that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been,
and has not been, alternately.  So that wheresoever you break off
the chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption
of It Will Be, or, It Will Not Be; or it Has Been, or, Has Not Been.
All which is Opinion.  And that which is alternate Appetite,
in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil, the same is alternate
Opinion in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future.
And as the last Appetite in Deliberation is called the Will,
so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future,
is called the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Final Sentence of him
that Discourseth.  And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate,
in the question of Good or Bad is called Deliberation; so the whole
chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False
is called DOUBT.

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact,
past, or to come.  For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally,
Sense; and ever after, Memory.  And for the knowledge of consequence,
which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute,
but Conditionall.  No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that,
is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that
if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be,
That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the
consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing,
to another name of the same thing.

Science  Opinion  Conscience
And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins
with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same
into general Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes,
the end or last sum is called the Conclusion; and the thought
of the mind by it signified is that conditional Knowledge,
or Knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called Science.
But if the first ground of such Discourse be not Definitions,
or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes,
then the End or Conclusion is again OPINION, namely of the truth
of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words,
without possibility of being understood.  When two, or more men,
know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it
one to another; which is as much as to know it together.
And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another,
or of a third, it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act,
for any man to speak against his Conscience; or to corrupt or force
another so to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always
hearkened unto very diligently in all times.  Afterwards, men made use
of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own
secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically
said that the Conscience is a thousand witnesses.  And last of all,
men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, (though never
so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those
their opinions also that reverenced name of Conscience, as if they
would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak against them;
and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most
but that they think so.

Beliefe  Faith
When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth
either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still
called Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another,
of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving,
he doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning
the Thing, as the Person; And the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH:
Faith, In the man; Beleefe, both Of the man, and Of the truth of
what he sayes.  So then in Beleefe are two opinions; one of
the saying of the man; the other of his vertue.  To Have Faith In,
or Trust To, or Beleeve A Man, signifie the same thing; namely,
an opinion of the veracity of the man: But to Beleeve What Is Said,
signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying.  But wee are
to observe that this Phrase, I Beleeve In; as also the Latine, Credo In;
and the Greek, Pisteno Eis, are never used but in the writings
of Divines.  In stead of them, in other writings are put, I Beleeve Him;
I Have Faith In Him; I Rely On Him: and in Latin, Credo Illi; Fido Illi:
and in Greek, Pisteno Anto: and that this singularity of the
Ecclesiastical use of the word hath raised many disputes about the
right object of the Christian Faith.

But by Beleeving In, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust
in the Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine.
For not onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God,
as to hold all for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it,
or not; which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any
person whatsoever: But they do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.

From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying
whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from
the thing it selfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason,
but from the Authority, and good opinion wee have, of him that
hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in,
and whose word we take, the object of our Faith; and the Honour done
in Believing, is done to him onely.  And consequently, when wee Believe
that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation
from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith, and Trust is in the Church;
whose word we take, and acquiesce therein.  And they that believe that
which a Prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word
of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe,
touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true,
or a false Prophet.  And so it is also with all other History.
For if I should not believe all that is written By Historians,
of the glorious acts of Alexander, or Caesar; I do not think the
Ghost of Alexander, or Caesar, had any just cause to be offended;
or any body else, but the Historian.  If Livy say the Gods made once a
Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy.
So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason,
than what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings;
whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.



CHAPTER VIII

OF THE VERTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL;
AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS


Intellectuall Vertue Defined
Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is
valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison.  For if all
things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized.
And by Vertues INTELLECTUALL, are always understood such abilityes
of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves;
and go commonly under the name of a Good Witte; though the same word
Witte, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.

Wit, Naturall, Or Acquired
These Vertues are of two sorts; Naturall, and Acquired.  By Naturall,
I mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing
else but Sense; wherein men differ so little one from another,
and from brute Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues.
But I mean, that Witte, which is gotten by Use onely, and Experience;
without Method, Culture, or Instruction.  This NATURALL WITTE,
consisteth principally in two things; Celerity Of Imagining,
(that is, swift succession of one thought to another;) and Steddy
Direction to some approved end.  On the Contrary a slow Imagination,
maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly
called DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes by other names that
signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.

Good Wit, Or Fancy
Good Judgement
Discretion
And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of
mens passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another:
and therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another:
and are held to, and observe differently the things that passe
through their imagination.  And whereas in his succession of mens thoughts,
there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either
in what they be Like One Another, or in what they be Unlike,
or What They Serve For, or How They Serve To Such A Purpose;
Those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are
but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a Good Wit; by which,
in this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy.  But they that observe
their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called Distinguishing,
and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in case,
such discerning be not easie, are said to have a Good Judgement:
and particularly in matter of conversation and businesse; wherein,
times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is
called DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy, without the help
of Judgement, is not commended as a Vertue: but the later which
is Judgement, and Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without
the help of Fancy.  Besides the Discretion of times, places,
and persons, necessary to a good Fancy, there is required also an
often application of his thoughts to their End; that is to say,
to some use to be made of them.  This done; he that hath this Vertue,
will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not onely by
illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors;
but also, by the rarity or their invention.  But without Steddinesse,
and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse;
such as they have, that entring into any discourse, are snatched
from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought,
into so many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that they
utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular
name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience;
whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others:
sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other
men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore
thought fit to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended
way of his discourse.

In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique; as also
in Sonnets, Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy
are required: But the Fancy must be more eminent; because they please
for the Extravagancy; but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.

In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the
goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse
of the actions that are most profitable to be known.  Fancy has no place,
but onely in adorning the stile.

In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is praedominant;
because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour;
which is done by noble, or by vile comparisons.  The Judgement does but
suggest what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.

In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best
to the Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.

In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth,
Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need
to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much
use of Fancy.  But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded.
For seeing they openly professe deceipt; to admit them into Councell,
or Reasoning, were manifest folly.

And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be apparent,
how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will be
taken for a signe of want of wit; and so will it never when the
Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane,
clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame;
which verball discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall
approve of the Time, Place, and Persons.  An Anatomist, or a Physitian
may speak, or write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not
to please, but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant,
and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled
into the dirt, should come and present himselfe before good company.
And 'tis the want of Discretion that makes the difference.
Again, in profest remissnesse of mind, and familiar company,
a man may play with the sounds, and aequivocal significations of words;
and that many times with encounters of extraordinary Fancy:
but in a Sermon, or in publique, or before persons unknown,
or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Gingling of words that
will not be accounted folly: and the difference is onely in the
want of Discretion.  So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy
that is wanting, but Discretion.  Judgement therefore without
Fancy is Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.

Prudence
When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over
a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe;
or what designe they may conduce into; if his observations be such
as are not easie, or usuall, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE;
and dependeth on much Experience, and Memory of the like things,
and their consequences heretofore.  In which there is not so much
difference of Men, as there is in their Fancies and Judgements;
Because the Experience of men equall in age, is not much unequall,
as to the quantity; but lyes in different occasions; every one having
his private designes.  To govern well a family, and a kingdome,
are not different degrees of Prudence; but different sorts of businesse;
no more then to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater
then the life, are different degrees of Art.  A plain husband-man
is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy Counseller
in the affaires of another man.

Craft
To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means,
such as usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have
that Crooked Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is a signe
of Pusillanimity.  For Magnanimity is contempt of unjust,
or dishonest helps.  And that which the Latines Call Versutia,
(translated into English, Shifting,) and is a putting off of
a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater,
as when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted Craft,
called Versutia, from Versura, which signifies taking mony at usurie,
for the present payment of interest.

Acquired Wit
As for Acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,)
there is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech;
and produceth the Sciences.  But of Reason and Science, I have
already spoken in the fifth and sixth Chapters.

The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions:
and the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different
Constitution of the body, and partly from different Education.
For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain,
and the organs of Sense, either exterior or interior, there would be
no lesse difference of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other Senses,
than in their Fancies, and Discretions.  It proceeds therefore
from the Passions; which are different, not onely from the
difference of mens complexions; but also from their difference
of customes, and education.

The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit,
are principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches,
of Knowledge, and of Honour.  All which may be reduced to the first,
that is Desire of Power.  For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but
severall sorts of Power.

Giddinesse  Madnesse
And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things;
but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man,
as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either
a great Fancy, or much Judgement.  For the Thoughts, are to the Desires,
as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the
things Desired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse
of the same, proceeding from thence.  For as to have no Desire,
is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have
Passions indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, and Distraction;
and to have stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing,
than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESSE.

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves.
Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from
the evill constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them;
and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by
the vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion.  But in both cases
the Madnesse is of one and the same nature.

The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse,
is either great Vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride,
and Selfe-Conceipt; or great Dejection of mind.

Rage
Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse
called RAGE, and FURY.  And thus it comes to passe that excessive
desire of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs,
and becomes Rage: That excessive love, with jealousie, becomes also Rage:
Excessive opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration,
for wisdome, learning, forme, and the like, becomes Distraction,
and Giddinesse: the same, joyned with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion
of the truth of any thing, contradicted by others, Rage.

Melancholy
Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse
commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners;
as in haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour;
and in fearing some one, some another particular thing.  In summe,
all Passions that produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called
by the generall name of Madnesse.  But of the severall kinds of Madnesse,
he that would take the paines, might enrowle a legion.  And if the
Excesses be madnesse, there is no doubt but the Passions themselves,
when they tend to Evill, are degrees of the same.

(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed
of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man,
by any very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion;
yet when many of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude
is visible enough.  For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater,
than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends?
Yet this is somewhat lesse than such a multitude will do.  For they
will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their
lifetime before, they have been protected, and secured from injury.
And if this be Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every
particular man.  For as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive
no sound of that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured,
that part contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea,
as any other part, of the same quantity: so also, thought wee
perceive no great unquietnesse, in one, or two men; yet we may be
well assured, that their singular Passions, are parts of the Seditious
roaring of a troubled Nation.  And if there were nothing else that
bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very arrogating such inspiration
to themselves, is argument enough.  If some man in Bedlam should
entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave,
to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility;
and he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect
no extravagant action for argument of his Madnesse.

This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit,
begins very often, from some lucky finding of an Errour generally
held by others; and not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct
of reason, they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it,
though it be many times an untruth they light on,) they presently
admire themselves; as being in the speciall grace of God Almighty,
who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.

Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion,
may be gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with
those of the evill disposition of the organs.  For the variety of
behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that
of Mad-men: some of them Raging, others Loving, others laughing,
all extravagantly, but according to their severall domineering Passions:
For the effect of the wine, does but remove Dissimulation;
and take from them the sight of the deformity of their Passions.
For, (I believe) the most sober men, when they walk alone without
care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and
Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publiquely seen:
which is a confession, that Passions unguided, are for the most part
meere Madnesse.

The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages,
concerning the cause of madnesse, have been two.  Some, deriving
them from the Passions; some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good,
or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possesse him,
and move his organs is such strange, and uncouth manner, as mad-men
use to do.  The former sort therefore, called such men, Mad-men:
but the Later, called them sometimes Daemoniacks, (that is,
possessed with spirits;) sometimes Energumeni, (that is agitated,
or moved with spirits;) and now in Italy they are called not onely Pazzi,
Mad-men; but also Spiritati, men possest.

There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the Greeks,
at the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extream hot day:
whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into Fevers,
had this accident from the heat, and from The Tragedy together,
that they did nothing but pronounce Iambiques, with the names of
Perseus and Andromeda; which together with the Fever, was cured,
by the comming on of Winter: And this madnesse was thought to proceed
from the Passion imprinted by the Tragedy.  Likewise there raigned
a fit of madnesse in another Graecian city, which seized onely
the young Maidens; and caused many of them to hang themselves.
This was by most then thought an act of the Divel.  But one that
suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed from some
Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not contemne also
their honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to strip such as
so hang'd themselves, and let them hang out naked.  This the story
sayes cured that madnesse.  But on the other side, the same Graecians,
did often ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the Eumenides,
or Furyes; and sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other Gods:
so much did men attribute to Phantasmes, as to think them aereal
living bodies; and generally to call them Spirits.  And as the Romans
in this, held the same opinion with the Greeks: so also did the Jewes;
For they calle mad-men Prophets, or (according as they thought the
spirits good or bad) Daemoniacks; and some of them called both Prophets,
and Daemoniacks, mad-men; and some called the same man both Daemoniack,
and mad-man.  But for the Gentiles, 'tis no wonder; because Diseases,
and Health; Vices, and Vertues; and many naturall accidents,
were with them termed, and worshipped as Daemons.  So that a man
was to understand by Daemon, as well (sometimes) an Ague, as a Divell.
But for the Jewes to have such opinion, is somewhat strange.
For neither Moses, nor Abraham pretended to Prophecy by possession
of a Spirit; but from the voyce of God; or by a Vision or Dream:
Nor is there any thing in his Law, Morall, or Ceremoniall, by which
they were taught, there was any such Enthusiasme; or any Possession.
When God is sayd, (Numb. 11. 25.) to take from the Spirit that was
in Moses, and give it to the 70. Elders, the Spirit of God (taking it
for the substance of God) is not divided.  The Scriptures by the
Spirit of God in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined to Godlinesse.
And where it is said (Exod. 28. 3.) "Whom I have filled with the
Spirit of wisdome to make garments for Aaron," is not meant a spirit
put into them, that can make garments; but the wisdome of their own
spirits in that kind of work.  In the like sense, the spirit of man,
when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit;
and so other spirits, though not alwayes, yet as often as the vertue
or vice so stiled, is extraordinary, and Eminent.  Neither did the
other Prophets of the old Testament pretend Enthusiasme; or,
that God spake in them; but to them by Voyce, Vision, or Dream;
and the Burthen Of The Lord was not Possession, but Command.
How then could the Jewes fall into this opinion of possession?
I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men;
namely, the want of curiosity to search naturall causes; and their
placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the grosse pleasures of
the Senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto.
For they that see any strange, and unusuall ability, or defect in
a mans mind; unlesse they see withall, from what cause it may
probably proceed, can hardly think it naturall; and if not naturall,
they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it be,
but that either God, or the Divell is in him?  And hence it came to passe,
when our Saviour (Mark 3.21.) was compassed about with the multitude,
those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him:
but the Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he
cast out divels; as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser.
And that (John 10. 20.) some said, "He hath a Divell, and is mad;"
whereas others holding him for a Prophet, sayd, "These are not
the words of one that hath a Divell."  So in the old Testament
he that came to anoynt Jehu, (2 Kings 9.11.) was a Prophet;
but some of the company asked Jehu, "What came that mad-man for?"
So that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himselfe
in extraordinary manner, was thought by the Jewes to be possessed
either with a good, or evill spirit; except by the Sadduces,
who erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were
at all any spirits, (which is very neere to direct Atheisme;)
and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to terme such
men Daemoniacks, rather than mad-men.

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them,
as if they were possest; and not as if they were mad.  To which
I can give no other kind of answer, but that which is given to
those that urge the Scripture in like manner against the opinion
of the motion of the Earth.  The Scripture was written to shew
unto men the kingdome of God; and to prepare their mindes to become
his obedient subjects; leaving the world, and the Philosophy thereof,
to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their naturall Reason.
Whether the Earths, or Suns motion make the day, and night; or whether
the Exorbitant actions of men, proceed from Passion, or from the Divell,
(so we worship him not) it is all one, as to our obedience,
and subjection to God Almighty; which is the thing for which the
Scripture was written.  As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease,
as to a person; it is the usuall phrase of all that cure by words onely,
as Christ did, (and Inchanters pretend to do, whether they speak
to a Divel or not.)  For is not Christ also said (Math. 8.26.)
to have rebuked the winds?  Is not he said also (Luk. 4. 39.)
to rebuke a Fever?  Yet this does not argue that a Fever is a Divel.
And whereas many of these Divels are said to confesse Christ;
it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that
those mad-men confessed him.  And whereas our Saviour (Math. 12. 43.)
speaketh of an unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man,
wandreth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none;
and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse
than himselfe; It is manifestly a Parable, alluding to a man,
that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished
by the strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than he was.
So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a beliefe,
that Daemoniacks were any other thing but Mad-men.

Insignificant Speech
There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men;
which may also be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely,
that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter,
by the Name of Absurdity.  And that is, when men speak such words,
as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen
upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received,
and repeat by rote; by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity.
And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions
of matters incomprehensible, as the Schoole-men; or in questions
of abstruse Philosophy.  The common sort of men seldome speak
Insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other Egregious persons
counted Idiots.  But to be assured their words are without any thing
correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some Examples;
which if any man require, let him take a Schoole-man into his hands,
and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point;
as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; Transubstantiation;
Free-will. &c. into any of the moderne tongues, so as to make
the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latine, such as they
were acquainted withall, that lived when the Latine tongue was Vulgar.
What is the meaning of these words.  "The first cause does not
necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the Essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to worke?"
They are the Translation of the Title of the sixth chapter of
Suarez first Booke, Of The Concourse, Motion, And Help Of God.
When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad,
or intend to make others so?  And particularly, in the question of
Transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken, they that say,
the White-nesse, Round-nesse, Magni-tude, Quali-ty, Corruptibili-ty,
all which are incorporeall, &c. go out of the Wafer, into the Body
of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those Nesses, Tudes and Ties,
to be so many spirits possessing his body?  For by Spirits,
they mean alwayes things, that being incorporeall, are neverthelesse
moveable from one place to another.  So that this kind of Absurdity,
may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of Madnesse;
and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of their worldly lust,
they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucide Intervals.
And thus much of the Vertues and Defects Intellectuall.



CHAPTER IX

OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE


There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Knowledge Of Fact:
the other Knowledge Of The Consequence Of One Affirmation To Another.
The former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is Absolute
Knowledge; as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done:
And this is the Knowledge required in a Witnesse.  The later is
called Science; and is Conditionall; as when we know, that,
If The Figure Showne Be A Circle, Then Any Straight Line Through
The Centre Shall Divide It Into Two Equall Parts.  And this is
the Knowledge required in a Philosopher; that is to say, of him
that pretends to Reasoning.

The Register of Knowledge Of Fact is called History.  Whereof there be
two sorts: one called Naturall History; which is the History of
such Facts, or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans Will;
Such as are the Histories of Metals, Plants, Animals, Regions,
and the like.  The other, is Civill History; which is the History of
the Voluntary Actions of men in Common-wealths.

The Registers of Science, are such Books as contain the Demonstrations
of Consequences of one Affirmation, to another; and are commonly called
Books of Philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the
diversity of the Matter; And may be divided in such manner as I have
divided them in the following Table.

I.  Science, that is, Knowledge of Consequences; which is called
     also PHILOSOPHY

     A.  Consequences from Accidents of Bodies Naturall; which is
        called NATURALL PHILOSOPHY

        1.  Consequences from the Accidents common to all Bodies Naturall;
           which are Quantity, and Motion.

           a.  Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Indeterminate;
              which, being the Principles or first foundation of
              Philosophy, is called Philosophia Prima

              PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA

           b.  Consequences from Motion, and Quantity Determined

              1) Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Determined

                 a) By Figure, By Number

                   1] Mathematiques,

                      GEOMETRY
                      ARITHMETIQUE

              2) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of Bodies in
                 Speciall

                 a) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of the
                    great parts of the World, as the Earth and Stars,

                    1] Cosmography

                       ASTRONOMY
                       GEOGRAPHY

                 b) Consequences from the Motion of Speciall kinds, and
                    Figures of Body,

                    1] Mechaniques, Doctrine of Weight

                       Science of
                       ENGINEERS
                       ARCHITECTURE
                       NAVIGATION

        2.  PHYSIQUES, or Consequences from Qualities

           a.  Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Transient, such
              as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish

              METEOROLOGY

           b.  Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Permanent

              1) Consequences from the Qualities of the Starres

                 a) Consequences from the Light of the Starres.  Out of
                    this, and the Motion of the Sunne, is made the
                    Science of

                    SCIOGRAPHY

                 b) Consequences from the Influence of the Starres,

                    ASTROLOGY

              2) Consequences of the Qualities from Liquid Bodies that
                 fill the space between the Starres; such as are the
                 Ayre, or substance aetherial.


              3) Consequences from Qualities of Bodies Terrestrial

                 a) Consequences from parts of the Earth that are
                    without Sense,

                    1] Consequences from Qualities of Minerals, as
                       Stones, Metals, &c
.
                    2] Consequences from the Qualities of Vegetables

                 b) Consequences from Qualities of Animals

                    1] Consequences from Qualities of Animals in
                       Generall

                       a] Consequences from Vision,

                          OPTIQUES

                       b] Consequences from Sounds,

                          MUSIQUE

                       c] Consequences from the rest of the senses

                    2] Consequences from Qualities of Men in Speciall

                       a] Consequences from Passions of Men,

                          ETHIQUES

                       b] Consequences from Speech,

                          i) In Magnifying, Vilifying, etc.

                             POETRY

                          ii) In Persuading,

                              RHETORIQUE

                          iii) In Reasoning,

                               LOGIQUE

                          iv) In Contracting,

                              The Science of
                              JUST and UNJUST


     B.  Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies; which is
        called POLITIQUES, and CIVILL PHILOSOPHY

        1.  Of Consequences from the Institution of COMMON-WEALTHS, to
           the Rights, and Duties of the Body Politique, or Soveraign.

        2.  Of Consequences from the same, to the Duty and Right of
           the Subjects.



CHAPTER X

OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR AND WORTHINESS


Power
The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means,
to obtain some future apparent Good.  And is either Originall,
or Instrumentall.

Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind:
as extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence,
Liberality, Nobility.  Instrumentall are those Powers, which acquired
by these, or by fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire more:
as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the Secret working of God,
which men call Good Luck.  For the nature of Power, is in this point,
like to Fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of
heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more hast.

The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the
Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall,
or civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will;
such as is the Power of a Common-wealth: or depending on the wills
of each particular; such as is the Power of a Faction, or of divers
factions leagued.  Therefore to have servants, is Power; To have Friends,
is Power: for they are strengths united.

Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power; because it procureth
friends, and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this
case they defend not; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.

Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the
adhaerance of those that need protection.

So is Reputation of love of a mans Country, (called Popularity,)
for the same Reason.

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many;
or the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means
to have the assistance, and service of many.

Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome,
or good fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power;
because it gaineth love.

Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power;
because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves,
more willingly than to others.

Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths,
where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their Power.

Eloquence is Power; because it is seeming Prudence.

Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth
men to the favour of women and strangers.

The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore,
not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them,
but of a few things.  For Science is of that nature, as none can
understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.

Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other
Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory,
are Power; And though the true Mother of them, be Science,
namely the Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light,
by the hand of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with
the vulgar for the Mother,) as his issue.

Worth
The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price;
that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power:
and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and
judgement of another.  An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great
Price in time of War present, or imminent; but in Peace not so.
A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace;
but not so much in War.  And as in other things, so in men,
not the seller, but the buyer determines the Price.  For let a man
(as most men do,) rate themselves as the highest Value they can;
yet their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.

The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which
is commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring.  To Value a man at
a high rate, is to Honour him; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him.
But high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison
to the rate that each man setteth on himselfe.

Dignity
The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the
Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY.  And this Value
of him by the Common-wealth, is understood, by offices of Command,
Judicature, publike Employment; or by Names and Titles, introduced
for distinction of such Value.

To Honour and Dishonour
To pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to HONOUR; because
a signe we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more
difficult the ayde is, the more is the Honour.

To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeyes them, whom they think
have no power to help, or hurt them.  And consequently to disobey,
is to Dishonour.

To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because 'tis buying
of Protection, and acknowledging of Power.  To give little gifts,
is to Dishonour; because it is but Almes, and signifies an opinion
of the need of small helps.  To be sedulous in promoting anothers good;
also to flatter, is to Honour; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde.
To neglect, is to Dishonour.

To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity, is to Honour;
being a confession of greater power.  To arrogate, is to Dishonour.

To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour;
for both to love, and to feare, is to value.  To contemne,
or lesse to love or feare then he expects, is to Dishonour;
for 'tis undervaluing.

To praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to Honour; because nothing
but goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued.  To revile, mock,
or pitty, is to Dishonour.

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with
decency, and humility, is to Honour him; as signes of fear to offend.
To speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly,
impudently, is to Dishonour.

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him;
signe of opinion of his vertue and power.  To distrust, or not believe,
is to Dishonour.

To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever,
is to Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty.
To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.

To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour,
or which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because
in approving the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power
which others acknowledge.  To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.

To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving
his judgement, and wisdome.  To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding
of errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.

To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve.
To imitate ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.

To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of
approbation of his judgement.  To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour him.

To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour;
as a signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power.  To deny employment
in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.

All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall; and as well within,
as without Common-wealths.  But in Common-wealths, where he,
or they that have the supreme Authority, can make whatsoever
they please, to stand for signes of Honour, there be other Honours.

A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office,
or Employment, or Action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe
of his will to Honour him.

The King of Persia, Honoured Mordecay, when he appointed he should
be conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of
the Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him,
proclayming, "Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour."
And yet another King of Persia, or the same another time, to one that
demanded for some great service, to weare one of the Kings robes,
gave him leave so to do; but with his addition, that he should weare it
as the Kings foole; and then it was Dishonour.  So that of Civill Honour;
such as are Magistracy, Offices, Titles; and in some places Coats,
and Scutchions painted: and men Honour such as have them, as having
so many signes of favour in the Common-wealth; which favour is Power.

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument
and signe of Power.

And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable;
as arguments of Power.  To be Honoured of few or none, Dishonourable.

Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God.
Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable.  Riches, are Honourable;
for they are Power.  Poverty, Dishonourable.  Magnanimity, Liberality,
Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from
the conscience of Power.  Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence,
are Dishonourable.

Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do,
is Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers.
And Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of
little impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed
things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference
of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not,
he overvalues little things, which is Pusillanimity.

All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from
much Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable;
For all these are Powers.  Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour,
Ignorance, or Folly, Dishonourable.

Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed
on some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of Power.
But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave,
it is Dishonourable.  For the gravity of the Former, is like the
steddinesse of a Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later,
like the steddinesse of a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.

To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office,
great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of
the power for which he is conspicuous.  On the contrary, Obscurity,
is Dishonourable.

To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because
they the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors.
On the contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.

Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable;
as signes of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power.
On the contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be
great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,)
be just or unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power.
Therefore the ancient Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured,
but greatly Honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems,
committing Rapes, Thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts:
In so much as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries;
nor in Mercury, as his Frauds, and Thefts: of whose praises,
in a hymne of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning,
he had invented Musique at noon, and before night, stolen away the
Cattell of Appollo, from his Herdsmen.

Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths,
it was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe;
but rather a lawfull Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks,
but also amongst all other Nations; as is manifest by the Histories
of antient time.  And at this day, in this part of the world,
private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable, though unlawfull,
till such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse,
and Ignominy for them that make the Challenge.  For Duels also are
many times effects of Courage; and the ground of Courage is alwayes
Strength or Skill, which are Power; though for the most part they be
effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in one,
or both the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are driven into
the Lists to avoyd disgrace.

Scutchions, and coats of Armes haereditary, where they have any
eminent Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power
consisteth either in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such
thing as is equally honoured in other men.  This kind of Honour,
commonly called Gentry, has been derived from the Antient Germans.
For there never was any such thing known, where the German Customes
were unknown.  Nor is it now any where in use, where the Germans
have not inhabited.  The antient Greek Commanders, when they went
to war, had their Shields painted with such Devises as they pleased;
insomuch as an unpainted Buckler was a signe of Poverty, and of
a common Souldier: but they transmitted not the Inheritance of them.
The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families: but they were the
Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors.  Amongst the people of Asia,
Afrique, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing.
The Germans onely had that custome; from whom it has been derived
into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great numbers they
either ayded the Romans, or made their own Conquests in these Westerne
parts of the world.

For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their
beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords,
or Masters of Families, that continually had wars one with another;
those Masters, or Lords, principally to the end they might,
when they were Covered with Arms, be known by their followers;
and partly for ornament, both painted their Armor, or their Scutchion,
or Coat, with the picture of some Beast, or other thing; and also put
some eminent and visible mark upon the Crest of their Helmets.
And his ornament both of the Armes, and Crest, descended by inheritance
to their Children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some
note of diversity, such as the Old master, that is to say in Dutch,
the Here-alt thought fit.  But when many such Families, joyned together,
made a greater Monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to distinguish
Scutchions, was made a private Office a part.  And the issue of
these Lords, is the great and antient Gentry; which for the most part
bear living creatures, noted for courage, and rapine; or Castles,
Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and other notes of War;
nothing being then in honour, but vertue military.  Afterwards, not
onely Kings, but popular Common-wealths, gave divers manners of
Scutchions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned from it,
for encouragement, or recompence to their service.  All which,
by an observing Reader, may be found in such ancient Histories,
Greek and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners,
in their times.

Titles of Honour
Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron,
are Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the
Soveraigne Power of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in
old time titles of Office, and Command, derived some from the Romans,
some from the Germans, and French.  Dukes, in Latine Duces,
being Generalls in War: Counts, Comites, such as bare the
Generall company out of friendship; and were left to govern and
defend places conquered, and pacified: Marquises, Marchiones,
were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds of the Empire.
Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the Empire,
about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customes of
the German Militia.  But Baron, seems to have been a Title of
the Gaules, and signifies a Great man; such as were the Kings,
or Princes men, whom they employed in war about their persons;
and seems to be derived from Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that signified
the same in the Language of the Gaules, that Vir in Latine; and
thence to Bero, and Baro: so that such men were called Berones,
and after Barones; and (in Spanish) Varones.  But he that would
know more particularly the originall of Titles of Honour, may find
it, as I have done this, in Mr. Seldens most excellent Treatise
of that subject.  In processe of time these offices of Honour,
by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peacable
government, were turned into meer Titles; serving for the most part,
to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in
the Common-wealth: and men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises,
and Barons of Places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command:
and other Titles also, were devised to the same end.

Worthinesse  Fitnesse
WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man;
and also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power,
or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular
ability, is usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.

For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have
any other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required
to the well discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has
the qualities most requisite for the well using of them: any of which
qualities being absent, one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man,
and valuable for some thing else.  Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches,
Office, and Employment, that neverthelesse, can plead no right to
have it before another; and therefore cannot be said to merit
or deserve it.  For Merit, praesupposeth a right, and that the
thing deserved is due by promise: Of which I shall say more hereafter,
when I shall speak of Contracts.




CHAPTER XI

OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS


What Is Here Meant By Manners
By MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man
should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick
his teeth before company, and such other points of the Small Morals;
But those qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together
in Peace, and Unity.  To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity
of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied.
For there is no such Finis Ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum
Bonum, (greatest good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old
Morall Philosophers.  Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires
are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand.
Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object
to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way
to the later.  The cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire,
is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to
assure for ever, the way of his future desire.  And therefore the
voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to
the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life;
and differ onely in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity
of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of
the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce
the effect desired.

A Restlesse Desire Of Power, In All Men
So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of
all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power,
that ceaseth onely in Death.  And the cause of this, is not alwayes
that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already
attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power:
but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well,
which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.  And from hence
it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours
to the assuring it a home by Lawes, or abroad by Wars: and when
that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of Fame from
new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall pleasure; in others,
of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art,
or other ability of the mind.

Love Of Contention From Competition
Competition of Riches, Honour, command, or other power, enclineth
to Contention, Enmity, and War: because the way of one Competitor,
to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant,
or repell the other.  Particularly, competition of praise,
enclineth to a reverence of Antiquity.  For men contend with the living,
not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may
obscure the glory of the other.

Civil Obedience From Love Of Ease
Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey
a common Power: because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the
protection might be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour.

From Feare Of Death Or Wounds
Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the
same reason.  On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented
with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious
of Military command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre;
and to stirre up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour
Military but by warre; nor any such hope to mend an ill game,
as by causing a new shuffle.

And From Love Of Arts
Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a
common Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure;
and consequently protection from some other Power than their own.

Love Of Vertue, From Love Of Praise
Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please
them whose judgement they value; for of these men whom we contemn,
we contemn also the Praises.  Desire of Fame after death does the same.
And though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us
on Earth, as being joyes, that are either swallowed up in the
unspeakable joyes of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme
torments of Hell: yet is not such Fame vain; because men have
a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the
benefit that may rebound thereby to their posterity: which though
they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure
in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.

Hate, From Difficulty Of Requiting Great Benefits
To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall,
greater benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to
counterfiet love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into
the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight
of his creditor, tacitely wishes him there, where he might never
see him more.  For benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldome;
which is to ones equall, hateful.  But to have received benefits
from one, whom we acknowledge our superiour, enclines to love;
because the obligation is no new depession: and cheerfull
acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an honour done
to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution.  Also to
receive benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as
there is hope of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the intention
of the receiver, the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall;
from whence proceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting;
the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor
is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.

And From Conscience Of Deserving To Be Hated
To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate,
enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer.  For he must expect revenge,
or forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.

Promptnesse To Hurt, From Fear
Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek
ayd by society: for there is no other way by which a man can
secure his life and liberty.

And From Distrust Of Their Own Wit
Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition,
better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise,
or crafty.  For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be
circumvented,) to strike first.  And in sedition, men being alwayes
in the procincts of Battell, to hold together, and use all advantages
of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from
subtilty of Wit.

Vain Undertaking From Vain-glory
Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves
of great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men,
are enclined onely to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when
danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have
their insufficiency discovered.

Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the
flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action,
without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves,
are enclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger,
or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way
of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved
with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.

Ambition, From Opinion Of Sufficiency
Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of
government, are disposed to Ambition.  Because without publique
Employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their
wisdome is lost.  And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined
to Ambition; for Eloquence seemeth wisdome, both to themselves
and others

Irresolution, From Too Great Valuing Of Small Matters
Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently
to lose the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action.
For after men have been in deliberation till the time of
action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done,
tis a signe, the difference of Motives, the one way and the other,
are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion
by weighing of trifles; which is pusillanimity.

Frugality,(though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to
atchieve such actions , as require the strength of many men
at once: For it weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished
and kept in vigor by Reward.

Confidence In Others From Ignorance Of The Marks Of Wisdome and Kindnesse
Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it;
because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming Kindnesse.
Adde to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhaere,
and subject themselves to those men that have them.  The two former,
having given them caution against danger from him; the later gives
them caution against danger from others.


And From The Ignorance Of Naturall Causes
Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather
constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others.
For all men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own,
must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than
themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.

And From Want Of Understanding
Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of
understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the
truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more,
the non-sense of them they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense,
can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected.


From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names,
to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions:
As they that approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they
that mislike it, Haeresie: and yet haeresie signifies no more
than private opinion; but has onely a greater tincture of choler.

From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish,
without study and great understanding, between one action of many men,
and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one
action of all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many
actions of a number of Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore
are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is
a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by
the perswasion of one.

Adhaerence To Custome, From Ignorance Of The Nature Of Right And Wrong
Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right,
Equity, Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example
the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust
which it hath been the custome to punish; and that Just, of the
impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an Example,
or (as the Lawyers which onely use the false measure of Justice
barbarously call it) a Precedent; like little children, that have
no other rule of good and evill manners, but the correction
they receive from their Parents, and Masters; save that children
are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown
strong, and stubborn, they appeale from custome to reason,
and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; receding from
custome when their interest requires it, and setting themselves
against reason, as oft as reason is against them: Which is the
cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed,
both by the Pen and the Sword: whereas the doctrine of Lines,
and Figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject
what be truth, as a thing that crosses no mans ambition, profit,
or lust.  For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary
to any mans right of dominion, or to the interest of men that
have dominion, That The Three Angles Of A Triangle Should Be Equall
To Two Angles Of A Square; that doctrine should have been,
if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry,
suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.

Adhaerence To Private Men, From Ignorance Of The Causes Of Peace
Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events,
to the causes immediate, and Instrumentall: For these are all the
causes they perceive.  And hence it comes to passe, that in all places,
men that are grieved with payments to the Publique, discharge their
anger upon the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors,
and other Officers of the publique Revenue; and adhaere to such
as find fault with the publike Government; and thereby, when
they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification,
fall also upon the Supreme Authority, for feare of punishment,
or shame of receiving pardon.

Credulity From Ignorance Of Nature
Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity,
so as to believe many times impossibilities: for such know
nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable
to detect the Impossibility. And Credulity, because men love
to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that
Ignorance it selfe without Malice, is able to make a man bothe
to believe lyes, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.

Curiosity To Know, From Care Of Future Time
Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the
causes of things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men
the better able to order the present to their best advantage.

Naturall Religion, From The Same
Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from
consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again,
the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought
at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause,
but is eternall; which is it men call God.  So that it is impossible
to make any profound enquiry into naturall causes, without being
enclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternall; though they
cannot have any Idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature.
For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves
by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily
conceive, and assure himselfe, there is somewhat there, which men
call Fire, and is the cause of the heat he feeles; but cannot
imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of it in his mind,
such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of
this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is
a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an Idea,
or Image of him in his mind.

And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes
of things, yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe,
of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm,
are enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds
of Powers Invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations;
and in time of distresse to invoke them; as also in the time of an
expected good successe, to give them thanks; making the creatures
of their own fancy, their Gods.  By which means it hath come to passe,
that from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of Gods.  And this Feare of things invisible, is the
naturall Seed of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion;
and in them that worship, or feare that Power otherwise than they do,
Superstition.

And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of
those that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish,
dresse, and forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own
invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which
they thought they should best be able to govern others, and make
unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.



CHAPTER XII

OF RELIGION


Religion, In Man Onely
Seeing there are no signes, nor fruit of Religion, but in Man onely;
there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion, is also
onely in Man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in
some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other Living creatures.

First, From His Desire Of Knowing Causes
And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive
into the Causes of the Events they see, some more, some lesse;
but all men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes
of their own good and evill fortune.

From The Consideration Of The Beginning Of Things
Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning,
to think also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin,
then when it did, rather than sooner or later.

From His Observation Of The Sequell Of Things
Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the
enjoying of their quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little,
or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation,
and memory of the order, consequence, and dependance of the things
they see; Man observeth how one Event hath been produced by another;
and remembreth in them Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot
assure himselfe of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good
and evill fortune for the most part are invisible,) he supposes
causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth
to the Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends,
and wiser than himselfe.

The Naturall Cause Of Religion, The Anxiety Of The Time To Come
The two first, make Anxiety.  For being assured that there be causes
of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter;
it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure
himselfe against the evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth,
not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come; So that
every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an estate
like to that of Prometheus.  For as Prometheus, (which interpreted,
is, The Prudent Man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of
large prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured
in the day, as much as was repayred in the night: So that man,
which looks too far before him, in the care of future time,
hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by feare of death,
poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of
his anxiety, but in sleep.

Which Makes Them Fear The Power Of Invisible Things
This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance
of causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something.
And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to
accuse, either of their good, or evill fortune, but some Power,
or Agent Invisible: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of
the old Poets said, that the Gods were at first created by humane Feare:
which spoken of the Gods, (that is to say, of the many Gods of
the Gentiles) is very true.  But the acknowledging of one God Eternall,
Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the
desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their
severall vertues, and operations; than from the feare of what was
to befall them in time to come.  For he that from any effect hee
seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and immediate cause
thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge himselfe
profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this,
that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed)
one First Mover; that is, a First, and an Eternall cause of all things;
which is that which men mean by the name of God: And all this without
thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both enclines to fear,
and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things;
and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many Gods, as there be
men that feigne them.

And Suppose Them Incorporeall
And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed;
they could not by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other conceipt,
but that it was the same with that of the Soule of man; and that
the Soule of man, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth
in a Dream, to one that sleepeth; or in a Looking-glasse, to one
that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are
nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall,
and externall Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts;
as the Latines called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them
Spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies; and those Invisible Agents,
which they feared, to bee like them; save that they appear,
and vanish when they please.  But the opinion that such Spirits
were Incorporeall, or Immateriall, could never enter into the mind
of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words
of contradictory signification, as Spirit, and Incorporeall;
yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them:
And therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the
acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternall God,
choose rather to confesse he is Incomprehensible, and above
their understanding; than to define his Nature By Spirit Incorporeall,
and then Confesse their definition to be unintelligible: or if they
give him such a title, it is not Dogmatically, with intention to
make the Divine Nature understood; but Piously, to honour him
with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from
the grossenesse of Bodies Visible.

But Know Not The Way How They Effect Anything
Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agents
wrought their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used,
in bringing things to passe, men that know not what it is that
we call Causing, (that is, almost all men) have no other rule
to guesse by, but by observing, and remembring what they have seen
to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before,
without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent Event,
any dependance or connexion at all: And therefore from the
like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope
for good or evill luck, superstitiously, from things that have no
part at all in the causing of it: As the Athenians did for their
war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for
their warre in Afrique, another Scipio; and others have done in
divers other occasions since.  In like manner they attribute their
fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken,
especially if the name of God be amongst them; as Charming,
and Conjuring (the Leiturgy of Witches;) insomuch as to believe,
they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man,
or any thing, into any thing.

But Honour Them As They Honour Men
Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite to Powers
invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence,
as they would use towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission
of Body, Considerate Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words,
Swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises,)
by invoking them.  Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing;
but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies,
to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.

And Attribute To Them All Extraordinary Events
Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men
the things which shall hereafter come to passe, especially
concerning their good or evill fortune in generall, or good or
ill successe in any particular undertaking, men are naturally
at a stand; save that using to conjecture of the time to come,
by the time past, they are very apt, not onely to take casuall things,
after one or two encounters, for Prognostiques of the like encounter
ever after, but also to believe the like Prognostiques from other men,
of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.

Foure Things, Naturall Seeds Of Religion
And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second
causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall
for Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion;
which by reason of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions
of severall men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different,
that those which are used by one man, are for the most part
ridiculous to another.

Made Different By Culture
For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men.
One sort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them,
according to their own invention.  The other, have done it,
by Gods commandement, and direction: but both sorts have done it,
with a purpose to make those men that relyed on them, the more
apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and civill Society.
So that the Religion of the former sort, is a part of humane Politiques;
and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of
their Subjects.  And the Religion of the later sort is Divine
Politiques; and containeth Precepts to those that have yeelded
themselves subjects in the Kingdome of God.  Of the former sort,
were all the Founders of Common-wealths, and the Law-givers
of the Gentiles: Of the later sort, were Abraham, Moses,
and our Blessed Saviour; by whom have been derived unto us
the Lawes of the Kingdome of God.

The Absurd Opinion Of Gentilisme
And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions
concerning the nature of Powers Invisible, there is almost nothing
that has a name, that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles,
in one place or another, a God, or Divell; or by their Poets feigned
to be inanimated, inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other.

The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.

The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds,
were so many Gods.

Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion,
a Leeke, Deified.  Besides, that they filled almost all places,
with spirits called Daemons; the plains, with Pan, and Panises,
or Satyres; the Woods, with Fawnes, and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons,
and other Nymphs; every River, and Fountayn, with a Ghost of his name,
and with Nymphs; every house, with it Lares, or Familiars;
every man, with his Genius; Hell, with Ghosts, and spirituall
Officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in the night time,
all places with Larvae, Lemures, Ghosts of men deceased, and a whole
kingdome of Fayries, and Bugbears.  They have also ascribed Divinity,
and built Temples to meer Accidents, and Qualities; such as are Time,
Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love, Contention, Vertue, Honour, Health,
Rust, Fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against,
they prayed to, as if there were Ghosts of those names hanging over
their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that Good, or Evill,
for, or against which they prayed.  They invoked also their own Wit,
by the name of Muses; their own Ignorance, by the name of Fortune;
their own Lust, by the name of Cupid; their own Rage, by the name Furies;
their own privy members by the name of Priapus; and attributed their
pollutions, to Incubi, and Succubae: insomuch as there was nothing,
which a Poet could introduce as a person in his Poem, which they
did not make either a God, or a Divel.

The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the
second ground for Religion, which is mens Ignorance of causes;
and thereby their aptnesse to attribute their fortune to causes,
on which there was no dependence at all apparent, took occasion
to obtrude on their ignorance, in stead of second causes,
a kind of second and ministeriall Gods; ascribing the cause
of Foecundity, to Venus; the cause of Arts, to Apollo; of Subtilty
and Craft, to Mercury; of Tempests and stormes, to Aeolus;
and of other effects, to other Gods: insomuch as there was
amongst the Heathen almost as great variety of Gods, as of businesse.

And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used
towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest
formerly named; the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added
their Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture; that the more ignorant
sort, (that is to say, the most part, or generality of the people,)
thinking the Gods for whose representation they were made,
were really included, and as it were housed within them,
might so much the more stand in feare of them: And endowed them
with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart
from all other humane uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy
to those their Idols; as Caverns, Groves, Woods, Mountains,
and whole Ilands; and have attributed to them, not onely the shapes,
some of Men, some of Beasts, some of Monsters; but also the Faculties,
and Passions of men and beasts; as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust,
Generation, (and this not onely by mixing one with another,
to propagate the kind of Gods; but also by mixing with men,
and women, to beget mongrill Gods, and but inmates of Heaven,
as Bacchus, Hercules, and others;) besides, Anger, Revenge,
and other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding
from them, as Fraud, Theft, Adultery, Sodomie, and any vice that
may be taken for an effect of Power, or a cause of Pleasure;
and all such Vices, as amongst men are taken to be against Law,
rather than against Honour.

Lastly, to the Prognostiques of time to come; which are naturally,
but Conjectures upon the Experience of time past; and supernaturall,
divine Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles,
partly upon pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Revelation,
have added innumerable other superstitious wayes of Divination;
and made men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in
the ambiguous or senslesse answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos,
Ammon, and other famous Oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous
by designe, to own the event both wayes; or absurd by the intoxicating
vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous Cavernes:
Sometimes in the leaves of the Sibills; of whose Prophecyes
(like those perhaps of Nostradamus; for the fragments now extant
seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books
in reputation in the time of the Roman Republique: Sometimes in
the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to be possessed
with a divine Spirit; which Possession they called Enthusiasme;
and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted Theomancy,
or Prophecy; Sometimes in the aspect of the Starres at their Nativity;
which was called Horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary Astrology:
Sometimes in their own hopes and feares, called Thumomancy, or Presage:
Sometimes in the Prediction of Witches, that pretended conference
with the dead; which is called Necromancy, Conjuring, and Witchcraft;
and is but juggling and confederate knavery: Sometimes in the
Casuall flight, or feeding of birds; called Augury: Sometimes in
the Entrayles of a sacrificed beast; which was Aruspicina:
Sometimes in Dreams: Sometimes in Croaking of Ravens, or chattering
of Birds: Sometimes in the Lineaments of the face; which was called
Metoposcopy; or by Palmistry in the lines of the hand; in casuall words,
called Omina: Sometimes in Monsters, or unusuall accidents; as Ecclipses,
Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births,
and the like, which they called Portenta and Ostenta, because
they thought them to portend, or foreshew some great Calamity to come;
Sometimes, in meer Lottery, as Crosse and Pile; counting holes in a sive;
dipping of Verses in Homer, and Virgil; and innumerable other such
vaine conceipts.  So easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing,
from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentlenesse,
and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.

The Designes Of The Authors Of The Religion Of The Heathen
And therefore the first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths
amongst the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in
obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; First, to imprint
in their minds a beliefe, that those precepts which they gave
concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their
own device, but from the dictates of some God, or other Spirit;
or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortalls,
that their Lawes might the more easily be received: So Numa Pompilius
pretended to receive the Ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans,
from the Nymph Egeria: and the first King and founder of the
Kingdome of Peru, pretended himselfe and his wife to be the
children of the Sunne: and Mahomet, to set up his new Religion,
pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in forme of a Dove.
Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same
things were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes.
Thirdly, to prescribe Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacrifices,
and Festivalls, by which they were to believe, the anger of
the Gods might be appeased; and that ill success in War,
great contagions of Sicknesse, Earthquakes, and each mans
private Misery, came from the Anger of the Gods; and their Anger
from the Neglect of their Worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking
some point of the Ceremonies required.  And though amongst the
antient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the
Poets is written of the paines, and pleasures after this life;
which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have
in their Harangues openly derided; yet that beliefe was alwaies
more cherished, than the contrary.

And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtayned in order
to their end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the
common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect,
or errour in their Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to
the lawes, were the lesse apt to mutiny against their Governors.
And being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of Festivalls,
and publike Gomes, made in honour of the Gods, needed nothing else
but bread, to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion
against the State.  And therefore the Romans, that had conquered
the greatest part of the then known World, made no scruple of
tollerating any Religion whatsoever in the City of Rome it selfe;
unlesse it had somthing in it, that could not consist with their
Civill Government; nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden,
but that of the Jewes; who (being the peculiar Kingdome of God)
thought it unlawfull to acknowledge subjection to any mortall King
or State whatsoever.  And thus you see how the Religion of the
Gentiles was a part of their Policy.

The True Religion, And The Lawes Of Gods Kingdome The Same
But where God himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted Religion;
there he also made to himselfe a peculiar Kingdome; and gave Lawes,
not only of behaviour towards himselfe; but also towards one another;
and thereby in the Kingdome of God, the Policy, and lawes Civill,
are a part of Religion; and therefore the distinction of Temporall,
and Spirituall Domination, hath there no place.  It is true,
that God is King of all the Earth: Yet may he be King of a peculiar,
and chosen Nation.  For there is no more incongruity therein,
than that he that hath the generall command of the whole Army,
should have withall a peculiar Regiment, or Company of his own.
God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen people,
he is King by Covenant.  But to speake more largly of the Kingdome
of God, both by Nature, and Covenant, I have in the following
discourse assigned an other place.

Chap 35 The Causes Of Change In Religion
From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understand
the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds,
or principles; which are only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers
invisible, and supernaturall; that can never be so abolished
out of humane nature, but that new Religions may againe be made
to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for such
purpose are in reputation.

For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith
which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only
to be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness,
but also to be a holy man, to whom God himselfe vouchsafeth
to declare his will supernaturally; It followeth necessarily,
when they that have the Goverment of Religion, shall come to have
either the wisedome of those men, their sincerity, or their love
suspected; or that they shall be unable to shew any probable token
of divine Revelation; that the Religion which they desire to uphold,
must be suspected likewise; and (without the feare of the Civill Sword)
contradicted and rejected.

Injoyning Beleefe Of Impossibilities
That which taketh away the reputation of Wisedome, in him that
formeth a Religion, or addeth to it when it is allready formed,
is the enjoyning of a beliefe of contradictories: For both parts
of a contradiction cannot possibly be true: and therefore to enjoyne
the beliefe of them, is an argument of ignorance; which detects
the Author in that; and discredits him in all things else he
shall propound as from revelation supernaturall: which revelation
a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing
against naturall reason.

Doing Contrary To The Religion They Establish
That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, is the doing,
or saying of such things, as appeare to be signes, that what
they require other men to believe, is not believed by themselves;
all which doings, or sayings are therefore called Scandalous,
because they be stumbling blocks, that make men to fall in the way
of Religion: as Injustice, Cruelty, Prophanesse, Avarice, and Luxury.
For who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions,
as proceed from any of these rootes, believeth there is any such
Invisible Power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men withall,
for lesser faults?

That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being detected
of private ends: as when the beliefe they require of others,
conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion,
Riches, Dignity, or secure Pleasure, to themselves onely, or specially.
For that which men reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought
to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others

Want Of The Testimony Of Miracles
Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine Calling,
can be no other, than the operation of Miracles; or true Prophecy,
(which also is a Miracle;) or extraordinary Felicity.  And therefore,
to those points of Religion, which have been received from them
that did such Miracles; those that are added by such, as approve not
their Calling by some Miracle, obtain no greater beliefe, than what
the Custome, and Lawes of the places, in which they be educated,
have wrought into them.  For as in naturall things, men of judgement
require naturall signes, and arguments; so in supernaturall things,
they require signes supernaturall, (which are Miracles,) before
they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.

All which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly
appear in the Examples following.  First, we have the Example
of the children of Israel; who when Moses, that had approved
his Calling to them by Miracles, and by the happy conduct of them
out of Egypt, was absent but 40 dayes, revolted from the worship
of the true God, recommended to them by him; and setting up
(Exod.32 1,2) a Golden Calfe for their God, relapsed into the
Idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had been so lately delivered.
And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that generation which
had seen the great works of God in Israel, (Judges 2 11) were dead;
another generation arose, and served Baal.  So that Miracles fayling,
Faith also failed.

Again, when the sons of Samuel, (1 Sam.8.3) being constituted
by their father Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly,
the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King,
in other manner than he was King of other people; and therefore cryed
out to Samuel, to choose them a King after the manner of the Nations.
So that Justice Fayling, Faith also fayled: Insomuch, as they deposed
their God, from reigning over them.

And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles
ceased in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians
encreased wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching
of the Apostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that successe,
may reasonably be attributed, to the contempt, into which the
Priests of the Gentiles of that time, had brought themselves,
by their uncleannesse, avarice, and jugling between Princes.
Also the Religion of the Church of Rome, was partly, for the same
cause abolished in England, and many other parts of Christendome;
insomuch, as the fayling of Vertue in the Pastors, maketh Faith
faile in the People: and partly from bringing of the Philosophy,
and doctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the Schoole-men;
from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities,
as brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance,
and of Fraudulent intention; and enclined people to revolt from them,
either against the will of their own Princes, as in France, and Holland;
or with their will, as in England.

Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary
for Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of
the Pope, and of his spirituall subjects, residing in the territories
of other Christian Princes, that were it not for the mutuall emulation
of those Princes, they might without warre, or trouble, exclude
all forraign Authority, as easily as it has been excluded in England.
For who is there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth,
to have it believed, that a King hath not his Authority from Christ,
unlesse a Bishop crown him?  That a King, if he be a Priest,
cannot Marry?  That whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage,
or not, must be judged by Authority from Rome?  That Subjects may
be freed from their Alleageance, if by the Court of Rome, the King
be judged an Heretique?  That a King (as Chilperique of France) may be
deposed by a Pope (as Pope Zachary,) for no cause; and his Kingdome
given to one of his Subjects?  That the Clergy, and Regulars,
in what Country soever, shall be exempt from the Jurisdiction
of their King, in cases criminall?  Or who does not see, to whose
profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales of Purgatory;
with other signes of private interest, enough to mortifie
the most lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate,
and Custome did not more sustain it, than any opinion they
have of the Sanctity, Wisdome, or Probity of their Teachers?
So that I may attribute all the changes of Religion in the world,
to one and the some cause; and that is, unpleasing Priests;
and those not onely amongst Catholiques , but even in that Church
that hath presumed most of Reformation.



CHAPTER XIII

OF THE  NATURALL CONDITION OF MANKIND,
AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY


Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind;
as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly
stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when
all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man,
is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to
himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.
For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to
kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy
with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.

And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded
upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall,
and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have,
and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us;
nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,)
I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength.
For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes
on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto.
That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but
a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men
think they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is,
than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame,
or for concurring with themselves, they approve.  For such is the
nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others
to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will
hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see
their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance.  But this proveth
rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall.  For there is
not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing,
than that every man is contented with his share.

From Equality Proceeds Diffidence
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the
attaining of our Ends.  And therefore if any two men desire
the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy,
they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally
their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,)
endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other.  And from hence
it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare,
than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build,
or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected
to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him,
not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty.
And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.

From Diffidence Warre
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man
to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force,
or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long,
till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is
no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.
Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating
their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther
than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad
to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion
increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing
only on their defence, to subsist.  And by consequence, such augmentation
of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans conservation,
it ought to be allowed him.

Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale
of griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to
over-awe them all.  For every man looketh that his companion should
value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all
signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours,
as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power,
to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,)
to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage;
and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes
of quarrel.  First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.

The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety;
and the third, for Reputation.  The first use Violence, to make
themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell;
the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word,
a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue,
either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred,
their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Out Of Civil States,
There Is Alwayes Warre Of Every One Against Every One
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without
a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition
which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man,
against every man.  For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely,
or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will
to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the
notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre;
as it is in the nature of Weather.  For as the nature of Foule weather,
lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto
of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not
in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto,
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.
All other time is PEACE.

The Incommodites Of Such A War
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every
man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time,
wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength,
and their own invention shall furnish them withall.  In such condition,
there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain;
and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use
of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious
Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things
as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth;
no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is
worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death;
And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things;
that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade,
and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this
Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same
confirmed by Experience.  Let him therefore consider with himselfe,
when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well
accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even
in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there bee Lawes,
and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him;
what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed;
of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children,
and servants, when he locks his chests.  Does he not there as much
accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words?  But neither of us
accuse mans nature in it.  The Desires, and other Passions of man,
are in themselves no Sin.  No more are the Actions, that proceed
from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them;
which till Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made,
till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it.

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time,
nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so,
over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now.
For the savage people in many places of America, except the government
of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust,
have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner,
as I said before.  Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life
there would be, where there were no common Power to feare;
by the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under
a peacefull government, use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men
were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings,
and persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency,
are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators;
having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another;
that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of
their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours;
which is a posture of War.  But because they uphold thereby,
the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it,
that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.

In Such A Warre, Nothing Is Unjust
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent;
that nothing can be Unjust.  The notions of Right and Wrong,
Justice and Injustice have there no place.  Where there is no
common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice.
Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues.
Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body,
nor Mind.  If they were, they might be in a man that were alone
in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions.  They are Qualities,
that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude.  It is consequent also
to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion,
no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans that he
can get; and for so long, as he can keep it.  And thus much for
the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in;
though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in
the Passions, partly in his Reason.

The Passions That Incline Men To Peace
The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death;
Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living;
and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them.  And Reason suggesteth
convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement.
These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature:
whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following Chapters.



CHAPTER XIV

OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURALL LAWES, AND OF CONTRACTS


Right Of Nature What
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale,
is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe,
for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life;
and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement,
and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

Liberty What
By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification
of the word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments,
may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would;
but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as
his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.

A Law Of Nature What
A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule,
found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that,
which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means
of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh
it may be best preserved.  For though they that speak of this subject,
use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be
distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do,
or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them:
so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty;
which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

Naturally Every Man Has Right To Everything
And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent
Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one;
in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is
nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him,
in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth,
that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing;
even to one anothers body.  And therefore, as long as this naturall Right
of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man,
(how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time,
which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.

The Fundamental Law Of Nature
And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason,
"That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he
has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it,
that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre."
The first branch, of which Rule, containeth the first,
and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, "To seek Peace,
and follow it."  The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature;
which is, "By all means we can, to defend our selves."

The Second Law Of Nature
From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded
to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; "That a man be willing,
when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence
of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right
to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men,
as he would allow other men against himselfe."  For as long as
every man holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh;
so long are all men in the condition of Warre.  But if other men
will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then there is no
Reason for any one, to devest himselfe of his: For that were
to expose himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than
to dispose himselfe to Peace.  This is that Law of the Gospell;
"Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do
ye to them."  And that Law of all men, "Quod tibi feiri non vis,
alteri ne feceris."

What it is to lay down a Right
To Lay Downe a mans Right to any thing, is to Devest himselfe
of the Liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own
Right to the same.  For he that renounceth, or passeth away his Right,
giveth not to any other man a Right which he had not before;
because there is nothing to which every man had not Right by Nature:
but onely standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own
originall Right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance
from another.  So that the effect which redoundeth to one man,
by another mans defect of Right, is but so much diminution of
impediments to the use of his own Right originall.

Renouncing A Right What It Is
Transferring Right What
Obligation  Duty  Justice
Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by
Transferring it to another.  By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not
to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth.  By TRANSFERRING;
when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person,
or persons.  And when a man hath in either manner abandoned,
or granted away his Right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND,
not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or abandoned,
from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it his DUTY,
not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such
hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being Sine Jure; the Right being
before renounced, or transferred.  So that Injury, or Injustice,
in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that,
which in the disputations of Scholers is called Absurdity.
For as it is there called an Absurdity, to contradict what one
maintained in the Beginning: so in the world, it is called Injustice,
and Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning
he had voluntarily done.  The way by which a man either simply
Renounceth, or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration,
or Signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes,
that he doth so Renounce, or Transferre; or hath so Renounced,
or Transferred the same, to him that accepteth it.  And these Signes
are either Words onely, or Actions onely; or (as it happeneth most often)
both Words and Actions.  And the same are the BONDS, by which men
are bound, and obliged: Bonds, that have their strength, not from
their own Nature, (for nothing is more easily broken then a mans word,)
but from Feare of some evill consequence upon the rupture.

Not All Rights Are Alienable
Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it;
it is either in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred
to himselfe; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby.
For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man,
the object is some Good To Himselfe.  And therefore there be some Rights,
which no man can be understood by any words, or other signes,
to have abandoned, or transferred.  As first a man cannot lay down
the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take
away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby,
at any Good to himselfe.  The same may be sayd of Wounds, and Chayns,
and Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to
such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another
to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell,
when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they
intend his death or not.  And lastly the motive, and end for which
this renouncing, and transferring or Right is introduced, is nothing else
but the security of a mans person, in his life, and in the means
of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it.  And therefore if a man
by words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the End,
for which those signes were intended; he is not to be understood
as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant
of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.

Contract What
The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call CONTRACT.

There is difference, between transferring of Right to the Thing;
and transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the Thing it selfe.
For the Thing may be delivered together with the Translation of the Right;
as in buying and selling with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or lands:
and it may be delivered some time after.

Covenant What
Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for
on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some
determinate time after, and in the mean time be trusted;
and then the Contract on his part, is called PACT, or COVENANT:
Or both parts may contract now, to performe hereafter: in which cases,
he that is to performe in time to come, being trusted, his performance
is called Keeping Of Promise, or Faith; and the fayling of performance
(if it be voluntary) Violation Of Faith.

Free-gift
When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties
transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another,
or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of Charity,
or Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion;
or in hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but GIFT,
FREEGIFT, GRACE: which words signifie one and the same thing.

Signes Of Contract Expresse
Signes of Contract, are either Expresse, or By Inference.
Expresse, are words spoken with understanding of what they signifie;
And such words are either of the time Present, or Past; as, I Give,
I Grant, I Have Given, I Have Granted, I Will That This Be Yours:
Or of the future; as, I Will Give, I Will Grant; which words
of the future, are called Promise.

Signes Of Contract By Inference
Signes by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words;
sometimes the consequence of Silence; sometimes the consequence of Actions; sometimes the consequence of Forbearing an Action: and generally
a signe by Inference, of any Contract, is whatsoever sufficiently
argues the will of the Contractor.

Free Gift Passeth By Words Of The Present Or Past
Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise,
are an insufficient signe of a Free-gift and therefore not obligatory.
For if they be of the time to Come, as, To Morrow I Will Give,
they are a signe I have not given yet, and consequently that my right
is not transferred, but remaineth till I transferre it by some other Act.
But if the words be of the time Present, or Past, as, "I have given, or do give to be delivered to morrow,"  then is my to morrows Right
given away to day; and that by the vertue of the words, though there were
no other argument of my will.  And there is a great difference
in the signification of these words, Volos Hoc Tuum Esse Cras,
and Cros Dabo; that is between "I will that this be thine to morrow,"
and, "I will give it to thee to morrow:" For the word I Will,
in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will Present;
but in the later, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to Come:
and therefore the former words, being of the Present, transferre
a future right; the later, that be of the Future, transferre nothing.
But if there be other signes of the Will to transferre a Right,
besides Words; then, though the gift be Free, yet may the Right be
understood to passe by words of the future: as if a man propound
a Prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, The gift is Free;
and though the words be of the Future, yet the Right passeth:
for if he would not have his words so be understood, he should not
have let them runne.

Signes Of Contract Are Words Both Of The Past, Present, and Future
In Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of
the time Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future;
because all Contract is mutuall translation, or change of Right;
and therefore he that promiseth onely, because he hath already
received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood
as if he intended the Right should passe: for unlesse he had been
content to have his words so understood, the other would not have
performed his part first.  And for that cause, in buying, and selling,
and other acts of Contract, A Promise is equivalent to a Covenant;
and therefore obligatory.

Merit What
He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, is said to MERIT
that which he is to receive by the performance of the other;
and he hath it as Due.  Also when a Prize is propounded to many, which is
to be given to him onely that winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many,
to be enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a Free Gift;
yet so to Win, or so to Catch, is to Merit, and to have it as DUE.
For the Right is transferred in the Propounding of the Prize,
and in throwing down the mony; though it be not determined to whom,
but by the Event of the contention.  But there is between these two
sorts of Merit, this difference, that In Contract, I Merit by vertue
of my own power, and the Contractors need; but in this case of Free Gift,
I am enabled to Merit onely by the benignity of the Giver; In Contract,
I merit at The Contractors hand that hee should depart with his right;
In this case of gift, I Merit not that the giver should part with
his right; but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine,
rather than anothers.  And this I think to be the meaning of
that distinction of the Schooles, between Meritum Congrui,
and Meritum Condigni.  For God Almighty, having promised Paradise
to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall desires,) that can walk through
this world according to the Precepts, and Limits prescribed by him;
they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit Paradise Ex Congruo.
But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own Righteousnesse,
or any other power in himselfe, but by the Free Grace of God onely;
they say, no man can Merit Paradise Ex Condigno.  This I say,
I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because Disputers
do not agree upon the signification of their own termes of Art,
longer than it serves their turn; I will not affirme any thing
of their meaning: onely this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely,
as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth Meriteth,
and may claime the Prize as Due.

Covenants Of Mutuall Trust, When Invalid
If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe presently,
but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is
a condition of Warre of every man against every man,) upon any
reasonable suspition, it is Voyd; But if there be a common
Power set over them bothe, with right and force sufficient
to compell performance; it is not Voyd.  For he that performeth first,
has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds
of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger,
and other Passions, without the feare of some coerceive Power;
which in the condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall,
and judges of the justnesse of their own fears cannot possibly
be supposed.  And therefore he which performeth first, does but
betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the Right (he can never
abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.

But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain
those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is
no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the Covenant
is to perform first, is obliged so to do.

The cause of Feare, which maketh such a Covenant invalid, must be
alwayes something arising after the Covenant made; as some new fact,
or other signe of the Will not to performe; else it cannot make
the Covenant Voyd.  For that which could not hinder a man from promising,
ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

Right To The End, Containeth Right To The Means
He that transferreth any Right, transferreth the Means of enjoying it,
as farre as lyeth in his power.  As he that selleth Land, is understood
to transferre the Herbage, and whatsoever growes upon it; Nor can he
that sells a Mill turn away the Stream that drives it.  And they that
give to a man The Right of government in Soveraignty, are understood
to give him the right of levying mony to maintain Souldiers;
and of appointing Magistrates for the administration of Justice.

No Covenant With Beasts
To make Covenant with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not
understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any
translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another;
and without mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant.

Nor With God Without Speciall Revelation
To make Covenant with God, is impossible, but by Mediation of such as
God speaketh to, either by Revelation supernaturall, or by his
Lieutenants that govern under him, and in his Name; For otherwise
we know not whether our Covenants be accepted, or not.  And therefore
they that Vow any thing contrary to any law of Nature, Vow in vain;
as being a thing unjust to pay such Vow.  And if it be a thing
commanded by the Law of Nature, it is not the Vow, but the Law
that binds them.

No Covenant, But Of Possible And Future
The matter, or subject of a Covenant, is alwayes something that
falleth under deliberation; (For to Covenant, is an act of the Will;
that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is
therefore alwayes understood to be something to come; and which is
judged Possible for him that Covenanteth, to performe.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be Impossible,
is no Covenant.  But if that prove impossible afterwards,
which before was thought possible, the Covenant is valid, and bindeth,
(though not to the thing it selfe,) yet to the value; or, if that also
be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much
as is possible; for to more no man can be obliged.

Covenants How Made Voyd
Men are freed of their Covenants two wayes; by Performing;
or by being Forgiven.  For Performance, is the naturall end of
obligation; and Forgivenesse, the restitution of liberty; as being
a retransferring of that Right, in which the obligation consisted.

Covenants Extorted By Feare Are Valide
Covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer Nature,
are obligatory.  For example, if I Covenant to pay a ransome,
or service for my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it.  For it is
a Contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to
receive mony, or service for it; and consequently, where no other Law
(as in the condition, of meer Nature) forbiddeth the performance,
the Covenant is valid.  Therefore Prisoners of warre, if trusted
with the payment of their Ransome, are obliged to pay it;
And if a weaker Prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger,
for feare; he is bound to keep it; unlesse (as hath been sayd before)
there ariseth some new, and just cause of feare, to renew the war.
And even in Common-wealths, if I be forced to redeem my selfe from
a Theefe by promising him mony, I am bound to pay it, till the Civill
Law discharge me.  For whatsoever I may lawfully do without Obligation,
the same I may lawfully Covenant to do through feare: and what I
lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

The Former Covenant To One, Makes Voyd The Later To Another
A former Covenant, makes voyd a later.  For a man that hath
passed away his Right to one man to day, hath it not to passe
to morrow to another: and therefore the later promise passeth no Right,
but is null.

A Mans Covenant Not To Defend Himselfe, Is Voyd
A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd.
For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down
his Right to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment,
(the avoyding whereof is the onely End of laying down any Right,)
and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant
transferreth any right; nor is obliging.  For though a man may
Covenant thus, "Unlesse I do so, or so, kill me;" he cannot Covenant thus
"Unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me."
For man by nature chooseth the lesser evill, which is danger of death
in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death
in not resisting.  And this is granted to be true by all men,
in that they lead Criminals to Execution, and Prison, with armed men,
notwithstanding that such Criminals have consented to the Law,
by which they are condemned.

No Man Obliged To Accuse Himselfe
A Covenant to accuse ones Selfe, without assurance of pardon,
is likewise invalide.  For in the condition of Nature, where every
man is Judge, there is no place for Accusation: and in the Civill State,
the Accusation is followed with Punishment; which being Force,
a man is not obliged not to resist.  The same is also true,
of the Accusation of those, by whose Condemnation a man falls
into misery; as of a Father, Wife, or Benefactor.  For the Testimony
of such an Accuser, if it be not willingly given, is praesumed to be
corrupted by Nature; and therefore not to be received: and where a mans
Testimony is not to be credited, his not bound to give it.
Also Accusations upon Torture, are not to be reputed as Testimonies.
For Torture is to be used but as means of conjecture, and light,
in the further examination, and search of truth; and what is in that case
confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is Tortured; not to
the informing of the Torturers: and therefore ought not to have
the credit of a sufficient Testimony: for whether he deliver himselfe
by true, or false Accusation, he does it by the Right of preserving
his own life.

The End Of An Oath
The Forme Of As Oath
The force of Words, being (as I have formerly noted) too weak
to hold men to the performance of their Covenants; there are
in mans nature, but two imaginable helps to strengthen it.
And those are either a Feare of the consequence of breaking their word;
or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to breake it.
This later is a Generosity too rarely found to be presumed on,
especially in the pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensuall Pleasure;
which are the greatest part of Mankind.  The Passion to be reckoned upon,
is Fear; whereof there be two very generall Objects: one,
the Power of Spirits Invisible; the other, the Power of those men
they shall therein Offend.  Of these two, though the former be the
greater Power, yet the feare of the later is commonly the greater Feare.
The Feare of the former is in every man, his own Religion: which hath
place in the nature of man before Civill Society.  The later hath not so;
at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises;
because in the condition of meer Nature, the inequality of Power
is not discerned, but by the event of Battell.  So that before
the time of Civill Society, or in the interruption thereof by Warre,
there is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on,
against the temptations of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or other
strong desire, but the feare of that Invisible Power, which they
every one Worship as God; and Feare as a Revenger of their perfidy.
All therefore that can be done between two men not subject to
Civill Power, is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth:
Which Swearing or OATH, is a Forme Of Speech, Added To A Promise;
By Which He That Promiseth, Signifieth, That Unlesse He Performe,
He Renounceth The Mercy Of His God, Or Calleth To Him For Vengeance
On Himselfe.  Such was the Heathen Forme, "Let Jupiter kill me else,
as I kill this Beast."  So is our Forme, "I shall do thus, and thus,
so help me God."  And this, with the Rites and Ceremonies,
which every one useth in his own Religion, that the feare of
breaking faith might be the greater.

No Oath, But By God
By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any other Forme,
or Rite, then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no Oath:
And there is no Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God.
For though men have sometimes used to swear by their Kings, for feare,
or flattery; yet they would have it thereby understood, they attributed
to them Divine honour.  And that Swearing unnecessarily by God,
is but prophaning of his name: and Swearing by other things,
as men do in common discourse, is not Swearing, but an impious Custome,
gotten by too much vehemence of talking.

An Oath Addes Nothing To The Obligation
It appears also, that the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation.
For a Covenant, if lawfull, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath,
as much as with it; if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be
confirmed with an Oath.



CHAPTER XV

OF OTHER LAWES OF NATURE


The Third Law Of Nature, Justice
From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre
to another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace
of Mankind, there followeth a Third; which is this, That Men
Performe Their Covenants Made: without which, Covenants are in vain,
and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining,
wee are still in the condition of Warre.

Justice And Injustice What
And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall
of JUSTICE.  For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no
Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing;
and consequently, no action can be Unjust.  But when a Covenant
is made, then to break it is Unjust: And the definition of INJUSTICE,
is no other than The Not Performance Of Covenant.  And whatsoever is
not Unjust, is Just.

Justice And Propriety Begin With The Constitution of Common-wealth
But because Covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not
performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former Chapter,)
are invalid; though the Originall of Justice be the making of Covenants;
yet Injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such feare
be taken away; which while men are in the naturall condition of Warre,
cannot be done.  Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive Power, to compell men equally to the
performance of their Covenants, by the terrour of some punishment,
greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant;
and to make good that Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men acquire,
in recompence of the universall Right they abandon: and such power
there is none before the erection of a Common-wealth.  And this is also
to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles:
For they say, that "Justice is the constant Will of giving to every
man his own."  And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety,
there is no Injustice; and where there is no coerceive Power erected,
that is, where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Propriety;
all men having Right to all things: Therefore where there is no
Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust.  So that the nature of Justice,
consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants
begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to
compell men to keep them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.

Justice Not Contrary To Reason
The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice;
and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans
conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care,
there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought
conduced thereunto; and therefore also to make, or not make; keep,
or not keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced
to ones benefit.  He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants;
and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach
of them may be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice:
but he questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the feare of God,
(for the same Foole hath said in his heart there is no God,) may not
sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his
own good; and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit,
as shall put a man in a condition, to neglect not onely the dispraise,
and revilings, but also the power of other men.  The Kingdome of God
is gotten by violence; but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence?
were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive
hurt by it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice;
or else Justice is not to be approved for good.  From such reasoning
as this, Succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the Name of Vertue;
and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of Faith;
yet have allowed it, when it is for the getting of a Kingdome.
And the Heathen that believed, that Saturn was deposed by his
son Jupiter, believed neverthelesse the same Jupiter to be the
avenger of Injustice: Somewhat like to a piece of Law in Cokes
Commentaries on Litleton; where he sayes, If the right Heire
of the Crown be attainted of Treason; yet the Crown shall descend
to him, and Eo Instante the Atteynder be voyd; From which instances
a man will be very prone to inferre; that when the Heire apparent
of a Kingdome, shall kill him that is in possession, though his father;
you may call it Injustice, or by what other name you will;
yet it can never be against Reason, seeing all the voluntary actions
of men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most
Reasonable, that conduce most to their ends.  This specious reasoning
is nevertheless false.

For the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security
of performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected
over the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants:
But either where one of the parties has performed already;
or where there is a Power to make him performe; there is the question
whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other
to performe, or not.  And I say it is not against reason.
For the manifestation whereof, we are to consider; First, that when
a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen,
and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident
which he could not expect, arriving may turne it to his benefit;
yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done.
Secondly, that in a condition of Warre, wherein every man to every man,
for want of a common Power to keep them all in awe, is an Enemy,
there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend
himselfe from destruction, without the help of Confederates;
where every one expects the same defence by the Confederation,
that any one else does: and therefore he which declares he thinks it
reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no
other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single Power.
He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently declareth that
he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any Society,
that unite themselves for Peace and defence, but by the errour of them
that receive him; nor when he is received, be retayned in it,
without seeing the danger of their errour; which errours a man
cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security;
and therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth;
and if he live in Society, it is by the errours of other men,
which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently
against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that
contribute not to his destruction, forbear him onely out of ignorance
of what is good for themselves.

As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity
of Heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way
imaginable; and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.

And for the other Instance of attaining Soveraignty by Rebellion;
it is manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot
reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by
gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner,
the attempt thereof is against reason.  Justice therefore,
that is to say, Keeping of Covenant, is a Rule of Reason,
by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life;
and consequently a Law of Nature.

There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of Nature,
to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on earth;
but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death; to which
they think the breach of Covenant may conduce; and consequently be
just and reasonable; (such are they that think it a work of merit to kill,
or depose, or rebell against, the Soveraigne Power constituted over them
by their own consent.)  But because there is no naturall knowledge
of mans estate after death; much lesse of the reward that is then
to be given to breach of Faith; but onely a beliefe grounded upon
other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know
those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally;
Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason, or Nature.

Covenants Not Discharged By The Vice Of The
Person To Whom They Are Made
Others, that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith,
do neverthelesse make exception of certain persons; as Heretiques,
and such as use not to performe their Covenant to others:
And this also is against reason.  For if any fault of a man,
be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made; the same ought in reason
to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it.

Justice Of Men, And Justice Of Actions What
The names of Just, and Unjust, when they are attributed to Men,
signifie one thing; and when they are attributed to Actions, another.
When they are attributed to Men, they signifie Conformity,
or Inconformity of Manners, to Reason.  But when they are attributed
to Actions, they signifie the Conformity, or Inconformity to Reason,
not of Manners, or manner of life, but of particular Actions.
A Just man therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can, that his
Actions may be all Just: and an Unjust man, is he that neglecteth it.
And such men are more often in our Language stiled by the names of
Righteous, and Unrighteous; then Just, and Unjust; though the meaning
be the same.  Therefore a Righteous man, does not lose that Title,
by one, or a few unjust Actions, that proceed from sudden Passion,
or mistake of Things, or Persons: nor does an Unrighteous man,
lose his character, for such Actions, as he does, of forbeares to do,
for feare: because his Will is not framed by the Justice,
but by the apparant benefit of what he is to do.  That which gives
to humane Actions the relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse or
Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns
to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud,
or breach of promise.  This Justice of the Manners, is that which
is meant, where Justice is called a Vertue; and Injustice a Vice.

But the Justice of Actions denominates men, not Just, but Guiltlesse;
and the Injustice of the same, (which is also called Injury,)
gives them but the name of Guilty.

Justice Of Manners, And Justice Of Actions
Again, the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do
Injurie; and is Injustice before it proceed to Act; and without
supposing any individuall person injured.  But the Injustice of an Action,
(that is to say Injury,) supposeth an individuall person Injured;
namely him, to whom the Covenant was made: And therefore many times the
injury is received by one man, when the dammage redoundeth to another.
As when The Master commandeth his servant to give mony to a stranger;
if it be not done, the Injury is done to the Master, whom he had before
Covenanted to obey; but the dammage redoundeth to the stranger,
to whom he had no Obligation; and therefore could not Injure him.
And so also in Common-wealths, private men may remit to one another
their debts; but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are
endammaged; because the detaining of Debt, is an Injury to themselves;
but Robbery and Violence, are Injuries to the Person of the Common-wealth.

Nothing Done To A Man, By His Own Consent Can Be Injury
Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own Will signified
to the doer, is no Injury to him.  For if he that doeth it,
hath not passed away his originall right to do what he please,
by some Antecedent Covenant, there is no breach of Covenant;
and therefore no Injury done him.  And if he have; then his Will
to have it done being signified, is a release of that Covenant;
and so again there is no Injury done him.

Justice Commutative, And Distributive
Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative,
and Distributive; and the former they say consisteth in
proportion Arithmeticall; the later in proportion Geometricall.
Commutative therefore, they place in the equality of value of
the things contracted for; And Distributive, in the distribution
of equall benefit, to men of equall merit.  As if it were Injustice
to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits.
The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite
of the Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which
they be contented to give.  And Merit (besides that which is by Covenant,
where the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of
the other part, and falls under Justice Commutative, not Distributive,)
is not due by Justice; but is rewarded of Grace onely.  And therefore
this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded,
is not right.  To speak properly, Commutative Justice, is the Justice
of a Contractor; that is, a Performance of Covenant, in Buying,
and Selling; Hiring, and Letting to Hire; Lending, and Borrowing;
Exchanging, Bartering, and other acts of Contract.

And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say,
the act of defining what is Just.  Wherein, (being trusted by them
that make him Arbitrator,) if he performe his Trust, he is said
to distribute to every man his own: and his is indeed Just Distribution,
and may be called (though improperly) Distributive Justice;
but more properly Equity; which also is a Law of Nature,
as shall be shewn in due place.

The Fourth Law Of Nature, Gratitude
As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does Gratitude depend
on Antecedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Free-gift:
and is the fourth Law of Nature; which may be conceived in this Forme,
"That a man which receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace,
Endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to
repent him of his good will."  For no man giveth, but with intention of
Good to himselfe; because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts,
the Object is to every man his own Good; of which if men see they
shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust;
nor consequently of mutuall help; nor of reconciliation of one man to
another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of War;
which is contrary to the first and Fundamentall Law of Nature,
which commandeth men to Seek Peace.  The breach of this Law,
is called Ingratitude; and hath the same relation to Grace,
that Injustice hath to Obligation by Covenant.

The Fifth, Mutuall accommodation, or Compleasance
A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say,
"That every man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest."
For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is
in mens aptnesse to Society; a diversity of Nature, rising from
their diversity of Affections; not unlike to that we see in stones
brought together for building of an Aedifice.  For as that stone
which by the asperity, and irregularity of Figure, takes more room
from others, than it selfe fills; and for the hardnesse, cannot be
easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by
the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so also,
a man that by asperity of Nature, will strive to retain those things
which to himselfe are superfluous, and to others necessary;
and for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be corrected,
is to be left, or cast out of Society, as combersome thereunto.
For seeing every man, not onely by Right, but also by necessity
of Nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is
necessary for his conservation; He that shall oppose himselfe against it,
for things superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon
is to follow; and therefore doth that, which is contrary to the
fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth To Seek Peace.
The observers of this Law, may be called SOCIABLE, (the Latines call
them Commodi;) The contrary, Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, Intractable.

The Sixth, Facility To Pardon
A sixth Law of Nature is this, "That upon caution of the Future time, a
man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it."
For PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace; which though granted
to them that persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Feare;
yet not granted to them that give caution of the Future time,
is signe of an aversion to Peace; and therefore contrary to
the Law of Nature.

The Seventh, That In Revenges, Men Respect Onely The Future Good
A seventh is, " That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for evil,)
Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse
of the good to follow."  Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment
with any other designe, than for correction of the offender,
or direction of others.  For this Law is consequent to the next before it,
that commandeth Pardon, upon security of the Future Time.
Besides, Revenge without respect to the Example, and profit to come,
is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end;
(for the End is alwayes somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end,
is vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason,
tendeth to the introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature;
and is commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty.

The Eighth, Against Contumely
And because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight;
insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not
to be revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature
set down this Precept, "That no man by deed, word, countenance,
or gesture, declare Hatred, or Contempt of another." The breach of
which Law, is commonly called Contumely.

The Ninth, Against Pride
The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition
of meer Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall.
The inequallity that now is, has been introduced by the Lawes civill.
I know that Aristotle in the first booke of his Politiques, for a
foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by Nature, some more worthy
to Command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be
for his Philosophy;) others to Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies,
but were not Philosophers as he;) as if Master and Servant were not
introduced by consent of men, but by difference of Wit; which is not only
against reason; but also against experience.  For there are very few
so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed
by others: Nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force,
with them who distrust their owne wisdome, do they alwaies, or often,
or almost at any time, get the Victory.  If Nature therefore have made
men equall, that equalitie is to be acknowledged; or if Nature have
made men unequall; yet because men that think themselves equall,
will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon Equall termes,
such equalitie must be admitted.  And therefore for the ninth Law
of Nature, I put this, "That every man acknowledge other for
his Equall by Nature."  The breach of this Precept is Pride.

The Tenth Against Arrogance
On this law, dependeth another, "That at the entrance into conditions
of Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right,
which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest."
As it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine
Rights of Nature; that is to say, not to have libertie to do
all they list: so is it necessarie for mans life, to retaine some;
as right to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, motion,
waies to go from place to place; and all things else without which
a man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the making
of Peace, men require for themselves, that which they would not have
to be granted to others, they do contrary to the precedent law,
that commandeth the acknowledgement of naturall equalitie,
and therefore also against the law of Nature.  The observers of
this law, are those we call Modest, and the breakers Arrogant Men.
The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia; that is,
a desire of more than their share.

The Eleventh Equity
Also "If a man be trusted to judge between man and man," it is a
precept of the Law of Nature, "that he deale Equally between them."
For without that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined
but by Warre.  He therefore that is partiall in judgment,
doth what in him lies, to deterre men from the use of Judges,
and Arbitrators; and consequently, (against the fundamentall
Lawe of Nature) is the cause of Warre.

The observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man,
of that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY,
and (as I have sayd before) distributive justice: the violation,
Acception Of Persons, Prosopolepsia.

The Twelfth, Equall Use Of Things Common
And from this followeth another law, "That such things as cannot
be divided, be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity
of the thing permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the
number of them that have Right."  For otherwise the distribution
is Unequall, and contrary to Equitie.

The Thirteenth, Of Lot
But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed
in common.  Then, The Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity, requireth,
"That the Entire Right; or else, (making the use alternate,)
the First Possession, be determined by Lot."  For equall distribution,
is of the Law of Nature; and other means of equall distribution
cannot be imagined.

The Fourteenth, Of Primogeniture, And First Seising
Of Lots there be two sorts, Arbitrary, and Naturall.  Arbitrary,
is that which is agreed on by the Competitors; Naturall, is either
Primogeniture, (which the Greek calls Kleronomia, which signifies,
Given by Lot;) or First Seisure.

And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common,
nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor;
and is some cases to the First-Borne, as acquired by Lot.

The Fifteenth, Of Mediators
It is also a Law of Nature, "That all men that mediate Peace,
be allowed safe Conduct."  For the Law that commandeth Peace,
as the End, commandeth Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession
the Means is safe Conduct.

The Sixteenth, Of Submission To Arbitrement
And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Lawes,
there may neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action;
First, whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done)
whether against the Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof,
is called a question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right;
therefore unlesse the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to
stand to the sentence of another, they are as farre from Peace as ever.
This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR.
And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, "That they that are
at controversie, submit their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator."

The Seventeenth, No Man Is His Own Judge
And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to
his own benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause:
and if he were never so fit; yet Equity allowing to each party
equall benefit, if one be admitted to be Judge, the other is to be
admitted also; & so the controversie, that is, the cause of War,
remains, against the Law of Nature.

The Eighteenth, No Man To Be Judge, That Has In Him
A Naturall Cause Of Partiality
For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received
for Arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure
apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other:
for he hath taken (though an unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe;
and no man can be obliged to trust him.  And thus also the controversie,
and the condition of War remaineth, contrary to the Law of Nature.

The Nineteenth, Of Witnesse
And in a controversie of Fact, the Judge being to give no more
credit to one, than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments)
must give credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more:
For else the question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to
the Law of Nature.

These are the Lawes of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of
the conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern
the doctrine of Civill Society.  There be other things tending
to the destruction of particular men; as Drunkenness, and all other
parts of Intemperance; which may therefore also be reckoned amongst
those things which the Law of Nature hath forbidden; but are not
necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.

A Rule, By Which The Laws Of Nature May Easily Be Examined
And though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of Nature,
to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busie
in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand;
yet to leave all men unexcusable, they have been contracted into
one easie sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is,
"Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe;"
which sheweth him, that he has no more to do in learning the Lawes
of Nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own,
they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the ballance,
and his own into their place, that his own passions, and selfe-love,
may adde nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these
Lawes of Nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.

The Lawes Of Nature Oblige In Conscience Alwayes,
But In Effect Then Onely When There Is Security
The Lawes of Nature oblige In Foro Interno; that is to say,
they bind to a desire they should take place: but In Foro Externo;
that is, to the putting them in act, not alwayes.  For he that
should be modest, and tractable, and performe all he promises,
in such time, and place, where no man els should do so, should but
make himselfe a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruine,
contrary to the ground of all Lawes of Nature, which tend to
Natures preservation.  And again, he that shall observe the same Lawes
towards him, observes them not himselfe, seeketh not Peace, but War;
& consequently the destruction of his Nature by Violence.

And whatsoever Lawes bind In Foro Interno, may be broken, not onely
by a fact contrary to the Law but also by a fact according to it,
in case a man think it contrary.  For though his Action in this case,
be according to the Law; which where the Obligation is In Foro Interno,
is a breach.

The Laws Of Nature Are Eternal;
The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall, For Injustice,
Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons,
and the rest, can never be made lawfull.  For it can never be
that Warre shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it.

And Yet Easie
The same Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour,
I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed.
For in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their
performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.

The Science Of These Lawes, Is The True Morall Philosophy
And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy.
For Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what
is Good, and Evill, in the conversation, and Society of mankind.
Good, and Evill, are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions;
which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men,
are different: And divers men, differ not onely in their Judgement,
on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast,
smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable,
or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life.
Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe;
and one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time
he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil: From whence arise Disputes,
Controversies, and at last War.  And therefore so long as man is in
the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,)
as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: and consequently
all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way,
or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice,
Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are
good; that is to say, Morall Vertues; and their contrarie Vices, Evill.
Now the science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and therfore
the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie.
But the Writers of Morall Philosophie, though they acknowledge the same
Vertues and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodnesse;
nor that they come to be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable,
and comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity of passions:
as if not the Cause, but the Degree of daring, made Fortitude;
or not the Cause, but the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality.

These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes;
but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning
what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves;
whereas Law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath
command over others.  But yet if we consider the same Theoremes,
as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things;
then are they properly called Lawes.



CHAPTER XVI

OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED


A Person What
A PERSON, is he "whose words or actions are considered, either as his own,
or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any
other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction."

Person Naturall, And Artificiall
When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person:
And when they are considered as representing the words and actions
of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person.

The Word Person, Whence
The word Person is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon,
which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise,
or Outward Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage;
and somtimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face,
as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any
Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters.
So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage
and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act,
or Represent himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth another,
is said to beare his Person, or act in his name; (in which sence
Cicero useth it where he saies, "Unus Sustineo Tres Personas;
Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I beare three Persons; my own,
my Adversaries, and the Judges;") and is called in diverse occasions,
diversly; as a Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar,
an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like.

Actor, Author
Authority
Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned
by those whom they represent.  And then the Person is the Actor;
and he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR:
In which case the Actor acteth by Authority.  For that which
in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner,
and in latine Dominus, in Greeke Kurios; speaking of Actions,
is called Author.  And as the Right of possession, is called
Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY.
So that by Authority, is alwayes understood a Right of doing any act:
and Done By Authority, done by Commission, or Licence from him
whose right it is.

Covenants By Authority, Bind The Author
From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant
by Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if
he had made it himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all
the consequences of the same.  And therfore all that hath been
said formerly, (Chap. 14) of the nature of Covenants between
man and man in their naturall capacity, is true also when they are
made by their Actors, Representers, or Procurators, that have authority
from them, so far-forth as is in their Commission, but no farther.

And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer,
not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill.
For no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor
consequently by a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.

But Not The Actor
When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command
of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him,
not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the
Action be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily;
to refuse to do it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth
breach of Covenant.

The Authority Is To Be Shewne
And he that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation
of the Actor, not knowing what Authority he hath, but onely
takes his word; in case such Authority be not made manifest
unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: For the Covenant
made with the Author, is not valid, without his Counter-assurance.
But if he that so Covenanteth, knew before hand he was to expect
no other assurance, than the Actors word; then is the Covenant valid;
because the Actor in this case maketh himselfe the Author.
And therefore, as when the Authority is evident, the Covenant
obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority is feigned,
it obligeth the Actor onely; there being no Author but himselfe.

Things Personated, Inanimate
There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by Fiction.
Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be
Personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer.  But things Inanimate,
cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors:
Yet the Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance,
given them by those that are Owners, or Governours of those things.
And therefore, such things cannot be Personated, before there be
some state of Civill Government.

Irrational;
Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason,
may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors
(during that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they
shall recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable.
Yet during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give
Authority to the Guardian.  But this again has no place but in a
State Civill, because before such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.

False Gods;
An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, my be Personated; as were the
Gods of the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed,
were Personated, and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights,
which men from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them.
But idols cannot be Authors: for a Idol is nothing.  The Authority
proceeded from the State: and therefore before introduction of
Civill Government, the Gods of the Heathen could not be Personated.

The True God
The true God may be Personated.  As he was; first, by Moses;
who governed the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,)
not in his own name, with Hoc Dicit Moses; but in Gods Name,
with Hoc Dicit Dominus.  Secondly, by the son of man, his own Son
our Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jewes,
and induce all Nations into the Kingdome of his Father; not as of
himselfe, but as sent from his Father.  And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost,
or Comforter, speaking, and working in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost,
was a Comforter that came not of himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded
from them both.

A Multitude Of Men, How One Person
A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man,
or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent
of every one of that Multitude in particular.  For it is the
Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented,
that maketh the Person One.  And it is the Representer that beareth
the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be
understood in Multitude.

Every One Is Author
And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many;
they cannot be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing
their Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man giving
their common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular;
and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him
Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what,
and how farre he shall represent them, none of them owneth more,
than they gave him commission to Act.

An Actor May Be Many Men Made One By Plurality Of Voyces.
And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the
greater number, must be considered as the voyce of them all.
For if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative,
and the greater in the Negative, there will be Negatives more than
enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Negatives,
standing uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the Representative hath.

Representatives, When The Number Is Even, Unprofitable
And a Representative of even number, especially when the number
is not great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes
equall, is therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action.
Yet in some cases contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine
a question; as in condemning, or absolving, equality of votes,
even in that they condemne not, do absolve; but not on the contrary
condemne, in that they absolve not.  For when a Cause is heard;
not to condemne, is to absolve; but on the contrary, to say that
not absolving, is condemning, is not true.  The like it is in a
deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till another time;
For when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing Execution,
is a decree of Dilation.

Negative Voyce
Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;)
whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away
the effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number
is no Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions,
and Interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the
greatest consequence, a mute Person, and unapt, as for may things else,
so for the government of a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.

Of Authors there be two sorts.  The first simply so called;
which I have before defined to be him, that owneth the Action
of another simply.  The second is he, that owneth an Action,
or Covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh
to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time.
And these Authors conditionall, are generally called SURETYES,
in Latine Fidejussores, and Sponsores; and particularly for Debt,
Praedes; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.





PART II

OF COMMON-WEALTH




CHAPTER XVII

OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A COMMON-WEALTH


The End Of Common-wealth, Particular Security
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty,
and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint
upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,)
is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented
life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that
miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent
(as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there is
no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of
punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of
these Lawes of Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

Which Is Not To Be Had From The Law Of Nature:
For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy,
and (in summe) Doing To Others, As Wee Would Be Done To,) if themselves,
without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed,
are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality,
Pride, Revenge, and the like.  And Covenants, without the Sword,
are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.
Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath
then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,)
if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security;
every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art,
for caution against all other men.  And in all places, where men
have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one another,
has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law
of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was
their honour; and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes
of Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives,
and instruments of husbandry.  And as small Familyes did then; so now
do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their
own security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger,
and fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders,
endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours,
by open force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly;
and are rememdbred for it in after ages with honour.

Nor From The Conjunction Of A Few Men Or Familyes
Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives
them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the
one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great,
as is sufficient to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement
to an Invasion.  The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security,
is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with
the Enemy we feare; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy
is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event
of warre, as to move him to attempt.

Nor From A Great Multitude, Unlesse Directed
By One Judgement:
And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions
be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular
appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection,
neither against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another.
For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and
application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another;
and reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing:
whereby they are easily, not onely subdued by a very few that
agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make warre
upon each other, for their particular interests.  For if we could
suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice,
and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe;
we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then
there neither would be nor need to be any Civill Government,
or Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.

And That Continually
Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should
last all the time of their life, that they be governed,
and directed by one judgement, for a limited time; as in one Battell,
or one Warre.  For though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous
endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet afterwards, when either
they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for
an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs
by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again
into a Warre amongst themselves.

Why Certain Creatures Without Reason, Or Speech,
Do Neverthelesse Live In Society, Without
Any Coercive Power
It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants,
live sociably one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle
numbred amongst Politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction,
than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech,
whereby one of them can signifie to another, what he thinks
expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps
desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same.  To which I answer,

First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity,
which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there
ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre;
but amongst these not so.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not
from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private,
they procure thereby the common benefit.  But man, whose Joy
consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing
but what is eminent.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason,
do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration
of their common businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many,
that thinke themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique,
better than the rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate,
one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction
and Civill warre.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice,
in making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections;
yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent
to others, that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill,
in the likenesse of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent
greatnesse of Good and Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their
Peace at their pleasure.

Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury,
and Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not
offended with their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome,
when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome,
and controule the Actions of them that governe the Common-wealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men,
is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder
if there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their
Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them
in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.

The Generation Of A Common-wealth
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend
them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another,
and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie,
and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves
and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength
upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their
Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say,
to appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person;
and every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of
whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause
to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace
and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will,
and their Judgements, to his Judgment.  This is more than Consent,
or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person,
made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner,
as if every man should say to every man, "I Authorise and give up
my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men,
on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise
all his Actions in like manner."  This done, the Multitude so united
in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS.
This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God,
our peace and defence.  For by this Authoritie, given him by every
particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much
Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof,
he is inabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home,
and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad.

The Definition Of A Common-wealth
And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which
(to define it,) is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude,
by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one
the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all,
as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence."

Soveraigne, And Subject, What
And he that carryeth this Person, as called SOVERAIGNE, and said
to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.

The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes.
One, by Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children,
to submit themselves, and their children to his government,
as being able to destroy them if they refuse, or by Warre subdueth
his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition.
The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Man,
or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected
by him against all others.  This later, may be called a Politicall
Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and the former,
a Common-wealth by Acquisition.  And first, I shall speak
of a Common-wealth by Institution.



CHAPTER XVIII

OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION


The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What
A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude
of men do Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One,
that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly Of Men, shall be given
by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all,
(that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one,
as well he that Voted For It, as he that Voted Against It,
shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man,
or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own,
to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected
against other men.

The Consequences To Such Institution, Are
I. The Subjects Cannot Change The Forme Of Government
From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights,
and Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power
is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are
not obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto.
And Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth,
being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements
of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves,
to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without
his permission.  And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch,
cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the
confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person
from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of men:
for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed
Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall do,
and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting,
all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man,
which is injustice: and they have also every man given the
Soveraignty to him that beareth their Person; and therefore
if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own,
and so again it is injustice.  Besides, if he that attempteth
to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or punished by him for such
attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the Institution,
Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And because it is injustice
for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his
own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust.  And whereas
some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign,
a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust:
for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body
that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant,
who hath the Soveraignty under God.  But this pretence of Covenant
with God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences,
that it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile,
and unmanly disposition.

2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited
Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all,
is given to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another,
and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant
on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects,
by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection.
That he which is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects
beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the
whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make a
severall Covenant with every man.  With the whole, as one party,
it is impossible; because as yet they are not one Person:
and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be men,
those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd, because
what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof,
is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done
in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular.
Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant
made by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other
of his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach,
there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie:
it returns therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth
the right of Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to
the designe they had in the Institution.  It is therefore in vain
to grant Soveraignty by way of precedent Covenant.  The opinion that
any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition,
proceedeth from want of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants
being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain,
or protect any man, but what it has from the publique Sword; that is,
from the untyed hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath
the Soveraignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all,
and performed by the strength of them all, in him united.
But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then no man imagineth
any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for no man is so dull
as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made a Covenant with the
Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such conditions;
which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman People.
That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and in a Popular
Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder
to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate,
than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.

3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against The
Institution Of The Soveraigne Declared By The Major Part.
Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared
a Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest;
that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do,
or else justly be destroyed by the rest.  For if he voluntarily
entered into the Congregation of them that were assembled,
he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore
tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne:
and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation
against any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant,
and therfore unjustly.  And whether he be of the Congregation,
or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either
submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of warre
he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed
by any man whatsoever.

4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly
Accused By The Subject
Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of
all the Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted;
it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of
his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice.
For he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein
no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: But by this
Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular man is Author
of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth
of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof
he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse
any man but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do
injury to ones selfe, is impossible.  It is true that they that have
Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury
in the proper signification.

5.What Soever The Soveraigne Doth,
Is Unpunishable By The Subject
Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that
hath Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in
any manner by his Subjects punished.  For seeing every Subject
is author of the actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another,
for the actions committed by himselfe.

6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary For The Peace
And Defence Of His Subjects
And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence
of them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means;
it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath
the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence;
and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same;
and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done,
both beforehand, for the preserving of Peace and Security,
by prevention of discord at home and Hostility from abroad; and,
when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same.
And therefore,

And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught Them
Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what
Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace;
and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what,
men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people;
and who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they
be published.  For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions;
and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the well
governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord.
And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but
the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by Peace.
For Doctrine Repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace
and Concord can be against the Law of Nature.  It is true, that in
a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of
Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received;
the contrary Truths may be generally offensive; Yet the most sudden,
and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never breake
the Peace, but onely somtimes awake the Warre.  For those men that
are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend,
or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition
not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another;
and they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually.
It belongeth therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power,
to be Judge, or constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines,
as a thing necessary to Peace, thereby to prevent Discord
and Civill Warre.

7. The Right Of Making Rules, Whereby The Subject May
Every Man Know What Is So His Owne, As No Other Subject
Can Without Injustice Take It From Him
Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of
prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he
may enjoy and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by
any of his fellow Subjects: And this is it men Call Propriety.
For before constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn)
all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre:
and therefore this Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on
Soveraign Power, is the Act of the Power, in order to the publique peace.
These Rules of Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull
and Unlawfull in the actions of subjects, are the Civill Lawes,
that is to say, the lawes of each Commonwealth in particular;
though the name of Civill Law be now restrained to the antient
Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which being the head of a
great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were in these parts
the Civill Law.

8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All Judicature
And Decision Of Controversies:
Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature;
that is to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies,
which may arise concerning Law, either Civill, or naturall,
or concerning Fact.  For without the decision of Controversies,
there is no protection of one Subject, against the injuries of another;
the Lawes concerning Meum and Tuum are in vaine; and to every
man remaineth, from the naturall and necessary appetite of his
own conservation, the right of protecting himselfe by his
private strength, which is the condition of Warre; and contrary to
the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.

9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall Think Best:
Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre,
and Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say,
of Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great
forces are to be assembled, armed, and payd for that end;
and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to defray the expenses thereof.
For the Power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in
their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the union of their
strength under one Command; which Command the Soveraign Instituted,
therefore hath; because the command of the Militia, without other
Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign.  And therefore
whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that hath the Soveraign
Power is alwayes Generallissimo.

10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And Ministers,
Both Of Peace, And Warre:
Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all Councellours,
Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in peace, and War.
For seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is
the common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to
use such Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.

11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That (Where No
Former Law hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary:
Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding
with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary
punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Lawe
he hath formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he
shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve
the Common-wealth, or deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.

12. And Of Honour And Order
Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set
upon themselves; what respect they look for from others;
and how little they value other men; from whence continually
arise amongst them, Emulation, Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre,
to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength
against a Common Enemy; It is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour,
and a publique rate of the worth of such men as have deserved,
or are able to deserve well of the Common-wealth; and that there be
force in the hands of some or other, to put those Lawes in execution.
But it hath already been shown, that not onely the whole Militia,
or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the Judicature of all
Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty.  To the Soveraign
therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to appoint
what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what
signes of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall give
to one another.

These Rights Are Indivisible
These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty;
and which are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man,
or Assembly of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth.
For these are incommunicable, and inseparable.  The Power to coyn Mony;
to dispose of the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have
praeemption in Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives,
may be transferred by the Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect
his Subject be retained.  But if he transferre the Militia,
he retains the Judicature in vain, for want of execution of the Lawes;
Or if he grant away the Power of raising Mony; the Militia is in vain:
or if he give away the government of doctrines, men will be frighted
into rebellion with the feare of Spirits.  And so if we consider
any one of the said Rights, we shall presently see, that the holding
of all the rest, will produce no effect, in the conservation of
Peace and Justice, the end for which all Common-wealths are Instituted.
And this division is it, whereof it is said, "A kingdome divided in
it selfe cannot stand:" For unlesse this division precede,
division into opposite Armies can never happen.  If there had not
first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England,
that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords,
and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided,
and fallen into this Civill Warre; first between those that
disagreed in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters
about the liberty of Religion; which have so instructed men
in this point of Soveraign Right, that there be few now (in England,)
that do not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will be so
generally acknowledged, at the next return of Peace; and so continue,
till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar
be better taught than they have hetherto been.

And Can By No Grant Passe Away Without Direct
Renouncing Of The Soveraign Power
And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows
necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be
granted away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct
termes renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the
Grantees to him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has
granted all he can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored,
as inseparably annexed thereunto.

The Power And Honour Of Subjects Vanisheth In The
Presence Of The Power Soveraign
This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed
to the Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them,
that say of Soveraign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores,
of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet they be
Universis Minores, of lesse power than them all together.
For if by All Together, they mean not the collective body as one person,
then All Together, and Every One, signifie the same; and the speech
is absurd.  But if by All Together, they understand them as one Person
(which person the Soveraign bears,) then the power of all together,
is the same with the Soveraigns power; and so again the speech is absurd;
which absurdity they see well enough, when the Soveraignty is in
an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not;
and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.

And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be
greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects.  For in the Soveraignty
is the fountain of Honour.  The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke,
and Prince are his Creatures.  As in the presence of the Master,
the Servants are equall, and without any honour at all; So are
the Subjects, in the presence of the Soveraign.  And though they
shine some more, some lesse, when they are out of his sight;
yet in his presence, they shine no more than the Starres in
presence of the Sun.

Soveraigne Power Not Hurtfull As The Want Of It,
And The Hurt Proceeds For The Greatest Part From Not
Submitting Readily, To A Lesse
But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is
very miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other
irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power
in their hands.  And commonly they that live under a Monarch,
think it the fault of Monarchy; and they that live under the
government of Democracy, or other Soveraign Assembly, attribute
all the inconvenience to that forme of Common-wealth; whereas the
Power in all formes, if they be perfect enough to protect them,
is the same; not considering that the estate of Man can never be
without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest,
that in any forme of Government can possibly happen to the people
in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries,
and horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that
dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes,
and a coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge:
nor considering that the greatest pressure of Soveraign Governours,
proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect
in the dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor,
consisteth their own selves, that unwillingly contributing to
their own defence, make it necessary for their Governours to draw
from them what they can in time of Peace, that they may have means
on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage
on their Enemies.  For all men are by nature provided of notable
multiplying glasses, (that is their Passions and Self-love,)
through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance;
but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely Morall
and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang
over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.



CHAPTER XIX

OF THE SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION,
AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVERAIGNE POWER


The Different Formes Of Common-wealths But Three
The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of
the Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one
of the Multitude.  And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man,
or in an Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either
Every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men
distinguished from the rest; it is manifest, there can be but Three
kinds of Common-wealth.  For the Representative must needs be One man,
or More: and if more, then it is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part.
When the Representative is One man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY:
when an Assembly of All that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY,
or Popular Common-wealth: when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it
is called an ARISTOCRACY.  Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none:
for either One, or More, or All must have the Soveraign Power
(which I have shewn to be indivisible) entire.

Tyranny And Oligarchy, But Different Names Of Monarchy,
And Aristocracy
There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of Policy;
as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other Formes
of Government, but of the same Formes misliked.  For they that
are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that
are displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: so also,
they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy,
(which signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes,
that want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same
reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind,
when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed
by the Governours.

Subordinate Representatives Dangerous
It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may,
if they please, give Authority to One Man, to represent them every one;
as well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever;
and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good,
to a Monarch, as absolutely, as to any other Representative.
Therefore, where there is already erected a Soveraign Power,
there can be no other Representative of the same people,
but onely to certain particular ends, by the Soveraign limited.
For that were to erect two Soveraigns; and every man to have his
person represented by two Actors, that by opposing one another,
must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace)
is indivisible, and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition
of Warre, contrary to the end for which all Soveraignty is instituted.
And therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Soveraign Assembly,
inviting the People of their Dominion, to send up their Deputies,
with power to make known their Advise, or Desires, should therefore
hold such Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute
Representative of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same
in a Monarchy.  And I know not how this so manifest a truth,
should of late be so little observed; that in a Monarchy,
he that had the Soveraignty from a descent of 600 years,
was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from every
one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their King;
was notwithstanding never considered as their Representative;
that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men,
which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their Petitions,
and give him (if he permitted it) their advise.  Which may serve
as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute
Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that Office,
and to take heed how they admit of any other generall Representation
upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the truth
committed to them.

Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign Assemblyes
The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth,
consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the difference
of Convenience, or Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security
of the people; for which end they were instituted.  And to compare
Monarchy with the other two, we may observe; First, that whosoever beareth
the Person of the people, or is one of that Assembly that bears it,
beareth also his own naturall Person.  And though he be carefull
in his politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more,
or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe,
his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique
interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private:
for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason.
From whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest
are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced.
Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique.
The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches,
strength and reputation of his Subjects.  For no King can be rich,
nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore,
or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention,
to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy,
or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much
to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious,
as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action,
or a Civill warre.

Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when,
and where he pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men
versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or
quality soever, and as long before the time of action, and with
as much secrecy, as he will.  But when a Soveraigne Assembly
has need of Counsell, none are admitted but such as have a Right
thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who
have beene versed more in the acquisition of Wealth than of Knowledge;
and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may,
and do commonly excite men to action, but not governe them in it.
For the Understanding is by the flame of the Passions, never enlightned,
but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an Assemblie can
receive Counsell with secrecie, because of their owne Multitude.

Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no
other Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies,
besides that of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number.
For the absence of a few, that would have the Resolution once taken,
continue firme, (which may happen by security, negligence,
or private impediments,) or the diligent appearance of a few of
the contrary opinion, undoes to day, all that was concluded yesterday.

Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy,
or interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height,
as may produce a Civill Warre.

Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject,
by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer,
may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and
inevitable inconvenience.  But the same may as well happen,
where the Soveraigne Power is in an Assembly: for their power
is the same; and they are as subject to evill Counsell, and to be
seduced by Orators, as a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming
one an others Flatterers, serve one anothers Covetousnesse
and Ambition by turnes.  And whereas the Favorites of an Assembly,
are many; and the Kindred much more numerous, than of any Monarch.
Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which cannot as well
succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators, that is to say,
Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have great power to hurt,
have little to save.  For to accuse, requires lesse Eloquence
(such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution
more resembles Justice.

Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie
may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between
Good and Evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Power,
must be in the hand of another Man, or of some Assembly of men,
which are to governe by his right, and in his name; as Curators,
and Protectors of his Person, and Authority.  But to say there
is inconvenience, in putting the use of the Soveraign Power,
into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is to say that
all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and Civill Warre.
And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from
the Contention of those, that for an office of so great honour,
and profit, may become Competitors.  To make it appear, that this
inconvenience, proceedeth not from that forme of Government we
call Monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent Monarch,
hath appointed who shall have the Tuition of his Infant Successor,
either expressely by Testament, or tacitly, by not controlling
the Custome in that case received: And then such inconvenience
(if it happen) is to be attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to the
Ambition, and Injustice of the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government,
where the people are not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights
of Soveraignty, is the same.  Or else the precedent Monarch,
hath not at all taken order for such Tuition; And then the Law
of Nature hath provided this sufficient rule, That the Tuition
shall be in him, that hath by Nature most interest in the preservation
of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue
by his death, or diminution.  For seeing every man by nature seeketh
his own benefit, and promotion; to put an Infant into the power of those,
that can promote themselves by his destruction, or dammage,
is not Tuition, but Trechery.  So that sufficient provision being taken,
against all just quarrell, about the Government under a Child,
if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace,
it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the
ambition of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty.  On the other side,
there is no great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in
a great Assembly, which is not, as to consultations of Peace,
and Warre, and making of Lawes, in the same condition, as if
the Government were in a Child.  For as a Child wants the judgement
to dissent from counsell given him, and is thereby necessitated
to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he is committed:
So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the counsell
of the major part, be it good, or bad.  And as a Child has need
of a Tutor, or Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority:
So also (in great Common-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly,
in all great dangers and troubles, have need of Custodes Libertatis;
that is of Dictators, or Protectors of their Authoritie; which are
as much as Temporary Monarchs; to whom for a time, they may commit
the entire exercise of their Power; and have (at the end of that time)
been oftner deprived thereof, than Infant Kings, by their Protectors,
Regents, or any other Tutors.

Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three;
that is to say, Monarchie, where one Man has it; or Democracie,
where the generall Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristocracie,
where it is in an Assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise
distinguished from the rest: Yet he that shall consider the particular
Common-wealthes that have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps
easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think
there be other Formes, arising from these mingled together.
As for example, Elective Kingdomes; where Kings have the Soveraigne
Power put into their hands for a time; of Kingdomes, wherein the King
hath a power limited: which Governments, are nevertheless by most
Writers called Monarchie.  Likewise if a Popular, or Aristocraticall
Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies Countrie, and govern the same,
by a President, Procurator, or other Magistrate; this may seeme perhaps
at first sight, to be a Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government.
But it is not so.  For Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes,
but Ministers of the Soveraigne; nor limited Kings Soveraignes,
but Ministers of them that have the Soveraigne Power: nor are those
Provinces which are in subjection to a Democracie, or Aristocracie
of another Common-wealth, Democratically, or Aristocratically governed,
but Monarchically.

And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to
his life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day;
or to certaine Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst
the Romans; If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more
Elective but Hereditary.  But if he have no Power to elect his Successor,
then there is some other Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease
may elect a new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him,
and returneth to the condition of Warre.  If it be known who have
the power to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also
that the Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give
that which they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves,
if they think good.  But if there be none that can give the Soveraigntie,
after the decease of him that was first elected; then has he power,
nay he is obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing
his Successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the Government,
from relapsing into the miserable condition of Civill warre.
And consequently he was, when elected, a Soveraign absolute.

Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him,
or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour,
is not supreme; that is to say not Soveraign.  The Soveraignty therefore
was alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him;
and by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy,
or Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had
a priviledge to lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the Ephori.

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of Judea
(for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a Democracy;
because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any of them,
had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were not governed
by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their Election:
but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the people
of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to the
people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in
the government, was a Monarch.  For though where the people are
governed by an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number,
the government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they
are governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a Monarchy;
not of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.

Of The Right Of Succession
Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall,
so that not onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy,
it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of men,
that as there was order taken for an Artificiall Man, so there
be order also taken, for an Artificiall Eternity of life; without which,
men that are governed by an Assembly, should return into the condition
of Warre in every age; and they that are governed by One man,
as soon as their Governour dyeth.  This Artificiall Eternity,
is that which men call the Right of Succession.

There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of
the Succession is not in the present Soveraign.  For if it be
in any other particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a
person subject, and may be assumed by the Soveraign at his pleasure;
and consequently the Right is in himselfe.  And if it be in no
particular man, but left to a new choyce; then is the Common-wealth
dissolved; and the Right is in him that can get it; contrary to
the intention of them that did institute the Common-wealth,
for their perpetuall, and not temporary security.

In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the Multitude
that are to be governed faile.  And therefore questions of the
right of Succession, have in that forme of Government no place at all.

In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dyeth, the election
of another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Soveraign,
to whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellours, and Officers.
For that which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of
the Subjects doth, as Author.  And though the Soveraign assembly,
may give Power to others, to elect new men, for supply of their Court;
yet it is still by their Authority, that the Election is made;
and by the same it may (when the publique shall require it) be recalled.

The Present Monarch Hath Right To Dispose Of The Succession
The greatest difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy:
And the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight,
it is not manifest who is to appoint the Successor; nor many times,
who it is whom he hath appointed.  For in both these cases, there is
required a more exact ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use.
As to the question, who shall appoint the Successor, of a Monarch
that hath the Soveraign Authority; that is to say, (for Elective Kings
and Princes have not the Soveraign Power in propriety, but in use only,)
we are to consider, that either he that is in possession, has right
to dispose of the Succession, or else that right is again in
the dissolved Multitude.  For the death of him that hath the
Soveraign power in propriety, leaves the Multitude without any
Soveraign at all; that is, without any Representative in whom
they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all:
And therefore they are incapable of Election of any new Monarch;
every man having equall right to submit himselfe to such as he thinks
best able to protect him, or if he can, protect himselfe by his
owne sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the condition
of a War of every man against every man, contrary to the end for which
Monarchy had its first Institution.  Therfore it is manifest,
that by the Institution of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor,
is alwaies left to the Judgment and Will of the present Possessor.

And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that
the Monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and
inheritance of his power; it is determined by his expresse Words,
and Testament; or by other tacite signes sufficient.

Succession Passeth By Expresse Words;
By expresse Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him
in his life time, viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperours
of Rome declared who should be their Heires.  For the word Heire
does not of it selfe imply the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man;
but whomsoever a man shall any way declare, he would have to succeed
him in his Estate.  If therefore a Monarch declare expresly,
that such a man shall be his Heire, either by Word or Writing,
then is that man immediately after the decease of his Predecessor,
Invested in the right of being Monarch.

Or, By Not Controlling A Custome;
But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other naturall
signes of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custome.
And therefore where the Custome is, that the next of Kindred
absolutely succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to
the Succession; for that, if the will of him that was in posession had
been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his life time.
And likewise where the Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred
succeedeth, there also the right of Succession is in the next of
the Kindred Male, for the same reason.  And so it is if the Custome
were to advance the Female.  For whatsoever Custome a man may by
a word controule, and does not, it is a naturall signe he would have
that Custome stand.

Or, By Presumption Of Naturall Affection
But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it is
to be understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the government
remain Monarchicall; because he hath approved that government in himselfe.
Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be preferred
before any other; because men are presumed to be more enclined by nature,
to advance their own children, than the children of other men;
and of their own, rather a Male than a Female; because men,
are naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger.
Thirdly, where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger;
and so still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote,
because it is alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer
in affection; and 'tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion,
the most honour from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred.

To Dispose Of The Succession, Though To A King Of
Another Nation, Not Unlawfull
But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession
by words of Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object
a great inconvenience: for he may sell, or give his Right of governing
to a stranger; which, because strangers (that is, men not used to live
under the same government, not speaking the same language) do commonly
undervalue one another, may turn to the oppression of his Subjects;
which is indeed a great inconvenience; but it proceedeth not necessarily
from the subjection to a strangers government, but from the unskilfulnesse
of the Governours, ignorant of the true rules of Politiques.
And therefore the Romans when they had subdued many Nations,
to make their Government digestible, were wont to take away
that grievance, as much as they thought necessary, by giving
sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes to Principall men
of every Nation they conquered, not onely the Privileges,
but also the Name of Romans; and took many of them into the Senate,
and Offices of charge, even in the Roman City.  And this was it our
most wise King, King James, aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of
his two Realms of England and Scotland.  Which if he could have obtained,
had in all likelihood prevented the Civill warres, which make both those
Kingdomes at this present, miserable.  It is not therefore any injury
to the people, for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by Will; though
by the fault of many Princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient.
Of the lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever
inconvenience can arrive by giving a Kingdome to a stranger,
may arrive also by so marrying with strangers, as the Right of
Succession may descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull.



CHAPTER XX

OF DOMINION PATERNALL AND DESPOTICALL


A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power
is acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly,
or many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds,
do authorise all the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath
their lives and liberty in his Power.

Wherein Different From A Common-wealth By Institution
And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty
by Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their Soveraign,
do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute:
But in this case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of.
In both cases they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them,
that hold all such Covenants, as proceed from fear of death,
or violence, voyd: which if it were true, no man, in any kind
of Common-wealth, could be obliged to Obedience.  It is true,
that in a Common-wealth once Instituted, or acquired, Promises proceeding
from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging,
when the thing promised is contrary to the Lawes; But the reason is not,
because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth,
hath no right in the thing promised.  Also, when he may lawfully performe,
and doth not, it is not the Invalidity of the Covenant, that absolveth him,
but the Sentence of the Soveraign.  Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully
promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh: But when the Soveraign,
who is the Actor, acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that
exorted the promise, as by the Author of such absolution.

The Rights Of Soveraignty The Same In Both
But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same in both.
His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another:
He cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects,
of Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is
necessary for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator;
and Supreme Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions
of Warre, and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates,
Counsellours, Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers;
and to determine of Rewards, and punishments, Honour, and Order.
The reasons whereof, are the same which are alledged in the
precedent Chapter, for the same Rights, and Consequences of
Soveraignty by Institution.

Dominion Paternall How Attained
Not By Generation, But By Contract
Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest.
The right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent
hath over his Children; and is called PATERNALL.  And is not so
derived from the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion
over his Child because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent,
either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared.
For as to the Generation, God hath ordained to man a helper;
and there be alwayes two that are equally Parents: the Dominion therefore
over the Child, should belong equally to both; and he be equally
subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two Masters.
And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to the Man onely,
as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it.
For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between
the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War.
In Common-wealths, this controversie is decided by the Civill Law:
and for the most part, (but not alwayes) the sentence is in
favour of the Father; because for the most part Common-wealths
have been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families.
But the question lyeth now in the state of meer Nature; where there are
supposed no lawes of Matrimony; no lawes for the Education of Children;
but the Law of Nature, and the naturall inclination of the Sexes,
one to another, and to their children.  In this condition of meer Nature,
either the Parents between themselves dispose of the dominion
over the Child by Contract; or do not dispose thereof at all.
If they dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the Contract.
We find in History that the Amazons Contracted with the Men of
the neighbouring Countries, to whom they had recourse for issue,
that the issue Male should be sent back, but the Female remain
with themselves: so that the dominion of the Females was in the Mother.

Or Education;
If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother.  For in the
condition of Meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes,
it cannot be known who is the Father, unlesse it be declared
by the Mother: and therefore the right of Dominion over the Child
dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers.  Again, seeing the
Infant is first in the power of the Mother; so as she may either nourish,
or expose it, if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother;
and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by
consequence the Dominion over it is hers.  But if she expose it, and
another find, and nourish it, the Dominion is in him that nourisheth it.
For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation
of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another,
every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power
 it is to save, or destroy him.

Or Precedent Subjection Of One Of The Parents To The Other
If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fathers power:
and if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Soveraign
Queen marrieth one of her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother;
because the Father also is her subject.

If a man and a woman, Monarches of two severall Kingdomes, have a Child,
and contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him,
the Right of the Dominion passeth by the Contract.  If they contract not,
the Dominion followeth the Dominion of the place of his residence.
For the Soveraign of each Country hath Dominion over all that
reside therein.

He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also
over their Childrens Children.  For he that hath Dominion
over the person of a man, hath Dominion over all that is his;
without which, Dominion were but a Title, without the effect.

The Right Of Succession Followeth The Rules Of The
Rights Of Possession
The Right of Succession to Paternall dominion, proceedeth in
the same manner, as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy;
of which I have already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.

Despoticall Dominion, How Attained
Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which
some Writers call DESPOTICALL, from Despotes, which signifieth a Lord,
or Master; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant.
And this Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the Vanquished,
to avoyd the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in
expresse words, or by other sufficient signes of the Will,
that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him,
the Victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure.  And after such
Covenant made, the Vanquished is a SERVANT, and not before:
for by the word Servant (whether it be derived from Servire, to Serve,
or from Servare, to Save, which I leave to Grammarians to dispute)
is not meant a Captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds,
till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did,
shall consider what to do with him: (for such men, (commonly
called Slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds,
or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master, justly:)
but one, that being taken, hath corporall liberty allowed him;
and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master,
is trusted by him.

Not By The Victory, But By The Consent Of The Vanquished
It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion
over the Vanquished, but his own Covenant.  Nor is he obliged
because he is Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken,
or put to flight; but because he commeth in, and submitteth to the Victor;
Nor is the Victor obliged by an enemies rendring himselfe,
(without promise of life,) to spare him for this his yeelding
to discretion; which obliges not the Victor longer, than in his own
discretion hee shall think fit.

And that men do, when they demand (as it is now called) Quarter,
(which the Greeks called Zogria, taking alive,) is to evade the present
fury of the Victor, by Submission, and to compound for their life,
with Ransome, or Service: and therefore he that hath Quarter,
hath not his life given, but deferred till farther deliberation;
For it is not an yeelding on condition of life, but to discretion.
And then onely is his life in security, and his service due,
when the Victor hath trusted him with his corporall liberty.
For Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it not of duty,
 but to avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters.

The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath;
and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods,
of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as
he shall think fit.  For he holdeth his life of his Master,
by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorising
whatsoever the Master shall do.  And in case the Master, if he refuse,
kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for
his disobedience, he is himselfe the author of the same; and cannot
accuse him of injury.

In summe the Rights and Consequences of both Paternall and
Despoticall Dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign
by Institution; and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down
in the precedent chapter.  So that for a man that is Monarch of
divers Nations, whereof he hath, in one the Soveraignty by
Institution of the people assembled, and in another by Conquest,
that is by the Submission of each particular, to avoyd death or bonds;
to demand of one Nation more than of the other, from the title
of Conquest, as being a Conquered Nation, is an act of ignorance
of the Rights of Soveraignty.  For the Soveraign is absolute over
both alike; or else there is no Soveraignty at all; and so every
man may Lawfully protect himselfe, if he can, with his own sword,
which is the condition of war.

Difference Between A Family And A Kingdom
By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of
some Common-wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty,
a little Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children;
or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children,
and servants together: wherein the Father of Master is the Soveraign.
But yet a Family is not properly a Common-wealth; unlesse it
be of that power by its own number, or by other opportunities,
as not to be subdued without the hazard of war.  For where a
number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united,
every one may use his own reason in time of danger, to save his own life,
either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as hee shall think best;
in the same manner as a very small company of souldiers, surprised by
an army, may cast down their armes, and demand quarter, or run away,
rather than be put to the sword.  And thus much shall suffice;
concerning what I find by speculation, and deduction, of Soveraign Rights,
from the nature, need, and designes of men, in erecting of Commonwealths,
and putting themselves under Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted with
power enough for their protection.

The Right Of Monarchy From Scripture
Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point.
To Moses, the children of Israel say thus. (Exod. 20. 19)
"Speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not God
speak to us, lest we dye."  This is absolute obedience to Moses.
Concerning the Right of Kings, God himself by the mouth of Samuel,
saith, (1 Sam. 8. 11, 12, &c.) "This shall be the Right of the King
you will have to reigne over you.  He shall take your sons, and set
them to drive his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run
before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and to make his
engines of War, and Instruments of his chariots; and shall take
your daughters to make perfumes, to be his Cookes, and Bakers.
He shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and
give them to his servants.  He shall take the tyth of your corne and wine,
and give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants.
He shall take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice
of your youth, and employ them in his businesse.  He shall take
the tyth of your flocks; and you shall be his servants."
This is absolute power, and summed up in the last words,
"you shall be his servants."  Againe, when the people heard
what power their King was to have, yet they consented thereto,
and say thus, (Verse. 19 &c.) "We will be as all other nations,
and our King shall judge our causes, and goe before us,
to conduct our wars."  Here is confirmed the Right that Soveraigns have,
both to the Militia, and to all Judicature; in which is conteined
as absolute power, as one man can possibly transferre to another.
Again, the prayer of King Salomon to God, was this.  (1 Kings 3. 9)
"Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to
discerne between Good and Evill."  It belongeth therefore to
the Soveraigne to bee Judge, and to praescribe the Rules of
Discerning Good and Evill; which Rules are Lawes; and therefore
in him is the Legislative Power.  Saul sought the life of David;
yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his Servants would
have done it, David forbad them, saying (1 Sam. 24. 9) "God forbid
I should do such an act against my Lord, the anoynted of God."
For obedience of servants St. Paul saith, (Coll. 3. 20) "Servants obey
your masters in All things," and, (Verse. 22) "Children obey your
Parents in All things."  There is simple obedience in those that
are subject to Paternall, or Despoticall Dominion.  Again, (Math. 23. 2,3)
"The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chayre and therefore All that
they shall bid you observe, that observe and do."  There again
is simple obedience.  And St. Paul, (Tit. 3. 2) "Warn them that
they subject themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority,
& obey them."  This obedience is also simple.  Lastly, our Saviour
himselfe acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are
by Kings imposed, where he sayes, "Give to Caesar that which is Caesars;"
and payed such taxes himselfe.  And that the Kings word, is sufficient
to take any thing from any subject, when there is need; and that the King
is Judge of that need: For he himselfe, as King of the Jewes,
commanded his Disciples to take the Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him
into Jerusalem, saying, (Mat. 21. 2,3) "Go into the Village over
against you, and you shall find a shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with her,
unty them, and bring them to me.  And if any man ask you, what you
mean by it, Say the Lord hath need of them: And they will let them go."
They will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title;
nor whether he be judge of that necessity; but acquiesce in
the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Gen. 3. 5)
"You shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill." and verse 11.
"Who told thee that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree,
of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat?"  For the Cognisance
of Judicature of Good and Evill, being forbidden by the name of
the fruit of the tree of Knowledge, as a triall of Adams obedience;
The Divell to enflame the Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit
already seemed beautifull, told her that by tasting it, they should
be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill.  Whereupon having both eaten,
they did indeed take upon them Gods office, which is Judicature
of Good and Evill; but acquired no new ability to distinguish
between them aright.  And whereas it is sayd, that having eaten,
they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place,
as if they had formerly blind, as saw not their own skins:
the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse
(wherein it was Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being
ashamed, did tacitely censure God himselfe.  And thereupon God saith,
"Hast thou eaten, &c." as if he should say, doest thou that owest me
obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it is
cleerly, (though Allegorically,) signified, that the Commands of them
that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be
censured, nor disputed.

Soveraign Power Ought In All Common-wealths To Be Absolute
So it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason,
and Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man,
as in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular,
and Aristocraticall Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men
can be imagined to make it.  And though of so unlimited a Power,
men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the consequences of
the want of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against
his neighbour, are much worse.  The condition of man in this life
shall never be without Inconveniences; but there happeneth in no
Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what proceeds from
the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants,
from which the Common-wealth had its being.  And whosoever
thinking Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse;
must subject himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is
to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask,
where, and when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged.
But one may ask them again, when, or where has there been a Kingdome
long free from Sedition and Civill Warre.  In those Nations, whose
Common-wealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by
forraign warre, the Subjects never did dispute of the Soveraign Power.
But howsoever, an argument for the Practise of men, that have not
sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes,
and nature of Common-wealths, and suffer daily those miseries,
that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid.  For though in
all places of the world, men should lay the foundation of their houses
on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be.
The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in
certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play)
on Practise onely: which Rules, neither poor men have the leisure,
nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity,
or the method to find out.



CHAPTER XXI

OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS


Liberty What
Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition;
(by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may be
applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall.
For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within
a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some
externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further.
And so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned,
or restrained, with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it
is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread
it selfe into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at Liberty,
to move in such manner, as without those externall impediments they would.
But when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing
it selfe, we use not to say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move;
as when a stone lyeth still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.

What It Is To Be Free
And according to this proper, and generally received meaning
of the word, A FREE-MAN, is "he, that in those things, which by his
strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what
he has a will to."  But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed
to any thing but Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not
subject to Motion, is not subject to Impediment: And therefore,
when 'tis said (for example) The way is free, no liberty of the
way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop.
And when we say a Guift is free, there is not meant any liberty
of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any law,
or Covenant to give it.  So when we Speak Freely, it is not the
liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law
hath obliged to speak otherwise then he did.  Lastly, from the use
of the word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will,
desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth
in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will,
desire, or inclination to doe.

Feare And Liberty Consistent
Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods
into the Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse
very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore
the action, of one that was Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt,
only for Feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him
from detaining, was the action of a man at Liberty.  And generally
all actions which men doe in Common-wealths, for Feare of the law,
or actions, which the doers had Liberty to omit.

Liberty And Necessity Consistent
Liberty and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath
not only Liberty, but a Necessity of descending by the Channel:
so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe; which
(because they proceed from their will) proceed from Liberty;
and yet because every act of mans will, and every desire,
and inclination proceedeth from some cause, which causes in
a continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of God the
first of all causes) proceed from Necessity.  So that to him
that could see the connexion of those causes, the Necessity of
all mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest.  And therefore God,
that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the Liberty
of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the Necessity
of doing that which God will, & no more, nor lesse.  For though
men may do many things, which God does not command, nor is
therefore Author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite
to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause.
And did not his will assure the Necessity of mans will, and
consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the Liberty of men
would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and
Liberty of God.  And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand)
of that naturall Liberty, which only is properly called Liberty.

Artificiall Bonds, Or Covenants
But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of
themselves thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call
a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificiall Chains,
called Civill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants,
have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly,
to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end
to their own Ears.  These Bonds in their own nature but weak,
may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not
by the difficulty of breaking them.

Liberty Of Subjects Consisteth In Liberty From Covenants
In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now,
of the Liberty of Subjects.  For seeing there is no Common-wealth
in the world, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men,
(as being a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in
all kinds of actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty,
of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable
to themselves.  For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense,
for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains,
and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe,
for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy.  Againe, if we take Liberty,
for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd, for men to demand
as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may be masters
of their lives.  And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand;
not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them,
without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws
to be put in execution.  The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore
only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign
hath praetermitted; such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell,
and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad,
their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children
as they themselves think fit; & the like.

Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With
The Unlimited Power Of The Soveraign
Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty,
the Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited.
For it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative
can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called
Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act
the Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing,
otherwise, than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound
thereby to observe the laws of Nature.  And therefore it may,
and doth often happen in Common-wealths, that a Subject may be
put to death, by the command of the Soveraign Power; and yet neither
doe the other wrong: as when Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed:
In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe
the action, for which he is neverthelesse, without Injury put to death.
And the same holdeth also in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death
an Innocent Subject.  For though the action be against the law of Nature,
as being contrary to Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;)
yet it was not an Injurie to Uriah; but to God.  Not to Uriah,
because the right to doe what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself;
And yet to God, because David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all
Iniquitie by the law of Nature.  Which distinction, David himself,
when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, "To thee only
have I sinned."  In the same manner, the people of Athens,
when they banished the most potent of their Common-wealth for ten years,
thought they committed no Injustice; and yet they never questioned
what crime he had done; but what hurt he would doe: Nay they commanded
the banishment of they knew not whom; and every Citizen bringing
his Oystershell into the market place, written with the name of him
he desired should be banished, without actuall accusing him,
sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of Justice;
And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a Jest of it.
And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens wanted right
to banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to be Just.

The Liberty Which Writers Praise, Is The Liberty
Of Soveraigns; Not Of Private Men
The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention,
in the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans,
and in the writings, and discourse of those that from them have
received all their learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie
of Particular men; but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is
the same with that, which every man then should have, if there were
no Civil Laws, nor Common-wealth at all.  And the effects of it
also be the same.  For as amongst masterlesse men, there is
perpetuall war, of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance,
to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from the Father; no propriety
of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a full and absolute Libertie
in every Particular man: So in States, and Common-wealths not dependent
on one another, every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute
Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man,
or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing
to their benefit.  But withall, they live in the condition of a
perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their frontiers
armed, and canons planted against their neighbours round about.
The Athenians, and Romanes, were free; that is, free Common-wealths:
not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist their own
Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie to resist,
or invade other people.  There is written on the Turrets of the city
of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man
can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie
from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in Constantinople.
Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome
is still the same.

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious
name of Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish,
mistake that for their Private Inheritance, and Birth right,
which is the right of the Publique only.  And when the same errour
is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings
in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition,
and change of Government.  In these westerne parts of the world,
we are made to receive our opinions concerning the Institution,
and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men,
Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived
those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed
them into their books, out of the Practice of their own Common-wealths,
which were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language,
out of the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the
Poems of Homer and Virgil.  And because the Athenians were taught,
(to keep them from desire of changing their Government,) that they
were Freemen, and all that lived under Monarchy were slaves;
therefore Aristotle puts it down in his Politiques,(lib.6.cap.2)
"In democracy, Liberty is to be supposed: for 'tis commonly held,
that no man is Free in any other Government."  And as Aristotle;
so Cicero, and other Writers have grounded their Civill doctrine,
on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy,
at first, by them that having deposed their Soveraign, shared amongst
them the Soveraignty of Rome; and afterwards by their Successors.
And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their
childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew of Liberty,)
of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions
of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers,
with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say,
there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts
have bought the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.

Liberty Of The Subject How To Be Measured
To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject;
that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by
the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do;
we are to consider, what Rights we passe away, when we make
a Common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves,
by owning all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or Assembly
we make our Soveraign.  For in the act of our Submission, consisteth
both our Obligation, and our Liberty; which must therefore be inferred
by arguments taken from thence; there being no Obligation on any man,
which ariseth not from some Act of his own; for all men equally,
are by Nature Free.  And because such arguments, must either be drawn
from the expresse words, "I Authorise all his Actions," or from the
Intention of him that submitteth himselfe to his Power, (which Intention
is to be understood by the End for which he so submitteth;)
The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived,
either from those Words, (or others equivalent;) or else from the End
of the Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects
within themselves, and their Defence against a common Enemy.

Subjects Have Liberty To Defend Their Own Bodies,
Even Against Them That Lawfully Invade Them;
First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant
of every one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition,
by Covenants of the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent;
It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all those things,
the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred.  I have shewn
before in the 14. Chapter, that Covenants, not to defend a mans
own body, are voyd.  Therefore,

Are Not Bound To Hurt Themselves;
If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill,
wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him;
or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing,
without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.

If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority,
concerning a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance
of Pardon) to confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the
same Chapter) can be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.

Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained
in these words, "I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions;"
in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former
naturall Liberty: For by allowing him to Kill Me, I am not bound
to Kill my selfe when he commands me.  "Tis one thing to say
"Kill me, or my fellow, if you please;"  another thing to say,
"I will kill my selfe, or my fellow."  It followeth therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe,
or any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may
sometimes have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute
any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the
Words of our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be
understood by the End thereof.  When therefore our refusall to obey,
frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained;
then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.

Nor To Warfare, Unless They Voluntarily Undertake It
Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight
against the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his
refusall with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without
Injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place:
for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth.
And there is allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse,
not onely to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected,)
but also to men of feminine courage.  When Armies fight, there is
on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out
of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly,
but dishonourably.  For the same reason, to avoyd battell,
is not Injustice, but Cowardise.  But he that inrowleth himselfe
a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of
a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell,
but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave.
And when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once
the help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged;
because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they
have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.

To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man,
guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty,
takes away from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us;
and is therefore destructive of the very essence of Government.
But in case a great many men together, have already resisted
the Soveraign Power Unjustly, or committed some Capitall crime,
for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not
the Liberty then to joyn together, and assist, and defend one another?
Certainly they have: For they but defend their lives, which the guilty
man may as well do, as the Innocent.  There was indeed injustice in
the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it,
though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act.
And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all.
But the offer of Pardon taketh from them, to whom it is offered,
the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting,
or defending the rest, unlawfull.

The Greatest Liberty Of Subjects, Dependeth On
The Silence Of The Law
As for other Lyberties, they depend on the silence of the Law.
In cases where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject
hath the liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion.
And therefore such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse;
and in some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that
have the Soveraignty shall think most convenient.  As for Example,
there was a time, when in England a man might enter in to his own Land,
(and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it) by force.
But in after-times, that Liberty of Forcible entry, was taken away
by a Statute made (by the King) in Parliament.  And is some places
of the world, men have the Liberty of many wives: in other places,
such Liberty is not allowed.

If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of Debt,
or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any
service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty corporall,
or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; He hath the same Liberty
to sue for his right, as if it were against a Subject; and before
such Judges, as are appointed by the Soveraign.  For seeing the
Soveraign demandeth by force of a former Law, and not by vertue
of his Power; he declareth thereby, that he requireth no more,
than shall appear to be due by that Law.  The sute therefore is not
contrary to the will of the Soveraign; and consequently the Subject
hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause; and sentence,
according to that Law.  But if he demand, or take any thing by pretence
of his Power; there lyeth, in that case, no action of Law:
for all that is done by him in Vertue of his Power, is done by
the Authority of every subject, and consequently, he that brings
an action against the Soveraign, brings it against himselfe.

If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all,
or any of his Subjects; which Grant standing, he is disabled
to provide for their safety, the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly
renounce, or transferre the Soveraignty to another.  For in that
he might openly, (if it had been his will,) and in plain termes,
have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be understood
it was not his will; but that the Grant proceeded from ignorance
of the repugnancy between such a Liberty and the Soveraign Power;
and therefore the Soveraignty is still retayned; and consequently
all those Powers, which are necessary to the exercising thereof;
such as are the Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature,
of appointing Officers, and Councellours, of levying Mony,
and the rest named in the 18th Chapter.

In What Cases Subjects Are Absolved Of Their Obedience
To Their Soveraign
The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to
last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which
he is able to protect them.  For the right men have by Nature
to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by
no Covenant be relinquished.  The Soveraignty is the Soule of
the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the members
doe no more receive their motion from it.  The end of Obedience
is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own,
or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it,
and his endeavour to maintaine it.  And though Soveraignty,
in the intention of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it
in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by forreign war;
but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it,
from the very institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality,
by Intestine Discord.

In Case Of Captivity
If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means
of life be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and
corporall Libertie given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor,
he hath Libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it,
is the subject of him that took him; because he had no other way
to preserve himselfe.  The case is the same, if he be deteined
on the same termes, in a forreign country.  But if a man be held
in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the libertie of his bodie;
he cannot be understood to be bound by Covenant to subjection;
and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.

In Case The Soveraign Cast Off The Government From
Himself And His Heyrs
If a Monarch shall relinquish the Soveraignty, both for himself,
and his heires; His Subjects returne to the absolute Libertie of Nature;
because, though Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are
the nerest of his Kin; yet it dependeth on his own will,
(as hath been said in the precedent chapter,) who shall be his Heyr.
If therefore he will have no Heyre, there is no Soveraignty,
nor Subjection.  The case is the same, if he dye without known Kindred,
and without declaration of his Heyre.  For then there can no Heire
be known, and consequently no Subjection be due.

In Case Of Banishment
If the Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment,
he is not Subject.  But he that is sent on a message, or hath
leave to travell, is still Subject; but it is, by Contract
between Soveraigns, not by vertue of the covenant of Subjection.
For whosoever entreth into anothers dominion, is Subject to all
the Lawes thereof; unless he have a privilege by the amity of
the Soveraigns, or by speciall licence.

In Case The Soveraign Render Himself Subject To Another
If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor;
his Subjects are delivered from their former obligation,
and become obliged to the Victor.  But if he be held prisoner,
or have not the liberty of his own Body; he is not understood to have
given away the Right of Soveraigntie; and therefore his Subjects
are obliged to yield obedience to the Magistrates formerly placed,
governing not in their own name, but in his.  For, his Right remaining,
the question is only of the Administration; that is to say,
of the Magistrates and Officers; which, if he have not means to name,
he is supposed to approve those, which he himself had formerly appointed.



CHAPTER XXII

OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT, POLITICALL, AND PRIVATE


The Divers Sorts Of Systemes Of People
Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth,
I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof.  And first of Systemes,
which resemble the similar parts, or Muscles of a Body naturall.
By SYSTEMES; I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest,
or one Businesse.  Of which, some are Regular, and some Irregular.
Regular are those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, is constituted
Representative of the whole number.  All other are Irregular.

Of Regular, some are Absolute, and Independent, subject to none
but their own Representative: such are only Common-wealths;
Of which I have spoken already in the 5. last preceding chapters.
Others are Dependent; that is to say, Subordinate to some Soveraign Power,
to which every one, as also their Representative is Subject.

Of Systemes subordinate, some are Politicall, and some Private.
Politicall (otherwise Called Bodies Politique, and Persons In Law,)
are those, which are made by authority from the Soveraign Power
of the Common-wealth.  Private, are those, which are constituted
by Subjects amongst themselves, or by authoritie from a stranger.
For no authority derived from forraign power, within the Dominion
of another, is Publique there, but Private.

And of Private Systemes, some are Lawfull; some Unlawfull:
Lawfull, are those which are allowed by the Common-wealth:
all other are Unlawfull.  Irregular Systemes, are those which
having no Representative, consist only in concourse of People;
which if not forbidden by the Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe,
(such as are conflux of People to markets, or shews, or any other
harmelesse end,) are Lawfull.  But when the Intention is evill,
or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are Unlawfull.

In All Bodies Politique The Power Of The Representative
Is Limited
In Bodies Politique, the power of the Representative is alwaies Limited:
And that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the Power Soveraign.
For Power Unlimited, is absolute Soveraignty.  And the Soveraign,
in every Commonwealth, is the absolute Representative of all the Subjects;
and therefore no other, can be Representative of any part of them,
but so far forth, as he shall give leave; And to give leave to
a Body Politique of Subjects, to have an absolute Representative
to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the Government of
so much of the Commonwealth, and to divide the Dominion,
contrary to their Peace and Defence, which the Soveraign cannot
be understood to doe, by any Grant, that does not plainly,
and directly discharge them of their subjection.  For consequences
of words, are not the signes of his will, when other consequences
are signes of the contrary; but rather signes of errour,
and misreckoning; to which all mankind is too prone.

The bounds of that Power, which is given to the Representative
of a Bodie Politique, are to be taken notice of, from two things.
One is their Writt, or Letters from the Soveraign: the other is
the Law of the Common-wealth.

By Letters Patents:
For though in the Institution or Acquisition of a Common-wealth,
which is independent, there needs no Writing, because the Power
of the Representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out
by the unwritten Law of Nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversities of Limitation necessary, concerning their businesses,
times, and places, as can neither be remembred without Letters,
nor taken notice of, unlesse such Letters be Patent, that they may
be read to them, and withall sealed, or testified, with the Seales,
or other permanent signes of the Authority Soveraign.

And The Lawes
And because such Limitation is not alwaies easie, or perhaps
possible to be described in writing; the ordinary Lawes,
common to all Subjects, must determine, that the Representative may
lawfully do, in all Cases, where the Letters themselves are silent.
And therefore

When The Representative Is One Man, His Unwarranted
Acts Are His Own Onely
In a Body Politique, if the Representative be one man, whatsoever he does
in the Person of the Body, which is not warranted in his Letters,
nor by the Lawes, is his own act, and not the act of the Body,
nor of any other Member thereof besides himselfe: Because further
than his Letters, or the Lawes limit, he representeth no mans person,
but his own.  But what he does according to these, is the act
of every one: For of the Act of the Soveraign every one is Author,
because he is their Representative unlimited; and the act of him
that recedes not from the Letters of the Soveraign, is the act
of the Soveraign, and therefore every member of the Body is Author of it.

When It Is An Assembly, It Is The Act Of Them
That Assented Onely
But if the Representative be an Assembly, whatsoever that Assembly
shall Decree, not warranted by their Letters, or the Lawes,
is the act of the Assembly, or Body Politique, and the act of every one
by whose Vote the Decree was made; but not the act of any man
that being present Voted to the contrary; nor of any man absent,
unlesse he Voted it by procuration.  It is the act of the Assembly,
because Voted by the major part; and if it be a crime, the Assembly may
be punished, as farre-forth as it is capable, as by dissolution,
or forfeiture of their Letters (which is to such artificiall,
and fictitious Bodies, capitall,) or (if the Assembly have
a Common stock, wherein none of the Innocent Members have propriety,)
by pecuniary Mulct.  For from corporall penalties Nature hath exempted
all Bodies Politique.  But they that gave not their Vote,
are therefore Innocent, because the Assembly cannot Represent
any man in things unwarranted by their Letters, and consequently
are not involved in their Votes.

When The Representative Is One Man, If He Borrow Mony,
Or Owe It, By Contract; He Is Lyable Onely, The Members Not
If the person of the Body Politique being in one man, borrow mony
of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same Body,
(for no Letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to mens own
inclinations to limit lending) the debt is the Representatives.
For if he should have Authority from his Letters, to make the members
pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence the Soveraignty
of them; and therefore the grant were either voyd, as proceeding
from Errour, commonly incident to humane Nature, and an unsufficient
signe of the will of the Granter; or if it be avowed by him,
then is the Representer Soveraign, and falleth not under
the present question, which is onely of Bodies subordinate.
No member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed,
but the Representative himselfe: because he that lendeth it,
being a stranger to the Letters, and to the qualification
of the Body, understandeth those onely for his debtors, that are engaged;
and seeing the Representer can ingage himselfe, and none else,
has him onely for Debtor; who must therefore pay him, out of
the common stock (if there be any), or (if there be none) out of
his own estate.

If he come into debt by Contract, or Mulct, the case is the same.

When It Is An Assembly, They Onely Are Liable
That Have Assented
But when the Representative is an Assembly, and the debt to a stranger;
all they, and onely they are responsible for the debt, that gave
their votes to the borrowing of it, or to the Contract that
made it due, or to the fact for which the Mulct was imposed;
because every one of those in voting did engage himselfe for
the payment: For he that is author of the borrowing, is obliged
to the payment, even of the whole debt, though when payd by any one,
he be discharged.

If The Debt Be To One Of The Assembly,
The Body Onely Is Obliged
But if the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Assembly onely is
obliged to the payment, out of their common stock (if they have any:)
For having liberty of Vote, if he Vote the Mony, shall be borrowed,
he Votes it shall be payd; If he Vote it shall not be borrowed,
or be absent, yet because in lending, he voteth the borrowing,
he contradicteth his former Vote, and is obliged by the later,
and becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot
demand payment from any particular man, but from the common
Treasure onely; which fayling he hath no remedy, nor complaint,
but against himselfe, that being privy to the acts of the Assembly,
and their means to pay, and not being enforced, did neverthelesse
through his own folly lend his mony.

Protestation Against The Decrees Of Bodies Politique
Sometimes Lawful; But Against Soveraign Power Never
It is manifest by this, that in Bodies Politique subordinate,
and subject to a Soveraign Power, it is sometimes not onely lawfull,
but expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation
against the decrees of the Representative Assembly, and cause
their dissent to be Registred, or to take witnesse of it;
because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted,
and be responsible for crimes committed by other men: But in
a Soveraign Assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because
he that protesteth there, denies their Soveraignty; and also
because whatsoever is commanded by the Soveraign Power, is as to
the Subject (though not so alwayes in the sight of God) justified
by the Command; for of such command every Subject is the Author.

Bodies Politique For Government Of A Province,
Colony, Or Town
The variety of Bodies Politique, is almost infinite; for they are
not onely distinguished by the severall affaires, for which they
are constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversitie;
but also by the times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations.
And as to their affaires, some are ordained for Government;
As first, the Government of a Province may be committed to
an Assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on
the Votes of the major part; and then this Assembly is a Body Politique,
and their power limited by Commission.  This word Province signifies
a charge, or care of businesse, which he whose businesse it is,
committeth to another man, to be administred for, and under him;
and therefore when in one Common-wealth there be divers Countries,
that have their Lawes distinct one from another, or are farre
distant in place, the Administration of the Government being committed
to divers persons, those Countries where the Soveraign is not resident,
but governs by Commission, are called Provinces.  But of the government
of a Province, by an Assembly residing in the Province it selfe,
there be few examples.  The Romans who had the Soveraignty of
many Provinces; yet governed them alwaies by Presidents, and Praetors;
and not by Assemblies, as they governed the City of Rome,
and Territories adjacent.  In like manner, when there were Colonies
sent from England, to Plant Virginia, and Sommer-Ilands; though the
government of them here, were committed to Assemblies in London,
yet did those Assemblies never commit the Government under them
to any Assembly there; but did to each Plantation send one Governour;
For though every man, where he can be present by Nature, desires to
participate of government; yet where they cannot be present,
they are by Nature also enclined, to commit the Government of their
common Interest rather to a Monarchicall, then a Popular form
of Government: which is also evident in those men that have
great private estates; who when they are unwilling to take
the paines of administring the businesse that belongs to them,
choose rather to trust one Servant, than a Assembly either of
their friends or servants.  But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may
suppose the Government of a Province, or Colony committed to an Assembly:
and when it is, that which in this place I have to say, is this;
that whatsoever debt is by that Assembly contracted; or whatsoever
unlawfull Act is decreed, is the Act onely of those that assented, and not
of any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alledged.
Also that an Assembly residing out of the bounds of that Colony
whereof they have the government, cannot execute any power over
the persons, or goods of any of the Colonie, to seize on them for debt,
or other duty, in any place without the Colony it selfe, as having
no Jurisdiction, nor Authoritie elsewhere, but are left to the remedie,
which the Law of the place alloweth them.  And though the Assembly
have right, to impose a Mulct upon any of their members, that shall
break the Lawes they make; yet out of the Colonie it selfe,
they have no right to execute the same.  And that which is said here,
of the Rights of an Assembly, for the government of a Province,
or a Colony, is appliable also to an Assembly for the Government
of a Town, or University, or a College, or a Church, or for any other
Government over the persons of men.

And generally, in all Bodies Politique, if any particular member
conceive himself Injured by the Body it self, the Cognisance of
his cause belongeth to the Soveraign, and those the Soveraign hath
ordained for Judges in such causes, or shall ordaine for that
particular cause; and not to the Body it self.  For the whole Body
is in this case his fellow subject, which in a Soveraign Assembly,
is otherwise: for there, if the Soveraign be not Judge, though in
his own cause, there can be no Judge at all.

Bodies Politique For Ordering Of Trade
In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forraigne Traffique,
the most commodious Representative is an Assembly of all the members;
that is to say, such a one, as every one that adventureth his mony,
may be present at all the Deliberations, and Resolutions of the Body,
if they will themselves.  For proof whereof, we are to consider the end,
for which men that are Merchants, and may buy and sell, export,
and import their Merchandise, according to their own discretions,
doe neverthelesse bind themselves up in one Corporation.
It is true, there be few Merchants, that with the Merchandise
they buy at home, can fraight a Ship, to export it; or with that
they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have therefore need to joyn
together in one Society; where every man may either participate
of the gaine, according to the proportion of his adventure;
or take his own; and sell what he transports, or imports,
at such prices as he thinks fit.  But this is no Body Politique,
there being no Common Representative to oblige them to any other Law,
than that which is common to all other subjects.  The End of their
Incorporating, is to make their gaine the greater; which is done
two wayes; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad.
So that to grant to a Company of Merchants to be a Corporation,
or Body Politique, is to grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one
is to be sole buyers; another to be sole sellers.  For when there
is a Company incorporate for any particular forraign Country,
they only export the Commodities vendible in that Country;
which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad.  For at home
there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which
is gainfull to the Merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower,
and sell abroad at higher rates: And abroad there is but one buyer
of forraign Merchandise, and but one that sels them at home;
both which againe are gainfull to the adventurers.

Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people
at home, the other to forraigners.  For at home by their sole
exportation they set what price they please on the husbandry
and handy-works of the people; and by the sole importation,
what price they please on all forraign commodities the people
have need of; both which are ill for the people.  On the contrary,
by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad, and sole buying
the forraign commodities upon the place, they raise the price of those,
and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the forraigner:
For where but one selleth, the Merchandise is the dearer;
and where but one buyeth the cheaper: Such Corporations therefore
are no other then Monopolies; though they would be very profitable
for a Common-wealth, if being bound up into one body in forraigne
Markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and sell
at what price he could.

The end then of these Bodies of Merchants, being not a Common benefit
to the whole Body, (which have in this case no common stock,
but what is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building,
buying, victualling and manning of Ships,) but the particular gaine
of every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted
with the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of
the Assembly, that shall have the power to order the same;
and be acquainted with their accounts.  And therefore the
Representative of such a Body must be an Assembly, where every
member of the Body may be present at the consultations, if he will.

If a Body Politique of Merchants, contract a debt to a stranger
by the act of their Representative Assembly, every Member is lyable
by himself for the whole.  For a stranger can take no notice of their
private Lawes, but considereth them as so many particular men,
obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment made by one
dischargeth all the rest: But if the debt be to one of the Company,
the creditor is debter for the whole to himself, and cannot therefore
demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if there be any.

If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is understood
to be layd upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure
in the Company.  For there is in this case no other common stock,
but what is made of their particular adventures.

If a Mulct be layd upon the Body for some unlawfull act, they only
are lyable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance
it was executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime
but being of the Body; which if a crime, (because the Body was
ordeyned by the authority of the Common-wealth,) is not his.

If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, he may be sued
by the Body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person
imprisoned by the authority of the Body; but only by Authority
of the Common-wealth: for if they can doe it by their own Authority,
they can by their own Authority give judgement that the debt is due,
which is as much as to be Judge in their own Cause.

A Bodie Politique For Counsel To Be Given
To The Soveraign
These Bodies made for the government of Men, or of Traffique,
be either perpetuall, or for a time prescribed by writing.
But there be Bodies also whose times are limited, and that
only by the nature of their businesse.  For example, if a
Soveraign Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall think fit
to give command to the towns, and other severall parts of their
territory, to send to him their Deputies, to enforme him of the
condition, and necessities of the Subjects, or to advise with him
for the making of good Lawes, or for any other cause, as with
one Person representing the whole Country, such Deputies, having
a place and time of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time,
a Body Politique, representing every Subject of that Dominion;
but it is onely for such matters as shall be propounded unto them
by that Man, or Assembly, that by the Soveraign Authority sent for them;
and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall be propounded,
nor debated by them, the Body is dissolved.  For if they were
the absolute Representative of the people, then were it the Soveraign
Assembly; and so there would be two Soveraign Assemblies, or two
Soveraigns, over the same people; which cannot consist with their Peace.
And therefore where there is once a Soveraignty, there can be no absolute
Representation of the people, but by it.  And for the limits of how
farre such a Body shall represent the whole People, they are set forth
in the Writing by which they were sent for.  For the People cannot
choose their Deputies to other intent, than is in the Writing directed
to them from their Soveraign expressed.

A Regular Private Body, Lawfull, As A Family
Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted
without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common
to all other Subjects.  And because they be united in one Person
Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Families,
in which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family.
For he obligeth his Children, and Servants, as farre as the
Law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound
to obedience in those actions, which the Law hath forbidden to be done.
In all other actions, during the time they are under domestique
government, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters,
as to their immediate Soveraigns.  For the Father, and Master
being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns
in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority,
than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them.

Private Bodies Regular, But Unlawfull
Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite
themselves into one person Representative, without any publique
Authority at all; such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves
and Gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging, and stealing;
and the Corporations of men, that by Authority from any forraign Person,
unite themselves in anothers Dominion, for easier propagation of
Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of the Common-wealth.

Systemes Irregular, Such As Are Private Leagues
Irregular Systemes, in their nature, but Leagues, or sometimes
meer concourse of people, without union to any particular designe,
not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from
a similitude of wills and inclinations, become Lawfull, or Unlawfull,
according to the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of every particular
mans design therein: And his designe is to be understood by the occasion.

The Leagues of Subjects, (because Leagues are commonly made for
mutuall defence,) are in a Common-wealth (which is no more than
a League of all the Subjects together) for the most part unnecessary,
and savour of unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull,
and go commonly by the name of factions, or Conspiracies.
For a League being a connexion of men by Covenants, if there be
no power given to any one Man or Assembly, (as in the condition
of meer Nature) to compell them to performance, is so long onely valid,
as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and therefore Leagues
between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane Power established,
to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull, but also profitable
for the time they last.  But Leagues of the Subjects of one and the
same Common-wealth, where every one may obtain his right by means
of the Soveraign Power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of Peace
and Justice, and (in case the designe of them be evill, or Unknown
to the Common-wealth) unlawfull.  For all uniting of strength by
private men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown,
dangerous to the Publique, and unjustly concealed.

Secret Cabals
If the Soveraign Power be in a great Assembly, and a number of men,
part of the Assembly, without authority, consult a part, to contrive the
guidance of the rest; This is a Faction, or Conspiracy unlawfull, as being
a fraudulent seducing of the Assembly for their particular interest.
But if he, whose private interest is to be debated, and judged in
the Assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is no Injustice;
because in this case he is no part of the Assembly.  And though he hire
such friends with mony, (unlesse there be an expresse Law against it,)
yet it is not Injustice.  For sometimes, (as mens manners are,)
Justice cannot be had without mony; and every man may think his
own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.

Feuds Of Private Families
In all Common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants,
than the government of his estate, and lawfull employment he has for
them requires, it is Faction, and unlawfull.  For having the protection
of the Common-wealth, he needeth not the defence of private force.
And whereas in Nations not throughly civilized, severall numerous
Families have lived in continuall hostility, and invaded one another
with private force; yet it is evident enough, that they have
done unjustly; or else that they had no Common-wealth.

Factions For Government
And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Government
of Religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of State,
as Patricians, and Plebeians of old time in Rome, and of
Aristocraticalls and Democraticalls of old time in Greece,
are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people,
and a taking of the Sword out of the hand of the Soveraign.

Concourse of people, is an Irregular Systeme, the lawfulnesse,
or unlawfulnesse, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the
number of them that are assembled.  If the occasion be lawfull,
and manifest, the Concourse is lawfull; as the usuall meeting of
men at Church, or at a publique Shew, in usuall numbers: for if
the numbers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident;
and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account
of his being amongst them, is to be judged conscious of an unlawfull,
and tumultuous designe.  It may be lawfull for a thousand men,
to joyn in a Petition to be delivered to a Judge, or Magistrate;
yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous Assembly;
because there needs but one or two for that purpose.  But in such cases
as these, it is not a set number that makes the Assembly Unlawfull,
but such a number, as the present Officers are not able to suppresse,
and bring to Justice.

When an unusuall number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse;
the Assembly is an Unlawfull tumult; because they may deliver their
accusation to the Magistrate by a few, or by one man.  Such was the case
of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number of other men,
brought two of Pauls companions before the Magistrate, saying with
one Voyce, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians;" which was their way
of demanding Justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine,
as was against their Religion, and Trade.  The occasion here,
considering the Lawes of that People, was just; yet was their Assembly
Judged Unlawfull, and the Magistrate reprehended them for it,
in these words,(Acts 19. 40) "If Demetrius and the other work-men
can accuse any man, of any thing, there be Pleas, and Deputies,
let them accuse one another.  And if you have any other thing to demand,
your case may be judged in an Assembly Lawfully called.  For we are
in danger to be accused for this dayes sedition, because, there is
no cause by which any man can render any reason of this Concourse
of People."  Where he calleth an Assembly, whereof men can give no
just account, a Sedition, and such as they could not answer for.
And this is all I shall say concerning Systemes, and Assemblyes of People,
which may be compared (as I said,) to the Similar parts of mans Body;
such as be Lawfull, to the Muscles; such as are Unlawfull, to Wens,
Biles, and Apostemes, engendred by the unnaturall conflux of evill humours.



CHAPTER XXIII

OF THE PUBLIQUE MINISTERS OF SOVERAIGN POWER


In the last Chapter I have spoken of the Similar parts of a
Common-wealth; In this I shall speak of the parts Organicall,
which are Publique Ministers.

Publique Minister Who
A PUBLIQUE MINISTER, is he, that by the Soveraign, (whether a Monarch,
or an Assembly,) is employed in any affaires, with Authority to
represent in that employment, the Person of the Common-wealth.
And whereas every man, or assembly that hath Soveraignty,
representeth two Persons, or (as the more common phrase is)
has two Capacities, one Naturall, and another Politique, (as a Monarch,
hath the person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of a man;
and a Soveraign Assembly hath the Person not onely of the Common-wealth,
but also of the Assembly); they that be servants to them in their
naturall Capacity, are not Publique Ministers; but those onely that
serve them in the Administration of the Publique businesse.
And therefore neither Ushers, nor Sergeants, nor other Officers
that waite on the Assembly, for no other purpose, but for the
commodity of the men assembled, in an Aristocracy, or Democracy;
nor Stewards, Chamberlains, Cofferers, or any other Officers
of the houshold of a Monarch, are Publique Ministers in a Monarchy.

Ministers For The Generall Administration
Of Publique Ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general Administration, either of the whole Dominion, or of a part thereof.
Of the whole, as to a Protector, or Regent, may bee committed by the
Predecessor of an Infant King, during his minority, the whole
Administration of his Kingdome.  In which case, every Subject
is so far obliged to obedience, as the Ordinances he shall make,
and the commands he shall give be in the Kings name, and not
inconsistent with his Soveraigne Power.  Of a Part, or Province;
as when either a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall give the
generall charge thereof to a Governour, Lieutenant, Praefect,
or Vice-Roy: And in this case also, every one of that Province,
is obliged to all he shall doe in the name of the Soveraign, and that
not incompatible with the Soveraigns Right.  For such Protectors,
Vice-Roys, and Governours, have no other right, but what depends
on the Soveraigns Will; and no Commission that can be given them,
can be interpreted for a Declaration of the will to transferre
the Soveraignty, without expresse and perspicuous words to that purpose.
And this kind of Publique Ministers resembleth the Nerves, and Tendons
that move the severall limbs of a body naturall.

For Speciall Administration, As For Oeconomy
Others have speciall Administration; that is to say, charges of
some speciall businesse, either at home, or abroad: As at home,
First, for the Oeconomy of a Common-wealth, They that have Authority
concerning the Treasure, as Tributes, Impositions, Rents, Fines,
or whatsoever publique revenue, to collect, receive, issue,
or take the Accounts thereof, are Publique Ministers: Ministers,
because they serve the Person Representative, and can doe nothing
against his Command, nor without his Authority: Publique,
because they serve him in his Politicall Capacity.

Secondly, they that have Authority concerning the Militia;
to have the custody of Armes, Forts, Ports; to Levy, Pay,
or Conduct Souldiers; or to provide for any necessary thing
for the use of war, either by Land or Sea, are publique Ministers.
But a Souldier without Command, though he fight for the Common-wealth,
does not therefore represent the Person of it; because there is
none to represent it to.  For every one that hath command,
represents it to them only whom he commandeth.

For Instruction Of The People
They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others
to teach the people their duty to the Soveraign Power, and instruct
them in the knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render
them more apt to live in godlinesse, and in peace among themselves,
and resist the publique enemy, are Publique Ministers: Ministers,
in that they doe it not by their own Authority, but by anothers;
and Publique, because they doe it (or should doe it) by no Authority,
but that of the Soveraign.  The Monarch, or the Soveraign Assembly only
hath immediate Authority from God, to teach and instruct the people;
and no man but the Soveraign, receiveth his power Dei Gratia simply;
that is to say, from the favour of none but God: All other, receive
theirs from the favour and providence of God, and their Soveraigns;
as in a Monarchy Dei Gratia & Regis; or Dei Providentia & Voluntate Regis.

For Judicature
They also to whom Jurisdiction is given, are Publique Ministers.
For in their Seats of Justice they represent the person of the Soveraign;
and their Sentence, is his Sentence; For (as hath been before
declared) all Judicature is essentially annexed to the Soveraignty;
and therefore all other Judges are but Ministers of him, or them
that have the Soveraign Power.  And as Controversies are of two sorts,
namely of Fact, and of Law; so are judgements, some of Fact, some of Law:
And consequently in the same controversie, there may be two Judges,
one of Fact, another of Law.

And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversie
between the party Judged, and the Judge; which because they be both
Subjects to the Soveraign, ought in Equity to be Judged by men
agreed on by consent of both; for no man can be Judge in his own cause.
But the Soveraign is already agreed on for Judge by them both,
and is therefore either to heare the Cause, and determine it himself,
or appoint for Judge such as they shall both agree on.  And this
agreement is then understood to be made between them divers wayes;
as first, if the Defendant be allowed to except against such of
his Judges, whose interest maketh him suspect them, (for as to
the Complaynant he hath already chosen his own Judge,) those which
he excepteth not against, are Judges he himself agrees on.
Secondly, if he appeale to any other Judge, he can appeale no further;
for his appeale is his choice.  Thirdly, if he appeale to the Soveraign
himself, and he by himself, or by Delegates which the parties shall
agree on, give Sentence; that Sentence is finall: for the Defendant
is Judged by his own Judges, that is to say, by himself.

These properties of just and rationall Judicature considered,
I cannot forbeare to observe the excellent constitution of
the Courts of Justice, established both for Common, and also
for Publique Pleas in England.  By Common Pleas, I meane those,
where both the Complaynant and Defendant are Subjects: and by Publique,
(which are also called Pleas of the Crown) those, where the Complaynant
is the Soveraign.  For whereas there were two orders of men,
whereof one was Lords, the other Commons; The Lords had this Priviledge,
to have for Judges in all Capitall crimes, none but Lords; and of them,
as many as would be present; which being ever acknowledged as
a Priviledge of favour, their Judges were none but such as they had
themselves desired.  And in all controversies, every Subject
(as also in civill controversies the Lords) had for Judges,
men of the Country where the matter in controversie lay; against which
he might make his exceptions, till at last Twelve men without exception
being agreed on, they were Judged by those twelve.  So that having
his own Judges, there could be nothing alledged by the party,
why the sentence should not be finall,  These publique persons,
with Authority from the Soveraign Power, either to Instruct,
or Judge the people, are such members of the Common-wealth,
as may fitly be compared to the organs of Voice in a Body naturall.

For Execution
Publique Ministers are also all those, that have Authority from
the Soveraign, to procure the Execution of Judgements given;
to publish the Soveraigns Commands; to suppresse Tumults; to apprehend,
and imprison Malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation
of the Peace.  For every act they doe by such Authority, is the act
of the Common-wealth; and their service, answerable to that of the Hands,
in a Bodie naturall.

Publique Ministers abroad, are those that represent the Person
of their own Soveraign, to forraign States.  Such are Ambassadors,
Messengers, Agents, and Heralds, sent by publique Authoritie,
and on publique Businesse.

But such as are sent by Authoritie only of some private partie
of a troubled State, though they be received, are neither Publique,
nor Private Ministers of the Common-wealth; because none of their
actions have the Common-wealth for Author.  Likewise, an Ambassador
sent from a Prince, to congratulate, condole, or to assist at
a solemnity, though Authority be Publique; yet because the businesse
is Private, and belonging to him in his naturall capacity;
is a Private person.  Also if a man be sent into another Country,
secretly to explore their counsels, and strength; though both
the Authority, and the Businesse be Publique; yet because there is
none to take notice of any Person in him, but his own; he is but
a Private Minister; but yet a Minister of the Common-wealth;
and may be compared to an Eye in the Body naturall.  And those that
are appointed to receive the Petitions or other informations
of the People, and are as it were the publique Eare, are Publique
Ministers, and represent their Soveraign in that office.

Counsellers Without Other Employment Then
To Advise Are Not Publique Ministers
Neither a Counsellor, nor a Councell of State, if we consider it
with no Authority of Judicature or Command, but only of giving
Advice to the Soveraign when it is required, or of offering it
when it is not required, is a Publique Person.  For the Advice
is addressed to the Soveraign only, whose person cannot in his
own presence, be represented to him, by another.  But a Body of
Counsellors, are never without some other Authority, either of
Judicature, or of immediate Administration: As in a Monarchy,
they represent the Monarch, in delivering his Commands to the
Publique Ministers: In a Democracy, the Councell, or Senate
propounds the Result of their deliberations to the people,
as a Councell; but when they appoint Judges, or heare Causes,
or give Audience to Ambassadors, it is in the quality of a Minister
of the People: And in an Aristocracy the Councell of State is the
Soveraign Assembly it self; and gives counsell to none but themselves.



CHAPTER XXIV

OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A COMMON-WEALTH


The Nourishment Of A Common-wealth Consisteth
In The Commodities Of Sea And Land;
The NUTRITION of a Common-wealth consisteth, in the Plenty,
and Distribution of Materials conducing to Life: In Concoction,
or Preparation; and (when concocted) in the Conveyance of it,
by convenient conduits, to the Publique use.

As for the Plenty of Matter, it is a thing limited by Nature,
to those commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common Mother)
Land, and Sea, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour
selleth to man-kind.

For the Matter of this Nutriment, consisting in Animals, Vegetals,
and Minerals, God hath freely layd them before us, in or neer to
the face of the Earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour,
and industry of receiving them.  Insomuch as Plenty dependeth
(next to Gods favour) meerly on the labour and industry of men.

This Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly Native,
and partly Forraign: Native, that which is to be had within
the Territory of the Common-wealth; Forraign, that which is
imported from without.  And because there is no Territory
under the Dominion of one Common-wealth, (except it be of very
vast extent,) that produceth all things needfull for the maintenance,
and motion of the whole Body; and few that produce not something
more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had within,
become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home,
by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by Exchange,
or by just Warre, or by Labour: for a mans Labour also, is a commodity
exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: And there have
been Common-wealths that having no more Territory, than hath
served them for habitation, have neverthelesse, not onely maintained,
but also encreased their Power, partly by the labour of trading
from one place to another, and partly by selling the Manifactures,
whereof the Materials were brought in from other places.

And The Right Of Distribution Of Them
The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the
constitution of Mine, and Thine, and His, that is to say,
in one word Propriety; and belongeth in all kinds of Common-wealth
to the Soveraign Power.  For where there is no Common-wealth,
there is, (as hath been already shewn) a perpetuall warre of every man
against his neighbour; And therefore every thing is his that getteth it,
and keepeth it by force; which is neither Propriety nor Community;
but Uncertainty.  Which is so evident, that even Cicero, (a passionate
defender of Liberty,) in a publique pleading, attributeth all Propriety
to the Law Civil, "Let the Civill Law," saith he, "be once abandoned,
or but negligently guarded, (not to say oppressed,) and there is nothing,
that any man can be sure to receive from his Ancestor, or leave
to his Children."  And again; "Take away the Civill Law, and no man
knows what is his own, and what another mans."  Seeing therefore the
Introduction of Propriety is an effect of Common-wealth; which can do
nothing but by the Person that Represents it, it is the act onely
of the Soveraign; and consisteth in the Lawes, which none can make
that have not the Soveraign Power.  And this they well knew of old,
who called that Nomos, (that is to say, Distribution,) which we
call Law; and defined Justice, by distributing to every man his own.

All Private Estates Of Land Proceed Originally
From The Arbitrary Distribution Of The Soveraign
In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land
it selfe: wherein the Soveraign assigneth to every man a portion,
according as he, and not according as any Subject, or any number of them,
shall judge agreeable to Equity, and the Common Good.  The Children
of Israel, were a Common-wealth in the Wildernesse; but wanted
the commodities of the Earth, till they were masters of the
Land of Promise; which afterward was divided amongst them,
not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of Eleazar the Priest,
and Joshua their Generall: who when there were twelve Tribes,
making them thirteen by subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph;
made neverthelesse but twelve portions of the Land; and ordained
for the Tribe of Levi no land; but assigned them the Tenth part
of the whole fruits; which division was therefore Arbitrary.
And though a People comming into possession of a land by warre,
do not alwaies exterminate the antient Inhabitants, (as did the Jewes,)
but leave to many, or most, or all of them their Estates; yet it is
manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the Victors distribution;
as the people of England held all theirs of William the Conquerour.

Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The Dominion
Of The Soveraign, But Onely Of Another Subject
From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject
hath in his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other
subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their Soveraign,
be it an Assembly, or a Monarch.  For seeing the Soveraign,
that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person he representeth,)
is understood to do nothing but in order to the common Peace
and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understood as
done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution
he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will
of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion,
and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them,
is to be reputed voyd.  It is true, that a Soveraign Monarch,
or the greater part of a Soveraign Assembly, may ordain the doing
of many things in pursuit of their Passions, contrary to their
own consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of the Law of Nature;
but this is not enough to authorise any subject, either to make
warre upon, or so much as to accuse of Injustice, or any way
to speak evill of their Soveraign; because they have authorised all
his actions, and in bestowing the Soveraign Power, made them their own.
But in what cases the Commands of Soveraigns are contrary to Equity,
and the Law of Nature, is to be considered hereafter in another place.

The Publique Is Not To Be Dieted
In the Distribution of land, the Common-wealth it selfe, may be
conceived to have a portion, and possesse, and improve the same
by their Representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient,
to susteine the whole expence to the common Peace, and defence
necessarily required: Which were very true, if there could be
any Representative conceived free from humane passions, and infirmities.
But the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of Publique Land,
or of any certaine Revenue for the Common-wealth, is in vaine;
and tendeth to the dissolution of Government, and to the condition
of meere Nature, and War, assoon as ever the Soveraign Power
falleth into the hands of a Monarch, or of an Assembly, that are either
too negligent of mony, or too hazardous in engaging the publique stock,
into a long, or costly war.  Common-wealths can endure no Diet:
For seeing their expence is not limited by their own appetite,
but by externall Accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours,
the Publique Riches cannot be limited by other limits, than those which
the emergent occasions shall require.  And whereas in England,
there were by the Conquerour, divers Lands reserved to his own use,
(besides Forrests, and Chases, either for his recreation, or for
preservation of Woods,) and divers services reserved on the Land he
gave his Subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his
Maintenance in his Publique, but in his Naturall capacity:
For he, and his Successors did for all that, lay Arbitrary Taxes
on all Subjects land, when they judged it necessary.  Or if those
publique Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient
maintenance of the Common-wealth, it was contrary to the scope
of the Institution; being (as it appeared by those ensuing Taxes)
insufficient, and (as it appeares by the late Revenue of the Crown)
Subject to Alienation, and Diminution.  It is therefore in vaine, to
assign a portion to the Common-wealth; which may sell, or give it away;
and does sell, and give it away when tis done by their Representative.

The Places And Matter Of Traffique Depend,
As Their Distribution, On The Soveraign
As the Distribution of Lands at home; so also to assigne in what places,
and for what commodities, the Subject shall traffique abroad,
belongeth to the Soveraign.  For if it did belong to private persons
to use their own discretion therein, some of them would bee drawn
for gaine, both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the
Common-wealth, and hurt it themselves, by importing such things,
as pleasing mens appetites, be neverthelesse noxious, or at least
unprofitable to them.  And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth,
(that is, to the Soveraign only,) to approve, or disapprove both
of the places, and matter of forraign Traffique.

The Laws Of Transferring Property Belong
Also To The Soveraign
Further, seeing it is not enough to the Sustentation of a Common-wealth,
that every man have a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some
few commodities, or a naturall property in some usefull art,
and there is no art in the world, but is necessary either for the being,
or well being almost of every particular man; it is necessary,
that men distribute that which they can spare, and transferre
their propriety therein, mutually one to another, by exchange,
and mutuall contract.  And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth,
(that is to say, to the Soveraign,) to appoint in what manner,
all kinds of contract between Subjects, (as buying, selling,
exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire,)
are to bee made; and by what words, and signes they shall be
understood for valid.  And for the Matter, and Distribution of
the Nourishment, to the severall Members of the Common-wealth,
thus much (considering the modell of the whole worke) is sufficient.

Mony The Bloud Of A Common-wealth
By Concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities,
which are not presently consumed, but reserved for Nourishment
in time to come, to some thing of equal value, and withall so portably,
as not to hinder the motion of men from place to place; to the end a man
may have in what place soever, such Nourishment as the place affordeth.
And this is nothing else but Gold, and Silver, and Mony.  For Gold
and Silver, being (as it happens) almost in all Countries of the world
highly valued, is a commodious measure for the value of all things
else between Nations; and Mony (of what matter soever coyned by the
Soveraign of a Common-wealth,) is a sufficient measure of the value
of all things else, between the Subjects of that Common-wealth.
By the means of which measures, all commodities, Moveable,
and Immoveable, are made to accompany a man, to all places of his resort,
within and without the place of his ordinary residence; and the same
passeth from Man to Man, within the Common-wealth; and goes round about,
Nourishing (as it passeth) every part thereof; In so much as
this Concoction, is as it were the Sanguification of the Common-wealth:
For naturall Bloud is in like manner made of the fruits of the Earth;
and circulating, nourisheth by the way, every Member of the Body of Man.

And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it self;
they have first this priviledge, that the value of them cannot be
altered by the power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths;
as being a common measure of the commodities of all places.
But base Mony, may easily be enhanced, or abased.  Secondly, they have
the priviledge to make Common-wealths, move, and stretch out their armes,
when need is, into forraign Countries; and supply, not only private
Subjects that travell, but also whole Armies with provision.
But that Coyne, which is not considerable for the Matter, but for the
Stamp of the place, being unable to endure change of ayr, hath its effect
at home only; where also it is subject to the change of Laws,
and thereby to have the value diminished, to the prejudice many times
of those that have it.

The Conduits And Way Of Mony To The Publique Use
The Conduits, and Wayes by which it is conveyed to the Publique use,
are of two sorts; One, that Conveyeth it to the Publique Coffers;
The other, that Issueth the same out againe for publique payments.
Of the first sort, are Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers;
of the second are the Treasurers againe, and the Officers appointed
for payment of severall publique or private Ministers.  And in this also,
the Artificiall Man maintains his resemblance with the Naturall;
whose Veins receiving the Bloud from the severall Parts of the Body,
carry it to the Heart; where being made Vitall, the Heart by
the Arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and enable for motion
all the Members of the same.

The Children Of A Common-wealth Colonies
The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are those
we call Plantations, or Colonies; which are numbers of men sent out
from the Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governour, to inhabit
a Forraign Country, either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made
voyd then, by warre.  And when a Colony is setled, they are either
a Common-wealth of themselves, discharged of their subjection to
their Soveraign that sent them, (as hath been done by many
Common-wealths of antient time,) in which case the Common-wealth
from which they went was called their Metropolis, or Mother,
and requires no more of them, then Fathers require of the Children,
whom they emancipate, and make free from their domestique government,
which is Honour, and Friendship; or else they remain united to
their Metropolis, as were the Colonies of the people of Rome;
and then they are no Common-wealths themselves, but Provinces,
and parts of the Common-wealth that sent them.  So that the Right
of Colonies (saving Honour, and League with their Metropolis,)
dependeth wholly on their Licence, or Letters, by which their Soveraign
authorised them to Plant.



CHAPTER XXV

OF COUNSELL


Counsell What
How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary
and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the
confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative
manner of speaking in them both, and in may other occasions besides.
For the words "Doe this," are the words not onely of him that Commandeth;
but also of him that giveth Counsell; and of him that Exhorteth;
and yet there are but few, that see not, that these are very
different things; or that cannot distinguish between them,
when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech
is directed, and upon what occasion.  But finding those phrases
in mens writings, and being not able, or not willing to enter
into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes
the Precepts of Counsellours, for the Precepts of them that command;
and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the
conclusions they would inferre, or the actions they approve.
To avoyd which mistakes, and render to those termes of Commanding,
Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper and distinct significations,
I define them thus.

Differences Between Command And Counsell
COMMAND is, where a man saith, "Doe this," or "Doe this not,"
without expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it.
From this it followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth,
pretendeth thereby his own Benefit: For the reason of his Command
is his own Will onely, and the proper object of every mans Will,
is some Good to himselfe.

COUNSELL, is where a man saith, "Doe" or "Doe not this," and
deduceth his own reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it
to him to whom he saith it.  And from this it is evident,
that he that giveth Counsell, pretendeth onely (whatsoever he intendeth)
the good of him, to whom he giveth it.

Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is,
that Command is directed to a mans own benefit; and Counsell
to the benefit of another man.  And from this ariseth another difference,
that a man may be obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath
covenanted to obey: But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled,
because the hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should
covenant to follow it, then is the Counsell turned into the nature
of a Command.  A third difference between them is, that no man can
pretend a right to be of another mans Counsell; because he is not
to pretend benefit by it to himselfe; but to demand right to
Counsell another, argues a will to know his designes, or to gain
some other Good to himselfe; which (as I said before) is of every mans
will the proper object.

This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that whatsoever it be,
he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask
Counsell of another, is to permit him to give such Counsell as he
shall think best; And consequently, he that giveth counsell to
his Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it,
cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to
the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the Proposition in debate.
For if the sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of, before the
Debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further Counsell;
For the Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the Debate,
and End of all Deliberation.  And generally he that demandeth Counsell,
is Author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Soveraign
cannot, no man else can.  But if one Subject giveth Counsell to another,
to do any thing contrary to the Lawes, whether that Counsell proceed
from evill intention, or from ignorance onely, it is punishable
by the Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is no good
excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes
to which he is subject.

Exhortation And Dehortation What
EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsell, accompanied with signes
in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed;
or to say it more briefly, Counsell Vehemently Pressed.  For he that
Exhorteth, doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth
to be done, and tye himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning;
but encourages him he Counselleth, to Action: As he that Dehorteth,
deterreth him from it.  And therefore they have in their speeches,
a regard to the common Passions, and opinions of men, in deducing
their reasons; and make use of Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples,
and other tooles of Oratory, to perswade their Hearers of the Utility,
Honour, or Justice of following their advise.

From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation,
is directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him
that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour;
who (by the definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own
benefits, but his whom he adviseth.  And that he directeth his Counsell
to his own benefit, is manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging,
or by the artificial giving thereof; which being not required of him,
and consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed
principally to his own benefit, and but accidentarily to the good
of him that is Counselled, or not at all.

Secondly, that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely,
where a man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech
is addressed to one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons
more rigorously, than can be done in a Multitude; which are too many
to enter into Dispute, and Dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently
to them all at once.  Thirdly, that they that Exhort and Dehort,
where they are required to give Counsell, are corrupt Counsellours,
and as it were bribed by their own interest.  For though the Counsell
they give be never so good; yet he that gives it, is no more
a good Counsellour, than he that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward,
is a just Judge.  But where a man may lawfully Command, as a Father
in his Family, or a Leader in an Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations,
are not onely lawfull, but also necessary, and laudable: But then they
are no more Counsells, but Commands; which when they are for Execution
of soure labour; sometimes necessity, and alwayes humanity requireth
to be sweetned in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune
and phrase of Counsell, rather then in harsher language of Command.

Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may take
from the formes of Speech that expresse them in Holy Scripture.
"Have no other Gods but me; Make to thy selfe no graven Image;
Take not Gods name in vain; Sanctifie the Sabbath; Honour thy Parents;
Kill not; Steale not," &c. are Commands; because the reason for which
we are to obey them, is drawn from the will of God our King,
whom we are obliged to obey.  But these words, "Sell all thou hast;
give it to the poore; and follow me," are Counsell; because the reason
for which we are to do so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this,
that we shall have "Treasure in Heaven."  These words, "Go into the
village over against you, and you shall find an Asse tyed, and her Colt;
loose her, and bring her to me," are a Command: for the reason of
their fact is drawn from the will of their Master: but these words,
"Repent, and be Baptized in the Name of Jesus," are Counsell;
because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit
of God Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner soever we rebell;
but of our selves, who have no other means of avoyding the punishment
hanging over us for our sins.

Differences Of Fit And Unfit Counsellours
As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced
from the nature of Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the benefit,
or hurt that may arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary
or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the
differences between apt, and inept counsellours be derived from the same.
For Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like actions
formerly observed, and Counsell but the Speech whereby that experience
is made known to another; the Vertues, and Defects of Counsell,
are the same with the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall:
And to the Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him
in the place of Memory, and Mentall Discourse.  But with this
resemblance of the Common-wealth, to a naturall man, there is one
dissimilitude joyned, of great importance; which is, that a naturall
man receiveth his experience, from the naturall objects of sense,
which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own;
whereas they that give Counsell to the Representative person of
a Common-wealth, may have, and have often their particular ends,
and passions, that render their Counsells alwayes suspected,
and many times unfaithfull.  And therefore we may set down for the
first condition of a good Counsellour,  That His Ends, And Interest,
Be Not Inconsistent With The Ends And Interest Of Him He Counselleth.

Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes
into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it,
in such manner, as he that is Counselled may be truly and evidently
informed; he ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech,
as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say,
with as firme ratiocination, as significant and proper language,
and as briefly, as the evidence will permit.  And therefore Rash,
And Unevident Inferences; (such as are fetched onely from Examples,
or authority of Books, and are not arguments of what is good,
or evill, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion,) Obscure, Confused,
And Ambiguous Expressions, Also All Metaphoricall Speeches, Tending To
The Stirring Up Of Passion, (because such reasoning, and such
expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or to lead him
we Counsell towards other ends than his own) Are Repugnant
To The Office Of A Counsellour.

Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling proceedeth from Experience,
and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all
those things that to the Administration of a great Common-wealth
are necessary to be known, No Man Is Presumed To Be A Good Counsellour,
But In Such Businesse, As He Hath Not Onely Been Much Versed In,
But Hath Also Much Meditated On, And Considered.  For seeing the
businesse of a Common-wealth is this, to preserve the people at home,
and defend them against forraign Invasion, we shall find,
it requires great knowledge of the disposition of Man-kind,
of the Rights of Government, and of the nature of Equity,
Law, Justice, and Honour, not to be attained without study;
And of the Strength, Commodities, Places, both of their own Country,
and their Neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designes
of all Nations that may any way annoy them.  And this is not attained to,
without much experience.  Of which things, not onely the whole summe,
but every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation
of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study.  The wit required
for Counsel, as I have said before is Judgement.  And the differences
of men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind
of study, or businesse, and of others to another.  When for the doing
of any thing, there be Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices,
the rules of Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equall
his Counsell, that has learnt, or found out the Rule.  And when there
is no such Rule, he that hath most experience in that particular
kind of businesse, has therein the best Judgement, and is
the best Counsellour.

Fourthly, to be able to give Counsell to a Common-wealth,
in a businesse that hath reference to another Common-wealth,
It Is Necessary To Be Acquainted With The Intelligences, And Letters
That Come From Thence, And With All The Records Of Treaties,
And Other Transactions Of State Between Them; which none can doe,
but such as the Representative shall think fit.  By which we may see,
that they who are not called to Counsell, can have no good Counsell
in such cases to obtrude.

Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man is better
Counselled by hearing them apart, then in an Assembly; and that
for many causes.  First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice
of every man; but in an Assembly may of them deliver their advise with I,
or No, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense,
but by the eloquence of another, or for feare of displeasing
some that have spoken, or the whole Assembly, by contradiction;
or for feare of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that
have applauded the contrary opinion.  Secondly, in an Assembly of many,
there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that
of the Publique; and these their Interests make passionate,
and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence drawes others into the same advice.
For the Passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat
of one brand; in Assembly are like many brands, that enflame one another,
(especially when they blow one another with Orations) to the setting
of the Common-wealth on fire, under pretence of Counselling it.
Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need)
the truth, or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of
the advise he gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections;
which cannot be done in an Assembly, where (in every difficult
question) a man is rather astonied, and dazled with the variety
of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take.
Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called together for advice,
wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent,
and also learned in the Politiques; and give not their advice with care
of the businesse propounded, but of the applause of their motly orations,
made of the divers colored threds, or shreds of Authors; which is an
Impertinence at least, that takes away the time of serious Consultation,
and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is easily avoided.
Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to be kept secret, (whereof there
be many occasions in Publique Businesse,) the Counsells of many,
and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore great
Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser numbers,
and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity
they have most confidence.

To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of
Counsell from a great Assembly of Counsellours, that wisheth for,
or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of
marrying his Children, disposing of his Lands, governing his Household,
or managing his private Estate, especially if there be amongst them
such as wish not his prosperity?  A man that doth his businesse
by the help of many and prudent Counsellours, with every one
consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth
able Seconds at Tennis play, placed in their proper stations.
He does next best, that useth his own Judgement only; as he that has
no Second at all.  But he that is carried up and down to his businesse
in a framed Counsell, which cannot move but by the plurality
of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly (out of envy,
or interest) retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all,
and like one that is carried to the ball, though by good Players,
yet in a Wheele-barrough, or other frame, heavy of it self,
and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours
of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set
their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or more
amongst them, that desire to have him lose.  And though it be true,
that many eys see more then one; yet it is not to be understood
of many Counsellours; but then only, when the finall Resolution
is in one man.  Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing
in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their
private benefit; they that desire not to misse their marke,
though they look about with two eyes, yet they never ayme but with one;
And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was ever kept up;
but either by a forraign Enemy that united them; or by the
reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret
Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions;
and not by the open Consultations of the Assembly.  And as for
very little Common-wealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall,
there is no humane wisdome can uphold them, longer then the
Jealousy lasteth of their potent Neighbours.



CHAPTER XXVI

OF CIVILL LAWES


Civill Law what
By CIVILL LAWES, I understand the Lawes, that men are therefore
bound to observe, because they are Members, not of this, or that
Common-wealth in particular, but of a Common-wealth.  For the knowledge
of particular Lawes belongeth to them, that professe the study of
the Lawes of their severall Countries; but the knowledge of Civill Law
in generall, to any man.  The antient Law of Rome was called their
Civil Law, from the word Civitas, which signifies a Common-wealth;
And those Countries, which having been under the Roman Empire,
and governed by that Law, retaine still such part thereof as they
think fit, call that part the Civill Law, to distinguish it from
the rest of their own Civill Lawes.  But that is not it I intend
to speak of here; my designe being not to shew what is Law here,
and there; but what is Law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers
others have done, without taking upon them the profession of
the study of the Law.

And first it manifest, that Law in generall, is not Counsell,
but Command; nor a Command of any man to any man; but only of him,
whose Command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him.
And as for Civill Law, it addeth only the name of the person
Commanding, which is Persona Civitatis, the Person of the Common-wealth.

Which considered, I define Civill Law in this Manner.  "CIVILL LAW,
Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath
Commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will,
to make use of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say,
of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule."

In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight evident.
For every man seeth, that some Lawes are addressed to all the Subjects
in generall; some to particular Provinces; some to particular Vocations;
and some to particular Men; and are therefore Lawes, to every of those
to whom the Command is directed; and to none else.  As also,
that Lawes are the Rules of Just, and Unjust; nothing being
reputed Unjust, that is not contrary to some Law.  Likewise, that
none can make Lawes but the Common-wealth; because our Subjection
is to the Common-wealth only: and that Commands, are to be signified
by sufficient Signs; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them.
And therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary
consequence be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth.
Now I deduce from it this that followeth.

The Soveraign Is Legislator
1. The Legislator in all Common-wealths, is only the Soveraign,
be he one Man, as in a Monarchy, or one Assembly of men, as in
a Democracy, or Aristocracy.  For the Legislator, is he that
maketh the Law.  And the Common-wealth only, praescribes,
and commandeth the observation of those rules, which we call Law:
Therefore the Common-wealth is the Legislator.  But the Common-wealth
is no Person, nor has capacity to doe any thing, but by the
Representative, (that is, the Soveraign;) and therefore the Soveraign
is the sole Legislator.  For the same reason, none can abrogate
a Law made, but the Soveraign; because a Law is not abrogated,
but by another Law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.

And Not Subject To Civill Law
2. The Soveraign of a Common-wealth, be it an Assembly, or one Man,
is not subject to the Civill Lawes.  For having power to make,
and repeale Lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from
that subjection, by repealing those Lawes that trouble him,
and making of new; and consequently he was free before.  For he is free,
that can be free when he will: Nor is it possible for any person
to be bound to himselfe; because he that can bind, can release;
and therefore he that is bound to himselfe onely, is not bound.

Use, A Law Not By Vertue Of Time, But Of
The Soveraigns Consent
3. When long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it is not
the Length of Time that maketh the Authority, but the Will
of the Soveraign signified by his silence, (for Silence is sometimes
an argument of Consent;) and it is no longer Law, then the
Soveraign shall be silent therein.  And therefore if the Soveraign
shall have a question of Right grounded, not upon his present Will,
but upon the Lawes formerly made; the Length of Time shal bring
no prejudice to his Right; but the question shal be judged by Equity.
For many unjust Actions, and unjust Sentences, go uncontrolled
a longer time, than any man can remember.  And our Lawyers account
no Customes Law, but such as are reasonable, and that evill Customes
are to be abolished; But the Judgement of what is reasonable,
and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the Law,
which is the Soveraign Assembly, or Monarch.

The Law Of Nature, And The Civill Law Contain Each Other
4. The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain each other,
and are of equall extent.  For the Lawes of Nature, which consist
in Equity, Justice, Gratitude, and other morall Vertues on
these depending, in the condition of meer Nature (as I have said
before in the end of the 15th Chapter,) are not properly Lawes,
but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience.
When a Common-wealth is once settled, then are they actually Lawes,
and not before; as being then the commands of the Common-wealth;
and therefore also Civill Lawes: for it is the Soveraign Power
that obliges men to obey them.  For in the differences of private men,
to declare, what is Equity, what is Justice, and what is morall Vertue,
and to make them binding, there is need of the Ordinances of
Soveraign Power, and Punishments to be ordained for such as shall
break them; which Ordinances are therefore part of the Civill Law.
The Law of Nature therefore is a part of the Civill Law in all
Common-wealths of the world.  Reciprocally also, the Civill Law
is a part of the Dictates of Nature.  For Justice, that is to say,
Performance of Covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a Dictate
of the Law of Nature.  But every subject in a Common-wealth,
hath covenanted to obey the Civill Law, (either one with another,
as when they assemble to make a common Representative, or with
the Representative it selfe one by one, when subdued by the Sword
they promise obedience, that they may receive life;) And therefore
Obedience to the Civill Law is part also of the Law of Nature.
Civill, and Naturall Law are not different kinds, but different
parts of Law; whereof one part being written, is called Civill,
the other unwritten, Naturall.  But the Right of Nature, that is,
the naturall Liberty of man, may by the Civill Law be abridged,
and restrained: nay, the end of making Lawes, is no other, but such
Restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any Peace.
And Law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit
the naturall liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they
might not hurt, but assist one another, and joyn together against
a common Enemy.

Provinciall Lawes Are Not Made By Custome,
But By The Soveraign Power
5. If the Soveraign of one Common-wealth, subdue a people that
have lived under other written Lawes, and afterwards govern
them by the same Lawes, by which they were governed before;
yet those Lawes are the Civill Lawes of the Victor, and not
of the Vanquished Common-wealth,  For the Legislator is he,
not by whose authority the Lawes were first made, but by whose
authority they now continue to be Lawes.  And therefore where
there be divers Provinces, within the Dominion of a Common-wealth,
and in those Provinces diversity of Lawes, which commonly are called
the Customes of each severall Province, we are not to understand
that such Customes have their Force, onely from Length of Time;
but that they were antiently Lawes written, or otherwise made known,
for the Constitutions, and Statutes of their Soveraigns; and are
now Lawes, not by vertue of the Praescription of time, but by
the Constitutions of their present Soveraigns.  But if an unwritten Law,
in all the Provinces of a Dominion, shall be generally observed,
and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that law can be no other
but a Law of Nature, equally obliging all man-kind.

Some Foolish Opinions Of Lawyers Concerning
The Making Of Lawes
6. Seeing then all Lawes, written, and unwritten, have their Authority,
and force, from the Will of the Common-wealth; that is to say,
from the Will of the Representative; which in a Monarchy is the Monarch,
and in other Common-wealths the Soveraign Assembly; a man may wonder
from whence proceed such opinions, as are found in the Books
of Lawyers of eminence in severall Common-wealths, directly,
or by consequence making the Legislative Power depend on private men,
or subordinate Judges.  As for example, "That the Common Law, hath no
Controuler but the Parlament;" which is true onely where a Parlament
has the Soveraign Power, and cannot be assembled, nor dissolved,
but by their own discretion.  For if there be a right in any else
to dissolve them, there is a right also to controule them,
and consequently to controule their controulings.  And if there be
no such right, then the Controuler of Lawes is not Parlamentum,
but Rex In Parlamento.  And where a Parlament is Soveraign,
if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from the
Countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man
will believe, that such an Assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves
a Legislative Power.  Item, that the two arms of a Common-wealth,
are Force, and Justice; The First Whereof Is In The King; The Other
Deposited In The Hands Of The Parlament.  As if a Common-wealth
could consist, where the Force were in any hand, which Justice had not
the Authority to command and govern.

7. That Law can never be against Reason, our Lawyers are agreed;
and that not the Letter,(that is, every construction of it,) but that
which is according to the Intention of the Legislator, is the Law.
And it is true: but the doubt is, of whose Reason it is, that shall
be received for Law.  It is not meant of any private Reason;
for then there would be as much contradiction in the Lawes,
as there is in the Schooles; nor yet (as Sr. Ed, Coke makes it
(Sir Edward Coke, upon Littleton Lib.2. Ch.6 fol 97.b),) an Artificiall
Perfection of Reason, Gotten By Long Study, Observation, And Experience,
(as his was.)  For it is possible long study may encrease, and confirm
erroneous Sentences: and where men build on false grounds, the more
they build, the greater is the ruine; and of those that study,
and observe with equall time, and diligence, the reasons and
resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore it is not
that Juris Prudentia, or wisedome of subordinate Judges; but the Reason
of this our Artificiall Man the Common-wealth, and his Command,
that maketh Law: And the Common-wealth being in their Representative
but one Person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the Lawes;
and when there doth, the same Reason is able, by interpretation,
or alteration, to take it away.  In all Courts of Justice,
the Soveraign (which is the Person of the Common-wealth,) is he
that Judgeth: The subordinate Judge, ought to have regard to the reason,
which moved his Soveraign to make such Law, that his Sentence may be
according thereunto; which then is his Soveraigns Sentence;
otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.

Law Made, If Not Also Made Known, Is No Law
8. From this, that the Law is a Command, and a Command consisteth
in declaration, or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth,
by voyce, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same,
we may understand, that the Command of the Common-wealth, is Law onely
to those, that have means to take notice of it.  Over naturall fooles,
children, or mad-men there is no Law, no more than over brute beasts;
nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they
had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the consequences
thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the actions
of any Soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves a Common-wealth.
And as those from whom Nature, or Accident hath taken away the notice
of all Lawes in generall; so also every man, from whom any accident,
not proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to
take notice of any particular Law, is excused, if he observe it not;
And to speak properly, that Law is no Law to him.  It is therefore
necessary, to consider in this place, what arguments, and signes
be sufficient for the knowledge of what is the Law; that is to say,
what is the will of the Soveraign, as well in Monarchies, as in other
formes of government.

Unwritten Lawes Are All Of Them Lawes Of Nature
And first, if it be a Law that obliges all the Subjects without exception,
and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as they
may take notice thereof, it is a Law of Nature.  For whatsoever men
are to take knowledge of for Law, not upon other mens words,
but every one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable
to the reason of all men; which no Law can be, but the Law of Nature.
The Lawes of Nature therefore need not any publishing, nor Proclamation;
as being contained in this one Sentence, approved by all the world,
"Do not that to another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done
by another to thy selfe."

Secondly, if it be a Law that obliges only some condition of men,
or one particular man and be not written, nor published by word,
then also it is a Law of Nature; and known by the same arguments, and
signs, that distinguish those in such a condition, from other Subjects.
For whatsoever Law is not written, or some way published by him
that makes it Law, can be known no way, but by the reason of him
that is to obey it; and is therefore also a Law not only Civill,
but Naturall.  For example, if the Soveraign employ a Publique Minister,
without written Instructions what to doe; he is obliged to take
for Instructions the Dictates of Reason; As if he make a Judge,
The Judge is to take notice, that his Sentence ought to be according
to the reason of his Soveraign, which being alwaies understood
to be Equity, he is bound to it by the Law of Nature: Or if an Ambassador,
he is (in al things not conteined in his written Instructions)
to take for Instruction that which Reason dictates to be most
conducing to his Soveraigns interest; and so of all other Ministers
of the Soveraignty, publique and private.  All which Instructions
of naturall Reason may be comprehended under one name of Fidelity;
which is a branch of naturall Justice.

The Law of Nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all
other Lawes, to be made known, to every man that shall be obliged
to obey them, either by word, or writing, or some other act,
known to proceed from the Soveraign Authority.  For the will of another,
cannot be understood, but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture
taken from his scope and purpose; which in the person of the
Common-wealth, is to be supposed alwaies consonant to Equity and Reason.
And in antient time, before letters were in common use, the Lawes
were many times put into verse; that the rude people taking pleasure in
singing, or reciting them, might the more easily reteine them in memory.
And for the same reason Solomon adviseth a man, to bind the ten
Commandements (Prov. 7. 3) upon his ten fingers.  And for the Law
which Moses gave to the people of Israel at the renewing of the Covenant,
(Deut. 11. 19) he biddeth them to teach it their Children,
by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way; at going to bed,
and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts, and dores
of their houses; and (Deut. 31. 12) to assemble the people, man,
woman, and child, to heare it read.

Nothing Is Law Where The Legislator Cannot Be Known
Nor is it enough the Law be written, and published; but also that there
be manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the Soveraign.
For private men, when they have, or think they have force enough
to secure their unjust designes, and convoy them safely to their
ambitious ends, may publish for Lawes what they please, without,
or against the Legislative Authority.  There is therefore requisite,
not only a Declaration of the Law, but also sufficient signes
of the Author, and Authority.  The Author, or Legislator is supposed
in every Common-wealth to be evident, because he is the Soveraign,
who having been Constituted by the consent of every one, is supposed
by every one to be sufficiently known.  And though the ignorance,
and security of men be such, for the most part, as that when the memory
of the first Constitution of their Common-wealth is worn out,
they doe not consider, by whose power they use to be defended
against their enemies, and to have their industry protected,
and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because no
man that considers, can make question of it, no excuse can be
derived from the ignorance of where the Soveraignty is placed.
And it is a Dictate of Naturall Reason, and consequently an
evident Law of Nature, that no man ought to weaken that power,
the protection whereof he hath himself demanded, or wittingly received
against others.  Therefore of who is Soveraign, no man, but by
his own fault, (whatsoever evill men suggest,) can make any doubt.
The difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the Authority derived
from him; The removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge of the
publique Registers, publique Counsels, publique Ministers, and
publique Seales; by which all Lawes are sufficiently verified.

Difference Between Verifying And Authorising
 Verifyed, I say, not Authorised: for the Verification, is but
the Testimony and Record; not the Authority of the law; which consisteth
in the Command of the Soveraign only.

The Law Verifyed By The Subordinate Judge
If therefore a man have a question of Injury, depending on the
Law of Nature; that is to say, on common Equity; the Sentence
of the Judge, that by Commission hath Authority to take cognisance
of such causes, is a sufficient Verification of the Law of Nature
in that individuall case.  For though the advice of one that professeth
the study of the Law, be usefull for the avoyding of contention;
yet it is but advice; tis the Judge must tell men what is Law,
upon the hearing of the Controversy.

By The Publique Registers
But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written Law;
every man by recourse to the Registers, by himself, or others,
may (if he will) be sufficiently enformed, before he doe such injury,
or commit the crime, whither it be an injury, or not: Nay he ought to
doe so: for when a man doubts whether the act he goeth about, be just,
or injust; and may informe himself, if he will; the doing is unlawfull.
In like manner, he that supposeth himself injured, in a case determined
by the written Law, which he may by himself, or others see and consider;
if he complaine before he consults with the Law, he does unjustly,
and bewrayeth a disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand
his own right.

By Letters Patent, And Publique Seale
If the question be of Obedience to a publique Officer; To have seen
his Commission, with the Publique Seale, and heard it read; or to
have had the means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient
Verification of his Authority.  For every man is obliged to doe
his best endeavour, to informe himself of all written Lawes,
that may concerne his own future actions.

The Interpretation Of The Law Dependeth
On The Soveraign Power
The Legislator known; and the Lawes, either by writing, or by the light of Nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very materiall circumstance to make them obligatory.  For it is not the Letter, but the Intendment, or Meaning; that is to say, the authentique Interpretation of the Law (which is the sense of the Legislator,) in which the nature of the Law consisteth; And therefore the Interpretation of all Lawes dependeth on the Authority Soveraign; and the Interpreters can be none but those, which the Soveraign, (to whom only the Subject oweth obedience) shall appoint.  For else, by the craft of an Interpreter, the Law my be made to beare a sense, contrary to that of the Soveraign; by which means the Interpreter becomes the Legislator.

All Lawes Need Interpretation
All Laws, written, and unwritten, have need of Interpretation.
The unwritten Law of Nature, though it be easy to such, as without
partiality, and passion, make use of their naturall reason,
and therefore leaves the violators thereof without excuse;
yet considering there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases
are not blinded by self love, or some other passion, it is now become
of all Laws the most obscure; and has consequently the greatest need
of able Interpreters.  The written Laws, if they be short, are easily
mis-interpreted, from the divers significations of a word, or two;
if long, they be more obscure by the diverse significations of
many words: in so much as no written Law, delivered in few,
or many words, can be well understood, without a perfect understanding
of the finall causes, for which the Law was made; the knowledge of
which finall causes is in the Legislator.  To him therefore there can
not be any knot in the Law, insoluble; either by finding out the ends,
to undoe it by; or else by making what ends he will, (as Alexander
did with his sword in the Gordian knot,) by the Legislative power;
which no other Interpreter can doe.

The Authenticall Interpretation Of Law Is Not
That Of Writers
The Interpretation of the Lawes of Nature, in a Common-wealth,
dependeth not on the books of Morall Philosophy.  The Authority
of writers, without the Authority of the Common-wealth, maketh not
their opinions Law, be they never so true.  That which I have written
in this Treatise, concerning the Morall Vertues, and of their necessity,
for the procuring, and maintaining peace, though it bee evident Truth,
is not therefore presently Law; but because in all Common-wealths
in the world, it is part of the Civill Law: For though it be
naturally reasonable; yet it is by the Soveraigne Power that
it is Law: Otherwise, it were a great errour, to call the Lawes
of Nature unwritten Law; whereof wee see so many volumes published,
and in them so many contradictions of one another, and of themselves.

The Interpreter Of The Law Is The Judge Giving Sentence
Viva Voce In Every Particular Case
The Interpretation of the Law of Nature, is the Sentence of the Judge
constituted by the Soveraign Authority, to heare and determine
such controversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the
application of the Law to the present case.  For in the act of
Judicature, the Judge doth no more but consider, whither the demand
of the party, be consonant to naturall reason, and Equity;
and the Sentence he giveth, is therefore the Interpretation
of the Law of Nature; which Interpretation is Authentique;
not because it is his private Sentence; but because he giveth it by
Authority of the Soveraign, whereby it becomes the Soveraigns Sentence;
which is Law for that time, to the parties pleading.

The Sentence Of A Judge, Does Not Bind Him, Or Another
Judge To Give Like Sentence In Like Cases Ever After
But because there is no Judge Subordinate, nor Soveraign, but may
erre in a Judgement of Equity; if afterward in another like case
he find it more consonant to Equity to give a contrary Sentence,
he is obliged to doe it.  No mans error becomes his own Law;
nor obliges him to persist in it.  Neither (for the same reason)
becomes it a Law to other Judges, though sworn to follow it.
For though a wrong Sentence given by authority of the Soveraign,
if he know and allow it, in such Lawes as are mutable, be a
constitution of a new Law, in cases, in which every little
circumstance is the same; yet in Lawes immutable, such as are
the Lawes of Nature, they are no Lawes to the same, or other Judges,
in the like cases for ever after.  Princes succeed one another;
and one Judge passeth, another commeth; nay, Heaven and Earth
shall passe; but not one title of the Law of Nature shall passe;
for it is the Eternall Law of God.  Therefore all the Sentences
of precedent Judges that have ever been, cannot all together make
a Law contrary to naturall Equity: Nor any Examples of former Judges,
can warrant an unreasonable Sentence, or discharge the present Judge
of the trouble of studying what is Equity (in the case he is to Judge,)
from the principles of his own naturall reason.  For example sake,
'Tis against the Law of Nature, To Punish The Innocent; and Innocent
is he that acquitteth himselfe Judicially, and is acknowledged
for Innocent by the Judge.  Put the case now, that a man is accused
of a capitall crime, and seeing the powers and malice of some enemy,
and the frequent corruption and partiality of Judges, runneth away
for feare of the event, and afterwards is taken, and brought to a
legall triall, and maketh it sufficiently appear, he was not guilty
of the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is neverthelesse condemned
to lose his goods; this is a manifest condemnation of the Innocent.
I say therefore, that there is no place in the world, where this
can be an interpretation of a Law of Nature, or be made a Law by
the Sentences of precedent Judges, that had done the same.
For he that judged it first, judged unjustly; and no Injustice
can be a pattern of Judgement to succeeding Judges.  A written Law
may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be punished for flying:
But that flying for feare of injury, should be taken for presumption
of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime Judicially,
is contrary to the nature of a Presumption, which hath no place
after Judgement given.  Yet this is set down by a great Lawyer
for the common Law of England.  "If a man," saith he, "that is Innocent,
be accused of Felony, and for feare flyeth for the same; albeit he
judicially acquitteth himselfe of the Felony; yet if it be found that
he fled for the Felony, he shall notwithstanding his Innocency,
Forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties.  For as to the
Forfeiture of them, the Law will admit no proofe against the
Presumption in Law, grounded upon his flight." Here you see,
An Innocent Man, Judicially Acquitted, Notwithstanding His Innocency,
(when no written Law forbad him to fly) after his acquitall,
Upon A Presumption In Law, condemned to lose all the goods he hath.
If the Law ground upon his flight a Presumption of the fact,
(which was Capitall,) the Sentence ought to have been Capitall:
if the presumption were not of the Fact, for what then ought he
to lose his goods?  This therefore is no Law of England; nor is
the condemnation grounded upon a Presumption of Law, but upon
the Presumption of the Judges.  It is also against Law, to say
that no Proofe shall be admitted against a Presumption of Law.
For all Judges, Soveraign and subordinate, if they refuse to
heare Proofe, refuse to do Justice: for though the Sentence be Just,
yet the Judges that condemn without hearing the Proofes offered,
are Unjust Judges; and their Presumption is but Prejudice;
which no man ought to bring with him to the Seat of Justice,
whatsoever precedent judgements, or examples he shall pretend to follow.
There be other things of this nature, wherein mens Judgements
have been perverted, by trusting to Precedents: but this is enough
to shew, that though the Sentence of the Judge, be a Law to the
party pleading, yet it is no Law to any Judge, that shall succeed
him in that Office.

In like manner, when question is of the Meaning of written Lawes,
he is not the Interpreter of them, that writeth a Commentary upon them.
For Commentaries are commonly more subject to cavill, than the Text;
and therefore need other Commentaries; and so there will be no end
of such Interpretation.  And therefore unlesse there be an Interpreter
authorised by the Soveraign, from which the subordinate Judges
are not to recede, the Interpreter can be no other than the ordinary Judges, in the some manner, as they are in cases of the unwritten Law; and their Sentences are to be taken by them that plead, for Lawes in that particular case; but not to bind other Judges, in like cases to give like judgements.  For a Judge may erre in the Interpretation even of written Lawes; but no errour of a subordinate Judge, can change the Law, which is the generall Sentence of the Soveraigne.

The Difference Between The Letter
And Sentence Of The Law
In written Lawes, men use to make a difference between the Letter,
and the Sentence of the Law: And when by the Letter, is meant
whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words, 'tis well distinguished.
For the significations of almost all words, are either in themselves,
or in the metaphoricall use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in
argument, to make many senses; but there is onely one sense of the Law.
But if by the Letter, be meant the Literall sense, then the Letter,
and the Sentence or intention of the Law, is all one.  For the literall
sense is that, which the Legislator is alwayes supposed to be Equity:
For it were a great contumely for a Judge to think otherwise
of the Soveraigne.  He ought therefore, if the Word of the Law
doe not fully authorise a reasonable Sentence, to supply it with
the Law of Nature; or if the case be difficult, to respit Judgement
till he have received more ample authority.  For Example, a written Law
ordaineth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force,
shall be restored by force: It happens that a man by negligence
leaves his house empty, and returning is kept out by force,
in which case there is no speciall Law ordained.  It is evident,
that this case is contained in the same Law: for else there is
no remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the
Intention of the Legislator.  Again, the word of the Law,
commandeth to Judge according to the Evidence: A man is accused
falsly of a fact, which the Judge saw himself done by another;
and not by him that is accused.  In this case neither shall the
Letter of the Law be followed to the condemnation of the Innocent,
nor shall the Judge give Sentence against the evidence of the Witnesses;
because the Letter of the Law is to the contrary: but procure
of the Soveraign that another be made Judge, and himselfe Witnesse.
So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of a written Law,
may lead him to the Intention of the Law, whereby to interpret
the same the better; though no Incommodity can warrant a Sentence
against the Law.  For every Judge of Right, and Wrong, is not Judge
of what is Commodious, or Incommodious to the Common-wealth.

The Abilities Required In A Judge
The abilities required in a good Interpreter of the Law, that is
to say, in a good Judge, are not the same with those of an Advocate;
namely the study of the Lawes.  For a Judge, as he ought to take
notice of the Fact, from none but the Witnesses; so also he ought
to take notice of the Law, from nothing but the Statutes,
and Constitutions of the Soveraign, alledged in the pleading,
or declared to him by some that have authority from the Soveraign Power
to declare them; and need not take care before-hand, what hee
shall Judge; for it shall bee given him what hee shall say
concerning the Fact, by Witnesses; and what hee shall say in
point of Law, from those that shall in their pleadings shew it,
and by authority interpret it upon the place.  The Lords of Parlament
in England were Judges, and most difficult causes have been heard
and determined by them; yet few of them were much versed in the
study of the Lawes, and fewer had made profession of them:
and though they consulted with Lawyers, that were appointed to be
present there for that purpose; yet they alone had the authority
of giving Sentence.  In like manner, in the ordinary trialls of Right,
Twelve men of the common People, are the Judges, and give Sentence,
not onely of the Fact, but of the Right; and pronounce simply
for the Complaynant, or for the Defendant; that is to say,
are Judges not onely of the Fact, but also of the Right: and in
a question of crime, not onely determine whether done, or not done;
but also whether it be Murder, Homicide, Felony, Assault, and the like,
which are determinations of Law: but because they are not supposed
to know the Law of themselves, there is one that hath Authority
to enforme them of it, in the particular case they are to Judge of.
But yet if they judge not according to that he tells them,
they are not subject thereby to any penalty; unlesse it be made appear,
they did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward.
The things that make a good Judge, or good Interpreter of the Lawes,
are, first A Right Understanding of that principall Law of Nature
called Equity; which depending not on the reading of other mens
Writings, but on the goodnesse of a mans own naturall Reason,
and Meditation, is presumed to be in those most, that have had
most leisure, and had the most inclination to meditate thereon.
Secondly, Contempt Of Unnecessary Riches, and Preferments.
Thirdly, To Be Able In Judgement To Devest Himselfe Of All Feare,
Anger, Hatred, Love, And Compassion.  Fourthly, and lastly,
Patience To Heare; Diligent Attention In Hearing; And Memory To Retain,
Digest And Apply What He Hath Heard.

Divisions Of Law
The difference and division of the Lawes, has been made in divers
manners, according to the different methods, of those men that
have written of them.  For it is a thing that dependeth not on Nature,
but on the scope of the Writer; and is subservient to every mans
proper method.  In the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven
sorts of Civill Lawes.

1. The Edicts, Constitutions, and Epistles Of The Prince, that is,
of the Emperour; because the whole power of the people was in him.
Like these, are the Proclamations of the Kings of England.

2. The Decrees Of The Whole People Of Rome (comprehending the Senate,)
when they were put to the Question by the Senate.  These were Lawes,
at first, by the vertue of the Soveraign Power residing in the people;
and such of them as by the Emperours were not abrogated, remained Lawes
by the Authority Imperiall.  For all Lawes that bind, are understood
to be Lawes by his authority that has power to repeale them.
Somewhat like to these Lawes, are the Acts of Parliament in England.

3. The Decrees Of The Common People (excluding the Senate,)
when they were put to the question by the Tribune of the people.
For such of them as were not abrogated by the Emperours,
remained Lawes by the Authority Imperiall.  Like to these,
were the Orders of the House of Commons in England.

4. Senatus Consulta, the Orders Of The Senate; because when the people
of Rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assemble them;
it was thought fit by the Emperour, that men should Consult
the Senate in stead of the people: And these have some resemblance
with the Acts of Counsell.

5. The Edicts Of Praetors, and (in some Cases) of the Aediles:
such as are the Chiefe Justices in the Courts of England.

6. Responsa Prudentum; which were the Sentences, and Opinions
of those Lawyers, to whom the Emperour gave Authority to interpret
the Law, and to give answer to such as in matter of Law demanded
their advice; which Answers, the Judges in giving Judgement
were obliged by the Constitutions of the Emperour to observe;
And should be like the Reports of Cases Judged, if other Judges
be by the Law of England bound to observe them.  For the Judges
of the Common Law of England, are not properly Judges, but Juris
Consulti; of whom the Judges, who are either the Lords, or Twelve
men of the Country, are in point of Law to ask advice.

7. Also, Unwritten Customes, (which in their own nature are
an imitation of Law,) by the tacite consent of the Emperour,
in case they be not contrary to the Law of Nature, are very Lawes.

Another division of Lawes, is into Naturall and Positive.
Naturall are those which have been Lawes from all Eternity;
and are called not onely Naturall, but also Morall Lawes;
consisting in the Morall Vertues, as Justice, Equity, and all
habits of the mind that conduce to Peace, and Charity; of which
I have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

Positive, are those which have not been for Eternity; but have been
made Lawes by the Will of those that have had the Soveraign Power
over others; and are either written, or made known to men,
by some other argument of the Will of their Legislator.

Another Division Of Law
Again, of Positive Lawes some are Humane, some Divine; And of Humane
positive lawes, some are Distributive, some Penal.  Distributive are
those that determine the Rights of the Subjects, declaring to
every man what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety
in lands, or goods, and a right or liberty of action; and these speak
to all the Subjects.  Penal are those, which declare, what Penalty
shall be inflicted on those that violate the Law; and speak to
the Ministers and Officers ordained for execution.  For though every one
ought to be informed of the Punishments ordained beforehand for their
transgression; neverthelesse the Command is not addressed to the
Delinquent, (who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himselfe,)
but to publique Ministers appointed to see the Penalty executed.
And these Penal Lawes are for the most part written together with
the Lawes Distributive; and are sometimes called Judgements.
For all Lawes are generall judgements, or Sentences of the Legislator;
as also every particular Judgement, is a Law to him, whose case is Judged.

Divine Positive Law How Made Known To Be Law
Divine Positive Lawes (for Naturall Lawes being Eternall,
and Universall, are all Divine,) are those, which being the
Commandements of God, (not from all Eternity, nor universally
addressed to all men, but onely to a certain people, or to
certain persons,) are declared for such, by those whom God
hath authorised to declare them.  But this Authority of man
to declare what be these Positive Lawes of God, how can it be known?
God may command a man by a supernaturall way, to deliver Lawes
to other men.  But because it is of the essence of Law, that he
who is to be obliged, be assured of the Authority of him that
declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God,
How Can A Man Without Supernaturall Revelation Be Assured Of
The Revelation Received By The Declarer? and How Can He Be Bound
To Obey Them?  For the first question, how a man can be assured
of the Revelation of another, without a Revelation particularly
to himselfe, it is evidently impossible: for though a man may be
induced to believe such Revelation, from the Miracles they see him doe,
or from seeing the Extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing
the Extraordinary wisedome, or Extraordinary felicity of his Actions,
all which are marks of Gods extraordinary favour; yet they are not
assured evidence of speciall Revelation.  Miracles are Marvellous workes:
but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another.
Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world,
are most often the work of God by Naturall, and ordinary causes.
And therefore no man can infallibly know by naturall reason,
that another has had a supernaturall revelation of Gods will;
but only a beliefe; every one (as the signs thereof shall appear
greater, or lesser) a firmer, or a weaker belief.

But for the second, how he can be bound to obey them; it is not so hard.
For if the Law declared, be not against the Law of Nature (which is
undoubtedly Gods Law) and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by
his own act; bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it:
for mens beliefe, and interiour cogitations, are not subject to the
commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary.
Faith of Supernaturall Law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting
to the same; and not a duty that we exhibite to God, but a gift
which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also Unbelief is not
a breach of any of his Lawes; but a rejection of them all,
except the Lawes Naturall.  But this that I say, will be made yet cleerer,
by the Examples, and Testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture.
The Covenant God made with Abraham (in a Supernaturall Manner) was thus,
(Gen. 17. 10) "This is the Covenant which thou shalt observe between
Me and Thee and thy Seed after thee."  Abrahams Seed had not this
revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the Covenant,
and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for Gods Law;
which they could not be, but in vertue of the obedience they owed
to their Parents; who (if they be Subject to no other earthly power,
as here in the case of Abraham) have Soveraign power over their children,
and servants.  Againe, where God saith to Abraham, "In thee shall
all Nations of the earth be blessed: For I know thou wilt command
thy children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord,
and to observe Righteousnesse and Judgement," it is manifest,
the obedience of his Family, who had no Revelation, depended on
their former obligation to obey their Soveraign.  At Mount Sinai
Moses only went up to God; the people were forbidden to approach
on paine of death; yet were they bound to obey all that Moses declared
to them for Gods Law.  Upon what ground, but on this submission
of their own, "Speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not God
speak to us, lest we dye?" By which two places it sufficiently appeareth,
that in a Common-wealth, a subject that has no certain and assured
Revelation particularly to himself concerning the Will of God,
is to obey for such, the Command of the Common-wealth: for if men
were at liberty, to take for Gods Commandements, their own dreams,
and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men; scarce two men
would agree upon what is Gods Commandement; and yet in respect of them,
every man would despise the Commandements of the Common-wealth.
I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the Morall Law,
(that is to say, to the Law of Nature,) all Subjects are bound
to obey that for divine Law, which is declared to be so, by the Lawes
of the Common-wealth.  Which also is evident to any mans reason;
for whatsoever is not against the Law of Nature, may be made Law
in the name of them that have the Soveraign power; and there is
no reason men should be the lesse obliged by it, when tis propounded
in the name of God.  Besides, there is no place in the world where men
are permitted to pretend other Commandements of God, than are declared
for such by the Common-wealth.  Christian States punish those that
revolt from Christian Religion, and all other States, those that set up
any Religion by them forbidden.  For in whatsoever is not regulated
by the Common-wealth, tis Equity (which is the Law of Nature,
and therefore an eternall Law of God) that every man equally
enjoy his liberty.

Another Division Of Lawes
There is also another distinction of Laws, into Fundamentall,
and Not Fundamentall: but I could never see in any Author,
what a Fundamentall Law signifieth.  Neverthelesse one may very
reasonably distinguish Laws in that manner.

A Fundamentall Law What
For a Fundamentall Law in every Common-wealth is that, which being
taken away, the Common-wealth faileth, and is utterly dissolved;
as a building whose Foundation is destroyed.  And therefore a
Fundamentall Law is that, by which Subjects are bound to uphold
whatsoever power is given to the Soveraign, whether a Monarch,
or a Soveraign Assembly, without which the Common-wealth cannot stand,
such as is the power of War and Peace, of Judicature, of Election
of Officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary
for the Publique good.  Not Fundamentall is that the abrogating whereof,
draweth not with it the dissolution of the Common-Wealth; such as are
the Lawes Concerning Controversies between subject and subject.
Thus much of the Division of Lawes.

Difference Between Law And Right
I find the words Lex Civilis, and Jus Civile, that is to say,
Law and Right Civil, promiscuously used for the same thing,
even in the most learned Authors; which neverthelesse ought not to be so.
For Right is Liberty, namely that Liberty which the Civil Law leaves us:
But Civill Law is an Obligation; and takes from us the Liberty which
the Law of Nature gave us.  Nature gave a Right to every man to secure
himselfe by his own strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour,
by way of prevention; but the Civill Law takes away that Liberty,
in all cases where the protection of the Lawe may be safely stayd for.
Insomuch as Lex and Jus, are as different as Obligation and Liberty.

And Between A Law And A Charter
Likewise Lawes and Charters are taken promiscuously for the same thing.
Yet Charters are Donations of the Soveraign; and not Lawes, but
exemptions from Law.  The phrase of a Law is Jubeo, Injungo, I Command,
and Enjoyn: the phrase of a Charter is Dedi, Concessi, I Have Given,
I Have Granted: but what is given or granted, to a man, is not forced
upon him, by a Law.  A Law may be made to bind All the Subjects of
a Common-wealth: a Liberty, or Charter is only to One man,
or some One part of the people.  For to say all the people of
a Common-wealth, have Liberty in any case whatsoever; is to say,
that in such case, there hath been no Law made; or else having
been made, is now abrogated.



CHAPTER XXVII

OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS


Sinne What
A Sinne, is not onely a Transgression of a Law, but also any Contempt of
the Legislator.  For such Contempt, is a breach of all his Lawes at once.
And therefore may consist, not onely in the Commission of a Fact,
or in the Speaking of Words by the Lawes forbidden, or in the
Omission of what the Law commandeth, but also in the Intention,
or purpose to transgresse.  For the purpose to breake the Law,
is some degree of Contempt of him, to whom it belongeth to
see it executed.  To be delighted in the Imagination onely,
of being possessed of another mans goods, servants, or wife,
without any intention to take them from him by force, or fraud,
is no breach of the Law, that sayth, "Thou shalt not covet:"
nor is the pleasure a man my have in imagining, or dreaming of
the death of him, from whose life he expecteth nothing but dammage,
and displeasure, a Sinne; but the resolving to put some Act in execution,
that tendeth thereto.  For to be pleased in the fiction of that,
which would please a man if it were reall, is a Passion so adhaerent
to the Nature both of a man, and every other living creature,
as to make it a Sinne, were to make Sinne of being a man.
The consideration of this, has made me think them too severe,
both to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the First
motions of the mind, (though checked with the fear of God) be Sinnes.
But I confesse it is safer to erre on that hand, than on the other.

A Crime What
A Crime, is a sinne, consisting in the Committing (by Deed, or Word) of
that which the Law forbiddeth, or the Omission of what it hath commanded.
So that every Crime is a sinne; but not every sinne a Crime.
To intend to steale, or kill, is a sinne, though it never appeare
in Word, or Fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it
to his charge: but till it appear by some thing done, or said,
by which the intention may be Crime; which distinction the Greeks
observed in the word amartema, and egklema, or aitia; wherof
the former, (which is translated Sinne,) signifieth any swarving
from the Law whatsoever; but the two later, (which are translated Crime,)
signifie that sinne onely, whereof one man may accuse another.
But of Intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there is
no place for humane accusation.  In like manner the Latines by
Peccatum, which is Sinne, signifie all manner of deviation from
the Law; but by crimen, (which word they derive from Cerno,
which signifies to perceive,) they mean onely such sinnes,
as my be made appear before a Judge; and therfore are not meer Intentions.

Where No Civill Law Is, There Is No Crime
From this relation of Sinne to the Law, and of Crime to the Civill Law,
may be inferred, First, that where Law ceaseth, Sinne ceaseth.
But because the Law of Nature is eternall, Violation of Covenants,
Ingratitude, Arrogance, and all Facts contrary to any Morall vertue,
can never cease to be Sinne.  Secondly, that the Civill Law ceasing,
Crimes cease: for there being no other Law remaining, but that of Nature,
there is no place for Accusation; every man being his own Judge,
and accused onely by his own Conscience, and cleared by the
Uprightnesse of his own Intention.  When therefore his Intention
is Right, his fact is no Sinne: if otherwise, his fact is Sinne;
but not Crime.  Thirdly, That when the Soveraign Power ceaseth,
Crime also ceaseth: for where there is no such Power, there is no
protection to be had from the Law; and therefore every one may protect
himself by his own power: for no man in the Institution of Soveraign
Power can be supposed to give away the Right of preserving his
own body; for the safety whereof all Soveraignty was ordained.
But this is to be understood onely of those, that have not themselves
contributed to the taking away of the Power that protected them:
for that was a Crime from the beginning.

Ignorance Of The Law Of Nature Excuseth No Man
The source of every Crime, is some defect of the Understanding;
or some errour in Reasoning, or some sudden force of the Passions.
Defect in the Understanding, is Ignorance; in Reasoning,
Erroneous Opinion.  Again, ignorance is of three sort; of the Law,
and of the Soveraign, and of the Penalty.  Ignorance of the Law
of Nature Excuseth no man; because every man that hath attained
to the use of Reason, is supposed to know, he ought not to do to another,
what he would not have done to himselfe.  Therefore into what place
soever a man shall come, if he do any thing contrary to that Law,
it is a Crime.  If a man come from the Indies hither, and perswade
men here to receive a new Religion, or teach them any thing that
tendeth to disobedience of the Lawes of this Country, though he be
never so well perswaded of the truth of what he teacheth,
he commits a Crime, and may be justly punished for the same,
not onely because his doctrine is false, but also because he does
that which he would not approve in another, namely, that comming
from hence, he should endeavour to alter the Religion there.
But ignorance of the Civill Law, shall Excuse a man in a strange Country,
till it be declared to him; because, till then no Civill Law is binding.

Ignorance Of The Civill Law Excuseth Sometimes
In the like manner, if the Civill Law of a mans own Country,
be not so sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will;
nor the Action against the Law of Nature; the Ignorance is a
good Excuse: In other cases ignorance of the Civill Law, Excuseth not.

Ignorance Of The Soveraign Excuseth Not
Ignorance of the Soveraign Power, in the place of a mans ordinary
residence, Excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of
the Power, by which he hath been protected there.

Ignorance Of The Penalty Excuseth Not
Ignorance of the Penalty, where the Law is declared, Excuseth no man:
For in breaking the Law, which without a fear of penalty to follow,
were not a Law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty,
though he know not what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily
doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of it;
but Punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the Lawes,
in every Common-wealth; which punishment, if it be determined
already by the Law, he is subject to that; if not, then is he
subject to Arbitrary punishment.  For it is reason, that he which
does Injury, without other limitation than that of his own Will,
should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of
his Will whose Law is thereby violated.

Punishments Declared Before The Fact,
Excuse From Greater Punishments After It
But when a penalty, is either annexed to the Crime in the Law it selfe,
or hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the Delinquent
is Excused from a greater penalty.  For the punishment foreknown, if not
great enough to deterre men from the action, is an invitement to it:
because when men compare the benefit of their Injustice,
with the harm of their punishment, by necessity of Nature
they choose that which appeareth best for themselves; and therefore
when they are punished more than the Law had formerly determined,
or more than others were punished for the same Crime; it the Law
that tempted, and deceiveth them.

Nothing Can Be Made A Crime By
A Law Made After The Fact
No Law, made after a Fact done, can make it a Crime: because if
the Fact be against the Law of Nature, the Law was before the Fact;
and a Positive Law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made;
and therefore cannot be Obligatory.  But when the Law that forbiddeth
a Fact, is made before the Fact be done; yet he that doth the Fact,
is lyable to the Penalty ordained after, in case no lesser Penalty
were made known before, neither by Writing, nor by Example,
for the reason immediatly before alledged.

False Principles Of Right And Wrong Causes Of Crime
From defect in Reasoning, (that is to say, from Errour,) men are
prone to violate the Lawes, three wayes.  First, by Presumption
of false Principles; as when men from having observed how in all places,
and in all ages, unjust Actions have been authorised, by the force,
and victories of those who have committed them; and that potent men,
breaking through the Cob-web Lawes of their Country, the weaker sort,
and those that have failed in their Enterprises, have been esteemed
the onely Criminals; have thereupon taken for Principles, and grounds
of their Reasoning, "That Justice is but a vain word: That whatsoever
a man can get by his own Industry, and hazard, is his own:
That the Practice of all Nations cannot be unjust: That examples
of former times are good Arguments of doing the like again;"
and many more of that kind: Which being granted, no Act in it selfe
can be a Crime, but must be made so (not by the Law, but) by the
successe of them that commit it; and the same Fact be vertuous,
or vicious, as Fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a Crime,
Sylla shall make meritorious, and Caesar (the same Lawes standing)
turn again into a Crime, to the perpetuall disturbance of the
Peace of the Common-wealth.

False Teachers Mis-interpreting The Law Of Nature
Secondly, by false Teachers, that either mis-interpret the Law of Nature,
making it thereby repugnant to the Law Civill; or by teaching for Lawes,
such Doctrines of their own, or Traditions of former times,
as are inconsistent with the duty of a Subject.

And False Inferences From True Principles, By Teachers
Thirdly, by Erroneous Inferences from True Principles; which happens
commonly to men that are hasty, and praecipitate in concluding,
and resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great
opinion of their own understanding, and believe that things
of this nature require not time and study, but onely common experience,
and a good naturall wit; whereof no man thinks himselfe unprovided:
whereas the knowledge, of Right and Wrong, which is no lesse difficult,
there is no man will pretend to, without great and long study.
And of those defects in Reasoning, there is none that can Excuse
(though some of them may Extenuate) a Crime, in any man, that
pretendeth to the administration of his own private businesse;
much lesse in them that undertake a publique charge; because
they pretend to the Reason, upon the want whereof they would
ground their Excuse.

By Their Passions;
Of the Passions that most frequently are the causes of Crime,
one, is Vain-glory, or a foolish over-rating of their own worth;
as if difference of worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches,
or bloud, or some other naturall quality, not depending on the Will
of those that have the Soveraign Authority.  From whence proceedeth
a Presumption that the punishments ordained by the Lawes, and extended
generally to all Subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them,
with the same rigour they are inflicted on poore, obscure,
and simple men, comprehended under the name of the Vulgar.

Presumption Of Riches,
Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by
the greatnesse of their wealth, adventure on Crimes, upon hope
of escaping punishment, by corrupting publique Justice, or obtaining
Pardon by Mony, or other rewards.

And Friends;
And that such as have multitude of Potent Kindred; and popular men,
that have gained reputation amongst the Multitude, take courage
to violate the Lawes, from a hope of oppressing the Power,
to whom it belongeth to put them in execution.

Wisedome
And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own Wisedome,
take upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question
the Authority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the Lawes
with their publique discourse, as that nothing shall be a Crime,
but what their own designes require should be so.  It happeneth also
to the same men, to be prone to all such Crimes, as consist in Craft,
and in deceiving of their Neighbours; because they think their designes
are too subtile to be perceived.  These I say are effects of a false
presumption of their own Wisdome.  For of them that are the first movers
in the disturbance of Common-wealth, (which can never happen without
a Civill Warre,) very few are left alive long enough, to see their
new Designes established: so that the benefit of their Crimes,
redoundeth to Posterity, and such as would least have wished it:
which argues they were not as wise, as they thought they were.
And those that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do commonly
deceive themselves, (the darknesse in which they believe they lye hidden,
being nothing else but their own blindnesse;) and are no wiser than
Children, that think all hid, by hiding their own eyes.

And generally all vain-glorious men, (unlesse they be withall timorous,)
are subject to Anger; as being more prone than others to interpret
for contempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: And there are
few Crimes that may not be produced by Anger.

Hatred, Lust, Ambition, Covetousnesse, Causes Of Crime
As for the Passions, of Hate, Lust, Ambition, and Covetousnesse,
what Crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every mans
experience and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said
of them, saving that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature,
both of man, and all other living creatures, as that their effects
cannot be hindred, but by extraordinary use of Reason, or a constant
severity in punishing them.  For in those things men hate,
they find a continuall, and unavoydable molestation; whereby either
a mans patience must be everlasting, or he must be eased by removing
the power of that which molesteth him;  The former is difficult;
the later is many times impossible, without some violation of the Law.
Ambition, and Covetousnesse are Passions also that are perpetually
incumbent, and pressing; whereas Reason is not perpetually present,
to resist them:  and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears,
their effects proceed.  And for Lust, what it wants in the lasting,
it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension
of all easie, or uncertain punishments.

Fear Sometimes Cause Of Crime, As When
The Danger Is Neither Present, Nor Corporeall
Of all Passions, that which enclineth men least to break the Lawes,
is Fear.  Nay, (excepting some generous natures,) it is the onely thing,
(when there is apparence of profit, or pleasure by breaking the Lawes,)
that makes men keep them.  And yet in many cases a Crime may be
committed through Feare.

For not every Fear justifies the Action it produceth, but the fear
onely of corporeall hurt, which we call Bodily Fear, and from
which a man cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action.
A man is assaulted, fears present death, from which he sees not
how to escape, but by wounding him that assaulteth him; If he wound
him to death, this is no Crime; because no man is supposed at the
making of a Common-wealth, to have abandoned the defence of his life,
or limbes, where the Law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance.
But to kill a man, because from his actions, or his threatnings,
I may argue he will kill me when he can, (seeing I have time,
and means to demand protection, from the Soveraign Power,) is a Crime.
Again, a man receives words of disgrace, or some little injuries
(for which they that made the Lawes, had assigned no punishment,
nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of Reason,
to take notice of,) and is afraid, unlesse he revenge it,
he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious
to the like injuries from others; and to avoyd this, breaks
the Law, and protects himselfe for the future, by the terrour
of his private revenge.  This is a Crime; For the hurt is not
Corporeall, but Phantasticall, and (though in this corner of
the world, made sensible by a custome not many years since begun,
amongst young and vain men,) so light, as a gallant man, and one
that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of.
Also a man may stand in fear of Spirits, either through his own
superstition, or through too much credit given to other men,
that tell him of strange Dreams and visions; and thereby be made
believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting divers things,
which neverthelesse, to do, or omit, is contrary to the Lawes;
And that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be Excused by this fear;
but is a Crime.  For (as I have shewn before in the second Chapter)
Dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after the
impressions our Senses had formerly received waking; and when men
are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be reall Visions;
and therefore he that presumes to break the Law upon his own,
or anothers Dream, or pretended Vision, or upon other Fancy
of the power of Invisible Spirits, than is permitted by the
Common-wealth, leaveth the Law of Nature, which is a certain offence,
and followeth the imagery of his own, or another private mans brain,
which he can never know whether it signifieth any thing, or nothing,
nor whether he that tells his Dream, say true, or lye; which if
every private man should have leave to do, (as they must by the
Law of Nature, if any one have it) there could no Law be made to hold,
and so all Common-wealth would be dissolved.

Crimes Not Equall
From these different sources of Crimes, it appeares already,
that all Crimes are not (as the Stoicks of old time maintained)
of the same allay.  There is place, not only for EXCUSE,
by which that which seemed a Crime, is proved to be none at all;
but also for EXTENUATION, by which the Crime, that seemed great,
is made lesse.  For though all Crimes doe equally deserve the name
of Injustice, as all deviation from a strait line is equally
crookednesse, which the Stoicks rightly observed; yet it does not
follow that all Crimes are equally unjust, no more than that all
crooked lines are equally crooked; which the Stoicks not observing,
held it as great a Crime, to kill a Hen, against the Law,
as to kill ones Father.

Totall Excuses
That which totally Excuseth a Fact, and takes away from it the
nature of a Crime, can be none but that, which at the same time,
taketh away the obligation of the Law.  For the fact committed
once against the Law, if he that committed it be obliged to the Law,
can be no other than a Crime.

The want of means to know the Law, totally Excuseth: For the Law
whereof a man has no means to enforme himself, is not obligatory.
But the want of diligence to enquire, shall not be considered
as a want of means; Nor shall any man, that pretendeth to reason
enough for the Government of his own affairs, be supposed to want
means to know the Lawes of Nature; because they are known by the
reason he pretends to: only Children, and Madmen are Excused from
offences against the Law Naturall.

Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy, (and he is
then in the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of
living, is so,) if it be without his own fault, the Obligation
of the Law ceaseth; because he must obey the enemy, or dye;
and consequently such obedience is no Crime: for no man is obliged
(when the protection of the Law faileth,) not to protect himself,
by the best means he can.

If a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe
a fact against the Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law
can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation.  And supposing
such a Law were obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, "If I
doe it not, I die presently; if I doe it, I die afterwards;
therefore by doing it, there is time of life gained;"  Nature therefore
compells him to the fact.

When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life,
and cannot preserve himselfe any other way, but by some fact against
the Law; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth,
which he cannot obtaine for mony nor charity; or in defence of his life,
snatch away another mans Sword, he is totally Excused, for the reason
next before alledged.

Excuses Against The Author
Again, Facts done against the Law, by the authority of another,
are by that authority Excused against the Author; because no man
ought to accuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument:
but it is not Excused against a third person thereby injured;
because in the violation of the law, bothe the Author, and Actor
are Criminalls.  From hence it followeth that when that Man,
or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, commandeth a man
to do that which is contrary to a former Law, the doing of it
is totally Excused: For he ought not to condemn it himselfe,
because he is the Author; and what cannot justly be condemned
by the Soveraign, cannot justly be punished by any other.
Besides, when the Soveraign commandeth any thing to be done
against his own former Law, the Command, as to that particular fact,
is an abrogation of the Law.

If that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, disclaime
any Right essentiall to the Soveraignty, whereby there accrueth
to the Subject, any liberty inconsistent with the Soveraign Power,
that is to say, with the very being of a Common-wealth, if the Subject
shall refuse to obey the Command in any thing, contrary to the
liberty granted, this is neverthelesse a Sinne, and contrary to
the duty of the Subject: for he ought to take notice of what is
inconsistent with the Soveraignty, because it was erected by his
own consent, and for his own defence; and that such liberty as is
inconsistent with it, was granted through ignorance of the evill
consequence thereof.  But if he not onely disobey, but also resist
a publique Minister in the execution of it, then it is a Crime;
because he might have been righted, (without any breach of the Peace,)
upon complaint.

The Degrees of Crime are taken on divers Scales, and measured,
First, by the malignity of the Source, or Cause: Secondly, by the
contagion of the Example: Thirdly, by the mischiefe of the Effect;
and Fourthly, by the concurrence of Times, Places, and Persons.

Presumption Of Power, Aggravateth
The same Fact done against the Law, if it proceed from Presumption
of strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute
the Law, is a greater Crime, than if it proceed from hope of not
being discovered, or of escape by flight: For Presumption of impunity
by force, is a Root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon
all temptations, a contempt of all Lawes; whereas in the later case,
the apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more
obedient for the future.  A Crime which we know to be so, is greater
than the same Crime proceeding from a false perswasion that
it is lawfull: For he that committeth it against his own conscience,
presumeth on his force, or other power, which encourages him to commit
the same again: but he that doth it by errour, after the errour
shewn him, is conformable to the Law.

Evill Teachers, Extenuate
Hee, whose errour proceeds from the authority of a Teacher,
or an Interpreter of the Law publiquely authorised, is not so faulty,
as he whose errour proceedeth from a peremptory pursute of his
own principles, and reasoning: For what is taught by one that
teacheth by publique Authority, the Common-wealth teacheth,
and hath a resemblance of Law, till the same Authority controuleth it;
and in all Crimes that contain not in them a denyall of the
Soveraign Power, nor are against an evident Law, Excuseth totally:
whereas he that groundeth his actions, on his private Judgement,
ought according to the rectitude, or errour thereof, to stand, or fall.

Examples Of Impunity, Extenuate
The same Fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men,
as a greater Crime, than if there have been may precedent
Examples of impunity.  For those Examples, are so many hopes
of Impunity given by the Soveraign himselfe: And because he which
furnishes a man with such a hope, and presumption of mercy,
as encourageth him to offend, hath his part in the offence;
he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole.

Praemeditation, Aggravateth;
A Crime arising from a sudden Passion, is not so great, as when
the same ariseth from long meditation: For in the former case
there is a place for Extenuation, in the common infirmity of
humane nature: but he that doth it with praemeditation, has used
circumspection, and cast his eye, on the Law, on the punishment,
and on the consequence thereof to humane society; all which
in committing the Crime, hee hath contemned, and postposed to
his own appetite.  But there is no suddennesse of Passion sufficient
for a totall Excuse: For all the time between the first knowing
of the Law, and the Commission of the Fact, shall be taken for
a time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the Law,
to rectifie the irregularity of his Passions.

Where the Law is publiquely, and with assiduity, before all
the people read, and interpreted; a fact done against it, is a
greater Crime, than where men are left without such instruction,
to enquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption
of their Callings, and be informed by private men: for in this case,
part of the fault is discharged upon common infirmity; but in the
former there is apparent negligence, which is not without some
contempt of the Soveraign Power.

Tacite Approbation Of The Soveraign, Extenuates
Those facts which the Law expresly condemneth, but the Law-maker
by other manifest signes of his will tacitly approveth, are lesse Crimes,
than the same facts, condemned both by the Law, and Lawmaker.
For seeing the will of the Law-maker is a Law, there appear
in this case two contradictory Lawes; which would totally Excuse,
if men were bound to take notice of the Soveraigns approbation,
by other arguments, than are expressed by his command.  But because
there are punishments consequent, not onely to the transgression
of his Law, but also to the observing of it, he is in part a cause
of the transgression, and therefore cannot reasonably impute
the whole Crime to the Delinquent.  For example, the Law condemneth
Duells; the punishment is made capitall: On the contrary part,
he that refuseth Duell, is subject to contempt and scorne,
without remedy; and sometimes by the Soveraign himselfe thought
unworthy to have any charge, or preferment in Warre: If thereupon
he accept Duell, considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain
the good opinion of them that have the Soveraign Power, he ought not
in reason to be rigorously punished; seeing part of the fault
may be discharged on the punisher; which I say, not as wishing
liberty of private revenges, or any other kind of disobedience;
but a care in Governours, not to countenance any thing obliquely,
which directly they forbid.  The examples of Princes, to those
that see them, are, and ever have been, more potent to govern
their actions, than the Lawes themselves.  And though it be our duty
to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty never
be performed, till it please God to give men an extraordinary,
and supernaturall grace to follow that Precept.

Comparison Of Crimes From Their Effects
Again, if we compare Crimes by the mischiefe of their Effects,
First, the same fact, when it redounds to the dammage of many,
is greater, than when it redounds to the hurt of few.  And therefore,
when a fact hurteth, not onely in the present, but also, (by example)
in the future, it is a greater Crime, than if it hurt onely
in the present: for the former, is a fertile Crime, and multiplyes
to the hurt of many; the later is barren.  To maintain doctrines
contrary to the Religion established in the Common-wealth, is a
greater fault, in an authorised Preacher, than in a private person:
So also is it, to live prophanely, incontinently, or do any
irreligious act whatsoever.  Likewise in a Professor of the Law,
to maintain any point, on do any act, that tendeth to the weakning
of the Soveraign Power, as a greater Crime, than in another man:
Also in a man that hath such reputation for wisedome, as that his
counsells are followed, or his actions imitated by many, his fact
against the Law, is a greater Crime, than the same fact in another:
For such men not onely commit Crime, but teach it for Law to
all other men.  And generally all Crimes are the greater,
by the scandall they give; that is to say, by becoming stumbling-blocks
to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go in,
as upon the light that other men carry before them.

Laesae Majestas
Also Facts of Hostility against the present state of the Common-wealth,
are greater Crimes, than the same acts done to private men;
For the dammage extends it selfe to all: Such are the betraying
of the strengths, or revealing of the secrets of the Common-wealth
to an Enemy; also all attempts upon the Representative of the
Common-wealth, be it a monarch, or an Assembly; and all endeavours
by word, or deed to diminish the Authority of the same, either in
the present time, or in succession: which Crimes the Latines
understand by Crimina Laesae Majestatis, and consist in designe,
or act, contrary to a Fundamentall Law.

Bribery And False Testimony
Likewise those Crimes, which render Judgements of no effect,
are greater Crimes, than Injuries done to one, or a few persons;
as to receive mony to give False judgement, or testimony,
is a greater Crime, than otherwise to deceive a man of the like,
or a greater summe; because not onely he has wrong, that falls
by such judgements; but all Judgements are rendered uselesse,
and occasion ministred to force, and private revenges.

Depeculation
Also Robbery, and Depeculation of the Publique treasure, or Revenues,
is a greater Crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a Private man;
because to robbe the publique, is to robbe many at once.

Counterfeiting Authority
Also the Counterfeit usurpation of publique Ministery, the Counterfeiting
of publique Seales, or publique Coine, than counterfeiting of
a private mans person, or his seale; because the fraud thereof,
extendeth to the dammage of many.

Crimes Against Private Men Compared
Of facts against the Law, done to private men, the greater Crime,
is that, where the dammage in the common opinion of men, is
most sensible.  And therefore

To kill against the Law, is a greater Crime, that any other injury,
life preserved.

And to kill with Torment, greater, than simply to kill.

And Mutilation of a limbe, greater, than the spoyling a man
of his goods.

And the spoyling a man of his goods, by Terrour of death,
or wounds, than by clandestine surreption.

And by clandestine Surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.

And the violation of chastity by Force, greater, than by flattery.

And of a woman Married, than of a woman not married.

For all these things are commonly so valued; though some men are more,
and some lesse sensible of the same offence.  But the Law regardeth
not the particular, but the generall inclination of mankind.

And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words,
or gesture, when they produce no other harme, than the present griefe
of him that is reproached, hath been neglected in the Lawes of
the Greeks, Romans, and other both antient, and moderne Common-wealths;
supposing the true cause of such griefe to consist, not in the
contumely, (which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own Vertue,)
but in the Pusillanimity of him that is offended by it.

Also a Crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person,
time, and place.  For to kill ones Parent, is a greater Crime,
than to kill another: for the Parent ought to have the honour
of a Soveraign, (though he have surrendred his Power to the Civill Law,)
because he had it originally by Nature.  And to Robbe a poore man,
is a greater Crime, than to robbe a rich man; because 'tis to
the poore a more sensible dammage.

And a Crime committed in the Time, or Place appointed for Devotion,
is greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds
from a greater contempt of the Law.

Many other cases of Aggravation, and Extenuation might be added:
but by these I have set down, it is obvious to every man,
to take the altitude of any other Crime proposed.

Publique Crimes What
Lastly, because in almost all Crimes there is an Injury done,
not onely to some Private man, but also to the Common-wealth;
the same Crime, when the accusation is in the name of the Common-wealth,
is called Publique Crime; and when in the name of a Private man,
a Private Crime; And the Pleas according thereunto called Publique,
Judicia Publica, Pleas of the Crown; or Private Pleas.  As in an
Accusation of Murder, if the accuser be a Private man, the plea is a
Private plea; if the accuser be the Soveraign, the plea is a Publique plea.



CHAPTER XXVIII

OF PUNISHMENTS, AND REWARDS


The Definition Of Punishment
"A PUNISHMENT, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him
that hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority
to be a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men
may thereby the better be disposed to obedience."

Right To Punish Whence Derived
Before I inferre any thing from this definition, there is a question
to be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the Right,
or Authority of Punishing in any case, came in.  For by that which has
been said before, no man is supposed bound by Covenant, not to resist
violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right
to another to lay violent hands upon his person.  In the making of a
Common-wealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another;
but not of defending himselfe.  Also he obligeth himselfe,
to assist him that hath the Soveraignty, in the Punishing of another;
but of himselfe not.  But to covenant to assist the Soveraign,
in doing hurt to another, unlesse he that so covenanteth have
a right to doe it himselfe, is not to give him a Right to Punish.
It is manifest therefore that the Right which the Common-wealth
(that is, he, or they that represent it) hath to Punish,
is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subjects.
But I have also shewed formerly, that before the Institution
of Common-wealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do
whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing,
hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto.  And this is the
foundation of that right of Punishing, which is exercised in
every Common-wealth.  For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign
that right; but onely in laying down theirs, strengthned him to use
his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all:
so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him onely;
and (excepting the limits set him by naturall Law) as entire,
as in the condition of meer Nature, and of warre of every one
against his neighbour.

Private Injuries, And Revenges No Punishments
From the definition of Punishment, I inferre, First, that neither
private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly
be stiled Punishment; because they proceed not from publique Authority.

Nor Denyall Of Preferment
Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the publique favour,
is not a Punishment; because no new evill is thereby on any
man Inflicted; he is onely left in the estate he was in before.

Nor Pain Inflicted Without Publique Hearing
Thirdly, that the evill inflicted by publique Authority, without
precedent publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name
of Punishment; but of an hostile act; because the fact for which
a man is Punished, ought first to be Judged by publique Authority,
to be a transgression of the Law.

Nor Pain Inflicted By Usurped Power
Fourthly, that the evill inflicted by usurped power, and Judges
without Authority from the Soveraign, is not Punishment; but an act
of hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for Author,
the person condemned; and therefore are not acts of publique Authority.

Nor Pain Inflicted Without Respect To The Future Good
Fifthly, that all evill which is inflicted without intention,
or possibility of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example)
other men, to obey the Lawes, is not Punishment; but an act of
hostility; because without such an end, no hurt done is contained
under that name.

Naturall Evill Consequences, No Punishments
Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by Nature,
divers hurtfull consequences; as when a man in assaulting another,
is himselfe slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse
by the doing of some unlawfull act; such hurt, though in respect of God,
who is the author of Nature, it may be said to be inflicted,
and therefore a Punishment divine; yet it is not contaned in the
name of Punishment in respect of men, because it is not inflicted
by the Authority of man.

Hurt Inflicted, If Lesse Than The Benefit
Of Transgressing, Is Not Punishment
Seventhly, If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit,
or contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed,
that harm is not within the definition; and is rather the Price,
or Redemption, than the Punishment of a Crime: Because it is
of the nature of Punishment, to have for end, the disposing of men
to obey the Law; which end (if it be lesse that the benefit
of the transgression) it attaineth not, but worketh a contrary effect.

Where The Punishment Is Annexed To The Law,
A Greater Hurt Is Not Punishment, But Hostility
Eighthly, If a Punishment be determined and prescribed in the Law
it selfe, and after the crime committed, there be a greater
Punishment inflicted, the excesse is not Punishment, but an
act of hostility.  For seeing the aym of Punishment is not a revenge,
but terrour; and the terrour of a great Punishment unknown,
is taken away by the declaration of a lesse, the unexpected addition
is no part of the Punishment.  But where there is no Punishment
at all determined by the Law, there whatsoever is inflicted,
hath the nature of Punishment.  For he that goes about the violation
of a Law, wherein no penalty is determined, expecteth an indeterminate,
that is to say, an arbitrary Punishment.

Hurt Inflicted For A Fact Done
Before The Law, No Punishment
Ninthly, Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Law
that forbad it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility:
For before the Law, there is no transgression of the Law: But Punishment
supposeth a fact judged, to have been a transgression of the Law;
Therefore Harme inflicted before the Law made, is not Punishment,
but an act of Hostility.

The Representative Of The Common-wealth Unpunishable
Tenthly, Hurt inflicted on the Representative of the Common-wealth,
is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: Because it is of
the nature of Punishment, to be inflicted by publique Authority,
which is the Authority only of the Representative it self.

Hurt To Revolted Subjects Is Done By
Right Of War, Not By Way Of Punishment
Lastly, Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy,
fals not under the name of Punishment: Because seeing they were
either never subject to the Law, and therefore cannot transgresse it;
or having been subject to it, and professing to be no longer so,
by consequence deny they can transgresse it, all the Harmes that
can be done them, must be taken as acts of Hostility.  But in declared
Hostility, all infliction of evill is lawfull.  From whence it followeth,
that if a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly
deny the authority of the Representative of the Common-wealth,
(whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for Treason,)
he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the Representative will:
For in denying subjection, he denyes such Punishment as by the Law hath
been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the Common-wealth;
that is, according to the will of the Representative.  For the
Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not to Enemies;
such as are they, that having been by their own act Subjects,
deliberately revolting, deny the Soveraign Power.

The first, and most generall distribution of Punishments, is into
Divine, and Humane.  Of the former I shall have occasion, to speak,
in a more convenient place hereafter.

Humane, are those Punishments that be inflicted by the Commandement
of Man; and are either Corporall, or Pecuniary, or Ignominy,
or Imprisonment, or Exile, or mixt of these.

Punishments Corporall
Corporall Punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body directly,
and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as
are stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body,
as were before lawfully enjoyed.

Capitall
And of these, some be Capitall, some Lesse than Capitall.
Capitall, is the Infliction of Death; and that either simply,
or with torment.  Lesse than Capitall, are Stripes, Wounds, Chains,
and any other corporall Paine, not in its own nature mortall.
For if upon the Infliction of a Punishment death follow not in
the Intention of the Inflicter, the Punishment is not be bee
esteemed Capitall, though the harme prove mortall by an accident
not to be foreseen; in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.

Pecuniary Punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the
deprivation of a Summe of Mony, but also of Lands, or any other
goods which are usually bought and sold for mony.  And in case
the Law, that ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design
to gather mony, from such as shall transgresse the same, it is not
properly a Punishment, but the Price of priviledge, and exemption
from the Law, which doth not absolutely forbid the fact, but only
to those that are not able to pay the mony: except where the Law
is Naturall, or part of Religion; for in that case it is not an
exemption from the Law, but a transgression of it.  As where a Law
exacteth a Pecuniary mulct, of them that take the name of God in vaine,
the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a dispensation to sweare,
but the Punishment of the transgression of a Law undispensable.
In like manner if the Law impose a Summe of Mony to be payd,
to him that has been Injured; this is but a satisfaction for
the hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the
party injured, not the crime of the offender.

Ignominy
Ignominy, is the infliction of such Evill, as is made Dishonorable;
or the deprivation of such Good, as is made Honourable by
the Common-wealth.  For there be some things Honorable by Nature;
as the effects of Courage, Magnanimity, Strength, Wisdome,
and other abilities of body and mind: Others made Honorable
by the Common-wealth; as Badges, Titles, Offices, or any other
singular marke of the Soveraigns favour.  The former, (though they
may faile by nature, or accident,) cannot be taken away by a Law;
and therefore the losse of them is not Punishment.  But the later,
may be taken away by the publique authority that made them Honorable,
and are properly Punishments: Such are degrading men condemned,
of their Badges, Titles, and Offices; or declaring them uncapable
of the like in time to come.

Imprisonment
Imprisonment, is when a man is by publique Authority deprived
of liberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is
the safe custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting
of paine on a man condemned.  The former is not Punishment;
because no man is supposed to be Punisht, before he be Judicially heard,
and declared guilty.  And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made
to suffer by bonds, or restraint, before his cause be heard,
over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody,
is against the Law of Nature.  But the Later is Punishment,
because Evill, and inflicted by publique Authority, for somewhat
that has by the same Authority been Judged a Transgression of the Law.
Under this word Imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of motion,
caused by an externall obstacle, be it a House, which is called
by the generall name of a Prison; or an Iland, as when men are
said to be confined to it; or a place where men are set to worke,
as in old time men have been condemned to Quarries, and in these
times to Gallies; or be it a Chaine, or any other such impediment.

Exile
Exile, (Banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned
to depart out of the dominion of the Common-wealth, or out of
a certaine part thereof; and during a prefixed time, or for ever,
not to return into it: and seemeth not in its own nature,
without other circumstances, to be a Punishment; but rather an escape,
or a publique commandement to avoid Punishment by flight.
And Cicero sayes, there was never any such Punishment ordained
in the City of Rome; but cals it a refuge of men in danger.
For if a man banished, be neverthelesse permitted to enjoy his Goods,
and the Revenue of his Lands, the meer change of ayr is no punishment;
nor does it tend to that benefit of the Common-wealth, for which
all Punishments are ordained, (that is to say, to the forming
of mens wils to the observation of the Law;) but many times to
the dammage of the Common-wealth.  For a Banished man, is a lawfull
enemy of the Common-wealth that banished him; as being no more
a Member of the same.  But if he be withall deprived of his Lands,
or Goods, then the Punishment lyeth not in the Exile, but is to be
reckoned amongst Punishments Pecuniary.

The Punishment Of Innocent Subjects
Is Contrary To The Law Of Nature
All Punishments of Innocent subjects, be they great or little,
are against the Law of Nature; For Punishment is only of
Transgression of the Law, and therefore there can be no Punishment
of the Innocent.  It is therefore a violation, First, of that Law
of Nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their Revenges, to look at
any thing but some future good: For there can arrive no good to the
Common-wealth, by Punishing the Innocent.  Secondly, of that, which
forbiddeth Ingratitude: For seeing all Soveraign Power, is originally
given by the consent of every one of the Subjects, to the end
they should as long as they are obedient, be protected thereby;
the Punishment of the Innocent, is a rendring of Evill for Good.
And thirdly, of the Law that commandeth Equity; that is to say,
an equall distribution of Justice; which in Punishing the Innocent
is not observed.

But The Harme Done To Innocents In War, Not So
But the Infliction of what evill soever, on an Innocent man,
that is not a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Common-wealth,
and without violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the
Law of Nature.  For all men that are not Subjects, are either Enemies,
or else they have ceased from being so, by some precedent covenants.
But against Enemies, whom the Common-wealth judgeth capable to
do them hurt, it is lawfull by the originall Right of Nature
to make warre; wherein the Sword Judgeth not, nor doth the Victor
make distinction of Nocent and Innocent, as to the time past;
nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the good
of his own People.  And upon this ground it is, that also in Subjects,
who deliberatly deny the Authority of the Common-wealth established,
the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the Fathers,
but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being,
and consequently innocent of the fact, for which they are afflicted:
because the nature of this offence, consisteth in the renouncing
of subjection; which is a relapse into the condition of warre,
commonly called Rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not
as Subjects, but as Enemies.  For Rebellion, is but warre renewed.

Reward, Is Either Salary, Or Grace
REWARD, is either of Gift, or by Contract.  When by Contract,
it is called Salary, and Wages; which is benefit due for service
performed, or promised.  When of Gift, it is benefit proceeding
from the Grace of them that bestow it, to encourage, or enable
men to do them service.  And therefore when the Soveraign of
a Common-wealth appointeth a Salary to any publique Office,
he that receiveth it, is bound in Justice to performe his office;
otherwise, he is bound onely in honour, to acknowledgement,
and an endeavour of requitall.  For though men have no lawfull remedy,
when they be commanded to quit their private businesse, to serve
the publique, without Reward, or Salary; yet they are not bound thereto,
by the Law of Nature, nor by the institution of the Common-wealth,
unlesse the service cannot otherwise be done; because it is supposed
the Soveraign may make use of all their means, insomuch as the most
common Souldier, may demand the wages of his warrefare, as a debt.

Benefits Bestowed For Fear, Are Not Rewards
The benefits which a Soveraign bestoweth on a Subject, for fear
of some power, and ability he hath to do hurt to the Common-wealth,
are not properly Rewards; for they are not Salaryes; because
there is in this case no contract supposed, every man being obliged
already not to do the Common-wealth disservice: nor are they Graces;
because they be extorted by feare, which ought not to be incident
to the Soveraign Power: but are rather Sacrifices, which the Soveraign
(considered in his naturall person, and not in the person of
the Common-wealth) makes, for the appeasing the discontent of him he
thinks more potent than himselfe; and encourage not to obedience, but on
the contrary, to the continuance, and increasing of further extortion.

Salaries Certain And Casuall
And whereas some Salaries are certain, and proceed from the
publique Treasure; and others uncertain, and casuall, proceeding
from the execution of the Office for which the Salary is ordained;
the later is in some cases hurtfull to the Common-wealth;
as in the case of Judicature.  For where the benefit of the Judges,
and Ministers of a Court of Justice, ariseth for the multitude of
Causes that are brought to their cognisance, there must needs follow
two Inconveniences: One, is the nourishing of sutes; for the more sutes,
the greater benefit: and another that depends on that, which is
contention about Jurisdiction; each Court drawing to it selfe,
as many Causes as it can.  But in offices of Execution there are
not those Inconveniences; because their employment cannot be
encreased by any endeavour of their own.  And thus much shall
suffice for the nature of Punishment, and Reward; which are,
as it were, the Nerves and Tendons, that move the limbes and
joynts of a Common-wealth.

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and
other Passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to Government;)
together with the great power of his Governour, whom I compared
to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses
of the one and fortieth of Job; where God having set forth
the great power of Leviathan, called him King of the Proud.
"There is nothing," saith he, "on earth, to be compared with him.
He is made so as not be afraid.  Hee seeth every high thing below him;
and is King of all the children of pride."  But because he is mortall,
and subject to decay, as all other Earthly creatures are; and because
there is that in heaven, (though not on earth) that he should stand
in fear of, and whose Lawes he ought to obey; I shall in the next
following Chapters speak of his Diseases, and the causes of his
Mortality; and of what Lawes of Nature he is bound to obey.



CHAPTER XXIX

OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO THE DISSOLUTION OF A COMMON-WEALTH


Dissolution Of Common-wealths Proceedeth
From Their Imperfect Institution
Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had
the use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured,
at least, from perishing by internall diseases.  For by the nature
of their Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind,
or as the Lawes of Nature, or as Justice it selfe, which gives them life.
Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence,
but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter;
but as they are the Makers, and orderers of them.  For men, as they
become at last weary of irregular justling, and hewing one another,
and desire with all their hearts, to conforme themselves into one firme
and lasting edifice; so for want, both of the art of making fit Laws,
to square their actions by, and also of humility, and patience,
to suffer the rude and combersome points of their present greatnesse
to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able Architect,
be compiled, into any other than a crasie building, such as hardly
lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads
of their posterity.

Amongst the Infirmities therefore of a Common-wealth, I will reckon
in the first place, those that arise from an Imperfect Institution,
and resemble the diseases of a naturall body, which proceed from
a Defectuous Procreation.

Want Of Absolute Power
Of which, this is one, "That a man to obtain a Kingdome, is sometimes
content with lesse Power, than to the Peace, and defence of the
Common-wealth is necessarily required." From whence it commeth to passe,
that when the exercise of the Power layd by, is for the publique safety
to be resumed, it hath the resemblance of as unjust act; which disposeth
great numbers of men (when occasion is presented) to rebell;
In the same manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents,
are subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality,
derived from their vicious conception, by breaking out into
biles and scabbs.  And when Kings deny themselves some such
necessary Power, it is not alwayes (though sometimes) out of
ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake;
but many times out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure:
Wherein they reason not well; because such as will hold them
to their promises, shall be maintained against them by forraign
Common-wealths; who in order to the good of their own Subjects
let slip few occasions to Weaken the estate of their Neighbours.
So was Thomas Beckett Archbishop of Canterbury, supported against
Henry the Second, by the Pope; the subjection of Ecclesiastiques
to the Common-wealth, having been dispensed with by William
the Conqueror at his reception, when he took an Oath, not to
infringe the liberty of the Church.  And so were the Barons,
whose power was by William Rufus (to have their help in transferring
the Succession from his Elder brother, to himselfe,) encreased
to a degree, inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, maintained in
their Rebellion against King John, by the French.  Nor does this happen
in Monarchy onely.  For whereas the stile of the antient Roman
Common-wealth, was, The Senate, and People of Rome; neither Senate,
nor People pretended to the whole Power; which first caused
the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturnius,
and others; and afterwards the warres between the Senate and the People,
under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and Caesar,
to the Extinction of their Democraty, and the setting up of Monarchy.

The people of Athens bound themselves but from one onely Action;
which was, that no man on pain of death should propound the
renewing of the warre for the Island of Salamis; And yet thereby,
if Solon had not caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards
in gesture and habit of a mad-man, and in verse, propounded it
to the People that flocked about him, they had had an enemy
perpetually in readinesse, even at the gates of their Citie;
such dammage, or shifts, are all Common-wealths forced to,
that have their Power never so little limited.

Private Judgement Of Good and Evill
In the second place, I observe the Diseases of a Common-wealth,
that proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof one is,
"That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions."
This is true in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no
Civill Lawes; and also under Civill Government, in such cases as are not
determined by the Law.  But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure
of Good and Evill actions, is the Civill Law; and the Judge the
Legislator, who is alwayes Representative of the Common-wealth.
From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves,
and dispute the commands of the Common-wealth; and afterwards to obey,
or disobey them, as in their private judgements they shall think fit.
Whereby the Common-wealth is distracted and Weakened.

Erroneous Conscience
Another doctrine repugnant to Civill Society, is, that "Whatsoever a man
does against his Conscience, is Sinne;" and it dependeth on
the presumption of making himself judge of Good and Evill.
For a mans Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing;
and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous.
Therefore, though he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all
he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule
to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives
in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique Conscience,
by which he hath already undertaken to be guided.  Otherwise in
such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but
private opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted,
and no man dare to obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it
shall seem good in his own eyes.

Pretence Of Inspiration
It hath been also commonly taught, "That Faith and Sanctity,
are not to be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernaturall
Inspiration, or Infusion," which granted, I see not why any man
should render a reason of his Faith; or why every Christian should not
be also a Prophet; or why any man should take the Law of his Country,
rather than his own Inspiration, for the rule of his action.
And thus wee fall again into the fault of taking upon us to
Judge of Good and Evill; or to make Judges of it, such private men
as pretend to be supernaturally Inspired, to the Dissolution of
all Civill Government.  Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by
those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that
speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty;
and yet are not supernaturall, but onely, for the great number
of them that concurre to every effect, unobservable.  Faith, and
Sanctity, are indeed not very frequent; but yet they are not Miracles,
but brought to passe by education, discipline, correction, and other
naturall wayes, by which God worketh them in his elect, as such time
as he thinketh fit.  And these three opinions, pernicious to Peace
and Government, have in this part of the world, proceeded chiefly
from the tongues, and pens of unlearned Divines; who joyning the
words of Holy Scripture together, otherwise than is agreeable to reason,
do what they can, to make men think, that Sanctity and Naturall Reason,
cannot stand together.

Subjecting The Soveraign Power To Civill Lawes
A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth, is this,
"That he that hath the Soveraign Power, is subject to the Civill Lawes."
It is true, that Soveraigns are all subjects to the Lawes of Nature;
because such lawes be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth
be abrogated.  But to those Lawes which the Soveraign himselfe,
that is, which the Common-wealth maketh, he is not subject.
For to be subject to Lawes, is to be subject to the Common-wealth,
that is to the Soveraign Representative, that is to himselfe;
which is not subjection, but freedome from the Lawes.  Which errour,
because it setteth the Lawes above the Soveraign, setteth also a
Judge above him, and a Power to punish him; which is to make
a new Soveraign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish
the second; and so continually without end, to the Confusion,
and Dissolution of the Common-wealth.

Attributing Of Absolute Propriety To The Subjects
A Fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the Dissolution of a Common-wealth, is,
"That every private man has an absolute Propriety in his Goods; such,
as excludeth the Right of the Soveraign."  Every man has indeed
a Propriety that excludes the Right of every other Subject:
And he has it onely from the Soveraign Power; without the protection
whereof, every other man should have equall Right to the same.
But if the Right of the Soveraign also be excluded, he cannot
performe the office they have put him into; which is, to defend them
both from forraign enemies, and from the injuries of one another;
and consequently there is no longer a Common-wealth.

And if the Propriety of Subjects, exclude not the Right of
the Soveraign Representative to their Goods; much lesse to
their offices of Judicature, or Execution, in which they
Represent the Soveraign himselfe.

Dividing Of The Soveraign Power
There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the
essence of a Common-wealth; and 'tis this, "That the Soveraign
Power may be divided."  For what is it to divide the Power of
a Common-wealth, but to Dissolve it; for Powers divided mutually
destroy each other.  And for these doctrines, men are chiefly
beholding to some of those, that making profession of the Lawes,
endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning, and not
upon the Legislative Power.

Imitation Of Neighbour Nations
And as False Doctrine, so also often-times the Example of different
Government in a neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to alteration
of the forme already setled.  So the people of the Jewes were
stirred up to reject God, and to call upon the Prophet Samuel,
for a King after the manner of the Nations; So also the lesser
Cities of Greece, were continually disturbed, with seditions
of the Aristocraticall, and Democraticall factions; one part of
almost every Common-wealth, desiring to imitate the Lacedaemonians;
the other, the Athenians.  And I doubt not, but many men, have been
contented to see the late troubles in England, out of an imitation
of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no more to grow rich,
than to change, as they had done, the forme of their Government.
For the constitution of mans nature, is of it selfe subject to
desire novelty: When therefore they are provoked to the same,
by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it,
it is almost impossible for them, not to be content with those
that solicite them to change; and love the first beginnings,
though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder; like hot blouds,
that having gotten the itch, tear themselves with their own nayles,
till they can endure the smart no longer.

Imitation Of The Greeks, And Romans
And as to Rebellion in particular against Monarchy; one of the most
frequent causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy,
and Histories of the antient Greeks, and Romans; from which,
young men, and all others that are unprovided of the Antidote
of solid Reason, receiving a strong, and delightfull impression,
of the great exploits of warre, atchieved by the Conductors of
their Armies, receive withall a pleasing Idea, of all they have
done besides; and imagine their great prosperity, not to have
proceeded from the aemulation of particular men, but from the
vertue of their popular form of government: Not considering the
frequent Seditions, and Civill Warres, produced by the imperfection
of their Policy.  From the reading, I say, of such books,
men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and
Latine writers, in their books, and discourses of Policy, make
it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it,
he call him Tyrant.  For they say not Regicide, that is, killing of
a King, but Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull.
From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion,
that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that
in a Monarchy they are all Slaves.  I say, they that live under a
Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under
a Popular Government; for they find no such matter.  In summe,
I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy,
than the allowing of such books to be publikely read, without present
applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away
their Venime; Which Venime I will not doubt to compare to the biting
of a mad Dogge, which is a disease the Physicians call Hydrophobia,
or Fear Of Water.  For as he that is so bitten, has a continuall
torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an estate,
as if the poyson endeavoured to convert him into a Dogge: So when a
Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democraticall writers,
that continually snarle at that estate; it wanteth nothing more
than a strong Monarch, which neverthelesse out of a certain
Tyrannophobia, or feare of being strongly governed, when they have him,
they abhorre.

As here have been Doctors, that hold there be three Soules in a man;
so there be also that think there may be more Soules, (that is,
more Soveraigns,) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a Supremacy
against the Soveraignty; Canons against Lawes; and a Ghostly Authority
against the Civill; working on mens minds, with words and distinctions,
that of themselves signifie nothing, but bewray (by their obscurity)
that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another Kingdome,
as it were a Kingdome of Fayries, in the dark.  Now seeing it is manifest,
that the Civill Power, and the Power of the Common-wealth is the
same thing; and that Supremacy, and the Power of making Canons,
and granting Faculties, implyeth a Common-wealth; it followeth,
that where one is Soveraign, another Supreme; where one can make Lawes,
and another make Canons; there must needs be two Common-wealths,
of one & the same Subjects; which is a Kingdome divided in it selfe,
and cannot stand.  For notwithstanding the insignificant distinction
of Temporall, and Ghostly, they are still two Kingdomes, and every
Subject is subject to two Masters.  For seeing the Ghostly Power
challengeth the Right to declare what is Sinne it challengeth
by consequence to declare what is Law, (Sinne being nothing but
the transgression of the Law;) and again, the Civill Power
challenging to declare what is Law, every Subject must obey
two Masters, who bothe will have their Commands be observed as Law;
which is impossible.  Or, if it be but one Kingdome, either the Civill,
which is the Power of the Common-wealth, must be subordinate to
the Ghostly; or the Ghostly must be subordinate to the Temporall
and then there is no Supremacy but the Temporall.  When therefore
these two Powers oppose one another, the Common-wealth cannot but
be in great danger of Civill warre, and Dissolution.  For the Civill
Authority being more visible, and standing in the cleerer light
of naturall reason cannot choose but draw to it in all times
a very considerable part of the people: And the Spirituall,
though it stand in the darknesse of Schoole distinctions,
and hard words; yet because the fear of Darknesse, and Ghosts,
is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to Trouble,
and sometimes to Destroy a Common-wealth.  And this is a Disease
which not unfitly may be compared to the Epilepsie, or Falling-sicknesse
(which the Jewes took to be one kind of possession by Spirits)
in the Body Naturall.  For as in this Disease, there is an
unnaturall spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots
of the Nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the motion
which naturally they should have from the power of the Soule
in the Brain, and thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions
(which men call Convulsions) in the parts; insomuch as he that
is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the water,
and sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of his senses;
so also in the Body Politique, when the Spirituall power,
moveth the Members of a Common-wealth, by the terrour of punishments,
and hope of rewards (which are the Nerves of it,) otherwise than
by the Civill Power (which is the Soule of the Common-wealth)
they ought to be moved; and by strange, and hard words suffocates
the people, and either Overwhelm the Common-wealth with Oppression,
or cast it into the Fire of a Civill warre.

Mixt Government
Sometimes also in the meerly Civill government, there be more
than one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the
Nutritive faculty,) has depended on a generall Assembly; the Power
of conduct and command, (which is the Motive Faculty,) on one man;
and the Power of making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,)
on the accidentall consent, not onely of those two, but also of a third;
This endangereth the Common-wealth, somtimes for want of consent
to good Lawes; but most often for want of such Nourishment, as is
necessary to Life, and Motion.  For although few perceive, that such
government, is not government, but division of the Common-wealth
into three Factions, and call it mixt Monarchy; yet the truth is,
that it is not one independent Common-wealth, but three independent
Factions; nor one Representative Person, but three.  In the Kingdome
of God, there may be three Persons independent, without breach of unity
in God that Reigneth; but where men Reigne, that be subject to diversity
of opinions, it cannot be so.  And therefore if the King bear
the person of the People, and the generall Assembly bear also
the person of the People, and another assembly bear the person
of a Part of the people, they are not one Person, nor one Soveraign,
but three Persons, and three Soveraigns.

To what Disease in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly compare
this irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not.  But I have seen
a man, that had another man growing out of his side, with an head,
armes, breast, and stomach, of his own: If he had had another man
growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.

Want Of Mony
Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, as are
of the greatest, and most present danger.  There be other, not so great;
which neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed.  As first, the
difficulty of raising Mony, for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth;
especially in the approach of warre.  This difficulty ariseth from
the opinion, that every Subject hath of a Propriety in his lands
and goods, exclusive of the Soveraigns Right to the use of the same.
From whence it commeth to passe, that the Soveraign Power,
which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the Common-wealth,
(finding the passage of mony to the publique Treasure obstructed,
by the tenacity of the people,) whereas it ought to extend it selfe,
to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their beginnings,
contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it cannot longer,
struggles with the people by strategems of Law, to obtain little summes,
which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way
for present supply, or Perish; and being put often to these extremities,
at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the
Common-wealth must perish.  Insomuch as we may compare this Distemper
very aptly to an Ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed,
or by venomous matter obstructed; the Veins which by their naturall
course empty themselves into the Heart, are not (as they ought to be)
supplyed from the Arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first
a cold contraction, and trembling of the limbes; and afterwards a hot,
and strong endeavour of the Heart, to force a passage for the Bloud;
and before it can do that, contenteth it selfe with the small
refreshments of such things as coole of a time, till (if Nature be
strong enough) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed,
and dissipateth the venome into sweat; or (if Nature be too weak)
the Patient dyeth.

Monopolies And Abuses Of Publicans
Again, there is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, which resembleth
the Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the Common-wealth,
flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much abundance,
in one, or a few private men, by Monopolies, or by Farmes of the
Publique Revenues; in the same manner as the Blood in a Pleurisie,
getting into the Membrane of the breast, breedeth there an Inflammation,
accompanied with a Fever, and painfull stitches.

Popular Men
Also, the Popularity of a potent Subject, (unlesse the Common-wealth
have very good caution of his fidelity,) is a dangerous Disease;
because the people (which should receive their motion from the
Authority of the Soveraign,) by the flattery, and by the reputation
of an ambitious man, are drawn away from their obedience to the Lawes,
to follow a man, of whose vertues, and designes they have no knowledge.
And this is commonly of more danger in a Popular Government, than in
a Monarchy; as it may easily be made believe, they are the People.
By this means it was, that Julius Caesar, who was set up by the People
against the Senate, having won to himselfe the affections of his Army,
made himselfe Master, both of Senate and People.  And this proceeding
of popular, and ambitious men, is plain Rebellion; and may be resembled
to the effects of Witchcraft.

Excessive Greatnesse Of A Town,
Multitude Of Corporations
Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse
of a Town, when it is able to furnish out of its own Circuit,
the number, and expence of a great Army: As also the great number
of Corporations; which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths
in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.

Liberty Of Disputing Against Soveraign Power
To which may be added, the Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power,
by pretenders to Politicall Prudence; which though bred for the
most part in the Lees of the people; yet animated by False Doctrines,
are perpetually medling with the Fundamentall Lawes, to the
molestation of the Common-wealth; like the little Wormes, which
Physicians call Ascarides.

We may further adde, the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia,
of enlarging Dominion; with the incurable Wounds thereby many times
received from the enemy; And the Wens, of ununited conquests,
which are many times a burthen, and with lesse danger lost,
than kept; As also the Lethargy of Ease, and Consumption of
Riot and Vain Expence.

Dissolution Of The Common-wealth
Lastly, when in a warre (forraign, or intestine,) the enemies
got a final Victory; so as (the forces of the Common-wealth
keeping the field no longer) there is no farther protection
of Subjects in their loyalty; then is the Common-wealth DISSOLVED,
and every man at liberty to protect himselfe by such courses
as his own discretion shall suggest unto him.  For the Soveraign,
is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth;
which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more, than the
Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though Immortal) Soule.
For though the Right of a Soveraign Monarch cannot be extinguished
by the act of another; yet the Obligation of the members may.
For he that wants protection, may seek it anywhere; and when he hath it,
is obliged (without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe
out of fear,) to protect his Protection as long as he is able.
But when the Power of an Assembly is once suppressed, the Right
of the same perisheth utterly; because the Assembly it selfe
is extinct; and consequently, there is no possibility for the
Soveraignty to re-enter.



CHAPTER XXX

OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVERAIGN REPRESENTATIVE


The Procuration Of The Good Of The People
The OFFICE of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,)
consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power,
namely the procuration of the Safety Of The People; to which he is
obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to God,
the Author of that Law, and to none but him.  But by Safety here,
is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments
of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger,
or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.

By Instruction & Lawes
And this is intended should be done, not by care applyed to Individualls,
further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain;
but by a generall Providence, contained in publique Instruction,
both of Doctrine, and Example; and in the making, and executing
of good Lawes, to which individuall persons may apply their own cases.

Against The Duty Of A Soveraign To Relinquish
Any Essentiall Right of Soveraignty:
Or Not To See The People Taught The Grounds Of Them
And because, if the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty (specified before
in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common-wealth is
thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition,
and calamity of a warre with every other man, (which is the greatest
evill that can happen in this life;) it is the Office of the Soveraign,
to maintain those Rights entire; and consequently against his duty,
First, to transferre to another, or to lay from himselfe any of them.
For he that deserteth the Means, deserteth the Ends; and he deserteth
the Means, that being the Soveraign, acknowledgeth himselfe subject
to the Civill Lawes; and renounceth the Power of Supreme Judicature;
or of making Warre, or Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of
the Necessities of the Common-wealth; or of levying Mony, and Souldiers,
when, and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary;
or of making Officers, and Ministers both of Warre, and Peace;
or of appointing Teachers, and examining what Doctrines are conformable,
or contrary to the Defence, Peace, and Good of the people.
Secondly, it is against his duty, to let the people be ignorant,
or mis-in-formed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall
Rights; because thereby men are easie to be seduced, and drawn to
resist him, when the Common-wealth shall require their use and exercise.

And the grounds of these Rights, have the rather need to be diligently,
and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any
Civill Law, or terrour of legal punishment.  For a Civill Law,
that shall forbid Rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the
essentiall Rights of Soveraignty,) is not (as a Civill Law)
any obligation, but by vertue onely of the Law of Nature, that
forbiddeth the violation of Faith; which naturall obligation if men
know not, they cannot know the Right of any Law the Soveraign maketh.
And for the Punishment, they take it but for an act of Hostility;
which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour
by acts of Hostility, to avoyd.

Objection Of Those That Say There Are No Principles
Of Reason For Absolute Soveraignty
As I have heard some say, that Justice is but a word, without substance;
and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe,
(not onely in the condition of warre, but also in a Common-wealth,)
is his own, which I have already shewed to be false: So there be also
that maintain, that there are no grounds, nor Principles of Reason,
to sustain those essentiall Rights, which make Soveraignty absolute.
For if there were, they would have been found out in some place,
or other; whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any Common-wealth,
where those Rights have been acknowledged, or challenged.
Wherein they argue as ill, as if the Savage people of America,
should deny there were any grounds, or Principles of Reason,
so to build a house, as to last as long as the materials, because they
never yet saw any so well built.  Time, and Industry, produce every day
new knowledge.  And as the art of well building, is derived from
Principles of Reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion,
long after mankind began (though poorly) to build: So, long time
after men have begun to constitute Common-wealths, imperfect,
and apt to relapse into disorder, there may, Principles of Reason
be found out, by industrious meditation, to make use of them,
or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interest,
at this day, very little.  But supposing that these of mine are not
such Principles of Reason; yet I am sure they are Principles
from Authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when I shall
come to speak of the Kingdome of God, (administred by Moses,)
over the Jewes, his peculiar people by Covenant.

Objection From The Incapacity Of The Vulgar
But they say again, that though the Principles be right, yet Common
people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them.
I should be glad, that the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a Kingdome,
or those that are accounted the most Learned, were no lesse
incapable than they.  But all men know, that the obstructions
to this kind of doctrine, proceed not so much from the difficulty
of the matter, as from the interest of them that are to learn.
Potent men, digest hardly any thing that setteth up a Power
to bridle their affections; and Learned men, any thing that
discovereth their errours, and thereby lesseneth their Authority:
whereas the Common-peoples minds, unlesse they be tainted with
dependance on the Potent, or scribbled over with the opinions
of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever
by Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them.  Shall whole Nations
be brought to Acquiesce in the great Mysteries of Christian Religion,
which are above Reason; and millions of men be made believe,
that the same Body may be in innumerable places, at one and the
same time, which is against Reason; and shall not men be able,
by their teaching, and preaching, protected by the Law, to make that
received, which is so consonant to Reason, that any unprejudicated man,
needs no more to learn it, than to hear it?  I conclude therefore,
that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights
(which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Soveraignty,
there is no difficulty, (whilest a Soveraign has his Power entire,)
but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom
he trusteth in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently,
it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely
his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger
that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.

Subjects Are To Be Taught,
Not To Affect Change Of Government:
And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First,
that they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government
they see in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own,
nor (whatsoever present prosperity they behold in Nations that are
otherwise governed than they,) to desire change.  For the prosperity
of a People ruled by an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly,
commeth not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience,
and Concord of the Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy,
because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him.
Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the
Concord of the People,) and they shall not onely not flourish,
but in short time be dissolved.  And they that go about by disobedience,
to doe no more than reforme the Common-wealth, shall find they do
thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable;)
which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit Father,
did by the Counsell of Medea, cut him in pieces, and boyle him,
together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man.
This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of Gods
Commandements: For there God says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos;
Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations; and in another place
concerning Kings, that they are Gods.

Nor Adhere (Against The Soveraign) To Popular Men:
Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led
with admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects,
how high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine
in the Common-wealth; nor of any Assembly, (except the Soveraign
Assembly,) so as to deferre to them any obedience, or honour,
appropriate to the Soveraign onely, whom (in their particular stations)
they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but such as is
conveighed by them from the Soveraign Authority.  For that Soveraign,
cannot be imagined to love his People as he ought, that is not
Jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of Popular men,
to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not onely
secretly, but openly, so as to proclaime Marriage with them
In Facie Ecclesiae by Preachers; and by publishing the same
in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation
of the second of the ten Commandements.

Nor To Dispute The Soveraign Power:
Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed,
how great fault it is, to speak evill of the Soveraign Representative,
(whether One man, or an Assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute
his Power, or any way to use his Name irreverently, whereby he may
be brought into Contempt with his People, and their Obedience
(in which the safety of the Common-wealth consisteth) slackened.
Which doctrine the third Commandement by resemblance pointeth to.

And To Have Dayes Set Apart To Learn Their Duty:
Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when 'tis taught,
remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom
the Soveraign Power is placed, without setting a part from their
ordinary labour, some certain times, in which they may attend
those that are appointed to instruct them; It is necessary that
some such times be determined, wherein they may assemble together,
and (after prayers and praises given to God, the Soveraign of Soveraigns)
hear those their Duties told them, and the Positive Lawes, such as
generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind
of the Authority that maketh them Lawes.  To this end had the Jewes
every seventh day, a Sabbath, in which the Law was read and expounded;
and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind, that their
King was God; that having created the world in six days, he rested
the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their labour,
that that God was their King, which redeemed them from their servile,
and painfull labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had
rejoyced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawfull recreation.
So that the first Table of the Commandements, is spent all,
in setting down the summe of Gods absolute Power; not onely as God,
but as King by pact, (in peculiar) of the Jewes; and may therefore
give light, to those that have the Soveraign Power conferred
on them by the consent of men, to see what doctrine they Ought
to teach their Subjects.

And To Honour Their Parents
And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on
the care of their Parents; it is necessary that they should
be obedient to them, whilest they are under their tuition;
and not onely so, but that also afterwards (as gratitude requireth,)
they acknowledge the benefit of their education, by externall
signes of honour.  To which end they are to be taught, that originally
the Father of every man was also his Soveraign Lord, with power over him
of life and death; and that the Fathers of families, when by
instituting a Common-wealth, they resigned that absolute Power,
yet it was never intended, they should lose the honour due
unto them for their education.  For to relinquish such right,
was not necessary to the Institution of Soveraign Power; nor would
there be any reason, why any man should desire to have children,
or take the care to nourish, and instruct them, if they were
afterwards to have no other benefit from them, than from other men.
And this accordeth with the fifth Commandement.

And To Avoyd Doing Of Injury:
Again, every Soveraign Ought to cause Justice to be taught, which
(consisting in taking from no man what is his) is as much as to say,
to cause men to be taught not to deprive their Neighbour, by violence,
or fraud, of any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs.
Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are
his own life, & limbs; and in the next degree, (in most men,)
those that concern conjugall affection; and after them riches
and means of living.  Therefore the People are to be taught,
to abstain from violence to one anothers person, by private revenges;
from violation of conjugall honour; and from forcibly rapine,
and fraudulent surreption of one anothers goods.  For which purpose
also it is necessary they be shewed the evill consequences
of false Judgement, by corruption either of Judges or Witnesses,
whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and Justice
becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the sixth,
seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandements.

And To Do All This Sincerely From The Heart
Lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts,
but the designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hindred,)
are Injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will,
as well as in the irregularity of the act.  And this is the intention
of the tenth Commandement, and the summe of the Second Table;
which is reduced all to this one Commandement of mutuall Charity,
"Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe:" as the summe of the
first Table is reduced to "the love of God;" whom they had then
newly received as their King.

The Use Of Universities
As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive
this Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may Opinions,
contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles,
have neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them.  I mean those,
which I have in the precedent Chapter specified: as That men shall Judge
of what is lawfull and unlawfull, not by the Law it selfe, but by
their own private Judgements;  That Subjects sinne in obeying
the Commands of the Common-wealth, unlesse they themselves have
first judged them to be lawfull: That their Propriety in their riches
is such, as to exclude the Dominion, which the Common-wealth hath
over the same: That it is lawfull for Subjects to kill such,
as they call Tyrants: That the Soveraign Power may be divided,
and the like; which come to be instilled into the People by this means.
They whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth attent on their trades,
and labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity,
or sloth carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which two sorts
of men take up the greatest part of Man-kind,) being diverted from
the deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in
the matter of Naturall Justice, but also of all other Sciences
necessarily requireth, receive the Notions of their duty,
chiefly from Divines in the Pulpit, and partly from such of
their Neighbours, or familiar acquaintance, as having the Faculty
of discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better learned
in cases of Law, and Conscience, than themselves.  And the Divines,
and such others as make shew of Learning, derive their knowledge from
the Universities, and from the Schooles of Law, or from the Books, which
by men eminent in those Schooles, and Universities have been published.
It is therefore manifest, that the Instruction of the people,
dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities.
But are not (may some men say) the Universities of England learned
enough already to do that? or is it you will undertake to teach
the Universities? Hard questions.  Yet to the first, I doubt not
to answer; that till towards the later end of Henry the Eighth,
the Power of the Pope, was alwayes upheld against the Power of
the Common-wealth, principally by the Universities; and that
the doctrines maintained by so many Preachers, against the
Soveraign Power of the King, and by so many Lawyers, and others,
that had their education there, is a sufficient argument,
that though the Universities were not authors of those false doctrines,
yet they knew not how to plant the true.  For in such a contradiction
of Opinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently
instructed; and 'tis no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that
subtile liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against
the Civill Authority.  But to the later question, it is not fit,
nor needfull for me to say either I, or No: for any man that sees
what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.

The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that
have the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administred
to all degrees of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty,
as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them;
so as the great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they
doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort,
than when one of these, does the like to one of them: For in this
consisteth Equity; to which, as being a Precept of the Law of Nature,
a Soveraign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of his People.
All breaches of the Law, are offences against the Common-wealth:
but there be some, that are also against private Persons.
Those that concern the Common-wealth onely, may without breach
of Equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is done
against himselfe, according to his own discretion.  But an offence
against a private man, cannot in Equity be pardoned, without the
consent of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.

The Inequality of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of Soveraign Power;
and therefore has no more place in the presence of the Soveraign;
that is to say, in a Court of Justice, then the Inequality between
Kings, and their Subjects, in the presence of the King of Kings.
The honour of great Persons, is to be valued for their beneficence,
and the aydes they give to men of inferiour rank, or not at all.
And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do, are not
extenuated, but aggravated by the greatnesse of their persons;
because they have least need to commit them.  The consequences
of this partiality towards the great, proceed in this manner.
Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and Hatred,
an Endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious
greatnesse, though with the ruine of the Common-wealth.

Equall Taxes
To Equall Justice, appertaineth also the Equall imposition of Taxes;
the equality whereof dependeth not on the Equality of riches,
but on the Equality of the debt, that every man oweth to the
Common-wealth for his defence.  It is not enough, for a man
to labour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight,
(if need be,) for the securing of his labour.  They must either do
as the Jewes did after their return from captivity, in re-edifying
the Temple, build with one hand, and hold the Sword in the other;
or else they must hire others to fight for them.  For the Impositions
that are layd on the People by the Soveraign Power, are nothing else
but the Wages, due to them that hold the publique Sword, to defend
private men in the exercise of severall Trades, and Callings.
Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the
enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor, and rich;
the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his life,
is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his;
saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors
not onely for their own persons, but for many more.  Which considered,
the Equality of Imposition, consisteth rather in the Equality
of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons
that consume the same.  For what reason is there, that he which
laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little,
should be more charged, then he that living idlely, getteth little,
and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection
from the Common-wealth, then the other? But when the Impositions,
are layd upon those things which men consume, every man payeth Equally
for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth defrauded, by the
luxurious waste of private men.

Publique Charity
And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable
to maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left
to the Charity of private persons; but to be provided for,
(as far-forth as the necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes
of the Common-wealth.  For as it is Uncharitablenesse in any man,
to neglect the impotent; so it is in the Soveraign of a Common-wealth,
to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain Charity.

Prevention Of Idlenesse
But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise:
they are to be forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not
finding employment, there ought to be such Lawes, as may encourage
all manner of Arts; as Navigation, Agriculture, Fishing, and all
manner of Manifacture that requires labour.  The multitude of poor,
and yet strong people still encreasing, they are to be transplanted
into Countries not sufficiently inhabited: where neverthelesse,
they are not to exterminate those they find there; but constrain them
to inhabit closer together, and not range a great deal of ground,
to snatch what they find; but to court each little Plot with art
and labour, to give them their sustenance in due season.
And when all the world is overchargd with Inhabitants, then
the last remedy of all is Warre; which provideth for every man,
by Victory, or Death.

Good Lawes What
To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good Lawes.
But what is a good Law? By a Good Law, I mean not a Just Law:
for no Law can be Unjust.  The Law is made by the Soveraign Power,
and all that is done by such Power, is warranted, and owned
by every one of the people; and that which every man will have so,
no man can say is unjust.  It is in the Lawes of a Common-wealth,
as in the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever the Gamesters all agree on,
is Injustice to none of them.  A good Law is that, which is Needfull,
for the Good Of The People, and withall Perspicuous.

Such As Are Necessary
For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not
to bind the People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct
and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves
by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion,
as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way.
And therefore a Law that is not Needfull, having not the true End
of a Law, is not Good.  A Law may be conceived to be Good, when
it is for the benefit of the Soveraign; though it be not Necessary
for the People; but it is not so.  For the good of the Soveraign
and People, cannot be separated.  It is a weak Soveraign, that has
weak Subjects; and a weak People, whose Soveraign wanteth Power
to rule them at his will.  Unnecessary Lawes are not good Lawes;
but trapps for Mony: which where the right of Soveraign Power
is acknowledged, are superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged,
unsufficient to defend the People.

Such As Are Perspicuous
The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it selfe,
as in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was made.
That is it, that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator, and the
meaning of the Legislator known, the Law is more easily understood
by few, than many words.  For all words, are subject to ambiguity;
and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the Law,
is multiplication of ambiguity: Besides it seems to imply,
(by too much diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words,
is without the compasse of the Law.  And this is a cause of many
unnecessary Processes.  For when I consider how short were the
Lawes of antient times; and how they grew by degrees still longer;
me thinks I see a contention between the Penners, and Pleaders
of the Law; the former seeking to circumscribe the later;
and the later to evade their circumscriptions; and that the Pleaders
have got the Victory.  It belongeth therefore to the Office
of a Legislator, (such as is in all Common-wealths the Supreme
Representative, be it one Man, or an Assembly,) to make the
reason Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and the Body of the Law
it selfe, as short, but in as proper, and significant termes, as may be.

Punishments
It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right
application of Punishments, and Rewards.  And seeing the end of punishing
is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of
the offender, or of others by his example; the severest Punishments
are to be inflicted for those Crimes, that are of most Danger
to the Publique; such as are those which proceed from malice
to the Government established; those that spring from contempt
of Justice; those that provoke Indignation in the Multitude;
and those, which unpunished, seem Authorised, as when they are
committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites of men in Authority:
For Indignation carrieth men, not onely against the Actors,
and Authors of Injustice; but against all Power that is likely
to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the Insolent act
of one of his Sonnes, he was driven out of Rome, and the Monarchy
it selfe dissolved.  But Crimes of Infirmity; such as are those
which proceed from great provocation, from great fear, great need,
or from ignorance whether the Fact be a great Crime, or not,
there is place many times for Lenity, without prejudice to
the Common-wealth; and Lenity when there is such place for it,
is required by the Law of Nature.  The Punishment of the Leaders,
and teachers in a Commotion; not the poore seduced People,
when they are punished, can profit the Common-wealth by their example.
To be severe to the People, is to punish that ignorance, which may
in great part be imputed to the Soveraign, whose fault it was,
they were no better instructed.

Rewards
In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign,
to apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit
to the Common-wealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End;
and is then done, when they that have well served the Common-wealth,
are with as little expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible,
so well recompenced, as others thereby may be encouraged, both to
serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts
by which they may be enabled to do it better.  To buy with Mony,
or Preferment, from a Popular ambitious Subject, to be quiet,
and desist from making ill impressions in the mindes of the People,
has nothing of the nature of Reward; (which is ordained not
for disservice, but for service past;) nor a signe of Gratitude,
but of Fear: nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the Dammage
of the Publique.  It is a contention with Ambition, like that of
Hercules with the Monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every
one that was vanquished, there grew up three.  For in like manner,
when the stubbornnesse of one Popular man, is overcome with Reward,
there arise many more (by the Example) that do the same Mischiefe,
in hope of like Benefit: and as all sorts of Manifacture,
so also Malice encreaseth by being vendible.  And though sometimes
a Civill warre, may be differred, by such wayes as that, yet the
danger growes still the greater, and the Publique ruine more assured.
It is therefore against the Duty of the Soveraign, to whom the
Publique Safety is committed, to Reward those that aspire to
greatnesse by disturbing the Peace of their Country, and not rather
to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger,
than after a longer time with greater.

Counsellours
Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsellours;
I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the Government
of the Common-wealth.  For this word Counsell, Consilium,
corrupted from Considium, is a large signification, and comprehendeth
all Assemblies of men that sit together, not onely to deliberate
what is to be done hereafter, but also to judge of Facts past,
and of Law for the present.  I take it here in the first sense onely:
And in this sense, there is no choyce of Counsell, neither in
a Democracy, nor Aristocracy; because the persons Counselling
are members of the person Counselled.  The choyce of Counsellours
therefore is to Monarchy; In which, the Soveraign that endeavoureth
not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are the most able,
dischargeth not his Office as he ought to do.  The most able
Counsellours, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving
evill Counsell, and most knowledge of those things that conduce
to the Peace, and Defence of the Common-wealth.  It is a hard matter
to know who expecteth benefit from publique troubles; but the signes
that guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the people
in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose
estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expences,
and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it.
But to know, who has most knowledge of the Publique affaires, is yet
harder; and they that know them, need them a great deale the lesse.
For to know, who knowes the Rules almost of any Art, is a great
degree of the knowledge of the same Art; because no man can be
assured of the truth of anothers Rules, but he that is first taught
to understand them.  But the best signes of Knowledge of any Art,
are, much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it.
Good Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore
there is no more reason to expect good Advice from the rich,
or noble, in matter of State, than in delineating the dimensions
of a fortresse; unlesse we shall think there needs no method
in the study of the Politiques, (as there does in the study
of Geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which is not so.
For the Politiques is the harder study of the two.  Whereas in these
parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a Right of certain persons,
to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance;
it is derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans; wherein many
absolute Lords joyning together to conquer other Nations, would not
enter in to the Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might be
marks of difference in time following, between their Posterity,
and the posterity of their Subjects; which Priviledges being
inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, by the favour of the Soveraign,
they may seem to keep; but contending for them as their Right,
they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no
further honour, than adhaereth naturally to their abilities.

And how able soever be the Counsellours in any affaire, the benefit
of their Counsell is greater, when they give every one his Advice,
and reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an Assembly,
by way of Orations; and when they have praemeditated, than when
they speak on the sudden; both because they have more time,
to survey the consequences of action; and are lesse subject
to be carried away to contradiction, through Envy, Emulation,
or other Passions arising from the difference of opinion.

The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations,
but onely the ease, and benefit the Subjects may enjoy, by Lawes
that look onely inward, is to be taken from the generall informations,
and complaints of the people of each Province, who are best acquainted
with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing
in derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty, to be diligently
taken notice of.  For without those Essentiall Rights, (as I have often
before said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.

Commanders
A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular, shall not
be beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and consequently
cannot performe that office with good successe.  He must therefore
be Industrious, Valiant, Affable, Liberall and Fortunate, that he
may gain an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his Souldiers.
This is Popularity, and breeds in the Souldiers both desire,
and courage, to recommend themselves to his favour; and protects
the severity of the Generall, in punishing (when need is) the Mutinous,
or negligent Souldiers.  But this love of Souldiers, (if caution be
not given of the Commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing
to Soveraign Power; especially when it is in the hands of an
Assembly not popular.  It belongeth therefore to the safety
of the People, both that they be good Conductors, and faithfull
subjects, to whom the Soveraign Commits his Armies.

But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular, that is, reverenced
and beloved of his People, there is no danger at all from the
Popularity of a Subject.  For Souldiers are never so generally unjust,
as to side with their Captain; though they love him, against their
Soveraign, when they love not onely his Person, but also his Cause.
And therefore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed
the Power of their Lawfull Soveraign, before they could settle
themselves in his place, have been alwayes put to the trouble
of contriving their Titles, to save the People from the shame
of receiving them.  To have a known Right to Soveraign Power,
is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more,
for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him,
but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own Family:
Nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their Armies.
For the greatest and most active part of Mankind, has never
hetherto been well contented with the present.

Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are
comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations,
I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations,
and the Law of Nature, is the same thing.  And every Soveraign
hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that
any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body.
And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government,
what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another,
dictateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences
of Soveraign Princes, and Soveraign Assemblies; there being no
Court of Naturall Justice, but in the Conscience onely; where not Man,
but God raigneth; whose Lawes, (such of them as oblige all Mankind,)
in respect of God, as he is the Author of Nature, are Naturall;
and in respect of the same God, as he is King of Kings, are Lawes.
But of the Kingdome of God, as King of Kings, and as King also
of a peculiar People, I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.



CHAPTER XXXI

OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD BY NATURE


The Scope Of The Following Chapters
That the condition of meer Nature, that is to say, of absolute Liberty,
such as is theirs, that neither are Soveraigns, nor Subjects,
is Anarchy, and the condition of Warre: That the Praecepts,
by which men are guided to avoyd that condition, are the Lawes of Nature:
That a Common-wealth, without Soveraign Power, is but a word,
without substance, and cannot stand: That Subjects owe to Soveraigns,
simple Obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant
to the Lawes of God, I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have
already written.  There wants onely, for the entire knowledge of
Civill duty, to know what are those Lawes of God.  For without that,
a man knows not, when he is commanded any thing by the Civill Power,
whether it be contrary to the Law of God, or not: and so, either by
too much civill obedience, offends the Divine Majesty, or through feare
of offending God, transgresses the commandements of the Common-wealth.
To avoyd both these Rocks, it is necessary to know what are
the Lawes Divine.  And seeing the knowledge of all Law, dependeth
on the knowledge of the Soveraign Power; I shall say something
in that which followeth, of the KINGDOME OF GOD.

Who Are Subjects In The Kingdome Of God
"God is King, let the Earth rejoice," saith the Psalmist. (Psal. 96. 1).
And again, "God is King though the Nations be angry; and he that
sitteth on the Cherubins, though the earth be moved." (Psal. 98. 1).
Whether men will or not, they must be subject alwayes to
the Divine Power.  By denying the Existence, or Providence of God,
men may shake off their Ease, but not their Yoke.  But to call this
Power of God, which extendeth it selfe not onely to Man, but also
to Beasts, and Plants, and Bodies inanimate, by the name of Kingdome,
is but a metaphoricall use of the word.  For he onely is properly
said to Raigne, that governs his Subjects, by his Word, and by promise
of Rewards to those that obey it, and by threatning them with Punishment
that obey it not. Subjects therefore in the Kingdome of God, are not
Bodies Inanimate, nor creatures Irrationall; because they understand
no Precepts as his: Nor Atheists; nor they that believe not that God
has any care of the actions of mankind; because they acknowledge no
Word for his, nor have hope of his rewards, or fear of his threatnings.
They therefore that believe there is a God that governeth the world,
and hath given Praecepts, and propounded Rewards, and Punishments to
Mankind, are Gods Subjects; all the rest, are to be understood as Enemies.

A Threefold Word Of God, Reason, Revelation, Prophecy
To rule by Words, requires that such Words be manifestly made known;
for else they are no Lawes: For to the nature of Lawes belongeth
a sufficient, and clear Promulgation, such as may take away
the excuse of Ignorance; which in the Lawes of men is but of
one onely kind, and that is, Proclamation, or Promulgation by
the voyce of man.  But God declareth his Lawes three wayes;
by the Dictates of Naturall Reason, By Revelation, and by the Voyce
of some Man, to whom by the operation of Miracles, he procureth
credit with the rest.  From hence there ariseth a triple Word of God,
Rational, Sensible, and Prophetique: to which Correspondeth a
triple Hearing; Right Reason, Sense Supernaturall, and Faith.
As for Sense Supernaturall, which consisteth in Revelation,
or Inspiration, there have not been any Universall Lawes so given,
because God speaketh not in that manner, but to particular persons,
and to divers men divers things.

A Twofold Kingdome Of God, Naturall And Prophetique
From the difference between the other two kinds of Gods Word,
Rationall, and Prophetique, there may be attributed to God,
a two-fold Kingdome, Naturall, and Prophetique: Naturall,
wherein he governeth as many of Mankind as acknowledge his Providence,
by the naturall Dictates of Right Reason; And Prophetique, wherein
having chosen out one peculiar Nation (the Jewes) for his Subjects,
he governed them, and none but them, not onely by naturall Reason,
but by Positive Lawes, which he gave them by the mouths of
his holy Prophets.  Of the Naturall Kingdome of God I intend
to speak in this Chapter.

The Right Of Gods Soveraignty Is Derived From His Omnipotence
The Right of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth
those that break his Lawes, is to be derived, not from his Creating them,
as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits;
but from his Irresistible Power.  I have formerly shewn, how the
Soveraign Right ariseth from Pact: To shew how the same Right may
arise from Nature, requires no more, but to shew in what case
it is never taken away.  Seeing all men by Nature had Right to
All things, they had Right every one to reigne over all the rest.
But because this Right could not be obtained by force, it concerned
the safety of every one, laying by that Right, to set up men
(with Soveraign Authority) by common consent, to rule and defend them:
whereas if there had been any man of Power Irresistible; there had
been no reason, why he should not by that Power have ruled,
and defended both himselfe, and them, according to his own discretion.
To those therefore whose Power is irresistible, the dominion of all
men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of Power; and consequently
it is from that Power, that the Kingdome over men, and the Right
of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Naturally to God Almighty;
not as Creator, and Gracious; but as Omnipotent.  And though Punishment
be due for Sinne onely, because by that word is understood Affliction
for Sinne; yet the Right of Afflicting, is not alwayes derived from
mens Sinne, but from Gods Power.

Sinne Not The Cause Of All Affliction
This question, "Why Evill men often Prosper, and Good men
suffer Adversity," has been much disputed by the Antient,
and is the same with this of ours, "By what Right God dispenseth
the Prosperities and Adversities of this life;" and is of
that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, not onely of the Vulgar,
but of Philosophers, and which is more, of the Saints, concerning
the Divine Providence.  "How Good," saith David, "is the God of Israel
to those that are Upright in Heart; and yet my feet were almost gone,
my treadings had well-nigh slipt; for I was grieved at the Wicked,
when I saw the Ungodly in such Prosperity."  And Job, how earnestly
does he expostulate with God, for the many Afflictions he suffered,
notwithstanding his Righteousnesse?  This question in the case of Job,
is decided by God himselfe, not by arguments derived from Job's Sinne,
but his own Power.  For whereas the friends of Job drew their arguments
from his Affliction to his Sinne, and he defended himselfe by
the conscience of his Innocence, God himselfe taketh up the matter,
and having justified the Affliction by arguments drawn from his Power,
such as this "Where was thou when I layd the foundations of the earth,"
and the like, both approved Job's Innocence, and reproved the Erroneous
doctrine of his friends.  Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence
of our Saviour, concerning the man that was born Blind, in these words,
"Neither hath this man sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works
of God might be made manifest in him."  And though it be said
"That Death entred into the world by sinne, (by which is meant that
if Adam had never sinned, he had never dyed, that is, never suffered
any separation of his soule from his body,) it follows not thence,
that God could not justly have Afflicted him, though he had not Sinned,
as well as he afflicteth other living creatures, that cannot sinne.

Divine Lawes
Having spoken of the Right of Gods Soveraignty, as grounded
onely on Nature; we are to consider next, what are the Divine Lawes,
or Dictates of Naturall Reason; which Lawes concern either the
naturall Duties of one man to another, or the Honour naturally
due to our Divine Soveraign.  The first are the same Lawes of Nature,
of which I have spoken already in the 14. and 15. Chapters
of this Treatise; namely, Equity, Justice, Mercy, Humility,
and the rest of the Morall Vertues.  It remaineth therefore
that we consider, what Praecepts are dictated to men, by their
Naturall Reason onely, without other word of God, touching
the Honour and Worship of the Divine Majesty.

Honour And Worship What
Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the Power,
and Goodnesse of another: and therefore to Honour God, is to think
as Highly of his Power and Goodnesse, as is possible.  And of that
opinion, the externall signes appearing in the Words, and Actions
of men, are called Worship; which is one part of that which the
Latines understand by the word Cultus: For Cultus signifieth properly,
and constantly, that labour which a man bestowes on any thing,
with a purpose to make benefit by it.  Now those things whereof we make
benefit, are either subject to us, and the profit they yeeld, followeth
the labour we bestow upon them, as a naturall effect; or they are not
subject to us, but answer our labour, according to their own Wills.
In the first sense the labour bestowed on the Earth, is called
Culture; and the education of Children a Culture of their mindes.
In the second sense, where mens wills are to be wrought to our
purpose, not by Force, but by Compleasance, it signifieth as much
as Courting, that is, a winning of favour by good offices; as by praises,
by acknowledging their Power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them
from whom we look for any benefit.  And this is properly Worship:
in which sense Publicola, is understood for a Worshipper of the People,
and Cultus Dei, for the Worship of God.

Severall Signes Of Honour
From internall Honour, consisting in the opinion of Power and Goodnesse,
arise three Passions; Love, which hath reference to Goodnesse;
and Hope, and Fear, that relate to Power: And three parts of
externall worship; Praise, Magnifying, and Blessing: The subject
of Praise, being Goodnesse; the subject of Magnifying, and Blessing,
being Power, and the effect thereof Felicity.  Praise, and Magnifying
are significant both by Words, and Actions: By Words, when we say
a man is Good, or Great: By Actions, when we thank him for his Bounty,
and obey his Power.  The opinion of the Happinesse of another,
can onely be expressed by words.

Worship Naturall And Arbitrary
There be some signes of Honour, (both in Attributes and Actions,)
that be Naturally so; as amongst Attributes, Good, Just, Liberall,
and the like; and amongst Actions, Prayers, Thanks, and Obedience.
Others are so by Institution, or Custome of men; and in some times
and places are Honourable; in others Dishonourable; in others
Indifferent: such as are the Gestures in Salutation, Prayer,
and Thanksgiving, in different times and places, differently used.
The former is Naturall; the later Arbitrary Worship.

Worship Commanded And Free
And of Arbitrary Worship, there bee two differences: For sometimes
it is a Commanded, sometimes Voluntary Worship: Commanded, when it is
such as hee requireth, who is Worshipped: Free, when it is such as
the Worshipper thinks fit.  When it is Commanded, not the words,
or gestures, but the obedience is the Worship.  But when Free,
the Worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them
the words, or actions by which we intend honour, seem ridiculous,
and tending to contumely; they are not Worship; because a signe
is not a signe to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is made;
that is, to the spectator.

Worship Publique And Private
Again, there is a Publique, and a Private Worship.  Publique, is the
Worship that a Common-wealth performeth, as one Person.  Private, is that
which a Private person exhibiteth.  Publique, in respect of the whole
Common-wealth, is Free; but in respect of Particular men it is not so.
Private, is in secret Free; but in the sight of the multitude,
it is never without some Restraint, either from the Lawes,
or from the Opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.

The End Of Worship
The End of Worship amongst men, is Power.  For where a man seeth
another worshipped he supposeth him powerfull, and is the readier
to obey him; which makes his Power greater.  But God has no Ends:
the worship we do him, proceeds from our duty, and is directed
according to our capacity, by those rules of Honour, that Reason
dictateth to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope
of benefit, for fear of dammage, or in thankfulnesse for good
already received from them.

Attributes Of Divine Honour
That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light
of Nature, I will begin with his Attributes.  Where, First,
it is manifest, we ought to attribute to him Existence: For no man
can have the will to honour that, which he thinks not to have any Beeing.

Secondly, that those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule
of the World was God, spake unworthily of him; and denyed his Existence:
For by God, is understood the cause of the World; and to say the World
is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.

Thirdly, to say the World was not Created, but Eternall, (seeing that
which is Eternall has no cause,) is to deny there is a God.

Fourthly, that they who attributing (as they think) Ease to God,
take from him the care of Mankind; take from him his Honour:
for it takes away mens love, and fear of him; which is the root of Honour.

Fifthly, in those things that signifie Greatnesse, and Power;
to say he is Finite, is not to Honour him: For it is not a signe
of the Will to Honour God, to attribute to him lesse than we can;
and Finite, is lesse than we can; because to Finite, it is easie
to adde more.

Therefore to attribute Figure to him, is not Honour; for all
Figure is Finite:

Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an Idea of him,
in our mind: for whatsoever we conceive is Finite:

Not to attribute to him Parts, or Totality; which are the Attributes
onely of things Finite:

Nor to say he is this, or that Place: for whatsoever is in Place,
is bounded, and Finite:

Nor that he is Moved, or Resteth: for both these Attributes
ascribe to him Place:

Nor that there be more Gods than one; because it implies them all Finite:
for there cannot be more than one Infinite: Nor to ascribe to him
(unlesse Metaphorically, meaning not the Passion, but the Effect)
Passions that partake of Griefe; as Repentance, Anger, Mercy:
or of Want; as Appetite, Hope, Desire; or of any Passive faculty:
For Passion, is Power limited by somewhat else.

And therefore when we ascribe to God a Will, it is not to be understood,
as that of Man, for a Rationall Appetite; but as the Power, by which
he effecteth every thing.

Likewise when we attribute to him Sight, and other acts of Sense;
as also Knowledge, and Understanding; which in us is nothing else,
but a tumult of the mind, raised by externall things that presse
the organicall parts of mans body: For there is no such thing in God;
and being things that depend on naturall causes, cannot be
attributed to him.

Hee that will attribute to God, nothing but what is warranted
by naturall Reason, must either use such Negative Attributes,
as Infinite, Eternall, Incomprehensible; or Superlatives, as Most High,
Most Great, and the like; or Indefinite, as Good, Just, Holy, Creator;
and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare what he is,
(for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our Fancy,)
but how much wee admire him, and how ready we would be to obey him;
which is a signe of Humility, and of a Will to honour him as much
as we can: For there is but one Name to signifie our Conception of
his Nature, and that is, I AM: and but one Name of his Relation to us,
and that is God; in which is contained Father, King, and Lord.

Actions That Are Signes Of Divine Honour
Concerning the actions of Divine Worship, it is a most generall
Precept of Reason, that they be signes of the Intention to Honour God;
such as are, First, Prayers: For not the Carvers, when they made Images,
were thought to make them Gods; but the People that Prayed to them.

Secondly, Thanksgiving; which differeth from Prayer in Divine Worship,
no otherwise, than that Prayers precede, and Thanks succeed the benefit;
the end both of the one, and the other, being to acknowledge God,
for Author of all benefits, as well past, as future.

Thirdly, Gifts; that is to say, Sacrifices, and Oblations,
(if they be of the best,) are signes of Honour: for they are Thanksgivings.

Fourthly, Not to swear by any but God, is naturally a signe of Honour:
for it is a confession that God onely knoweth the heart; and that
no mans wit, or strength can protect a man against Gods vengence
on the perjured.

Fifthly, it is a part of Rationall Worship, to speak Considerately
of God; for it argues a Fear of him, and Fear, is a confession
of his Power.  Hence followeth, That the name of God is not to be
used rashly, and to no purpose; for that is as much, as in Vain:
And it is to no purpose; unlesse it be by way of Oath, and by order
of the Common-wealth, to make Judgements certain; or between
Common-wealths, to avoyd Warre.  And that disputing of Gods nature
is contrary to his Honour: For it is supposed, that in this naturall
Kingdome of God, there is no other way to know any thing, but by
naturall Reason; that is, from the Principles of naturall Science;
which are so farre from teaching us any thing of Gods nature,
as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of
the smallest creature living.  And therefore, when men out
of the Principles of naturall Reason, dispute of the Attributes
of God, they but dishonour him: For in the Attributes which we give
to God, we are not to consider the signification of Philosophicall Truth;
but the signification of Pious Intention, to do him the greatest
Honour we are able.  From the want of which consideration,
have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the Nature of God,
that tend not to his Honour, but to the honour of our own wits,
and learning; and are nothing else but inconsiderate, and vain
abuses of his Sacred Name.

Sixthly, in Prayers, Thanksgivings, Offerings and Sacrifices,
it is a Dictate of naturall Reason, that they be every one
in his kind the best, and most significant of Honour.  As for example,
that Prayers, and Thanksgiving, be made in Words and Phrases, not sudden,
nor light, nor Plebeian; but beautifull and well composed; For else
we do not God as much honour as we can.  And therefore the Heathens
did absurdly, to worship Images for Gods: But their doing it in Verse,
and with Musick, both of Voyce, and Instruments, was reasonable.
Also that the Beasts they offered in sacrifice, and the Gifts
they offered, and their actions in Worshipping, were full of
submission, and commemorative of benefits received, was according
to reason, as proceeding from an intention to honour him.

Seventhly, Reason directeth not onely to worship God in Secret;
but also, and especially, in Publique, and in the sight of men:
For without that, (that which in honour is most acceptable)
the procuring others to honour him, is lost.

Lastly, Obedience to his Lawes (that is, in this case to the
Lawes of Nature,) is the greatest worship of all.  For as Obedience
is more acceptable to God than sacrifice; so also to set light
by his Commandements, is the greatest of all contumelies.
And these are the Lawes of that Divine Worship, which naturall
Reason dictateth to private men.

Publique Worship Consisteth In Uniformity
But seeing a Common-wealth is but one Person, it ought also to
exhibite to God but one Worship; which then it doth, when it
commandeth it to be exhibited by Private men, Publiquely.
And this is Publique Worship; the property whereof, is to be Uniforme:
For those actions that are done differently, by different men,
cannot be said to be a Publique Worship.  And therefore, where many
sorts of Worship be allowed, proceeding from the different Religions
of Private men, it cannot be said there is any Publique Worship,
nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion at all.

All Attributes Depend On The Lawes Civill
And because words (and consequently the Attributes of God) have
their signification by agreement, and constitution of men;
those Attributes are to be held significative of Honour, that men
intend shall so be; and whatsoever may be done by the wills of
particular men, where there is no Law but Reason, may be done by
the will of the Common-wealth, by Lawes Civill.  And because a
Common-wealth hath no Will, nor makes no Lawes, but those that
are made by the Will of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power;
it followeth, that those Attributes which the Soveraign ordaineth,
in the Worship of God, for signes of Honour, ought to be taken
and used for such, by private men in their publique Worship.

Not All Actions
But because not all Actions are signes by Constitution; but some
are Naturally signes of Honour, others of Contumely, these later
(which are those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of
them they reverence) cannot be made by humane power a part
of Divine worship; nor the former (such as are decent, modest,
humble Behaviour) ever be separated from it.  But whereas there be
an infinite number of Actions, and Gestures, of an indifferent nature;
such of them as the Common-wealth shall ordain to be Publiquely
and Universally in use, as signes of Honour, and part of Gods Worship,
are to be taken and used for such by the Subjects.  And that which
is said in the Scripture, "It is better to obey God than men,"
hath place in the kingdome of God by Pact, and not by Nature.

Naturall Punishments
Having thus briefly spoken of the Naturall Kingdome of God,
and his Naturall Lawes, I will adde onely to this Chapter
a short declaration of his Naturall Punishments.  There is no
action of man in this life, that is not the beginning of so long
a chayn of Consequences, as no humane Providence, is high enough,
to give a man a prospect to the end.  And in this Chayn, there are
linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such manner,
as he that will do any thing for his pleasure, must engage himselfe
to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and these pains, are the
Naturall Punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of
more Harme that Good.  And hereby it comes to passe, that Intemperance,
is naturally punished with Diseases; Rashnesse, with Mischances;
Injustice, with the Violence of Enemies; Pride, with Ruine; Cowardise,
with Oppression; Negligent government of Princes, with Rebellion;
and Rebellion, with Slaughter.  For seeing Punishments are consequent
to the breach of Lawes; Naturall Punishments must be naturally
consequent to the breach of the Lawes of Nature; and therfore
follow them as their naturall, not arbitrary effects.

The Conclusion Of The Second Part
And thus farre concerning the Constitution, Nature, and Right
of Soveraigns; and concerning the Duty of Subjects, derived from
the Principles of Naturall Reason.  And now, considering how different
this Doctrine is, from the Practise of the greatest part of the world,
especially of these Western parts, that have received their Morall
learning from Rome, and Athens; and how much depth of Morall Philosophy
is required, in them that have the Administration of the Soveraign Power;
I am at the point of believing this my labour, as uselesse, and the
Common-wealth of Plato; For he also is of opinion that it is impossible
for the disorders of State, and change of Governments by Civill Warre,
ever to be taken away, till Soveraigns be Philosophers.  But when I
consider again, that the Science of Naturall Justice, is the onely
Science necessary for Soveraigns, and their principall Ministers;
and that they need not be charged with the Sciences Mathematicall,
(as by Plato they are,) further, than by good Lawes to encourage men
to the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor any other Philosopher
hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or probably proved
all the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby,
both how to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hope, that one time
or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign,
who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear,)
without the help of any interested, or envious Interpreter; and by the
exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching
of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice.





PART III

OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH




CHAPTER XXXII

OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITIQUES


The Word Of God Delivered By Prophets Is
The Main Principle Of Christian Politiques
I have derived the Rights of Soveraigne Power, and the duty of
Subjects hitherto, from the Principles of Nature onely; such as
Experience has found true, or Consent (concerning the use of words)
has made so; that is to say, from the nature of Men, known to us
by Experience, and from Definitions (of such words as are Essentiall
to all Politicall reasoning) universally agreed on.  But in that I
am next to handle, which is the Nature and Rights of a CHRISTIAN
COMMON-WEALTH, whereof there dependeth much upon Supernaturall
Revelations of the Will of God; the ground of my Discourse must be,
not only the Naturall Word of God, but also the Propheticall.

Neverthelesse, we are not to renounce our Senses, and Experience;
nor (that which is the undoubted Word of God) our naturall Reason.
For they are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate,
till the coming again of our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be
folded up in the Napkin of an Implicate Faith, but employed in the
purchase of Justice, Peace, and true Religion,  For though there be
many things in Gods Word above Reason; that is to say, which cannot
by naturall reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is
nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either
in our unskilfull Interpretation, or erroneous Ratiocination.

Therefore, when any thing therein written is too hard for
our examination, wee are bidden to captivate our understanding
to the Words; and not to labour in sifting out a Philosophicall truth
by Logick, of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under
any rule of naturall science.  For it is with the mysteries of
our Religion, as with wholsome pills for the sick, which swallowed
whole, have the vertue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part
cast up again without effect.

What It Is To Captivate The Understanding
But by the Captivity of our Understanding, is not meant a Submission
of the Intellectual faculty, to the Opinion of any other man; but of
the Will to Obedience, where obedience is due.  For Sense, Memory,
Understanding, Reason, and Opinion are not in our power to change;
but alwaies, and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear,
and consider suggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our Will,
but our Will of them.  We then Captivate our Understanding and Reason,
when we forbear contradiction; when we so speak, as (by lawfull
Authority) we are commanded; and when we live accordingly; which in sum,
is Trust, and Faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind
be incapable of any Notion at all from the words spoken.

How God Speaketh To Men
When God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation
of another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately.
How God speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by
those well enough, to whom he hath so spoken; but how the same
should be understood by another, is hard, if not impossible to know.
For if a man pretend to me, that God hath spoken to him supernaturally,
and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive
what argument he can produce, to oblige me to beleeve it.  It is true,
that if he be my Soveraign, he may oblige me to obedience, so, as not
by act or word to declare I beleeve him not; but not to think any
otherwise then my reason perswades me.  But if one that hath not such
authority over me, shall pretend the same, there is nothing that
exacteth either beleefe, or obedience.

For to say that God hath spoken to him in the Holy Scripture,
is not to say God hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation
of the Prophets, or of the Apostles, or of the Church, in such manner
as he speaks to all other Christian men.  To say he hath spoken
to him in a Dream, is no more than to say he dreamed that God
spake to him; which is not of force to win beleef from any man,
that knows dreams are for the most part naturall, and may proceed
from former thoughts; and such dreams as that, from selfe conceit,
and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a mans own godlinesse,
or other vertue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favour
of extraordinary Revelation.  To say he hath seen a Vision, or heard
a Voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between sleeping and waking:
for in such manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream
for a vision, as not having well observed his own slumbering.
To say he speaks by supernaturall Inspiration, is to say he finds
an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself,
for which he can alledge no naturall and sufficient reason.
So that though God Almighty can speak to a man, by Dreams, Visions,
Voice, and Inspiration; yet he obliges no man to beleeve he hath
so done to him that pretends it; who (being a man), may erre,
and (which is more) may lie.

By What Marks Prophets Are Known
How then can he, to whom God hath never revealed his Wil immediately
(saving by the way of natural reason) know when he is to obey,
or not to obey his Word, delivered by him, that sayes he is a Prophet?
(1 Kings 22) Of 400 Prophets, of whom the K. of Israel asked counsel,
concerning the warre he made against Ramoth Gilead, only Micaiah
was a true one.(1 Kings 13)  The Prophet that was sent to prophecy
against the Altar set up by Jeroboam, though a true Prophet,
and that by two miracles done in his presence appears to be
a Prophet sent from God, was yet deceived by another old Prophet,
that perswaded him as from the mouth of God, to eat and drink with him.
If one Prophet deceive another, what certainty is there of knowing the
will of God, by other way than that of Reason?  To which I answer out of
the Holy Scripture, that there be two marks, by which together,
not asunder, a true Prophet is to be known.  One is the doing
of miracles; the other is the not teaching any other Religion than
that which is already established.  Asunder (I say) neither of these
is sufficient.  (Deut. 13 v. 1,2,3,4,5 ) "If a Prophet rise amongst you,
or a Dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a miracle,
and the miracle come to passe; if he say, Let us follow strange Gods,
which thou hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to him, &c.
But that Prophet and Dreamer of dreams shall be put to death,
because he hath spoken to you to Revolt from the Lord your God."
In which words two things are to be observed, First, that God wil
not have miracles alone serve for arguments, to approve the
Prophets calling; but (as it is in the third verse) for an
experiment of the constancy of our adherence to himself.  For the
works of the Egyptian Sorcerers, though not so great as those of Moses,
yet were great miracles.  Secondly, that how great soever the miracle be,
yet if it tend to stir up revolt against the King, or him that governeth
by the Kings authority, he that doth such miracle, is not to be
considered otherwise than as sent to make triall of their allegiance.
For these words, "revolt from the Lord your God," are in this place
equivalent to "revolt from your King."  For they had made God their
King by pact at the foot of Mount Sinai; who ruled them by Moses only;
for he only spake with God, and from time to time declared Gods
Commandements to the people.  In like manner, after our Saviour Christ
had made his Disciples acknowledge him for the Messiah, (that is to say,
for Gods anointed, whom the nation of the Jews daily expected for
their King, but refused when he came,) he omitted not to advertise
them of the danger of miracles. "There shall arise," (saith he)
"false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall doe great wonders
and miracles, even to the seducing (if it were possible) of the
very Elect." (Mat. 24. 24)  By which it appears, that false Prophets
may have the power of miracles; yet are wee not to take their doctrin
for Gods Word.  St. Paul says further to the Galatians, that
"if himself, or an Angell from heaven preach another Gospel to them,
than he had preached, let him be accursed." (Gal. 1. 8)  That Gospel was,
that Christ was King; so that all preaching against the power
of the King received, in consequence to these words, is by
St. Paul accursed.  For his speech is addressed to those,
who by his preaching had already received Jesus for the Christ,
that is to say, for King of the Jews.

The Marks Of A Prophet In The Old Law, Miracles,
And Doctrine Conformable To The Law
And as Miracles, without preaching that Doctrine which God
hath established; so preaching the true Doctrine, without the
doing of Miracles, is an unsufficient argument of immediate Revelation.
For if a man that teacheth not false Doctrine, should pretend to
bee a Prophet without shewing any Miracle, he is never the more
to bee regarded for his pretence, as is evident by Deut. 18. v. 21, 22.
"If thou say in thy heart, How shall we know that the Word
(of the Prophet) is not that which the Lord hath spoken.
When the Prophet shall have spoken in the name of the Lord,
that which shall not come to passe, that's the word which
the Lord hath not spoken, but the Prophet has spoken it out of
the pride of his own heart, fear him not."  But a man may here
again ask, When the Prophet hath foretold a thing, how shal we know
whether it will come to passe or not?  For he may foretel it as
a thing to arrive after a certain long time, longer then the time
of mans life; or indefinitely, that it will come to passe one
time or other: in which case this mark of a Prophet is unusefull;
and therefore the miracles that oblige us to beleeve a Prophet,
ought to be confirmed by an immediate, or a not long deferr'd event.
So that it is manifest, that the teaching of the Religion which God
hath established, and the showing of a present Miracle, joined together,
were the only marks whereby the Scripture would have a true Prophet,
that is to say immediate Revelation to be acknowledged; neither of them
being singly sufficient to oblige any other man to regard what he saith.

Miracles Ceasing, Prophets Cease,
And The Scripture Supplies Their Place
Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby
to acknowledge the pretended Revelations, or Inspirations of any
private man; nor obligation to give ear to any Doctrine, farther than
it is conformable to the Holy Scriptures, which since the time
of our Saviour, supply the want of all other Prophecy; and from which,
by wise and careful ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary
to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without Enthusiasme,
or supernaturall Inspiration, may easily be deduced.  And this Scripture
is it, out of which I am to take the Principles of my Discourse,
concerning the Rights of those that are the Supream Govenors on earth,
of Christian Common-wealths; and of the duty of Christian Subjects
towards their Soveraigns.  And to that end, I shall speak in the
next Chapter, or the Books, Writers, Scope and Authority of the Bible.



CHAPTER XXXIII

OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY,
AND INTERPRETERS OF THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURES


Of The Books Of Holy Scripture
By the Books of Holy SCRIPTURE, are understood those, which ought
to be the Canon, that is to say, the Rules of Christian life.
And because all Rules of life, which men are in conscience bound
to observe, are Laws; the question of the Scripture, is the question
of what is Law throughout all Christendome, both Naturall, and Civill.
For though it be not determined in Scripture, what Laws every Christian
King shall constitute in his own Dominions; yet it is determined
what laws he shall not constitute.  Seeing therefore I have already
proved, that Soveraigns in their own Dominions are the sole Legislators;
those Books only are Canonicall, that is, Law, in every nation,
which are established for such by the Soveraign Authority.
It is true, that God is the Soveraign of all Soveraigns; and therefore,
when he speaks to any Subject, he ought to be obeyed, whatsoever
any earthly Potentate command to the contrary.  But the question is not
of obedience to God, but of When, and What God hath said; which to
Subjects that have no supernaturall revelation, cannot be known,
but by that naturall reason, which guided them, for the obtaining
of Peace and Justice, to obey the authority of their severall
Common-wealths; that is to say, of their lawfull Soveraigns.
According to this obligation, I can acknowledge no other Books of
the Old Testament, to be Holy Scripture, but those which have been
commanded to be acknowledged for such, by the Authority of the
Church of England.  What Books these are, is sufficiently known,
without a Catalogue of them here; and they are the same that are
acknowledged by St. Jerome, who holdeth the rest, namely, the Wisdome
of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Judith, Tobias, the first and second of
Maccabees, (though he had seen the first in Hebrew) and the third
and fourth of Esdras, for Apocrypha.  Of the Canonicall, Josephus
a learned Jew, that wrote in the time of the Emperor Domitian,
reckoneth Twenty Two, making the number agree with the Hebrew Alphabet.
St. Jerome does the same, though they reckon them in different manner.
For Josephus numbers Five Books of Moses, Thirteen of Prophets,
that writ the History of their own times (which how it agrees with
the Prophets writings contained in the Bible wee shall see hereafter),
and Four of Hymnes and Morall Precepts.  But St. Jerome reckons Five
Books of Moses, Eight of Prophets, and Nine of other Holy writ,
which he calls of Hagiographa.  The Septuagint, who were 70. learned
men of the Jews, sent for by Ptolemy King of Egypt, to translate
the Jewish Law, out of the Hebrew into the Greek, have left us no
other for holy Scripture in the Greek tongue, but the same that are
received in the Church of England.

As for the Books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged
for Canon by all Christian Churches, and by all sects of Christians,
that admit any Books at all for Canonicall.

Their Antiquity
Who were the originall writers of the severall Books of Holy Scripture,
has not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other History,
(which is the only proof of matter of fact); nor can be by any
arguments of naturall Reason; for Reason serves only to convince
the truth (not of fact, but) of consequence.  The light therefore
that must guide us in this question, must be that which is held out
unto us from the Bookes themselves: And this light, though it show us
not the writer of every book, yet it is not unusefull to give us
knowledge of the time, wherein they were written.

The Pentateuch Not Written By Moses
And first, for the Pentateuch, it is not argument enough that they
were written by Moses, because they are called the five Books of Moses;
no more than these titles, The Book of Joshua, the Book of Judges,
The Book of Ruth, and the Books of the Kings, are arguments
sufficient to prove, that they were written by Joshua, by the Judges,
by Ruth, and by the Kings.  For in titles of Books, the subject
is marked, as often as the writer.  The History Of Livy, denotes the
Writer; but the History Of Scanderbeg, is denominated from the subject.
We read in the last Chapter of Deuteronomie, Ver. 6. concerning
the sepulcher of Moses, "that no man knoweth of his sepulcher
to this day," that is, to the day wherein those words were written.
It is therefore manifest, that those words were written after
his interrement.  For it were a strange interpretation, to say Moses
spake of his own sepulcher (though by Prophecy), that it was not found
to that day, wherein he was yet living.  But it may perhaps be alledged,
that the last Chapter only, not the whole Pentateuch, was written
by some other man, but the rest not: Let us therefore consider that
which we find in the Book of Genesis, Chap. 12. Ver. 6 "And Abraham
passed through the land to the place of Sichem, unto the plain of Moreh,
and the Canaanite was then in the land;" which must needs bee
the words of one that wrote when the Canaanite was not in the land;
and consequently, not of Moses, who dyed before he came into it.
Likewise Numbers 21. Ver. 14. the Writer citeth another more
ancient Book, Entituled, The Book of the Warres of the Lord,
wherein were registred the Acts of Moses, at the Red-sea,
and at the brook of Arnon.  It is therefore sufficiently evident,
that the five Books of Moses were written after his time,
though how long after it be not so manifest.

But though Moses did not compile those Books entirely, and in
the form we have them; yet he wrote all that which hee is there
said to have written: as for example, the Volume of the Law,
which is contained, as it seemeth in the 11 of Deuteronomie,
and the following Chapters to the 27. which was also commanded
to be written on stones, in their entry into the land of Canaan.
(Deut. 31. 9) And this did Moses himself write, and deliver to
the Priests and Elders of Israel, to be read every seventh year
to all Israel, at their assembling in the feast of Tabernacles.
And this is that Law which God commanded, that their Kings
(when they should have established that form of Government)
should take a copy of from the Priests and Levites to lay in
the side of the Arke; (Deut. 31. 26) and the same which having
been lost, was long time after found again by Hilkiah, and sent
to King Josias, who causing it to be read to the People, renewed
the Covenant between God and them. (2 King. 22. 8 & 23. 1,2,3)

The Book of Joshua Written After His Time
That the Book of Joshua was also written long after the time
of Joshua, may be gathered out of many places of the Book it self.
Joshua had set up twelve stones in the middest of Jordan, for a
monument of their passage; (Josh 4. 9) of which the Writer saith thus,
"They are there unto this day;" (Josh 5. 9) for "unto this day",
is a phrase that signifieth a time past, beyond the memory of man.
In like manner, upon the saying of the Lord, that he had rolled off
from the people the Reproach of Egypt, the Writer saith, "The place
is called Gilgal unto this day;" which to have said in the time
of Joshua had been improper.  So also the name of the Valley of Achor,
from the trouble that Achan raised in the Camp, (Josh. 7. 26)
the Writer saith, "remaineth unto this day;" which must needs bee
therefore long after the time of Joshua.  Arguments of this kind
there be many other; as Josh. 8. 29.  13. 13.  14. 14.  15. 63.

The Booke Of Judges And Ruth
Written Long After The Captivity
The same is manifest by like arguments of the Book of Judges,
chap. 1. 21,26  6.24  10.4  15.19  17.6  and Ruth 1. 1.  but
especially Judg. 18. 30. where it is said, that Jonathan
"and his sonnes were Priests to the Tribe of Dan, untill the day
of the captivity of the land."

The Like Of The Bookes Of Samuel
That the Books of Samuel were also written after his own time,
there are the like arguments, 1 Sam. 5.5.  7.13,15.  27.6.  & 30.25.
where, after David had adjudged equall part of the spoiles,
to them that guarded the Ammunition, with them that fought,
the Writer saith, "He made it a Statute and an Ordinance to Israel
to this day." (2. Sam. 6.4.)  Again, when David (displeased,
that the Lord had slain Uzzah, for putting out his hand to sustain
the Ark,) called the place Perez-Uzzah, the Writer saith,
it is called so "to this day": the time therefore of the writing
of that Book, must be long after the time of the fact; that is,
long after the time of David.

The Books Of The Kings, And The Chronicles
As for the two Books of the Kings, and the two books of the Chronicles,
besides the places which mention such monuments, as the Writer saith,
remained till his own days; such as are  1 Kings 9.13.  9.21.  10. 12.
12.19.  2 Kings 2.22.  8.22.  10.27.  14.7.  16.6.  17.23.  17.34.
17.41.  1 Chron. 4.41.  5.26.  It is argument sufficient they were
written after the captivity in Babylon, that the History of them
is continued till that time.  For the Facts Registred are alwaies
more ancient than such Books as make mention of, and quote the Register;
as these Books doe in divers places, referring the Reader to the
Chronicles of the Kings of Juda, to the Chronicles of the Kings
of Israel, to the Books of the Prophet Samuel, or the Prophet Nathan,
of the Prophet Ahijah; to the Vision of Jehdo, to the Books of
the Prophet Serveiah, and of the Prophet Addo.

Ezra And Nehemiah
The Books of Esdras and Nehemiah were written certainly after
their return from captivity; because their return, the re-edification
of the walls and houses of Jerusalem, the renovation of the Covenant,
and ordination of their policy are therein contained.

Esther
The History of Queen Esther is of the time of the Captivity;
and therefore the Writer must have been of the same time, or after it.

Job
The Book of Job hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written:
and though it appear sufficiently (Exekiel 14.14, and James 5.11.)
that he was no fained person; yet the Book it self seemeth not to be
a History, but a Treatise concerning a question in ancient time
much disputed, "why wicked men have often prospered in this world,
and good men have been afflicted;" and it is the most probably, because
from the beginning, to the third verse of the third chapter, where the
complaint of Job beginneth, the Hebrew is (as St. Jerome testifies)
in prose; and from thence to the sixt verse of the last chapter in
Hexameter Verses; and the rest of that chapter again in prose.
So that the dispute is all in verse; and the prose is added,
but as a Preface in the beginning, and an Epilogue in the end.
But Verse is no usuall stile of such, as either are themselves
in great pain, as Job; or of such as come to comfort them,
as his friends; but in Philosophy, especially morall Philosophy,
in ancient time frequent.

The Psalter
The Psalmes were written the most part by David, for the use
of the Quire.  To these are added some songs of Moses, and other
holy men; and some of them after the return from the Captivity;
as the 137. and the 126. whereby it is manifest that the Psalter
was compiled, and put into the form it now hath, after the return
of the Jews from Babylon.

The Proverbs
The Proverbs, being a Collection of wise and godly Sayings,
partly of Solomon, partly of Agur the son of Jakeh; and partly of
the Mother of King Lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been
collected by Solomon, rather then by Agur, or the Mother of Lemues;
and that, though the sentences be theirs, yet the collection or
compiling them into this one Book, was the work of some other godly man,
that lived after them all.

Ecclesiastes And The Canticles
The Books of Ecclesiastes and the Canticles have nothing that
was not Solomons, except it be the Titles, or Inscriptions.
For "The Words of the Preacher, the Son of David, King in Jerusalem;"
and, "the Song of Songs, which is Solomon's," seem to have been made
for distinctions sake, then, when the Books of Scripture were gathered
into one body of the Law; to the end, that not the Doctrine only,
but the Authors also might be extant.

The Prophets
Of the Prophets, the most ancient, are Sophoniah, Jonas, Amos,
Hosea, Isaiah and Michaiah, who lived in the time of Amaziah,
and Azariah, otherwise Ozias, Kings of Judah.  But the Book of Jonas
is not properly a Register of his Prophecy, (for that is contained
in these few words, "Fourty dayes and Ninivy shall be destroyed,"
but a History or Narration of his frowardenesse and disputing
Gods commandements; so that there is small probability he should be
the Author, seeing he is the subject of it.  But the Book of Amos
is his Prophecy.

Jeremiah, Abdias, Nahum, and Habakkuk prophecyed in the time of Josiah.

Ezekiel, Daniel, Aggeus, and Zacharias, in the Captivity.

When Joel and Malachi prophecyed, is not evident by their Writings.
But considering the Inscriptions, or Titles of their Books, it is
manifest enough, that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament,
was set forth in the form we have it, after the return of
the Jews from their Captivity in Babylon, and before the time of
Ptolemaeus Philadelphus, that caused it to bee translated into Greek
by seventy men, which were sent him out of Judea for that purpose.
And if the Books of Apocrypha (which are recommended to us
by the Church, though not for Canonicall, yet for profitable Books
for our instruction) may in this point be credited, the Scripture
was set forth in the form wee have it in, by Esdras; as may appear
by that which he himself saith, in the second book, chapt. 14.
verse 21, 22, &c. where speaking to God, he saith thus, "Thy law
is burnt; therefore no man knoweth the things which thou has done,
or the works that are to begin.  But if I have found Grace before thee,
send down the holy Spirit into me, and I shall write all that hath
been done in the world, since the beginning, which were written in
thy Law, that men may find thy path, and that they which will live
in the later days, may live."  And verse 45. "And it came to passe
when the forty dayes were fulfilled, that the Highest spake, saying,
'The first that thou hast written, publish openly, that the worthy
and unworthy may read it; but keep the seventy last, that thou mayst
deliver them onely to such as be wise among the people.'"
And thus much concerning the time of the writing of the Bookes
of the Old Testament.

The New Testament
The Writers of the New Testament lived all in lesse then an age
after Christs Ascension, and had all of them seen our Saviour,
or been his Disciples, except St. Paul, and St. Luke; and
consequently whatsoever was written by them, is as ancient
as the time of the Apostles.  But the time wherein the Books
of the New Testament were received, and acknowledged by the Church
to be of their writing, is not altogether so ancient.  For, as the
Bookes of the Old Testament are derived to us, from no higher time
then that of Esdras, who by the direction of Gods Spirit retrived them,
when they were lost: Those of the New Testament, of which the copies
were not many, nor could easily be all in any one private mans hand,
cannot bee derived from a higher time, that that wherein the Governours
of the Church collected, approved, and recommended them to us, as the
writings of those Apostles and Disciples; under whose names they go.
The first enumeration of all the Bookes, both of the Old, and
New Testament, is in the Canons of the Apostles, supposed to be
collected by Clement the first (after St. Peter) Bishop of Rome.
But because that is but supposed, and by many questioned, the Councell
of Laodicea is the first we know, that recommended the Bible to
the then Christian Churches, for the Writings of the Prophets
and Apostles: and this Councell was held in the 364. yeer after Christ.
At which time, though ambition had so far prevailed on the great
Doctors of the Church, as no more to esteem Emperours, though Christian,
for the Shepherds of the people, but for Sheep; and Emperours not
Christian, for Wolves; and endeavoured to passe their Doctrine,
not for Counsell, and Information, as Preachers; but for Laws,
as absolute Governours; and thought such frauds as tended to make
the people the more obedient to Christian Doctrine, to be pious;
yet I am perswaded they did not therefore falsifie the Scriptures,
though the copies of the Books of the New Testament, were in the hands
only of the Ecclesiasticks; because if they had had an intention
so to doe, they would surely have made them more favorable to their
power over Christian Princes, and Civill Soveraignty, than they are.
I see not therefore any reason to doubt, but that the Old, and New
Testament, as we have them now, are the true Registers of those
things, which were done and said by the Prophets, and Apostles.
And so perhaps are some of those Books which are called Apocrypha,
if left out of the Canon, not for inconformity of Doctrine with
the rest, but only because they are not found in the Hebrew.
For after the conquest of Asia by Alexander the Great, there were
few learned Jews, that were not perfect in the Greek tongue.
For the seventy Interpreters that converted the Bible into Greek,
were all of them Hebrews; and we have extant the works of Philo
and Josephus both Jews, written by them eloquently in Greek.
But it is not the Writer, but the authority of the Church,
that maketh a Book Canonicall.

Their Scope
And although these Books were written by divers men, yet it is
manifest the Writers were all indued with one and the same Spirit,
in that they conspire to one and the same end, which is the
setting forth of the Rights of the Kingdome of God, the Father,
Son, and Holy Ghost.  For the Book of Genesis, deriveth the
Genealogy of Gods people, from the creation of the World,
to the going into Egypt: the other four Books of Moses, contain
the Election of God for their King, and the Laws which hee prescribed
for their Government: The Books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, and Samuel,
to the time of Saul, describe the acts of Gods people, till the time
they cast off Gods yoke, and called for a King, after the manner
of their neighbour nations; The rest of the History of the Old
Testament, derives the succession of the line of David, to the
Captivity, out of which line was to spring the restorer of
the Kingdome of God, even our blessed Saviour God the Son,
whose coming was foretold in the Bookes of the Prophets,
after whom the Evangelists writt his life, and actions, and his claim
to the Kingdome, whilst he lived one earth: and lastly, the Acts,
and Epistles of the Apostles, declare the coming of God, the Holy Ghost,
and the Authority he left with them, and their successors, for the
direction of the Jews, and for the invitation of the Gentiles.
In summe, the Histories and the Prophecies of the old Testament,
and the Gospels, and Epistles of the New Testament, have had one
and the same scope, to convert men to the obedience of God;
1. in Moses, and the Priests; 2. in the man Christ; and 3. in the
Apostles and the successors to Apostolicall power.  For these three
at several times did represent the person of God: Moses, and his
successors the High Priests, and Kings of Judah, in the Old Testament:
Christ himself, in the time he lived on earth: and the Apostles,
and their successors, from the day of Pentecost (when the Holy Ghost
descended on them) to this day.

The Question Of The Authority Of The Scriptures Stated.
It is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian
Religion, From Whence The Scriptures Derive Their Authority;
which question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as,
How Wee Know Them To Be The Word Of God, or, Why We Beleeve Them
To Be So: and the difficulty of resolving it, ariseth chiefly from
the impropernesse of the words wherein the question it self is couched.
For it is beleeved on all hands, that the first and originall Author
of them is God; and consequently the question disputed, is not that.
Again, it is manifest, that none can know they are Gods Word,
(though all true Christians beleeve it,) but those to whom God himself
hath revealed it supernaturally; and therefore the question is not
rightly moved, of our Knowledge of it.  Lastly, when the question
is propounded of our Beleefe; because some are moved to beleeve for one,
and others for other reasons, there can be rendred no one generall
answer for them all.  The question truly stated is, By What Authority
They Are Made Law.

Their Authority And Interpretation
As far as they differ not from the Laws of Nature, there is no doubt,
but they are the Law of God, and carry their Authority with them,
legible to all men that have the use of naturall reason: but this is
no other Authority, then that of all other Morall Doctrine consonant
to Reason; the Dictates whereof are Laws, not Made, but Eternall.

If they be made Law by God himselfe, they are of the nature of
written Law, which are Laws to them only to whom God hath so
sufficiently published them, as no man can excuse himself, by saying,
he know not they were his.

He therefore, to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed, that they
are his, nor that those that published them, were sent by him,
is not obliged to obey them, by any Authority, but his, whose Commands
have already the force of Laws; that is to say, by any other Authority,
then that of the Common-wealth, residing in the Soveraign, who only
has the Legislative power.  Again, if it be not the Legislative Authority
of the Common-wealth, that giveth them the force of Laws, it must bee
some other Authority derived from God, either private, or publique:
if private, it obliges onely him, to whom in particular God hath been
pleased to reveale it.  For if every man should be obliged, to take
for Gods Law, what particular men, on pretence of private Inspiration,
or Revelation, should obtrude upon him, (in such a number of men,
that out of pride, and ignorance, take their own Dreams, and
extravagant Fancies, and Madnesse, for testimonies of Gods Spirit;
or out of ambition, pretend to such Divine testimonies, falsely,
and contrary to their own consciences,) it were impossible that
any Divine Law should be acknowledged.  If publique, it is the
Authority of the Common-wealth, or of the Church.  But the Church,
if it be one person, is the same thing with a Common-wealth
of Christians; called a Common-wealth, because it consisteth of men
united in one person, their Soveraign; and a Church, because it
consisteth in Christian men, united in one Christian Soveraign.
But if the Church be not one person, then it hath no authority at all;
it can neither command, nor doe any action at all; nor is capable of
having any power, or right to any thing; nor has any Will, Reason,
nor Voice; for all these qualities are personall.  Now if the whole
number of Christians be not contained in one Common-wealth, they
are not one person; nor is there an Universall Church that hath
any authority over them; and therefore the Scriptures are not made Laws,
by the Universall Church: or if it bee one Common-wealth, then all
Christian Monarchs, and States are private persons, and subject
to bee judged, deposed, and punished by an Universall Soveraigne
of all Christendome.  So that the question of the Authority of
the Scriptures is reduced to this, "Whether Christian Kings, and
the Soveraigne Assemblies in Christian Common-wealths, be absolute
in their own Territories, immediately under God; or subject to one
Vicar of Christ, constituted over the Universall Church; to bee judged,
condemned, deposed, and put to death, as hee shall think expedient,
or necessary for the common good."

Which question cannot bee resolved, without a more particular
consideration of the Kingdome of God; from whence also, wee are
to judge of the Authority of Interpreting the Scripture.
For, whosoever hath a lawfull power over any Writing, to make it Law,
hath the power also to approve, or disapprove the interpretation
of the same.



CHAPTER XXXIV

OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF SPIRIT, ANGEL, AND INSPIRATION
IN THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE


Body And Spirit How Taken In The Scripture
Seeing the foundation of all true Ratiocination, is the constant
Signification of words; which in the Doctrine following, dependeth not
(as in naturall science) on the Will of the Writer, nor (as in common
conversation) on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in
the Scripture; It is necessary, before I proceed any further,
to determine, out of the Bible, the meaning of such words,
as by their ambiguity, may render what I am to inferre upon them,
obscure, or disputable.  I will begin with the words BODY, and SPIRIT,
which in the language of the Schools are termed, Substances,
Corporeall, and Incorporeall.

The Word Body, in the most generall acceptation, signifieth that
which filleth, or occupyeth some certain room, or imagined place;
and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a reall part of that
we call the Universe.  For the Universe, being the Aggregate of
all Bodies, there is no reall part thereof that is not also Body;
nor any thing properly a Body, that is not also part of (that
Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe.  The same also, because
Bodies are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of apparence
to the sense of living creatures, is called Substance, that is to say,
Subject, to various accidents, as sometimes to be Moved, sometimes
to stand Still; and to seem to our senses sometimes Hot, sometimes Cold,
sometimes of one Colour, Smel, Tast, or Sound, somtimes of another.
And this diversity of Seeming, (produced by the diversity of the
operation of bodies, on the organs of our sense) we attribute to
alterations of the Bodies that operate, & call them Accidents
of those Bodies.  And according to this acceptation of the word,
Substance and Body, signifie the same thing; and therefore
Substance Incorporeall are words, which when they are joined together,
destroy one another, as if a man should say, an Incorporeall Body.

But in the sense of common people, not all the Universe is called Body,
but only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of Feeling,
to resist their force, or by the sense of their Eyes, to hinder them
from a farther prospect.  Therefore in the common language of men,
Aire, and Aeriall Substances, use not to be taken for Bodies, but
(as often as men are sensible of their effects) are called Wind, or
Breath, or (because the some are called in the Latine Spiritus) Spirits;
as when they call that aeriall substance, which in the body of any
living creature, gives it life and motion, Vitall and Animall Spirits.
But for those Idols of the brain, which represent Bodies to us,
where they are not, as in a Looking-glasse, in a Dream, or to a
Distempered brain waking, they are (as the Apostle saith generally
of all Idols) nothing; Nothing at all, I say, there where they
seem to bee; and in the brain it self, nothing but tumult,
proceeding either from the action of the objects, or from the
disorderly agitation of the Organs of our Sense.  And men, that are
otherwise imployed, then to search into their causes, know not of
themselves, what to call them; and may therefore easily be perswaded,
by those whose knowledge they much reverence, some to call them Bodies,
and think them made of aire compacted by a power supernaturall,
because the sight judges them corporeall; and some to call them Spirits,
because the sense of Touch discerneth nothing in the place where
they appear, to resist their fingers: So that the proper signification
of Spirit in common speech, is either a subtile, fluid, and invisible
Body, or a Ghost, or other Idol or Phantasme of the Imagination.
But for metaphoricall significations, there be many: for sometimes
it is taken for Disposition or Inclination of the mind; as when
for the disposition to controwl the sayings of other men, we say,
A Spirit Contradiction; For A Disposition to Uncleannesse, An Unclean
Spirit; for Perversenesse, A Froward Spirit; for Sullennesse, A Dumb
Spirit, and for Inclination To Godlinesse, And Gods Service,
the Spirit of God: sometimes for any eminent ability, or extraordinary
passion, or disease of the mind, as when Great Wisdome is called
the Spirit Of Wisdome; and Mad Men are said to be Possessed With A Spirit.

Other signification of Spirit I find no where any; and where none
of these can satisfie the sense of that word in Scripture,
the place falleth not under humane Understanding; and our Faith
therein consisteth not in our Opinion, but in our Submission;
as in all places where God is said to be a Spirit; or where by the
Spirit of God, is meant God himselfe.  For the nature of God
is incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of
What He Is, but only That He Is; and therefore the Attributes
we give him, are not to tell one another, What He Is, Nor to
signifie our opinion of his Nature, but our desire to honor him
with such names as we conceive most honorable amongst our selves.

The Spirit Of God Taken In The Scripture
Sometimes For A Wind, Or Breath
Gen. 1. 2. "The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters."
Here if by the Spirit of God be meant God himself, then is Motion
attributed to God, and consequently Place, which are intelligible
only of Bodies, and not of substances incorporeall; and so the place
is above our understanding, that can conceive nothing moved that
changes not place, or that has not dimension; and whatsoever has
dimension, is Body.  But the meaning of those words is best
understood by the like place, Gen. 8. 1.  Where when the earth
was covered with Waters, as in the beginning, God intending to
abate them, and again to discover the dry land, useth like words,
"I will bring my Spirit upon the Earth, and the waters shall be
diminished:" in which place by Spirit is understood a Wind,
(that is an Aire or Spirit Moved,) which might be called
(as in the former place) the Spirit of God, because it was Gods Work.

Secondly, For Extraordinary Gifts Of The Understanding
Gen. 41. 38. Pharaoh calleth the Wisdome of Joseph, the Spirit of God.
For Joseph having advised him to look out a wise and discreet man,
and to set him over the land of Egypt, he saith thus, "Can we find
such a man as this is, in whom is the Spirit of God?" and Exod. 28.3.
"Thou shalt speak (saith God) to all that are wise hearted,
whom I have filled with the Spirit of Wisdome, to make Aaron Garments,
to consecrate him."  Where extraordinary Understanding, though but in
making Garments, as being the Gift of God, is called the Spirit of God.
The same is found again, Exod. 31.3,4,5,6. and 35.31.  And Isaiah 11.2,3.
where the Prophet speaking of the Messiah, saith, "The Spirit of
the Lord shall abide upon him, the Spirit of wisdome and understanding,
the Spirit of counsell, and fortitude; and the Spirit of the fear
of the Lord."  Where manifestly is meant, not so many Ghosts,
but so many eminent Graces that God would give him.

Thirdly, For Extraordinary Affections
In the Book of Judges, an extraordinary Zeal, and Courage in the
defence of Gods people, is called the Spirit of God; as when it
excited Othoniel, Gideon, Jeptha, and Samson to deliver them
from servitude, Judg. 3.10. 6.34. 11.29. 13.25. 14.6,19.  And of Saul,
upon the newes of the insolence of the Ammonites towards the men
of Jabeth Gilead, it is said (1 Sam.11.6.) that "The Spirit of God
came upon Saul, and his Anger (or, as it is in the Latine, His Fury)
was kindled greatly."  Where it is not probable was meant a Ghost,
but an extraordinary Zeal to punish the cruelty of the Ammonites.
In like manner by the Spirit of God, that came upon Saul, when hee
was amongst the Prophets that praised God in Songs, and Musick
(1 Sam.19.20.) is to be understood, not a Ghost, but an unexpected
and sudden Zeal to join with them in their devotions.

Fourthly, For The Gift Of Prediction
By Dreams And Visions.
The false Prophet Zedekiah, saith to Micaiah (1 Kings 22.24.)
"Which way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to thee?"
Which cannot be understood of a Ghost; for Micaiah declared before
the Kings of Israel and Judah, the event of the battle, as from
a Vision, and not as from a Spirit, speaking in him.

In the same manner it appeareth, in the Books of the Prophets,
that though they spake by the Spirit of God, that is to say,
by a speciall grace of Prediction; yet their knowledge of the future,
was not by a Ghost within them, but by some supernaturall Dream or Vision.

Fiftly, For Life
Gen. 2.7. It is said, "God made man of the dust of the Earth,
and breathed into his nostrills (spiraculum vitae) the breath of life,
and man was made a living soul.  There the Breath of Life inspired
by God, signifies no more, but that God gave him life; And (Job 27.3.)
"as long as the Spirit of God is in my nostrils;" is no more then to say,
"as long as I live."  So in Ezek. 1.20. "the Spirit of life was
in the wheels," is equivalent to, "the wheels were alive."
And (Ezek. 2.30.) "the spirit entred into me, and set me on my feet,"
that is, "I recovered my vitall strength;" not that any Ghost,
or incorporeal substance entred into, and possessed his body.

Sixtly, For A Subordination To Authority
In the 11 chap. of Numbers. verse 17. "I will take (saith God)
of the Spirit, which is upon thee, and will put it upon them,
and they shall bear the burthen of the people with thee;"
that is, upon the seventy Elders: whereupon two of the seventy
are said to prophecy in the campe; of whom some complained,
and Joshua desired Moses to forbid them; which Moses would not doe.
Whereby it appears; that Joshua knew not they had received authority
so to do, and prophecyed according to the mind of Moses, that is to say,
by a Spirit, or Authority subordinate to his own.

In the like sense we read (Deut. 34.9.) that "Joshua was full
of the Spirit of wisdome, because Moses had laid his hands upon him:
that is, because he was Ordained by Moses, to prosecute the work
hee had himselfe begun, (namely, the bringing of Gods people into
the promised land), but prevented by death, could not finish.

In the like sense it is said, (Rom. 8.9.)  "If any man have not
the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his: not meaning thereby the
Ghost of Christ, but a Submission to his Doctrine.  As also
(1 John 4.2.) "Hereby you shall know the Spirit of God; Every Spirit
that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God;"
by which is meant the Spirit of unfained Christianity, or Submission
to that main Article of Christian faith, that Jesus is the Christ;
which cannot be interpreted of a Ghost.

Likewise these words (Luke 4.1.) "And Jesus full of the Holy Ghost"
(that is, as it is exprest, Mat. 4.1. and Mar. 1.12. "of the Holy
Spirit",) may be understood, for Zeal to doe the work for which hee
was sent by God the Father: but to interpret it of a Ghost,
is to say, that God himselfe (for so our Saviour was,) was
filled with God; which is very unproper, and unsignificant.
How we came to translate Spirits, by the word Ghosts, which
signifieth nothing, neither in heaven, nor earth, but the Imaginary
inhabitants of mans brain, I examine not: but this I say, the word
Spirit in the text signifieth no such thing; but either properly
a reall Substance, or Metaphorically, some extraordinary Ability
of Affection of the Mind, or of the Body.

Seventhly, For Aeriall Bodies
The Disciples of Christ, seeing him walking upon the sea, (Mat. 14.26.
and Marke 6.49.) supposed him to be a Spirit, meaning thereby an
Aeriall Body, and not a Phantasme: for it is said, they all saw him;
which cannot be understood of the delusions of the brain, (which are
not common to many at once, as visible Bodies are; but singular,
because of the differences of Fancies), but of Bodies only.
In like manner, where he was taken for a Spirit, by the same Apostles
(Luke 24.3,7.): So also (Acts 12.15) when St. Peter was delivered out
of Prison, it would not be beleeved; but when the Maid said he was
at the dore, they said it was his Angel; by which must be meant
a corporeall substance, or we must say, the Disciples themselves
did follow the common opinion of both Jews and Gentiles, that some
such apparitions were not Imaginary, but Reall; and such as needed
not the fancy of man for their Existence: These the Jews called
Spirits, and Angels, Good or Bad; as the Greeks called the same
by the name of Daemons.  And some such apparitions may be reall,
and substantiall; that is to say, subtile Bodies, which God can form
by the same power, by which he formed all things, and make use of,
as of Ministers, and Messengers (that is to say, Angels) to declare
his will, and execute the same when he pleaseth, in extraordinary
and supernaturall manner.  But when hee hath so formed them they
are Substances, endued with dimensions, and take up roome, and can be
moved from place to place, which is peculiar to Bodies; and therefore
are not Ghosts Incorporeall, that is to say, Ghosts that are in No Place;
that is to say, that are No Where; that is to say, that seeming to be
Somewhat, are Nothing.  But if corporeall be taken in the most vulgar
manner, for such Substances as are perceptible by our externall Senses;
then is Substance Incorporeall, a thing not Imaginary, but Reall;
namely, a thin Substance Invisible, but that hath the same dimensions
that are in grosser Bodies.

Angel What
By the name of ANGEL, is signified generally, a Messenger;
and most often, a Messenger of God: And by a Messenger of God,
is signified, any thing that makes known his extraordinary Presence;
that is to say, the extraordinary manifestation of his power,
especially by a Dream, or Vision.

Concerning the creation of Angels, there is nothing delivered
in the Scriptures.  That they are Spirits, is often repeated:
but by the name of Spirit, is signified both in Scripture,
and vulgarly, both amongst Jews, and Gentiles, sometimes thin Bodies;
as the Aire, the Wind, the Spirits Vitall, and Animall, of living
creatures; and sometimes the Images that rise in the fancy in Dreams,
and Visions; which are not reall Substances, but accidents of the brain;
yet when God raiseth them supernaturally, to signifie his Will, they
are not unproperly termed Gods Messengers, that is to say, his Angels.

And as the Gentiles did vulgarly conceive the Imagery of the brain,
for things really subsistent without them, and not dependent on
the fancy; and out of them framed their opinions of Daemons,
Good and Evill; which because they seemed to subsist really,
they called Substances; and because they could not feel them
with their hands, Incorporeall: so also the Jews upon the same ground,
without any thing in the Old Testament that constrained them thereunto,
had generally an opinion, (except the sect of the Sadduces,) that
those apparitions (which it pleased God sometimes to produce
in the fancie of men, for his own service, and therefore called
them his Angels) were substances, not dependent on the fancy,
but permanent creatures of God; whereof those which they thought
were good to them, they esteemed the Angels of God, and those
they thought would hurt them, they called Evill Angels, or Evill
Spirits; such as was the Spirit of Python, and the Spirits of Mad-men,
of Lunatiques, and Epileptiques: For they esteemed such as were
troubled with such diseases, Daemoniaques.

But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where Angels
are mentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, there can
nothing else be understood by the word Angel, but some image raised
(supernaturally) in the fancy, to signifie the presence of God
in the execution of some supernaturall work; and therefore in the rest,
where their nature is not exprest, it may be understood in the same manner.

For we read Gen. 16. that the same apparition is called, not onely
an Angel, but God; where that which (verse 7.) is called the Angel
of the Lord, in the tenth verse, saith to Agar, "I will multiply
thy seed exceedingly;" that is, speaketh in the person of God.
Neither was this apparition a Fancy figured, but a Voice.
By which it is manifest, that Angel signifieth there, nothing but
God himself, that caused Agar supernaturally to apprehend a voice
supernaturall, testifying Gods speciall presence there.  Why therefore
may not the Angels that appeared to Lot, and are called Gen. 19.13. Men;
and to whom, though they were but two, Lot speaketh (ver. 18.) as but one,
and that one, as God, (for the words are, "Lot said unto them,
Oh not so my Lord") be understood of images of men, supernaturally
formed in the Fancy; as well as before by Angel was understood
a fancyed Voice?  When the Angel called to Abraham out of heaven,
to stay his hand (Gen. 22.11.) from slaying Isaac, there was
no Apparition, but a Voice; which neverthelesse was called properly
enough a Messenger, or Angel of God, because it declared Gods will
supernaturally, and saves the labour of supposing any permanent Ghosts.
The Angels which Jacob saw on the Ladder of Heaven (Gen. 28.12.)
were a Vision of his sleep; therefore onely Fancy, and a Dream;
yet being supernaturall, and signs of Gods Speciall presence,
those apparitions are not improperly called Angels.  The same is to be
understood (Gen.31.11.) where Jacob saith thus, "The Angel of the Lord
appeared to mee in my sleep."  For an apparition made to a man in
his sleep, is that which all men call a Dreame, whether such Dreame
be naturall, or supernaturall: and that which there Jacob calleth
an Angel, was God himselfe; for the same Angel saith (verse 13.)
"I am the God of Bethel."

Also (Exod.14.9.) the Angel that went before the Army of Israel to
the Red Sea, and then came behind it, is (verse 19.) the Lord himself;
and he appeared not in the form of a beautifull man, but in form (by day)
of a Pillar Of Cloud and (by night) in form of a Pillar Of Fire;
and yet this Pillar was all the apparition, and Angel promised
to Moses (Exod. 14.9.) for the Armies guide: For this cloudy pillar,
is said, to have descended, and stood at the dore of the Tabernacle,
and to have talked with Moses.

There you see Motion, and Speech, which are commonly attributed
to Angels, attributed to a Cloud, because the Cloud served as a sign
of Gods presence; and was no lesse an Angel, then if it had had
the form of a Man, or Child of never so great beauty; or Wings,
as usually they are painted, for the false instruction of common people.
For it is not the shape; but their use, that makes them Angels.
But their use is to be significations of Gods presence in
supernaturall operations; As when Moses (Exod. 33.14.) had desired
God to goe along with the Campe, (as he had done alwaies before
the making of the Golden Calfe,) God did not answer, "I will goe,"
nor "I will send an Angel in my stead;" but thus, "my presence
shall goe with thee."

To mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name
of Angel is found, would be too long.  Therefore to comprehend
them all at once, I say, there is no text in that part of the
Old Testament, which the Church of England holdeth for Canonicall,
from which we can conclude, there is, or hath been created,
any permanent thing (understood by the name of Spirit or Angel,)
that hath not quantity; and that may not be, by the understanding divided;
that is to say, considered by parts; so as one part may bee in one place,
and the next part in the next place to it; and, in summe, which is not
(taking Body for that, which is some what, or some where) Corporeall;
but in every place, the sense will bear the interpretation of Angel,
for Messenger; as John Baptist is called an Angel, and Christ the
Angel of the Covenant; and as (according to the same Analogy) the Dove,
and the Fiery Tongues, in that they were signes of Gods speciall presence,
might also be called Angels.  Though we find in Daniel two names
of Angels, Gabriel, and Michael; yet is cleer out of the text it selfe,
(Dan. 12.1) that by Michael is meant Christ, not as an Angel,
but as a Prince: and that Gabriel (as the like apparitions made
to other holy men in their sleep) was nothing but a supernaturall
phantasme, by which it seemed to Daniel, in his dream, that two Saints
being in talke, one of them said to the other, "Gabriel, let us make
this man understand his Vision:" For God needeth not, to distinguish
his Celestiall servants by names, which are usefull onely to
the short memories of Mortalls.  Nor in the New Testament is there
any place, out of which it can be proved, that Angels (except when
they are put for such men, as God hath made the Messengers,
and Ministers of his word, or works) are things permanent,
and withall incorporeall.  That they are permanent, may bee gathered
from the words of our Saviour himselfe, (Mat. 25.41.) where he saith,
it shall be said to the wicked in the last day, "Go ye cursed into
everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels:" which place
is manifest for the permanence of Evill Angels, (unlesse wee might
think the name of Devill and his Angels may be understood of the
Churches Adversaries and their Ministers;) but then it is repugnant
to their Immateriality; because Everlasting fire is no punishment
to impatible substances, such as are all things Incorporeall.
Angels therefore are not thence proved to be Incorporeall.
In like manner where St. Paul sayes (1 Cor. 6.3.) "Knew ye not
that wee shall judge the Angels?" And (2 Pet. 2.4.) " For if God
spared not the Angels that sinned, but cast them down into Hell."
And (Jude 1,6.) "And the Angels that kept not their first estate,
but left their owne habitation, hee hath reserved in everlasting
chaines under darknesse unto the Judgement of the last day;" though
it prove the Permanence of Angelicall nature, it confirmeth also
their Materiality.  And (Mat. 22.30.) In the resurrection men doe
neither marry, nor give in marriage, but are as the Angels of God
in heaven:" but in the resurrection men shall be Permanent,
and not Incorporeall; so therefore also are the Angels.

There be divers other places out of which may be drawn the
like conclusion.  To men that understand the signification
of these words, Substance, and Incorporeall; as Incorporeall
is taken not for subtile body, but for Not Body, they imply
a contradiction: insomuch as to say, an Angel, or Spirit is
(in that sense) an Incorporeall Substance, is to say in effect,
there is no Angel nor Spirit at all.  Considering therefore the
signification of the word Angel in the Old Testament, and the nature
of Dreams and Visions that happen to men by the ordinary way of Nature;
I was enclined to this opinion, that Angels were nothing but
supernaturall apparitions of the Fancy, raised by the speciall
and extraordinary operation of God, thereby to make his presence
and commandements known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people.
But the many places of the New Testament, and our Saviours own words,
and in such texts, wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture,
have extorted from my feeble Reason, an acknowledgement, and beleef,
that there be also Angels substantiall, and permanent.  But to beleeve
they be in no place, that is to say, no where, that is to say, nothing,
as they (though indirectly) say, that will have them Incorporeall,
cannot by Scripture bee evinced.

Inspiration What
On the signification of the word Spirit, dependeth that of
the word INSPIRATION; which must either be taken properly;
and then it is nothing but the blowing into a man some thin
and subtile aire, or wind, in such manner as a man filleth a bladder
with his breath; or if Spirits be not corporeal, but have their
existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but the blowing in
of a Phantasme; which is improper to say, and impossible;
for Phantasmes are not, but only seem to be somewhat.  That word
therefore is used in the Scripture metaphorically onely: As (Gen. 2.7.)
where it is said, that God Inspired into man the breath of life,
no more is meant, then that God gave unto him vitall motion.
For we are not to think that God made first a living breath,
and then blew it into Adam after he was made, whether that breath
were reall, or seeming; but only as it is (Acts 17.25.) "that he gave
him life and breath;" that is, made him a living creature.
And where it is said (2 Tim. 3.16.) "all Scripture is given
by Inspiration from God," speaking there of the Scripture of the
Old Testament, it is an easie metaphor, to signifie, that God enclined
the spirit or mind of those Writers, to write that which should
be usefull, in teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing men
in the way of righteous living.  But where St. Peter (2 Pet. 1.21.)
saith, that "Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man,
but the holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit,"
by the Holy Spirit, is meant the voice of God in a Dream, or Vision
supernaturall, which is not Inspiration; Nor when our Saviour breathing
on his Disciples, said, "Receive the Holy Spirit," was that Breath
the Spirit, but a sign of the spirituall graces he gave unto them.
And though it be said of many, and of our Saviour himself, that he was
full of the Holy Spirit; yet that Fulnesse is not to be understood
for Infusion of the substance of God, but for accumulation of his gifts,
such as are the gift of sanctity of life, of tongues, and the like,
whether attained supernaturally, or by study and industry; for in all
cases they are the gifts of God.  So likewise where God sayes
(Joel 2.28.) "I will powre out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your Sons
and your Daughters shall prophecy, your Old men shall dream Dreams,
and your Young men shall see Visions," wee are not to understand it
in the proper sense, as if his Spirit were like water, subject to
effusion, or infusion; but as if God had promised to give them
Propheticall Dreams, and Visions.  For the proper use of the word
Infused, in speaking of the graces of God, is an abuse of it;
for those graces are Vertues, not Bodies to be carryed hither and
thither, and to be powred into men, as into barrels.

In the same manner, to take Inspiration in the proper sense,
or to say that Good Spirits entred into men to make them prophecy,
or Evill Spirits into those that became Phrenetique, Lunatique,
or Epileptique, is not to take the word in the sense of the Scripture;
for the Spirit there is taken for the power of God, working by causes
to us unknown.  As also (Acts 2.2.) the wind, that is there said
to fill the house wherein the Apostles were assembled on the
day of Pentecost, is not to be understood for the Holy Spirit,
which is the Deity it self; but for an Externall sign of Gods
speciall working on their hearts, to effect in them the internall
graces, and holy vertues hee thought requisite for the performance
of their Apostleship.



CHAPTER XXXV

OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF KINGDOME OF GOD,
OF HOLY, SACRED, AND SACRAMENT


The Kingdom Of God Taken By Divines Metaphorically
But In The Scriptures Properly
The Kingdome of God in the Writings of Divines, and specially in Sermons,
and Treatises of Devotion, is taken most commonly for Eternall Felicity,
after this life, in the Highest Heaven, which they also call the
Kingdome of Glory; and sometimes for (the earnest of that felicity)
Sanctification, which they terme the Kingdome of Grace, but never
for the Monarchy, that is to say, the Soveraign Power of God over
any Subjects acquired by their own consent, which is the proper
signification of Kingdome.

To the contrary, I find the KINGDOME OF GOD, to signifie in most places
of Scripture, a Kingdome Properly So Named, constituted by the Votes
of the People of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose God
for their King by Covenant made with him, upon Gods promising them
the possession of the land of Canaan; and but seldom metaphorically;
and then it is taken for Dominion Over Sinne; (and only in the
New Testament;) because such a Dominion as that, every Subject
shall have in the Kingdome of God, and without prejudice to the Soveraign.

From the very Creation, God not only reigned over all men Naturally
by his might; but also had Peculiar Subjects, whom he commanded by
a Voice, as one man speaketh to another.  In which manner he Reigned
over Adam, and gave him commandement to abstaine from the tree of
cognizance of Good and Evill; which when he obeyed not, but tasting
thereof, took upon him to be as God, judging between Good and Evill,
not by his Creators commandement, but by his own sense, his punishment
was a privation of the estate of Eternall life, wherein God had
at first created him: And afterwards God punished his posterity,
for their vices, all but eight persons, with an universall deluge;
And in these eight did consist the then Kingdome Of God.

The Originall Of The Kingdome Of God
After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and (Gen. 17.7,8.)
to make a Covenant with him in these words, "I will establish
my Covenant between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee
in their generations, for an everlasting Covenant, to be a God to thee,
and to thy seed after thee; And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed
after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land
of Canaan for an everlasting possession."  And for a memoriall,
and a token of this Covenant, he ordaineth (verse 11.) the Sacrament
of Circumcision.  This is it which is called the Old Covenant,
or Testament; and containeth a Contract between God and Abraham;
by which Abraham obligeth himself, and his posterity, in a peculiar
manner to be subject to Gods positive Law; for to the Law Morall
he was obliged before, as by an Oath of Allegiance.  And though
the name of King be not yet given to God, nor of Kingdome to Abraham
and his seed; yet the thing is the same; namely, an Institution by pact,
of Gods peculiar Soveraignty over the seed of Abraham; which in
the renewing of the same Covenant by Moses, at Mount Sinai,
is expressely called a peculiar Kingdome of God over the Jews:
and it is of Abraham (not of Moses) St. Paul saith (Rom. 4.11.)
that he is the "Father of the Faithfull," that is, of those that
are loyall, and doe not violate their Allegiance sworn to God,
then by Circumcision, and afterwards in the New Covenant by Baptisme.

That The Kingdome Of God Is Properly
His Civill Soveraignty Over A Peculiar People By Pact
This Covenant, at the Foot of Mount Sinai, was renewed by Moses
(Exod. 19.5.) where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people
in this manner, "If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my Covenant,
then yee shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the Earth is mine;
and yee shall be unto me a Sacerdotall Kingdome, and an holy Nation."
For a "Peculiar people" the vulgar Latine hath, Peculium De
Cunctis Populis: the English translation made in the beginning of
the Reign of King James, hath, a "Peculiar treasure unto me
above all Nations;" and the Geneva French, "the most precious Jewel
of all Nations."   But the truest Translation is the first,
because it is confirmed by St. Paul himself (Tit. 2.14.) where he saith,
alluding to that place, that our blessed Saviour "gave himself for us,
that he might purifie us to himself, a peculiar (that is,
an extraordinary) people:" for the word is in the Greek periousios,
which is opposed commonly to the word epiousios: and as this signifieth
Ordinary, Quotidian, or (as in the Lords Prayer) Of Daily Use;
so the other signifieth that which is Overplus, and Stored Up,
and Enjoyed In A Speciall Manner; which the Latines call Peculium;
and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason God
rendereth of it, which followeth immediately, in that he addeth,
"For all the Earth is mine," as if he should say, "All the Nations
of the world are mine;" but it is not so that you are mine,
but in a Speciall Manner: For they are all mine, by reason of my Power;
but you shall be mine, by your own Consent, and Covenant; which is
an addition to his ordinary title, to all nations.

The same is again confirmed in expresse words in the same Text,
"Yee shall be to me a Sacerdotall Kingdome, and an holy Nation."
The Vulgar Latine hath it, Regnum Sacerdotale, to which agreeth
the Translation of that place (1 Pet. 2.9.) Sacerdotium Regale,
A Regal Priesthood; as also the Institution it self, by which no man
might enter into the Sanctum Sanctorum, that is to say, no man
might enquire Gods will immediately of God himselfe, but onely
the High Priest.  The English Translation before mentioned,
following that of Geneva, has, "a Kingdome of Priests;" which is
either meant of the succession of one High Priest after another,
or else it accordeth not with St. Peter, nor with the exercise
of the High Priesthood; For there was never any but the High Priest
onely, that was to informe the People of Gods Will; nor any Convocation
of Priests ever allowed to enter into the Sanctum Sanctorum.

Again, the title of a Holy Nation confirmes the same: For Holy
signifies, that which is Gods by speciall, not by generall Right.
All the Earth (as is said in the text) is Gods; but all the Earth
is not called Holy, but that onely which is set apart for his
especiall service, as was the Nation of the Jews.  It is therefore
manifest enough by this one place, that by the Kingdome of God,
is properly meant a Common-wealth, instituted (by the consent of those
which were to be subject thereto) for their Civill Government,
and the regulating of their behaviour, not onely towards God their King,
but also towards one another in point of justice, and towards
other Nations both in peace and warre; which properly was a Kingdome,
wherein God was King, and the High priest was to be (after the death
of Moses) his sole Viceroy, or Lieutenant.

But there be many other places that clearly prove the same.
As first (1 Sam. 8.7.) when the Elders of Israel (grieved with
the corruption of the Sons of Samuel) demanded a King, Samuel displeased
therewith, prayed unto the Lord; and the Lord answering said unto him,
"Hearken unto the voice of the People, for they have not rejected thee,
but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them."
Out of which it is evident, that God himself was then their King;
and Samuel did not command the people, but only delivered to them
that which God from time to time appointed him.

Again, (1 Sam. 12.12.) where Samuel saith to the People, "When yee
saw that Nahash King of the Children of Ammon came against you,
ye said unto me, Nay, but a King shall reign over us, when the
Lord your God was your King:" It is manifest that God was their King,
and governed the Civill State of their Common-wealth.

And after the Israelites had rejected God, the Prophets did
foretell his restitution; as (Isaiah 24.23.) "Then the Moon shall
be confounded, and the Sun ashamed when the Lord of Hosts shall
reign in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem;" where he speaketh
expressely of his Reign in Zion, and Jerusalem; that is, on Earth.
And (Micah 4.7.) "And the Lord shall reign over them in Mount Zion:"
This Mount Zion is in Jerusalem upon the Earth.  And (Ezek. 20.33.)
"As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand,
and a stretched out arme, and with fury powred out, I wil rule over you;
and (verse 37.) I will cause you to passe under the rod, and I will
bring you into the bond of the Covenant;" that is, I will reign over you,
and make you to stand to that Covenant which you made with me by Moses,
and brake in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel,
and in your election of another King.

And in the New testament, the Angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour
(Luke 1.32,33) "He shall be great, and be called the Son of the
Most High, and the Lord shall give him the throne of his Father David;
and he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his Kingdome
there shall be no end."  This is also a Kingdome upon Earth;
for the claim whereof, as an enemy to Caesar, he was put to death;
the title of his crosse, was, Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews;
hee was crowned in scorn with a crown of Thornes; and for the
proclaiming of him, it is said of the Disciples (Acts 17.7.)
"That they did all of them contrary to the decrees of Caesar,
saying there was another King, one Jesus.  The Kingdome therefore
of God, is a reall, not a metaphoricall Kingdome; and so taken,
not onely in the Old Testament, but the New; when we say,
"For thine is the Kingdome, the Power, and Glory," it is to be
understood of Gods Kingdome, by force of our Covenant, not by
the Right of Gods Power; for such a Kingdome God alwaies hath;
so that it were superfluous to say in our prayer, "Thy Kingdome come,"
unlesse it be meant of the Restauration of that Kingdome of God
by Christ, which by revolt of the Israelites had been interrupted
in the election of Saul.  Nor had it been proper to say,
"The Kingdome of Heaven is at hand," or to pray, "Thy Kingdome come,"
if it had still continued.

There be so many other places that confirm this interpretation,
that it were a wonder there is no greater notice taken of it,
but that it gives too much light to Christian Kings to see their
right of Ecclesiastical Government.  This they have observed,
that in stead of a Sacerdotall Kingdome, translate, a Kingdome
of Priests: for they may as well translate a Royall Priesthood,
(as it is in St. Peter) into a Priesthood of Kings.  And whereas,
for a Peculiar People, they put a Pretious Jewel, or Treasure,
a man might as well call the speciall Regiment, or Company
of a Generall, the Generalls pretious Jewel, or his Treasure.

In short, the Kingdome of God is a Civill Kingdome; which consisted,
first in the obligation of the people of Israel to those Laws,
which Moses should bring unto them from Mount Sinai; and which
afterwards the High Priest of the time being, should deliver
to them from before the Cherubins in the Sanctum Sanctorum;
and which kingdome having been cast off, in the election of Saul,
the Prophets foretold, should be restored by Christ; and the
Restauration whereof we daily pray for, when we say in the
Lords Prayer, "Thy Kingdome come;" and the Right whereof we
acknowledge, when we adde, "For thine is the Kingdome, the Power,
and Glory, for ever and ever, Amen;" and the Proclaiming whereof,
was the Preaching of the Apostles; and to which men are prepared,
by the Teachers of the Gospel; to embrace which Gospel, (that is to say,
to promise obedience to Gods government) is, to bee in the Kingdome
of Grace, because God hath gratis given to such the power to bee
the subjects (that is, Children) of God hereafter, when Christ
shall come in Majesty to judge the world, and actually to
govern his owne people, which is called the Kingdome of Glory.
If the Kingdome of God (called also the Kingdome of Heaven,
from the gloriousnesse, and admirable height of that throne)
were not a Kingdome which God by his Lieutenant, or Vicars,
who deliver his Commandements to the people, did exercise on Earth;
there would not have been so much contention, and warre, about who
it is, by whom God speaketh to us; neither would many Priests
have troubled themselves with Spirituall Jurisdiction, nor any King
have denied it them.

Out of this literall interpretation of the Kingdome of God, ariseth
also the true interpretation of the word HOLY.  For it is a word,
which in Gods Kingdome answereth to that, which men in their Kingdomes
use to call Publique, or the Kings.

The King of any Countrey is the Publique Person, or Representative
of all his own Subjects.  And God the King of Israel was the
Holy One of Israel.  The Nation which is subject to one earthly
Soveraign, is the Nation of that Soveraign, that is, of the
Publique Person.  So the Jews, who were Gods Nation, were called
(Exod. 19.6.) "a Holy Nation."  For by Holy, is alwaies understood,
either God himselfe, or that which is Gods in propriety; as by Publique
is alwaies meant, either the Person of the Common-wealth it self,
or something that is so the Common-wealths, as no private person
can claim any propriety therein.

Therefore the Sabbath (Gods day) is a Holy Day; the Temple,
(Gods house) a Holy House; Sacrifices, Tithes, and Offerings
(Gods tribute) Holy Duties; Priests, Prophets, and anointed Kings,
under Christ (Gods ministers) Holy Men; The Coelestiall ministring
Spirits (Gods Messengers) Holy Angels; and the like: and wheresoever
the word Holy is taken properly, there is still something signified
of Propriety, gotten by consent.  In saying "Hallowed be thy name,"
we do but pray to God for grace to keep the first Commandement,
of "having no other Gods but Him."  Mankind is Gods Nation in
propriety: but the Jews only were a Holy Nation.  Why, but because
they became his Propriety by covenant.

Sacred What
And the word Profane, is usually taken in the Scripture for the same
with Common; and consequently their contraries, Holy, and Proper,
in the Kingdome of God must be the same also.  But figuratively,
those men also are called Holy, that led such godly lives, as if
they had forsaken all worldly designes, and wholly devoted,
and given themselves to God.  In the proper sense, that which
is made Holy by Gods appropriating or separating it to his own use,
is said to be Sanctified by God, as the Seventh day in the fourth
Commandement; and as the Elect in the New Testament were said to
bee Sanctified, when they were endued with the Spirit of godlinesse.
And that which is made Holy by the dedication of men, and given
to God, so as to be used onely in his publique service, is called
also SACRED, and said to be consecrated, as Temples, and other
Houses of Publique Prayer, and their Utensils, Priests, and
Ministers, Victimes, Offerings, and the externall matter of Sacraments.

Degrees of Sanctity
Of Holinesse there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart
for the service of God, there may bee some set apart again,
for a neerer and more especial service.  The whole Nation of the
Israelites were a people Holy to God; yet the tribe of Levi
was amongst the Israelites a Holy tribe; and amongst the Levites,
the Priests were yet more Holy; and amongst the Priests, the High Priest
was the most Holy.  So the Land of Judea was the Holy Land; but the
Holy City wherein God was to be worshipped, was more Holy; and again,
the Temples more Holy than the City; and the Sanctum Sanctorum
more Holy than the rest of the Temple.

Sacrament
A SACRAMENT, is a separation of some visible thing from common use;
and a consecration of it to Gods service, for a sign, either
of our admission into the Kingdome of God, to be of the number
of his peculiar people, or for a Commemoration of the same.
In the Old Testament, the sign of Admission was Circumcision;
in the New Testament, Baptisme.  The Commemoration of it in
the Old Testament, was the Eating (at a certain time, which
was Anniversary) of the Paschall Lamb; by which they were put
in mind of the night wherein they were delivered out of their
bondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the celebrating of
the Lords Supper; by which, we are put in mind, of our deliverance
from the bondage of sin, by our Blessed Saviours death upon the crosse.
The Sacraments of Admission, are but once to be used, because there
needs but one Admission; but because we have need of being often
put in mind of our deliverance, and of our Allegeance, The Sacraments
of Commemoration have need to be reiterated.  And these are the
principall Sacraments, and as it were the solemne oathes we make
of our Alleageance.  There be also other Consecrations, that may
be called Sacraments, as the word implyeth onely Consecration to
Gods service; but as it implies an oath, or promise of Alleageance
to God, there were no other in the Old Testament, but Circumcision,
and the Passover; nor are there any other in the New Testament,
but Baptisme, and the Lords Supper.



CHAPTER XXXVI

OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS


Word What
When there is mention of the Word of God, or of Man, it doth not
signifie a part of Speech, such as Grammarians call a Nown, or a Verb,
or any simple voice, without a contexture with other words to make
it significative; but a perfect Speech or Discourse, whereby
the speaker Affirmeth, Denieth, Commandeth, Promiseth, Threateneth,
Wisheth, or Interrogateth.  In which sense it is not Vocabulum,
that signifies a Word; but Sermo, (in Greek Logos) that is some Speech,
Discourse, or Saying.

The Words Spoken By God And Concerning God,
Both Are Called Gods Word In Scripture
Again, if we say the Word of God, or of Man, it may bee understood
sometimes of the Speaker, (as the words that God hath spoken,
or that a Man hath spoken): In which sense, when we say, the Gospel
of St. Matthew, we understand St. Matthew to be the Writer of it:
and sometimes of the Subject: In which sense, when we read in the Bible,
"The words of the days of the Kings of Israel, or Judah," 'tis meant,
that the acts that were done in those days, were the Subject of
those Words; And in the Greek, which (in the Scripture) retaineth
many Hebraismes, by the Word of God is oftentimes meant, not that
which is spoken by God, but concerning God, and his government;
that is to say, the Doctrine of Religion: Insomuch, as it is all one,
to say Logos Theou, and Theologia; which is, that Doctrine which wee
usually call Divinity, as is manifest by the places following
(Acts 13.46.) "Then Paul and Barnabas waxed bold, and said,
It was necessary that the Word of God should first have been
spoken to you, but seeing you put it from you, and judge your
selves unworthy of everlasting life, loe, we turn to the Gentiles."
That which is here called the Word of god, was the Doctrine of
Christian Religion; as it appears evidently by that which goes before.
And (Acts 5.20.) where it is said to the Apostles by an Angel,
"Go stand and speak in the Temple, all the Words of this life;"
by the Words of this life, is meant, the Doctrine of the Gospel;
as is evident by what they did in the Temple, and is expressed
in the last verse of the same Chap.  "Daily in the Temple, and in
every house they ceased not to teach and preach Christ Jesus:"
In which place it is manifest, that Jesus Christ was the subject
of this Word of Life; or (which is all one) the subject of the
Words of this Life Eternall, that our saviour offered them.
So (Acts 15.7.) the Word of God, is called the Word of the Gospel,
because it containeth the Doctrine of the Kingdome of Christ;
and the same Word (Rom. 10.8,9.) is called the Word of Faith;
that is, as is there expressed, the Doctrine of Christ come,
and raised from the dead.  Also (Mat. 13. 19.) "When any one
heareth the Word of the Kingdome;" that is, the Doctrine of
the Kingdome taught by Christ.  Again, the same Word, is said
(Acts 12. 24.) "to grow and to be multiplied;" which to understand
of the Evangelicall Doctrine is easie, but of the Voice, or Speech
of God, hard and strange.  In the same sense the Doctrine of Devils,
signifieth not the Words of any Devill, but the Doctrine of
Heathen men concerning Daemons, and those Phantasms which they
worshipped as Gods.  (1 Tim. 4.1.)

Considering these two significations of the WORD OF GOD, as it is
taken in Scripture, it is manifest in this later sense (where it is
taken for the Doctrine of the Christian Religion,) that the whole
scripture is the Word of God: but in the former sense not so.
For example, though these words, "I am the Lord thy God, &c."
to the end of the Ten Commandements, were spoken by God to Moses;
yet the Preface, "God spake these words and said," is to be understood
for the Words of him that wrote the holy History.  The Word of God,
as it is taken for that which he hath spoken, is understood
sometimes Properly, sometimes Metaphorically.  Properly, as the words,
he hath spoken to his Prophets; Metaphorically, for his Wisdome, Power,
and eternall Decree, in making the world; in which sense, those Fiats,
"Let there be light," "Let there be a firmament," "Let us make man," &c.
(Gen. 1.) are the Word of God.   And in the same sense it is said
(John 1.3.) "All things were made by it, and without it was nothing
made that was made; And (Heb. 1.3.) "He upholdeth all things by
the word of his Power;" that is, by the Power of his Word; that is,
by his Power; and (Heb. 11.3.) "The worlds were framed by the
Word of God;" and many other places to the same sense: As also
amongst the Latines, the name of Fate, which signifieth properly
The Word Spoken, is taken in the same sense.

Secondly, For The Effect Of His Word
Secondly, for the effect of his Word; that is to say, for the thing
it self, which by his Word is Affirmed, Commanded, Threatned,
or Promised; as (Psalm 105.19.) where Joseph is said to have been
kept in prison, "till his Word was come;" that is, till that was
come to passe which he had (Gen. 40.13.) foretold to Pharaohs Butler,
concerning his being restored to his office: for there by His Word
Was Come, is meant, the thing it self was come to passe.
So also (1 King. 18.36.) Elijah saith to God, "I have done all
these thy Words," in stead of "I have done all these things at
thy Word," or commandement: and (Jer. 17.15.) "Where is the Word
of the Lord," is put for, "Where is the Evill he threatened:"
And (Ezek. 12.28.) "There shall none of my Words be prolonged
any more:" by "Words" are understood those Things, which God
promised to his people.  And in the New Testament (Mat. 24.35.)
"heaven and earth shal pass away, but my Words shall not pass away;"
that is, there is nothing that I have promised or foretold,
that shall not come to passe.  And in this sense it is, that
St. John the Evangelist, and, I think, St. John onely calleth
our Saviour himself as in the flesh "the Word of God (as Joh. 1.14.)
the Word was made Flesh;" that is to say, the Word, or Promise
that Christ should come into the world, "who in the beginning
was with God;" that is to say, it was in the purpose of God the Father,
to send God the Son into the world, to enlighten men in the way
of Eternall life, but it was not till then put in execution,
and actually incarnate; So that our Saviour is there called
"the Word," not because he was the promise, but the thing promised.
They that taking occasion from this place, doe commonly call
him the Verbe of God, do but render the text more obscure.
They might as well term him the Nown of God: for as by Nown,
so also by Verbe, men understand nothing but a part of speech,
a voice, a sound, that neither affirms, nor denies, nor commands,
nor promiseth, nor is any substance corporeall, or spirituall;
and therefore it cannot be said to bee either God, or Man;
whereas our Saviour is both.  And this Word which St. John in
his Gospel saith was with God, is (in his 1 Epistle, verse 1.)
called "the Word of Life;" and (verse 2.) "The eternall life,
which was with the Father:" so that he can be in no other sense
called the Word, then in that, wherein he is called Eternall life;
that is, "he that hath procured us Eternall life," by his comming
in the flesh.  So also (Apocalypse 19.13.) the Apostle speaking
of Christ, clothed in a garment dipt in bloud, saith; his name is
"the Word of God;" which is to be understood, as if he had said
his name had been, "He that was come according to the purpose
of God from the beginning, and according to his Word and promises
delivered by the Prophets."  So that there is nothing here of the
Incarnation of a Word, but of the Incarnation of God the Son,
therefore called the Word, because his Incarnation was the
Performance of the Promise; In like manner as the Holy Ghost
is called The Promise. (Acts 1.4.  Luke 24.49.)

Thirdly, For The Words Of Reason And Equity
There are also places of the Scripture, where, by the Word of God,
is signified such Words as are consonant to reason, and equity,
though spoken sometimes neither by prophet, nor by a holy man.
For Pharaoh Necho was an Idolator; yet his Words to the good
King Josiah, in which he advised him by Messengers, not to oppose
him in his march against Carchemish, are said to have proceeded
from the mouth of God; and that Josiah not hearkning to them,
was slain in the battle; as is to be read 2 Chron. 35. vers. 21,22,23.
It is true, that as the same History is related in the first
book of Esdras, not Pharaoh, but Jeremiah spake these words
to Josiah, from the mouth of the Lord.  But wee are to give credit
to the Canonicall Scripture, whatsoever be written in the Apocrypha.

The Word of God, is then also to be taken for the Dictates of reason,
and equity, when the same is said in the Scriptures to bee written
in mans heart; as Psalm 36.31. Jerem. 31.33. Deut.30.11, 14. and many
other like places.

Divers Acceptions Of The Word Prophet
The name of PROPHET, signifieth in Scripture sometimes Prolocutor;
that is, he that speaketh from God to Man, or from man to God:
And sometimes Praedictor, or a foreteller of things to come;
And sometimes one that speaketh incoherently, as men that are distracted.
It is most frequently used in the sense of speaking from God
to the People.  So Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah,
and others were Prophets.  And in this sense the High Priest
was a Prophet, for he only went into the Sanctum Sanctorum,
to enquire of God; and was to declare his answer to the people.
And therefore when Caiphas said, it was expedient that one man
should die for the people, St. John saith (chap. 11.51.) that
"He spake not this of himselfe, but being High Priest that year,
he prophesied that one man should dye for the nation."  Also they that
in Christian Congregations taught the people, (1 Cor. 14.3.)
are said to Prophecy.  In the like sense it is, that God saith
to Moses (Exod. 4.16.) concerning "Aaron, He shall be thy Spokes-man
to the People; and he shall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt be
to him in stead of God;" that which here is Spokes-man, is (chap.7.1.)
interpreted Prophet;  "See (saith God) I have made thee a God to Pharaoh,
and Aaron thy Brother shall be thy Prophet."  In the sense of speaking
from man to God, Abraham is called a Prophet (Genes. 20.7.) where God
in a Dream speaketh to Abimelech in this manner, "Now therefore restore
the man his wife, for he is a Prophet, and shall pray for thee;"
whereby may be also gathered, that the name of Prophet may be given,
not unproperly to them that in Christian Churches, have a Calling
to say publique prayers for the Congregation.  In the same sense,
the Prophets that came down from the High place (or Hill of God)
with a Psaltery, and a Tabret, and a Pipe, and a Harp (1 Sam. 10.5,6.)
and (vers. 10.) Saul amongst them, are said to Prophecy, in that
they praised God, in that manner publiquely.  In the like sense,
is Miriam (Exod. 15.20.) called a Prophetesse.  So is it also
to be taken (1 Cor. 11.4,5.) where St. Paul saith, "Every man
that prayeth or prophecyeth with his head covered, &c. and every
woman that prayeth or prophecyeth with her head uncovered: For Prophecy
in that place, signifieth no more, but praising God in Psalmes,
and Holy Songs; which women might doe in the Church, though
it were not lawfull for them to speak to the Congregation.
And in this signification it is, that the Poets of the Heathen,
that composed Hymnes and other sorts of Poems in the honor
of their Gods, were called Vates (Prophets) as is well enough
known by all that are versed in the Books of the Gentiles,
and as is evident (Tit. 1.12.) where St. Paul saith of the Cretians,
that a Prophet of their owne said, they were Liars; not that
St. Paul held their Poets for Prophets, but acknowledgeth that
the word Prophet was commonly used to signifie them that celebrated
the honour of God in Verse

Praediction Of Future Contingents, Not Alwaies Prophecy
When by Prophecy is meant Praediction, or foretelling of future
Contingents; not only they were Prophets, who were Gods Spokesmen,
and foretold those things to others, which God had foretold to them;
but also all those Imposters, that pretend by the helpe of
familiar spirits, or by superstitious divination of events past,
from false causes, to foretell the like events in time to come:
of which (as I have declared already in the 12. chapter of
this Discourse) there be many kinds, who gain in the opinion
of the common sort of men, a greater reputation of Prophecy,
by one casuall event that may bee but wrested to their purpose,
than can be lost again by never so many failings.  Prophecy is not
an art, nor (when it is taken for Praediction) a constant Vocation;
but an extraordinary, and temporary Employment from God, most often
of Good men, but sometimes also of the Wicked.  The woman of Endor,
who is said to have had a familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised
a Phantasme of Samuel, and foretold Saul his death, was not therefore
a Prophetesse; for neither had she any science, whereby she could
raise such a Phantasme; nor does it appear that God commanded
the raising of it; but onely guided that Imposture to be a means
of Sauls terror and discouragement; and by consequent, of the
discomfiture, by which he fell.  And for Incoherent Speech,
it was amongst the Gentiles taken for one sort of Prophecy,
because the Prophets of their Oracles, intoxicated with a spirit,
or vapour from the cave of the Pythian Oracle at Delphi, were for
the time really mad, and spake like mad-men; of whose loose words
a sense might be made to fit any event, in such sort, as all bodies
are said to be made of Materia prima.  In the Scripture I find it also
so taken (1 Sam. 18. 10.) in these words, "And the Evill spirit came
upon Saul, and he Prophecyed in the midst of the house."

The Manner How God Hath Spoken To The Prophets
And although there be so many significations in Scripture of
the word Prophet; yet is that the most frequent, in which it is
taken for him, to whom God speaketh immediately, that which
the Prophet is to say from him, to some other man, or to the people.
And hereupon a question may be asked, in what manner God speaketh
to such a Prophet.  Can it(may some say) be properly said,
that God hath voice and language, when it cannot be properly said,
he hath a tongue, or other organs, as a man?  The Prophet David
argueth thus, "Shall he that made the eye, not see? or he that
made the ear, not hear?  But this may be spoken, not (as usually)
to signifie Gods nature, but to signifie our intention to honor him.
For to See, and Hear, are Honorable Attributes, and may be
given to God, to declare (as far as our capacity can conceive)
his Almighty power.  But if it were to be taken in the strict,
and proper sense, one might argue from his making of all parts
of mans body, that he had also the same use of them which
we have; which would be many of them so uncomely, as it would be
the greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to him.
Therefore we are to interpret Gods speaking to men immediately,
for that way (whatsoever it be), by which God makes them understand
his will: And the wayes whereby he doth this, are many; and to be
sought onely in the Holy Scripture: where though many times
it be said, that God spake to this, and that person, without
declaring in what manner; yet there be again many places, that
deliver also the signes by which they were to acknowledge
his presence, and commandement; and by these may be understood,
how he spake to many of the rest.

To The Extraordinary Prophets Of The Old Testament
He Spake By Dreams, Or Visions
In what manner God spake to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah,
is not expressed; nor how he spake to Abraham, till such time as
he came out of his own countrey to Sichem in the land of Canaan;
and then (Gen. 12.7.) God is said to have Appeared to him.
So there is one way, whereby God made his presence manifest;
that is, by an Apparition, or Vision.  And again, (Gen. 15.1.)
The Word of the Lord came to Abraham in a Vision; that is to say,
somewhat, as a sign of Gods presence, appeared as Gods Messenger,
to speak to him.  Again, the Lord appeared to Abraham (Gen. 18. 1.)
by an apparition of three Angels; and to Abimelech (Gen. 20. 3.)
in a dream: To Lot (Gen. 19. 1.) by an apparition of Two Angels:
And to Hagar (Gen. 21. 17.) by the apparition of one Angel:
And to Abraham again (Gen. 22. 11.) by the apparition of a voice
from heaven: And (Gen. 26. 24.) to Isaac in the night; (that is,
in his sleep, or by dream): And to Jacob (Gen. 18. 12.) in a dream;
that is to say (as are the words of the text) "Jacob dreamed
that he saw a ladder, &c."  And (Gen. 32. 1.) in a Vision of Angels:
And to Moses (Exod. 3.2.) in the apparition of a flame of fire
out of the midst of a bush: And after the time of Moses, (where the
manner how God spake immediately to man in the Old Testament,
is expressed) hee spake alwaies by a Vision, or by a Dream;
as to Gideon, Samuel, Eliah, Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest
of the Prophets; and often in the New Testament, as to Joseph,
to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. John the Evangelist
in the Apocalypse.

Onely to Moses hee spake in a more extraordinary manner in Mount Sinai,
and in the Tabernacle; and to the High Priest in the Tabernacle,
and in the Sanctum Sanctorum of the Temple.  But Moses, and after him
the High Priests were Prophets of a more eminent place, and degree
in Gods favour; And God himself in express words declareth, that to
other Prophets hee spake in Dreams and Visions, but to his servant Moses,
in such manner as a man speaketh to his friend.  The words are these
(Numb. 12. 6,7,8.) "If there be a Prophet among you, I the Lord will make
my self known to him in a Vision, and will speak unto him in a Dream.
My servant Moses is not so, who is faithfull in all my house;
with him I will speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, not in
dark speeches; and the similitude of the Lord shall he behold."
And (Exod. 33. 11.) "The Lord spake to Moses face to face, as a man
speaketh to his friend."  And yet this speaking of God to Moses,
was by mediation of an Angel, or Angels, as appears expressely,
Acts 7. ver. 35. and 53. and Gal. 3. 19. and was therefore a Vision,
though a more cleer Vision than was given to other Prophets.
And conformable hereunto, where God saith (Deut. 13. 1.) "If there
arise amongst you a Prophet, or Dreamer of Dreams," the later word
is but the interpretation of the former.  And (Joel 2. 28.) "Your sons
and your daughters shall Prophecy; your old men shall dream Dreams,
and your young men shall see Visions:" where again, the word Prophecy
is expounded by Dream, and Vision.  And in the same manner it was,
that God spake to Solomon, promising him Wisdome, Riches, and Honor;
for the text saith, (1 Kings 3. 15.) "And Solomon awoak, and behold
it was a Dream:" So that generally the Prophets extraordinary in the
old Testament took notice of the Word of God no otherwise, than from
their Dreams, or Visions, that is to say, from the imaginations
which they had in their sleep, or in an Extasie; which imaginations
in every true Prophet were supernaturall; but in false Prophets
were either naturall, or feigned.

The same Prophets were neverthelesse said to speak by the Spirit;
as (Zach. 7. 12.) where the Prophet speaking of the Jewes, saith,
"They made their hearths hard as Adamant, lest they should hear the law,
and the words which the Lord of Hosts hath sent in his Spirit
by the former Prophets."  By which it is manifest, that speaking
by the Spirit, or Inspiration, was not a particular manner
of Gods speaking, different from Vision, when they that were said
to speak by the Spirit, were extraordinary Prophets, such as for
every new message, were to have a particular Commission, or
(which is all one) a new Dream, or Vision.

To Prophets Of Perpetuall Calling, And Supreme,
God Spake In The Old Testament From The Mercy Seat,
In A Manner Not Expressed In The Scripture.
Of Prophets, that were so by a perpetuall Calling in the Old Testament,
some were Supreme, and some Subordinate: Supreme were first Moses;
and after him the High Priest, every one for his time, as long as
the Priesthood was Royall; and after the people of the Jews,
had rejected God, that he should no more reign over them,
those Kings which submitted themselves to Gods government,
were also his chief Prophets; and the High Priests office
became Ministeriall.  And when God was to be consulted, they put on
the holy vestments, and enquired of the Lord, as the King commanded them,
and were deprived of their office, when the King thought fit.
For King Saul (1 Sam. 13. 9.) commanded the burnt offering to
be brought, and (1 Sam. 14. 18.) he commands the Priest to bring
the Ark neer him; and (ver. 19.) again to let it alone, because he saw
an advantage upon his enemies.  And in the same chapter Saul asketh
counsell of God.  In like manner King David, after his being anointed,
though before he had possession of the Kingdome, is said to
"enquire of the Lord" (1 Sam. 23. 2.) whether he should fight
against the Philistines at Keilah; and (verse 10.) David commandeth
the Priest to bring him the Ephod, to enquire whether he should stay
in Keilah, or not.  And King Solomon (1 Kings 2. 27.) took
the Priesthood from Abiathar, and gave it (verse 35.) to Zadoc.
Therefore Moses, and the High Priests, and the pious Kings,
who enquired of God on all extraordinary occasions, how they
were to carry themselves, or what event they were to have,
were all Soveraign Prophets.  But in what manner God spake unto them,
is not manifest.  To say that when Moses went up to God in Mount Sinai,
it was a Dream, or Vision, such as other Prophets had, is contrary
to that distinction which God made between Moses, and other Prophets,
Numb. 12. 6,7,8.  To say God spake or appeared as he is in his own nature,
is to deny his Infinitenesse, Invisibility, Incomprehensibility.
To say he spake by Inspiration, or Infusion of the Holy Spirit,
as the Holy Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses equall
with Christ, in whom onely the Godhead (as St. Paul speaketh Col. 2.9.)
dwelleth bodily.  And lastly, to say he spake by the Holy Spirit,
as it signifieth the graces, or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to
attribute nothing to him supernaturall.  For God disposeth men to Piety,
Justice, Mercy, Truth, Faith, and all manner of Vertue, both Morall,
and Intellectuall, by doctrine, example, and by severall occasions,
naturall, and ordinary.

And as these ways cannot be applyed to God, in his speaking to Moses,
at Mount Sinai; so also, they cannot be applyed to him, in his
speaking to the High Priests, from the Mercy-Seat.  Therefore in what
manner God spake to those Soveraign Prophets of the Old Testament,
whose office it was to enquire of him, is not intelligible.
In the time of the New Testament, there was no Soveraign
Prophet, but our Saviour; who was both God that spake, and
the Prophet to whom he spake.

To Prophets Of Perpetuall Calling, But Subordinate,
God Spake By The Spirit.
To subordinate Prophets of perpetuall Calling, I find not any place
that proveth God spake to them supernaturally; but onely in
such manner, as naturally he inclineth men to Piety, to Beleef,
to Righteousnesse, and to other vertues all other Christian Men.
Which way, though it consist in Constitution, Instruction, Education,
and the occasions and invitements men have to Christian vertues;
yet it is truly attributed to the operation of the Spirit of God,
or Holy Spirit (which we in our language call the Holy Ghost):
For there is no good inclination, that is not of the operation of God.
But these operations are not alwaies supernaturall.  When therefore
a Prophet is said to speak in the Spirit, or by the Spirit of God,
we are to understand no more, but that he speaks according to Gods will,
declared by the supreme Prophet.  For the most common acceptation
of the word Spirit, is in the signification of a mans intention,
mind, or disposition.

In the time of Moses, there were seventy men besides himself,
that Prophecyed in the Campe of the Israelites.  In what manner
God spake to them, is declared in the 11 of Numbers, verse 25.
"The Lord came down in a cloud, and spake unto Moses, and took of
the Spirit that was upon him, and gave it to the seventy Elders.
And it came to passe, when the Spirit rested upon them, they Prophecyed,
and did not cease,  By which it is manifest, first, that their
Prophecying to the people, was subservient, and subordinate to
the Prophecying of Moses; for that God took of the Spirit of Moses,
to put upon them; so that they Prophecyed as Moses would have them:
otherwise they had not been suffered to Prophecy at all.
For there was (verse 27.) a complaint made against them to Moses;
and Joshua would have Moses to have forbidden them; which he did not,
but said to Joshua, Bee not jealous in my behalf.  Secondly, that
the Spirit of God in that place, signifieth nothing but the Mind
and Disposition to obey, and assist Moses in the administration
of the Government.  For if it were meant they had the substantial
Spirit of God ; that is, the Divine nature, inspired into them,
then they had it in no lesse manner than Christ himself, in whom
onely the Spirit of God dwelt bodily.  It is meant therefore
of the Gift and Grace of God, that guided them to co-operate with Moses;
from whom their Spirit was derived.  And it appeareth (verse 16.) that,
they were such as Moses himself should appoint for Elders and Officers
of the People: For the words are, "Gather unto me seventy men,
whom thou knowest to be Elders and Officers of the people:" where,
"thou knowest," is the same with "thou appointest," or "hast appointed
to be such."  For we are told before (Exod. 18.) that Moses following
the counsell of Jethro his Father-in-law, did appoint Judges,
and Officers over the people, such as feared God; and of these,
were those Seventy, whom God by putting upon them Moses spirit,
inclined to aid Moses in the Administration of the Kingdome:
and in this sense the Spirit of God is said (1 Sam. 16. 13, 14.)
presently upon the anointing of David, to have come upon
David, and left Saul; God giving his graces to him he chose to
govern his people, and taking them away from him, he rejected.
So that by the Spirit is meant Inclination to Gods service;
and not any supernaturall Revelation.

God Sometimes Also Spake By Lots
God spake also many times by the event of Lots; which were
ordered by such as he had put in Authority over his people.
So wee read that God manifested by the Lots which Saul caused
to be drawn (1 Sam. 14. 43.) the fault that Jonathan had committed,
in eating a honey-comb, contrary to the oath taken by the people.
And (Josh. 18. 10.) God divided the land of Canaan amongst the Israelite,
by the "lots that Joshua did cast before the Lord in Shiloh."
In the same manner it seemeth to be, that God discovered
(Joshua 7.16., &c.) the crime of Achan.  And these are the wayes
whereby God declared his Will in the Old Testament.

All which ways he used also in the New Testament.  To the Virgin Mary,
by a Vision of an Angel: To Joseph in a Dream: again to Paul in the way
to Damascus in a Vision of our Saviour: and to Peter in the Vision
of a sheet let down from heaven, with divers sorts of flesh, of clean
and unclean, beasts; and in prison, by Vision of an Angel: And to all
the Apostles, and Writers of the New Testament, by the graces of
his Spirit; and to the Apostles again (at the choosing of Matthias
in the place of Judas Iscariot) by lot.

Every Man Ought To Examine The Probability
Of A Pretended Prophets Calling
Seeing then all Prophecy supposeth Vision, or Dream, (which two,
when they be naturall, are the same,) or some especiall gift of God,
so rarely observed in mankind, as to be admired where observed;
and seeing as well such gifts, as the most extraordinary Dreams,
and Visions, may proceed from God, not onely by his supernaturall,
and immediate, but also by his naturall operation, and by mediation
of second causes; there is need of Reason and Judgement to discern
between naturall, and supernaturall Gifts, and between naturall,
and supernaturall Visions, or Dreams.  And consequently men had need
to be very circumspect, and wary, in obeying the voice of man,
that pretending himself to be a Prophet, requires us to obey God in
that way, which he in Gods name telleth us to be the way to happinesse.
For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity,
pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule, and reign over them;
which is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and is therefore
worthy to be suspected of Ambition and Imposture; and consequently,
ought to be examined, and tryed by every man, before hee yeeld
them obedience; unlesse he have yeelded it them already, in the
institution of a Common-wealth; as when the Prophet is the
Civill Soveraign, or by the Civil Soveraign Authorized.  And if this
examination of Prophets, and Spirits, were not allowed to every one
of the people, it had been to no purpose, to set out the marks,
by which every man might be able, to distinguish between those,
whom they ought, and those whom they ought not to follow.
Seeing therefore such marks are set out (Deut. 13. 1,&c.) to know
a Prophet by; and (1 John 4.1.&C) to know a Spirit by: and seeing
there is so much Prophecying in the Old Testament; and so much Preaching
in the New Testament against Prophets; and so much greater a number
ordinarily of false Prophets, then of true; every one is to beware
of obeying their directions, at their own perill.  And first, that
there were many more false than true Prophets, appears by this,
that when Ahab (1 Kings 12.) consulted four hundred Prophets,
they were all false Imposters, but onely one Michaiah.  And a little
before the time of the Captivity, the Prophets were generally lyars.
"The Prophets" (saith the Lord by Jerem. cha. 14. verse 14.) "prophecy
Lies in my name.  I sent them not, neither have I commanded them,
nor spake unto them, they prophecy to you a false Vision, a thing
of naught; and the deceit of their heart."  In so much as God
commanded the People by the mouth of the Prophet Jeremiah
(chap. 23. 16.) not to obey them.  "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts,
hearken not unto the words of the Prophets, that prophecy to you.
They make you vain, they speak a Vision of their own heart,
and not out of the mouth of the Lord.

All Prophecy But Of The Soveraign Prophet
Is To Be Examined By Every Subject
Seeing then there was in the time of the Old Testament, such quarrells
amongst the Visionary Prophets, one contesting with another,
and asking When departed the Spirit from me, to go to thee?
as between Michaiah, and the rest of the four hundred; and such
giving of the Lye to one another, (as in Jerem. 14.14.) and such
controversies in the New Testament at this day, amongst the
Spirituall Prophets: Every man then was, and now is bound to make use
of his Naturall Reason, to apply to all Prophecy those Rules which God
hath given us, to discern the true from the false.  Of which rules,
in the Old Testament, one was, conformable doctrine to that which Moses
the Soveraign Prophet had taught them; and the other the miraculous
power of foretelling what God would bring to passe, as I have already
shown out of Deut. 13. 1. &c.   and in the New Testament there was
but one onely mark; and that was the preaching of this Doctrine,
That Jesus Is The Christ, that is, the King of the Jews, promised
in the Old Testament.  Whosoever denyed that Article, he was a
false Prophet, whatsoever miracles he might seem to work; and he
that taught it was a true Prophet.  For St. John (1 Epist, 4. 2, &c)
speaking expressely of the means to examine Spirits, whether they
be of God, or not; after he hath told them that there would arise
false Prophets, saith thus, "Hereby know ye the Spirit of God.
Every Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh,
is of God;" that is, is approved and allowed as a Prophet of God:
not that he is a godly man, or one of the Elect, for this,
that he confesseth, professeth, or preacheth Jesus to be the Christ;
but for that he is a Prophet avowed.  For God sometimes speaketh
by Prophets, whose persons he hath not accepted; as he did by Baalam;
and as he foretold Saul of his death, by the Witch of Endor.
Again in the next verse, "Every Spirit that confesseth not that
Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh, is not of Christ.  And this is
the Spirit of Antichrist."  So that the rule is perfect on both sides;
that he is a true Prophet, which preacheth the Messiah already come,
in the person of Jesus; and he a false one that denyeth him come,
and looketh for him in some future Imposter, that shall take upon him
that honour falsely, whom the Apostle there properly calleth Antichrist.
Every man therefore ought to consider who is the Soveraign Prophet;
that is to say, who it is, that is Gods Viceregent on earth; and hath
next under God, the Authority of Governing Christian men; and to
observe for a Rule, that Doctrine, which in the name of God,
hee commanded to bee taught; and thereby to examine and try out
the truth of those Doctrines, which pretended Prophets with miracles,
or without, shall at any time advance: and if they find it contrary
to that Rule, to doe as they did, that came to Moses, and complained
that there were some that Prophecyed in the Campe, whose Authority
so to doe they doubted of; and leave to the Soveraign, as they did
to Moses to uphold, or to forbid them, as hee should see cause;
and if hee disavow them, then no more to obey their voice; or if he
approve them, then to obey them, as men to whom God hath given a part
of the Spirit of their Soveraigne.  For when Christian men, take not
their Christian Soveraign, for Gods Prophet; they must either take
their owne Dreams, for the prophecy they mean to bee governed by,
and the tumour of their own hearts for the Spirit of God; or they must
suffer themselves to bee lead by some strange Prince; or by some of
their fellow subjects, that can bewitch them, by slander of
the government, into rebellion, without other miracle to confirm
their calling, then sometimes an extraordinary successe, and Impunity;
and by this means destroying all laws, both divine, and humane,
reduce all Order, Government, and Society, to the first Chaos
of Violence, and Civill warre.



CHAPTER XXXVII

OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE


A Miracle Is A Work That Causeth Admiration
By Miracles are signified the Admirable works of God: & therefore
they are also called Wonders.  And because they are for the most part,
done, for a signification of his commandement, in such occasions,
as without them, men are apt to doubt, (following their private
naturall reasoning,) what he hath commanded, and what not,
they are commonly in Holy Scripture, called Signes, in the same sense,
as they are called by the Latines, Ostenta, and Portenta, from shewing,
and fore-signifying that, which the Almighty is about to bring to passe.

And Must Therefore Be Rare, And Whereof
There Is No Naturall Cause Known
To understand therefore what is a Miracle, we must first understand
what works they are, which men wonder at, and call Admirable.
And there be but two things which make men wonder at any event:
The one is, if it be strange, that is to say, such, as the like of it
hath never, or very rarely been produced: The other is, if when it is
produced, we cannot imagine it to have been done by naturall means,
but onely by the immediate hand of God.  But when wee see some possible,
naturall cause of it, how rarely soever the like has been done;
or if the like have been often done, how impossible soever it be
to imagine a naturall means thereof, we no more wonder, nor esteem it
for a Miracle.

Therefore, if a Horse, or Cow should speak, it were a Miracle;
because both the thing is strange, & the Naturall cause difficult
to imagin: So also were it, to see a strange deviation of nature,
in the production of some new shape of a living creature.
But when a man, or other Animal, engenders his like, though we know
no more how this is done, than the other; yet because 'tis usuall,
it is no Miracle.  In like manner, if a man be metamorphosed
into a stone, or into a pillar, it is a Miracle; because strange:
but if a peece of wood be so changed; because we see it often,
it is no Miracle: and yet we know no more, by what operation of God,
the one is brought to passe, than the other.

The first Rainbow that was seen in the world, was a Miracle,
because the first; and consequently strange; and served for
a sign from God, placed in heaven, to assure his people, there
should be no more an universall destruction of the world by Water.
But at this day, because they are frequent, they are not Miracles,
neither to them that know their naturall causes, nor to them who
know them not.  Again, there be many rare works produced by
the Art of man: yet when we know they are done; because thereby
wee know also the means how they are done, we count them not
for Miracles, because not wrought by the immediate hand of God,
but by mediation of humane Industry.

That Which Seemeth A Miracle To One Man,
May Seem Otherwise To Another
Furthermore, seeing Admiration and Wonder, is consequent to
the knowledge and experience, wherewith men are endued, some more,
some lesse; it followeth, that the same thing, may be a Miracle to one,
and not to another.  And thence it is, that ignorant, and superstitious
men make great Wonders of those works, which other men, knowing
to proceed from Nature, (which is not the immediate, but the
ordinary work of God,) admire not at all: As when Ecclipses of
the Sun and Moon have been taken for supernaturall works, by the
common people; when neverthelesse, there were others, could from
their naturall causes, have foretold the very hour they should arrive:
Or, as when a man, by confederacy, and secret intelligence, getting
knowledge of the private actions of an ignorant, unwary man,
thereby tells him, what he has done in former time; it seems to him
a Miraculous thing; but amongst wise, and cautelous men, such Miracles
as those, cannot easily be done.

The End Of Miracles
Again, it belongeth to the nature of a Miracle, that it be wrought
for the procuring of credit to Gods Messengers, Ministers, and Prophets,
that thereby men may know, they are called, sent, and employed by God,
and thereby be the better inclined to obey them.  And therefore,
though the creation of the world, and after that the destruction
of all living creatures in the universall deluge, were admirable works;
yet because they were not done to procure credit to any Prophet,
or other Minister of God, they use not to be called Miracles.
For how admirable soever any work be, the Admiration consisteth
not in that it could be done, because men naturally beleeve
the Almighty can doe all things, but because he does it at
the Prayer, or Word of a man.  But the works of God in Egypt,
by the hand of Moses, were properly Miracles; because they
were done with intention to make the people of Israel beleeve,
that Moses came unto them, not out of any design of his owne interest,
but as sent from God.  Therefore after God had commanded him
to deliver the Israelites from the Egyptian bondage, when he said
(Exod 4.1. &c.) "They will not beleeve me, but will say, the Lord
hath not appeared unto me," God gave him power, to turn the Rod
he had in his hand into a Serpent, and again to return it into a Rod;
and by putting his hand into his bosome, to make it leprous;
and again by pulling it out to make it whole, to make the Children
of Israel beleeve (as it is verse 5.) that the God of their Fathers
had appeared unto him; And if that were not enough, he gave him power
to turn their waters into bloud.  And when hee had done these Miracles
before the people, it is said (verse 41.) that "they beleeved him."
Neverthelesse, for fear of Pharaoh, they durst not yet obey him.
Therefore the other works which were done to plague Pharaoh
and the Egyptians, tended all to make the Israelites beleeve
in Moses, and were properly Miracles.  In like manner if we consider
all the Miracles done by the hand of Moses, and all the rest of the
Prophets, till the Captivity; and those of our Saviour, and his
Apostles afterward; we shall find, their end was alwaies to beget,
or confirm beleefe, that they came not of their own motion,
but were sent by God.  Wee may further observe in Scripture,
that the end of Miracles, was to beget beleef, not universally
in all men, elect, and reprobate; but in the elect only; that is
to say, is such as God had determined should become his Subjects.
For those miraculous plagues of Egypt, had not for end, the conversion
of Pharaoh; For God had told Moses before, that he would harden
the heart of Pharaoh, that he should not let the people goe: And when
he let them goe at last, not the Miracles perswaded him, but the plagues
forced him to it.  So also of our Saviour, it is written, (Mat. 13. 58.)
that he wrought not many Miracles in his own countrey, because of
their unbeleef; and (in Marke 6.5.) in stead of, "he wrought not many,"
it is, "he could work none."  It was not because he wanted power;
which to say, were blasphemy against God; nor that the end of Miracles
was not to convert incredulous men to Christ; for the end of all
the Miracles of Moses, of Prophets, of our Saviour, and of his
Apostles was to adde men to the Church; but it was, because the end
of their Miracles, was to adde to the Church (not all men, but)
such as should be saved; that is to say, such as God had elected.
Seeing therefore our Saviour sent from his Father, hee could not
use his power in the conversion of those, whom his Father had rejected.
They that expounding this place of St. Marke, say, that his word,
"Hee could not," is put for, "He would not," do it without example
in the Greek tongue, (where Would Not, is put sometimes for Could Not,
in things inanimate, that have no will; but Could Not, for Would Not,
never,) and thereby lay a stumbling block before weak Christians;
as if Christ could doe no Miracles, but amongst the credulous.

The Definition Of A Miracle
From that which I have here set down, of the nature, and use
of a Miracle, we may define it thus, "A MIRACLE, is a work of God,
(besides his operation by the way of Nature, ordained in the Creation,)
done for the making manifest to his elect, the mission of an
extraordinary Minister for their salvation.

And from this definition, we may inferre; First, that in all Miracles,
the work done, is not the effect of any vertue in the Prophet;
because it is the effect of the immediate hand of God; that is
to say God hath done it, without using the Prophet therein,
as a subordinate cause.

Secondly, that no Devil, Angel, or other created Spirit, can
do a Miracle.  For it must either be by vertue of some naturall science,
or by Incantation, that is, vertue of words.  For if the Inchanters
do it by their own power independent, there is some power that
proceedeth not from God; which all men deny: and if they doe it
by power given them, then is the work not from the immediate
hand of God, but naturall, and consequently no Miracle.

There be some texts of Scripture, that seem to attribute the power
of working wonders (equall to some of those immediate Miracles,
wrought by God himself,) to certain Arts of Magick, and Incantation.
As for example, when we read that after the Rod of Moses being cast
on the ground became a Serpent, (Exod. 7. 11.) "the Magicians of Egypt
did the like by their Enchantments;" and that after Moses had turned
the waters of the Egyptian Streams, Rivers, Ponds, and Pooles of water
into blood, (Exod. 7. 22.) "the Magicians of Egypt did so likewise,
with their Enchantments;" and that after Moses had by the power
of God brought frogs upon the land, (Exod. 8. 7.) "the Magicians also
did so with their Enchantments, and brought up frogs upon the land
of Egypt;" will not a man be apt to attribute Miracles to Enchantments;
that is to say, to the efficacy of the sound of Words; and think
the same very well proved out of this, and other such places? and yet
there is no place of Scripture, that telleth us what on Enchantment is.
If therefore Enchantment be not, as many think it, a working of
strange effects by spells, and words; but Imposture, and delusion,
wrought by ordinary means; and so far from supernaturall, as the
Impostors need not the study so much as of naturall causes,
but the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition of mankind,
to doe them; those texts that seem to countenance the power of Magick,
Witchcraft, and Enchantment, must needs have another sense,
than at first sight they seem to bear.

That Men Are Apt To Be Deceived By False Miracles
For it is evident enough, that Words have no effect, but on those
that understand them; and then they have no other, but to signifie
the intentions, or passions of them that speak; and thereby produce,
hope, fear, or other passions, or conceptions in the hearer.
Therefore when a Rod seemeth a Serpent, or the Water Bloud,
or any other Miracle seemeth done by Enchantment; if it be not
to the edification of Gods people, not the Rod, nor the Water,
nor any other thing is enchanted; that is to say, wrought upon
by the Words, but the Spectator.  So that all the Miracle
consisteth in this, that the Enchanter has deceived a man;
which is no Miracle, but a very easie matter to doe.

For such is the ignorance, and aptitude to error generally
of all men, but especially of them that have not much knowledge
of naturall causes, and of the nature, and interests of men;
as by innumerable and easie tricks to be abused.  What opinion
of miraculous power, before it was known there was a Science of
the course of the Stars, might a man have gained, that should have
told the people, This hour, or day the Sun should be darkned?
A juggler by the handling of his goblets, and other trinkets,
if it were not now ordinarily practised, would be thought to do
his wonders by the power at least of the Devil.  A man that hath
practised to speak by drawing in of his breath, (which kind of men
in antient time were called Ventriloqui,) and so make the weaknesse
of his voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of
the organs of Speech, but from distance of place, is able to make
very many men beleeve it is a voice from Heaven, whatsoever he please
to tell them.  And for a crafty man, that hath enquired into the secrets,
and familiar confessions that one man ordinarily maketh to another
of his actions and adventures past, to tell them him again is no
hard matter; and yet there be many, that by such means as that,
obtain the reputation of being Conjurers.  But it is too long
a businesse, to reckon up the severall sorts of those men, which the
Greeks called Thaumaturgi, that is to say, workers of things wonderfull;
and yet these do all they do, by their own single dexterity.
But if we looke upon the Impostures wrought by Confederacy,
there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is impossible
to bee beleeved.  For two men conspiring, one to seem lame,
the other to cure him with a charme, will deceive many: but many
conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all
the rest to bear witnesse; will deceive many more.

Cautions Against The Imposture Of Miracles
In this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty beleefe to pretended
Miracles, there can be no better, nor I think any other caution,
than that which God hath prescribed, first by Moses, (as I have said
before in the precedent chapter,) in the beginning of the 13. and end
of the 18. of Deuteronomy; That wee take not any for Prophets,
that teach any other Religion, then that which Gods Lieutenant,
(which at that time was Moses,) hath established; nor any,
(though he teach the same Religion,) whose Praediction we doe not
see come to passe.  Moses therefore in his time, and Aaron,
and his successors in their times, and the Soveraign Governour
of Gods people, next under God himself, that is to say, the Head
of the Church in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine
he hath established, before wee give credit to a pretended Miracle,
or Prophet.  And when that is done, the thing they pretend to be
a Miracle, we must both see it done, and use all means possible
to consider, whether it be really done; and not onely so, but whether
it be such, as no man can do the like by his naturall power,
but that it requires the immediate hand of God.  And in this also
we must have recourse to Gods Lieutenant; to whom in all doubtfull cases,
wee have submitted our private judgments.  For Example; if a man
pretend, that after certain words spoken over a peece of bread,
that presently God hath made it not bread, but a God, or a man,
or both, and neverthelesse it looketh still as like bread as ever
it did; there is no reason for any man to think it really done;
nor consequently to fear him, till he enquire of God, by his Vicar,
or Lieutenant, whether it be done, or not.  If he say not, then
followeth that which Moses saith, (Deut. 18. 22.) "he hath spoken it
presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him."  If he say 'tis done,
then he is not to contradict it.  So also if wee see not, but onely
hear tell of a Miracle, we are to consult the Lawful Church; that is
to say, the lawful Head thereof, how far we are to give credit
to the relators of it.  And this is chiefly the case of men,
that in these days live under Christian Soveraigns.  For in these times,
I do not know one man, that ever saw any such wondrous work, done by
the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a man, that a man endued
but with a mediocrity of reason, would think supernaturall:
and the question is no more, whether what wee see done, be a Miracle;
whether the Miracle we hear, or read of, were a reall work,
and not the Act of a tongue, or pen; but in plain terms, whether
the report be true, or a lye.  In which question we are not every one,
to make our own private Reason, or Conscience, but the Publique Reason,
that is, the reason of Gods Supreme Lieutenant, Judge; and indeed
we have made him Judge already, if wee have given him a Soveraign
power, to doe all that is necessary for our peace and defence.
A private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,)
to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been
given out for Miracles, according as he shall see, what benefit
can accrew by mens belief, to those that pretend, or countenance
them, and thereby conjecture, whether they be Miracles, or Lies.
But when it comes to confession of that faith, the Private Reason
must submit to the Publique; that is to say, to Gods Lieutenant.
But who is this Lieutenant of God, and Head of the Church,
shall be considered in its proper place thereafter.



CHAPTER XXXVIII

OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNALL LIFE,
HELL, SALVATION, THE WORLD TO COME, AND REDEMPTION


The maintenance of Civill Society, depending on Justice; and Justice
on the power of Life and Death, and other lesse Rewards and Punishments,
residing in them that have the Soveraignty of the Common-wealth;
It is impossible a Common-wealth should stand, where any other than
the Soveraign, hath a power of giving greater rewards than Life;
and of inflicting greater punishments than Death.  Now seeing
Eternall Life is a greater reward, than the Life Present;
and Eternall Torment a greater punishment than the Death of Nature;
It is a thing worthy to be well considered, of all men that desire
(by obeying Authority) to avoid the calamities of Confusion,
and Civill war, what is meant in Holy Scripture, by Life Eternall,
and Torment Eternall; and for what offences, against whom committed,
men are to be Eternally Tormented; and for what actions, they are
to obtain Eternall Life.

The Place Of Adams Eternity If He Had Not Sinned,
Had Been The Terrestrial Paradise
And first we find, that Adam was created in such a condition of life,
as had he not broken the commandement of God, he had enjoyed it
in the Paradise of Eden Everlastingly.  For there was the Tree of Life;
whereof he was so long allowed to eat, as he should forbear to eat
of the tree of Knowledge of Good an Evill; which was not allowed him.
And therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out
of Paradise, "lest he should put forth his hand, and take also
of the tree of life, and live for ever." (Gen. 3. 22.)  By which it
seemeth to me, (with submission neverthelesse both in this,
and in all questions, whereof the determination dependeth on
the Scriptures, to the interpretation of the Bible authorized
by the Common-wealth, whose Subject I am,) that Adam if he had
not sinned, had had an Eternall Life on Earth: and that Mortality
entred upon himself, and his posterity, by his first Sin.
Not that actuall Death then entred; for Adam then could never
have had children; whereas he lived long after, and saw a numerous
posterity ere he dyed.  But where it is said, "In the day that thou
eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," it must needs bee meant
of his Mortality, and certitude of death.  Seeing then Eternall life
was lost by Adams forfeiture, in committing sin, he that should
cancell that forfeiture was to recover thereby, that Life again.
Now Jesus Christ hath satisfied for the sins of all that beleeve in him;
and therefore recovered to all beleevers, that ETERNALL LIFE,
which was lost by the sin of Adam.  And in this sense it is,
that the comparison of St. Paul holdeth (Rom. 5.18, 19.) "As by the
offence of one, Judgment came upon all men to condemnation,
even so by the righteousnesse of one, the free gift came upon
all men to Justification of Life."  Which is again (1 Cor. 15.21,22)
more perspicuously delivered in these words, "For since by man
came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead.
For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."

Texts Concerning The Place Of Life Eternall,
For Beleevers
Concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that Eternall Life,
which Christ hath obtained for them, the texts next before alledged
seem to make it on Earth.  For if as in Adam, all die, that is,
have forfeited Paradise, and Eternall Life on Earth; even so
in Christ all shall be made alive; then all men shall be made
to live on Earth; for else the comparison were not proper.
Hereunto seemeth to agree that of the Psalmist, (Psal. 133.3.)
"Upon Zion God commanded the blessing, even Life for evermore;"
for Zion, is in Jerusalem, upon Earth: as also that of S. Joh.
(Rev. 2.7.) "To him that overcommeth I will give to eat of the
tree of life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God."
This was the tree of Adams Eternall life; but his life was to
have been on Earth.  The same seemeth to be confirmed again by
St. Joh. (Rev. 21.2.) where he saith, "I John saw the Holy City,
New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as
a Bride adorned for her husband:" and again v. 10. to the same effect:
As if he should say, the new Jerusalem, the Paradise of God,
at the coming again of Christ, should come down to Gods people
from Heaven, and not they goe up to it from Earth.  And this differs
nothing from that, which the two men in white clothing (that is,
the two Angels) said to the Apostles, that were looking upon Christ
ascending (Acts 1.11.)  "This same Jesus, who is taken up from you
into Heaven, shall so come, as you have seen him go up into Heaven."
Which soundeth as if they had said, he should come down to govern
them under his Father, Eternally here; and not take them up
to govern them in Heaven; and is conformable to the Restauration
of the Kingdom of God, instituted under Moses; which was a Political
government of the Jews on Earth.  Again, that saying of our Saviour
(Mat. 22.30.) "that in the Resurrection they neither marry, nor are
given in marriage, but are as the Angels of God in heaven," is a
description of an Eternall Life, resembling that which we lost
in Adam in the point of Marriage.  For seeing Adam, and Eve,
if they had not sinned, had lived on Earth Eternally, in their
individuall persons; it is manifest, they should not continually
have procreated their kind.  For if Immortals should have generated,
as Mankind doth now; the Earth in a small time, would not have been
able to afford them a place to stand on.  The Jews that asked
our Saviour the question, whose wife the woman that had married
many brothers, should be, in the resurrection, knew not what were
the consequences of Immortality; that there shal be no Generation,
and consequently no marriage, no more than there is Marriage,
or generation among the Angels.  The comparison between that
Eternall life which Adam lost, and our Saviour by his Victory
over death hath recovered; holdeth also in this, that as Adam
lost Eternall Life by his sin, and yet lived after it for a time;
so the faithful Christian hath recovered Eternal Life by Christs passion,
though he die a natural death, and remaine dead for a time; namely,
till the Resurrection. For as Death is reckoned from the Condemnation
of Adam, not from the Execution; so life is reckoned from the Absolution,
not from the Resurrection of them that are elected in Christ.

Ascension Into Heaven
That the place wherein men are to live Eternally, after the
Resurrection, is the Heavens, meaning by Heaven, those parts
of the world, which are the most remote from Earth, as where
the stars are, or above the stars, in another Higher Heaven,
called Caelum Empyreum, (whereof there is no mention in Scripture,
nor ground in Reason) is not easily to be drawn from any text
that I can find.  By the Kingdome of Heaven, is meant the Kingdome
of the King that dwelleth in Heaven; and his Kingdome was
the people of Israel, whom he ruled by the Prophets his Lieutenants,
first Moses, and after him Eleazar, and the Soveraign Priests,
till in the days of Samuel they rebelled, and would have a
mortall man for their King, after the manner of other Nations.
And when our Saviour Christ, by the preaching of his Ministers,
shall have perswaded the Jews to return, and called the Gentiles
to his obedience, then shall there be a new Kingdome of Heaven,
because our King shall then be God, whose Throne is Heaven;
without any necessity evident in the Scripture, that man shall
ascend to his happinesse any higher than Gods Footstool the Earth.
On the contrary, we find written (Joh. 3.13.) that "no man hath
ascended into Heaven, but he that came down from Heaven, even the
Son of man, that is in Heaven."  Where I observe by the way,
that these words are not, as those which go immediately before,
the words of our Saviour, but of St. John himself; for Christ was
then not in Heaven, but upon the Earth.  The like is said of David
(Acts 2.34.) where St. Peter, to prove the Ascension of Christ,
using the words of the Psalmist, (Psal. 16.10.) "Thou wilt not
leave my soule in Hell, nor suffer thine Holy one to see corruption,"
saith, they were spoken (not of David, but) of Christ; and to prove it,
addeth this Reason, "For David is not ascended into Heaven."
But to this a man may easily answer, and say, that though their
bodies were not to ascend till the generall day of Judgment,
yet their souls were in Heaven as soon as they were departed
from their bodies; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the words
of our Saviour (Luke 20.37,38.) who proving the Resurrection
out of the word of Moses, saith thus, "That the dead are raised,
even Moses shewed, at the bush, when he calleth the Lord,
the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.
For he is not a God of the Dead, but of the Living; for they all
live to him."  But if these words be to be understood only of
the Immortality of the Soul, they prove not at all that which
our Saviour intended to prove, which was the Resurrection of the Body,
that is to say, the Immortality of the Man.  Therefore our Saviour
meaneth, that those Patriarchs were Immortall; not by a property
consequent to the essence, and nature of mankind, but by the will of God,
that was pleased of his mere grace, to bestow Eternall Life upon
the faithfull.  And though at that time the Patriarchs and many
other faithfull men were Dead, yet as it is in the text,
they Lived To God; that is, they were written in the Book of Life
with them that were absolved of their sinnes, and ordained to
Life eternall at the Resurrection.  That the Soul of man is in
its own nature Eternall, and a living Creature independent on the Body;
or that any meer man is Immortall, otherwise than by the Resurrection
in the last day, (except Enos and Elias,) is a doctrine not apparent
in Scripture.  The whole 14. Chapter of Job, which is the speech
not of his friends, but of himselfe, is a complaint of this
Mortality of Nature; and yet no contradiction of the Immortality
at the Resurrection.  "There is hope of a tree," (saith hee verse 7.)
"if it be cast down, Though the root thereof wax old, and the stock
thereof die in the ground, yet when it scenteth the water it will bud,
and bring forth boughes like a Plant.  But man dyeth, and wasteth away,
yea, man giveth up the Ghost, and where is he?" and (verse 12.)
"man lyeth down, and riseth not, till the heavens be no more."
But when is it, that the heavens shall be no more? St. Peter tells us,
that it is at the generall Resurrection.  For in his 2. Epistle,
3. Chapter, and 7. verse, he saith, that "the Heavens and the Earth
that are now, are reserved unto fire against the day of Judgment,
and perdition of ungodly men," and (verse 12.) "looking for, and hasting
to the comming of God, wherein the Heavens shall be on fire,
and shall be dissolved, and the Elements shall melt with fervent heat.
Neverthelesse, we according to the promise look for new Heavens,
and a new Earth, wherein dwelleth righteousnesse."  Therefore where
Job saith, man riseth not till the Heavens be no more; it is all one,
as if he had said, the Immortall Life (and Soule and Life in
the Scripture, do usually signifie the same thing) beginneth not
in man, till the Resurrection, and day of Judgment; and hath for cause,
not his specificall nature, and generation; but the Promise.
For St. Peter saies not, " Wee look for new heavens, and a new earth,
(from Nature) but from Promise."

Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident
places of Scripture, in the 35. chapter of this book, that the
Kingdom of God is a Civil Common-wealth, where God himself is
Soveraign, by vertue first of the Old, and since of the New Covenant,
wherein he reigneth by his Vicar, or Lieutenant; the same places
do therefore also prove, that after the comming again of our Saviour
in his Majesty, and glory, to reign actually, and Eternally;
the Kingdom of God is to be on Earth.  But because this doctrine
(though proved out of places of Scripture not few, nor obscure)
will appear to most men a novelty; I doe but propound it;
maintaining nothing in this, or any other paradox of Religion;
but attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning
the Authority, (not yet amongst my Countrey-men decided,) by which
all sorts of doctrine are to bee approved, or rejected; and whose
commands, both in speech, and writing, (whatsoever be the opinions
of private men) must by all men, that mean to be protected by
their Laws, be obeyed.  For the points of doctrine concerning
the Kingdome (of) God, have so great influence on the Kingdome
of Man, as not to be determined, but by them, that under God have
the Soveraign Power.

The Place After Judgment, Of Those Who Were
Never In The Kingdome Of God, Or Having Been In,
Are Cast Out
As the Kingdome of God, and Eternall Life, so also Gods Enemies,
and their Torments after Judgment, appear by the Scripture,
to have their place on Earth.  The name of the place, where all men
remain till the Resurrection, that were either buryed, or swallowed up
of the Earth, is usually called in Scripture, by words that signifie
Under Ground; which the Latines read generally Infernus, and Inferni,
and the Greeks Hades; that is to say, a place where men cannot see;
and containeth as well the Grave, as any other deeper place.
But for the place of the damned after the Resurrection, it is
not determined, neither in the Old, nor New Testament, by any note
of situation; but onely by the company: as that it shall bee,
where such wicked men were, as God in former times in extraordinary,
and miraculous manner, had destroyed from off the face of the Earth:
As for Example, that they are in Inferno, in Tartarus, or in
the bottomelesse pit; because Corah, Dathan, and Abirom, were
swallowed up alive into the earth.  Not that the Writers of the
Scripture would have us beleeve, there could be in the globe
of the Earth, which is not only finite, but also (compared to the
height of the Stars) of no considerable magnitude, a pit without a
bottome; that is, a hole of infinite depth, such as the Greeks in their
Daemonologie (that is to say, in their doctrine concerning Daemons,)
and after them, the Romans called Tartarus; of which Virgill sayes,

	Bis patet in praeceps, tantem tenditque sub umbras,
	Quantus ad aethereum coeli suspectus Olympum:

for that is a thing the proportion of Earth to Heaven cannot bear:
but that wee should beleeve them there, indefinitely, where those
men are, on whom God inflicted that Exemplary punnishment.

The Congregation Of Giants
Again, because those mighty men of the Earth, that lived in
the time of Noah, before the floud, (which the Greeks called Heroes,
and the Scripture Giants, and both say, were begotten, by copulation
of the children of God, with the children of men,) were for their
wicked life destroyed by the generall deluge; the place of the Damned,
is therefore also sometimes marked out, by the company of those
deceased Giants; as Proverbs 21.16. "The man that wandreth out
of the way of understanding, shall remain in the congregation
of the Giants," and Job 26.5. "Behold the Giants groan under water,
and they that dwell with them."  Here the place of the Damned,
is under the water.  And Isaiah 14.9. "Hell is troubled how
to meet thee," (that is, the King of Babylon) "and will displace
the Giants for thee:" and here again the place of the Damned,
(if the sense be literall,) is to be under water.

Lake Of Fire
Thirdly, because the Cities of Sodom, and Gomorrah, by the
extraordinary wrath of God, were consumed for their wickednesse
with Fire and Brimstone, and together with them the countrey
about made a stinking bituminous Lake; the place of the Damned
is sometimes expressed by Fire, and a Fiery Lake: as in the
Apocalypse ch.21.8. "But the timorous, incredulous, and abominable,
and Murderers, and Whoremongers, and Sorcerers, and Idolators,
and all Lyars, shall have their part in the Lake that burneth
with Fire, and Brimstone; which is the second Death."  So that it
is manifest, that Hell Fire, which is here expressed by Metaphor,
from the reall Fire of Sodome, signifieth not any certain kind,
or place of Torment; but is to be taken indefinitely, for Destruction,
as it is in the 20. Chapter, at the 14. verse; where it is said,
that "Death and Hell were cast into the Lake of Fire;" that is to say,
were abolished, and destroyed; as if after the day of Judgment,
there shall be no more Dying, nor no more going into Hell; that is,
no more going to Hades (from which word perhaps our word Hell
is derived,) which is the same with no more Dying.

Utter Darknesse
Fourthly, from the Plague of Darknesse inflicted on the Egyptians,
of which it is written (Exod. 10.23.) "They saw not one another,
neither rose any man from his place for three days; but all
the Children of Israel had light in their dwellings;" the place
of the wicked after Judgment, is called Utter Darknesse, or
(as it is in the originall) Darknesse Without.  And so it is
expressed (Mat. 22.13.) where the King commandeth his Servants,
"to bind hand and foot the man that had not on his Wedding garment,
and to cast him out, Eis To Skotos To Exoteron, Externall Darknesse,
or Darknesse Without: which though translated Utter Darknesse,
does not signifie How Great, but Where that darknesse is to be;
namely, Without The Habitation of Gods Elect.

Gehenna, And Tophet
Lastly, whereas there was a place neer Jerusalem, called the
Valley of the Children of Hinnon; in a part whereof, called Tophet,
the Jews had committed most grievous Idolatry, sacrificing their
children to the Idol Moloch; and wherein also God had afflicted
his enemies with most grievous punishments; and wherein Josias
had burnt the Priests of Moloch upon their own Altars, as appeareth
at large in the 2 of Kings chap. 23. the place served afterwards,
to receive the filth, and garbage which was carried thither,
out of the City; and there used to be fires made, from time
to time, to purifie the aire, and take away the stench of Carrion.
From this abominable place, the Jews used ever after to call
the place of the Damned, by the name of Gehenna, or Valley of Hinnon.
And this Gehenna, is that word, which is usually now translated HELL;
and from the fires from time to time there burning, we have
the notion of Everlasting, and Unquenchable Fire.

Of The Literall Sense Of The Scripture Concerning Hell
Seeing now there is none, that so interprets the Scripture,
as that after the day of Judgment, the wicked are all Eternally
to be punished in the Valley of Hinnon; or that they shall so
rise again, as to be ever after under ground, or under water;
or that after the Resurrection, they shall no more see one another;
nor stir from one place to another; it followeth, me thinks,
very necessarily, that that which is thus said concerning Hell Fire,
is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there is a proper sense
to bee enquired after, (for of all Metaphors there is some reall ground,
that may be expressed in proper words) both of the Place of Hell,
and the nature of Hellish Torment, and Tormenters.

Satan, Devill, Not Proper Names, But Appellatives
And first for the Tormenters, wee have their nature, and properties,
exactly and properly delivered by the names of, The Enemy, or Satan;
The Accuser, or Diabolus; The Destroyer, or Abbadon.  Which significant
names, Satan, Devill, Abbadon, set not forth to us any Individuall
person, as proper names use to doe; but onely an office, or quality;
and are therefore Appellatives; which ought not to have been
left untranslated, as they are, in the Latine, and Modern Bibles;
because thereby they seem to be the proper names of Daemons;
and men are the more easily seduced to beleeve the doctrine
of Devills; which at that time was the Religion of the Gentiles,
and contrary to that of Moses, and of Christ.

And because by the Enemy, the Accuser, and Destroyer, is meant,
the Enemy of them that shall be in the Kingdome of God; therefore
if the Kingdome of God after the Resurrection, bee upon the Earth,
(as in the former Chapter I have shewn by Scripture it seems to be,)
The Enemy, and his Kingdome must be on Earth also.  For so also was it,
in the time before the Jews had deposed God.  For Gods Kingdome
was in Palestine; and the Nations round about, were the Kingdomes
of the Enemy; and consequently by Satan, is meant any Earthly
Enemy of the Church.

Torments Of Hell
The Torments of Hell, are expressed sometimes, by "weeping,
and gnashing of teeth," as Mat. 8.12.  Sometimes, by "the worm
of Conscience;" as Isa.66.24. and Mark 9.44, 46, 48; sometimes,
by Fire, as in the place now quoted, "where the worm dyeth not,
and the fire is not quenched," and many places beside: sometimes
by "Shame, and contempt," as Dan. 12.2. "And many of them that
sleep in the dust of the Earth, shall awake; some to Everlasting life;
and some to shame, and everlasting contempt."  All which places
design metaphorically a grief, and discontent of mind, from the
sight of that Eternall felicity in others, which they themselves
through their own incredulity, and disobedience have lost.
And because such felicity in others, is not sensible but by
comparison with their own actuall miseries; it followeth that
they are to suffer such bodily paines, and calamities, as are
incident to those, who not onely live under evill and cruell
Governours, but have also for Enemy, the Eternall King of the Saints,
God Almighty.  And amongst these bodily paines, is to be reckoned
also to every one of the wicked a second Death.  For though
the Scripture bee clear for an universall Resurrection; yet wee
do not read, that to any of the Reprobate is promised an Eternall life.
For whereas St. Paul (1 Cor. 15.42, 43.) to the question concerning
what bodies men shall rise with again, saith, that "the body
is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; It is sown
in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weaknesse,
it is raised in power;" Glory and Power cannot be applyed to
the bodies of the wicked: Nor can the name of Second Death,
bee applyed to those that can never die but once: And although
in Metaphoricall speech, a Calamitous life Everlasting, may bee
called an Everlasting Death yet it cannot well be understood
of a Second Death.  The fire prepared for the wicked, is an
Everlasting Fire: that is to say, the estate wherein no man
can be without torture, both of body and mind, after the Resurrection,
shall endure for ever; and in that sense the Fire shall be unquenchable,
and the torments Everlasting: but it cannot thence be inferred,
that hee who shall be cast into that fire, or be tormented with
those torments, shall endure, and resist them so, as to be
eternally burnt, and tortured, and yet never be destroyed, nor die.
And though there be many places that affirm Everlasting Fire,
and Torments (into which men may be cast successively one after
another for ever;) yet I find none that affirm there shall bee
an Eternall Life therein of any individuall person; but on
the contrary, an Everlasting Death, which is the Second Death:
(Apoc. 20. 13,14.) "For after Death, and the Grave shall have
delivered up the dead which were in them, and every man be judged
according to his works; Death and the Grave shall also be cast
into the Lake of Fire.  This is the Second Death."  Whereby it is
evident, that there is to bee a Second Death of every one that
shall bee condemned at the day of Judgement, after which hee
shall die no more.

The Joyes Of Life Eternall, And Salvation
The Same Thing
Salvation From Sin, And From Misery, All One
The joyes of Life Eternall, are in Scripture comprehended all
under the name of SALVATION, or Being Saved.  To be saved,
is to be secured, either respectively, against speciall Evills,
or absolutely against all Evill, comprehending Want, Sicknesse,
and Death it self.  And because man was created in a condition
Immortall, not subject to corruption, and consequently to nothing
that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature; and fell from that
happinesse by the sin of Adam; it followeth, that to be Saved From Sin,
is to be saved from all the Evill, and Calamities that Sinne hath
brought upon us.  And therefore in the Holy Scripture, Remission
of Sinne, and Salvation from Death and Misery, is the same thing,
as it appears by the words of our Saviour, who having cured a man
sick of the Palsey, by saying, (Mat. 9.2.) "Son be of good cheer,
thy Sins be forgiven thee;" and knowing that the Scribes took for
blasphemy, that a man should pretend to forgive Sins, asked them
(v.5.) "whether it were easier to say, Thy Sinnes be forgiven thee,
or, Arise and walk;" signifying thereby, that it was all one,
as to the saving of the sick, to say, "Thy Sins are forgiven,"
and "Arise and walk;" and that he used that form of speech,
onely to shew he had power to forgive Sins.  And it is besides
evident in reason, that since Death and Misery, were the punishments
of Sin, the discharge of Sinne, must also be a discharge of Death
and Misery; that is to say, Salvation absolute, such as the faithfull
are to enjoy after the day of Judgment, by the power, and favour
of Jesus Christ, who for that cause is called our SAVIOUR.

Concerning Particular Salvations, such as are understood, 1 Sam. 14.39.
"as the Lord liveth that saveth Israel," that is, from their
temporary enemies, and 2 Sam. 22.4. "Thou art my Saviour,
thou savest me from violence;"  and 2 Kings 13.5. "God gave
the Israelites a Saviour, and so they were delivered from the
hand of the Assyrians," and the like, I need say nothing;
there being neither difficulty, nor interest, to corrupt the
interpretation of texts of that kind.

The Place Of Eternall Salvation
But concerning the Generall Salvation, because it must be in the
Kingdome of Heaven, there is great difficulty concerning the Place.
On one side, by Kingdome (which is an estate ordained by men
for their perpetuall security against enemies, and want) it seemeth
that this Salvation should be on Earth.  For by Salvation is set
forth unto us, a glorious Reign of our King, by Conquest; not a
safety by Escape: and therefore there where we look for Salvation,
we must look also for Triumph; and before Triumph, for Victory;
and before Victory, for Battell; which cannot well be supposed,
shall be in Heaven.  But how good soever this reason may be,
I will not trust to it, without very evident places of Scripture.
The state of Salvation is described at large, Isaiah, 33.
ver. 20,21,22,23,24.

"Look upon Zion, the City of our solemnities, thine eyes shall
see Jerusalem a quiet habitation, a tabernacle that shall not
be taken down; not one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed,
neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken.

But there the glorious Lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers,
and streams; wherein shall goe no Gally with oares; neither shall
gallant ship passe thereby.

For the Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our Lawgiver, the Lord
is our King, he will save us.

Thy tacklings are loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast;
they could not spread the sail: then is the prey of a great
spoil divided; the lame take the prey.

And the Inhabitant shall not say, I am sicke; the people that
shall dwell therein shall be forgiven their Iniquity."

In which words wee have the place from whence Salvation is to proceed,
"Jerusalem, a quiet habitation;" the Eternity of it, "a tabernacle
that shall not be taken down," &c. The Saviour of it, "the Lord,
their Judge, their Lawgiver, their King, he will save us;"
the Salvation, "the Lord shall be to them as a broad mote of
swift waters," &c. the condition of their Enemies, "their tacklings
are loose, their masts weake, the lame shal take the spoil of them."
The condition of the Saved, "The Inhabitants shall not say, I am sick:"
And lastly, all this is comprehended in Forgivenesse of sin,
"The people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity."
By which it is evident, that Salvation shall be on Earth, then,
when God shall reign, (at the coming again of Christ) in Jerusalem;
and from Jerusalem shall proceed the Salvation of the Gentiles
that shall be received into Gods Kingdome; as is also more expressely
declared by the same Prophet, Chap. 66.20, 21. "And they," (that is,
the Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage) "shall bring all your brethren,
for an offering to the Lord, out of all nations, upon horses,
and in charets, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts,
to my holy mountain, Jerusalem, saith the Lord, as the Children of Israel
bring an offering in a clean vessell into the House of the Lord.
And I will also take of them for Priests and for Levites,
saith the Lord:" Whereby it is manifest, that the chief seat
of Gods Kingdome (which is the Place, from whence the Salvation
of us that were Gentiles, shall proceed) shall be Jerusalem;
And the same is also confirmed by our Saviour, in his discourse
with the woman of Samaria, concerning the place of Gods worship;
to whom he saith, John 4.22. that the Samaritans worshipped
they know not what, but the Jews worship what they knew, "For Salvation
is of the Jews (Ex Judais, that is, begins at the Jews): as if he
should say, you worship God, but know not by whom he wil save you,
as we doe, that know it shall be one of the tribe of Judah, a Jew,
not a Samaritan.  And therefore also the woman not impertinently
answered him again, "We know the Messias shall come." So that which
our saviour saith, "Salvation is from the Jews," is the same
that Paul sayes (Rom. 1.16,17.) "The Gospel is the power of God
to Salvation to every one that beleeveth; To the Jew first,
and also to the Greek.  For therein is the righteousnesse of God
revealed from faith to faith;" from the faith of the Jew,
to the faith of the Gentile.  In the like sense the Prophet Joel
describing the day of Judgment, (chap. 2.30,31.) that God would
"shew wonders in heaven, and in earth, bloud, and fire, and
pillars of smoak.  The Sun should be turned to darknesse,
and the Moon into bloud, before the great and terrible day
of the Lord come," he addeth verse 32. "and it shall come to passe,
that whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved.
For in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem shall be Salvation."  And Obadiah
verse 17 saith the same, "Upon Mount Zion shall be Deliverance;
and there shall be holinesse, and the house of Jacob shall possesse
their possessions," that is, the possessions of the Heathen,
which possessions he expresseth more particularly in the following
verses, by the Mount of Esau, the Land of the Philistines, the Fields
of Ephraim, of Samaria, Gilead, and the Cities of the South,
and concludes with these words, "the Kingdom shall be the Lords."
All these places are for Salvation, and the Kingdome of God
(after the day of Judgement) upon Earth.  On the other side,
I have not found any text that can probably be drawn, to prove
any Ascension of the Saints into Heaven; that is to say, into any
Coelum Empyreum, or other aetheriall Region; saving that it is called
the Kingdome of Heaven; which name it may have, because God,
that was King of the Jews, governed them by his commands, sent to Moses
by Angels from Heaven, to reduce them to their obedience; and shall
send him thence again, to rule both them, and all other faithfull men,
from the day of Judgment, Everlastingly: or from that, that the
Throne of this our Great King is in Heaven; whereas the Earth
is but his Footstoole.  But that the Subjects of God should have
any place as high as his throne, or higher than his Footstoole,
it seemeth not sutable to the dignity of a King, nor can I find
any evident text for it in holy Scripture.

From this that hath been said of the Kingdom of God, and of Salvation,
it is not hard to interpret, what is meant by the WORLD TO COME.
There are three worlds mentioned in Scripture, the Old World,
the Present World, and the World to Come.  Of the first, St. Peter
speaks, (2 Pet. 2.5.) "If God spared not the Old World, but saved Noah
the eighth person, a Preacher of righteousnesse, bringing the flood
upon the world of the ungodly," &c.  So the First World, was from Adam
to the generall Flood.  Of the present World, our Saviour speaks
(John 18.36.) "My Kingdome is not of this World."  For he came onely
to teach men the way of Salvation, and to renew the Kingdome
of his Father, by his doctrine.  Of the World to come, St. Peter
speaks, (2 Pet. 3. 13.) "Neverthelesse we according to his promise
look for new Heavens, and a new Earth."  This is that WORLD,
wherein Christ coming down from Heaven, in the clouds, with great power,
and glory, shall send his Angels, and shall gather together his elect,
from the four winds, and from the uttermost parts of the Earth,
and thence forth reign over them, (under his Father) Everlastingly.

Redemption
Salvation of a sinner, supposeth a precedent REDEMPTION; for he
that is once guilty of Sin, is obnoxious to the Penalty of
the same; and must pay (or some other for him) such Ransome,
as he that is offended, and has him in his power, shall require.
And seeing the person offended, is Almighty God, in whose power
are all things; such Ransome is to be paid before Salvation can
be acquired, as God hath been pleased to require.  By this Ransome,
is not intended a satisfaction for Sin, equivalent to the Offence,
which no sinner for himselfe, nor righteous man can ever be able
to make for another; The dammage a man does to another, he may make
amends for by restitution, or recompence, but sin cannot be
taken away by recompence; for that were to make the liberty to sin,
a thing vendible.  But sins may bee pardoned to the repentant,
either Gratis, or upon such penalty, as God is pleased to accept.
That which God usually accepted in the Old Testament, was some
Sacrifice, or Oblation.  To forgive sin is not an act of Injustice,
though the punishment have been threatned.  Even amongst men,
though the promise of Good, bind the promiser; yet threats,
that is to say, promises, of Evill, bind them not; much lesse
shall they bind God, who is infinitely more mercifull then men.
Our Saviour Christ therefore to Redeem us, did not in that sense
satisfie for the Sins of men, as that his Death, of its own vertue,
could make it unjust in God to punish sinners with Eternall death;
but did make that Sacrifice, and Oblation of himself, at his
first coming, which God was pleased to require, for the Salvation
at his second coming, of such as in the mean time should repent,
and beleeve in him.  And though this act of our Redemption,
be not alwaies in Scripture called a Sacrifice, and Oblation,
but sometimes a Price, yet by Price we are not to understand
any thing, by the value whereof, he could claim right to a pardon
for us, from his offended Father, but that Price which God the Father
was pleased in mercy to demand.



CHAPTER XXXIX

OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE WORD CHURCH


Church The Lords House
The word Church, (Ecclesia) signifieth in the Books of Holy Scripture
divers things.  Sometimes (though not often) it is taken for Gods House,
that is to say, for a Temple, wherein Christians assemble to perform
holy duties publiquely; as, 1 Cor. 14. ver. 34. "Let your women keep
silence in the Churches:" but this is Metaphorically put, for the
Congregation there assembled; and hath been since used for the Edifice
it self, to distinguish between the Temples of Christians, and Idolaters.
The Temple of Jerusalem was Gods House, and the House of Prayer;
and so is any Edifice dedicated by Christians to the worship of Christ,
Christs House: and therefore the Greek Fathers call it Kuriake, The Lords
House; and thence, in our language it came to be called Kyrke, and Church.

Ecclesia Properly What
Church (when not taken for a House) signifieth the same that Ecclesia
signified in the Grecian Common-wealths; that is to say, a Congregation,
or an Assembly of Citizens, called forth, to hear the Magistrate
speak unto them; and which in the Common-wealth of Rome was called
Concio, as he that spake was called Ecclesiastes, and Concionator.
And when they were called forth by lawfull Authority, (Acts 19.39.)
it was Ecclesia Legitima, a Lawfull Church, Ennomos Ecclesia.
But when they were excited by tumultuous, and seditious clamor,
then it was a confused Church, Ecclesia Sugkechumene.

It is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be
of the Congregation, though not actually assembled; that is to say,
for the whole multitude of Christian men, how far soever they be
dispersed: as (Act. 8.3.) where it is said, that "Saul made havock of
the Church:" And in this sense is Christ said to be Head of the Church.
And sometimes for a certain part of Christians, as (Col. 4.15.)
"Salute the Church that is in his house."  Sometimes also for
the Elect onely; as (Ephes. 5.27.) "A Glorious Church, without spot,
or wrinkle, holy, and without blemish;" which is meant of the
Church Triumphant, or, Church To Come.  Sometimes, for a Congregation
assembled, of professors of Christianity, whether their profession
be true, or counterfeit, as it is understood, Mat. 18.17. where
it is said, "Tell it to the Church, and if hee neglect to hear
the Church, let him be to thee as a Gentile, or Publican.

In What Sense The Church Is One Person
Church Defined
And in this last sense only it is that the Church can be taken
for one Person; that is to say, that it can be said to have power
to will, to pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws,
or to doe any other action whatsoever; For without authority
from a lawfull Congregation, whatsoever act be done in a concourse
of people, it is the particular act of every one of those that
were present, and gave their aid to the performance of it; and not
the act of them all in grosse, as of one body; much lesse that act
of them that were absent, or that being present, were not willing
it should be done.  According to this sense, I define a CHURCH to be,
"A company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person
of one Soveraign; at whose command they ought to assemble, and without
whose authority they ought not to assemble."  And because in all
Common-wealths, that Assembly, which is without warrant from the
Civil Soveraign, is unlawful; that Church also, which is assembled
in any Common-wealth, that hath forbidden them to assemble,
is an unlawfull Assembly.

A Christian Common-wealth, And A Church All One
It followeth also, that there is on Earth, no such universall Church
as all Christians are bound to obey; because there is no power on Earth,
to which all other Common-wealths are subject: There are Christians,
in the Dominions of severall Princes and States; but every one of them
is subject to that Common-wealth, whereof he is himself a member;
and consequently, cannot be subject to the commands of any other Person.
And therefore a Church, such as one as is capable to Command, to Judge,
Absolve, Condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with
a Civil Common-wealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called
a Civill State, for that the subjects of it are Men; and a Church,
for that the subjects thereof are Christians.  Temporall and Spirituall
Government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men
see double, and mistake their Lawfull Soveraign.  It is true,
that the bodies of the faithfull, after the Resurrection shall be
not onely Spirituall, but Eternall; but in this life they are grosse,
and corruptible.  There is therefore no other Government in this life,
neither of State, nor Religion, but Temporall; nor teaching of any
doctrine, lawfull to any Subject, which the Governour both of the State,
and of the Religion, forbiddeth to be taught: And that Governor must
be one; or else there must needs follow Faction, and Civil war
in the Common-wealth, between the Church and State; between
Spiritualists, and Temporalists; between the Sword Of Justice,
and the Shield Of Faith; and (which is more) in every Christian mans
own brest, between the Christian, and the Man.  The Doctors of
the Church, are called Pastors; so also are Civill Soveraignes:
But if Pastors be not subordinate one to another, so as that there
may bee one chief Pastor, men will be taught contrary Doctrines,
whereof both may be, and one must be false.  Who that one chief
Pastor is, according to the law of Nature, hath been already shewn;
namely, that it is the Civill Soveraign; And to whom the Scripture
hath assigned that Office, we shall see in the Chapters following.



CHAPTER XL

OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD, IN ABRAHAM,
MOSES, THE HIGH PRIESTS, AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH


The Soveraign Rights Of Abraham
The Father of the Faithfull, and first in the Kingdome of God
by Covenant, was Abraham.  For with him was the Covenant first made;
wherein he obliged himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge
and obey the commands of God; not onely such, as he could take
notice of, (as Morall Laws,) by the light of Nature; but also such,
as God should in speciall manner deliver to him by Dreams and Visions.
For as to the Morall law, they were already obliged, and needed not
have been contracted withall, by promise of the Land of Canaan.
Nor was there any Contract, that could adde to, or strengthen
the Obligation, by which both they, and all men else were bound
naturally to obey God Almighty: And therefore the Covenant which
Abraham made with God, was to take for the Commandement of God,
that which in the name of God was commanded him, in a Dream,
or Vision, and to deliver it to his family, and cause them
to observe the same.

Abraham Had The Sole Power Of Ordering
The Religion Of His Own People
In this Contract of God with Abraham, wee may observe three points
of important consequence in the government of Gods people.
First, that at the making of this Covenant, God spake onely
to Abraham; and therefore contracted not with any of his family,
or seed, otherwise then as their wills (which make the essence of
all Covenants) were before the Contract involved in the will of Abraham;
who was therefore supposed to have had a lawfull power, to make them
perform all that he covenanted for them.  According whereunto
(Gen 18.18, 19.) God saith, "All the Nations of the Earth shall
be blessed in him, For I know him that he will command his children
and his houshold after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord."
From whence may be concluded this first point, that they to whom God
hath not spoken immediately, are to receive the positive commandements
of God, from their Soveraign; as the family and seed of Abraham
did from Abraham their Father, and Lord, and Civill Soveraign.
And Consequently in every Common-wealth, they who have no
supernaturall Revelation to the contrary, ought to obey the laws of
their own Soveraign, in the externall acts and profession of Religion.
As for the inward Thought, and beleef of men, which humane Governours
can take no notice of, (for God onely knoweth the heart) they are not
voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will,
and of the power of God; and consequently fall not under obligation.

No Pretence Of Private Spirit Against
The Religion Of Abraham
From whence proceedeth another point, that it was not unlawfull
for Abraham, when any of his Subjects should pretend Private Vision,
or Spirit, or other Revelation from God, for the countenancing
of any doctrine which Abraham should forbid, or when they followed,
or adhered to any such pretender, to punish them; and consequently
that it is lawfull now for the Soveraign to punish any man that
shall oppose his Private Spirit against the Laws: For hee hath
the same place in the Common-wealth, that Abraham had in his own Family.

Abraham Sole Judge, And Interpreter Of What God Spake
There ariseth also from the same, a third point; that as none but
Abraham in his family, so none but the Soveraign in a Christian
Common-wealth, can take notice what is, or what is not the Word of God.
For God spake onely to Abraham; and it was he onely, that was able
to know what God said, and to interpret the same to his family:
And therefore also, they that have the place of Abraham in a
Common-wealth, are the onely Interpreters of what God hath spoken.

The Authority Of Moses Whereon Grounded
The same Covenant was renewed with Isaac; and afterwards with Jacob;
but afterwards no more, till the Israelites were freed from
the Egyptians, and arrived at the Foot of Mount Sinai: and then
it was renewed by Moses (as I have said before, chap. 35.)
in such manner, as they became from that time forward the Peculiar
Kingdome of God; whose Lieutenant was Moses, for his owne time;
and the succession to that office was setled upon Aaron, and his heirs
after him, to bee to God a Sacerdotall Kingdome for ever.

By this constitution, a Kingdome is acquired to God. But seeing Moses
had no authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the right
of Abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; it appeareth
not as yet, that the people were obliged to take him for Gods Lieutenant,
longer than they beleeved that God spake unto him.  And therefore
his authority (notwithstanding the Covenant they made with God)
depended yet merely upon the opinion they had of his Sanctity,
and of the reality of his Conferences with God, and the verity
of his Miracles; which opinion coming to change, they were no more
obliged to take any thing for the law of God, which he propounded
to them in Gods name.  We are therefore to consider, what other ground
there was, of their obligation to obey him.  For it could not be
the commandement of God that could oblige them; because God spake
not to them immediately, but by the mediation of Moses Himself;
And our Saviour saith of himself, (John 5. 31.) "If I bear
witnesse of my self, my witnesse is not true," much lesse
if Moses bear witnesse of himselfe, (especially in a claim of
Kingly power over Gods people) ought his testimony to be received.
His authority therefore, as the authority of all other Princes, must be
grounded on the Consent of the People, and their Promise to obey him.
And so it was: for "the people" (Exod. 20.18.) "when they saw
the Thunderings, and the Lightnings, and the noyse of the Trumpet,
and the mountaine smoaking, removed, and stood a far off.
And they said unto Moses, speak thou with us, and we will hear,
but let not God speak with us lest we die."  Here was their
promise of obedience; and by this it was they obliged themselves
to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them for the Commandement of God.

Moses Was (Under God) Soveraign Of The Jews,
All His Own Time, Though Aaron Had The Priesthood
And notwithstanding the Covenant constituted a Sacerdotall Kingdome,
that is to say, a Kingdome hereditary to Aaron; yet that is to be
understood of the succession, after Moses should bee dead.
For whosoever ordereth, and establisheth the Policy, as first founder
of a Common-wealth (be it Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy)
must needs have Soveraign Power over the people all the while
he is doing of it.  And that Moses had that power all his own time,
is evidently affirmed in the Scripture.  First, in the text last
before cited, because the people promised obedience, not to Aaron
but to him.  Secondly, (Exod. 24.1, 2.) "And God said unto Moses,
Come up unto the Lord, thou, and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy
of the Elders of Israel.  And Moses alone shall come neer the Lord,
but they shall not come nigh, neither shall the people goe up with him."
By which it is plain, that Moses who was alone called up to God,
(and not Aaron, nor the other Priests, nor the Seventy Elders,
nor the People who were forbidden to come up) was alone he,
that represented to the Israelites the Person of God; that is to say,
was their sole Soveraign under God.  And though afterwards it be said
(verse 9.) "Then went up Moses, and Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu,
and seventy of the Elders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel,
and there was under his feet, as it were a paved work of a
saphire stone," &c. yet this was not till after Moses had been
with God before, and had brought to the people the words which
God had said to him.  He onely went for the businesse of the people;
the others, as the Nobles of his retinue, were admitted for honour
to that speciall grace, which was not allowed to the people;
which was, (as in the verse after appeareth) to see God and live.
"God laid not his hand upon them, they saw God and did eat and drink"
(that is, did live), but did not carry any commandement from him
to the people.  Again, it is every where said, "The Lord spake
unto Moses," as in all other occasions of Government; so also
in the ordering of the Ceremonies of Religion, contained in the 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 Chapters of Exodus, and throughout Leviticus:
to Aaron seldome.  The Calfe that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire.
Lastly, the question of the Authority of Aaron, by occasion of his
and Miriams mutiny against Moses, was (Numbers 12.) judged by God
himself for Moses.  So also in the question between Moses, and the People,
when Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, and two hundred and fifty Princes
of the Assembly "gathered themselves together" (Numbers 16. 3)
"against Moses, and against Aaron, and said unto them, 'Ye take too
much upon you, seeing all the congregation are Holy, every one of them,
and the Lord is amongst them, why lift you up your selves above
the congregation of the Lord?'"  God caused the Earth to swallow Corah,
Dathan, and Abiram with their wives and children alive, and consumed
those two hundred and fifty Princes with fire.  Therefore neither Aaron,
nor the People, nor any Aristocracy of the chief Princes of the People,
but Moses alone had next under God the Soveraignty over the Israelites:
And that not onely in causes of Civill Policy, but also of Religion;
For Moses onely spake with God, and therefore onely could tell the People,
what it was that God required at their hands.  No man upon pain of death
might be so presumptuous as to approach the Mountain where God talked
with Moses.  "Thou shalt set bounds" (saith the Lord, Exod 19. 12.)
"to the people round about, and say, Take heed to your selves that you
goe not up into the Mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever
toucheth the Mount shall surely be put to death."  and again
(verse 21.) Get down, charge the people, lest they break through
unto the Lord to gaze."  Out of which we may conclude, that
whosoever in a Christian Common-wealth holdeth the place of Moses,
is the sole Messenger of God, and Interpreter of his Commandements.
And according hereunto, no man ought in the interpretation of
the Scripture to proceed further then the bounds which are set
by their severall Soveraigns.  For the Scriptures since God now
speaketh in them, are the Mount Sinai; the bounds whereof are
the Laws of them that represent Gods Person on Earth.  To look upon them
and therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and learn to fear him
is allowed; but to interpret them; that is, to pry into what God
saith to him whom he appointeth to govern under him, and make
themselves Judges whether he govern as God commandeth him, or not,
is to transgresse the bounds God hath set us, and to gaze
upon God irreverently.

All Spirits Were Subordinate To The Spirit Of Moses
There was no Prophet in the time of Moses, nor pretender to
the Spirit of God, but such as Moses had approved, and Authorized.
For there were in his time but Seventy men, that are said to
Prophecy by the Spirit of God, and these were of all Moses
his election; concerning whom God saith to Moses (Numb. 11.16.)
"Gather to mee Seventy of the Elders of Israel, whom thou knowest
to be the Elders of the People."  To these God imparted his Spirit;
but it was not a different Spirit from that of Moses; for it is said
(verse 25.) "God came down in a cloud, and took of the Spirit
that was upon Moses, and gave it to the Seventy Elders."  But as I
have shewn before (chap. 36.) by Spirit, is understood the Mind;
so that the sense of the place is no other than this, that God
endued them with a mind conformable, and subordinate to that
of Moses, that they might Prophecy, that is to say, speak to
the people in Gods name, in such manner, as to set forward
(as Ministers of Moses, and by his authority) such doctrine as
was agreeable to Moses his doctrine.  For they were but Ministers;
and when two of them Prophecyed in the Camp, it was thought a new
and unlawfull thing; and as it is in the 27. and 28. verses of
the same Chapter, they were accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses
to forbid them, as not knowing that it was by Moses his Spirit
that they Prophecyed.  By which it is manifest, that no Subject ought
to pretend to Prophecy, or to the Spirit, in opposition to the
doctrine established by him, whom God hath set in the place of Moses.

After Moses The Soveraignty Was In The High Priest
Aaron being dead, and after him also Moses, the Kingdome, as being
a Sacerdotall Kingdome, descended by vertue of the Covenant,
to Aarons Son, Eleazar the High Priest: And God declared him
(next under himself) for Soveraign, at the same time that he
appointed Joshua for the Generall of their Army.  For thus God saith
expressely (Numb. 27.21.) concerning Joshua; "He shall stand before
Eleazar the Priest, who shall ask counsell for him, before the Lord,
at his word shall they goe out, and at his word they shall come in,
both he, and all the Children of Israel with him:" Therefore the
Supreme Power of making War and Peace, was in the Priest.
The Supreme Power of Judicature belonged also to the High Priest:
For the Book of the Law was in their keeping; and the Priests
and Levites onely were the subordinate Judges in causes Civill,
as appears in Deut. 17.8, 9, 10.  And for the manner of Gods worship,
there was never doubt made, but that the High Priest till the time
of Saul, had the Supreme Authority.  Therefore the Civill and
Ecclesiasticall Power were both joined together in one and the
same person, the High Priest; and ought to bee so, in whosoever
governeth by Divine Right; that is, by Authority immediate from God.

Of The Soveraign Power Between
The Time Of Joshua And Of Saul
After the death of Joshua, till the time of Saul, the time between
is noted frequently in the Book of Judges, "that there was in those
dayes no King in Israel;" and sometimes with this addition, that
"every man did that which was right in his own eyes."  By which is
to bee understood, that where it is said, "there was no King," is meant,
"there was no Soveraign Power" in Israel.  And so it was, if we
consider the Act, and Exercise of such power.  For after the death
of Joshua, & Eleazar, "there arose another generation" (Judges 2.10.)
"that knew not the Lord, nor the works which he had done for Israel,
but did evill in the sight of the Lord, and served Baalim."
And the Jews had that quality which St. Paul noteth, "to look
for a sign," not onely before they would submit themselves to
the government of Moses, but also after they had obliged themselves
by their submission.  Whereas Signs, and Miracles had for End
to procure Faith, not to keep men from violating it, when they
have once given it; for to that men are obliged by the law of Nature.
But if we consider not the Exercise, but the Right of governing,
the Soveraign power was still in the High Priest.  Therefore whatsoever
obedience was yeelded to any of the Judges, (who were men chosen by God extraordinarily, to save his rebellious subjects out of the hands
of the enemy,) it cannot bee drawn into argument against the Right
the High Priest had to the Soveraign Power, in all matters,
both of Policy and Religion.  And neither the Judges, nor Samuel
himselfe had an ordinary, but extraordinary calling to the Government;
and were obeyed by the Israelites, not out of duty, but out of
reverence to their favour with God, appearing in their wisdome,
courage, or felicity.  Hitherto therefore the Right of Regulating
both the Policy, and the Religion, were inseparable.

Of The Rights Of The Kings Of Israel
To the Judges, succeeded Kings; And whereas before, all authority,
both in Religion, and Policy, was in the High Priest; so now it was
all in the King.  For the Soveraignty over the people, which was before,
not onely by vertue of the Divine Power, but also by a particular pact
of the Israelites in God, and next under him, in the High Priest,
as his Viceregent on earth, was cast off by the People, with the
consent of God himselfe.  For when they said to Samuel (1 Sam. 8.5.)
"make us a King to judge us, like all the Nations," they signified
that they would no more bee governed by the commands that should bee
laid upon them by the Priest, in the name of God; but by one that
should command them in the same manner that all other nations
were commanded; and consequently in deposing the High Priest
of Royall authority, they deposed that peculiar Government of God.
And yet God consented to it, saying to Samuel (verse 7.) "Hearken
unto the voice of the People, in all that they shall say unto thee;
for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected mee,
that I should not reign over them."  Having therefore rejected God,
in whose Right the Priests governed, there was no authority left
to the Priests, but such as the King was pleased to allow them;
which was more, or lesse, according as the Kings were good, or evill.
And for the Government of Civill affaires, it is manifest, it was all
in the hands of the King.  For in the same Chapter, verse 20. They say
they will be like all the Nations; that their King shall be their Judge,
and goe before them, and fight their battells; that is, he shall have
the whole authority, both in Peace and War.  In which is contained also
the ordering of Religion; for there was no other Word of God in that time,
by which to regulate Religion, but the Law of Moses, which was
their Civill Law.  Besides, we read (1 Kings 2.27.) that Solomon
"thrust out Abiathar from being Priest before the Lord:" He had
therefore authority over the High Priest, as over any other Subject;
which is a great mark of Supremacy in Religion.  And we read also
(1 Kings 8.) that hee dedicated the Temple; that he blessed the People;
and that he himselfe in person made that excellent prayer, used in
the Consecrations of all Churches, and houses of Prayer; which is
another great mark of Supremacy in Religion.  Again, we read
(2 Kings 22.) that when there was question concerning the Book
of the Law found in the Temple, the same was not decided by
the High Priest, but Josiah sent both him, and others to enquire
concerning it, of Hulda, the Prophetesse; which is another mark
of the Supremacy in Religion.  Lastly, wee read (1 Chro. 26.30.)
that David made Hashabiah and his brethren, Hebronites, Officers
of Israel among them Westward, "in all businesse of the Lord,
and in the service of the King."  Likewise (verse 32.) that hee
made other Hebronites, "rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites,
and the halfe tribe of Manasseh" (these were the rest of Israel
that dwelt beyond Jordan) "for every matter pertaining to God,
and affairs of the King."  Is not this full Power, both Temporall
and Spirituall, as they call it, that would divide it? To conclude;
from the first institution of Gods Kingdome, to the Captivity,
the Supremacy of Religion, was in the same hand with that of
the Civill Soveraignty; and the Priests office after the election
of Saul, was not Magisteriall, but Ministeriall.

The Practice Of Supremacy In Religion,
Was Not In The Time Of The Kings,
According To The Right Thereof
Notwithstanding the government both in Policy and Religion,
were joined, first in the High Priests, and afterwards in the Kings,
so far forth as concerned the Right; yet it appeareth by the same
Holy History, that the people understood it not; but there being
amongst them a great part, and probably the greatest part, that no
longer than they saw great miracles, or (which is equivalent to
a miracle) great abilities, or great felicity in the enterprises
of their Governours, gave sufficient credit, either to the fame
of Moses, or to the Colloquies between God and the Priests;
they took occasion as oft as their Governours displeased them,
by blaming sometimes the Policy, sometimes the Religion, to change
the Government, or revolt from their Obedience at their pleasure:
And from thence proceeded from time to time the civill troubles,
divisions, and calamities of the Nation.  As for example, after
the death of Eleazar and Joshua, the next generation which had not
seen the wonders of God, but were left to their own weak reason,
not knowing themselves obliged by the Covenant of a Sacerdotall Kingdome,
regarded no more the Commandement of the Priest, nor any law of Moses,
but did every man that which was right in his own eyes; and obeyed
in Civill affairs, such men, as from time to time they thought able
to deliver them from the neighbour Nations that oppressed them;
and consulted not with God (as they ought to doe,) but with such men,
or women, as they guessed to bee Prophets by their Praedictions
of things to come; and thought they had an Idol in their Chappel,
yet if they had a Levite for their Chaplain, they made account
they worshipped the God of Israel.

And afterwards when they demanded a King, after the manner of
the nations; yet it was not with a design to depart from the worship
of God their King; but despairing of the justice of the sons of Samuel,
they would have a King to judg them in Civill actions; but not that
they would allow their King to change the Religion which they thought
was recommended to them by Moses.  So that they alwaies kept in store
a pretext, either of Justice, or Religion, to discharge themselves
of their obedience, whensoever they had hope to prevaile.
Samuel was displeased with the people, for that they desired
a King, (for God was their King already, and Samuel had but
an authority under him); yet did Samuel, when Saul observed not
his counsell, in destroying Agag as God had commanded, anoint
another King, namely David, to take the succession from his heirs.
Rehoboam was no Idolater; but when the people thought him an Oppressor;
that Civil pretence carried from him ten Tribes to Jeroboam an Idolater.
And generally through the whole History of the Kings, as well of Judah,
as of Israel, there were Prophets that alwaies controlled the Kings,
for transgressing the Religion; and sometimes also for Errours of State;
(2 Chro. 19. 2.) as Jehosaphat was reproved by the Prophet Jehu,
for aiding the King of Israel against the Syrians; and Hezekiah,
by Isaiah, for shewing his treasures to the Ambassadors of Babylon.
By all which it appeareth, that though the power both of State
and Religion were in the Kings; yet none of them were uncontrolled
in the use of it, but such as were gracious for their own naturall
abilities, or felicities.  So that from the practise of those times,
there can no argument be drawn, that the right of Supremacy in Religion
was not in the Kings, unlesse we place it in the Prophets; and conclude,
that because Hezekiah praying to the Lord before the Cherubins,
was not answered from thence, nor then, but afterwards by the
Prophet Isaiah, therefore Isaiah was supreme Head of the Church;
or because Josiah consulted Hulda the Prophetesse, concerning
the Book of the Law, that therefore neither he, nor the High Priest,
but Hulda the Prophetesse had the Supreme authority in matter
of Religion; which I thinke is not the opinion of any Doctor.

After The Captivity The Jews Had No
Setled Common-wealth
During the Captivity, the Jews had no Common-wealth at all:
And after their return, though they renewed their Covenant with God,
yet there was no promise made of obedience, neither to Esdras,
nor to any other; And presently after they became subjects to
the Greeks (from whose Customes, and Daemonology, and from the
doctrine of the Cabalists, their Religion became much corrupted):
In such sort as nothing can be gathered from their confusion,
both in State and Religion, concerning the Supremacy in either.
And therefore so far forth as concerneth the Old Testament,
we may conclude, that whosoever had the Soveraignty of the
Common-wealth amongst the Jews, the same had also the Supreme
Authority in matter of Gods externall worship; and represented
Gods Person; that is the person of God the Father; though he
were not called by the name of Father, till such time as he sent
into the world his Son Jesus Christ, to redeem mankind from
their sins, and bring them into his Everlasting Kingdome,
to be saved for evermore.  Of which we are to speak in the
Chapter following.



CHAPTER XLI

OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR


Three Parts Of The Office Of Christ
We find in Holy Scripture three parts of the Office of the Messiah:
the first of a Redeemer, or Saviour: The second of a Pastor,
Counsellour, or Teacher, that is, of a Prophet sent from God,
to convert such as God hath elected to Salvation; The third of a King,
and Eternall King, but under his Father, as Moses and the High Priests
were in their severall times.  And to these three parts are corespondent
three times.  For our Redemption he wrought at his first coming,
by the Sacrifice, wherein he offered up himself for our sinnes
upon the Crosse: our conversion he wrought partly then in his own Person;
and partly worketh now by his Ministers; and will continue to work
till his coming again.  And after his coming again, shall begin
that his glorious Reign over his elect, which is to last eternally.

His Office As A Redeemer
To the Office of a Redeemer, that is, of one that payeth the
Ransome of Sin, (which Ransome is Death,) it appertaineth,
that he was Sacrificed, and thereby bare upon his own head, and carryed
away from us our iniquities, in such sort as God had required.
Not that the death of one man, though without sinne, can satisfie
for the offences of all men, in the rigour of Justice, but in the
Mercy of God, that ordained such Sacrifices for sin, as he was pleased
in his mercy to accept.  In the old Law (as we may read, Leviticus
the 16.) the Lord required, that there should every year once,
bee made an Atonement for the Sins of all Israel, both Priests,
and others; for the doing whereof, Aaron alone was to sacrifice
for himself and the Priests a young Bullock; and for the rest
of the people, he was to receive from them two young Goates,
of which he was to Sacrifice one; but as for the other, which was
the Scape Goat, he was to lay his hands on the head thereof,
and by a confession of the iniquities of the people, to lay them
all on that head, and then by some opportune man, to cause the Goat
to be led into the wildernesse, and there to Escape, and carry away
with him the iniquities of the people.  As the Sacrifice of
the one Goat was a sufficient (because an acceptable) price
for the Ransome of all Israel; so the death of the Messiah,
is a sufficient price, for the Sins of all mankind, because there
was no more required.  Our Saviour Christs sufferings seem to be
here figured, as cleerly, as in the oblation of Isaac, or in any other
type of him in the Old Testament: He was both the sacrificed Goat,
and the Scape Goat; "Hee was oppressed, and he was afflicted
(Isa. 53.7.); he opened not his mouth; he brought as a lamb
to the slaughter, and as a sheep is dumbe before the shearer,
so opened he not his mouth:"  Here he is the Sacrificed Goat.
"He hath born our Griefs, (ver.4.) and carried our sorrows;"
And again, (ver. 6.) "the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquities
of us all:" And so he is the Scape Goat.  "He was cut off from
the land of the living (ver. 8.) for the transgression of my People:"
There again he is the Sacrificed Goat.  And again (ver. 11.)
"he shall bear their sins:" Hee is the Scape Goat.  Thus is the Lamb
of God equivalent to both those Goates; sacrificed, in that he dyed;
and escaping, in his Resurrection; being raised opportunely
by his Father, and removed from the habitation of men in his Ascension.

Christs Kingdome Not Of This World
For as much therefore, as he that Redeemeth, hath no title to
the Thing Redeemed, before the Redemption, and Ransome paid;
and this Ransome was the Death of the Redeemer; it is manifest,
that our Saviour (as man) was not King of those that he Redeemed,
before hee suffered death; that is, during that time hee conversed
bodily on the Earth.  I say, he was not then King in present,
by vertue of the Pact, which the faithfull make with him in Baptisme;
Neverthelesse, by the renewing of their Pact with God in Baptisme,
they were obliged to obey him for King, (under his Father) whensoever
he should be pleased to take the Kingdome upon him.  According whereunto,
our Saviour himself expressely saith, (John 18.36.) "My Kingdome
is not of this world."  Now seeing the Scripture maketh mention
but of two worlds; this that is now, and shall remain to the day
of Judgment, (which is therefore also called, The Last Day;)
and that which shall bee a new Heaven, and a new Earth; the Kingdome
of Christ is not to begin till the general Resurrection.  And that is it
which our Saviour saith, (Mat. 16.27.) "The Son of man shall come
in the glory of his Father, with his Angels; and then he shall
reward every man according to his works."  To reward every man
according to his works, is to execute the Office of a King;
and this is not to be till he come in the glory of his Father,
with his Angells.  When our Saviour saith, (Mat. 23.2.) "The Scribes
and Pharisees sit in Moses seat; All therefore whatsoever they bid
you doe, that observe and doe;" hee declareth plainly, that hee
ascribeth Kingly Power, for that time, not to himselfe, but to them.
And so hee hath also, where he saith, (Luke 12.14.) "Who made mee
a Judge, or Divider over you?"  And (John 12.47.) "I came not
to judge the world, but to save the world."  And yet our Saviour
came into this world that hee might bee a King, and a Judge
in the world to come: For hee was the Messiah, that is, the Christ,
that is, the Anointed Priest, and the Soveraign Prophet of God;
that is to say, he was to have all the power that was in Moses
the Prophet, in the High Priests that succeeded Moses, and in
the Kings that succeeded the Priests.  And St. John saies expressely
(chap. 5. ver. 22.) "The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed
all judgment to the Son."  And this is not repugnant to that other place,
"I came not to judge the world:" for this is spoken of the world present,
the other of the world to come; as also where it is said, that at
the second coming of Christ, (Mat. 19. 28.) 'Yee that have followed me
in the Regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the throne
of his Glory, yee shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging the
twelve tribes of Israel."

The End Of Christs Comming Was To Renew
The Covenant Of The Kingdome Of God,
And To Perswade The Elect To Imbrace It,
Which Was The Second Part Of His Office
If then Christ while hee was on Earth, had no Kingdome in this World,
to what end was his first coming?  It was to restore unto God, by a
new Covenant, the Kingdome, which being his by the Old Covenant, had been
cut off by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul.
Which to doe, he was to preach unto them, that he was the Messiah,
that is, the King promised to them by the Prophets; and to offer
himselfe in sacrifice for the sinnes of them that should by faith
submit themselves thereto; and in case the nation generally should
refuse him, to call to his obedience such as should beleeve in him
amongst the Gentiles.  So that there are two parts of our Saviours
Office during his aboad upon the Earth;  One to Proclaim himself
the Christ; and another by Teaching, and by working of Miracles,
to perswade, and prepare men to live so, as to be worthy of the
Immortality Beleevers were to enjoy, at such time as he should
come in majesty, to take possession of his Fathers Kingdome.
And therefore it is, that the time of his preaching, is often
by himself called the Regeneration; which is not properly a Kingdome,
and thereby a warrant to deny obedience to the Magistrates that
then were, (for hee commanded to obey those that sate then in
Moses chaire, and to pay tribute to Caesar;) but onely an earnest
of the Kingdome of God that was to come, to those to whom God had
given the grace to be his disciples, and to beleeve in him;
For which cause the Godly are said to bee already in the Kingdome
of Grace, as naturalized in that heavenly Kingdome.

The Preaching Of Christ Not Contrary To
The Then Law Of The Jews, Nor Of Caesar
Hitherto therefore there is nothing done, or taught by Christ,
that tendeth to the diminution of the Civill Right of the Jewes,
or of Caesar.  For as touching the Common-wealth which then
was amongst the Jews, both they that bare rule amongst them,
that they that were governed, did all expect the Messiah,
and Kingdome of God; which they could not have done if their Laws
had forbidden him (when he came) to manifest, and declare himself.
Seeing therefore he did nothing, but by Preaching, and Miracles
go about to prove himselfe to be that Messiah, hee did therein
nothing against their laws.  The Kingdome hee claimed was to bee
in another world; He taught all men to obey in the mean time
them that sate in Moses seat: he allowed them to give Caesar
his tribute, and refused to take upon himselfe to be a Judg.
How then could his words, or actions bee seditious, or tend
to the overthrow of their then Civill Government? But God having
determined his sacrifice, for the reduction of his elect to their
former covenanted obedience, for the means, whereby he would bring
the same to effect, made use of their malice, and ingratitude.
Nor was it contrary to the laws of Caesar.  For though Pilate himself
(to gratifie the Jews) delivered him to be crucified; yet before
he did so, he pronounced openly, that he found no fault in him:
And put for title of his condemnation, not as the Jews required,
"that he pretended to be King;" but simply, "That hee was King
of the Jews;" and notwithstanding their clamour, refused to alter it;
saying, "What I have written, I have written."

The Third Part Of His Office Was To Be
King (Under His Father) Of The Elect
As for the third part of his Office, which was to be King,
I have already shewn that his Kingdome was not to begin till
the Resurrection.  But then he shall be King, not onely as God,
in which sense he is King already, and ever shall be, of all the Earth,
in vertue of his omnipotence; but also peculiarly of his own Elect,
by vertue of the pact they make with him in their Baptisme.
And therefore it is, that our Saviour saith (Mat. 19.28.)
that his Apostles should sit upon twelve thrones, judging the
twelve tribes of Israel, "When the Son of man shall sit in
the throne of his glory;" whereby he signified that he should
reign then in his humane nature; and (Mat. 16.27.) "The Son of man
shall come in the glory of his Father, with his Angels, and then
he shall reward every man according to his works."  The same we
may read, Marke 13..26. and 14.26. and more expressely for the time,
Luke 22.29, 30. "I appoint unto you a Kingdome, as my Father
hath appointed to mee, that you may eat and drink at my table
in my Kingdome, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel."
By which it is manifest that the Kingdome of Christ appointed
to him by his Father, is not to be before the Son of Man shall come
in Glory, and make his Apostles Judges of the twelve tribes of Israel.
But a man may here ask, seeing there is no marriage in the Kingdome
of Heaven, whether men shall then eat, and drink; what eating
therefore is meant in this place? This is expounded by our Saviour
(John 6.27.) where he saith, "Labour not for the meat which perisheth,
but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, which the
Son of man shall give you."  So that by eating at Christs table,
is meant the eating of the Tree of Life; that is to say, the enjoying
of Immortality, in the Kingdome of the Son of Man.  By which places,
and many more, it is evident, that our Saviours Kingdome is to bee
exercised by him in his humane nature.

Christs Authority In The Kingdome Of God
Subordinate To That Of His Father
Again, he is to be King then, no otherwise than as subordinate,
or Viceregent of God the Father, as Moses was in the wildernesse;
and as the High Priests were before the reign of Saul; and as
the Kings were after it.  For it is one of the Prophecies concerning
Christ, that he should be like (in Office) to Moses; "I will raise
them up a Prophet (saith the Lord, Deut. 18.18.) from amongst
their Brethren like unto thee, and will put my words into his mouth,"
and this similitude with Moses, is also apparent in the actions
of our Saviour himself, whilest he was conversant on Earth.
For as Moses chose twelve Princes of the tribes, to govern under him;
so did our Saviour choose twelve Apostles, who shall sit on
twelve thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel; And as Moses
authorized Seventy Elders, to receive the Spirit of God, and to
Prophecy to the people, that is, (as I have said before,) to speak
unto them in the name of God; so our Saviour also ordained seventy
Disciples, to preach his Kingdome, and Salvation to all Nations.
And as when a complaint was made to Moses, against those of
the Seventy that prophecyed in the camp of Israel, he justified
them in it, as being subservient therein to his government;
so also our Saviour, when St. John complained to him of a certain man
that cast out Devills in his name, justified him therein, saying,
(Luke 9.50.) "Forbid him not, for hee that is not against us,
is on our part."

Again, our Saviour resembled Moses in the institution of Sacraments,
both of Admission into the Kingdome of God, and of Commemoration
of his deliverance of his Elect from their miserable condition.
As the Children of Israel had for Sacrament of their Reception
into the Kingdome of God, before the time of Moses, the rite of
Circumcision, which rite having been omitted in the Wildernesse,
was again restored as soon as they came into the land of Promise;
so also the Jews, before the coming of our Saviour, had a rite
of Baptizing, that is, of washing with water all those that
being Gentiles, embraced the God of Israel.  This rite St. John
the Baptist used in the reception of all them that gave their
names to the Christ, whom hee preached to bee already come
into the world; and our Saviour instituted the same for a Sacrament
to be taken by all that beleeved in him.  From what cause the rite
of Baptisme first proceeded, is not expressed formally in the Scripture;
but it may be probably thought to be an imitation of the law of Moses,
concerning Leprousie; wherein the Leprous man was commanded to be kept
out of the campe of Israel for a certain time; after which time being
judged by the Priest to be clean, hee was admitted into the campe
after a solemne Washing.  And this may therefore bee a type of
the Washing in Baptisme; wherein such men as are cleansed of the
Leprousie of Sin by Faith, are received into the Church with the
solemnity of Baptisme.  There is another conjecture drawn from
the Ceremonies of the Gentiles, in a certain case that rarely happens;
and that is, when a man that was thought dead, chanced to recover,
other men made scruple to converse with him, as they would doe
to converse with a Ghost, unlesse hee were received again into
the number of men, by Washing, as Children new born were washed
from the uncleannesse of their nativity, which was a kind of new birth.
This ceremony of the Greeks, in the time that Judaea was under the
Dominion of Alexander, and the Greeks his successors, may probably
enough have crept into the Religion of the Jews.  But seeing it is
not likely our Saviour would countenance a Heathen rite, it is most
likely it proceeded from the Legall Ceremony of Washing after Leprosie.
And for the other Sacraments, of eating the Paschall Lambe, it is
manifestly imitated in the Sacrament of the Lords Supper; in which
the Breaking of the Bread, and the pouring out of the Wine,
do keep in memory our deliverance from the Misery of Sin,
by Christs Passion, as the eating of the Paschall Lambe, kept
in memory the deliverance of the Jewes out of the Bondage of Egypt.
Seeing therefore the authority of Moses was but subordinate,
and hee but a Lieutenant to God; it followeth, that Christ,
whose authority , as man, was to bee like that of Moses,
was no more but subordinate to the authority of his Father.
The same is more expressely signified, by that that hee teacheth
us to pray, "Our Father, Let thy Kingdome come;" and, "For thine
is the Kingdome, the power and the Glory;" and by that it is said,
that "Hee shall come in the Glory of his Father;" and by that which
St. Paul saith, (1 Cor. 15.24.) "then commeth the end, when hee
shall have delivered up the Kingdome to God, even the Father;"
and by many other most expresse places.

One And The Same God Is The Person
Represented By Moses, And By Christ
Our Saviour therefore, both in Teaching, and Reigning, representeth
(as Moses Did) the Person of God; which God from that time forward,
but not before, is called the Father; and being still one and the
same substance, is one Person as represented by Moses, and another
Person as represented by his Sonne the Christ.  For Person being a
relative to a Representer, it is consequent to plurality of
Representers, that there bee a plurality of Persons, though of one
and the same Substance.



CHAPTER XLII

OF POWER ECCLESIASTICALL


For the understanding of POWER ECCLESIASTICALL, what, and in whom
it is, we are to distinguish the time from the Ascension of our
Saviour, into two parts; one before the Conversion of Kings, and men
endued with Soveraign Civill Power; the other after their Conversion.
For it was long after the Ascension, before any King, or Civill Soveraign
embraced, and publiquely allowed the teaching of Christian Religion.

Of The Holy Spirit That Fel On The Apostles
And for the time between, it is manifest, that the Power Ecclesiasticall,
was in the Apostles; and after them in such as were by them ordained
to Preach the Gospell, and to convert men to Christianity, and to
direct them that were converted in the way of Salvation; and after these
the Power was delivered again to others by these ordained, and this
was done by Imposition of hands upon such as were ordained; by which
was signified the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God,
to those whom they ordained Ministers of God, to advance his Kingdome.
So that Imposition of hands, was nothing else but the Seal of their
Commission to Preach Christ, and teach his Doctrine; and the giving
of the Holy Ghost by that ceremony of Imposition of hands, was an
imitation of that which Moses did.  For Moses used the same ceremony
to his Minister Joshua, as wee read Deuteronomy 34. ver. 9.
"And Joshua the son of Nun was full of the Spirit of Wisdome;
for Moses had laid his hands upon him."  Our Saviour therefore
between his Resurrection, and Ascension, gave his Spirit to
the Apostles; first, by "Breathing on them, and saying, (John 20.22.)
"Receive yee the Holy Spirit;" and after his Ascension (Acts 2.2, 3.)
by sending down upon them, a "mighty wind, and Cloven tongues of fire;"
and not by Imposition of hands; as neither did God lay his hands
on Moses; and his Apostles afterward, transmitted the same Spirit
by Imposition of hands, as Moses did to Joshua.  So that it is manifest
hereby, in whom the Power Ecclesiasticall continually remained,
in those first times, where there was not any Christian Common-wealth;
namely, in them that received the same from the Apostles, by successive
laying on of hands.

Of The Trinity
Here wee have the Person of God born now the third time.  For as Moses,
and the High Priests, were Gods Representative in the Old Testament;
and our Saviour himselfe as Man, during his abode on earth:
So the Holy Ghost, that is to say, the Apostles, and their successors,
in the Office of Preaching, and Teaching, that had received the
Holy Spirit, have Represented him ever since.  But a Person,
(as I have shewn before, [chapt. 16.].) is he that is Represented,
as often as hee is Represented; and therefore God, who has been
Represented (that is, Personated) thrice, may properly enough be said
to be three Persons; though neither the word Person, nor Trinity
be ascribed to him in the Bible.  St. John indeed (1 Epist. 5.7.) saith,
"There be three that bear witnesse in heaven, the Father, the Word,
and the Holy Spirit; and these Three are One:" But this disagreeth not,
but accordeth fitly with three Persons in the proper signification
of Persons; which is, that which is Represented by another.
For so God the Father, as Represented by Moses, is one Person;
and as Represented by his Sonne, another Person, and as Represented
by the Apostles, and by the Doctors that taught by authority from
them derived, is a third Person; and yet every Person here,
is the Person of one and the same God.  But a man may here ask,
what it was whereof these three bare witnesse.  St. John therefore
tells us (verse 11.) that they bear witnesse, that "God hath given us
eternall life in his Son."  Again, if it should be asked, wherein
that testimony appeareth, the Answer is easie; for he hath testified
the same by the miracles he wrought, first by Moses; secondly,
by his Son himself; and lastly by his Apostles, that had received
the Holy Spirit; all which in their times Represented the Person of God;
and either prophecyed, or preached Jesus Christ.  And as for
the Apostles, it was the character of the Apostleship, in the twelve
first and great Apostles, to bear Witnesse of his Resurrection;
as appeareth expressely (Acts 1. ver. 21,22.) where St Peter,
when a new Apostle was to be chosen in the place of Judas Iscariot,
useth these words, "Of these men which have companied with us
all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us,
beginning at the Baptisme of John, unto that same day that hee
was taken up from us, must one bee ordained to be a Witnesse
with us of his Resurrection:" which words interpret the Bearing
of Witnesse, mentioned by St. John.  There is in the same place
mentioned another Trinity of Witnesses in Earth.  For (ver. 8.)
he saith, "there are three that bear Witnesse in Earth, the Spirit,
and the Water, and the Bloud; and these three agree in one:"
that is to say, the graces of Gods Spirit, and the two Sacraments,
Baptisme, and the Lords Supper, which all agree in one Testimony,
to assure the consciences of beleevers, of eternall life;
of which Testimony he saith (verse 10.) "He that beleeveth on
the Son of man hath the Witnesse in himselfe."  In this Trinity
on Earth the Unity is not of the thing; for the Spirit, the Water,
and the Bloud, are not the same substance, though they give
the same testimony: But in the Trinity of Heaven, the Persons
are the persons of one and the same God, though Represented
in three different times and occasions.  To conclude, the doctrine
of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture,
is in substance this; that God who is alwaies One and the same,
was the Person Represented by Moses; the Person Represented by
his Son Incarnate; and the Person Represented by the Apostles.
As Represented by the Apostles, the Holy Spirit by which they spake,
is God; As Represented by his Son (that was God and Man), the Son
is that God; As represented by Moses, and the High Priests, the Father,
that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God:
From whence we may gather the reason why those names Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit in the signification of the Godhead, are never used
in the Old Testament: For they are Persons, that is, they have
their names from Representing; which could not be, till divers
men had Represented Gods Person in ruling, or in directing under him.

Thus wee see how the Power Ecclesiasticall was left by our Saviour
to the Apostles; and how they were (to the end they might the better
exercise that Power,) endued with the Holy Spirit, which is therefore
called sometime in the New Testament Paracletus which signifieth
an Assister, or one called to for helpe, though it bee commonly
translated a Comforter.  Let us now consider the Power it selfe,
what it was, and over whom.

The Power Ecclesiasticall Is But The Power To Teach
Cardinall Bellarmine in his third generall Controversie, hath handled
a great many questions concerning the Ecclesiasticall Power of
the Pope of Rome; and begins with this, Whether it ought to be
Monarchicall, Aristocraticall, or Democraticall.  All which sorts
of Power, are Soveraign, and Coercive.  If now it should appear,
that there is no Coercive Power left them by our Saviour; but onely
a Power to proclaim  the Kingdom of Christ, and to perswade men
to submit themselves thereunto; and by precepts and good counsell,
to teach them that have submitted, what they are to do, that they
may be received into the Kingdom of God when it comes; and that
the Apostles, and other Ministers of the Gospel, are our Schoolemasters,
and not our Commanders, and their Precepts not Laws, but wholesome
Counsells then were all that dispute in vain.

An Argument Thereof, The Power Of Christ Himself:
I have shewn already (in the last Chapter,) that the Kingdome
of Christ is not of this world: therefore neither can his
Ministers (unlesse they be Kings,) require obedience in his name.
For if the Supreme King, have not his Regall Power in this world;
by what authority can obedience be required to his Officers?
As my Father sent me, (so saith our Saviour) I send you.
But our Saviour was sent to perswade the Jews to return to,
and to invite the Gentiles, to receive the Kingdome of his Father,
and not to reign in Majesty, no not, as his Fathers Lieutenant,
till the day of Judgment.

From The Name Of Regeneration:
The time between the Ascension, and the generall Resurrection,
is called, not a Reigning, but a Regeneration; that is, a Preparation
of men for the second and glorious coming of Christ, at the day
of Judgment; as appeareth by the words of our Saviour, Mat. 19.28.
"You that have followed me in the Regeneration, when the Son of man
shall sit in the throne of his glory, you shall also sit upon
twelve Thrones;"  And of St. Paul (Ephes. 6.15.) "Having your feet
shod with the Preparation of the Gospell of Peace."

From The Comparison Of It, With Fishing, Leaven, Seed
And is compared by our Saviour, to Fishing; that is, to winning men
to obedience, not by Coercion, and Punishing; but by Perswasion:
and therefore he said not to his Apostles, hee would make them
so many Nimrods, Hunters Of Men; But Fishers Of Men.  It is compared
also to Leaven; to Sowing of Seed, and to the Multiplication of
a grain of Mustard-seed; by all which Compulsion is excluded;
and consequently there can in that time be no actual Reigning.
The work of Christs Ministers, is Evangelization; that is,
a Proclamation of Christ, and a preparation for his second comming;
as the Evangelization of John Baptist, was a preparation to
his first coming.

From The Nature Of Faith:
Again, the Office of Christs Ministers in this world, is to
make men Beleeve, and have Faith in Christ: But Faith hath
no relation to, nor dependence at all upon Compulsion, or Commandement;
but onely upon certainty, or probability of Arguments drawn from Reason,
or from something men beleeve already.  Therefore the Ministers
of Christ in this world, have no Power by that title, to Punish
any man for not Beleeving, or for Contradicting what they say;
they have I say no Power by that title of Christs Ministers,
to Punish such: but if they have Soveraign Civill Power, by politick
institution, then they may indeed lawfully Punish any Contradiction
to their laws whatsoever: And St. Paul, of himselfe and other then
Preachers of the Gospell saith in expresse words, (2 Cor. 1.24.)
"Wee have no Dominion over your Faith, but are Helpers of your Joy."

From The Authority Christ Hath Left To Civill Princes
Another Argument, that the Ministers of Christ in this present world
have no right of Commanding, may be drawn from the lawfull Authority
which Christ hath left to all Princes, as well Christians, as Infidels.
St. Paul saith (Col. 3.20.) "Children obey your Parents in all things;
for this is well pleasing to the Lord."  And ver. 22. "Servants obey
in all things your Masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service,
as men-pleasers, but in singlenesse of heart, as fearing the Lord;"
This is spoken to them whose Masters were Infidells; and yet they
are bidden to obey them In All Things.  And again, concerning
obedience to Princes. (Rom. 13. the first 6. verses) exhorting to
"be subject to the Higher Powers," he saith, "that all Power is
ordained of God;" and "that we ought to be subject to them,
not onely for" fear of incurring their "wrath, but also for
conscience sake."  And St. Peter, (1 Epist. chap. 2e ver. 13, 14, 15.)
"Submit your selves to every Ordinance of Man, for the Lords sake,
whether it bee to the King, as Supreme, or unto Governours,
as to them that be sent by him for the punishment of evill doers,
and for the praise of them that doe well; for so is the will of God."
And again St. Paul (Tit. 3.1.) "Put men in mind to be subject
to Principalities, and Powers, and to obey Magistrates."
These Princes, and Powers, whereof St. Peter, and St. Paul here speak,
were all Infidels; much more therefore we are to obey those Christians,
whom God hath ordained to have Soveraign Power over us.
How then can wee be obliged to doe any thing contrary to
the Command of the King, or other Soveraign Representant of
the Common-wealth, whereof we are members, and by whom we look
to be protected? It is therefore manifest, that Christ hath not
left to his Ministers in this world, unlesse they be also endued
with Civill Authority, any authority to Command other men.

What Christians May Do To Avoid Persecution
But what (may some object) if a King, or a Senate, or other
Soveraign Person forbid us to beleeve in Christ?  To this I answer,
that such forbidding is of no effect, because Beleef, and Unbeleef never
follow mens Commands.  Faith is a gift of God, which Man can neither
give, nor take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture.
And if it be further asked, What if wee bee commanded by our
lawfull Prince, to say with our tongue, wee beleeve not; must we
obey such command?  Profession with the tongue is but an externall
thing, and no more then any other gesture whereby we signifie
our obedience; and wherein a Christian, holding firmely in his heart
the Faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the Prophet Elisha
allowed to Naaman the Syrian.  Naaman was converted in his heart
to the God of Israel; For hee saith (2 Kings 5.17.) "Thy servant
will henceforth offer neither burnt offering, nor sacrifice unto
other Gods but unto the Lord.  In this thing the Lord pardon thy servant,
that when my Master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship there,
and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon;
when I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon thy servant
in this thing."  This the Prophet approved, and bid him "Goe in peace."
Here Naaman beleeved in his heart; but by bowing before the Idol Rimmon,
he denyed the true God in effect, as much as if he had done it
with his lips.  But then what shall we answer to our Saviours saying,
"Whosoever denyeth me before men, I will deny him before my Father
which is in Heaven?"  This we may say, that whatsoever a Subject,
as Naaman was, is compelled to in obedience to his Soveraign,
and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws
of his country, that action is not his, but his Soveraigns;
nor is it he that in this case denyeth Christ before men,
but his Governour, and the law of his countrey.  If any man shall
accuse this doctrine, as repugnant to true, and unfeigned Christianity;
I ask him, in case there should be a subject in any Christian
Common-wealth, that should be inwardly in his heart of the
Mahometan Religion, whether if his Soveraign Command him to bee present
at the divine service of the Christian Church, and that on pain of death,
he think that Mamometan obliged in conscience to suffer death
for that cause, rather than to obey that command of his lawful Prince.
If he say, he ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizeth
all private men, to disobey their Princes, in maintenance of
their Religion, true, or false; if he say, he ought to bee obedient,
then he alloweth to himself, that which hee denyeth to another,
contrary to the words of our Saviour, "Whatsoever you would that men
should doe unto you, that doe yee unto them;" and contrary to
the Law of Nature, (which is the indubitable everlasting Law of God)
"Do not to another, that which thou wouldest not he should doe unto thee."

Of Martyrs
But what then shall we say of all those Martyrs we read of in
the History of the Church, that they have needlessely cast away
their lives? For answer hereunto, we are to distinguish the persons
that have been for that cause put to death; whereof some have received
a Calling to preach, and professe the Kingdome of Christ openly;
others have had no such Calling, nor more has been required of them
than their owne faith.  The former sort, if they have been put to death,
for bearing witnesse to this point, that Jesus Christ is risen
from the dead, were true Martyrs; For a Martyr is, (to give the true
definition of the word) a Witnesse of the Resurrection of Jesus
the Messiah; which none can be but those that conversed with him
on earth, and saw him after he was risen: For a Witnesse must have
seen what he testifieth, or else his testimony is not good.
And that none but such, can properly be called Martyrs of Christ,
is manifest out of the words of St. Peter, Act. 1.21, 22.
"Wherefore of these men which have companyed with us all the time
that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from
the Baptisme of John unto that same day hee was taken up from us,
must one be ordained to be a Martyr (that is a Witnesse) with us
of his Resurrection:"  Where we may observe, that he which is to bee
a Witnesse of the truth of the Resurrection of Christ, that is to say,
of the truth of this fundamentall article of Christian Religion,
that Jesus was the Christ, must be some Disciple that conversed
with him, and saw him before, and after his Resurrection;
and consequently must be one of his originall Disciples:
whereas they which were not so, can Witnesse no more, but that
their antecessors said it, and are therefore but Witnesses of
other mens testimony; and are but second Martyrs, or Martyrs
of Christs Witnesses.

He, that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out
of the History of our Saviours life, and of the Acts, or Epistles
of the Apostles; or which he beleeveth upon the authority of
a private man, wil oppose the Laws and Authority of the Civill State,
is very far from being a Martyr of Christ, or a Martyr of his Martyrs.
'Tis one Article onely, which to die for, meriteth so honorable a name;
and that Article is this, that Jesus Is The Christ; that is to say,
He that hath redeemed us, and shall come again to give us salvation,
and eternall life in his glorious Kingdome.  To die for every tenet
that serveth the ambition, or profit of the Clergy, is not required;
nor is it the Death of the Witnesse, but the Testimony it self
that makes the Martyr: for the word signifieth nothing else,
but the man that beareth Witnesse, whether he be put to death
for his testimony, or not.

Also he that is not sent to preach this fundamentall article,
but taketh it upon him of his private authority, though he be
a Witnesse, and consequently a Martyr, either primary of Christ,
or secondary of his Apostles, Disciples, or their Successors;
yet is he not obliged to suffer death for that cause; because being
not called thereto, tis not required at his hands; nor ought hee
to complain, if he loseth the reward he expecteth from those
that never set him on work.  None therefore can be a Martyr,
neither of the first, nor second degree, that have not a warrant
to preach Christ come in the flesh; that is to say, none,
but such as are sent to the conversion of Infidels.  For no man
is a Witnesse to him that already beleeveth, and therefore needs
no Witnesse; but to them that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it.
Christ sent his Apostles, and his Seventy Disciples, with authority
to preach; he sent not all that beleeved: And he sent them
to unbeleevers; "I send you (saith he) as sheep amongst wolves;"
not as sheep to other sheep.

Argument From The Points Of Their Commission
Lastly the points of their Commission, as they are expressely
set down in the Gospel, contain none of them any authority
over the Congregation.

To Preach
We have first (Mat. 10.) that the twelve Apostles were sent
"to the lost sheep of the house of Israel," and commanded to Preach,
"that the Kingdome of God was at hand."  Now Preaching in the originall,
is that act, which a Crier, Herald, or other Officer useth to
doe publiquely in Proclaiming of a King.  But a Crier hath not
right to Command any man.  And (Luke 10.2.) the seventy Disciples
are sent out, "as Labourers, not as Lords of the Harvest;"
and are bidden (verse 9.) to say, "The Kingdome of God is come
nigh unto you;" and by Kingdome here is meant, not the Kingdome
of Grace, but the Kingdome of Glory; for they are bidden
to denounce it (ver. 11.) to those Cities which shall not
receive them, as a threatning, that it shall be more tolerable
in that day for Sodome, than for such a City.  And (Mat. 20.28.)
our Saviour telleth his Disciples, that sought Priority of place,
their Office was to minister, even as the Son of man came,
not to be ministred unto, but to minister.  Preachers therefore
have not Magisteriall, but Ministeriall power: "Bee not called Masters,
(saith our Saviour, Mat. 23.10) for one is your Master, even Christ."

And Teach
Another point of their Commission, is, to Teach All Nations;
as it is in Mat. 28.19. or as in St. Mark 16.15 "Goe into all the world,
and Preach the Gospel to every creature."  Teaching therefore,
and Preaching is the same thing.  For they that Proclaim the
comming of a King, must withall make known by what right he commeth,
if they mean men shall submit themselves unto him: As St. Paul did
to the Jews of Thessalonica, when "three Sabbath days he reasoned
with them out of the Scriptures, opening, and alledging that Christ
must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that
this Jesus is Christ."   But to teach out of the Old Testament
that Jesus was Christ, (that is to say, King,) and risen from the dead,
is not to say, that men are bound after they beleeve it, to obey those
that tell them so, against the laws, and commands of their Soveraigns;
but that they shall doe wisely, to expect the coming of Christ hereafter,
in Patience, and Faith, with Obedience to their present Magistrates.

To Baptize;
Another point of their Commission, is to Baptize, "in the name
of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."  What is Baptisme?
Dipping into water.  But what is it to Dip a man into the water
in the name of any thing? The meaning of these words of Baptisme is this.
He that is Baptized, is Dipped or Washed, as a sign of becomming
a new man, and a loyall subject to that God, whose Person was
represented in old time by Moses, and the High Priests, when he
reigned over the Jews; and to Jesus Christ, his Sonne, God, and Man,
that hath redeemed us, and shall in his humane nature Represent
his Fathers Person in his eternall Kingdome after the Resurrection;
and to acknowledge the Doctrine of the Apostles, who assisted by
the Spirit of the Father, and of the Son, were left for guides to bring
us into that Kingdome, to be the onely, and assured way thereunto.
This, being our promise in Baptisme; and the Authority of Earthly
Soveraigns being not to be put down till the day of Judgment;
(for that is expressely affirmed by S. Paul 1 Cor. 15. 22, 23, 24.
where he saith, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall
be made alive.  But every man in his owne order, Christ the
first fruits, afterward they that are Christs, at his comming;
Then Commeth the end, when he shall have delivered up the
Kingdome of God, even the Father, when he shall have put down
all Rule, and all Authority and Power") it is manifest, that we
do not in Baptisme constitute over us another authority, by which
our externall actions are to be governed in this life; but promise
to take the doctrine of the Apostles for our direction in the
way to life eternall.

And To Forgive, And Retain Sinnes
The Power of Remission, And Retention Of Sinnes, called also
the Power of Loosing, and Binding, and sometimes the Keyes Of
The Kingdome Of Heaven, is a consequence of the Authority to Baptize,
or refuse to Baptize.  For Baptisme is the Sacrament of Allegeance,
of them that are to be received into the Kingdome of God;
that is to say, into Eternall life; that is to say, to Remission of Sin:
For as Eternall life was lost by the Committing , so it is recovered
by the Remitting of mens Sins.  The end of Baptisme is Remission of Sins:
and therefore St. Peter, when they that were converted by his Sermon on
the day of Pentecost, asked what they were to doe, advised them to
"repent, and be Baptized in the name of Jesus, for the Remission
of Sins."  And therefore seeing to Baptize is to declare the Reception
of men into Gods Kingdome; and to refuse to Baptize is to declare
their Exclusion; it followeth, that the Power to declare them Cast out,
or Retained in it, was given to the same Apostles, and their Substitutes,
and Successors.  And therefore after our Saviour had breathed upon them,
saying, (John 20.22.) "Receive the Holy Ghost," hee addeth in the
next verse, "Whose soever Sins ye Remit, they are Remitted unto them;
and whose soever Sins ye Retain, they are Retained."  By which words,
is not granted an Authority to Forgive, or Retain Sins, simply
and absolutely, as God Forgiveth or Retaineth them, who knoweth
the Heart of man, and truth of his Penitence and Conversion;
but conditionally, to the Penitent: And this Forgivenesse,
or Absolution, in case the absolved have but a feigned Repentance,
is thereby without other act, or sentence of the Absolvent, made void,
and hath no effect at all to Salvation, but on the contrary, to the
Aggravation of his Sin.  Therefore the Apostles, and their Successors,
are to follow but the outward marks of Repentance; which appearing,
they have no Authority to deny Absolution; and if they appeare not,
they have no authority to Absolve.  The same also is to be observed
in Baptisme: for to a converted Jew, or Gentile, the Apostles had not
the Power to deny Baptisme; nor to grant it to the Un-penitent.
But seeing no man is able to discern the truth of another mans
Repentance, further than by externall marks, taken from his words,
and actions, which are subject to hypocrisie; another question
will arise, Who it is that is constituted Judge of those marks.
And this question is decided by our Saviour himself; (Mat. 18.
15, 16, 17.) "If thy Brother (saith he) shall trespasse against thee,
go and tell him his fault between thee, and him alone; if he shall
hear thee, thou hast gained thy Brother.  But if he will not hear thee,
then take with thee one, or two more.  And if he shall neglect
to hear them, tell it unto the Church, let him be unto thee as an
Heathen man, and a Publican."  By which it is manifest, that the
Judgment concerning the truth of Repentance, belonged not to any
one Man, but to the Church, that is, to the Assembly of the Faithfull,
or to them that have authority to bee their Representant.
But besides the Judgment, there is necessary also the pronouncing
of Sentence: And this belonged alwaies to the Apostle, or some Pastor
of the Church, as Prolocutor; and of this our Saviour speaketh
in the 18 verse, "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound
in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed
in heaven."  And comformable hereunto was the practise of St. Paul
(1 Cor. 5.3, 4, & 5.) where he saith, "For I verily, as absent in body,
but present in spirit, have determined already, as though I were present,
concerning him that hath so done this deed; In the name of our Lord
Jesus Christ when ye are gathered together, and my spirit,
with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, To deliver such a one to Satan;"
that is to say, to cast him out of the Church, as a man whose Sins
are not Forgiven.  Paul here pronounceth the Sentence; but the Assembly
was first to hear the Cause, (for St. Paul was absent;) and by
consequence to condemn him.  But in the same chapter (ver. 11, 12.)
the Judgment in such a case is more expressely attributed to
the Assembly: "But now I have written unto you, not to keep company,
if any man that is called a Brother be a Fornicator, &c. with such
a one no not to eat.  For what have I to do to judg them that
are without? Do not ye judg them that are within?" The Sentence
therefore by which a man was put out of the Church, was pronounced
by the Apostle, or Pastor; but the Judgment concerning the merit
of the cause, was in the Church; that is to say, (as the times
were before the conversion of Kings, and men that had Soveraign
Authority in the Common-wealth,) the Assembly of the Christians
dwelling in the same City; as in Corinth, in the Assembly of the
Christians of Corinth.

Of Excommunication
This part of the Power of the Keyes, by which men were thrust out
from the Kingdome of God, is that which is called Excommunication;
and to excommunicate, is in the Originall, Aposunagogon Poiein,
To Cast Out Of The Synagogue; that is, out of the place of Divine
service; a word drawn from the custom of the Jews, to cast out
of their Synagogues, such as they thought in manners, or doctrine,
contagious, as Lepers were by the Law of Moses separated from
the congregation of Israel, till such time as they should be
by the Priest pronounced clean.

The Use Of Excommunication Without Civill Power.
The Use and Effect of Excommunication, whilest it was not yet
strengthened with the Civill Power, was no more, than that they,
who were not Excommunicate, were to avoid the company of them that were.
It was not enough to repute them as Heathen, that never had been
Christians; for with such they might eate, and drink; which with
Excommunicate persons they might not do; as appeareth by the words
of St. Paul, (1 Cor. 5. ver. 9, 10, &c.) where he telleth them,
he had formerly forbidden them to "company with Fornicators;" but
(because that could not bee without going out of the world,)
he restraineth it to such Fornicators, and otherwise vicious persons,
as were of the brethren; "with such a one" (he saith) they ought not
to keep company, "no, not to eat."  And this is no more than our
Saviour saith (Mat. 18.17.) "Let him be to thee as a Heathen,
and as a Publican."  For Publicans (which signifieth Farmers,
and Receivers of the revenue of the Common-wealth) were so hated,
and detested by the Jews that were to pay for it, as that Publican
and Sinner were taken amongst them for the same thing: Insomuch,
as when our Saviour accepted the invitation of Zacchaeus a Publican;
though it were to Convert him, yet it was objected to him as a Crime.
And therefore, when our Saviour, to Heathen, added Publican,
he did forbid them to eat with a man Excommunicate.

As for keeping them out of their Synagogues, or places of Assembly,
they had no Power to do it, but that of the owner of the place,
whether he were Christian, or Heathen.  And because all places are
by right, in the Dominion of the Common-wealth; as well hee that
was Excommunicated, as hee that never was Baptized, might enter
into them by Commission from the Civill Magistrate; as Paul before
his conversion entred into their Synagogues at Damascus, (Acts 9.2.)
to apprehend Christians, men and women, and to carry them bound
to Jerusalem, by Commission from the High Priest.

Of No Effect Upon An Apostate
By which it appears, that upon a Christian, that should become
an Apostate, in a place where the Civill Power did persecute,
or not assist the Church, the effect of Excommunication had nothing
in it, neither of dammage in this world, nor of terrour: Not of terrour,
because of their unbeleef; nor of dammage, because they returned
thereby into the favour of the world; and in the world to come,
were to be in no worse estate, then they which never had beleeved.
The dammage redounded rather to the Church, by provocation of them
they cast out, to a freer execution of their malice.

But Upon The Faithfull Only
Excommunication therefore had its effect onely upon those,
that beleeved that Jesus Christ was to come again in Glory,
to reign over, and to judge both the quick, and the dead,
and should therefore refuse entrance into his Kingdom, to those
whose Sins were Retained; that is, to those that were Excommunicated
by the Church.  And thence it is that St. Paul calleth Excommunication,
a delivery of the Excommunicate person to Satan.  For without
the Kingdom of Christ, all other Kingdomes after Judgment,
are comprehended in the Kingdome of Satan.  This is it that
the faithfull stood in fear of, as long as they stood Excommunicate,
that is to say, in an estate wherein their sins were not Forgiven.
Whereby wee may understand, that Excommunication in the time
that Christian Religion was not authorized by the Civill Power,
was used onely for a correction of manners, not of errours in opinion:
for it is a punishment, whereof none could be sensible but such
as beleeved, and expected the coming again of our Saviour to
judge the world; and they who so beleeved, needed no other opinion,
but onely uprightnesse of life, to be saved.

For What Fault Lyeth Excommunication
There Lyeth Excommunication for Injustice; as (Mat. 18.) If thy Brother
offend thee, tell it him privately; then with Witnesses; lastly,
tell the Church; and then if he obey not, "Let him be to thee
as an Heathen man, and a Publican."  And there lyeth Excommunication
for a Scandalous Life, as (1 Cor. 5. 11.) "If any man that is called
a Brother, be a Fornicator, or Covetous, or an Idolater, or a Drunkard,
or an Extortioner, with such a one yee are not to eat."
But to Excommunicate a man that held this foundation, that Jesus
Was The Christ, for difference of opinion in other points,
by which that Foundation was not destroyed, there appeareth
no authority in the Scripture, nor example in the Apostles.
There is indeed in St. Paul (Titus 3.10.) a text that seemeth
to be to the contrary.  "A man that is an Haeretique, after the first
and second admonition, reject."  For an Haeretique, is he, that being
a member of the Church, teacheth neverthelesse some private opinion,
which the Church has forbidden: and such a one, S. Paul adviseth Titus,
after the first, and second admonition, to Reject.  But to Reject
(in this place) is not to Excommunicate the Man; But to Give Over
Admonishing Him, To Let Him Alone, To Set By Disputing With Him,
as one that is to be convinced onely by himselfe.  The same Apostle
saith (2 Tim. 2.23.) "Foolish and unlearned questions avoid;"
The word Avoid in this place, and Reject in the former, is the same
in the Originall, paraitou: but Foolish questions may bee set by
without Excommunication.  And again, (Tit. 3.93) "Avoid Foolish
questions," where the Originall, periistaso, (set them by)
is equivalent to the former word Reject.  There is no other place
that can so much as colourably be drawn, to countenance the Casting
out of the Church faithfull men, such as beleeved the foundation,
onely for a singular superstructure of their own, proceeding perhaps
from a good & pious conscience.  But on the contrary, all such places
as command avoiding such disputes, are written for a Lesson to Pastors,
(such as Timothy and Titus were) not to make new Articles of Faith,
by determining every small controversie, which oblige men to
a needlesse burthen of Conscience, or provoke them to break the
union of the Church.  Which Lesson the Apostles themselves observed well.
S. Peter and S. Paul, though their controversie were great,
(as we may read in Gal. 2.11.) yet they did not cast one another out
of the Church.  Neverthelesse, during the Apostles time, there were
other Pastors that observed it not; As Diotrephes (3 John 9. &c.)
who cast out of the Church, such as S. John himself thought fit
to be received into it, out of a pride he took in Praeeminence;
so early it was, that Vainglory, and Ambition had found entrance
into the Church of Christ.

Of Persons Liable To Excommunication
That a man be liable to Excommunication, there be many conditions
requisite; as First, that he be a member of some Commonalty,
that is to say, of some lawfull Assembly, that is to say,
of some Christian Church, that hath power to judge of the cause
for which hee is to bee Excommunicated.  For where there is
no community, there can bee no Excommunication; nor where there
is no power to Judge, can there bee any power to give Sentence.
From hence it followeth, that one Church cannot be Excommunicated
by another: For either they have equall power to Excommunicate
each other, in which case Excommunication is not Discipline,
nor an act of Authority, but Schisme, and Dissolution of charity;
or one is so subordinate to the other, as that they both have
but one voice, and then they be but one Church; and the part
Excommunicated, is no more a Church, but a dissolute number
of individuall persons.

And because the sentence of Excommunication, importeth an advice,
not to keep company, nor so much as to eat with him that is Excommunicate,
if a Soveraign Prince, or Assembly bee Excommunicate, the sentence
is of no effect.  For all Subjects are bound to be in the company
and presence of their own Soveraign (when he requireth it) by
the law of Nature; nor can they lawfully either expell him from
any place of his own Dominion, whether profane or holy; nor go out
of his Dominion, without his leave; much lesse (if he call them
to that honour,) refuse to eat with him.  And as to other Princes
and States, because they are not parts of one and the same congregation,
they need not any other sentence to keep them from keeping company
with the State Excommunicate: for the very Institution, as it uniteth
many men into one Community; so it dissociateth one Community
from another: so that Excommunication is not needfull for keeping
Kings and States asunder; nor has any further effect then is in
the nature of Policy it selfe; unlesse it be to instigate Princes
to warre upon one another.

Nor is the Excommunication of a Christian Subject, that obeyeth the laws
of his own Soveraign, whether Christian, or Heathen, of any effect.
For if he beleeve that "Jesus is the Christ, he hath the Spirit of God"
(1 Joh. 4.1.) "and God dwelleth in him, and he in God," (1 Joh. 4.15.)
But hee that hath the Spirit of God; hee that dwelleth in God;
hee in whom God dwelleth, can receive no harm by the Excommunication
of men.  Therefore, he that beleeveth Jesus to be the Christ,
is free from all the dangers threatned to persons Excommunicate.
He that beleeveth it not, is no Christian.  Therefore a true and
unfeigned Christian is not liable to Excommunication; Nor he also
that is a professed Christian, till his Hypocrisy appear in his Manners,
that is, till his behaviour bee contrary to the law of his Soveraign,
which is the rule of Manners, and which Christ and his Apostles have
commanded us to be subject to.  For the Church cannot judge of Manners
but by externall Actions, which Actions can never bee unlawfull,
but when they are against the Law of the Common-wealth.

If a mans Father, or Mother, or Master bee Excommunicate, yet are not
the Children forbidden to keep them Company, nor to Eat with them;
for that were (for the most part) to oblige them not to eat at all,
for want of means to get food; and to authorise them to disobey
their Parents, and Masters, contrary to the Precept of the Apostles.

In summe, the Power of Excommunication cannot be extended further
than to the end for which the Apostles and Pastors of the Church
have their Commission from our Saviour; which is not to rule by
Command and Coaction, but by Teaching and Direction of men in the
way of Salvation in the world to come.  And as a Master in any Science,
may abandon his Scholar, when hee obstinately neglecteth the practise
of his rules; but not accuse him of Injustice, because he was never
bound to obey him: so a Teacher of Christian doctrine may abandon
his Disciples that obstinately continue in an unchristian life;
but he cannot say, they doe him wrong, because they are not obliged
to obey him: For to a Teacher that shall so complain, may be applyed
the Answer of God to Samuel in the like place, (1 Sam. 8.)
"They have not rejected thee, but mee."  Excommunication therefore
when it wanteth the assistance of the Civill Power, as it doth,
when a Christian State, or Prince is Excommunicate by a forain Authority,
is without effect; and consequently ought to be without terrour.
The name of Fulmen Excommunicationis (that is, the Thunderbolt
Of Excommunication) proceeded from an imagination of the Bishop of Rome,
which first used it, that he was King of Kings, as the Heathen made
Jupiter King of the Gods; and assigned him in their Poems, and Pictures,
a Thunderbolt, wherewith to subdue, and punish the Giants, that should
dare to deny his power: Which imagination was grounded on two errours;
one, that the Kingdome of Christ is of this world, contrary to our
Saviours owne words, "My Kingdome is not of this world;" the other,
that hee is Christs Vicar, not onely over his owne Subjects,
but over all the Christians of the World; whereof there is no
ground in Scripture, and the contrary shall bee proved in its due place.

Of The Interpreter Of The Scriptures Before
Civill Soveraigns Became Christians
St. Paul coming to Thessalonica, where was a Synagogue of the Jews,
(Acts 17.2, 3.)  "As his manner was, went in unto them, and three
Sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, Opening and
alledging, that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again
from the dead; and that this Jesus whom he preached was the Christ."
The Scriptures here mentioned were the Scriptures of the Jews,
that is, the Old Testament.  The men, to whom he was to prove
that Jesus was the Christ, and risen again from the dead,
were also Jews, and did beleeve already, that they were the Word of God.
Hereupon (as it is verse 4.) some of them beleeved, and (as it is
in the 5. ver.) some beleeved not.  What was the reason, when they all
beleeved the Scripture, that they did not all beleeve alike;
but that some approved, others disapproved the Interpretation of
St. Paul that cited them; and every one Interpreted them to himself?
It was this; S. Paul came to them without any Legall Commission,
and in the manner of one that would not Command, but Perswade;
which he must needs do, either by Miracles, as Moses did to
the Israelites in Egypt, that they might see his Authority in Gods works;
or by Reasoning from the already received Scripture, that they might see
the truth of his doctrine in Gods Word.  But whosoever perswadeth
by reasoning from principles written, maketh him to whom hee
speaketh Judge, both of the meaning of those principles, and also
of the force of his inferences upon them.  If these Jews of
Thessalonica were not, who else was the Judge of what S. Paul
alledged out of Scripture? If S. Paul, what needed he to quote
any places to prove his doctrine? It had been enough to have said,
I find it so in Scripture, that is to say, in your Laws, of which
I am Interpreter, as sent by Christ.  The Interpreter therefore
of the Scripture, to whose Interpretation the Jews of Thessalonica
were bound to stand, could be none: every one might beleeve,
or not beleeve, according as the Allegations seemed to himselfe
to be agreeable, or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alledged.
And generally in all cases of the world, hee that pretendeth any proofe,
maketh Judge of his proofe him to whom he addresseth his speech.
And as to the case of the Jews in particular, they were bound by
expresse words (Deut. 17.) to receive the determination of all
hard questions, from the Priests and Judges of Israel for the time being.
But this is to bee understood of the Jews that were yet unconverted.

For the Conversion of the Gentiles, there was no use of alledging
the Scriptures, which they beleeved not.  The Apostles therefore
laboured by Reason to confute their Idolatry; and that done,
to perswade them to the faith of Christ, by their testimony
of his Life, and Resurrection.  So that there could not yet bee
any controversie concerning the authority to Interpret Scripture;
seeing no man was obliged during his infidelity, to follow any mans
Interpretation of any Scripture, except his Soveraigns Interpretation
of the Laws of his countrey.

Let us now consider the Conversion it self, and see what
there was therein, that could be cause of such an obligation.
Men were converted to no other thing then to the Beleef of that
which the Apostles preached: And the Apostles preached nothing,
but that Jesus was the Christ, that is to say, the King that was
to save them, and reign over them eternally in the world to come;
and consequently that hee was not dead, but risen again from the dead,
and gone up into Heaven, and should come again one day to judg the world,
(which also should rise again to be judged,) and reward every man
according to his works.  None of them preached that himselfe, or any
other Apostle was such an Interpreter of the Scripture, as all that
became Christians, ought to take their Interpretation for Law.
For to Interpret the Laws, is part of the Administration of a
present Kingdome; which the Apostles had not.  They prayed then,
and all other Pastors ever since, "Let thy Kingdome come;" and
exhorted their Converts to obey their then Ethnique Princes.
The New Testament was not yet published in one Body.  Every of
the Evangelists was Interpreter of his own Gospel; and every Apostle
of his own Epistle; And of the Old Testament, our Saviour himselfe
saith to the Jews (John 5. 39.) "Search the Scriptures; for in them
yee thinke to have eternall life, and they are they that testifie of me."
If hee had not meant they should Interpret them, hee would not have
bidden them take thence the proof of his being the Christ; he would
either have Interpreted them himselfe, or referred them to the
Interpretation of the Priests.

When a difficulty arose, the Apostles and Elders of the Church
assembled themselves together, and determined what should bee preached,
and taught, and how they should Interpret the Scriptures to the People;
but took not from the People the liberty to read, and Interpret them
to themselves.  The Apostles sent divers Letters to the Churches,
and other Writings for their instruction; which had been in vain,
if they had not allowed them to Interpret, that is, to consider
the meaning of them.  And as it was in the Apostles time, it must be
till such time as there should be Pastors, that could authorise
an Interpreter, whose Interpretation should generally be stood to:
But that could not be till Kings were Pastors, or Pastors Kings.

Of The Power To Make Scripture Law
There be two senses, wherein a Writing may be said to be Canonicall;
for Canon, signifieth a Rule; and a Rule is a Precept, by which a man
is guided, and directed in any action whatsoever.  Such Precepts,
though given by a Teacher to his Disciple, or a Counsellor to his friend,
without power to Compell him to observe them, are neverthelesse Canons;
because they are Rules: But when they are given by one, whom he that
receiveth them is bound to obey, then are those Canons, not onely Rules,
but Laws: The question therefore here, is of the Power to make
the Scriptures (which are the Rules of Christian Faith) Laws.

Of The Ten Commandements
That part of the Scripture, which was first Law, was the Ten
Commandements, written in two Tables of Stone, and delivered by God
himselfe to Moses; and by Moses made known to the people.
Before that time there was no written Law of God, who as yet
having not chosen any people to bee his peculiar Kingdome,
had given no Law to men, but the Law of Nature, that is to say,
the Precepts of Naturall Reason, written in every mans own heart.
Of these two Tables, the first containeth the law of Soveraignty;
1. That they should not obey, nor honour the Gods of other Nations,
in these words, "Non habebis Deos alienos coram me," that is,
"Thou shalt not have for Gods, the Gods that other Nations worship;
but onely me:" whereby they were forbidden to obey, or honor,
as their King and Governour, any other God, than him that spake
unto them then by Moses, and afterwards by the High Priest.
2. That they "should not make any Image to represent him;"
that is to say, they were not to choose to themselves, neither in
heaven, nor in earth, any Representative of their own fancying,
but obey Moses and Aaron, whom he had appointed to that office.
3. That "they should not take the Name of God in vain;" that is,
they should not speak rashly of their King, nor dispute his
Right, nor the commissions of Moses and Aaron, his Lieutenants.
4. That "they should every Seventh day abstain from their ordinary
labour," and employ that time in doing him Publique Honor.
The second Table containeth the Duty of one man towards another,
as "To honor Parents; Not to kill; Not to Commit Adultery;
Not to steale; Not to corrupt Judgment by false witnesse;"
and finally, "Not so much as to designe in their heart the doing
of any injury one to another."  The question now is, Who it was
that gave to these written Tables the obligatory force of Lawes.
There is no doubt but that they were made Laws by God himselfe:
But because a Law obliges not, nor is Law to any, but to them that
acknowledge it to be the act of the Soveraign, how could the people
of Israel that were forbidden to approach the Mountain to hear
what God said to Moses, be obliged to obedience to all those laws
which Moses propounded to them?  Some of them were indeed the
Laws of Nature, as all the Second Table; and therefore to be
acknowledged for Gods Laws; not to the Israelites alone, but to
all people: But of those that were peculiar to the Israelites,
as those of the first Table, the question remains; saving that they
had obliged themselves, presently after the propounding of them,
to obey Moses, in these words (Exod. 20.19.) "Speak them thou to us,
and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die."
It was therefore onely Moses then, and after him the High Priest,
whom (by Moses) God declared should administer this his peculiar
Kingdome, that had on Earth, the power to make this short Scripture
of the Decalogue to bee Law in the Common-wealth of Israel.
But Moses, and Aaron, and the succeeding High Priests were the
Civill Soveraigns.  Therefore hitherto, the Canonizing, or making
of the Scripture Law, belonged to the Civill Soveraigne.

Of The Judicial, And Leviticall Law
The Judiciall Law, that is to say, the Laws that God prescribed
to the Magistrates of Israel, for the rule of their administration
of Justice, and of the Sentences, or Judgments they should pronounce,
in Pleas between man and man; and the Leviticall Law, that is to say,
the rule that God prescribed touching the Rites and Ceremonies of
the Priests and Levites, were all delivered to them by Moses onely;
and therefore also became Lawes, by vertue of the same promise of
obedience to Moses.  Whether these laws were then written, or not written,
but dictated to the People by Moses (after his forty dayes being with
God in the Mount) by word of mouth, is not expressed in the Text;
but they were all positive Laws, and equivalent to holy Scripture,
and made Canonicall by Moses the Civill Soveraign.

The Second Law
After the Israelites were come into the Plains of Moab over
against Jericho, and ready to enter into the land of Promise,
Moses to the former Laws added divers others; which therefore
are called Deuteronomy: that is, Second Laws.  And are (as it is written,
Deut. 29.1.) "The words of a Covenant which the Lord commanded Moses
to make with the Children of Israel, besides the Covenant which he
made with them in Horeb."  For having explained those former Laws,
in the beginning of the Book of Deuteronomy, he addeth others,
that begin at the 12. Cha. and continue to the end of the 26.
of the same Book.  This Law (Deut. 27.1.) they were commanded
to write upon great stones playstered over, at their passing over Jordan:
This Law also was written by Moses himself in a Book; and delivered into
the hands of the "Priests, and to the Elders of Israel," (Deut. 31.9.)
and commanded (ve. 26.) "to be put in the side of the Arke;" for in
the Ark it selfe was nothing but the Ten Commandements.
This was the Law, which Moses (Deuteronomy 17.18.) commanded the
Kings of Israel should keep a copie of: And this is the Law, which having
been long time lost, was found again in the Temple in the time of Josiah,
and by his authority received for the Law of God.  But both Moses at
the writing, and Josiah at the recovery thereof, had both of them the
Civill Soveraignty.  Hitherto therefore the Power of making Scripture
Canonicall, was in the Civill Soveraign.

Besides this Book of the Law, there was no other Book, from the time
of Moses, till after the Captivity, received amongst the Jews
for the Law of God.  For the Prophets (except a few) lived in
the time of the Captivity it selfe; and the rest lived but a little
before it; and were so far from having their Prophecies generally
received for Laws, as that their persons were persecuted, partly by
false Prophets, and partly by the Kings which were seduced by them.
And this Book it self, which was confirmed by Josiah for the Law of God,
and with it all the History of the Works of God, was lost
in the Captivity, and sack of the City of Jerusalem, as appears by
that of 2 Esdras 14.21. "Thy Law is burnt; therefor no man knoweth
the things that are done of thee, of the works that shall begin."
And before the Captivity, between the time when the Law was lost,
(which is not mentioned in the Scripture, but may probably be thought
to be the time of Rehoboam, when Shishak King of Egypt took the
spoils of the Temple,(1 Kings 14.26.)) and the time of Josiah,
when it was found againe, they had no written Word of God,
but ruled according to their own discretion, or by the direction of such,
as each of them esteemed Prophets.

The Old Testament, When Made Canonicall
From whence we may inferre, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament,
which we have at this day, were not Canonicall, nor a Law unto the Jews,
till the renovation of their Covenant with God at their return from
the Captivity, and restauration of their Common-wealth under Esdras.
But from that time forward they were accounted the Law of the Jews,
and for such translated into Greek by Seventy Elders of Judaea,
and put into the Library of Ptolemy at Alexandria, and approved
for the Word of God.  Now seeing Esdras was the High Priest,
and the High Priest was their Civill Soveraigne, it is manifest,
that the Scriptures were never made Laws, but by the Soveraign
Civill Power.

The New Testament Began To Be Canonicall Under Christian Soveraigns
By the Writings of the Fathers that lived in the time before that
Christian Religion was received, and authorised by Constantine the
Emperour, we may find, that the Books wee now have of the New Testament,
were held by the Christians of that time (except a few, in respect
of whose paucity the rest were called the Catholique Church,
and others Haeretiques) for the dictates of the Holy Ghost;
and consequently for the Canon, or Rule of Faith: such was the
reverence and opinion they had of their Teachers; as generally
the reverence that the Disciples bear to their first Masters,
in all manner of doctrine they receive from them, is not small.
Therefore there is no doubt, but when S. Paul wrote to the Churches
he had converted; or any other Apostle, or Disciple of Christ,
to those which had then embraced Christ, they received those their
Writings for the true Christian Doctrine.  But in that time,
when not the Power and Authority of the Teacher, but the Faith
of the Hearer caused them to receive it, it was not the Apostles
that made their own Writings Canonicall, but every Convert
made them so to himself.

But the question here, is not what any Christian made a Law,
or Canon to himself, (which he might again reject, by the same right
he received it;) but what was so made a Canon to them, as without
injustice they could not doe any thing contrary thereunto.
That the New Testament should in this sense be Canonicall,
that is to say, a Law in any place where the Law of the Common-wealth
had not made it so, is contrary to the nature of a Law.  For a Law,
(as hath been already shewn) is the Commandement of that Man,
or Assembly, to whom we have given Soveraign Authority, to make
such Rules for the direction of our actions, as hee shall think fit;
and to punish us, when we doe any thing contrary to the same.
When therefore any other man shall offer unto us any other Rules,
which the Soveraign Ruler hath not prescribed, they are but Counsell,
and Advice; which, whether good, or bad, hee that is counselled,
may without injustice refuse to observe, and when contrary to the Laws
already established, without injustice cannot observe, how good soever
he conceiveth it to be.  I say, he cannot in this case observe the same
in his actions, nor in his discourse with other men; though he may
without blame beleeve the his private Teachers, and wish he had
the liberty to practise their advice; and that it were publiquely
received for Law.  For internall faith is in its own nature invisible,
and consequently exempted from all humane jurisdiction; whereas the words,
and actions that proceed from it, as breaches of our Civil obedience,
are injustice both before God and Man.  Seeing then our Saviour hath
denyed his Kingdome to be in this world, seeing he hath said,
he came not to judge, but to save the world, he hath not subjected
us to other Laws than those of the Common-wealth; that is, the Jews
to the Law of Moses, (which he saith (Mat. 5.) he came not to destroy,
but to fulfill,) and other Nations to the Laws of their severall
Soveraigns, and all men to the Laws of Nature; the observing whereof,
both he himselfe, and his Apostles have in their teaching recommended
to us, as a necessary condition of being admitted by him in the
last day into his eternall Kingdome, wherein shall be Protection,
and Life everlasting.  Seeing then our Saviour, and his Apostles,
left not new Laws to oblige us in this world, but new Doctrine
to prepare us for the next; the Books of the New Testament,
which containe that Doctrine, untill obedience to them was commanded,
by them that God hath given power to on earth to be Legislators,
were not obligatory Canons, that is, Laws, but onely good,
and safe advice, for the direction of sinners in the way to salvation,
which every man might take, and refuse at his owne perill,
without injustice.

Again, our Saviour Christs Commission to his Apostles, and Disciples,
was to Proclaim his Kingdome (not present, but) to come;
and to Teach all Nations; and to Baptize them that should beleeve;
and to enter into the houses of them that should receive them;
and where they were not received, to shake off the dust of their feet
against them; but not to call for fire from heaven to destroy them,
nor to compell them to obedience by the Sword.  In all which there is
nothing of Power, but of Perswasion.  He sent them out as Sheep
unto Wolves, not as Kings to their Subjects.  They had not
in Commission to make Laws; but to obey, and teach obedience
to Laws made; and consequently they could not make their Writings
obligatory Canons, without the help of the Soveraign Civill Power.
And therefore the Scripture of the New Testament is there only Law,
where the lawfull Civill Power hath made it so.  And there also
the King, or Soveraign, maketh it a Law to himself; by which he
subjecteth himselfe, not to the Doctor, or Apostle, that converted him,
but to God himself, and his Son Jesus Christ, as immediately as did
the Apostles themselves.

Of The Power Of Councells To Make The Scripture Law
That which may seem to give the New Testament, in respect of
those that have embraced Christian Doctrine, the force of Laws,
in the times, and places of persecution, is the decrees they made
amongst themselves in their Synods.  For we read (Acts 15.28.)
the stile of the Councell of the Apostles, the Elders, and the
whole Church, in this manner, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost,
and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen than these necessary
things, &C." which is a stile that signifieth a Power to lay a burthen
on them that had received their Doctrine.  Now "to lay a burthen on
another," seemeth the same that "to oblige;" and therefore the Acts
of that Councell were Laws to the then Christians.  Neverthelesse,
they were no more Laws than are these other Precepts, "Repent,
Be Baptized; Keep the Commandements; Beleeve the Gospel; Come unto me;
Sell all that thou hast; Give it to the poor;" and "Follow me;"
which are not Commands, but Invitations, and Callings of men to
Christianity, like that of Esay 55.1. "Ho, every man that thirsteth,
come yee to the waters, come, and buy wine and milke without money."
For first, the Apostles power was no other than that of our Saviour,
to invite men to embrace the Kingdome of God; which they themselves
acknowledged for a Kingdome (not present, but) to come; and they that
have no Kingdome, can make no Laws.  And secondly, if their Acts
of Councell, were Laws, they could not without sin be disobeyed.
But we read not any where, that they who received not the Doctrine
of Christ, did therein sin; but that they died in their sins;
that is, that their sins against the Laws to which they owed obedience,
were not pardoned.  And those Laws were the Laws of Nature,
and the Civill Laws of the State, whereto every Christian man had
by pact submitted himself.  And therefore by the Burthen, which the
Apostles might lay on such as they had converted, are not to be
understood Laws, but Conditions, proposed to those that sought Salvation;
which they might accept, or refuse at their own perill, without a new sin,
though not without the hazard of being condemned, and excluded out
of the Kingdome of God for their sins past.  And therefore of Infidels,
S. John saith not, the wrath of God shall "come" upon them, but
"the wrath of God remaineth upon them;" and not that they shall
be condemned; but that "they are condemned already."(John 3.36, 3.18)
Nor can it be conceived, that the benefit of Faith, "is Remission of sins"
unlesse we conceive withall, that the dammage of Infidelity,
is "the Retention of the same sins."

But to what end is it (may some man aske), that the Apostles,
and other Pastors of the Church, after their time, should meet together,
to agree upon what Doctrine should be taught, both for Faith and Manners,
if no man were obliged to observe their Decrees?  To this may be answered,
that the Apostles, and Elders of that Councell, were obliged even
by their entrance into it, to teach the Doctrine therein concluded,
and decreed to be taught, so far forth, as no precedent Law,
to which they were obliged to yeeld obedience, was to the contrary;
but not that all other Christians should be obliged to observe,
what they taught.  For though they might deliberate what each of them
should teach; yet they could not deliberate what others should do,
unless their Assembly had had a Legislative Power; which none
could have but Civill Soveraigns.  For though God be the Soveraign
of all the world, we are not bound to take for his Law, whatsoever
is propounded by every man in his name; nor any thing contrary
to the Civill Law, which God hath expressely commanded us to obey.

Seeing then the Acts of Councell of the Apostles, were then no Laws,
but Councells; much lesse are Laws the Acts of any other Doctors,
or Councells since, if assembled without the Authority of the
Civill Soveraign.  And consequently, the Books of the New Testament,
though most perfect Rules of Christian Doctrine, could not be made Laws
by any other authority then that of Kings, or Soveraign Assemblies.

The first Councell, that made the Scriptures we now have, Canon,
is not extant: For that Collection the first Bishop of Rome after
S. Peter, is subject to question: For though the Canonicall books
bee there reckoned up; yet these words, "Sint vobis omnibus
Clericis & Laicis Libris venerandi, &c." containe a distinction
of Clergy, and Laity, that was not in use so neer St. Peters time.
The first Councell for setling the Canonicall Scripture, that is extant,
is that of Laodicea, Can. 59. which forbids the reading of other Books
then those in the Churches; which is a Mandate that is not addressed
to every Christian, but to those onely that had authority to read any
publiquely in the Church; that is, to Ecclesiastiques onely.

Of The Right Of Constituting Ecclesiasticall
Officers In The Time Of The Apostles
Of Ecclesiastical Officers in the time of the Apostles, some were
Magisteriall, some Ministeriall.  Magisteriall were the Offices
of preaching of the Gospel of the Kingdom of God to Infidels;
of administring the Sacraments, and Divine Service; and of teaching
the Rules of Faith and Manners to those that were converted.
Ministeriall was the Office of Deacons, that is, of them that were
appointed to the administration of the secular necessities of the Church,
at such time as they lived upon a common stock of mony, raised out of
the voluntary contributions of the faithfull.

Amongst the Officers Magisteriall, the first, and principall
were the Apostles; whereof there were at first but twelve;
and these were chosen and constituted by our Saviour himselfe;
and their Office was not onely to Preach, Teach, and Baptize,
but also to be Martyrs, (Witnesses of our Saviours Resurrection.)
This Testimony, was the specificall, and essentiall mark;
whereby the Apostleship was distinguished from other Magistracy
Ecclesiasticall; as being necessary for an Apostle, either to have seen
our Saviour after his Resurrection, or to have conversed with him before,
and seen his works, and other arguments of his Divinity, whereby they
might be taken for sufficient Witnesses.  And therefore at the election
of a new Apostle in the place of Judas Iscariot, S. Peter saith
(Acts 1.21,22.) "Of these men that have companyed with us,
all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us,
beginning from the Baptisme of John unto that same day that he was
taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a Witnesse with us of
his Resurrection:" where, by this word Must, is implyed a necessary
property of an Apostle, to have companyed with the first and prime
Apostles in the time that our Saviour manifested himself in the flesh.

Matthias Made Apostle By The Congregation.
The first Apostle, of those which were not constituted by Christ
in the time he was upon the Earth, was Matthias, chosen in this manner:
There were assembled together in Jerusalem about 120 Christians
(Acts 1.15.)  These appointed two, Joseph the Just, and Matthias
(ver. 23.) and caused lots to be drawn; "and (ver. 26.) the Lot
fell on Matthias and he was numbred with the Apostles."  So that here
we see the ordination of this Apostle, was the act of the Congregation,
and not of St. Peter, nor of the eleven, otherwise then as Members
of the Assembly.

Paul And Barnabas Made Apostles
By The Church Of Antioch
After him there was never any other Apostle ordained, but Paul and
Barnabas, which was done (as we read Acts 13.1,2,3.) in this manner.
"There were in the Church that was at Antioch, certaine Prophets,
and Teachers; as Barnabas, and Simeon that was called Niger,
and Lucius of Cyrene, and Manaen; which had been brought up with
Herod the Tetrarch, and Saul.  As they ministred unto the Lord,
and fasted, the Holy Ghost said, 'Separate mee Barnabas, and Saul
for the worke whereunto I have called them.'  And when they had fasted,
and prayed, and laid their hands on them, they sent them away."

By which it is manifest, that though they were called by the Holy Ghost,
their Calling was declared unto them, and their Mission authorized
by the particular Church of Antioch.  And that this their calling
was to the Apostleship, is apparent by that, that they are both called
(Acts 14.14.) Apostles: And that it was by vertue of this act
of the Church of Antioch, that they were Apostles, S. Paul declareth
plainly (Rom. 1.1.) in that hee useth the word, which the Holy Ghost
used at his calling: For he stileth himself, "An Apostle separated
unto the Gospel of God;" alluding to the words of the Holy Ghost,
"Separate me Barnabas and Saul, &c."  But seeing the work of an Apostle,
was to be a Witnesse of the Resurrection of Christ, and man may here aske,
how S. Paul that conversed not with our Saviour before his passion,
could know he was risen.  To which it is easily answered,
that our Saviour himself appeared to him in the way to Damascus,
from Heaven, after his Ascension; "and chose him for a vessell
to bear his name before the Gentiles, and Kings, and Children of Israel;"
and consequently (having seen the Lord after his passion) was
a competent Witnesse of his Resurrection: And as for Barnabas,
he was a Disciple before the Passion.  It is therefore evident
that Paul, and Barnabas were Apostles; and yet chosen, and authorized
(not by the first Apostles alone, but) by the Church of Antioch;
as Matthias was chosen, and authorized by the Church of Jerusalem.

What Offices In The Church Are Magisteriall
Bishop, a word formed in our language, out of the Greek Episcopus,
signifieth an overseer, or Superintendent of any businesse,
and particularly a Pastor or Shepherd; and thence by metaphor
was taken, not only amongst the Jews that were originally Shepherds,
but also amongst the Heathen, to signifie the Office of a King, or any
other Ruler, or Guide of People, whether he ruled by Laws, or Doctrine.
And so the Apostles were the first Christian Bishops, instituted
by Christ himselfe: in which sense the Apostleship of Judas is called
(Acts 1.20.) his Bishoprick.  And afterwards, when there were
constituted Elders in the Christian Churches, with charge to guide
Christs flock by their doctrine, and advice; these Elders were also
called Bishops.  Timothy was an Elder (which word Elder, in the
New Testament is a name of Office, as well as of Age;) yet he was
also a Bishop.  And Bishops were then content with the Title of Elders.
Nay S. John himselfe, the Apostle beloved of our Lord, beginneth
his Second Epistle with these words, "The Elder to the Elect Lady."
By which it is evident, that Bishop, Pastor, Elder, Doctor,
that is to say, Teacher, were but so many divers names of the
same Office in the time of the Apostles.  For there was then no
government by Coercion, but only by Doctrine, and Perswading.
The Kingdome of God was yet to come, in a new world; so that there
could be no authority to compell in any Church, till the Common-wealth
had embraced the Christian Faith; and consequently no diversity
of Authority, though there were diversity of Employments.

Besides these Magisteriall employments in the Church, namely Apostles,
Bishops, Elders, Pastors, and Doctors, whose calling was to
proclaim Christ to the Jews, and Infidels, and to direct, and teach
those that beleeved we read in the New Testament of no other.
For by the names of Evangelists and Prophets, is not signified
any Office, but severall Gifts, by which severall men were profitable
to the Church: as Evangelists, by writing the life and acts
of our Saviour; such as were S. Matthew and S. John Apostles,
and S. Marke and S. Luke Disciples, and whosoever else wrote
of that subject, (as S. Thomas, and S. Barnabas are said to have done,
though the Church have not received the Books that have gone
under their names:) and as Prophets, by the gift of interpreting
the Old Testament; and sometimes by declaring their speciall
Revelations to the Church.  For neither these gifts, nor the gifts
of Languages, nor the gift of Casting out Devils, or of Curing
other diseases, nor any thing else did make an Officer in the Church,
save onely the due calling and election to the charge of Teaching.

Ordination Of Teachers
As the Apostles, Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas, were not made by
our Saviour himself, but were elected by the Church, that is,
by the Assembly of Christians; namely, Matthias by the Church
of Jerusalem, and Paul, and Barnabas by the Church of Antioch;
so were also the Presbyters, and Pastors in other Cities,
elected by the Churches of those Cities.  For proof whereof,
let us consider, first, how S. Paul proceeded in the Ordination
of Presbyters, in the Cities where he had converted men to the
Christian Faith, immediately after he and Barnabas had received
their Apostleship.  We read (Acts 14.23.) that "they ordained Elders
in every Church;" which at first sight may be taken for an Argument,
that they themselves chose, and gave them their authority:
But if we consider the Originall text, it will be manifest,
that they were authorized, and chosen by the Assembly of the
Christians of each City.  For the words there are, "cheirotonesantes
autoispresbuterous kat ekklesian," that is, "When they had Ordained
them Elders by the Holding up of Hands in every Congregation."
Now it is well enough known, that in all those Cities, the manner
of choosing Magistrates, and Officers, was by plurality of suffrages;
and (because the ordinary way of distinguishing the Affirmative Votes
from the Negatives, was by Holding up of Hands) to ordain an Officer
in any of the Cities, was no more but to bring the people together,
to elect them by plurality of Votes, whether it were by plurality
of elevated hands, or by plurality of voices, or plurality of balls,
or beans, or small stones, of which every man cast in one,
into a vessell marked for the Affirmative, or Negative; for divers Cities
had divers customes in that point.  It was therefore the Assembly
that elected their own Elders: the Apostles were onely Presidents
of the Assembly to call them together for such Election,
and to pronounce them Elected, and to give them the benediction,
which now is called Consecration.  And for this cause they that
were Presidents of the Assemblies, as (in the absence of the Apostles)
the Elders were, were called proestotes, and in Latin Antistities;
which words signifie the Principall Person of the Assembly,
whose office was to number the Votes, and to declare thereby
who was chosen; and where the Votes were equall, to decide
the matter in question, by adding his own; which is the Office
of a President in Councell.  And (because all the Churches had
their Presbyters ordained in the same manner,) where the word
is Constitute, (as Titus 1.5.) "ina katasteses kata polin presbuterous,"
"For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldest constitute
Elders in every City," we are to understand the same thing; namely,
that hee should call the faithfull together, and ordain them Presbyters
by plurality of suffrages.  It had been a strange thing, if in a Town,
where men perhaps had never seen any Magistrate otherwise chosen
then by an Assembly, those of the Town becomming Christians,
should so much as have thought on any other way of Election
of their Teachers, and Guides, that is to say, of their Presbyters,
(otherwise called Bishops,) then this of plurality of suffrages,
intimated by S. Paul (Acts 14.23.) in the word Cheirotonesantes:
Nor was there ever any choosing of Bishops, (before the Emperors
found it necessary to regulate them in order to the keeping of
the peace amongst them,) but by the Assemblies of the Christians
in every severall Town.

The same is also confirmed by the continuall practise even to this day,
in the Election of the Bishops of Rome.  For if the Bishop of any place,
had the right of choosing another, to the succession of the
Pastorall Office, in any City, at such time as he went from thence,
to plant the same in another place; much more had he had the Right,
to appoint his successour in that place, in which he last resided
and dyed: And we find not, that ever any Bishop of Rome appointed
his successor.  For they were a long time chosen by the People,
as we may see by the sedition raised about the Election, between
Damascus, and Ursinicus; which Ammianus Marcellinus saith was so great,
that Juventius the Praefect, unable to keep the peace between them,
was forced to goe out of the City; and that there were above an
hundred men found dead upon that occasion in the Church it self.
And though they afterwards were chosen, first, by the whole
Clergy of Rome, and afterwards by the Cardinalls; yet never
any was appointed to the succession by his predecessor.
If therefore they pretended no right to appoint their successors,
I think I may reasonably conclude, they had no right to appoint
the new power; which none could take from the Church to bestow on them,
but such as had a lawfull authority, not onely to Teach, but to
Command the Church; which none could doe, but the Civill Soveraign.

Ministers Of The Church What
The word Minister in the Originall Diakonos signifieth one that
voluntarily doth the businesse of another man; and differeth from
a Servant onely in this, that Servants are obliged by their condition,
to what is commanded them; whereas Ministers are obliged onely
by their undertaking, and bound therefore to no more than that
they have undertaken: So that both they that teach the Word of God,
and they that administer the secular affairs of the Church,
are both Ministers, but they are Ministers of different Persons.
For the Pastors of the Church, called (Acts 6.4.) "The Ministers
of the Word," are Ministers of Christ, whose Word it is: But the
Ministery of a Deacon, which is called (verse 2. of the same Chapter)
"Serving of Tables," is a service done to the Church, or Congregation:
So that neither any one man, nor the whole Church, could ever of
their Pastor say, he was their Minister; but of a Deacon,
whether the charge he undertook were to serve tables, or distribute
maintenance to the Christians, when they lived in each City on
a common stock, or upon collections, as in the first times,
or to take a care of the House of Prayer, or of the Revenue,
or other worldly businesse of the Church, the whole Congregation
might properly call him their Minister.

For their employment, as Deacons, was to serve the Congregation;
though upon occasion they omitted not to preach the Gospel,
and maintain the Doctrine of Christ, every one according to his gifts,
as S. Steven did; and both to Preach, and Baptize, as Philip did:
For that Philip, which (Act. 8. 5.) Preached the Gospel at Samaria,
and (verse 38.) Baptized the Eunuch, was Philip the Deacon,
not Philip the Apostle.  For it is manifest (verse 1.) that when
Philip preached in Samaria, the Apostles were at Jerusalem,
and (verse 14.) "When they heard that Samaria had received the
Word of God, sent Peter and John to them;" by imposition of whose hands,
they that were Baptized (verse 15.) received (which before by
the Baptisme of Philip they had not received) the Holy Ghost.
For it was necessary for the conferring of the Holy Ghost,
that their Baptisme should be administred, or confirmed by
a Minister of the Word, not by a Minister of the Church.
And therefore to confirm the Baptisme of those that Philip the Deacon
had Baptized, the Apostles sent out of their own number from Jerusalem
to Samaria, Peter, and John; who conferred on them that before
were but Baptized, those graces that were signs of the Holy Spirit,
which at that time did accompany all true Beleevers; which what
they were may be understood by that which S. Marke saith (chap. 16.17.)
"These signs follow them that beleeve in my Name; they shall
cast out Devills; they shall speak with new tongues; They shall
take up Serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall
not hurt them; They shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover."
This to doe, was it that Philip could not give; but the Apostles could,
and (as appears by this place) effectually did to every man that
truly beleeved, and was by a Minister of Christ himself Baptized:
which power either Christs Ministers in this age cannot conferre,
or else there are very few true Beleevers, or Christ hath
very few Ministers.

And How Chosen What:
That the first Deacons were chosen, not by the Apostles, but by
a Congregation of the Disciples; that is, of Christian men of all sorts,
is manifest out of Acts 6. where we read that the Twelve,
after the number of Disciples was multiplyed, called them together,
and having told them, that it was not fit that the Apostles should
leave the Word of God, and serve tables, said unto them (verse 3.)
"Brethren looke you out among you seven men of honest report,
full of the Holy Ghost, and of Wisdome, whom we may appoint
over this businesse."  Here it is manifest, that though the Apostles
declared them elected; yet the Congregation chose them; which also,
(verse the fift) is more expressely said, where it is written,
that "the saying pleased the multitude, and they chose seven, &c."

Of Ecclesiasticall Revenue, Under The Law Of Moses
Under the Old Testament, the Tribe of Levi were onely capable
of the Priesthood, and other inferiour Offices of the Church.
The land was divided amongst the other Tribes (Levi excepted,)
which by the subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph, into Ephraim
and Manasses, were still twelve.  To the Tribe of Levi were assigned
certain Cities for their habitation, with the suburbs for their cattell:
but for their portion, they were to have the tenth of the fruits
of the land of their Brethren.  Again, the Priests for their maintenance
had the tenth of that tenth, together with part of the oblations,
and sacrifices.  For God had said to Aaron (Numb. 18. 20.)
"Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land, neither shalt thou
have any part amongst them, I am thy part, and thine inheritance
amongst the Children of Israel."  For God being then King, and
having constituted the Tribe of Levi to be his Publique Ministers,
he allowed them for their maintenance, the Publique revenue,
that is to say, the part that God had reserved to himself;
which were Tythes, and Offerings: and that it is which is meant,
where God saith, I am thine inheritance.  And therefore to the Levites
might not unfitly be attributed the name of Clergy from Kleros,
which signifieth Lot, or Inheritance; not that they were heirs
of the Kingdome of God, more than other; but that Gods inheritance,
was their maintenance.  Now seeing in this time God himself
was their King, and Moses, Aaron, and the succeeding High Priests
were his Lieutenants; it is manifest, that the Right of Tythes,
and Offerings was constituted by the Civill Power.

After their rejection of God in the demand of a King, they enjoyed
still the same revenue; but the Right thereof was derived from that,
that the Kings did never take it from them: for the Publique Revenue
was at the disposing of him that was the Publique Person; and that
(till the Captivity) was the King.  And again, after the return
from the Captivity, they paid their Tythes as before to the Priest.
Hitherto therefore Church Livings were determined by the Civill Soveraign.

In Our Saviours Time, And After
Of the maintenance of our Saviour, and his Apostles, we read onely
they had a Purse, (which was carried by Judas Iscariot;) and,
that of the Apostles, such as were Fisher-men, did sometimes
use their trade; and that when our Saviour sent the Twelve Apostles
to Preach, he forbad them "to carry Gold, and Silver, and Brasse
in their purses, for that the workman is worthy of his hire:"
(Mat. 10. 9,10.) By which it is probable, their ordinary maintenance
was not unsuitable to their employment; for their employment was
(ver. 8.) "freely to give, because they had freely received;"
and their maintenance was the Free Gift of those that beleeved the good
tyding they carryed about of the coming of the Messiah their Saviour.
To which we may adde, that which was contributed out of gratitude,
by such as our Saviour had healed of diseases; of which are mentioned
"Certain women (Luke 8. 2,3.) which had been healed of evill spirits
and infirmities; Mary Magdalen, out of whom went seven Devills;
and Joanna the wife of Chuza, Herods Steward; and Susanna,
and many others, which ministred unto him of their substance.

After our Saviours Ascension, the Christians of every City
lived in Common, (Acts 4. 34.) upon the mony which was made
of the sale of their lands and possessions, and laid down at
the feet of the Apostles, of good will, not of duty; for
"whilest the Land remained (saith S. Peter to Ananias Acts 5.4.)
was it not thine? and after it was sold, was it not in thy power?"
which sheweth he needed not to have saved his land, nor his money
by lying, as not being bound to contribute any thing at all,
unlesse he had pleased.  And as in the time of the Apostles,
so also all the time downward, till after Constantine the Great,
we shall find, that the maintenance of the Bishops, and Pastors
of the Christian Church, was nothing but the voluntary contribution
of them that had embraced their Doctrine.  There was yet no mention
of Tythes: but such was in the time of Constantine, and his Sons,
the affection of Christians to their Pastors, as Ammianus Marcellinus
saith (describing the sedition of Damasus and Ursinicus about
the Bishopricke,) that it was worth their contention, in that the
Bishops of those times by the liberality of their flock, and especially
of Matrons, lived splendidly, were carryed in Coaches, and sumptuous
in their fare and apparell.

The Ministers Of The Gospel Lived On The Benevolence Of Their Flocks
But here may some ask, whether the Pastor were then bound to live
upon voluntary contribution, as upon almes, "For who (saith S. Paul
1 Cor. 9. 7.) goeth to war at his own charges? or who feedeth a flock,
and eatheth not of the milke of the flock?" And again, (1 Cor. 9. 13.)
"Doe ye not know that they which minister about holy things,
live of the things of the Temple; and they which wait at the Altar,
partake with the Altar;" that is to say, have part of that
which is offered at the Altar for their maintenance? And then
he concludeth, "Even so hath the Lord appointed, that they which
preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel.  From which place
may be inferred indeed, that the Pastors of the Church ought to
be maintained by their flocks; but not that the Pastors were
to determine, either the quantity, or the kind of their own allowance,
and be (as it were) their own Carvers.  Their allowance must needs
therefore be determined, either by the gratitude, and liberality
of every particular man of their flock, or by the whole Congregation.
By the whole Congregation it could not be, because their Acts were then
no Laws: Therefore the maintenance of Pastors, before Emperours and Civill
Soveraigns had made Laws to settle it, was nothing but Benevolence.
They that served at the Altar lived on what was offered.
In what court should they sue for it, who had no Tribunalls?
Or if they had Arbitrators amongst themselves, who should execute
their Judgments, when they had no power to arme their Officers?
It remaineth therefore, that there could be no certaine maintenance
assigned to any Pastors of the Church, but by the whole Congregation;
and then onely, when their Decrees should have the force
(not onely of Canons, but also) of Laws; which Laws could not
be made, but by Emperours, Kings, or other Civill Soveraignes.
The Right of Tythes in Moses Law, could not be applyed to the
then Ministers of the Gospell; because Moses and the High Priests
were the Civill Soveraigns of the people under God, whose Kingdom
amongst the Jews was present; whereas the Kingdome of God by Christ
is yet to come.

Hitherto hath been shewn what the Pastors of the Church are;
what are the points of their Commission (as that they were to Preach,
to Teach, to Baptize, to be Presidents in their severall Congregations;)
what is Ecclesiasticall Censure, viz. Excommunication, that is to say,
in those places where Christianity was forbidden by the Civill Laws,
a putting of themselves out of the company of the Excommunicate,
and where Christianity was by the Civill Law commanded, a putting the
Excommunicate out of the Congregations of Christians; who elected
the Pastors and Ministers of the Church, (that it was, the Congregation);
who consecrated and blessed them, (that it was the Pastor);
what was their due revenue, (that it was none but their own possessions,
and their own labour, and the voluntary contributions of devout
and gratefull Christians).  We are to consider now, what Office
those persons have, who being Civill Soveraignes, have embraced also
the Christian Faith.

That The Civill Soveraign Being A Christian
Hath The Right Of Appointing Pastors
And first, we are to remember, that the Right of Judging what Doctrines
are fit for Peace, and to be taught the Subjects, is in all
Common-wealths inseparably annexed (as hath been already proved cha. 18.)
to the Soveraign Power Civill, whether it be in one Man, or in one
Assembly of men.  For it is evident to the meanest capacity,
that mens actions are derived from the opinions they have of the Good,
or Evill, which from those actions redound unto themselves;
and consequently, men that are once possessed of an opinion,
that their obedience to the Soveraign Power, will bee more hurtfull
to them, than their disobedience, will disobey the Laws, and thereby
overthrow the Common-wealth, and introduce confusion, and Civill war;
for the avoiding whereof, all Civill Government was ordained.
And therefore in all Common-wealths of the Heathen, the Soveraigns have
had the name of Pastors of the People, because there was no Subject that
could lawfully Teach the people, but by their permission and authority.

This Right of the Heathen Kings, cannot bee thought taken from them
by their conversion to the Faith of Christ; who never ordained,
that Kings for beleeving in him, should be deposed, that is,
subjected to any but himself, or (which is all one) be deprived
of the power necessary for the conservation of Peace amongst
their Subjects, and for their defence against foraign Enemies.
And therefore Christian Kings are still the Supreme Pastors of their
people, and have power to ordain what Pastors they please, to teach
the Church, that is, to teach the People committed to their charge.

Again, let the right of choosing them be (as before the conversion
of Kings) in the Church, for so it was in the time of the Apostles
themselves (as hath been shewn already in this chapter);
even so also the Right will be in the Civill Soveraign, Christian.
For in that he is a Christian, he allowes the Teaching; and in that
he is the Soveraign (which is as much as to say, the Church
by Representation,) the Teachers hee elects, are elected by the Church.
And when an Assembly of Christians choose their Pastor in a
Christian Common-wealth, it is the Soveraign that electeth him,
because tis done by his Authority; In the same manner, as when a Town
choose their Maior, it is the act of him that hath the Soveraign Power:
For every act done, is the act of him, without whose consent it is invalid.
And therefore whatsoever examples may be drawn out of History,
concerning the Election of Pastors, by the People, or by the Clergy,
they are no arguments against the Right of any Civill Soveraign,
because they that elected them did it by his Authority.

Seeing then in every Christian Common-wealth, the Civill Soveraign
is the Supreme Pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his Subjects
is committed, and consequently that it is by his authority,
that all other Pastors are made, and have power to teach,
and performe all other Pastorall offices; it followeth also,
that it is from the Civill Soveraign, that all other Pastors
derive their right of Teaching, Preaching, and other functions
pertaining to that Office; and that they are but his Ministers;
in the same manner as the Magistrates of Towns, Judges in
Courts of Justice, and Commanders of Armies, are all but Ministers
of him that is the Magistrate of the whole Common-wealth,
Judge of all Causes, and Commander of the whole Militia,
which is alwayes the Civill Soveraign.  And the reason hereof,
is not because they that Teach, but because they that are to Learn,
are his Subjects.  For let it be supposed, that a Christian King
commit the Authority of Ordaining Pastors in his Dominions
to another King, (as divers Christian Kings allow that power
to the Pope;) he doth not thereby constitute a Pastor over himself,
nor a Soveraign Pastor over his People; for that were to deprive
himself of the Civill Power; which depending on the opinion men have
of their Duty to him, and the fear they have of Punishment in
another world, would depend also on the skill, and loyalty of Doctors,
who are no lesse subject, not only to Ambition, but also to Ignorance,
than any other sort of men.  So that where a stranger hath authority
to appoint Teachers, it is given him by the Soveraign in whose
Dominions he teacheth.  Christian Doctors are our Schoolmasters
to Christianity; But Kings are Fathers of Families, and may receive
Schoolmasters for their Subjects from the recommendation of a stranger,
but not from the command; especially when the ill teaching them
shall redound to the great and manifest profit of him that
recommends them: nor can they be obliged to retain them,
longer than it is for the Publique good; the care of which they
stand so long charged withall, as they retain any other essentiall
Right of the Soveraignty.

The Pastorall Authority Of Soveraigns Only
Is De Jure Divino, That Of Other Pastors
Is Jure Civili
If a man therefore should ask a Pastor, in the execution of his Office,
as the chief Priests and Elders of the people (Mat. 21.23.)
asked our Saviour, "By what authority dost thou these things,
and who gave thee this authority:" he can make no other just Answer,
but that he doth it by the Authority of the Common-wealth,
given him by the King, or Assembly that representeth it.
All Pastors, except the Supreme, execute their charges in the Right,
that is by the Authority of the Civill Soveraign, that is, Jure Civili.
But the King, and every other Soveraign executeth his Office
of Supreme Pastor, by immediate Authority from God, that is to say,
In Gods Right, or Jure Divino.  And therefore none but Kings can put
into their Titles (a mark of their submission to God onely )
Dei Gratia Rex, &c.  Bishops ought to say in the beginning
of their Mandates, "By the favour of the Kings Majesty, Bishop of
such a Diocesse;" or as Civill Ministers, "In his Majesties Name."
For in saying, Divina Providentia, which is the same with Dei Gratia,
though disguised, they deny to have received their authority
from the Civill State; and sliely slip off the Collar of their
Civill Subjection, contrary to the unity and defence of the Common-wealth.

Christian Kings Have Power To Execute
All Manner Of Pastoral Function
But if every Christian Soveraign be the Supreme Pastor of his
own Subjects, it seemeth that he hath also the Authority,
not only to Preach (which perhaps no man will deny;) but also
to Baptize, and to Administer the Sacrament of the Lords Supper;
and to Consecrate both Temples, and Pastors to Gods service;
which most men deny; partly because they use not to do it;
and partly because the Administration of Sacraments, and Consecration
of Persons, and Places to holy uses, requireth the Imposition
of such mens hands, as by the like Imposition successively
from the time of the Apostles have been ordained to the like Ministery.
For proof therefore that Christian Kings have power to Baptize,
and to Consecrate, I am to render a reason, both why they use not
to doe it, and how, without the ordinary ceremony of Imposition of hands,
they are made capable of doing it, when they will.

There is no doubt but any King, in case he were skilfull in the Sciences,
might by the same Right of his Office, read Lectures of them himself,
by which he authorizeth others to read them in the Universities.
Neverthelesse, because the care of the summe of the businesse of
the Common-wealth taketh up his whole time, it were not convenient for him
to apply himself in Person to that particular.  A King may also if
he please, sit in Judgment, to hear and determine all manner of Causes,
as well as give others authority to doe it in his name; but that
the charge that lyeth upon him of Command and Government,
constrain him to bee continually at the Helm, and to commit
the Ministeriall Offices to others under him.  In the like manner
our Saviour (who surely had power to Baptize) Baptized none himselfe,
but sent his Apostles and Disciples to Baptize. (John 4.2.)
So also S. Paul, by the necessity of Preaching in divers and
far distant places, Baptized few: Amongst all the Corinthians
he Baptized only Crispus, Cajus, and Stephanus; (1 Cor.1.14,16.)
and the reason was, because his principall Charge was to Preach.
(1 Cor. 1.17.)   Whereby it is manifest, that the greater Charge,
(such as is the Government of the Church,) is a dispensation
for the lesse.  The reason therefore why Christian Kings use not
to Baptize, is evident, and the same, for which at this day
there are few Baptized by Bishops, and by the Pope fewer.

And as concerning Imposition of Hands, whether it be needfull,
for the authorizing of a King to Baptize, and Consecrate,
we may consider thus.

Imposition of Hands, was a most ancient publique ceremony amongst
the Jews, by which was designed, and made certain, the person,
or other thing intended in a mans prayer, blessing, sacrifice,
consecration, condemnation, or other speech.  So Jacob in blessing
the children of Joseph (Gen. 48.14.) "Laid his right Hand on
Ephraim the younger, and his left Hand on Manasseh the first born;"
and this he did Wittingly (though they were so presented to him
by Joseph, as he was forced in doing it to stretch out his arms acrosse)
to design to whom he intended the greater blessing.  So also in the
sacrificing of the Burnt offering, Aaron is commanded (Exod. 29.10.)
"to Lay his Hands on the head of the bullock;" and (ver. 15.)
"to Lay his Hand on the head of the ramme."  The same is also
said again, Levit. 1.4. & 8.14.  Likewise Moses when he ordained
Joshua to be Captain of the Israelites, that is, consecrated him
to Gods service, (Numb. 27.23.) "Laid his hands upon him,
and gave him his Charge," designing and rendring certain,
who it was they were to obey in war.  And in the consecration
of the Levites (Numb. 8.10.) God commanded that "the Children of Israel
should Put their Hands upon the Levites."  And in the condemnation
of him that had blasphemed the Lord (Levit. 24.14.) God commanded that
"all that heard him should Lay their Hands on his head, and that all
the Congregation should stone him."  And why should they only
that heard him, Lay their Hands upon him, and not rather a Priest,
Levite, or other Minister of Justice, but that none else were able
to design, and demonstrate to the eyes of the Congregation,
who it was that had blasphemed, and ought to die? And to design a man,
or any other thing, by the Hand to the Eye is lesse subject to mistake,
than when it is done to the Eare by a Name.

And so much was this ceremony observed, that in blessing the whole
Congregation at once, which cannot be done by Laying on of Hands,
yet "Aaron (Levit. 9.22.) did lift up his Hand towards the people
when he blessed them."  And we read also of the like ceremony
of Consecration of Temples amongst the Heathen, as that the Priest
laid his Hands on some post of the Temple, all the while he was
uttering the words of Consecration.  So naturall it is to design
any individuall thing, rather by the Hand, to assure the Eyes,
than by Words to inform the Eare in matters of Gods Publique service.

This ceremony was not therefore new in our Saviours time.
For Jairus (Mark 5.23.) whose daughter was sick, besought our Saviour
(not to heal her, but) "to Lay his Hands upon her, that shee
might bee healed."  And (Matth. 19.13.) "they brought unto him
little children, that hee should Put his Hands on them, and Pray."

According to this ancient Rite, the Apostles, and Presbyters,
and the Presbytery it self, Laid Hands on them whom they ordained Pastors,
and withall prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost;
and that not only once, but sometimes oftner, when a new occasion
was presented: but the end was still the same, namely a punctuall,
and religious designation of the person, ordained either to the
Pastorall Charge in general, or to a particular Mission: so (Act. 6.6.)
"The Apostles Prayed, and Laid their Hands" on the seven Deacons;
which was done, not to give them the Holy Ghost, (for they were
full of the Holy Ghost before thy were chosen, as appeareth
immediately before, verse 3.) but to design them to that Office.
And after Philip the Deacon had converted certain persons in Samaria,
Peter and John went down (Act. 8.17.)" and laid their Hands on them,
and they received the Holy Ghost."  And not only an Apostle,
but a Presbyter had this power: For S. Paul adviseth Timothy
(1 Tim. 5.22.) "Lay Hands suddenly on no man;" that is, designe no man
rashly to the Office of a Pastor.  The whole Presbytery Laid their Hands
on Timothy, as we read 1 Tim. 4.14. but this is to be understood,
as that some did it by the appointment of the Presbytery,
and most likely their Proestos, or Prolocutor, which it may be
was St. Paul himself.  For in his 2 Epist. to Tim. ver. 6. he saith
to him, "Stirre up the gift of God which is in thee, by the Laying
on of my Hands:" where note by the way, that by the Holy ghost,
is not meant the third Person in the Trinity, but the Gifts
necessary to the Pastorall Office.  We read also, that St. Paul
had Imposition of Hands twice; once from Ananias at Damascus
(Acts 9.17,18.) at the time of his Baptisme; and again (Acts 13.3.)
at Antioch, when he was first sent out to Preach.  The use then of this
ceremony considered in the Ordination of Pastors, was to design
the Person to whom they gave such Power.   But if there had been
then any Christian, that had had the Power of Teaching before;
the Baptizing of him, that is the making of him a Christian,
had given him no new Power, but had onely caused him to preach
true Doctrine, that is, to use his Power aright; and therefore
the Imposition of Hands had been unnecessary; Baptisme it selfe
had been sufficient.  But every Soveraign, before Christianity,
had the power of Teaching, and Ordaining Teachers; and therefore
Christianity gave them no new Right, but only directed them in the way
of teaching truth; and consequently they needed no Imposition of Hands
(besides that which is done in Baptisme) to authorize them
to exercise any part of the Pastorall Function, as namely,
to Baptize, and Consecrate.  And in the Old Testament, though
the Priest only had right to Consecrate, during the time that
the Soveraignty was in the High Priest; yet it was not so when
the Soveraignty was in the King: For we read (1 Kings 8.)
That Solomon Blessed the People, Consecrated the Temple,
and pronounced that Publique Prayer, which is the pattern now
for Consecration of all Christian Churches, and Chappels:
whereby it appears, he had not only the right of Ecclesiasticall
Government; but also of exercising Ecclesiasticall Functions.

The Civill Soveraigne If A Christian,
Is Head Of The Church In His Own Dominions
From this consolidation of the Right Politique, and Ecclesiastique
in Christian Soveraigns, it is evident, they have all manner of Power
over their Subjects, that can be given to man, for the government
of mens externall actions, both in Policy, and Religion; and may make
such Laws, as themselves shall judge fittest, for the government
of their own Subjects, both as they are the Common-wealth,
and as they are the Church: for both State, and Church are the same men.

If they please therefore, they may (as many Christian Kings now doe)
commit the government of their Subjects in matters of Religion
to the Pope; but then the Pope is in that point Subordinate to them,
and exerciseth that Charge in anothers Dominion Jure Civili,
in the Right of the Civill Soveraign; not Jure Divino, in Gods Right;
and may therefore be discharged of that Office, when the Soveraign
for the good of his Subjects shall think it necessary.  They may also
if they please, commit the care of Religion to one Supreme Pastor,
or to an Assembly of Pastors; and give them what power over the Church,
or one over another, they think most convenient; and what titles of honor,
as of Bishops, Archbishops, Priests, or Presbyters, they will;
and make such Laws for their maintenance, either by Tithes,
or otherwise, as they please, so they doe it out of a sincere conscience,
of which God onely is the Judge.  It is the Civill Soveraign,
that is to appoint Judges, and Interpreters of the Canonicall Scriptures;
for it is he that maketh them Laws.  It is he also that giveth strength
to Excommunications; which but for such Laws and Punishments,
as may humble obstinate Libertines, and reduce them to union
with the rest of the Church, would bee contemned.  In summe,
he hath the Supreme Power in all causes, as well Ecclesiasticall,
as Civill, as far as concerneth actions, and words, for these onely
are known, and may be accused; and of that which cannot be accused,
there is no Judg at all, but God, that knoweth the heart.
And these Rights are incident to all Soveraigns, whether Monarchs,
or Assemblies: for they that are the Representants of a Christian People,
are Representants of the Church: for a Church, and a Common-wealth
of Christian People, are the same thing.

Cardinal Bellarmines Books
De Summo Pontifice Considered
Though this that I have here said, and in other places of this Book,
seem cleer enough for the asserting of the Supreme Ecclesiasticall
Power to Christian Soveraigns; yet because the Pope of Romes challenge
to that Power universally, hath been maintained chiefly, and I think
as strongly as is possible, by Cardinall Bellarmine, in his Controversie
De Summo Pontifice; I have thought it necessary, as briefly as I can,
to examine the grounds, and strength of his Discourse.

The First Book
Of five Books he hath written of this subject, the first containeth
three Questions: One, Which is simply the best government, Monarchy,
Aristocracy, or Democracy; and concludeth for neither, but for
a government mixt of all there: Another, which of these is
the best Government of the Church; and concludeth for the mixt,
but which should most participate of Monarchy: the third,
whether in this mixt Monarchy, St. Peter had the place of Monarch.
Concerning his first Conclusion, I have already sufficiently proved
(chapt. 18.) that all Governments which men are bound to obey,
are Simple, and Absolute.  In Monarchy there is but One Man Supreme;
and all other men that have any kind of Power in the State,
have it by his Commission, during his pleasure; and execute it
in his name: And in Aristocracy, and Democracy, but One Supreme
Assembly, with the same Power that in Monarchy belongeth to
the Monarch, which is not a Mixt, but an Absolute Soveraignty.
And of the three sorts, which is the best, is not to be disputed,
where any one of them is already established; but the present
ought alwaies to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best;
because it is against both the Law of Nature, and the Divine
positive Law, to doe any thing tending to the subversion thereof.
Besides, it maketh nothing to the Power of any Pastor, (unlesse he
have the Civill Soveraignty,) what kind of Government is the best;
because their Calling is not to govern men by Commandement,
but to teach them, and perswade them by Arguments, and leave it to them
to consider, whether they shall embrace, or reject the Doctrine taught.
For Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, do mark out unto us
three sorts of Soveraigns, not of Pastors; or, as we may say,
three sorts of Masters of Families, not three sorts of Schoolmasters
for their children.

And therefore the second Conclusion, concerning the best form
of Government of the Church, is nothing to the question of
the Popes Power without his own Dominions: For in all other
Common-wealths his Power (if hee have any at all) is that of
the Schoolmaster onely, and not of the Master of the Family.

For the third Conclusion, which is, that St. Peter was Monarch
of the Church, he bringeth for his chiefe argument the place
of S. Matth. (chap. 16.18, 19.) "Thou art Peter, And upon this rock
I will build my Church, &c.  And I will give thee the keyes of Heaven;
whatsoever thou shalt bind on Earth, shall be bound in Heaven,
and whatsoever thou shalt loose on Earth, shall be loosed in Heaven."
Which place well considered, proveth no more, but that the
Church of Christ hath for foundation one onely Article; namely,
that which Peter in the name of all the Apostles professing,
gave occasion to our Saviour to speak the words here cited;
which that wee may cleerly understand, we are to consider,
that our Saviour preached by himself, by John Baptist, and by
his Apostles, nothing but this Article of Faith, "that he was the Christ;"
all other Articles requiring faith no otherwise, than as founded on that.
John began first, (Mat. 3.2.) preaching only this, "The Kingdome of God
is at hand."  Then our Saviour himself (Mat. 4.17.) preached the same:
And to his Twelve Apostles, when he gave them their Commission
(Mat. 10.7.) there is no mention of preaching any other Article but that.
This was the fundamentall Article, that is the Foundation of the
Churches Faith.  Afterwards the Apostles being returned to him,
he asketh them all, (Mat. 16.13) not Peter onely, "Who men said he was;"
and they answered, that "some said he was John the Baptist, some Elias,
and others Jeremias, or one of the Prophets:" Then (ver. 15.)
he asked them all again, (not Peter onely) "Whom say yee that I am?"
Therefore Peter answered (for them all) "Thou art Christ,
the Son of the Living God;" which I said is the Foundation of the Faith
of the whole Church; from which our Saviour takes the occasion of saying,
"Upon this stone I will build my Church;" By which it is manifest,
that by the Foundation-Stone of the Church, was meant the
Fundamentall Article of the Churches Faith.  But why then
(will some object) doth our Saviour interpose these words,
"Thou art Peter"? If the originall of this text had been rigidly
translated, the reason would easily have appeared: We are therefore
to consider, that the Apostle Simon, was surnamed Stone, (which is the
signification of the Syriacke word Cephas, and of the Greek word Petrus).
Our Saviour therefore after the confession of that Fundamentall Article,
alluding to his name, said (as if it were in English) thus,
Thou art "Stone," and upon this Stone I will build my Church:
which is as much as to say, this Article, that "I am the Christ,"
is the Foundation of all the Faith I require in those that are to bee
members of my Church: Neither is this allusion to a name,
an unusuall thing in common speech: But it had been a strange,
and obscure speech, if our Saviour intending to build his Church
on the Person of St. Peter, had said, "thou art a Stone, and upon
this Stone I will build my Church," when it was so obvious without
ambiguity to have said, "I will build my Church on thee; and yet
there had been still the same allusion to his name.

And for the following words, "I will give thee the Keyes of Heaven, &c."
it is no more than what our Saviour gave also to all the rest
of his Disciples (Matth. 18.18.) "Whatsoever yee shall bind on Earth,
shall be bound in Heaven.  And whatsoever ye shall loose on Earth,
shall be loosed in Heaven."  But howsoever this be interpreted,
there is no doubt but the Power here granted belongs to all
Supreme Pastors; such as are all Christian Civill Soveraignes
in their own Dominions.  In so much, as if St. Peter, or our
Saviour himself had converted any of them to beleeve him,
and to acknowledge his Kingdome; yet because his Kingdome
is not of this world, he had left the supreme care of converting
his subjects to none but him; or else hee must have deprived him of
the Soveraignty, to which the Right of Teaching is inseparably annexed.
And thus much in refutation of his first Book, wherein hee would prove
St. Peter to have been the Monarch Universall of the Church,
that is to say, of all the Christians in the world.

The Second Book
The second Book hath two Conclusions: One, that S. Peter was
Bishop of Rome, and there dyed: The other, that the Popes of Rome
are his Successors.  Both which have been disputed by others.
But supposing them to be true; yet if by Bishop of Rome bee understood
either the Monarch of the Church, or the Supreme Pastor of it;
not Silvester, but Constantine (who was the first Christian Emperour)
was that Bishop; and as Constantine, so all other Christian Emperors
were of Right supreme Bishops of the Roman Empire; I say of the
Roman Empire, not of all Christendome: For other Christian Soveraigns
had the same Right in their severall Territories, as to an Office
essentially adhaerent to their Soveraignty.  Which shall serve
for answer to his second Book.

The Third Book
In the third Book, he handleth the question whether the Pope
be Antichrist.  For my part, I see no argument that proves he is so,
in that sense that Scripture useth the name: nor will I take
any argument from the quality of Antichrist, to contradict
the Authority he exerciseth, or hath heretofore exercised
in the Dominions of any other Prince, or State.

It is evident that the Prophets of the Old Testament foretold,
and the Jews expected a Messiah, that is, a Christ, that should
re-establish amongst them the kingdom of God, which had been rejected
by them in the time of Samuel, when they required a King after the manner
of other Nations.  This expectation of theirs, made them obnoxious
to the Imposture of all such, as had both the ambition to attempt
the attaining of the Kingdome, and the art to deceive the People
by counterfeit miracles, by hypocriticall life, or by orations
and doctrine plausible.  Our Saviour therefore, and his Apostles
forewarned men of False Prophets, and of False Christs.
False Christs, are such as pretend to be the Christ, but are not,
and are called properly Antichrists, in such sense, as when
there happeneth a Schisme in the Church by the election of
two Popes, the one calleth the other Antipapa, or the false Pope.
And therefore Antichrist in the proper signification hath
two essentiall marks; One, that he denyeth Jesus to be Christ;
and another that he professeth himselfe to bee Christ.  The first Mark
is set down by S. John in his 1 Epist. 4. ch. 3. ver. "Every Spirit
that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh,
is not of God; And this is the Spirit of Antichrist."  The other Mark
is expressed in the words of our Saviour, (Mat. 24.5.) "Many shall come
in my name, saying, I am Christ;" and again, "If any man shall say
unto you, Loe, here is Christ, there is Christ beleeve it not."
And therefore Antichrist must be a False Christ, that is,
some one of them that shall pretend themselves to be Christ.
And out of these two Marks, "to deny Jesus to be the Christ,"
and to "affirm himselfe to be the Christ," it followeth,
that he must also be an "Adversary of the true Christ," which
is another usuall signification of the word Antichrist.
But of these many Antichrists, there is one speciall one,
O Antichristos, The Antichrist, or Antichrist definitely,
as one certaine person; not indefinitely An Antichrist.
Now seeing the Pope of Rome, neither pretendeth himself,
nor denyeth Jesus to be the Christ, I perceive not how he can
be called Antichrist; by which word is not meant, one that falsely
pretendeth to be His Lieutenant, or Vicar Generall, but to be Hee.
There is also some Mark of the time of this speciall Antichrist,
as (Mat. 24.15.) when that abominable Destroyer, spoken of by Daniel,
(Dan. 9. 27.) shall stand in the Holy place, and such tribulation
as was not since the beginning of the world, nor ever shall be again,
insomuch as if it were to last long, (ver. 22.) "no flesh could be saved;
but for the elects sake those days shall be shortened" (made fewer).
But that tribulation is not yet come; for it is to be followed
immediately (ver. 29.) by a darkening of the Sun and Moon,
a falling of the Stars, a concussion of the Heavens, and the glorious
coming again of our Saviour, in the cloudes.  And therefore
The Antichrist is not yet come; whereas, many Popes are both
come and gone.  It is true, the Pope in taking upon him to give Laws
to all Christian Kings, and Nations, usurpeth a Kingdome in this world,
which Christ took not on him: but he doth it not As Christ,
but as For Christ, wherein there is nothing of the Antichrist.

The Fourth Book
In the fourth Book, to prove the Pope to be the supreme Judg in
all questions of Faith and Manners, (which is as much as to be
the absolute Monarch of all Christians in the world,) be bringeth
three Propositions: The first, that his Judgments are Infallible:
The second, that he can make very Laws, and punish those that
observe them not: The third, that our Saviour conferred all
Jurisdiction Ecclesiasticall on the Pope of Rome.

Texts For The Infallibility Of
The Popes Judgement In Points Of Faith
For the Infallibility of his Judgments, he alledgeth the Scriptures:
and first, that of Luke 22.31. "Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired you
that hee may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee,
that thy faith faile not; and when thou art converted, strengthen
thy Brethren."  This, according to Bellarmines exposition, is,
that Christ gave here to Simon Peter two priviledges: one,
that neither his Faith should fail, neither he, nor any of his
successors should ever define any point concerning Faith,
or Manners erroneously, or contrary to the definition of a former Pope:
Which is a strange, and very much strained interpretation.
But he that with attention readeth that chapter, shall find
there is no place in the whole Scripture, that maketh more against
the Popes Authority, than this very place.  The Priests and Scribes
seeking to kill our Saviour at the Passeover, and Judas possessed
with a resolution to betray him, and the day of killing the Passeover
being come, our Saviour celebrated the same with his Apostles,
which he said, till the Kingdome of God was come hee would doe no more;
and withall told them, that one of them was to betray him:
Hereupon they questioned, which of them it should be; and withall
(seeing the next Passeover their Master would celebrate should be
when he was King) entred into a contention, who should then be
the greater man.  Our Saviour therefore told them, that the Kings
of the Nations had Dominion over their Subjects, and are called by
a name (in Hebrew) that signifies Bountifull; but I cannot be so to you,
you must endeavour to serve one another; I ordain you a Kingdome,
but it is such as my Father hath ordained mee; a Kingdome that I am
now to purchase with my blood, and not to possesse till my second coming;
then yee shall eat and drink at my Table, and sit on Thrones,
judging the twelve Tribes of Israel: And then addressing himself
to St. Peter, he saith, Simon, Simon, Satan seeks by suggesting
a present domination, to weaken your faith of the future;
but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith shall not fail;
Thou therefore (Note this,) being converted, and understanding
my Kingdome as of another world, confirm the same faith in thy Brethren:
To which S. Peter answered (as one that no more expected any authority
in this world) "Lord I am ready to goe with thee, not onely to Prison,
but to Death."  Whereby it is manifest, S. Peter had not onely
no jurisdiction given him in this world, but a charge to teach
all the other Apostles, that they also should have none.
And for the Infallibility of St. Peters sentence definitive
in matter of Faith, there is no more to be attributed to it
out of this Text, than that Peter should continue in the beleef
of this point, namely, that Christ should come again, and possesse
the Kingdome at the day of Judgement; which was not given by the Text
to all his Successors; for wee see they claim it in the World that now is.

The second place is that of Matth. 16. "Thou art Peter, and upon
this rocke I will build my Church, and the gates of Hell shall not
prevail against it."  By which (as I have already shewn in this chapter)
is proved no more, than that the gates of Hell shall not prevail
against the confession of Peter, which gave occasion to that speech;
namely this, That Jesus Is Christ The Sonne Of God.

The third text is John 21. ver. 16,17. "Feed my sheep;" which contains
no more but a Commission of Teaching: And if we grant the rest of the
Apostles to be contained in that name of Sheep; then it is the supreme
Power of Teaching: but it was onely for the time that there were
no Christian Soveraigns already possessed of that Supremacy.
But I have already proved, that Christian Soveraignes are in their
owne Dominions the supreme Pastors, and instituted thereto, by vertue
of their being Baptized, though without other Imposition of Hands.
For such imposition being a Ceremony of designing the person,
is needlesse, when hee is already designed to the Power of Teaching
what Doctrine he will, by his institution to an Absolute Power
over his Subjects.  For as I have proved before, Soveraigns are
supreme Teachers (in generall) by their Office and therefore oblige
themselves (by their Baptisme) to teach the Doctrine of Christ:
And when they suffer others to teach their people, they doe it
at the perill of their own souls; for it is at the hands of
the Heads of Families that God will require the account of the
instruction of his Children and Servants.  It is of Abraham himself,
not of a hireling, that God saith (Gen. 18.19) "I know him that
he will command his Children, and his houshold after him, that they
keep the way of the Lord, and do justice and judgement.

The fourth place is that of Exod. 28.30. "Thou shalt put in the
Breastplate of Judgment, the Urim and the Thummin:" which hee saith
is interpreted by the Septuagint, delosin kai aletheian, that is,
Evidence and Truth: And thence concludeth, God had given Evidence,
and Truth, (which is almost infallibility,) to the High Priest.
But be it Evidence and Truth it selfe that was given; or be it but
Admonition to the Priest to endeavour to inform himself cleerly,
and give judgment uprightly; yet in that it was given to the High Priest,
it was given to the Civill Soveraign: For next under God was the
High Priest in the Common-wealth of Israel; and is an argument for
Evidence and Truth, that is, for the Ecclesiasticall Supremacy
of Civill Soveraigns over their own Subjects, against the pretended
Power of the Pope.  These are all the Texts hee bringeth for the
Infallibility of the Judgement of the Pope, in point of Faith.

Texts For The Same In Point Of Manners
For the Infallibility of his Judgment concerning Manners,
hee bringeth one Text, which is that of John 16.13. "When the Spirit
of truth is come, hee will lead you into all truth" where (saith he)
by All Truth, is meant, at least, All Truth Necessary To Salvation.
But with this mitigation, he attributeth no more Infallibility
to the Pope, than to any man that professeth Christianity,
and is not to be damned: For if any man erre in any point,
wherein not to erre is necessary to Salvation, it is impossible
he should be saved; for that onely is necessary to Salvation,
without which to be saved is impossible.  What points these are,
I shall declare out of the Scripture in the Chapter following.
In this place I say no more, but that though it were granted,
the Pope could not possibly teach any error at all, yet doth not
this entitle him to any Jurisdiction in the Dominions of another Prince,
unlesse we shall also say, a man is obliged in conscience to set
on work upon all occasions the best workman, even then also when
he hath formerly promised his work to another.

Besides the Text, he argueth from Reason, thus, If the Pope could
erre in necessaries, then Christ hath not sufficiently provided
for the Churches Salvation; because he hath commanded her to follow
the Popes directions.  But this Reason is invalid, unlesse he shew when,
and where Christ commanded that, or took at all any notice of a Pope:
Nay granting whatsoever was given to S. Peter was given to the Pope;
yet seeing there is in the Scripture no command to any man to obey
St. Peter, no man can bee just, that obeyeth him, when his commands
are contrary to those of his lawfull Soveraign.

Lastly, it hath not been declared by the Church, nor by the Pope himselfe,
that he is the Civill Soveraign of all the Christians in the world;
and therefore all Christians are not bound to acknowledge his
Jurisdiction in point of Manners.  For the Civill Soveraignty,
and supreme Judicature in controversies of Manners, are the same thing:
And the Makers of Civill Laws, are not onely Declarers, but also Makers
of the justice, and injustice of actions; there being nothing in mens
Manners that makes them righteous, or unrighteous, but their conformity
with the Law of the Soveraign.  And therefore when the Pope challengeth
Supremacy in controversies of Manners, hee teacheth men to disobey
the Civill Soveraign; which is an erroneous Doctrine, contrary to
the many precepts of our Saviour and his Apostles, delivered to us
in the Scripture.

To prove the Pope has Power to make Laws, he alledgeth many places;
as first, Deut. 17.12. "The man that will doe presumptuously,
and will not hearken unto the Priest, (that standeth to Minister
there before the Lord thy God, or unto the Judge,) even that man
shall die, and thou shalt put away the evill from Israel."
For answer whereunto, we are to remember that the High Priest
(next and immediately under God) was the Civill Soveraign;
and all Judges were to be constituted by him.  The words alledged
sound therefore thus.  "The man that will presume to disobey
the Civill Soveraign for the time being, or any of his Officers in the
execution of their places, that man shall die, &c." which is cleerly for
the Civill Soveraignty, against the Universall power of the Pope.

Secondly, he alledgeth that of Matth. 16. "Whatsoever yee shall bind, &c."
and interpreteth it for such Binding as is attributed (Matth. 23.4.)
to the Scribes and Pharisees, "They bind heavy burthens, and grievous
to be born, and lay them on mens shoulders;" by which is meant (he sayes)
Making of Laws; and concludes thence, the Pope can make Laws.
But this also maketh onely for the Legislative power of Civill Soveraigns:
For the Scribes, and Pharisees sat in Moses Chaire, but Moses next
under God was Soveraign of the People of Israel: and therefore our
Saviour commanded them to doe all that they should say, but not all
that they should do.  That is, to obey their Laws, but not
follow their Example.

The third place, is John 21.16. "Feed my sheep;" which is not a Power
to make Laws, but a command to Teach.  Making Laws belongs to
the Lord of the Family; who by his owne discretion chooseth his Chaplain,
as also a Schoolmaster to Teach his children.

The fourth place John 20.21. is against him.  The words are,
"As my Father sent me, so send I you."  But our Saviour was sent
to Redeem (by his Death) such as should Beleeve; and by his own,
and his Apostles preaching to prepare them for their entrance
into his Kingdome; which he himself saith, is not of this world,
and hath taught us to pray for the coming of it hereafter,
though hee refused (Acts 1.6,7.) to tell his Apostles when
it should come; and in which, when it comes, the twelve Apostles
shall sit on twelve Thrones (every one perhaps as high as that
of St. Peter) to judge the twelve tribes of Israel.  Seeing then
God the Father sent not our Saviour to make Laws in this present world,
wee may conclude from the Text, that neither did our Saviour send
S. Peter to make Laws here, but to perswade men to expect his
second comming with a stedfast faith; and in the mean time,
if Subjects, to obey their Princes; and if Princes, both to beleeve it
themselves, and to do their best to make their Subjects doe the same;
which is the Office of a Bishop.  Therefore this place maketh most
strongly for the joining of the Ecclesiasticall Supremacy to the
Civill Soveraignty, contrary to that which Cardinall Bellarmine
alledgeth it for.

The fift place is Acts 15.28. "It hath seemed good to the Holy Spirit,
and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden, than these necessary things,
that yee abstaine from meats offered to Idols, and from bloud,
and from things strangled, and from fornication."  Here hee notes
the word Laying Of Burdens for the Legislative Power.  But who is there,
that reading this Text, can say, this stile of the Apostles may not
as properly be used in giving Counsell, as in making Laws?
The stile of a Law is, We Command: But, We Think Good, is the
ordinary stile of them, that but give Advice; and they lay a Burthen
that give Advice, though it bee conditionall, that is, if they to whom
they give it, will attain their ends: And such is the Burthen,
of abstaining from things strangled, and from bloud; not absolute,
but in case they will not erre.  I have shewn before (chap. 25.)
that Law, is distinguished from Counsell, in this, that the reason
of a Law, is taken from the designe, and benefit of him that
prescribeth it; but the reason of a Counsell, from the designe,
and benefit of him, to whom the Counsell is given.  But here,
the Apostles aime onely at the benefit of the converted Gentiles,
namely their Salvation; not at their own benefit; for having done their
endeavour, they shall have their reward, whether they be obeyed, or not.
And therefore the Acts of this Councell, were not Laws, but Counsells.

The sixt place is that of Rom. 13. "Let every Soul be subject
to the Higher Powers, for there is no Power but of God;" which is meant,
he saith not onely of Secular, but also of Ecclesiasticall Princes.
To which I answer, first, that there are no Ecclesiasticall Princes
but those that are also Civill Soveraignes; and their Principalities
exceed not the compasse of their Civill Soveraignty; without those
bounds though they may be received for Doctors, they cannot be
acknowledged for Princes.  For if the Apostle had meant, we should be
subject both to our own Princes, and also to the Pope, he had taught us
a doctrine, which Christ himself hath told us is impossible, namely,
"to serve two Masters."  And though the Apostle say in another place,
"I write these things being absent, lest being present I should
use sharpnesse, according to the Power which the Lord hath given me;"
it is not, that he challenged a Power either to put to death, imprison,
banish, whip, or fine any of them, which are Punishments; but onely to Excommunicate, which (without the Civill Power)is no more but a leaving
of their company, and having no more to doe with them, than with
a Heathen man, or a Publican; which in many occasions might be a
greater pain to the Excommunicant, than to the Excommunicate.

The seventh place is 1 Cor. 4.21. "Shall I come unto you with a Rod,
or in love, and the spirit of lenity?" But here again, it is not
the Power of a Magistrate to punish offenders, that is meant by a Rod;
but onely the Power of Excommunication, which is not in its owne
nature a Punishment, but onely a Denouncing of punishment,
that Christ shall inflict, when he shall be in possession of
his Kingdome, at the day of Judgment.  Nor then also shall it bee
properly a Punishment, as upon a Subject that hath broken the Law;
but a Revenge, as upon an Enemy, or Revolter, that denyeth the Right
of our Saviour to the Kingdome: And therefore this proveth not
the Legislative Power of any Bishop, that has not also the Civill Power.

The eighth place is, Timothy 3.2. "A Bishop must be the husband
but of one wife, vigilant, sober, &c." which he saith was a Law.
I thought that none could make a Law in the Church, but the Monarch
of the Church, St. Peter.  But suppose this Precept made by the
authority of St. Peter; yet I see no reason why to call it a Law,
rather than an Advice, seeing Timothy was not a Subject, but a Disciple
of St. Paul; nor the flock under the charge of Timothy, his Subjects
in the Kingdome, but his Scholars in the Schoole of Christ:
If all the Precepts he giveth Timothy, be Laws, why is not this
also a Law, "Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for
thy healths sake"? And why are not also the Precepts of good Physitians,
so many Laws? but that it is not the Imperative manner of speaking,
but an absolute Subjection to a Person, that maketh his Precept Laws.

In like manner, the ninth place, 1 Tim. 5. 19. "Against an Elder
receive not an accusation, but before two or three Witnesses,"
is a wise Precept, but not a Law.

The tenth place is, Luke 10.16. "He that heareth you, heareth mee;
and he that despiseth you, despiseth me."  And there is no doubt,
but he that despiseth the Counsell of those that are sent by Christ,
despiseth the Counsell of Christ himself.  But who are those now that
are sent by Christ, but such as are ordained Pastors by lawfull Authority?
and who are lawfully ordained, that are not ordained by the Soveraign
Pastor? and who is ordained by the Soveraign Pastor in a Christian
Common-wealth, that is not ordained by the authority of the
Soveraign thereof? Out of this place therefore it followeth,
that he which heareth his Soveraign being a Christian, heareth Christ;
and hee that despiseth the Doctrine which his King being a Christian,
authorizeth, despiseth the Doctrine of Christ (which is not that
which Bellarmine intendeth here to prove, but the contrary).
But all this is nothing to a Law.  Nay more, a Christian King,
as a Pastor, and Teacher of his Subjects, makes not thereby
his Doctrines Laws.  He cannot oblige men to beleeve; though as
a Civill Soveraign he may make Laws suitable to his Doctrine,
which may oblige men to certain actions, and sometimes to such
as they would not otherwise do, and which he ought not to command;
and yet when they are commanded, they are Laws; and the externall
actions done in obedience to them, without the inward approbation,
are the actions of the Soveraign, and not of the Subject,
which is in that case but as an instrument, without any motion
of his owne at all; because God hath commanded to obey them.

The eleventh, is every place, where the Apostle for Counsell,
putteth some word, by which men use to signifie Command; or calleth
the following of his Counsell, by the name of Obedience.
And therefore they are alledged out of 1 Cor. 11.2. "I commend you
for keeping my Precepts as I delivered them to you."  The Greek is,
"I commend you for keeping those things I delivered to you,
as I delivered them."  Which is far from signifying that they were Laws,
or any thing else, but good Counsell.  And that of 1 Thess. 4.2.
"You know what commandements we gave you: where the Greek word is
paraggelias edokamen, equivalent to paredokamen, what wee delivered
to you, as in the place next before alledged, which does not prove
the Traditions of the Apostles, to be any more than Counsells;
though as is said in the 8 verse, "he that despiseth them,
despiseth not man, but God": For our Saviour himself came not
to Judge, that is, to be King in this world; but to Sacrifice
himself for Sinners, and leave Doctors in his Church, to lead,
not to drive men to Christ, who never accepteth forced actions,
(which is all the Law produceth,) but the inward conversion of
the heart; which is not the work of Laws, but of Counsell, and Doctrine.

And that of 2 Thess. 3.14. "If any man Obey not our word by this Epistle,
note that man, and have no company with him, that he may bee ashamed":
where from the word Obey, he would inferre, that this Epistle was a Law
to the Thessalonians.  The Epistles of the Emperours were indeed Laws.
If therefore the Epistle of S. Paul were also a Law, they were to obey
two Masters.  But the word Obey, as it is in the Greek upakouei,
signifieth Hearkening To, or Putting In Practice, not onely that
which is Commanded by him that has right to punish, but also that
which is delivered in a way of Counsell for our good; and therefore
St. Paul does not bid kill him that disobeys, nor beat, nor imprison,
nor amerce him, which Legislators may all do; but avoid his company,
that he may bee ashamed: whereby it is evident, it was not the Empire
of an Apostle, but his Reputation amongst the Faithfull, which the
Christians stood in awe of.

The last place is that of Heb. 13.17. "Obey your Leaders, and submit
your selves to them, for they watch for your souls, as they that
must give account:" And here also is intended by Obedience,
a following of their Counsell: For the reason of our Obedience,
is not drawn from the will and command of our Pastors, but from
our own benefit, as being the Salvation of our Souls they watch for,
and not for the Exaltation of their own Power, and Authority.
If it were meant here, that all they teach were Laws, then not onely
the Pope, but every Pastor in his Parish should have Legislative Power.
Again, they that are bound to obey, their Pastors, have no power
to examine their commands.  What then shall wee say to St. John
who bids us (1 Epist. chap. 4. ver. 1.) "Not to beleeve every Spirit,
but to try the Spirits whether they are of God, because many false
Prophets are gone out into the world"?  It is therefore manifest,
that wee may dispute the Doctrine of our Pastors; but no man
can dispute a Law.  The Commands of Civill Soveraigns are on all sides
granted to be Laws: if any else can make a Law besides himselfe,
all Common-wealth, and consequently all Peace, and Justice
must cease; which is contrary to all Laws, both Divine and Humane.
Nothing therefore can be drawn from these, or any other places
of Scripture, to prove the Decrees of the Pope, where he has not
also the Civill Soveraignty, to be Laws.

The Question Of Superiority Between The Pope And Other Bishops
The last point hee would prove, is this, "That our Saviour Christ
has committed Ecclesiasticall Jurisdiction immediately to none
but the Pope."  Wherein he handleth not the Question of Supremacy between
the Pope and Christian Kings, but between the Pope and other Bishops.
And first, he sayes it is agreed, that the Jurisdiction of Bishops,
is at least in the generall De Jure Divino, that is, in the Right of God;
for which he alledges S. Paul, Ephes.  4.11. where hee sayes,
that Christ after his Ascension into heaven, "gave gifts to men,
some Apostles, some Prophets, and some Evangelists, and some Pastors,
and some Teachers:" And thence inferres, they have indeed their
Jurisdiction in Gods Right; but will not grant they have it
immediately from God, but derived through the Pope.  But if a man
may be said to have his Jurisdiction De Jure Divino, and yet not
immediately; what lawfull Jurisdiction, though but Civill,
is there in a Christian Common-wealth, that is not also De Jure Divino?
For Christian Kings have their Civill Power from God immediately;
and the Magistrates under him exercise their severall charges
in vertue of his Commission; wherein that which they doe,
is no lesse De Jure Divino Mediato, than that which the Bishops doe,
in vertue of the Popes Ordination.  All lawfull Power is of God,
immediately in the Supreme Governour, and mediately in those
that have Authority under him: So that either hee must grant
every Constable in the State, to hold his Office in the Right of God; or
he must not hold that any Bishop holds his so, besides the Pope himselfe.

But this whole Dispute, whether Christ left the Jurisdiction to
the Pope onely, or to other Bishops also, if considered out of these
places where the Pope has the Civill Soveraignty, is a contention
De Lana Caprina: For none of them (where they are not Soveraigns)
has any Jurisdiction at all.  For Jurisdiction is the Power of
hearing and determining Causes between man and man; and can belong
to none, but him that hath the Power to prescribe the Rules of Right
and Wrong; that is, to make Laws; and with the Sword of Justice
to compell men to obey his Decisions, pronounced either by himself,
or by the Judges he ordaineth thereunto; which none can lawfully do,
but the Civill Soveraign.

Therefore when he alledgeth out of the 6 of Luke, that our Saviour
called his Disciples together, and chose twelve of them which he
named Apostles, he proveth that he Elected them (all, except Matthias,
Paul and Barnabas,) and gave them Power and Command to Preach,
but not to Judge of Causes between man and man: for that is
a Power which he refused to take upon himselfe, saying, "Who made
me a Judge, or a Divider, amongst you?" and in another place,
"My Kingdome is not of this world."  But hee that hath not
the Power to hear, and determine Causes between man and man,
cannot be said to have any Jurisdiction at all.  And yet this
hinders not, but that our Saviour gave them Power to Preach
and Baptize in all parts of the world, supposing they were not
by their own lawfull Soveraign forbidden: For to our own Soveraigns
Christ himself, and his Apostles have in sundry places expressely
commanded us in all things to be obedient.

The arguments by which he would prove, that Bishops receive
their Jurisdiction from the Pope (seeing the Pope in the Dominions
of other Princes hath no Jurisdiction himself,) are all in vain.
Yet because they prove, on the contrary, that all Bishops receive
Jurisdiction when they have it from their Civill Soveraigns,
I will not omit the recitall of them.

The first, is from Numbers 11. where Moses not being able alone
to undergoe the whole burthen of administring the affairs of the
People of Israel, God commanded him to choose Seventy Elders,
and took part of the spirit of Moses, to put it upon those
Seventy Elders: by which it is understood, not that God weakened
the spirit of Moses, for that had not eased him at all; but that
they had all of them their authority from him; wherein he doth truly,
and ingenuously interpret that place.  But seeing Moses had the
entire Soveraignty in the Common-wealth of the Jews, it is manifest,
that it is thereby signified, that they had their Authority from
the Civill Soveraign: and therefore that place proveth, that Bishops
in every Christian Common-wealth have their Authority from the Civill
Soveraign; and from the Pope in his own Territories only, and not in
the Territories of any other State.

The second argument, is from the nature of Monarchy; wherein all
Authority is in one Man, and in others by derivation from him:
But the Government of the Church, he says, is Monarchicall.
This also makes for Christian Monarchs.  For they are really
Monarchs of their own people; that is, of their own Church
(for the Church is the same thing with a Christian people;)
whereas the Power of the Pope, though hee were S. Peter, is neither
Monarchy, nor hath any thing of Archicall, nor Craticall,
but onely of Didacticall; For God accepteth not a forced,
but a willing obedience.

The third, is, from that the Sea of S. Peter is called by S. Cyprian,
the Head, the Source, the Roote, the Sun, from whence the Authority of
Bishops is derived.  But by the Law of Nature (which is a better Principle
of Right and Wrong, than the word of any Doctor that is but a man)
the Civill Soveraign in every Common-wealth, is the Head, the Source,
the Root, and the Sun, from which all Jurisdiction is derived.
And therefore, the Jurisdiction of Bishops, is derived from the
Civill Soveraign.

The fourth, is taken from the Inequality of their Jurisdictions:
For if God (saith he) had given it them immediately, he had given
aswell Equality of Jurisdiction, as of Order: But wee see, some are
Bishops but of own Town, some of a hundred Towns, and some of many
whole Provinces; which differences were not determined by the
command of God; their Jurisdiction therefore is not of God, but of Man;
and one has a greater, another a lesse, as it pleaseth the Prince
of the Church.  Which argument, if he had proved before, that the Pope
had had an Universall Jurisdiction over all Christians, had been
for his purpose.  But seeing that hath not been proved, and that it is
notoriously known, the large Jurisdiction of the Pope was given him
by those that had it, that is, by the Emperours of Rome, (for the
Patriarch of Constantinople, upon the same title, namely, of being
Bishop of the Capitall City of the Empire, and Seat of the Emperour,
claimed to be equal to him,) it followeth, that all other Bishops
have their Jurisdiction from the Soveraigns of the place wherein
they exercise the same: And as for that cause they have not their
Authority De Jure Divino; so neither hath the Pope his De Jure Divino,
except onely where hee is also the Civill Soveraign.

His fift argument is this, "If Bishops have their Jurisdiction
immediately from God, the Pope could not take it from them,
for he can doe nothing contrary to Gods ordination;" And this
consequence is good, and well proved.  "But, (saith he) the Pope
can do this, and has done it."  This also is granted, so he doe
it in his own Dominions, or in the Dominions of any other Prince
that hath given him that Power; but not universally, in Right of
the Popedome: For that power belongeth to every Christian Soveraign,
within the bounds of his owne Empire, and is inseparable from
the Soveraignty.  Before the People of Israel had (by the commandment
of God to Samuel) set over themselves a King, after the manner
of other Nations, the High Priest had the Civill Government;
and none but he could make, nor depose an inferiour Priest:
But that Power was afterwards in the King, as may be proved
by this same argument of Bellarmine; For if the Priest (be he
the High Priest or any other) had his Jurisdiction immediately
from God, then the King could not take it from him; "for he could
do nothing contrary to Gods ordinance:) But it is certain,
that King Solomon (1 Kings 2.26.) deprived Abiathar the High Priest
of his office, and placed Zadok (verse 35.) in his room.
Kings therefore may in the like manner Ordaine, and Deprive Bishops,
as they shall thinke fit, for the well governing of their Subjects.

His sixth argument is this, If Bishops have their Jurisdiction
De Jure Divino (that is, immediately from God,) they that maintaine it,
should bring some Word of God to prove it: But they can bring none.
The argument is good; I have therefore nothing to say against it.
But it is an argument no lesse good, to prove the Pope himself
to have no Jurisdiction in the Dominion of any other Prince.

Lastly, hee bringeth for argument, the testimony of two Popes,
Innocent, and Leo; and I doubt not but hee might have alledged,
with as good reason, the testimonies of all the Popes almost
since S. Peter: For considering the love of Power naturally implanted
in mankind, whosoever were made Pope, he would be tempted to uphold
the same opinion.  Neverthelesse, they should therein but doe,
as Innocent, and Leo did, bear witnesse of themselves, and therefore
their witness should not be good.

Of The Popes Temporall Power
In the fift Book he hath four Conclusions.  The first is,
"That the Pope in not Lord of all the world:" the second,
"that the Pope is not Lord of all the Christian world:" The third,
"That the Pope (without his owne Territory) has not any Temporall
Jurisdiction DIRECTLY:"  These three Conclusions are easily granted.
The fourth is, "That the Pope has (in the Dominions of other Princes)
the Supreme Temporall Power INDIRECTLY:" which is denyed; unlesse he mean
by Indirectly, that he has gotten it by Indirect means; then is that
also granted.  But I understand, that when he saith he hath it Indirectly,
he means, that such Temporall Jurisdiction belongeth to him of Right,
but that this Right is but a Consequence of his Pastorall Authority,
the which he could not exercise, unlesse he have the other with it:
And therefore to the Pastorall Power (which he calls Spirituall)
the Supreme Power Civill is necessarily annexed; and that thereby
hee hath a Right to change Kingdomes, giving them to one,
and taking them from another, when he shall think it conduces
to the Salvation of Souls.

Before I come to consider the Arguments by which hee would prove
this doctrine, it will not bee amisse to lay open the Consequences
of it; that Princes, and States, that have the Civill Soveraignty
in their severall Common-wealths, may bethink themselves,
whether it bee convenient for them, and conducing to the good
of their Subjects, of whom they are to give an account at the
day of Judgment, to admit the same.

When it is said, the Pope hath not (in the Territories of other States)
the Supreme Civill Power Directly; we are to understand, he doth not
challenge it, as other Civill Soveraigns doe, from the originall
submission thereto of those that are to be governed.  For it is evident,
and has already been sufficiently in this Treatise demonstrated,
that the Right of all Soveraigns, is derived originally from the consent
of every one of those that are to bee governed; whether they
that choose him, doe it for their common defence against an Enemy,
as when they agree amongst themselves to appoint a Man, or an Assembly
of men to protect them; or whether they doe it, to save their lives,
by submission to a conquering Enemy.  The Pope therefore, when he
disclaimeth the Supreme Civill Power over other States Directly,
denyeth no more, but that his Right cometh to him by that way;
He ceaseth not for all that, to claime it another way; and that is,
(without the consent of them that are to be governed) by a Right
given him by God, (which hee calleth Indirectly,) in his Assumption
to the Papacy.  But by what way soever he pretend, the Power is the same;
and he may (if it bee granted to be his Right) depose Princes and States,
as often as it is for the Salvation of Soules, that is, as often
as he will; for he claimeth also the Sole Power to Judge, whether
it be to the salvation of mens Souls, or not.  And this is the
Doctrine, not onely that Bellarmine here, and many other Doctors
teach in their Sermons and Books, but also that some Councells
have decreed, and the Popes have decreed, and the Popes have
accordingly, when the occasion hath served them, put in practise.
For the fourth Councell of Lateran held under Pope Innocent the third,
(in the third Chap. De Haereticis,) hath this Canon.  "If a King
at the Popes admonition, doe not purge his Kingdome of Haeretiques,
and being Excommunicate for the same, make not satisfaction
within a year, his subjects are absolved of their Obedience."
And the practise hereof hath been seen on divers occasions;
as in the Deposing of Chilperique, King of France; in the Translation
of the Roman Empire to Charlemaine; in the Oppression of John
King of England; in Transferring the Kingdome of Navarre;
and of late years, in the League against Henry the third of France,
and in many more occurrences.  I think there be few Princes that
consider not this as Injust, and Inconvenient; but I wish they would
all resolve to be Kings, or Subjects.  Men cannot serve two Masters:
They ought therefore to ease them, either by holding the Reins
of Government wholly in their own hands; or by wholly delivering them
into the hands of the Pope; that such men as are willing to be obedient,
may be protected in their obedience.  For this distinction of Temporall,
and Spirituall Power is but words.  Power is as really divided,
and as dangerously to all purposes, by sharing with another
Indirect Power, as with a Direct one.  But to come now to his Arguments.

The first is this, "The Civill Power is subject to the Spirituall:
Therefore he that hath the Supreme Power Spirituall, hath right
to command Temporall Princes, and dispose of their Temporalls in order
to the Spirituall.  As for the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall,
let us consider in what sense it may be said intelligibly,
that the Temporall, or Civill Power is subject to the Spirituall.
There be but two ways that those words can be made sense.
For when wee say, one Power is subject to another Power, the meaning
either is, that he which hath the one, is subject to him that hath
the other; or that the one Power is to the other, as the means to the end.
For wee cannot understand, that one Power hath Power over another Power;
and that one Power can have Right or Command over another:
For Subjection, Command, Right, and Power are accidents, not of Powers,
but of Persons: One Power may be subordinate to another, as the art
of a Sadler, to the art of a Rider.  If then it be granted,
that the Civill Government be ordained as a means to bring us
to a Spirituall felicity; yet it does not follow, that if a King
have the Civill Power, and the Pope the Spirituall, that therefore
the King is bound to obey the Pope, more then every Sadler is bound
to obey every Rider.  Therefore as from Subordination of an Art,
cannot be inferred the Subjection of the Professor; so from the
Subordination of a Government, cannot be inferred the Subjection
of the Governor.  When therefore he saith, the Civill Power is
Subject to the Spirituall, his meaning is, that the Civill Soveraign,
is Subject to the Spirituall Soveraign.  And the Argument stands thus,
"The Civil Soveraign, is subject to the Spirituall; Therefore
the Spirituall Prince may command Temporall Princes."  Where the
conclusion is the same, with the Antecedent he should have proved.
But to prove it, he alledgeth first, this reason, "Kings and Popes,
Clergy and Laity make but one Common-wealth; that is to say,
but one Church: And in all Bodies the Members depend one upon another:
But things Spirituall depend not of things Temporall: Therefore,
Temporall depend on Spirituall.  And therefore are Subject to them."
In which Argumentation there be two grosse errours: one is,
that all Christian Kings, Popes, Clergy, and all other Christian men,
make but one Common-wealth: For it is evident that France is
one Common-wealth, Spain another, and Venice a third, &c.
And these consist of Christians; and therefore also are severall
Bodies of Christians; that is to say, severall Churches:
And their severall Soveraigns Represent them, whereby they are
capable of commanding and obeying, of doing and suffering,
as a natural man; which no Generall or Universall Church is,
till it have a Representant; which it hath not on Earth: for if it had,
there is no doubt but that all Christendome were one Common-wealth,
whose Soveraign were that Representant, both in things Spirituall
and Temporall: And the Pope, to make himself this Representant,
wanteth three things that our Saviour hath not given him, to Command,
and to Judge, and to Punish, otherwise than (by Excommunication)
to run from those that will not Learn of him: For though the Pope
were Christs onely Vicar, yet he cannot exercise his government,
till our Saviours second coming: And then also it is not the Pope,
but St. Peter himselfe, with the other Apostles, that are to be
Judges of the world.

The other errour in this his first Argument is, that he sayes,
the Members of every Common-wealth, as of a naturall Body,
depend one of another: It is true, they cohaere together;
but they depend onely on the Soveraign, which is the Soul of
the Common-wealth; which failing, the Common-wealth is dissolved
into a Civill war, no one man so much as cohaering to another,
for want of a common Dependance on a known Soveraign; Just as
the Members of the naturall Body dissolve into Earth, for want of a Soul
to hold them together.  Therefore there is nothing in this similitude,
from whence to inferre a dependance of the Laity on the Clergy,
or of the Temporall Officers on the Spirituall; but of both
on the Civill Soveraign; which ought indeed to direct his Civill
commands to the Salvation of Souls; but is not therefore subject
to any but God himselfe.  And thus you see the laboured fallacy
of the first Argument, to deceive such men as distinguish not
between the Subordination of Actions in the way to the End;
and the Subjection of Persons one to another in the administration
of the Means.  For to every End, the Means are determined by Nature,
or by God himselfe supernaturally: but the Power to make men use
the Means, is in every nation resigned (by the Law of Nature,
which forbiddeth men to violate their Faith given) to the Civill Soveraign.

His second Argument is this, "Every Common-wealth, (because it is
supposed to be perfect and sufficient in it self,) may command
any other Common-wealth, not subject to it, and force it to change
the administration of the Government, nay depose the Prince,
and set another in his room, if it cannot otherwise defend
it selfe against the injuries he goes about to doe them: much more
may a Spirituall Common-wealth command a Temporall one to change the
administration of their Government, and may depose Princes, and
institute others, when they cannot otherwise defend the Spirituall Good."

That a Common-wealth, to defend it selfe against injuries, may lawfully
doe all that he hath here said, is very true; and hath already in
that which hath gone before been sufficiently demonstrated.
And if it were also true, that there is now in this world a
Spirituall Common-wealth, distinct from a Civill Common-wealth,
then might the Prince thereof, upon injury done him, or upon want
of caution that injury be not done him in time to come, repaire,
and secure himself by Warre; which is in summe, deposing, killing,
or subduing, or doing any act of Hostility.  But by the same reason,
it would be no lesse lawfull for a Civill Soveraign, upon the like
injuries done, or feared, to make warre upon the Spirituall Soveraign;
which I beleeve is more than Cardinall Bellarmine would have inferred
from his own proposition.

But Spirituall Common-wealth there is none in this world: for it is the
same thing with the Kingdome of Christ; which he himselfe saith, is not
of this world; but shall be in the next world, at the Resurrection,
when they that have lived justly, and beleeved that he was the Christ,
shall (though they died Naturall bodies) rise Spirituall bodies;
and then it is, that our Saviour shall judge the world, and conquer
his Adversaries, and make a Spirituall Common-wealth.  In the mean time,
seeing there are no men on earth, whose bodies are Spirituall;
there can be no Spirituall Common-wealth amongst men that are yet
in the flesh; unlesse wee call Preachers, that have Commission to Teach,
and prepare men for their reception into the Kingdome of Christ
at the Resurrection, a Common-wealth; which I have proved to bee none.

The third Argument is this; "It is not lawfull for Christians
to tolerate an Infidel, or Haereticall King, in case he endeavour
to draw them to his Haeresie, or Infidelity.  But to judge whether
a King draw his subjects to Haeresie, or not, belongeth to the Pope.
Therefore hath the Pope Right, to determine whether the Prince be
to be deposed, or not deposed."

To this I answer, that both these assertions are false.  For Christians,
(or men of what Religion soever,) if they tolerate not their King,
whatsoever law hee maketh, though it bee concerning Religion, doe violate
their faith, contrary to the Divine Law, both Naturall and Positive:
Nor is there any Judge of Haeresie amongst Subjects, but their own
Civill Soveraign; for "Haeresie is nothing else, but a private opinion,
obstinately maintained, contrary to the opinion which the Publique
Person (that is to say, the Representant of the Common-wealth)
hath commanded to bee taught."  By which it is manifest, that an
opinion publiquely appointed to bee taught, cannot be Haeresie;
nor the Soveraign Princes that authorize them, Haeretiques.
For Haeretiques are none but private men, that stubbornly defend
some Doctrine, prohibited by their lawful Soveraigns.

But to prove that Christians are not to tolerate Infidell,
or Haereticall Kings, he alledgeth a place in Deut. 17. where God
forbiddeth the Jews, when they shall set a King over themselves,
to choose a stranger; And from thence inferreth, that it is unlawfull
for a Christian, to choose a King, that is not a Christian.
And 'tis true, that he that is a Christian, that is, hee that hath
already obliged himself to receive our Saviour when he shall come,
for his King, shal tempt God too much in choosing for King in this world,
one that hee knoweth will endeavour, both by terrour, and perswasion
to make him violate his faith.  But, it is (saith hee) the same danger,
to choose one that is not a Christian, for King, and not to depose him,
when hee is chosen.  To this I say, the question is not of the danger
of not deposing; but of the Justice of deposing him.  To choose him,
may in some cases bee unjust; but to depose him, when he is chosen,
is in no case Just.  For it is alwaies violation of faith, and
consequently against the Law of Nature, which is the eternal Law of God.
Nor doe wee read, that any such Doctrine was accounted Christian
in the time of the Apostles; nor in the time of the Romane
Emperours, till the Popes had the Civill Soveraignty of Rome.
But to this he hath replyed, that the Christians of old, deposed not
Nero, nor Diocletian, nor Julian, nor Valens an Arrian, for this
cause onely, that they wanted Temporall forces.  Perhaps so.
But did our Saviour, who for calling for, might have had twelve
Legions of immortall, invulnerable Angels to assist him, want forces
to depose Caesar, or at least Pilate, that unjustly, without finding
fault in him, delivered him to the Jews to bee crucified?
Or if the Apostles wanted Temporall forces to depose Nero,
was it therefore necessary for them in their Epistles to the
new made Christians, to teach them, (as they did) to obey the Powers
constituted over them, (whereof Nero in that time was one,) and that
they ought to obey them, not for fear of their wrath, but for
conscience sake? Shall we say they did not onely obey, but also teach
what they meant not, for want of strength? It is not therefore
for want of strength, but for conscience sake, that Christians
are to tolerate their Heathen Princes, or Princes (for I cannot
call any one whose Doctrine is the Publique Doctrine, an Haeretique)
that authorize the teaching of an Errour.  And whereas for the
Temporall Power of the Pope, he alledgeth further, that St. Paul
(1 Cor. 6.) appointed Judges under the Heathen Princes of those times,
such as were not ordained by those Princes; it is not true.
For St. Paul does but advise them, to take some of their Brethren
to compound their differences, as Arbitrators, rather than to goe
to law one with another before the Heathen Judges; which is a
wholsome Precept, and full of Charity, fit to bee practised also
in the Best Christian Common-wealths.  And for the danger that
may arise to Religion, by the Subjects tolerating of an Heathen,
or an Erring Prince, it is a point, of which a Subject is no
competent Judge; or if hee bee, the Popes Temporall Subjects
may judge also of the Popes Doctrine.  For every Christian Prince,
as I have formerly proved, is no lesse Supreme Pastor of his
own Subjects, than the Pope of his.

The fourth Argument, is taken from the Baptisme of Kings; wherein,
that they may be made Christians they submit their Scepters to Christ;
and promise to keep, and defend the Christian Faith.  This is true;
for Christian Kings are no more but Christs Subjects: but they may,
for all that, bee the Popes Fellowes; for they are Supreme Pastors
of their own Subjects; and the Pope is no more but King, and Pastor,
even in Rome it selfe.

The fifth Argument, is drawn from the words spoken by our Saviour,
Feed My Sheep; by which was give all Power necessary for a Pastor;
as the Power to chase away Wolves, such as are Haeretiques;
the Power to shut up Rammes, if they be mad, or push at the other
Sheep with their Hornes, such as are Evill (though Christian) Kings;
and Power to give the Flock convenient food: From whence hee inferreth,
that St. Peter had these three Powers given him by Christ.
To which I answer, that the last of these Powers, is no more than
the Power, or rather Command to Teach.  For the first, which is
to chase away Wolves, that is, Haeretiques, the place hee quoteth
is (Matth. 7.15.) "Beware of false Prophets which come to you
in Sheeps clothing, but inwardly are ravening Wolves."  But neither
are Haeretiques false Prophets, or at all Prophets: nor (admitting
Haeretiques for the Wolves there meant,) were the Apostles commanded
to kill them, or if they were Kings, to depose them; but to beware of,
fly, and avoid them: nor was it to St. Peter, nor to any of the Apostles,
but to the multitude of the Jews that followed him into the mountain,
men for the most part not yet converted, that hee gave this Counsell,
to Beware of false Prophets: which therefore if it conferre a Power
of chasing away Kings, was given, not onely to private men;
but to men that were not at all Christians.  And as to the Power
of Separating, and Shutting up of furious Rammes, (by which hee
meaneth Christian Kings that refuse to submit themselves to the
Roman Pastor,) our Saviour refused to take upon him that Power
in this world himself, but advised to let the Corn and Tares
grow up together till the day of Judgment: much lesse did hee
give it to St. Peter, or can S. Peter give it to the Popes.
St. Peter, and all other Pastors, are bidden to esteem those Christians
that disobey the Church, that is, (that disobey the Christian Soveraigne)
as Heathen men, and as Publicans.  Seeing then men challenge to
the Pope no authority over Heathen Princes, they ought to challenge
none over those that are to bee esteemed as Heathen.

But from the Power to Teach onely, hee inferreth also a Coercive
Power in the Pope, over Kings.  The Pastor (saith he) must give
his flock convenient food: Therefore the Pope may, and ought to
compell Kings to doe their duty.  Out of which it followeth,
that the Pope, as Pastor of Christian men, is King of Kings:
which all Christian Kings ought indeed either to Confesse,
or else they ought to take upon themselves the Supreme Pastorall Charge,
every one in his own Dominion.

His sixth, and last Argument, is from Examples.  To which I answer,
first, that Examples prove nothing; Secondly, that the Examples
he alledgeth make not so much as a probability of Right.
The fact of Jehoiada, in Killing Athaliah (2 Kings 11.) was either by the
Authority of King Joash, or it was a horrible Crime in the High Priest,
which (ever after the election of King Saul) was a mere Subject.
The fact of St. Ambrose, in Excommunicating Theodosius the Emperour,
(if it were true hee did so,) was a Capitall Crime.  And for the Popes,
Gregory 1. Greg. 2. Zachary, and Leo 3. their Judgments are void,
as given in their own Cause; and the Acts done by them conformably
to this Doctrine, are the greatest Crimes (especially that of Zachary)
that are incident to Humane Nature.  And thus much of Power
Ecclesiasticall; wherein I had been more briefe, forbearing
to examine these Arguments of Bellarmine, if they had been his,
as a Private man, and not as the Champion of the Papacy, against all
other Christian Princes, and States.



CHAPTER XLIII

OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR A MANS RECEPTION INTO THE KINGDOME OF HEAVEN.


The Difficulty Of Obeying
God And Man Both At Once,
The most frequent praetext of Sedition, and Civill Warre, in Christian
Common-wealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet
sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once, both God, and Man,
then when their Commandements are one contrary to the other.
It is manifest enough, that when a man receiveth two contrary
Commands, and knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey that,
and not the other, though it be the command even of his lawfull
Soveraign (whether a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly,) or the
command of his Father.  The difficulty therefore consisteth in this,
that men when they are commanded in the name of God, know not in
divers Cases, whether the command be from God, or whether he that
commandeth, doe but abuse Gods name for some private ends of his own.
For as there ware in the Church of the Jews, many false Prophets,
that sought reputation with the people, by feigned Dreams, and Visions;
so there have been in all times in the Church of Christ, false Teachers,
that seek reputation with the people, by phantasticall and false
Doctrines; and by such reputation (as is the nature of Ambition,)
to govern them for their private benefit.

Is None To Them That Distinguish Between What Is,
And What Is Not Necessary To Salvation
But this difficulty of obeying both God, and the Civill Soveraign
on earth, to those that can distinguish between what is Necessary,
and what is not Necessary for their Reception into the Kingdome of God,
is of no moment.  For if the command of the Civill Soveraign bee such,
as that it may be obeyed, without the forfeiture of life Eternall;
not to obey it is unjust; and the precept of the Apostle takes place;
"Servants obey your Masters in all things;" and, "Children obey your
Parents in all things;" and the precept of our Saviour, "The Scribes
and Pharisees sit in Moses Chaire,  All therefore they shall say,
that observe, and doe."  But if the command be such, as cannot be obeyed,
without being damned to Eternall Death, then it were madnesse to obey it,
and the Counsell of our Saviour takes place, (Mat. 10. 28.)
"Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soule.)
All men therefore that would avoid, both the punishments that are
to be in this world inflicted, for disobedience to their earthly
Soveraign, and those that shall be inflicted in the world to come
for disobedience to God, have need be taught to distinguish well
between what is, and what is not Necessary to Eternall Salvation.

All That Is Necessary To Salvation
Is Contained In Faith And Obedience
All that is NECESSARY to Salvation, is contained in two Vertues,
Faith in Christ, and Obedience to Laws.  The latter of these,
if it were perfect, were enough to us.  But because wee are all
guilty of disobedience to Gods Law, not onely originally in Adam,
but also actually by our own transgressions, there is required
at our hands now, not onely Obedience for the rest of our time,
but also a Remission of sins for the time past; which Remission
is the reward of our Faith in Christ.  That nothing else is
Necessarily required to Salvation, is manifest from this,
that the Kingdome of Heaven, is shut to none but to Sinners;
that is to say, to the disobedient, or transgressors of the Law;
nor to them, in case they Repent, and Beleeve all the Articles
of Christian Faith, Necessary to Salvation.

What Obedience Is Necessary;
The Obedience required at our hands by God, that accepteth in all
our actions the Will for the Deed, is a serious Endeavour to Obey him;
and is called also by all such names as signifie that Endeavour.
And therefore Obedience, is sometimes called by the names of Charity,
and Love, because they imply a Will to Obey; and our Saviour himself
maketh our Love to God, and to one another, a Fulfilling of the
whole Law: and sometimes by the name of Righteousnesse; for Righteousnesse
is but the will to give to every one his owne, that is to say,
the will to obey the Laws: and sometimes by the name of Repentance;
because to Repent, implyeth a turning away from sinne, which is the same,
with the return of the will to Obedience.  Whosoever therefore
unfeignedly desireth to fulfill the Commandements of God, or repenteth
him truely of his transgressions, or that loveth God with all his heart,
and his neighbor as himself, hath all the Obedience Necessary to his
Reception into the Kingdome of God: For if God should require
perfect Innocence, there could no flesh be saved.

And To What Laws
But what Commandements are those that God hath given us?  Are all
those Laws which were given to the Jews by the hand of Moses,
the Commandements of God?  If they bee, why are not Christians
taught to obey them?  If they be not, what others are so, besides
the Law of Nature? For our Saviour Christ hath not given us new Laws,
but Counsell to observe those wee are subject to; that is to say,
the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of our severall Soveraigns:
Nor did he make any new Law to the Jews in his Sermon on the Mount,
but onely expounded the Laws of Moses, to which they were subject before.
The Laws of God therefore are none but the Laws of Nature,
whereof the principall is, that we should not violate our Faith,
that is, a commandement to obey our Civill Soveraigns, which
wee constituted over us, by mutuall pact one with another.
And this Law of God, that commandeth Obedience to the Law Civill,
commandeth by consequence Obedience to all the Precepts of the Bible,
which (as I have proved in the precedent Chapter) is there onely Law,
where the Civill Soveraign hath made it so; and in other places
but Counsell; which a man at his own perill, may without injustice
refuse to obey.

In The Faith Of A Christian,
Who Is The Person Beleeved
Knowing now what is the Obedience Necessary to Salvation, and to whom
it is due; we are to consider next concerning Faith, whom, and why
we beleeve; and what are the Articles, or Points necessarily to be
beleeved by them that shall be saved.  And first, for the Person
whom we beleeve, because it is impossible to beleeve any Person,
before we know what he saith, it is necessary he be one that wee
have heard speak.  The Person therefore, whom Abraham, Isaac, Jacob,
Moses and the Prophets beleeved, was God himself, that spake unto them
supernaturally: And the Person, whom the Apostles and Disciples
that conversed with Christ beleeved, was our Saviour himself.
But of them, to whom neither God the Father, nor our Saviour ever spake,
it cannot be said, that the Person whom they beleeved, was God.
They beleeved the Apostles, and after them the Pastors and Doctors
of the Church, that recommended to their faith the History of the
Old and New Testament: so that the Faith of Christians ever since
our Saviours time, hath had for foundation, first, the reputation
of their Pastors, and afterward, the authority of those that made
the Old and New Testament to be received for the Rule of Faith;
which none could do but Christian Soveraignes; who are therefore the
Supreme Pastors, and the onely Persons, whom Christians now hear speak
from God; except such as God speaketh to, in these days supernaturally.
But because there be many false Prophets "gone out into the world,"
other men are to examine such Spirits (as St. John advised us,
1 Epistle, Chap. 4. ver.1.) "whether they be of God, or not."
And therefore, seeing the Examination of Doctrines belongeth
to the Supreme Pastor, the Person which all they that have no
speciall revelation are to beleeve, is (in every Common-wealth)
the Supreme Pastor, that is to say, the Civill Soveraigne.

The Causes Of Christian Faith
The causes why men beleeve any Christian Doctrine, are various;
For Faith is the gift of God; and he worketh it in each severall man,
by such wayes, as it seemeth good unto himself.  The most ordinary
immediate cause of our beleef, concerning any point of Christian
Faith, is, that wee beleeve the Bible to be the Word of God.
But why wee beleeve the Bible to be the Word of God, is much
disputed, as all questions must needs bee, that are not well stated.
For they make not the question to be, "Why we Beleeve it," but
"How wee Know it;" as if Beleeving and Knowing were all one.
And thence while one side ground their Knowledge upon the Infallibility
of the Church, and the other side, on the Testimony of the Private Spirit,
neither side concludeth what it pretends.  For how shall a man know
the Infallibility of the Church, but by knowing first the Infallibility
of the Scripture? Or how shall a man know his own Private spirit
to be other than a beleef, grounded upon the Authority, and Arguments
of his Teachers; or upon a Presumption of his own Gifts? Besides, there
is nothing in the Scripture, from which can be inferred the
Infallibility of the Church; much lesse, of any particular Church;
and least of all, the Infallibility of any particular man.

Faith Comes By Hearing
It is manifest, therefore, that Christian men doe not know,
but onely beleeve the Scripture to be the Word of God; and that
the means of making them beleeve which God is pleased to afford
men ordinarily, is according to the way of Nature, that is to say,
from their Teachers.  It is the Doctrine of St. Paul concerning
Christian Faith in generall, (Rom. 10.17.) "Faith cometh by Hearing,"
that is, by Hearing our lawfull Pastors.  He saith also (ver. 14,15.
of the same Chapter) "How shall they beleeve in him of whom they
have not heard? and how shall they hear without a Preacher?
and how shall they Preach, except they be sent?" Whereby it is evident,
that the ordinary cause of beleeving that the Scriptures are
the Word of God, is the same with the cause of the beleeving
of all other Articles of our Faith, namely, the Hearing of those
that are by the Law allowed and appointed to Teach us, as our Parents
in their Houses, and our Pastors in the Churches: Which also is made
more manifest by experience.  For what other cause can there
bee assigned, why in Christian Common-wealths all men either beleeve,
or at least professe the Scripture to bee the Word of God,
and in other Common-wealths scarce any; but that in Christian
Common-wealths they are taught it from their infancy; and in other
places they are taught otherwise?

But if Teaching be the cause of Faith, why doe not all beleeve?
It is certain therefore that Faith is the gift of God, and hee
giveth it to whom he will.  Neverthelesse, because of them
to whom he giveth it, he giveth it by the means of Teachers,
the immediate cause of Faith is Hearing.  In a School where
many are taught, and some profit, others profit not, the cause
of learning in them that profit, is the Master; yet it cannot
be thence inferred, that learning is not the gift of God.
All good things proceed from God; yet cannot all that have them,
say they are Inspired; for that implies a gift supernaturall,
and the immediate hand of God; which he that pretends to,
pretends to be a Prophet, and is subject to the examination of the Church.

But whether men Know, or Beleeve, or Grant the Scriptures to be
the Word of God; if out of such places of them, as are without
obscurity, I shall shew what Articles of Faith are necessary,
and onely necessary for Salvation, those men must needs Know,
Beleeve, or Grant the same.

The Onely Necessary Article Of Christian Faith,
The (Unum Necessarium) Onely Article of Faith, which the Scripture
maketh simply Necessary to Salvation, is this, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST.
By the name of Christ, is understood the King, which God had before
promised by the Prophets of the Old Testament, to send into the world,
to reign (over the Jews, and over such of other nations as should
beleeve in him) under himself eternally; and to give them that
eternall life, which was lost by the sin of Adam.  Which when I have
proved out of Scripture, I will further shew when, and in what sense
some other Articles may bee also called Necessary.

Proved From The Scope Of The Evangelists:
For Proof that the Beleef of this Article, Jesus Is The Christ,
is all the Faith required to Salvation, my first Argument
shall bee from the Scope of the Evangelists; which was by the
description of the life of our Saviour, to establish that one Article,
Jesus Is The Christ.  The summe of St. Matthews Gospell is this,
That Jesus was of the stock of David; Born of a Virgin; which are
the Marks of the true Christ: That the Magi came to worship him
as King of the Jews: That Herod for the same cause sought to kill him:
That John Baptist proclaimed him: That he preached by himselfe,
and his Apostles that he was that King; That he taught the Law,
not as a Scribe, but as a man of Authority: That he cured diseases
by his Word onely, and did many other Miracles, which were foretold
the Christ should doe: That he was saluted King when he entered
into Jerusalem: That he fore-warned them to beware of all others
that should pretend to be Christ: That he was taken, accused,
and put to death, for saying, hee was King: That the cause of
his condemnation written on the Crosse, was JESUS OF NAZARETH,
THE KING OF THE JEWES.  All which tend to no other end than this,
that men should beleeve, that Jesus Is The Christ.  Such therefore
was the Scope of St. Matthews Gospel.  But the Scope of all
the Evangelists (as may appear by reading them) was the same.
Therefore the Scope of the whole Gospell, was the establishing
of that onely Article.  And St. John expressely makes it his conclusion,
John 20. 31. "These things are written, that you may know that
Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God.

From The Sermons Of The Apostles:
My second Argument is taken from the Subject of the Sermons
of the Apostles, both whilest our Saviour lived on earth,
and after his Ascension.  The Apostles in our Saviours time
were sent, Luke 9.2. to Preach the Kingdome of God: For neither there,
nor Mat. 10.7. giveth he any Commission to them, other than this,
"As ye go, Preach, saying, the Kingdome of Heaven is at hand;" that is,
that Jesus is the Messiah, the Christ, the King which was to come.
That their Preaching also after his ascension was the same, is manifest
out of Acts 17.6. "They drew (saith St. Luke) Jason and certain
Brethren unto the Rulers of the City, crying, These that have turned
the world upside down are come hither also, whom Jason hath received.
And these all do contrary to the Decrees of Caesar, saying, that there
is another King, one Jesus:"  And out of the 2.&3. verses of the
same Chapter, where it is said, that St. Paul "as his manner was,
went in unto them; and three Sabbath dayes reasoned with them out
of the Scriptures; opening and alledging, that Christ must needs
have suffered, and risen againe from the dead, and that this Jesus
(whom he preached) is Christ."

From The Easinesse Of The Doctrine:
The third Argument is, from those places of Scripture, by which
all the Faith required to Salvation is declared to be Easie.
For if an inward assent of the mind to all the Doctrines concerning
Christian Faith now taught, (whereof the greatest part are disputed,)
were necessary to Salvation, there would be nothing in the world so hard,
as to be a Christian.  The Thief upon the Crosse though repenting,
could not have been saved for saying, "Lord remember me when thou
commest into thy Kingdome;" by which he testified no beleefe of any
other Article, but this, That Jesus Was The King.  Nor could it bee
said (as it is Mat. 11. 30.) that "Christs yoke is Easy, and his
burthen Light:" Nor that "Little Children beleeve in him," as it is
Matth. 18.6.  Nor could St. Paul have said (1 Cor. 1. 21.) "It pleased
God by the Foolishnesse of preaching, to save them that beleeve:"
Nor could St. Paul himself have been saved, much lesse have been
so great a Doctor of the Church so suddenly, that never perhaps
thought of Transsubstantiation, nor Purgatory, nor many other
Articles now obtruded.

From Formall And Cleer Texts
The fourth Argument is taken from places expresse, and such as
receive no controversie of Interpretation; as first, John 5. 39.
"Search the Scriptures, for in them yee thinke yee have eternall life;
and they are they that testifie of mee."  Our Saviour here speaketh
of the Scriptures onely of the Old Testament; for the Jews
at that time could not search the Scriptures of the New Testament,
which were not written.  But the Old Testament hath nothing of Christ,
but the Markes by which men might know him when hee came; as that
he should descend from David, be born at Bethlehem, and of a Virgin;
doe great Miracles, and the like.  Therefore to beleeve that
this Jesus was He, was sufficient to eternall life: but more
than sufficient is not Necessary; and consequently no other
Article is required.  Again, (John 11. 26.) "Whosoever liveth
and beleeveth in mee, shall not die eternally," Therefore to beleeve
in Christ, is faith sufficient to eternall life; and consequently
no more faith than that is Necessary, But to beleeve in Jesus,
and to beleeve that Jesus is the Christ, is all one, as appeareth
in the verses immediately following.  For when our Saviour (verse 26.)
had said to Martha, "Beleevest thou this?" she answereth (verse 27.)
"Yea Lord, I beleeve that thou art the Christ, the Son of God,
which should come into the world;" Therefore this Article alone
is faith sufficient to life eternall; and more than sufficient
is not Necessary.  Thirdly, John 20. 31. "These things are written
that yee might beleeve, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God,
and that beleeving yee might have life through his name."
There, to beleeve that Jesus Is The Christ, is faith sufficient
to the obtaining of life; and therefore no other Article is Necessary.
Fourthly, 1 John 4. 2. "Every Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ
is come in the flesh, is of God."  And 1 Joh. 5. 1. "whosoever
beleeveth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God."  And verse 5.
"Who is hee that overcommeth the world, but he that beleeveth
that Jesus is the Son of God?"  Fiftly, Act. 8. ver. 36, 37.
"See (saith the Eunuch) here is water, what doth hinder me
to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou beleevest with all
thy heart thou mayst.  And hee answered and said, I beleeve that
Jesus Christ is the Son of God.'  Therefore this Article beleeved,
Jesus Is The Christ, is sufficient to Baptisme, that is to say,
to our Reception into the Kingdome of God, and by consequence,
onely Necessary.  And generally in all places where our Saviour
saith to any man, "Thy faith hath saved thee," the cause he saith it,
is some Confession, which directly, or by consequence, implyeth a beleef,
that Jesus Is The Christ.

From That It Is The Foundation Of All Other Articles
The last Argument is from the places, where this Article is made the
Foundation of Faith: For he that holdeth the Foundation shall bee saved.
Which places are first, Mat. 24.23. "If any man shall say unto you,
Loe, here is Christ, or there, beleeve it not, for there shall
arise false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall shew great
signes and wonders, &c."  Here wee see, this Article Jesus Is
The Christ, must bee held, though hee that shall teach the contrary
should doe great miracles.  The second place is Gal. 1. 8.
"Though we, or an Angell from Heaven preach any other Gospell unto you,
than that wee have preached unto you, let him bee accursed."
But the Gospell which Paul, and the other Apostles, preached,
was onely this Article, that Jesus Is The Christ; Therefore for
the Beleef of this Article, we are to reject the Authority of
an Angell from heaven; much more of any mortall man, if he
teach the contrary.  This is therefore the Fundamentall Article
of Christian Faith.  A third place is, 1 Joh. 4.1. "Beloved,
beleeve not every spirit.  Hereby yee shall know the Spirit of God;
every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh,
is of God."  By which it is evident, that this Article, is the measure,
and rule, by which to estimate, and examine all other Articles;
and is therefore onely Fundamentall.  A fourth is, Matt. 16.18.
where after St. Peter had professed this Article, saying to our Saviour,
"Thou art Christ the Son of the living God," Our Saviour answered,
"Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my Church:"
from whence I inferre, that this Article is that, on which all other
Doctrines of the Church are built, as on their Foundation.
A fift is (1 Cor. 3. ver. 11, 12, &c.) "Other Foundation can no man lay,
than that which is laid, Jesus is the Christ.  Now if any man build
upon this Foundation, Gold, Silver, pretious Stones, Wood, Hay, Stubble;
Every mans work shall be made manifest; For the Day shall declare it,
because it shall be revealed by fire, and the fire shall try every
mans work, of what sort it is.  If any mans work abide, which he
hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward: If any mans work
shall bee burnt, he shall suffer losse; but he himself shall be saved,
yet so as by fire."  Which words, being partly plain and easie
to understand, and partly allegoricall and difficult; out of that
which is plain, may be inferred, that Pastors that teach this Foundation,
that Jesus Is The Christ, though they draw from it false consequences,
(which all men are sometimes subject to,) they may neverthelesse
bee saved; much more that they may bee saved, who being no Pastors,
but Hearers, beleeve that which is by their lawfull Pastors taught them.
Therefore the beleef of this Article is sufficient; and by consequence
there is no other Article of Faith Necessarily required to Salvation.

Now for the part which is Allegoricall, as "That the fire shall try
every mans work," and that "They shall be saved, but so as by fire,"
or "through fire," (for the originall is dia puros,) it maketh nothing
against this conclusion which I have drawn from the other words,
that are plain.  Neverthelesse, because upon this place there hath
been an argument taken, to prove the fire of Purgatory, I will also
here offer you my conjecture concerning the meaning of this triall
of Doctrines, and saving of men as by Fire.  The Apostle here seemeth
to allude to the words of the Prophet Zachary, Ch. 13. 8,9. who
speaking of the Restauration of the Kingdome of God, saith thus,
"Two parts therein shall be cut off, and die, but the third
shall be left therein; and I will bring the third part through the Fire,
and will refine them as Silver is refined, and will try them as
Gold is tryed; they shall call on the name of the Lord, and I
will hear them."  The day of Judgment, is the day of the Restauration
of the Kingdome of God; and at that day it is, that St. Peter tells us
(2 Pet. 3. v.7, 10, 12.) shall be the Conflagration of the world,
wherein the wicked shall perish; but the remnant which God will save,
shall passe through that Fire, unhurt, and be therein (as Silver and
Gold are refined by the fire from their drosse) tryed, and refined
from their Idolatry, and be made to call upon the name of the true God.
Alluding whereto St. Paul here saith, that The Day (that is,
the Day of Judgment, the Great Day of our Saviours comming to restore
the Kingdome of God in Israel) shall try every mans doctrine,
by Judging, which are Gold, Silver, Pretious Stones, Wood, Hay, Stubble;
And then they that have built false Consequences on the true Foundation,
shall see their Doctrines condemned; neverthelesse they themselves
shall be saved, and passe unhurt through this universall Fire,
and live eternally, to call upon the name of the true and onely God.
In which sense there is nothing that accordeth not with the rest
of Holy Scripture, or any glimpse of the fire of Purgatory.

In What Sense Other Articles May Be Called Necessary
But a man may here aske, whether it bee not as necessary to Salvation,
to beleeve, that God is Omnipotent; Creator of the world; that
Jesus Christ is risen; and that all men else shall rise again
from the dead at the last day; as to beleeve, that Jesus Is The Christ.
To which I answer, they are; and so are many more Articles: but they
are such, as are contained in this one, and may be deduced from it,
with more, or lesse difficulty.  For who is there that does not see,
that they who beleeve Jesus to be the Son of the God of Israel,
and that the Israelites had for God the Omnipotent Creator of
all things, doe therein also beleeve, that God is the Omnipotent
Creator of all things?  Or how can a man beleeve, that Jesus is
the King that shall reign eternally, unlesse hee beleeve him also
risen again from the dead? For a dead man cannot exercise the
Office of a King.  In summe, he that holdeth this Foundation,
Jesus Is The Christ, holdeth Expressely all that hee seeth rightly
deduced from it, and Implicitely all that is consequent thereunto,
though he have not skill enough to discern the consequence.
And therefore it holdeth still good, that the beleef of this one
Article is sufficient faith to obtaine remission of sinnes to the
Penitent, and consequently to bring them into the Kingdome of Heaven.

That Faith, And Obedience Are
Both Of Them Necessary To Salvation
Now that I have shewn, that all the Obedience required to Salvation,
consisteth in the will to obey the Law of God, that is to say,
in Repentance; and all the Faith required to the same, is comprehended
in the beleef of this Article, Jesus Is The Christ; I will further
alledge those places of the Gospell, that prove, that all that
is Necessary to Salvation is contained in both these joined together.
The men to whom St. Peter preached on the day of Pentecost,
next after the Ascension of our Saviour, asked him, and the rest
of the Apostles, saying, (Act. 2.37.) "Men and Brethren what
shall we doe?" to whom St. Peter answered (in the next verse)
"Repent, and be Baptized every one of you, for the remission of sins,
and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost."  Therefore Repentance,
and Baptisme, that is, beleeving that Jesus Is The Christ, is all
that is Necessary to Salvation.  Again, our Saviour being asked
by a certain Ruler, (Luke 18.18.) "What shall I doe to inherit
eternall life?"  Answered (verse 20) "Thou knowest the Commandements,
Doe not commit Adultery, Doe not Kill, Doe not Steal, Doe not bear
false witnesse, Honor thy Father, and thy Mother;" which when
he said he had observed, our Saviour added, "Sell all thou hast,
give it to the Poor, and come and follow me:" which was as much
as to say, Relye on me that am the King: Therefore to fulfill the Law,
and to beleeve that Jesus is the King, is all that is required
to bring a man to eternall life.  Thirdly, St. Paul saith (Rom. 1.17.)
"The Just shall live by Faith;" not every one, but the Just;
therefore Faith and Justice (that is, the Will To Be Just,
or Repentance) are all that is Necessary to life eternall.
And (Mark 1.15.) our Saviour preached, saying, "The time
is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand, Repent and Beleeve
the Evangile," that is, the Good news that the Christ was come.
Therefore to Repent, and to Beleeve that Jesus is the Christ,
is all that is required to Salvation.


What Each Of Them Contributes Thereunto
Seeing then it is Necessary that Faith, and Obedience (implyed
in the word Repentance) do both concurre to our Salvation; the question
by which of the two we are Justified, is impertinently disputed.
Neverthelesse, it will not be impertinent, to make manifest
in what manner each of them contributes thereunto; and in what sense
it is said, that we are to be Justified by the one, and by the other.
And first, if by Righteousnesse be understood the Justice of the
Works themselves, there is no man that can be saved; for there is none
that hath not transgressed the Law of God.  And therefore when wee
are said to be Justified by Works, it is to be understood of the Will,
which God doth alwaies accept for the Work it selfe, as well in good,
as in evill men.  And in this sense onely it is, that a man is
called Just, or Unjust; and that his Justice Justifies him, that is,
gives him the title, in Gods acceptation, of Just; and renders
him capable of Living By His Faith, which before he was not.
So that Justice Justifies in that that sense, in which to Justifie,
is the same that to Denominate A Man Just; and not in the
signification of discharging the Law; whereby the punishment
of his sins should be unjust.

But a man is then also said to be Justified, when his Plea,
though in it selfe unsufficient, is accepted; as when we Plead
our Will, our Endeavour to fulfill the Law, and Repent us of
our failings, and God accepteth it for the Performance it selfe:
And because God accepteth not the Will for the Deed, but onely
in the Faithfull; it is therefore Faith that makes good our Plea;
and in this sense it is, that Faith onely Justifies: So that Faith
and Obedience are both Necessary to Salvation; yet in severall senses
each of them is said to Justifie.

Obedience To God And To The Civill Soveraign
Not Inconsistent, Whether Christian,
Having thus shewn what is Necessary to Salvation; it is not hard
to reconcile our Obedience to the Civill Soveraign; who is either
Christian, or Infidel.  If he bee a Christian, he alloweth
the beleefe of this Article, that Jesus Is The Christ; and of all
the Articles that are contained in, or are evident consequence
deduced from it: which is all the Faith Necessary to Salvation.
And because he is a Soveraign, he requireth Obedience to all his owne,
that is, to all the Civill Laws; in which also are contained all the
Laws of Nature, that is, all the Laws of God: for besides the Laws
of Nature, and the Laws of the Church, which are part of the Civill Law,
(for the Church that can make Laws is the Common-wealth,) there bee
no other Laws Divine.  Whosoever therefore obeyeth his Christian
Soveraign, is not thereby hindred, neither from beleeving, nor
from obeying God.  But suppose that a Christian King should
from this Foundation, Jesus Is The Christ, draw some false consequences,
that is to say, make some superstructions of Hay, or Stubble,
and command the teaching of the same; yet seeing St. Paul says,
he shal be saved; much more shall he be saved, that teacheth them
by his command; and much more yet, he that teaches not, but onely
beleeves his lawfull Teacher.  And in case a Subject be forbidden
by the Civill Soveraign to professe some of those his opinions,
upon what grounds can he disobey?  Christian Kings may erre
in deducing a Consequence, but who shall Judge? Shall a private
man Judge, when the question is of his own obedience? or shall any
man Judg but he that is appointed thereto by the Church, that is,
by the Civill Soveraign that representeth it? or if the Pope,
or an Apostle Judge, may he not erre in deducing of a consequence?
did not one of the two, St. Peter, or St. Paul erre in a superstructure,
when St. Paul withstood St. Peter to his face? There can therefore
be no contradiction between the Laws of God, and the Laws of a
Christian Common-wealth.

Or Infidel
And when the Civill Soveraign is an Infidel, every one of his own
Subjects that resisteth him, sinneth against the Laws of God
(for such as are the Laws of Nature,) and rejecteth the counsell
of the Apostles, that admonisheth all Christians to obey their Princes,
and all Children and Servants to obey they Parents, and Masters,
in all things.  And for their Faith, it is internall, and invisible;
They have the licence that Naaman had, and need not put themselves
into danger for it.  But if they do, they ought to expect their
reward in Heaven, and not complain of their Lawfull Soveraign;
much lesse make warre upon him.  For he that is not glad of any
just occasion of Martyrdome, has not the faith be professeth,
but pretends it onely, to set some colour upon his own contumacy.
But what Infidel King is so unreasonable, as knowing he has a Subject,
that waiteth for the second comming of Christ, after the present world
shall be burnt, and intendeth then to obey him (which is the intent
of beleeving that Jesus is the Christ,) and in the mean time thinketh
himself bound to obey the Laws of that Infidel King, (which all
Christians are obliged in conscience to doe,) to put to death,
or to persecute such a Subject?

And thus much shall suffice, concerning the Kingdome of God,
and Policy Ecclesiasticall.  Wherein I pretend not to advance
any Position of my own, but onely to shew what are the Consequences
that seem to me deducible from the Principles of Christian Politiques,
(which are the holy Scriptures,) in confirmation of the Power
of Civill Soveraigns, and the Duty of their Subjects.  And in the
allegation of Scripture, I have endeavoured to avoid such Texts
as are of obscure, or controverted Interpretation; and to alledge
none, but is such sense as is most plain, and agreeable to the harmony
and scope of the whole Bible; which was written for the re-establishment
of the Kingdome of God in Christ.  For it is not the bare Words,
but the Scope of the writer that giveth the true light,
by which any writing is to bee interpreted; and they that insist
upon single Texts, without considering the main Designe, can derive
no thing from them cleerly; but rather by casting atomes of Scripture,
as dust before mens eyes, make every thing more obscure than it is;
an ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth, but
their own advantage.



CHAPTER XLIV

OF SPIRITUALL DARKNESSE FROM MISINTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE


The Kingdome Of Darknesse What
Besides these Soveraign Powers, Divine, and Humane, of which
I have hitherto discoursed, there is mention in Scripture of
another Power, namely, (Eph. 6. 12.), that of "the Rulers
of the Darknesse of this world, (Mat. 12. 26.), "the Kingdome
of Satan," and, (Mat. 9. 34.), "the Principality of Beelzebub
over Daemons," that is to say, over Phantasmes that appear in the Air:
For which cause Satan is also called (Eph. 2. 2.) "the Prince of
the Power of the Air;" and (because he ruleth in the darknesse
of this world) (Joh. 16. 11.) "The Prince of this world;"
And in consequence hereunto, they who are under his Dominion,
in opposition to the faithfull (who are the Children Of The Light)
are called the Children Of Darknesse.  For seeing Beelzebub is
Prince of Phantasmes, Inhabitants of his Dominion of Air and Darknesse,
the Children of Darknesse, and these Daemons, Phantasmes, or Spirits
of Illusion, signifie allegorically the same thing.  This considered,
the Kingdome of Darknesse, as it is set forth in these, and other
places of the Scripture, is nothing else but a "Confederacy of Deceivers,
that to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour
by dark, and erroneous Doctrines, to extinguish in them the Light,
both of Nature, and of the Gospell; and so to dis-prepare them
for the Kingdome of God to come."

The Church Not Yet Fully Freed Of Darknesse
As men that are utterly deprived from their Nativity, of the light
of the bodily Eye, have no Idea at all, of any such light;
and no man conceives in his imagination any greater light,
than he hath at some time, or other perceived by his outward Senses:
so also is it of the light of the Gospel, and of the light of
the Understanding, that no man can conceive there is any greater
degree of it, than that which he hath already attained unto.
And from hence it comes to passe, that men have no other means
to acknowledge their owne Darknesse, but onely by reasoning
from the un-forseen mischances, that befall them in their ways;
The Darkest part of the Kingdome of Satan, is that which is without
the Church of God; that is to say, amongst them that beleeve not
in Jesus Christ.  But we cannot say, that therefore the Church
enjoyeth (as the land of Goshen) all the light, which to the
performance of the work enjoined us by God, is necessary.
Whence comes it, that in Christendome there has been, almost from
the time of the Apostles, such justling of one another out of
their places, both by forraign, and Civill war? such stumbling at
every little asperity of their own fortune, and every little eminence
of that of other men? and such diversity of ways in running to
the same mark, Felicity, if it be not Night amongst us, or at
least a Mist? wee are therefore yet in the Dark.

Four Causes Of Spirituall Darknesse
The Enemy has been here in the Night of our naturall Ignorance,
and sown the tares of Spirituall Errors; and that, First, by abusing,
and putting out the light of the Scriptures: For we erre, not knowing
the Scriptures.  Secondly, by introducing the Daemonology of the
Heathen Poets, that is to say, their fabulous Doctrine concerning
Daemons, which are but Idols, or Phantasms of the braine, without
any reall nature of their own, distinct from humane fancy; such as
are dead mens Ghosts, and Fairies, and other matter of old Wives tales.
Thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture divers reliques of the Religion,
and much of the vain and erroneous Philosophy of the Greeks,
especially of Aristotle.  Fourthly, by mingling with both these,
false, or uncertain Traditions, and fained, or uncertain History.
And so we come to erre, by "giving heed to seducing Spirits,"
and the Daemonology of such "as speak lies in Hypocrisie,"
(or as it is in the Originall, 1 Tim. 4.1,2. "of those that play
the part of lyars") "with a seared conscience," that is, contrary to their
own knowledge.  Concerning the first of these, which is the Seducing
of men by abuse of Scripture, I intend to speak briefly in this Chapter.

Errors From Misinterpreting The Scriptures,
Concerning The Kingdome Of God
The greatest, and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all
the rest are either consequent, or subservient, is the wresting of it,
to prove that the Kingdome of God, mentioned so often in the Scripture,
is the present Church, or multitude of Christian men now living,
or that being dead, are to rise again at the last day: whereas the
Kingdome of God was first instituted by the Ministery of Moses,
over the Jews onely; who were therefore called his Peculiar People;
and ceased afterward, in the election of Saul, when they refused
to be governed by God any more, and demanded a King after the manner
of the nations; which God himself consented unto, as I have more
at large proved before, in the 35. Chapter.  After that time,
there was no other Kingdome of God in the world, by any Pact,
or otherwise, than he ever was, is, and shall be King, of all men,
and of all creatures, as governing according to his Will,
by his infinite Power.  Neverthelesse, he promised by his Prophets
to restore this his Government to them again, when the time he hath
in his secret counsell appointed for it shall bee fully come,
and when they shall turn unto him by repentance, and amendment of life;
and not onely so, but he invited also the Gentiles to come in,
and enjoy the happinesse of his Reign, on the same conditions
of conversion and repentance; and hee promised also to send his Son
into the world, to expiate the sins of them all by his death,
and to prepare them by his Doctrine, to receive him at his
second coming: Which second coming not yet being, the Kingdome of God
is not yet come, and wee are not now under any other Kings by Pact,
but our Civill Soveraigns; saving onely, that Christian men are
already in the Kingdome of Grace, in as much as they have already
the Promise of being received at his comming againe.

As That The Kingdome Of God Is The Present Church:
Consequent to this Errour, that the present Church is Christs Kingdome,
there ought to be some one Man, or Assembly, by whose mouth our Saviour
(now in heaven) speaketh, giveth law, and which representeth his person
to all Christians, or divers Men, or divers Assemblies that doe the same
to divers parts of Christendome.  This power Regal under Christ,
being challenged, universally by that Pope, and in particular
Common-wealths by Assemblies of the Pastors of the place,
(when the Scripture gives it to none but to Civill Soveraigns,)
comes to be so passionately disputed, that it putteth out the Light
of Nature, and causeth so great a Darknesse in mens understanding,
that they see not who it is to whom they have engaged their obedience.

And That The Pope Is His Vicar Generall
Consequent to this claim of the Pope to Vicar Generall of Christ
in the present Church, (supposed to be that Kingdom of his,
to which we are addressed in the Gospel,) is the Doctrine,
that it is necessary for a Christian King, to receive his Crown
by a Bishop; as if it were from that Ceremony, that he derives
the clause of Dei Gratia in his title; and that then onely he is
made King by the favour of God, when he is crowned by the authority
of Gods universall Viceregent on earth; and that every Bishop
whosoever be his Soveraign, taketh at his Consecration an oath of
absolute Obedience to the Pope, Consequent to the same, is the
Doctrine of the fourth Councell of Lateran, held under Pope Innocent
the third, (Chap. 3. De Haereticis.) "That if a King at the Popes
admonition, doe not purge his Kingdome of Haeresies, and being
excommunicate for the same, doe not give satisfaction within a year,
his Subjects are absolved of the bond of their obedience."
Where, by Haeresies are understood all opinions which the Church
of Rome hath forbidden to be maintained.  And by this means,
as often as there is any repugnancy between the Politicall designes
of the Pope, and other Christian Princes, as there is very often,
there ariseth such a Mist amongst their Subjects, that they know not
a stranger that thrusteth himself into the throne of their lawfull Prince,
from him whom they had themselves placed there; and in this Darknesse
of mind, are made to fight one against another, without discerning their
enemies from their friends, under the conduct of another mans ambition.

And That The Pastors Are The Clergy
From the same opinion, that the present Church is the Kingdome of God,
it proceeds that Pastours, Deacons, and all other Ministers of the Church,
take the name to themselves of the Clergy, giving to other Christians
the name of Laity, that is, simply People.  For Clergy signifies those,
whose maintenance is that Revenue, which God having reserved to himselfe
during his Reigne over the Israelites, assigned to the tribe of Levi
(who were to be his publique Ministers, and had no portion of land
set them out to live on, as their brethren) to be their inheritance.
The Pope therefore, (pretending the present Church to be, as the
Realme of Israel, the Kingdome of God) challenging to himselfe
and his subordinate Ministers, the like revenue, as the Inheritance
of God, the name of Clergy was sutable to that claime.  And thence it is,
that Tithes, or other tributes paid to the Levites, as Gods Right,
amongst the Israelites, have a long time been demanded, and taken
of Christians, by Ecclesiastiques, Jure Divino, that is, in Gods Right.
By which meanes, the people every where were obliged to a double tribute;
one to the State, another to the Clergy; whereof, that to the Clergy,
being the tenth of their revenue, is double to that which a King of Athens
(and esteemed a Tyrant) exacted of his subjects for the defraying of all
publique charges: For he demanded no more but the twentieth part;
and yet abundantly maintained therewith the Commonwealth.
And in the Kingdome of the Jewes, during the Sacerdotall Reigne
of God, the Tithes and Offerings were the whole Publique Revenue.

From the same mistaking of the present Church for the Kingdom of God,
came in the distinction betweene the Civill and the Canon Laws:
The civil Law being the acts of Soveraigns in their own Dominions,
and the Canon Law being the Acts of the Pope in the same Dominions.
Which Canons, though they were but Canons, that is, Rules Propounded,
and but voluntarily received by Christian Princes, till the translation
of the Empire to Charlemain; yet afterwards, as the power of the Pope
encreased, became Rules Commanded, and the Emperours themselves
(to avoyd greater mischiefes, which the people blinded might be led into)
were forced to let them passe for Laws.

From hence it is, that in all Dominions, where the Popes Ecclesiasticall
power is entirely received, Jewes, Turkes, and Gentiles, are in
the Roman Church tolerated in their Religion, as farre forth,
as in the exercise and profession thereof they offend not against
the civill power: whereas in a Christian, though a stranger,
not to be of the Roman Religion, is Capitall; because the Pope
pretendeth that all Christians are his Subjects.  For otherwise
it were as much against the law of Nations, to persecute a Christian
stranger, for professing the Religion of his owne country,
as an Infidell; or rather more, in as much as they that are not
against Christ, are with him.

From the same it is, that in every Christian State there are
certaine men, that are exempt, by Ecclesiasticall liberty,
from the tributes, and from the tribunals of the Civil State;
for so are the secular Clergy, besides Monks and Friars, which in
many places, bear so great a proportion to the common people,
as if need were, there might be raised out of them alone, an Army,
sufficient for any warre the Church militant should imploy them in,
against their owne, or other Princes.

Error From Mistaking Consecration For Conjuration
A second generall abuse of Scripture, is the turning of Consecration
into Conjuration, or Enchantment.  To Consecrate, is in Scripture,
to Offer, Give, or Dedicate, in pious and decent language and gesture,
a man, or any other thing to God, by separating of it from common use;
that is to say, to Sanctifie, or make it Gods, and to be used only
by those, whom God hath appointed to be his Publike Ministers,
(as I have already proved at large in the 35. Chapter;) and thereby
to change, not the thing Consecrated, but onely the use of it,
from being Profane and common, to be Holy, and peculiar to Gods service.
But when by such words, the nature of qualitie of the thing it selfe,
is pretended to be changed, it is not Consecration, but either an
extraordinary worke of God, or a vaine and impious Conjuration.
But seeing (for the frequency of pretending the change of Nature
in their Consecrations,) it cannot be esteemed a work extraordinary,
it is no other than a Conjuration or Incantation, whereby they would
have men to beleeve an alteration of Nature that is not, contrary to
the testimony of mans Sight, and of all the rest of his Senses.
As for example, when the Priest, in stead of Consecrating Bread
and Wine to Gods peculiar service in the Sacrament of the Lords Supper,
(which is but a separation of it from the common use, to signifie,
that is, to put men in mind of their Redemption, by the Passion
of Christ, whose body was broken, and blood shed upon the Crosse
for our transgressions,) pretends, that by saying of the words
of our Saviour, "This is my Body," and "This is my Blood,"
the nature of Bread is no more there, but his very Body;
notwithstanding there appeared not to the Sight, or other Sense
of the Receiver, any thing that appeareth not before the Consecration.
The Egyptian Conjurers, that are said to have turned their Rods
to Serpents, and the Water into Bloud, are thought but to have deluded
the senses of the Spectators by a false shew of things, yet are
esteemed Enchanters: But what should wee have thought of them,
if there had appeared in their Rods nothing like a Serpent,
and in the Water enchanted, nothing like Bloud, nor like any thing
else but Water, but that they had faced down the King, that they
were Serpents that looked like Rods, and that it was Bloud that
seemed Water? That had been both Enchantment, and Lying.
And yet in this daily act of the Priest, they doe the very same,
by turning the holy words into the manner of a Charme, which produceth
nothing now to the Sense; but they face us down, that it hath turned
the Bread into a Man; nay more, into a God; and require men to
worship it, as if it were our Saviour himself present God and Man,
and thereby to commit most grosse Idolatry.  For if it bee enough
to excuse it of Idolatry, to say it is no more Bread, but God;
why should not the same excuse serve the Egyptians, in case they
had the faces to say, the Leeks, and Onyons they worshipped,
were not very Leeks, and Onyons, but a Divinity under their Species,
or likenesse.  The words, "This is my Body," are aequivalent to these,
"This signifies, or represents my Body;" and it is an ordinary figure
of Speech: but to take it literally, is an abuse; nor though so taken,
can it extend any further, than to the Bread which Christ himself
with his own hands Consecrated.  For hee never said, that of what
Bread soever, any Priest whatsoever, should say, "This is my Body," or,
"This is Christs Body," the same should presently be transubstantiated.
Nor did the Church of Rome ever establish this Transubstantiation,
till the time of Innocent the third; which was not above 500. years agoe,
when the Power of Popes was at the Highest, and the Darknesse of the time
grown so great, as men discerned not the Bread that was given them to eat,
especially when it was stamped with the figure of Christ upon the Crosse,
as if they would have men beleeve it were Transubstantiated,
not onely into the Body of Christ, but also into the Wood of his Crosse,
and that they did eat both together in the Sacrament.

Incantation In The Ceremonies Of Baptisme
The like incantation, in stead of Consecration, is used also
in the Sacrament of Baptisme: Where the abuse of Gods name
in each severall Person, and in the whole Trinity, with the sign
of the Crosse at each name, maketh up the