An essay upon the relation of cause and effect : controverting the doctrine of Mr. Hume, concerning the nature of that relation, with observations upon the opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence connected with the same subject. / Shepherd, Mary, Lady

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AN 



ESSAY 



UPON THE 



RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, 



AN 



ESSAY 



delation of Cause auto Cffert, 



CONTROVERTING 



THE DOCTRINE OF MR. HUME, 

CONCERNING 

THE NATURE OF THAT RELATION J 

WITH 

OBSERVATIONS 

UPON THE 

OPINIONS OF DR. BROWN AND MR, LAWRENCE, 

CONNECTED 
WITH THE SAME SUBJECT. 



u 



LONDON: 

PRINTED FOR T. HOOKHAM, OLD BOND STREET, 

1824. 



Printed by S. Gosnell, Little Queen Street, London. 



ADVERTISEMENT 



TO THE 



READER. 



IN the work now presented to the public, 
I have endeavoured to set down the sug- 
gestions, which at different times have 
occurred to me upon the theory of the re- 
lation of Cause and Effect, adopted by Mr. 
Hume, Dr. Brown, and Mr. Lawrence; 
and to unfold the train of reasoning which 
has led me to regard their arguments as 
illogical, and their conclusions as untrue. 

I am fully aware of the difficulties at- 
tending such an undertaking, arising both 
from the popularity of those authors, as 
well as from the nature of the subject. 

1127665 



- VI 

Every one must be conscious that the 
particular forms of expression, in which 
thoughts of an abstruse and subtle nature 
are introduced to the imagination, and 
grow familiar there, are so intimately as- 
sociated with them, as to appear then* 
just and accurate representative. But 
these forms of expression, though clear and 
satisfactory to the person in whose mind 
they are so associated, may yet fail in con- 
veying the same ideas with sufficient pre- 
cision to the understandings of others. In 
the statement of facts, in moral discussions, 
in declamation or poetry, this inconveni- 
ence can scarcely arise, since they rarely 
present to an intelligent reader any image 
which has not under some modification 
previously passed through his mind, and 
is not connected with his reflections or ex- 
perience. But in the subtlety of meta- 
physics it is otherwise ; and moreover, lan- 
guage which was originally framed to suit 

the commonest occasions of life, is ill fitted, 

4 



Vll 

even under the application of the most ac- 
complished intellect, to express the nice 
abstractions of that science. 

These difficulties are the only excuse I 
can offer for many obscurities of expres- 
sion, which I fear will be found in the fol- 
lowing dissertation, which consists of little 
more than marginal observations, upon 
what I cannot but regard as fallacies of 
the above-mentioned writers, without any 
pretence of composition or laboured ar- 
rangement. 



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"e3 : PREFACE. 



IT is attempted, in the following pages, 
to controvert Mr. Hume's doctrine on the 
" Nature of the Relation of Cause and 
Effect/ ' as set forth in several sections of 
his "Treatise on Human Nature;" and 
as confirmed in three sections of his 
"Essays." The former work is taken 
notice of only in as far as it forms a foun- 
dation for the latter. But, in as much as 
some propositions are taken for granted in 
these latter sections, which serve as the 
support of all the argument, it could nei- 
ther be so well answered, nor brought so 
clearly within the reader's comprehension, 
as by exposing the fallacies of those as- 
sumed premises on which it is founded, 
and which are to be found at large in the 
earlier work. 

B 



In this respect, Mr. Hume cannot fairly 
avail himself of the higher esteem he has 
called upon us to grant to his " Essays" 
above his juvenile " Treatise;" for, as the 
conclusions are the same in the Essays as 
in the Treatise, and as the medium argu- 
ments used in the Essays are the conclusions 
drawn in consequence of great detail of pre- 
vious discussion in the Treatise, it is both 
fair and necessary to examine these details. 

It may be, as is hinted in the Adver- 
tisement to the Essays, " that these de- 
" tails contain some of those negligent 
(t reasonings that he could have wished not 
" to acknowledge in after life." 

I shall not, however, readily allow of 
the advantage of such an excuse ; for, as 
long as the premises that support his ma- 
tured opinions are only to be found regular- 
ly deduced in this unacknowledged work, 
it is incumbent upon one attempting an An- 



3 

swer to expose them ; for, there is no little 
art, in refusing to adopt the " negligent 
" reasonings of youth," in a state of ad- 
vanced judgment, yet covertly making use 
of a material proposition (that might pass 
as true, even in many an acute mind, in 
reading these popular and elegant Essays), 
which is only supported by the sophistical 
reasonings of the youthful Treatise, and 
is evidently adopted in consequence of 
them. It is also possible, that Mr. Hume 
might not intend to deny his opinions, in 
every particular that regarded these points, 
as he continued to hold the consequential 
doctrine deduced from them ; therefore 
there may be the less infringement upon 
the wish he expresses, " not to be consi- 
" dered as publicly avowing any doctrine not 
" contained in his latter Essays." 

:>:--. ., : 

" That Nature may be conceived to al- 

" ter her course, without a contradiction," 
is the material proposition (eliciied in the 



4 

Treatise, and subsequently assumed in the 
Essays), on account of which the reader's 
patience is principally intended to be in- 
truded upon ; and which is mentioned in 
this place, in order that he may perceive 
the importance of its investigation, previ- 
ously to his consideration of the more 
avowed objects brought under his notice, 
in the answers to the three sections of- the 
Essays, entitled, " Sceptical Doubts con- 
<( cerning the operations of the Under- 
" standing; " " Sceptical Solutions of 
" these Doubts;" and " Of the Idea of 
" necessary Connexion." 

The doctrines contained in these last, 
lead directly to a scepticism of an athe- 
istical tendency, whose dangerous nature 
can require no comment, nor any apology 
for its refutation. Nevertheless, did there 
seem but sound argument for their sup- 
port, ^whatever might be the unhappiness 
of the opinions that could be inferred from 



them, I would leave them unnoticed and 
uncontroverted, imagining there might 
possibly be an error in the argument, be- 
yond the reach of my discovery ; and should 
content myself in withholding an assent to 
propositions which my understanding might 
be unable to refute. Nor at this time of 
day does the intention of entering into this 
controversy appear to be useless. It is 
not many years since Mr. Hume's notions 
were the occasion of much dispute, on the 
vsry ground on which I have undertaken 
it ; a dispute which nearly lost the mathe- 
matical chair in one of our universities to 
the present possessor of it, on account of 
his favouring this doctrine. His opinion, 
however, as far as it related to any coun- 
tenance it might afford to the principles of 
atheism, was defended from the insinua- 
tion, by a learned treatise, from the then 
Professor of Moral Philosophy in the same 
university. This treatise, whilst it con- 
troverts Mr. Hume's opinions in some re- 

B 3 






6 

spects, denies that atheistical inferences 
may be deduced from them : but I shall 
endeavour to show, that, in this respect, 
the author wanted observation and acute- 
ness : neither perceiving the corollaries 
that go along with the doctrine, nor de- 
tecting the sly and powerful sophistry of 
the reasoning by which they are sup- 
ported. 

Also a modern and living author, of 
great celebrity, Mr. Lawrence, in his late 
Lectures, has adopted Mr. Hume's and 
Dr. Brown's notions of the relation of 
cause and effect, as containing a proof of 
the materiality of the soul; a doctrine of 
sufficient importance to justify a further 
investigation of the argument on which it 
is supposed to be well founded. 

In every controversial work, much ob- 
scurity appears in an author's arguments, 
on account of the opinions of his adversary 



not being distinctly understood; owing 
either to partial quotation, or mistaken 
statement : I therefore mean to obviate all 
chance of any misunderstanding on that 
ground, by giving the adversary's opinions 
upon the controverted doctrine in his own 
words; taking care to leave out only ex- 
traneous matter, and to alter the arrange- 
ment in such a manner as to form at once 
a clear and concise, a fair and intelligible 
view of the whole subject. 



fi4 



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AN 



ESSAY, 

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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 
rr\ ... 

1 HE plan I mean to adopt, in order to give 
a clear view of Mr. Hume's doctrine of the 
relation of Cause and Effect, in the most 
concise manner possible, is ; first to arrange 
such quotations from the " Treatise of 
Human Nature," as will show the opinions 
there held; and afterwards select some 
others from the " Essays," in which they 
are corroborated, and enlarged upon ; and 
which will be sufficient to show, that the 
doctrines contained in the Treatise are 
there repeated; with the addition of an 
application of them to the affairs of ordinary 
life; as affording a ground of scepticism 
concerning the powers of the understand- 
ing having any part to perform in the re- 
gulation of her expectations. 



10 

The quotations from the Treatise will 
first show, " what is the doctrine enquired 
into;" Secondly, the argument, by which 
Mr. Hume attempts to confute the opinion 
of the necessity of a Cause, for every be- 
ginning of existence; and also the argu- 
ment he employs in aid of his own doctrine, 
concerning the ideas we have of the neces- 
sary connexion of Cause and Effect; and of 
the belief there is placed in such necessary 
connexion. Thirdly, the definition of the 
relation of Cause and Effect ; this definition 
being the object aimed at by the whole 
argument. 

The doctrine enquired into is the neces- 
sary connexion of Cause and Effect, and is 
divided into these two general propositions 
or queries ; 

First, " For what reason we pronounce 
" it necessary, that every thing whose 
" existence has a beginning should also 
" have a Cause?" 

Secondly, " Why we conclude, that 
" such particular Causes must necessarily 



11 

" have such particular Effects ; and what is 
" the nature of that inference we draw 
" from the one to the other, and of the 
" belief we repose in it*?" 

Mr. Hume's method of answering these 
questions is by adopting a new and scepti- 
cal view of the subject, and by attempting 
to confute those philosophers who were of 
a different opinion from himself concerning 
it, by asserting, that it is " neither intui- 
" lively nor demonstratively certain that 
" every thing which begins to exist must 
" have a cause; for in order to show that 
" neither intuition, nor demonstration, 
" proves the maxim that whatever begins 
" to exist must have a cause for existence, 
" let us consider that all certainty arises 
" from a comparison of ideas, and from 
" the discovery of such relations, as are 
" unalterable so long as the ideas continue 
" the same. These relations are, resem- 
" blance, proportions in quantity, degrees 

* See Treatise on Human Nature, Vol. 1, Fart 3. 
Concluding Sentences of Sect. 2d, page 116. Sect. 3d, 
5th, 6th, 7th, part of Sect. 8th, page 150 to end. 



12 

" of any quality, and contrariety ; none of 
" which are implied in this proposition, 
" whatever has a beginning has also a cause 
" of existence; that proposition therefore is 
" not intuitively certain/' " That the pro- 
" position is incapable of demonstrative 
" proof, we may satisfy ourselves by con- 
" sidering that all distinct ideas are separa- 
" blefrom each other; and as the ideas are 
" separable from each other, and as the 
" ideas of Cause and Effect are evidently 
" distinct, it will be easy for us to conceive 
" any object to be non-existent this moment 
" and to be existent the next, without con- 
" joining to it the distinct idea of a Cause, 
" a productive principle." " The separa- 
" tion therefore of the idea of a cause, 
" from that of a beginning of existence, is 
" plainly possible for the imagination, and 
" consequently the actual separation of 
" these objects, is so far possible, that it 
" implies no contradiction, nor absurdity ; 
" and is, therefore, incapable of being re- 
" futed by any reasoning, from mere ideas; 
" without which it is impossible to demon- 
44 strate the necessity of a cause." -"Ac- 
" cordingly eveiy demonstration which has 



13 

" been produced for the necessity of a 
" cause, is fallacious and sophistical. They 
" all presuppose the existence that begins to 
" be an effect; but this does not prove that 
" every sort of being must have a Cause." 

" As the opinion, therefore, that every 
" existence must have a Cause, is not de- 
" rived from knowledge, or scientific reason- 
" ing, it must necessarily arise from obser- 
" vation and experience ; the next question 
" therefore is, how experience gives rise to 
" such a principle? This question I shall 
" sink in the following : Why we conclude 
" that such particular causes must neces- 
" sarily have such particular effects ? Be- 
" cause the same answer will serve for both 
" questions." 

5(1 

The next subject, therefore, which is 
considered is " necessary connexion;" 
where it is shown in what way experience 
becomes the foundation of our expectations 
of similar effects rising from similar causes. 
The reader must remember that this dis- 
cussion is supposed to contain the answer 
to the question, concerning the idea we 
have of the necessity of a Supreme Cause ; 



14 

else he might be apt to forget that he has 
the author's authority for considering the 
custom and habit of the mind, arising from 
an association of ideas, as the only ground 
of our belief in the necessity of a cause for 
the beginning of any existence; and con- 
sequently for any notion of the necessity 
for a great Author, Contriver, and Ar- 
ranger of the universe. 

Mr. Hume goes on, " The next ques- 
" tion therefore is, whether experience 
produces the idea by means of the under- 
standing or the imagination, whether we 
are determined by reason to make the 
transition, or by a certain association (of 
ideas) and relation of perceptions." 



" If reason determined us, it would be 
" on this principle That instances of 
" which we have had no experience must 
" resemble those of which we have had eocpe- 
" rience; for that the course of nature conti- 
" nues uniformly the same. Now there can 
" be no demonstrative arguments to prove 
" that those instances of which we have 
*' had no experience resemble those of 
" which we have had experience." 



15 

" We can at least imagine a change in 
" the course of nature ; reason therefore 
" can never show us the connexion of one 
'< object with another, though aided by 
" experience; when, therefore, the mind 
" passes from the idea or impression of one 
" object to the idea or belief of another, 
"it is not by reason, but by certain prin- 
" ciples, which associate together the ideas 
" of these objects, and unite them in the 
" imagination. The inference, therefore, 
" solely depends on the union of ideas ; 
" for, 

" After we have observed resemblance 
" in a sufficient number of instances, we 
" immediately feel a determination of the 
" mind to pass from one object to its 
" usual attendant, and to consider it in a 
" stronger light on account of that rela- 
" tion. The several instances of resem- 
" bling connection lead us into the notion 
" of power and necessity " 

" Necessary connexion, therefore, is the 
" effect of this observation, and is nothing 



16 

*'. but an internal action of the mind, or a 
" determination to carry our thoughts from 
" one object to another." 

l)9f Ji.fi J^HQUvt ( 13ilOli* fiirtf i Jj;-d(> *' 

" The efficacy or energy of Cause, 
*' therefore, is neither placed in the Causes 
" themselves, nor in the Deity, nor in the 
" concurrence of these two principles, but 
" belongs entirely to the soul, which con- 
" siders the union of two or more objects 
" in all past instances. Thus objects have 
" no discoverable connexion together, nor 
" is it from any other principle, but custom 
" operating on the imagination, that we can 
" draw any inference from the appearance 
" of one, to the existence of the other ; and 
" all BELIEF in this connexion consists only 
" in a lively idea associated to a present im- 
<f pression; for belief is nothing but an idea 
" that is different from a fiction in the 
" manner of its being conceived, ^present 
"impression, transports the mind to such 
" ideas as are related to it, and communi- 
" cates to them a share of its force and 
" vivacity" The definition of the relation 
of Cause and Effect, follows this analysis of 



17 

it ; and may be observed to be conformable 
to this notion of a custom of the mind being 
its only foundation. 

Thus, 3dly, " We shall now give a 
" precise definition of Cause and Effect. 
" There may be two definitions given of 
" this relation, which are only different 
" views of the same object, and make us 
" consider it either as a philosophical or as 
-" a natural relation : either as a compari- 
" son of two ideas, or an association be- 
" tween them." 

3ll- i, n 

,., \y e ma y define a cause to be an 
" object precedent and contiguous to another, 
" and iv here all the objects resembling the 
" former are placed in like relations of pre- 
" cedency and contiguity to those objects that 
" resemble the latter. In the latter sense, a 
" cause is an object precedent and contiguous 
" to another, and so united with it, that the 
" idea of the one determines the mind to form 
" the idea of the othw, and the impression of 
" the one to form a more lively idea of the 
"other." 



18 

I now refer the reader to the three Sec- 
tions already mentioned, as found in the 
2d Vol. of Mr. Hume's " Essays ;" namely, 

*' Sceptical Doubts concerning the ope- 
" rations of the Understanding." 

" Sceptical Solutions of these Doubts ;" 
and, " Of the Idea of necessary Connexion." 

From these I have arranged some Ex- 
tracts that will enable us to observe that 
these doctrines are repeated there, with the 
addition of an application of them to the 
affairs of ordinary life, as affording a ground 
of scepticism concerning the powers of the 
understanding, in the regulation of its ex- 
pectations. 

That "Nature may be conceived to 
alter her course, without a contradiction," 
is the material proposition in both Essays ; 
used as an argument to prove, that it is 
" custom" only which forces the " imagi- 
nation" to fancy there is a " necessary 
connexion between Cause and Effect," with 



a liveliness, and vivacity of conception, 
equal to a firm belief founded an reason. 
In the Essays, the whole of these notions are 
supposed to derive their support from the 
argument, that as we have no knowledge, 
either a priori, or a posteriori, concerning 
the "secrets of Nature;" so our obser- 
vation of the action of a Cause, affords no 
ground for the conclusions of reason re- 
specting it. 



That the idea of causation is only de- 
rived from custom, becomes therefore the 
premises from which the conclusion is de- 
duced, that " beings can begin their exist- 
ences of themselves ;" which proposition, 
though not formally repeated in the Es- 
says (and which immediately renders void 
that for the necessity of a great first 
Cause, and " productive principle" of all 
things), must tacitly in these Essays be 
considered as well grounded, because, as 
every foundation whatever, for supposing 
any eause necessary for any effect, is denied, 
and only an influence of " custom on the 
imagination" is allowed as suggesting af 

c 2 



20 

"fancy of it*;" it necessarily follows, that 
nothing beyond what this influence suggests 
can be assigned as any reason why there 
should be any productive principle for all 
the contrivances and ends that take place 
in the universe ; it must therefore, I think, 
be understood that this " juvenile reason- 
ing'* was adopted, and acknowledged but 
too surely, in the latter Essays. 

.It *$nfJO'jq8 

The extracts from the " Essays" are in- 
tended to be a counter-part to those taken 
from the " Treatise/' which " show the 
argument Mr. Hume employs in favour of 
his own doctrine concerning the necessary 
connexion of Cause and Effect, and of the 
Belief reposed in it." As also the defini- 
tions of this relation, which the notions 
give rise to, and which, with a single ex- 
ception, will be observed to be little varied 
from the former ones. 

?> e^L'Ja'J^d .-i>f ll c j'ff 2" [<>'i > ! V< rfO') 

* Had ideas no more union in the fancy, than ob- 
jects seem to have to the understanding, we could never 
draw any inference from Causes to Effects, nor repose 
belief in any matter of fact. See Treatise on Human 
Nature, vol. i. part 3d, p. 134. 



21 

I begin the subject with those reasonings 
which are reckoned the support of the 
main argument, " Nature may be con- 
ceived to alter her course, without a con- 
tradiction." 

First. Says Mr. Hume*, " I shall 
" venture to affirm, as a general proposi- 
" tion, which admits of no exception, that 
" the knowledge of the relation of Cause 
" and Effect is not in any instance attained 
" a priori. Experience then is the founda- 
" tion of all our reasonings concerning that 
" relation." 



" And, as the first imagination of a par- 
" ticular Effect is arbitrary, where we con- 
" suit not experience; so must we also e#> 
" teem the supposed tie or connexion between 
" the Cause and Effect which binds them to- 
" gether, and renders it impossible that any 
" other Effect could result from the opera- 
" tion of that Cause f ." 
n/> -< ^ 

* Hume's Essays, Vol. 2, Part 1, Sect. 4th, p. 27, 
33, 37, &c. Part of Sect. 5. Sect. 7. 
f Ibid. p. 30. 

c3 



22 

Secondly, " After Experience of the 
" operations of Cause and Effect, our con- 
** elusions from that experience are not 
" founded on reasoning, or any process of 
" the understanding ; for Nature has kept 
" us at a great distance from all her secrets, 
" and has afforded us only the knowledge 
" of a few superficial qualities of objects, 
" while she conceals from us those powers 
" and principles on which the influence of 
'^ these objects entirely depends.** ! ' 



Thirdly. " But notwithstanding this 
" ignorance of natural powers and princi- 
" pies, we always presume, when we see 
" like sensible qualities, that they have 
" like secret powers, and expect that Ef- 
" fects similar to those we have experi- 
"** nced, will flow from them." " This is a 
" process of the mind or thought of which 
" I would willingly know the foundation ;" 
" but enumerating all the branches of 
^* human knowledge, I shall endeavour to 
" show that none of them can afford an 
" argument, whence reason may draw a 
" conclusion, that the future must iieces- 
" sarily resemble the past ; for all reason- 



23 

" ings may be divided into two kinds ; 
" namely, demonstrative reasoning, and 
" that concerning matter of fact and ex- 
" perience. That there are no demonstra- 
" tive arguments in the case seems evident, 
" since it implies no contradiction that the 
" course of nature may change; and that 
" an object seemingly like those we have 
" experienced may be attended with differ- 
" ent or contrary effects ;" for, 
",rr- ffjrvji 

" May I not clearly and distinctly con- 
" ceive that a body falling from the clouds, 
" and which in all other respects resembles 
" snow, may have the taste of salt, or feeling 
* * of fire. Is there any more intelligible pro- 
" position than to affirm, that all the trees 
" will flourish in December and January, 
" and decay in May and June?" " The 
" bread which I formerly ate nourished 
" me ; but does it follow that other bread 
" must also nourish me, &c. ?" 
' 

" From causes which appear similar we 
" expect similar effects this is the sum of 
" all our experimental conclusions but it 
" seems evident that if this conclusion 

c4 



24 

were formed by reason^ it would be as 
perfect at first, and upon one instance, 
as after ever so long a course of experi- 
ence ; but the case is far otherwise." 



" Nothing so like as eggs ; yet no one, 
" on account of this apparent similarity, 
" expects the same taste and relish in all 
" of them. Now, where is that process of 
" reasoning, which from one instance 
" draws a conclusion so different from that 
" which it infers from a hundred others ? 
" When a man says, I have found in all 
" past instances such sensible qualities 
" conjoined with such secret powers, and 
" when he says, similar sensible qualities 
" will always be attended with similar 
" secret powers, he is not guilty of a tau- 
" tology, nor are these propositions in any 
" respect the same. You say the one pro- 
" position is an inference from the other ; 
" but you must confess the inference is not 
" intuitive, nor yet is it demonstrative ; of 
" what nature is it then ?" 
to mjjtf ariJ at aMf~ &J f jefj f > -laiuciia iosqzs li 

" This principle is custom and habit : 
" for wherever the repetition of any parti- 



25 

" cular act produces a propensity to renew 
" the act, we always say this propensity is 
" the effect of custom. Custom is the 
" great guide of human life ; and when we 
" say, therefore, that one object is con- 
" nected with another, we mean only they 
" have acquired a connexion in our thoughts; 
" and our belief (in this necessary connex- 
" ion,) is nothing more than a conception 
" more intense and steady than attends the 
" fictions of the imagination ; and this 
" manner of conception arises from a cus- 
" tomary conjunction with something present 
" to the memory or the senses." 

The definition of the relation of Cause 
and Effect is much the same as in the 
" Treatise ;" it is this : 

" We may define a Cause to be an ob- 
" ject followed by another; and where all 
" the objects similar to the first are follow- 
" ed by objects similar to the second ; or, in 
" other words, where, if the first object 
" had not been, the second never had ex- 
" isted." 



26 

And again, he has a third definition : 
" The appearance of a cause always con- 
** : veys the mind by a customary transition 
'* to the idea of the effect. Of this also 
" we have experience ; we may therefore 
" form another definition of a cause, and 
" call it an object followed by another, 
" and whose appearance always conveys 
** the thought to that other." 



27 

. . '' ,. 

, : 

CHAPTER THE SECOND. 

-;i' ' 

HAVING now made an abstract of Mr. 
Hume's Treatise and Essays on the subject 
of the relation of Cause and Effect, I shall 
proceed to examine each part in as regular 
an order as I conveniently can ; and endea- 
vour to answer the two questions first pro- 
posed, in a more popular, and, I hope, not 
more illogical method than Mr. Hume has 
followed, by attempting to prove, 

FIRST, That reason, not fancy and 
" custom/' leads us to the knowledge, That 
every thing which begins to exist must have 
a Cause. SECONDLY, That reason forces 
the mind to perceive, that similar causes 
must necessarily produce similar effects. 
THIRDLY, I shall thence establish a more 
philosophical definition of the relation of 
Cause and Effect. FOURTHLY, show, in 
what respects Mr. Hume's definition is 
faulty. FIFTHLY, proceed to prove that 
Nature cannot be supposed to alter her 



28 

Course without a contradiction in terms ; 
and, finally, show, that Custom and Habit 
alone are not our guides; but chiefly rea- 
son, for the regulation of our expectations 
in ordinary life. 

$M\J;ir: r ifi* ito >"_ U 

After this, I shall endeavour to point 

out some material faults in Dr. Brown's 
reasoning, tending rather to support Mr. 
Hume's erroneous arguments, than to repel 
them : arguments which Mr. Lawrence 
avails himself of, in the Physiological Lec- 
tures, at present before the public ; which 
have drawn so much of its Notice ; and 
upon which I shall not consider it irrelevant 
to make a few remarks. 

SECTION THE FIRST. 

First, then, let me show, why Mr. Hume's 
argument, in favour of the possibility of 
beings commencing their own existence is 
sophistical ; as well as his attempted con- 
futation of those philosophers who have 
argued to the contrary. Mr. Hume says, 
the proposition, " that whatever has a be- 
ginning, has also a Cause of existence, 



29 

cannot be demonstrated, because the ideas 
of Cause and Effect are "distinct" and 
" separable;" and it will be easy to con- 
ceive " any object to be non-existent this 
minute/' and " existent the next;" with- 
out " conjoining to it the idea of a Cause, 
or a productive principle." " This imagi- 
nation is plausible, and may perhaps appear 
well founded until thoroughly sifted. On a 
first impression, Causes and their Effects 
may seem separable, because two things 
are mentioned ; one is distinct from the 
other, and may be imagined separated 
from it. 

TLey may also seem to follow one ano- 
ther, and time to elapse between the opera- 
tion of the Cause, and the appearance of the 
Effect ; so that during the interval of the 
supposed period, the effect might be ima- 
gined in suspense, and so indifferent to 
existence or non-existence; but upon a 
strict and rigid attention to the real nature 
of a thing in opposition to its accidental 
appearances, one cannot, for a moment, 
suppose that the circumstances here men- 
tioned, namely, of antecedency of Cause 



,30 

and subsequency of Effect ; or of that dis- 
tinctness of language which occasions two 
words to be used for two ideas ; should in 
any degree render it possible for causes 
and their effects to exist apart in nature. 
That it is impossible for them to do so, 
without involving a direct contradiction in 
terms, is a proposition I hope to prove in 
the course of this Essay. 

But before examining into this notion, 
concerning the possibility of effects being 
held in suspense, and then of being liable 
to begin their own existence, or, in Mr. 
Hume's words, " of the separation of the 
" idea of a cause from that of a begin- 
" ning of existence," it will be necessary 
to render the expressions in which it is 
conveyed more intelligible. This can in 
no way be done so long as the definition of 
the word effect presupposes a cause ; for 
the supposition of the objection lies, in 
its being possible for effects to be held in 
suspense : but in order that this should be 
possible, the meaning of the word effect 
must be altered. Then, if the ideas are 
altered that lie under the term, according 



31 

as the varied occasion seems to require, 
there can be no philosophy ; and it never 
can be insisted on, that the effects, which 
are supposed to be conjoined with their 
causes at one period of time ; and to re- 
quire, in order to their exhibition, those 
causes or others ; and to receive the name 
of effects, on account of requiring causes ; 
can again, upon another occasion, not be 
effects, not require causes, be held in sus- 
pense, and be imagined capable of begin- 
ning their existence by themselves, without 
conjoining to them the distinct idea of any 
" productive principle." It might as well 
be reckoned sound reasoning, after de- 
fining the figure 2 to be a sign signifying 
that two units are necessary to its compo- 
sition, to maintain, that because it stands 
singly, it can be imagined an unit itself, 
without a contradiction ; so that it does 
not stand in need of 2 units to its com- 
position : that is, a word may be taken 
in two contradictory senses, and then it 
may be reasonable to predicate of each, 
affections that belong only to the other ; 
and so to form any contradictory scheme 
in the world. To make, therefore, any 



32 

thing like a rational meaning in this sen- 
tence of Mr. Hume's, nothing more can be 
intended by it, than that we should ima- 
gine, those existences which we always 
observe conjoined with others in such a 
manner, that they appear to be their ef- 
fects, properties, or qualities, to owe them 
no real existence or dependence; and there- 
fore capable of being independent objects, 
and of beginning their own existence. In 
like manner, it may be said of causes, that 
although the word signifies something cal- 
culated to introduce a certain quality, yet 
that in fact it does not introduce a new 
quality; thus naming the object in one 
sense, and imagining its essence in another 
sense. 
pbii;l< .ti vKfif!, .f*K? tefl) 



This also is as though we should agree 
to designate each unit by the figure 1 ; and 
to assert, that the union of two units in- 
troduces a compound notion, which shall 
be made known by the sign 2 ; and on ac- 
count of this relation, the union of the 
units shall be called the cause of the com- 
pound quality two, under a single term ; 
and the sign 2 shall be named its effect; 



33 

and afterwards assert, that we can imagine 
the cause, that is the union of the two units, 
to exist without, and separate from, the 
effect, the result 2. All this cannot take 
place whilst we assign the same meaning 
to our words ; and if we use the terms in 
different senses, there can be no philoso- 
phy. Therefore, to make any meaning 
whatever of the proposition, " We may 
" imagine causes to exist separate from 
" their effects ;" the objects we call causes 
are not to be imagined as causes, but may 
be supposed not to cause any thing, but to 
exist without determining their own effects, 
or any others; that is, causes and their 
effects are so evidently distinct, that they 
may be imagined to be unconnected ob- 
jects, that are not causes and effects, and to 
exist separately without a contradiction, 
though they are named expressly as signs 
of the ideas we have, that they are neces- 
sary to one another. 

Thus, the original question, namely, 
."Whether every thing which begins to 
" exist requires a cause for its existence ?" 
resolves itself into two others ; viz. 

D 



34 

First, Whether objects called EFFECTS, ne- 
cessarily require causes for their existence ? 
or, whether they may begin to exist with, 
or without them indifferently ? As also, 

Secondly, Whether any objects what- 
ever, without being considered as having 
the nature of effects, can begin their ex- 
istences ? 

It may be plainly seen, that the first, of 
these questions is sunk in the latter, be- 
cause, if objects usually considered as ef- 
fects need not be considered as effects, then 
they are forced to begin their existences 
of themselves; for, conjoined or not to 
their causes, we know by our senses that 
they do begin to exist : we will, therefore, 
immediately hasten to the consideration of 
the second question, which may be stated 
in the following terms : Whether every ob- 
ject which begins to exist must owe its 
existence to a cause? 

Let the object which we suppose to be- 
gin its existence of itself be imagined, 
abstracted from the nature of all objects 



35 

we are acquainted with, saving in its ca- 
pacity for existence ; let us suppose it to 
be no effect; there shall be no prevening 
circumstances whatever that affect it, nor 
any existence in the universe : let it be so ; 
let there be nought but a blank; and 
a mass of whatsoever can be supposed not 
to require a cause START FORTH into exist- 
ence, and make the first breach on the 
wide nonentity around ; now, what is this 
starting forth, beginning, coming into ex- 
istence, but an action, which is a quality 
of an object not yet in being, and so not 
possible to have its qualities determined, 
nevertheless exhibiting its qualities ? 

If, indeed, it should be shown, that 
there is no proposition whatever taken as 
a ground on which to build an argument 
in this question, neither one conclusion 
nor the other can be supported ; and there 
need be no attempt at reasoning. But, if 
my adversary allows that, no existence be- 
ing supposed previously in the universe, 
existence, in order to be, must begin to be, 
and that the notion of beginning an action 
(the being that begins it not supposed yet 

D 2 



36 

in existence), involves a contradiction in 
terms; then this beginning to exist cannot 
appear but as a capacity some nature hath 
to alter the presupposed nonentity, and to 
act f6r itself, whilst itself is not in being. 
The original assumption may deny, as 
much as it pleases, all cause of existence; 
but, whilst in its veiy idea, the commence- 
ment of existence is an effect predicated 
of some supposed cause ', (^because the quality 
of an object which must be in existence to 
possess it,) we must conclude that there is no 
object which begins to exist, but must owe its 
existence to some cause. 

For this reason it is, that the answers 
to Dr. Clarke and Mr. Locke are unsound, 
in as far as they are an endeavour to show, 
that their arguments are altogether so- 
phistical. Mr. Hume objects to them, 
that the existence supposed to begin 
by itself, " is not to be considered 
as an effect; and that these authors as- 
sume what is not granted, viz. that the 
existence in question requires a cause;" 
as where Dr. Clarke shows it is an absur- 
dity to imagine an object its own cause, and 



37 

Mr. Locke asserts that it is equally so, to 
conceive of nothing as a cause. It is un- 
doubtedly true, that these authors assumed 
that which was in question ; namely, that 
every existence must have a cause : but, 
as every thing not yet in existence, to exist 
at all, must begin, and as the beginning of 
any thing must always be supposed, by the 
nature of the action, to be a quality of 
something in existence, which existence is 
yet DENIED by the statement of the ques- 
tion, these philosophers felt the involved 
absurdity so great, that they passed over 
the first question as too ridiculous, pro- 
bably, to consider formally ; then show- 
ed, that the mind of man was forced 
to look upon all things which begin to 
exist as dependent QUALITIES ; and thus, that 
an object could neither depend upon itself 
for existence, nor yet upon nothing. 

Let it be remembered, too, that al- 
though Mr. Hume inveighs against this 
method as sophistical, by conceiving it 
begs the question, yet his own argument, 
the whole way, consists in the possibility 
of imagining an effect " non- existent this 

D3 



38 

minute," and " existing the next;" and 
does not himself consider any other " sort of 
being" possible ; and has no other way of 
supporting his own notion of the begin- 
ning of existence by itself, except under 
the idea of an effect in suspense ; which is 
still a relative term, and begs the question 
for the necessity of its correlative, i. e. its 
cause, just as much as he asserts his ad- 
versaries do, whom he declares to be illo- 
gical reasoners. 

If then (as I hope I have shown) all 
objects whatever, which begin to exist, 
must owe their existence to some cause, those 
we usually consider as effects CANNOT be 
held in suspense ; suddenly alter their na- 
ture; be "non-existent this minute, and 
existent the next;" and, though always 
introduced as qualities of other objects, be 
easily separated from the ideas of their 
causes, and require no " productive prin- 
ciple." 

- . , . f T , . , .' -i ' 

" That Cause and Effect are distinct 
and separable ;" so " that any object may 
be conceived, as therefore capable of begin- 



39 

ning its own existence," must be considered 
as among the notions adopted in the Essays: 
what else is the meaning of such proposi- 
tions as these : " There appears not 
" throughout all nature, any one instance 
" of connection, as conceivable by us;" 
" one event follows another," "but we never 
can observe any tye betiveen them, &c.*" 
Indeed, the not admitting " any relations of 
ideas," or " any reasonings a priori," (so 
as to be capable of supporting the idea of 
CAUSATION as a creating principle absolutely 
necessary in the universe) is but repeating 
" the juvenile ideas" of the Treatise, and 
" casting them anew in these later pieces^ " 

Before I proceed further, I wish my 
reader to grant the proposition, " That a 
Being cannot begin its existence of itself;" 
because I mean to make use of it in iny 
further reply to Mr. Hume's doctrines; 
and, unless this step is allowed, I can 
make no further progress in this argument. 



* Essays, Sec. 7. p. 77. 

f See advertisement to the Essays. 



40 

SECTION THE SECOND. 

We will now proceed to the second 
part of the original inquiry ; that is, Why 
" we conclude that such particular Causes 
must necessarily have such particular Ef- 
fects ; and what is the nature of that in- 
ference we draw from one to the other, 
and of the belief we repose in it ? The 
question, however, ought to stand thus, 
" why LIKE CAUSES must necessarily have 
LIKE EFFECTS ? because what is really en- 
quired into, is the general notion of neces- 
sary connexion, between all like Cause and 
Effect; and by thus putting the question 
respecting particulars only, although they 
might be included in an universal answer, 
yet no answer applicable to them MERELY, 
could authorize an universal axiom. The 
manner of stating the enquiiy in the Essays, 
is also too vaguely expressed, (although it 
be evident that it is the general relation 
which is enquired into.) Mr. Hume says, 
" we will now enquire, how we arrive at the 
knowledge of Cause and Effect*:' It ought 
to be stated, how we arrive at the knowledge 
of the necessary connexion, between like 
Cause and Effect ? 

* Essays, Sec. 4. p. 27. 



41 

Let it be remembered, that Mr. Hume 
says, " this principle is nothing but custom 
and habit;" that " belief in necessary 
" connexion is nothing but an intense 
" and steady conception, arising from 
" the customary conjunction of the ob- 
" ject with something present to the me- 
" mory or senses ; that when flame and 
" heat, cold and snow, have always been 
" conjoined together, there is such a cus- 
" tomary conjunction between them, that 
" when flame and snow are anew present - 
" ed to the senses, the mind is carried by 
" custom to expect heat and cold." 

" That reason can never show us the 
" connexion of one object with another, 
" though aided by experience ; for we can 
" at least conceive a change in the course 
" of nature. That necessary connexion is 
" nothing but an internal act of the mind, 
" determined to carry its thoughts from 
" one object to another." Thus necessary 
connexion of cause and effect is only a 
custom of the mind ! Power is only a cus- 
tom of the mind! Expectations, and ex- 
perience, are only customs of the mind ! 



42 

The consequence of which doctrine is, that 
as a custom of the mind is entirely a dif- 
ferent circumstance from the operation of 
nature, we may "conceive" at least the 
contrary of what we have been accustomed 
to may take place, we may conceive the 
" course of nature to change." 

Now it is my intention to shew, in con- 
tradiction to these ideas of Mr. Hume, that 
it is Reason, and not Custom, which guides 
our minds in forming the notions of neces- 
sary connexion, of belief and of expectation*. 

* I conceive it impossible to have a complete con- 
viction that every Effect is inherent, or contained in its 
Cause, until the mind be imbued with the knowledge, 
that objects are but unknown circumstances in Nature, 
when unperceived by the senses ; which when perceived, 
exhibit their appropriate qualities accordingly ; and which 
then appear in certain defined masses, as to the different 
senses they affect, as to their figure, &c. ; and receive an 
arbitrary name for their assemblage. They must have 
also among each other certain proportions. When these 
unknown circumstances, (or affections, or substances,) in 
nature, mix, and are thereby altered, the qualities which 
affect tlw senses are in the same proportions altered, and 
are necessarily included in those objects as their Effects. 
But this part of the subject, is of such moment that a se- 
parate consideration of it is intended. 



43 

In order to this let us bear in mind the 
reasoning already adduced in the foregoing 
Chapter, and it thence immediately follows, 
that objects which we know by our senses 
do begin their existences, and by our rea- 
son know they cannot begin it of them- 
selves, must begin it by the operation of 
some other beings in existence, producing 
these new qualities in nature, and introduc- 
ing them to our observation. The very 
meaning of the word Cause, is Producer 
or Creator; of Effect, the Produced or Cre- 
ated and the idea is gained by such an ob- 
servance of nature, as we think is efficient 
in any given case, to an experimentum crucis. 

Long observation of the invariableness 
of antecedency, and subsequency, is. not 
wanted; many trials are not wanted, to 
generate the notion of producing power. 

One trial is enough, in such circum- 
stances, as will bring the mind to the fol- 
lowing reasoning. 

Here is a new quality, which appears 
to my senses : 



44 

But it could not arise of itself; nor 
could any surrounding objects, but one (pi- 
more) aifect it; therefore that one, (or 
more) have occasioned it, for there is no- 
thing else to make a difference; and a 
difference could not " begin of itself." 

This is an argument, which all persons, 
however illiterate, feel the force of. It is 
the only foundation for the demonstrations 
of the laboratory of the chymist ; which all 
life resembles, and so closely, in many in- 
stances, that the philosopher, and the vul- 
gar, are equally sure of what cause is 
absolutely necessary to the production of 
certain effects; for instance, each knows that 
in certain giyen circumstances, the closing of 
the Eye will eclipse the prospect, of nature ; 
and the slight motion of reopening it, 
will restore all the objects to view. There- 
fore, the Eye (in these circumstances,) 
is the Cause or Producer of vision. ONE 
trial would be enough, under certain known 
circumstances*. Why ? not from " custom" 

f When more trials are needed than ONE, it is in order 
to detect the circumstances, not to lay a foundation for the 
general principle, that a LIKE Cause repeated, a LIK* 
Effect will take place. 



because there has been one trial only.; 
but from Reason, because vision not being 
able to produce itself, nor any of the sur- 
rounding objects by the supposition ; it is the 
Eye which must necessarily perform the 
operation; for there is nothing else to make 
a difference ; and a different quality could 
not " begin its own existence' 3 It is this 

SOrt Of REASONING UPON EXPERIMENT, which 

takes place in every man's mind, concern- 
ing every affair in life, which generates the 
notion of Power, and necessary Connexion ; 
and gives birth to that maxim, " a like 
Cause must produce a like Effect" The 
circumstances being supposed the same on 
a second occasion as on a former one, and 
carefully observed to be so ; the Eye when 
opened would be expected to let in light, 
and all her objects. " I observe (says the 
" mind) in this or any other case, all the 
" prevening circumstances the same as be- 
" fore ; for there is nothing to make a dif- 
" ference ; and a difference cannot arise 
" without something to occasion it ; else 
" there would be a beginning of existence 
" by itself, which is impossible." 



46 

It is this compound idea, therefore, the 
result of the experience of what does take 
place upon any given trial, MIXED with the 
reasoning that nothing else could ensue, un- 
less on the one hand, efficient causes were 
allowed for the alteration ; or, on the other, 
that things could " alter their existences FOR 
THEMSELVES ;" which generates the notion 
of power or " producing principle," and for 
which we have formed the word. 

It is in vain to say that a habit of asso- 
ciation of ideas from observing " contiguity 
in time, and place," between objects is all 
we know of power ; a habit of the mind 
will not begin existence, will not introduce 
a quality. The really philosophical method 
of viewing the subject is this : that objects 
in relation to us, are nothing but masses 
of certain qualities, affecting certain of our 
senses; and which, when independent of 
our senses, are unknown powers or qua- 
lities in nature. These masses change 
their qualities by their mixture with any 
other mass, and then the corresponding 
qualities determined to the senses must 
of course also change. These changed 



47 

qualities, are termed effects; or conse- 
quents ; but are really no more than NEW 
QUALITIES arising from new objects, which 
have been formed by the junctions of other 
objects (previously formed) or might be con- 
sidered as the unobserved qualities of exist- 
ing objects ; which shall be observed when 
properly exhibited. 

If then an existence now in being, con- 
joined with any other, forms thereby a new 
nature, capable of exhibiting new qualities, 
these new qualities must enter into the de- 
finition of the objects ; they become a part 
of their natures ; and when by careful ex- 
periment, or judicious observation, no new 
prevening circumstances are supposed to 
make an alteration in the conjunction of 
the same bodies, the new qualities, that are 
named effects, are expected without a doubt 
to arise upon every such conjunction ; be- 
cause, they as much belong to this newly 
combined nature, as the original qualities 
did to each separate nature, before their 
conjunction. So little is custom the prin- 
ciple of cause and effect, that if upon the 
first and original trial of the element of fire, 



48 

all surrounding circumstances were put 
away from having any influence over it, 
saving the body it destroyed ; that power 
of discerptibility would be ever after con- 
sidered as one of its qualities ; as much as 
its colour or its light, or its warmth, without 
the presence of which, it would not be 
fire. 

This conjunction with a grosser material 
than itself, is the new circumstance, on 
which it exhibits its essential and perma- 
nent quality of discerptibility to the senses ; 
now if the trial be complete, when upon a 
second occasion an object having the same 
sensible qualities as fire hath, known 
also to have been elicited from the same 
prevening circumstances, meets with the 
same gross body as heretofore, it must of 
necessity consume it. There is nothing to 
make a difference. A difference is an Effect, 
a change of being, an altered existence, an 
existence which cannot " begin of itself 
any more than any other in Nature ; could 
the fire be supposed not to consume the 
gross body, there would be a difference of 
qualities, that is, new qualities, which by 



49 

the data there is no cause for. The origi- 
nal circumstances, of which fire is the 
compound Effect, from which it results as 
a formed object, are supposed to be ordered 
the same as on a former occasion ; these 
are necessarily compelled to be attended 
with the same effects or combined qualities ; 
otherwise there would be the " beginnings 
of existence" by themselves, which has be- 
fore been shown to be impossible. But 
the combined qualities, are the whole quali- 
ties that fire in every circumstance, is capa- 
ble of producing. Meeting, therefore, with 
a gross body, which on any one occasion, 
in certain circumstances, it once consumed ; 
under the same circumstances, it must ne- 
cessarily again consume it. That DIFFER- 
ENCES OF EXISTENCE cannot begin of them- 
selves ; is therefore the second conclusion 
supposed to be established. 

" Antecedency and subsequency" are 
therefore immaterial to the proper de- 
finition of Cause and Effect;" on the 
contrary, although an object, in order to 
act as a Cause, must be in Being ante- 
cedently to such action; yet when it 

E 



60 

acts as a Cause, its Effects are synchronous 
with that action, and are included in it; 
which a close inspection into the nature of 
cause will prove. For effects are no more 
than the new qualities, of newly formed 
objects. Each conjunction of bodies, (now 
separately in existence, and of certain de- 
fined qualities,) produces upon their union 
those new natures, whose qualities must 
necessarily be in, and with them, in the 
very moment of their formation. 



Thus the union of two distinct natures, is 
the cause, producer or creator of another ; 
which must instantly, and immediately, have 
all its peculiar qualities ; but the cause has 
not acted, is not completed, till the union 
has taken place, and the new nature is 
formed with all its qualities, in, and about it. 
Came producing Effect, therefore, under 
the strict eye of philosophical scrutiny, is 
a new object exhibiting new qualities; or 
shortly, the formation of a new mass of 
qualities. A cliain of conjunctions of bodies, 
of course, occupies time; and is the rea- 
son why the careless observation of phi- 
losophers, enabling them to take notice 



51 

only of some one distinct effect, (after per- 
haps innumerable successive conjunctions 
of bodies,) occasions the mistake, by which 
they consider subsequency of effect, as a part 
of the essential definition of that- term ; and 
priority, as essential to the nature of Cause. 

As a short illustration of the doctrine 
unfolded, let us take the idea of nourish- 
ment, considered as the effect, subsequent 
to the taking of food, its cause. Here the 
nature of nourishment, is a process which 
begins to act immediately that food is in 
conjunction with the stomach. " That we 
are nourished;" is only the last result of a 
continuous chain of causes and effects, in 
formation from the first moment the food 
enters the stomach, to that, in which every 
particle is absorbed and deposited in the 
proper place in the body. Here, the capa- 
city of food to exhibit certain qualities, 
when in conjunction with the body, is 
shown ; the nature of the human body, to 
exhibit certain other qualities, in conse- 
quence of that conjunction, is also shown ; 
but the effect of nourishment, being subse- 
quent to, and at such a distance of time 

E 2 



52 

from, the original Cause, is only so, on 
account of its being the effect of a vast 
number of causes, or unions of objects in 
succession, of which the union of the sto- 
mach and the food was first in order. 
.settaOlo' siu-Rn ydt ol NVAV-V.V/WI w ^\\mix\ 

Our deficient observation, is apt to pre- 
vent our taking notice of the 2d, 3d, or 
indefinite number of effects ; which arise in 
consequence of as many conjunctions of 
objects. 
rf )nw v? .; ifihfarffroff V> vwVwv 

But the first, and other effects succes- 
sively, are as much and entirely synchron- 
ous with their causes, as any other quality 
of any single object, which is always exhi- 
bited along with it. 

2dly. It is also quite immaterial to the 
definition of this relation, whether an un- 
tried, or unobserved quality, be called 
quality, or effect. The unknown or at pre- 
sent undetermined quality, which is termed 
an effect, might always change its place 
with some known quality, and not bear 
the name of effect ; and vice versa : Thus, 
a blind man may call the object which 



53 

warmed, or burned him, fire ; but his eyes 
being supposed suddenly to open, he would 
consider the flame and its brilliant colour 
as the effects of fire ; whilst he who sees 
fire constantly, being able always to take 
notice of its flame and colour, considers 
them as the constant and unvarying quali- 
ties of fire, and which render the substance 
before him worthy of bearing that name ; 
but the quality of burning, which he does 
not constantly experience, he names an 
effect or consequence of fire previously being 
in existence. But the true method of look- 
ing upon the subject is this that fire, in 
order to deserve the name it bears, must 
comprehend all its qualities tried and un- 
tried ; observed and unobserved; determined 
and undetermined; it deserves the name 
only on account of its being a certain de- 
fined object; elicited from certain causes 
observed to be efficient to its production; and 
by the very conditions of the question, is al- 
lowed to be the same. But an object 
is nothing else (in relation to MS,) than a 
mass of peculiar qualities ; and when obser- 
vations inform us, that any known mass is 
produced by similar circumstances, on 

E 3 



54 

various occasions; such mass or object must 
necessarily contain all its qualities, and be 
equal to exhibit all its effects in hitherto 
untried events. Upon any occasion where 
we are either certain, or have a high pro- 
bability, that an object presented to us is 
truly similar to a former one, and was 
created by the same causes ; we expect all 
tried qualities to be the same as before, and 
any untried quality, (that is, any quality not 
in present operation, though previously 
ascertained,) must belong ever after to its 
definition. All that is necessary is to be 
correct, as to the prevening or influencing 
circumstances which gave birth to the ob- 
ject. They being the same on any two or 
more occasions, the object elicited must 
necessarily be the same but it is not the 
same, unless it hath all its qualities, and no 
other than its qualities. Therefore fire, in 
order to have a right to the sign of the 
word fire, for an expression of its attributes, 
in order to be a " like cause," must of 
necessity burn as much as it must be red, 
otherwise the red object were not fire ; and 
could not have been produced by those 
causes that elicit that element. I mean 



55 

therefore to conclude, that Effects are but 
the qualities of an object not experienced 
by some of the senses of the human frame, 
whilst certain others at present touch it ; 
the knowledge of which last, being joined 
to the observation of the WHENCE the object 
was produced, beget the knowledge of 
what new untried qualities may be expect- 
ed in future under given circumstances. It 
becomes therefore part of the definition of 
fire to burn certain bodies, to melt others ; 
of bread to nourish the human body; of 
snow to be cold, and white ; and these qua- 
lities they must have, in order to compose 
that entire enumeration of qualities, for 
which appropriate names have been formed, 
and to the exhibition of which similar and 
efficient causes have been in action. 

If it should be said, that in considering 
objects as masses of combined qualities, the 
result of like Causes previously in action, 
we beg the question not yet supposed 
to be granted, I answer ; that like Causes, 
that is, like objects, are by the supposi- 
tion admitted, and then the question 
arises, whether it is demonstrable they 

E 4 



56 

must have like effects or qualities, under 
like circumstances in future? I answer, 
they must have like effects, or qualities, be- 
cause there is nothing else given that can be 
supposed to make a difference ; and a differ- 
ence of qualities could not arise of itself, 
could not begin its own existence ; and I 
add, not only, there is nothing else sup- 
posed that can make a difference ; but that 
when we also know that in the FORMATION 
of any object no difference took place ; 
then, there is no ground whatever, for 
imagining the possibility of an alteration 
in the effects of that object. But although 
it be very difficult in the analysis of this 
question, not to use the word cause in its 
intended sense, before the definition of the 
word is given, and although it be true that 
in this last observation I may have done so 
in saying, that objects must be the same which 
are elicited from like causes, i.e. from the junc- 
tion of like prevening circumstances-, (and 
which position will be fully borne out in the 
process of the argument;) yet a fastidious 
reader may omit every such reference to the 
notion of Cause ; for the argument is per- 
fect without it, and stands thus : 



57 

Effects are nothing but those same con- 
junctions of qualities, which in other words 
are admitted as similar causes, in the sup- 
position of the question. The objects 
Cwhose union is necessary to a given result,) 
must certainly exist, antecedent to such an 
union. But it is in their UNION, there exists 
those newly formed objects, or masses of 
qualities called Effects, which are therefore 
identical with the similar cause; for in this 
union, Cause and Effect are synchronous, and 
they are but different words for the same 
Essence. Fire and wood must be antece- 
dent to combustion, no doubt ; but in the 
union of Fire and Wood, there exists imme- 
diately combustion as a new event in na- 
ture; also in this union exists the similar 
cause allowed by the data, whilst combus- 
tion is also termed the Effect of the union 
of Fire and Wood ; but, however termed, an 
effect, is in fact a new but similar ob- 
ject as heretofore. A similar mass of qua- 
lities, in kind, which cannot therefore be a 
different mass of qualities in kind. Equals 
added to equals upon any two occasions, 
the whole must be equal ; add equal quali- 
ties to equal qualities, the sum of the quali- 
4 



58 

ties must be equal upon every repetition 
of the junction ; and the sum must be the 
same result taken twice over, not two differ- 
ent, or possibly altered sums. Therefore I 
repeat, that in the consideration of the 
nature of Cause and Effect, it is immaterial 
whether the yet unframed qualities of ob- 
jects, previous to their junction, be named 
effects; they are to be considered as quali- 
ties ; and qualities may be considered as 
effects , under any circumstances that prevent 
their usual exhibition. Effects when deve- 
loped are no more than qualities ; and qua- 
lities previous to their developement are in 
our imagination considered as Effects. 

3dly. Again, it is immaterial to the defini- 
tion of the relation of Cause and Effect, that 
we are not acquainted with the " secret pow- 
ers" of natural objects, either before or after 
experience ; for when we find, that in any 
distinct and given circumstances they put on 
certain qualities to the senses, their secret 
powers and properties must be qualified in 
all like circumstances to be the same, and 
are obliged to be so ; because no contrary 
qualities could " begin their existences of 



59 

themselves;" and by the supposition there 
is no cause in the circumstances, to give rise 
to any differences in the qualities. Indeed, 
Mr. Hume makes a great mistake in sup- 
posing it necessary to demonstrate, in every 
particular instance, what particular Effect 
must necessarily flow from its object, in 
order to gain the idea of necessary Connex- 
ion. The how and the why have nothing to 
do with the general reasoning affecting the 
general proposition; for "whether like 
Causes shall produce like Effects" is not a 
question exactly the same as whether 
" such particular causes shall have such 
particular effects ? which Mr. Hume seeins 
to consider as precisely of the same import*; 
whereas one is a general question, which 
however answered, in the affirmative or ne- 
gative, would apply to particulars. But sup- 
posing in each particular instance under our 
notice, we could descry the " secret powers 
of nature " the general question concerning 
all like causes would still remain unan- 
swered ; and an universal conclusion could 
not logically be deduced from the particular 

* Compare Sec. 4. p. 30, with Sec. 4. p. 34. 



ro 

premises concerning it: as will be more 
fully argued in the discussion upon Dr. 
Brown's reasoning. 

If it should be asked, (as Mr. Hume 
presently does,) how is it known when ob- 
jects are similar upon any two occasions ; 
the "sensible qualities may be the same, and 
not the secret powers, upon which the Ef- 
fects depend ?' ' I answer, this is to shift the 
question from the examination of like Causes 
supposed, to the consideration of the method 
whereby their presence may be detected*. 
But this difficulty is met, and considered in, 
its proper place ; I shall only here say, that 
as the secret powers are the real external 
unknown Causes in Nature, which deter- 
mine the sensible qualities, as well as every 
other Effect ; so when we find the sensible 
qualities the same on any two occasions, 



* I should notJiere have taken notice of this objection, 
but that as Mr. Hume does suddenly shift the question, 
so I would not appear to avoid an answer to it : otherwise it 
is something too early to enter upon the subject ; obliging 
me to make use of my argument previously to its complete 
developement. But the reader may pass over to the next 
Section if he please. 



we are sure the secret powers are similar 
thus far, and therefore fitted to exhibit their 
further similar effects; (or combined secret 
powers and sensible qualities ;_) and although 
some unobserved cause might creep in to 
alter the object, whilst appearing the same, 
yet this we do not imagine when we are 
not aware of it, especially in cases where 
the same sensible qualities have been re- 
gularly exhibited along with like secret 
powers ; for this regularity is perceived as 
an Effect, for which there must be a pro- 
portional Cause, and begets a proportional 
belief accordingly. We argue from the re- 
gular Effects, (the sensible qualities;) to 
the regular Causes, (the secret powers -,) 
which having been equal to certain other 
Effects or properties, we expect again the 
same, under similar circumstances. We 
argue from the regular ends nature keeps 
in view, up to nature's God, who ordained 
them, and who must be supposed still to 
continue true to those ends ; and along with 
the grander operations of nature, we may 
often in many cases observe our own ac- 
tions, and those of others, conspiring only to 
fashion similar objects. But when the secret 



62 

powers, and sensible qualities, are known, or 
supposed the same, the conclusion is demon- 
strative ; so must be the Effects. Whilst, 
were it possible to know the secret powers 
in each particular past instance, universal 
truth would not thence result. Neither has 
Mr. Hume any right to make this argument ; 
because to conceive " there may be secret 
" powers which may change the Effects, 
" dependent on them," is to make use of 
the relation between Cause and Effect, as 
of a really necessary connexion, in order to 
oppose his adversary : a principle which he 
previously refuses to admit. Also the ob- 
jection forms an illogical argument in ano- 
ther way. For it virtually draws a general 
conclusion from two negative premises. To 
assert, that like sensible qualities merely, 
will NOT produce like Effects ; and, that like 
sensible qualities are NOT like Causes, is to 
separate the middle term both from the sub- 
ject and from the predicate of the general 
question. By such an argument Mr. Hume 
is certainly right in supposing, that REASON 
cannot support " our conclusions concern- 
" ing the operations of Cause and Effect" 



63 

Having thus cleared a way, towards the 
comprehension of this relation of Cause and 
Effect, we will proceed to a definition of 
those terms in the next Section. 

SECTION THE THIRD. 

A Cause, therefore, is such action of an 
object, as shall enable it, in conjunction 
with another, to form a new nature, capa- 
ble of exhibiting qualities varying from 
those of either of the objects unconjoined. 
This is really to be a producer of new be* 
ing. This is a generation, or creation, of 
qualities not conceived of, antecedently to 
their existence ; and not merely an " idea 
always followed by another," on account of 
a " customary association between them." 

An Effect is the produced quality exhi- 
bited to the senses, as the essential pro- 
perty of natures so conjoined. Necessary 
connexion of cause and effect is the obli- 
gation qualities have to inhere in their 
objects, and to exhibit their varieties ac- 
cording to the different human senses with 
which they come in contact. Power is but 
another word for efficient cause, or " pro- 



64 

ductive principle;" and signifies the pro- 
perty which lies in the secret nature of 
objects, when unobserved by the senses, 
and which determines the qualities that 
can be exhibited to them upon every new 
conjunction. An object may be defined, a 
combined mass of qualities ; the result of 
proportional unknown circumstances in na- 
ture, meeting with the human senses. 

But Mr. Hume's three definitions of the 
relation of Cause and Effect are, in many 
respects, faulty, and not borne out by his 
own arguments ; for he defines a Cause 
" an object followed by another, and where 
" all the objects similar to the first are fol- 
" lowed by objects similar to the second." 
Now, if he means an object that will in 
future, as in past times, be always follow- 
ed by another; an invariable necessity in 
the antecedent to be followed by its subse- 
quent, his whole argument tends to prove 
the contrary, and to show that experience 
has power to answer for the past only, and 
cannot for the future ; for, that we may 
conceive a " change in the course of na- 
ture," and that imagination supplies only 



65 

the notion of invariable expectation from 
" custom ;" that this is the sense of the 
passage containing the original defini- 
tion, we may be sure of, from what fol- 
lows; for he goes on to say, " or in other 
" words, where if the first object had not 
" been, the second never had existed;" but 
this idea expresses a much stricter necessity 
of connexion than does the relation of any 
number of objects, which had only followed 
each other in past time, however often 
their antecedency and subsequency had 
been repeated. Such a necessity is con- 
tradicted the whole way by the argument. 
It is quite another sentiment, from that 
which arises from the ideas of always be- 
fore and after. That which requires an- 
other object to its existence, must be ne- 
cessarily connected with it ; and I contend 
that it is so connected, as a new quality of 
an altered mode of existence. But Mr. 
Hume says, it is only connected, as an in- 
variable subsequent, must always be under- 
stood to require its invariable antecedent. 
But I retort, Why does the definition 
assume more than the argument can pos- 
sibly bear out ? 

F 



66 

How can the invariableness of the fu- 
ture be answered for by the experience of 
any invariableness in the past ? It is truly 
impossible that it should be so. Custom 
can only, at the most, lead us to expect 
that the future would be similar to the 
past ; but it never could so sufficiently an- 
swer for it, as to enable us to form a defi- 
nition concerning its absolute INVARIABLE- 
NESS of phenomenon. 

Indeed, in many cases there are single 
exceptions to universal experience, and to 
any habit of expectation founded on it ; 
which at once proves Mr. Hume's defini- 
tion to be erroneous ; for hence the invaria- 
bleness of the sequence becomes altered, and 
custom shown to be utterly incapable of af- 
fording an universal definition, of the rela- 
tion in question. Now, experiment is what 
decides as to a real and necessary cause, 
under given circumstances. When an event 
happens under one set of circumstances, 
not under another in all respects the same, 
save ONE ; that one is a true cause, and a 
necessary one ; and under the same circum- 
stances, it must be invariably wanted to 



67 

that end ; and every mind feels it so, be* 
cause it perceives that an alteration could 
not begin of itself. This, and nothing but 
this, is a strict necessity, and can enable the 
mind to predicate for the future as for the 
past. 

But the first definition is also faulty in 
another instance ; because in every just 
definition, the ideas that are included 
hi the terms, must not suit any other 
object. Now many objects are invariably 
antecedents and subsequents, that are not 
Causes and Effects ; and it can be no good 
definition, to warrant the arguing in a circle, 
which this definition evidently does. 

The second definition is also erroneous, 
because although similar causes must have 
similar eifects, yet diverse causes may 
produce the same effects also therefore 
the second object might exist without the 
first, by the operation of any other cause 
efficient to it*. The third definition, viz. 

* I make this remark however, rather with respect to 
Mr. Hume's notion of Cause than my own ; in order to 

F2 



68 

" an object followed by another, and whose 
" appearance always conveys the thought 
" to that other," does not differ materially 
from the first yet it is worthy of observa- 
tion, that the thought always being carried 
by the appearance of one object to the idea 
of another, proves nothing but an acciden- 
tal^ though strong association of ideas ; and 
is in like manner objectionable, on account 
of suiting other objects than the thing defined. 
Eveiy Andrew is not necessarily " Simon 
Peter's Brother," although my thought 
always recurs to that idea, upon every men- 
tion of the name of Andrew. 

SECTION THE FOURTH. 

It follows then from the definitions 
given in the preceding section, and the 
reasonings on which they are formed, that 
were a body, in all other respects resembling 
snow, to have the taste of salt and feeling of 
fire, it would be an extraordinary phoenome- 
non, no doubt ; and one which might for 

shew there is an inconsistency between his argument and 
his definition ; for diverse antecedents might invariably be 
followed by similar subsequents; then, in each separate 
case the second object might exist without the first. 



69 

ought we know take place, but it would not 
be snow; and such a body could not fall from 
the clouds but by new causes efficient to 
its formation ; it would, therefore, be en- 
tirely a different object, and would require 
a new name ; and the phoenomenon could 
offer no ground for the conclusion, that 
reason does not afford an argument, for the 
expectation of similar effects from similar 
causes. 

Nature, it is true, varies all her opera- 
tions ; but not in a manner that can ever 
make it appear otherwise than a contradic- 
tion to reason, that it should be through 
interferences with her regular course. For 
instance, something similar to the case 
imagined does take place ; we all know 
that various substances fall from the clouds ; 
but they are all named by various names 
accordingly ; they are known by reason to 
be different masses of qualities , different ob- 
jects, which must have been produced by 
different circumstances. Such variety, 
therefore, offers no contradiction to our REA- 
SON, our EXPECTATIONS, or our TERMS. Yet 



70 

Mr. Hume seems to think that nature, with- 
out a contradiction to our ideas, may be 
supposed to alter her course in the determi- 
nation of her qualities ; and occasion con- 
trary and different qualities, from otherwise 
similar objects. Nature, no doubt, pre- 
serving in many objects certain appear- 
ances to some of the senses, may vary the 
remaining qualities. 

But this cannot be, without her using 
prevening causes of an altered kind, effi- 
cient to the new production ; and then it is 
a new object and must be newly named. 
Such events as these, which are nothing 
else than all the various events, in the uni- 
verse, (for all things are alike to some of 
the senses, and diverse in others;) na- 
ture is full of; but this does not prove, 
there is not a necessary connexion between 
CAUSE AND EFFECT; and that custom only 
guides our expectations. On the contrary, 
it is because there can be no " beginnings 
of existences" by themselves, that we know, 
when new phenomena arise, from apparently 
similar circumstances, that we must lie 



71 

under a mistake ; and that the new objects 
cannot be the same objects altered, and eli- 
cited from similar circumstances. We 
might as well deem meteoric stones to be 
snow, as a body, which had the taste of salt 
and the feeling of fire. Nature, therefore, 
cannot, when employing like causes in ac- 
tion, alter her course in determining differ- 
ent and contrary " Effects" from otherwise 
similar objects ; because in such a case, 
these new qualities would absolutely be un- 
caused ; different qualities would be exhi- 
bited from precisely similar conjunctions of 
bodies, i. e. different and contrary qualities, 
(or Effects) from otherwise similar objects, 
(or Causes) which is impossible. 

Should it be said that nature is sup- 
posed to be employing different causes in 
action ; by altering the " secret powers" 
(whilst the " sensible qualities" remain the 
same,) that it is in this way she changes 
her course then the prevening conjunctions 
of bodies which produced these secret 
powers, being supposed different ; the na- 
tures of the objects are different ; they are 
truly other objects, and there is no astonish - 

F4 



7*2 

ment at the production of their altered Ef- 
fects ; there is no alteration in the course 
of nature ; and the Phenomena will not 
support Mr. Hume's argument against REA- 
SON, and in favour of CUSTOM only ; it fol- 
lows, therefore, that if "we imagine the 
course of nature may change," it must be 
under the notion of a cause equivalent to it; 
in which case there is no contradiction offered 
to the notion of causation as founded on REA- 
SON. But for nature otherwise to change, and 
to vary either her " Effects," or " Secret 
powers" without varying the causes or pre- 
vening circumstances whose junction form- 
ed the objects, whence these result; is so 
obviously impossible, that we cannot even 
suppose the will and power of the Deity 
to be able to work the contradiction. He 
could not make a finite quality, depen- 
dent upon himself or some other cause 
for its exhibition, to become independent. 
and able to exist of itself; he could not 
otherwise than by himself altering the de- 
termination of the causes that form the 
objects ; then there is a cause for the al- 
leged change the objects are not simi- 
lar objects; the whole pi-evening circum- 



73 

stances are. not the same ; and it is only 
unlike causes again that beget unlike ef- 
fects; unlike objects that vary in their qua- 
lities. 

But the following sentence*, which con- 
tains the passage alluded to, involves 
an ambiguity of expression, which ought 
to be noticed, lest it should appear as 
though I had mistaken it, and conse- 
quently my answer not appear sufficiently 
applicable, viz. " Nature maybe supposed 
" to change her course since it implies no 
" contradiction, that an object SEEMINGLY 
" like those which we have experienced, 
" may be attended with different or con- 
" trary Effects." There is here an ambi- 
guity of sense on account of the expression 
" SEEMINGLY;" for it may either intend, an 
alteration in the determination of Effects 
from objects, in ALL OTHER respects similar, 
save in these CONTRARY effects ; or an " ARBI- 
TRARY" change in the " secret powers" "which 
" mix with the sensible qualities; and on which 
" the effects entirely depend" in either sense, 
such an arbitrary change in the course of 

* * Sec. 4. p. 36. 



74 

nature, is a " CONTRADICTION TO REASON" 
and an IMPOSSIBILITY. 

Mr. Hume however seems to use it in 
either of these senses, as the occasion 
serves, and without conceiving there is 
much difference between them. 

The former sense however appears to 
be that in which it is used, as applicable in 
the instance concerning the changes upon 
snow. Compare these passages*, " may I not 
" distinctly conceive, a body in all other 
" respects resembling snow having the taste 
" of salt, and feeling of fire," withf , 
" Every Effect is a distinct event from 
" its Cause ; and ever after it is suggest- 
" ed, its conjunction must appear arbi- 
" trary with its Cause, since there are 
" always many other effects, which to rea- 
" son might seem fully as consistent and 
" natural." But it is in the latter sense, 
viz. : in the " arbitrary" alteration of the 
" secret powers," (in order to form DIFFERENT 

* Essays, Vol. 2. Sec. 4. p. 36. 
f Ibid. p. 30. 



75 

Causes for the determination of DIFFERENT 
Effects}, which must explain the following 
passage*: " Let the course of nature be 
" allowed hitherto ever so regular proves 
" not that for the future it will continue 
" so." " The secret nature of objects, 
" and consequently all their effects and 
" influences, may change without any 
" change in the sensible qualities ;" In 
either of the senses in which Mr. Hume 
uses the notion in question, it is equally 
absurd ; for as Cause is not by him granted, 
nature must be supposed to change her 
regular march uncaused; whether in striking 
off different and contrary qualities, from 
objects in every other respect similar, save 
in these arbitrary and contrary determina- 
tions ; or in the mixing different secret 
powers amidst the sensible qualities. Nor 
will it answer for Mr. Hume to shift his 
position, and say; that the " secret powers" 
may be considered, as changed by the re- 
gular operations of nature ; and that, on 

account of our inability to detect them, 



* Ibid. p. 39. The method in which this idea beg& 
the question, has been taken notice of before. 



76 

we are necessarily obliged to consider, the 
sensible qualities ONLY, as like Causes ; 
thereby concluding the Effects will be si- 
milar upon insufficient grounds; and thus 
REASON, not able to support the idea of a 
really necessary connexion between them. 

For upon this supposition, the real re- 
lation of Cause and Effect, is assumed as 
granted 

1st. In order to account for the change 
in the secret powers. 

2dly. To account for the change in the 
effects dependent upon them. 

And this is at once yielding the whole 
argument to the adversary *! enabling him 
justly to retort, that he makes use of the 

* This sort of argument forms a sophism which logi- 
cians term " ignoratio elenchi ;" " something being proved 
" which is not necessarily inconsistent with the proposi- 
" tion maintained :" See W. Logick. p. 340. And this 
is the real gist, of the whole of Mr. Hume's argument (a 
posteriori) and which is generally considered, I believe, as 
both acute and logical. 



77 

general principle concerning Cause and Ef- 
fect (whicli is now granted), and which he 
supports upon " general reasoning" where- 
by in many instances to suspect, and in 
many others to detect, UNlike secret powers 
amidst the sensible qualities, by which 
means it becomes applicable, as an AXIOM 
founded on REASON, wherewith to try eveiy 
kind of experience both in philosophy and 
common life whilst also he can maintain; 
that unless it were for the knowledge of 
such a general principle, no knowledge of 
the " secret powers of nature in ever so 
many past instances, could be of any ma- 
terial service to us for the future. 

All mathematical demonstration is 
built upon the notion ; that where quan- 
tities, or diagrams, resemble each other, 
the relations which are true, with respect 
to ONE of each kind will be true with 
respect to all others of a like kind ; ONLY 
because there is nothing else to make a 
difference among them. So, if in all past 
time, such secret powers could be shown 
necessarily connected with such sensible 
qualities ; yet in future it could not thence 



78 

be proved to continue so, unless supported 
by the axioms; that LIKE Causes must EX- 
HIBIT like Effects, and that DIFFERENCES 
CANNOT ARISE of themselves. 

Upon the whole, therefore, Mr. Hume 
must be understood to mean, that as we 
know nothing of " Cause and Effect," or of 
the " secret processes of nature" so she might 
be supposed indifferently to strike off con- 
trary Effects from similar prevening Causes, 
or else to alter their " secret powers," whilst 
their FORMATION was produced by the same 
means as usual. Thus that exactly the 
same circumstances might prevene the fall- 
ing of snow, (precisely the same objects 
might unite to produce that object,) upon 
any two occasions, yet, it might have the 
taste of salt or feeling of fire ! That the "se- 
cret powers of vegetation might in future 
be altered; although the seasons should 
roll the same as before ; and every power 
in nature be only equal to the contrary 
supposition ! 

To all which I answer, nature cannot 
alter her course when she is employing simi- 

4 



79 

lar means in the formation of objects, by 
changing any of the " Secret powers," or 
altering any Effects ; because the prevening 
circumstances being supposed in any two 
cases similar, there would be no assigna- 
ble reason for the difference. A difference, 
or change, either in the " secret powers" 
of objects, or the Effects of Causes, (other 
things remaining the same) is exactly equal 
to the CREATION of so many new qualities, 
which could not, without a CONTRADICTION, 
arise of themselves. 

I can conceive it said by some, although 
Mr. Hume would have no right to do so, 
that a miraculous interference might alter 
the course of nature ; not so, not in deter- 
mining the production of dissimilar objects 
from similar causes. No miracle could 
form an uncaused change in nature (which 
is the notion in question). 

A miraculous interference, that is, an 
interference of God as a cause, might alter 
the production of objects, yet still there is a 
cause equivalent to the change, and again 
unlike objects beget unlike qualities : I 



80 

therefore draw a conclusion from the whole 
of this reasoning, exactly contrary to Mr. 
Hume's inference from his ; admitting in- 
deed with him, that before experience we 
cannot know what particular effects will 
flow from given causes ; yet after experience 
I judge that it is " reason which guides us in 
"our expectations; because it convinces 
" us, that instances" (of Effects,) "of which 
" we have had no experience must resem- 
" ble" (when Causes are similar) " those of 
" which we have had experience, for that 
" the course of nature must continue uni- 
" formly the same," by the regular determi- 
nation of like Cause and Effect. 

The same kind of answer will serve for 
other paradoxical questions which Mr. 
Hume puts in these Essays. 

Is there, says he, any more intelligible 
proposition than to affirm, that all the trees 
will flourish in December and January, and 
decay in May and June ? Certainly not, to 
those who conceive that the " course bf 
nature may without an implied contradic- 
tion alter the determination of Effects that 



81 

proceed from like Causes," or, which is the 
same thing, exhibit different or contrary 
qualities, from similar objects. But accord- 
ing to the method I have laid down of 
viewing the operations of nature, there can- 
not be a more unintelligible proposition than 
to assert of those trees, which have usually 
flourished in May and June, that they may 
cease to do so, and only thrive in December 
and January. 

So far from the mind being able dis- 
tinctly " to conceive" such a change in their 
qualities, when the proof has been once 
afforded, that it is their nature to require 
warmth for their growth ; and that cold 
kills their blossoms ; it must be ever after 
considered impossible for these objects to 
affect qualities not originally included in 
their natures ; or, for their natures to 
alter, without a cause equivalent to the 
alteration or a cause equivalent to it to be 
supposed, without REASON being the founda- 
tion of the whole principle of CAUSATION. 

To suppose that the circumstances which 
at first stamped them the objects they are, 

G 



'82 

could enable them to preserve themselves 
similar objects, and yet arbitrarily put on 
wholly contrary qualities, seems to be about 
as reasonable as to assert that black may be- 
come white, and white become black, and yet 
each colour merit its original name, of black 
or white; whilst, at the same time, these 
changes take place on account of such a 
" change in the course of nature," as de- 
termine that although all the causes in 
action are sufficient only to produce 
black, yet white shall appear; and vice 
versa. Indeed, before " nature could be 
conceived to alter her course ;" the question 
about which Mr. Hume is examining ex- 
perience (namely, whether she will support 
the knowledge of the necessary connexion 
of like objects and their qualities,) must be 
supposed to be already answered in the 
negative ; and that it is KNOWN that nature 
may be supposed to exhibit similar antece- 
dents followed by different subsequents, or 
in other words that there is no necessary 
connexion between like objects and like 
qualities; which is begging the question; 
and in a different way from that in which 
he means to answer it, for he means to 
2 



83 

support the doctrine of necessary connex- 
ion, though upon principles peculiarly his 
own. Should it be said that I assume the 
contrary position, I answer, I do not assume 
it ; but have previously proved the general 
conclusion, that " all like causes must 
have like effects ; (because otherwise, ob- 
jects would begin of themselves :) in order 
purposely to show that " nature cannot alter 
her course." Mr. Hume makes also a great 
mistake in supposing because we can con- 
ceive in the fancy the existence of objects 
contrary to our experience, that therefore 
they may really exist in nature ; for it by 
no means follows that ihings which are 
incongruous in nature, may not be contem- 
plated by the imagination, and received as 
possible until reason shows the contrary. 
Indeed, the fallacy, on which his whole 
sceptical doctrines are built, may be seen 
at the very outset of his first Essay. He 
imagines it impossible to conceive the con- 
trary to any known relation in quantities ; 
but that we may conceive the contrary of 
every matter of fact as possible impossible, 
under the same circumstances, and if the 
circumstances alter, the fact is a different 

G 2 



84 

fact; but not a contrary one any more 
than the different relations of various quan- 
tities are not contrary to each other. Mr. 
Hume did not perceive that all objects 
whatever in relation to us, are but masses 
of certain qualities elicited from certain 
prevening circumstances, and therefore in- 
capable of having different qualities, (or of 
showing diverse effects) whilst yet they 
remain similar objects born under like cir- 
cumstances. He did not perceive that the 
"productive principle" or the Cause of an 
Effect, is to be found in the junction of ob- 
jects already existing, by which new ob- 
jects are formed ; but conceiving the na- 
ture of the operation of this principle 
to be wholly unknown, he imagined and 
alleged all things to be only " conjoined, 
and not connected;" and that they might 
change their places fortuitously ; custom 
only connecting them in the fancy ; and a 
contrary fancy as capable of unconnecting 
them again. 

Strange philosophy! " Effects may be 
supposed non-existent this minute, and 
existent the next;" (and so in suspense,) 



85 

and may therefore " begin their existence 
by themselves." If this be so, undoubtedly 
we want no Causes for our Effects ; our 
Rose-trees may suspend their blossoms in 
June ; the flower require no warmth for its 
expansion, and remain non-existent till De- 
cember ! 

That different objects have different 
qualities, all are well acquainted with ; 
The Chinese rose, and the holley, can 
thrive in Winter; but the same kind of 
rose, that hitherto has grown only in spring, 
and flourished in summer, can no more put 
forth its leaves and expand its blossoms in 
winter, than the mercury in a tried ther- 
mometer can suddenly contract to the freez- 
ing point, in a burning summer's day. 

Let us however, before quitting this im- 
portant and interesting argument, chuse 
an example to prove, that " nature can- 
not without a contradiction be imagined 
to alter her course." Let a receiver be ima- 
gined void of every substance whatever; 
and nothing but an uncoloured space within 
it. Now it is surely the ' ' course of nature, ' y 



for this imcoloured space to remain as it is, 
without some cause steps in to alter it; and 
if some cause steps in to alter it, " nature does 
not alter her course." Then let nature be 
supposed to alter her course, and a scarlet 
colour uncaused to enter. Does not every 
reader perceive the impossibility that scarlet 
uncaused could enter? that it could " start 
of itself into existence?" yet such is the 
idea that is veiled under Mr. Hume's argu- 
ment ; that different and contrary qualities 
can take place in similar circumstances ; 
that a rose may blow in winter, when the 
causes were efficient to its blowing only in 
June ! No circumstances are supposed 
changed; and yet " of itself," the nature of 
the rose may change ! and so may a new 
phenomenon take place in an empty receiver, 
as the entrance of a scarlet colour, or of a 
dove, or any other imaginable being, without 
an equivalent change of circumstances for 
its introduction. ' 

The sum of Mr. Hume's argument is, 
that we knowing nothing of the " se- 
crets of nature," we cannot know there is 
really a necessary connexion between ob- 



87 

jects; but imagining there is, this ima- 
gination arises, from a CUSTOMARY OBSER- 
VATION, of the invariableness of their antece- 
dence and subsequence ; which invariable- 
ness, however, does not prove, that each 
connexion may be more than an insulated 
casual event; not obligatory in nature; 
therefore other subsequent events might, 
without a contradiction, be imagined to 
happen after similar antecedents, and a dif- 
ferent order of events might be supposed in 
the " course of nature." 



Now shortly the whole of this reasoning 
concerning the possibility of nature altering 
her course, is but a circle ! for the argument 
is invented to show that CUSTOM not REA- 
SON, must be the only ground of our belief in 
the relation of Cause and Effect. But it is 
impossible to imagine such a change in nature, 
unless reason were previously excluded as 
the principle of that relation ; and it is im- 
possible to exclude reason as the principle of 
that relation, except by supposing that nature 
may alter her course. Thus the idea of cau- 
sation, is founded only on experience*, ex- 

* " The opinion that a cause is necessary to every 
" new production arises from experience." TREATISE. 

o 4 



perienceis supplied with arguments by cus- 
tom not by reason * and custom is supported 
in her authority by a supposed change in 
nature f, impossible to any idea of causa- 
tion J, Unless ALREADY SUPPOSED TO BE 
MERELY THE EFFECT OF CUSTOM . 

Nor must we conclude this branch of 
the subject, without observing the contra- 
diction that lies in the very endeavour to 
persuade the world that custom is the true 
" CAUSE of BELIEF" in necessary connex- 
ion, when before assenting to such a doc- 
trine it must give up ah 1 usual habits of think- 
ing upon the subject, and believe upon Mr. 

* " All inferences from experience are Effects of cus- 
" torn not of reasoning" ESSAYS. 

[ " Since it implies no contradiction that the course 
" of nature may change, there can be no demonstrative 
" arguments in the case." ESSAYS. 

" Wherever there is a propensity without being 
" impelled by any reasoning we say this propensity is the 
" Effect of custom." ESSAYS. 

J " If tiwre were nothing to bind objects together the 
" inferences from present facts would be entirely precari- 
"ous." ESSAYS. 

" Our belief in causation is the Effect of custom." 
ESSAYS. 



89 

Hume's reasoning, what it never before be- 
lieved ! 

Mr. Hume himself recapitulates his ar- 
gument thus : 

" Every idea is copied from some pre- 
" ceding impression (idea being an Effect 
" derived from impression as its Cause^). 
" In all single instances of the operation of 
" bodies there is nothing that produces, 
" nor consequently can suggest the idea of 
" necessary connexion. But when many 
" instances appear, we feel a new impres- 
" sion, a customary connexion in the 
" thought, between one object and its usual 
" attendant*." 

Now this method of placing the argu- 
ment is but the statement of another 
circle ; for causation is used as the very 
principle which lies at the foundation of 

* Compare the Treatise and Essays, in both works 
impressions are considered as absolutely necessary to 
cause ideas to create them ; to produce them ; they are 
considered as the truly " productive principle" of ideas 
Objects without which they could not exist. 



90 

the whole system ; and afterwards we are 
desired to search for the impression, which 
is the CAUSE of that EFFECT, viz. the idea 
causation. 

And it is no answer to say that the 
notion of causation is spoken of in his own 
sense, not in his adversary's ; for in either 
sense it is equally illogical, to prove the 
conclusion by the premises, and the pre- 
mises by the conclusion. 

What should we think of an author, who, 
in attempting to account for the original 
discovery of metals, proved that it was 
effected by the use of instruments framed 
from a material termed iron, drawn from the 
bowels of the earth ? 

In like manner there is a want of logical 
precision in referring all the principles 
which connect our ideas to three kinds of 
associations amongst them ; of which cau- 
sation is ranked as one ; and then (in order 
to account for causation,) shew the power 
that lies in the associations of ideas. Such 
a notion ends in the formation of a mere 



91 

identical proposition; viz. a certain asso- 
ciation of ideas is causation; and causation 
consists in an association of ideas. 

But there is still another passage in 
Mr. Hume's Essays, of greater conse- 
quence than any I have quoted, or argued 
on ; and which I shall yet detain the reader 
for a few moments in order to consider; 
it is this following: 

" As reason is incapable of any va- 
" riation, the conclusions which it draws 
" from one circle, are the same which 
" it would form from surveying all the 
" circles in the universe. But no man 
" having seen one body move after being 
" impelled by another would infer, that 
" every body will move after a like iin- 
" pulse*." 

This passage I consider as containing 
the whole gist of Mr. Hume's error, and 
therefore it points out where my answer 
should meet it. The error consists, in inak- 

* Essays, Vol. 2. Sec, 6, p. 4-7. 



92 

ing an incomplete comparison, between 
the two subjects compared. Every body 
is taken in an indefinite sense for every 
kind of body ; but circle is not taken for 
every kind of figure. The reason whence 
the CONCLUSIONS concerning all circles are 
general, is upon the very principle of Cause 
and Effect ; for I know by experience, that 
upon the first study of Mathematical 
science, I found much difficulty in a phi- 
losophical objection I could not easily 
answer ; namely ; that the relations of the 
quantities in one figure did not seem 
necessarily applicable to all of a like kind ; 
until I perceived that the affections of all, 
were INVOLVED in one of each kind; as 
there was nothing to occasion a differ- 
ence amidst their relations. Now then let 
the data be the same, and the IMPULSE given 
not only be like, but the BODY given be like; 
and I conceive that every man, and every 
child, would expect, upon a second trial, 
that the same body would move in the same 
manner as before. The inference would be 
drawn from the mind perceiving, (in the 
first instance,) that no motion would have 
taken place except from the conjunction of 



93 

the body with the impulsive force ; and in 
the second case would add to the memory 
of this Effect, the reasoning, that there 
being nothing else to make a difference, a 
like Effect would again take place. Nay, I 
am persuaded, that reason might go so far 
as, from calculating the proportions of the 
impulse used, and the body moved, to con- 
clude the varieties, which would take place 
under proportionably different circum- 
stances. 

Mr. Hume draws two inferences of much 
consequence from his doctrine ; 1st, that 
as our custom of thinking is not the operation 
of nature, so we have no positive proof, that 
a cause is wanted for the existence of the 
universe as of a truly " productive princi- 
ple" 2dly, That it is unreasonable to be- 
lieve in miracles, because it is foolish to allow 
of our customary habits of thinking, which 
arise from " experience in the course of 
nature," to be interfered with by an " ex- 
perience of a less frequent occurrence;" 
which dependence upon testimony can 
only afford. This latter inference he pro- 
fesses in his Essay against Miracles. The 



94 

former opinion is less openly acknow- 
ledged; not being stated in explicit terms, 
but of immediate inference from the doc- 
trine ; and which he was well aware of, was 
the case. 

"." .' i \ -. .' ' . ~j .'.....'- ; v j - >-- - - 

The sum of niy answer and argument 
is, that although we know not the " se- 
crets of nature/' yet we know that no- 
thing can "begin its own existence;" 
therefore there must truly be a " productive 
principle/' a cause necessary for every new 
existence in nature; that we gain the 
knowledge of a " necessary connexion be- 
tween Cause and Effect," by an expert- 
mentum cruds, and therefore no greater 
number of invariable antecedents and con- 
sequents are wanted, than what is neces- 
sary, in order to observe what circum- 
stances affect each other, or the contrary. 
That neither fancy nor custom creates 
the notion by an association of ideas ; but 
the UNDERSTANDING gains it, by an observa- 
tion of what is that circumstance, without 
which a new object does not exist. Things 
therefore could not change their places, nor 



95 

nature alter her course, without a contra- 
diction. 

Hence it is that a cause is wanted 
in the universe equivalent to the change 
from non-existence to existence ! And also 
that it is not more unreasonable to believe 
in miracles than in any other extraordinary 
phenomena in nature, when we may sup- 
pose, that efficient Causes have been in ac- 
tion, towards their production ; and that 
fatal causes are of siifficient weight to justify 
the altered ivork of Providence ! 

But a minute investigation of Mr. Hume's 
Essay on Miracles is much wanted. The 
purport of it, and the method by which it is 
drawn out as a consequence from the three 
preceding Essays, has not (that I know 
of) been observed by the learned. One 
would think at first sight that Mr. Hume, 
in admitting that the " course of nature 
might change, "conceded much to the Chris- 
tians. Instead of which he adroitly turns 
round upon them, and says, " so it may in 
fact ;" but in " custom" you think it cannot, 
therefore it is absurd to allow this custom 



96 

of thought to be overthrown by testimony. 
In this struggle of fancy, against fancy, the 
more powerful must and ought to prevail ! 
If these pages should find favour before the 
public, an examination of the Essay on 
Miracles is intended to follow them ; with- 
out which the answer to these on Cause 
and Effect is hardly complete. 

Should an objection arise to my doc- 
trine, that on account of supposing causes 
to act as the junctions of different qua- 
lities, and yet by pushing back all causes 
to the ONE UNCAUSED ESSENCE ; I thereby 
prevent the idea of him being reposed in as 
a Cause ; as he forms ONE object only : I 
answer, that the uncaused essence, however 
mysterious in his nature, and however aw- 
ful and distant to our speculations, must 
nevertheless have attributes; or in other 
words, its own peculiar qualities, which re- 
quired no former beings, to give birth to 
them. 

The unions of such qualities among 
themselves, might well be equal to the 
going forth of the great Creation! The 



97 

union of wisdom, with benevolence ; and of 
these with the "power" arising out of the 
inexhaustible resources of his essence, 
might well occasion the " starting forth" 
of innumerable beings ; the highest orders 
of which, without the slightest philosophi- 
cal contradiction, might be considered as 
coeval and coequal with the Father " as 
touching the Godhead." But after this, 
the wide universe, with all its gradations of 
wonderful beings, with all its powers of life 
and heat, and motion, must have come out 
from him according to the laws with which 
they were endowed. And although the 
original undivided essence, whose qualities 
were equal to such creation, must be con- 
sidered as antecedent to his own work ; yet 
the operation of that essence must ever 
have been the same from all eternity ; and 
in that point of view, the junction of wisdom 
and benevolence, with whatever " capaci- 
ties" of that essence were efficient to their 
ends, must have been accompanied with 
their instant synchronous Effects ; the 
formation of inferior beings. " Let there 
be light," said God, " and there was light:" 



ii 



98 

Thus God, the universal Father, and 
with him any noble manifestations of his 
essence ; then archangel, and angel ; man 
(or beings analogous to him) and animals ; 
mind, and matter; may be considered as 
having existed eternally, coming forth from 
him, living in him, and supported by him ; 
whilst an analogous state of being must be 
expected to continue eternally, in like man- 
ner and it may also be expected as a cir- 
cumstance consistent and probable with 
the whole of so grand an arrangement, that 
some inferior orders of beings may be raised 
in the scale of nature, to be inhabitants of 
a kindlier world than this ; with enlarged 
capacities for happiness and virtue. 

The consideration of the method the 
understanding has recourse to, in order to 
judge of the probable presence of similar 
causes on the contrary, will come under our 
view in the next Chapter. 



99 



CHAPTER THE THIRD. 

I SHALL now proceed to apply the princi- 
ples already laid down, to the examination 
of the question concerning the guidance of 
our expectations in ordinary life, which 
question forms the subject of the Essay 
entitled Sceptical Doubts concerning the 
operations of the Understanding. The 
question itself might be shortly stated thus : 
why does the operation of the apparent 
qualities of an object upon the senses, lead 
the mind to expect the action of its untried 
qualities, when placed in fit circumstances 
for their operation ? 

Why should bread, on account of its 
formerly nourishing the body, be expected 
to nourish it again ? why may it not, whilst 
it preserves " its colour, consistence, &c." 
nevertheless destroy the human frame ? 

In my answer to these questions, I shall 
allow to Mr. Hume, that the memory of the 

H 2 



100 

sensible and apparent qualities of any ob- 
ject, is necessary to the acknowledgment of 
it as the same body, upon every acquaint- 
ance with it; also that the memory of what 
its qualities will be, when conjoined with 
any other, is also requisite to the expecta- 
tion of any farther qualities arising from it. 

* 

-try 

The idea of these must be associated 
with the sensible qualities ; but the know- 
ledge that they will assuredly take place, 
when existing in like circumstances, is 
founded upon much stronger principles 
than those of custom and habit. 

', 
It is founded 

First, Upon a quick, steady, accurate 
observation, whether the prevening causes 
are the SAME, from which an object is elicited 
in any PRESENT instance, as upon a FORMER 
one ; and, 

2dly,-Upon a demonstration, that if 
the observation hath been correct, the 
result (i. e. the whole effects or qualities,) 
must necessarily be the same as heretofore ; 

2 



101 

otherwise contrary qualities, as already dis- 
cussed, would arise without a cause, i. e. a 
difference begin of itself, which has been 
shown to be impossible*. Thus the first 
step the mind takes, in order to be satisfied 
that the same apparent qualities in any ob- 
ject will be attended with like " secret 
powers" is the consideration, from the sur- 
rounding circumstances, of what the pre- 
vening causes were, which gave birth to the 
object ; and therefore whether the apparent 
qualities are truly the accompaniments of 
the same nature or not. As for instance, 
we can form a notion almost with certainty, 
whether the substance placed upon the 
table has been truly elicited from such 
causes, as could alone produce the com- 
pound object bread. Whether the pure 
liquid offered, be the result of such circum- 

* It has already been shown upon mathematical prin- 
ciples, that a difference in the result of equal unions, can 
no more arise out of the mixtures of any other qualities 
of objects, than from the Junctions of those of number. 
If ONE added to ONE, bear out the result TWO, once; it 
must ever do so ; and if a certain proportion of blue and 
yellow particles, form a mixture termed GREEN, once; 
GREEN in like manner shall ever thence result. 

H 3 



102 

stances as render it water, or of such others, 
as may prove it, (notwithstanding its appa- 
rent quality to the eye,) to be spirits of 
ammonia ? c. It is not the mere appear- 
ance of the external qualities, which can 
determine the mind to expect certain ef- 
fects ; it is only that appearance in conjunc- 
tion with the recollection of the probable 
causes, that have produced the objects in 
question, and which lead the mind to sup- 
pose the said objects to be truly bread, 
water, or hartshorn ; and therefore impos- 
sible not to be capable of exhibiting all their 
qualities, and none other than their qua- 
lities. 

vifi-J fv;'jH f;f *>idfj: 

The first step belongs to those com- 
bined qualities of mind called good sense ; 
and will always be made with an assurance 
and propriety in proportion to it. The na- 
ture of its operation is this; the mind 
knows that different objects have the same 
apparent qualities to some of the senses, 
which cannot aiford a sufficient test con- 
cerning the farther exhibition of others ; 
but observation enables it to judge, when 
an object is presented, what causes have 



103 

been used in its formation ; and if it perceives 
that the causes have been similar, it knows 
that the whole effects or qualities must 
necessarily be similar; otherwise there 
might be an uncaused " change in the 
course of nature ;" which, although some- 
times philosophers imagine possible, no or- 
dinary minds ever do, because they never 
think a change can take place of itself; or 
in other words, qualities begin their own 
existences 

It is nothing but this reasoning concern- 
ing the causes, used in the formation of an 
object, which makes us argue to the " secret 
powers," and the similar appearances only 
guide us, in as far as they form a proof that 
they are truly the same objects, with re- 
spect to those appearances ; for SIMILAR 
objects could not have different appear- 
ances. 

:--SiJiic: 

The way to try the case is to observe 
the action of the mind, when two objects 
are presented of precisely similar appear- 
ance, but which may be thought, on account 



H 4 



104 

of the uncertainty as to the circumstances 
which excited them, possibly, to possess 
different properties. 

91** 'ft . ffs$5*in*iK*f O ': 1 ">'*}. < v 

We always enquire, in such cases, as to 
some leading circumstance, which may ena- 
ble us to judge what causes were used in 
their formation. 

If an ignorant person, for instance, whom 
we perceived could not read, were about to 
serve us in a chyrnist's shop with Epsom 
salts ; we, being aware that oxalic acid had 
the same apparent qualities, should not feel 
an assurance in the " secret powers ;" but 
would cautiously enquire for some mark, 
by which to be guided in our notion as to 
then* original FORMATION ; i. e. as to what 
mass of qualities apparent, and secret, had 
been combined by the hand of nature, or 
art, in the object before us. It is here that 
Mr. Hume's mistake is evident in the state- 
ment of what he deems an irresolvable dif- 
ficulty, concerning the method of the mind 
in the guidance of its expectation with 
respect to the untried qualities, or "Ef- 
fects," of the objects presented to it. 



105 

These are his words, 

: 

" The two following propositions are 
" far from being the same ; I have found 
" that such an object has always been at-' 
" tended with such an Effect ; and I foresee 
" that all other objects, in appearance si- 
" milar, will be attended with similar 
" effects/' The connexion between the 
two propositions is not intuitive ; of what 
nature is it then ? I answer, WE NEVER DO 
MAKE THE CONNEXION we never do foresee 
that objects similar in appearance ONLY, 
will be attended with similar Effects. 
But as trail/ similar objects, must necessari- 
ly appear the same, we combine these ac- 
knowledged similarities, with the circum- 
stances which we are aware of, as most 
probable to have been used in their formation, 
and thence judge whether the object be 
truly a mass of similar Effects or qualities, 
elicited from like causes in action, or the 
contrary. 
. 

If the causes in action have been the 
same ; (and we are pretty good judges if 



106 

they have, or have not, in the vast variety 
of ordinary cases with which we have to 
do,) then the objects in question must ne- 
cessarily possess the whole qualities which 
belong to their natures, whether taken 
singly, and acting alone on the senses ; or 
acting in conjunction with another object, and 
exhibiting those further qualities, which 
are usually termed " Effects" 

Thus Mr. Hume's statement " I have 
" found such an object has always been at- 
" tended with such an effect ; and I foresee 
" other objects, in appearance similar, will 
" be attended with similar effects ;" is not 
the state of the human mind in any given 
circumstance. It should rather run thus, 
(although the familiarity we have from in- 
fancy with the objects of life prevent the 
notion from being so distinctly formed, 
much less expressed, as to be easily detected 
when called upon.) 

Here is an object which has been the 
result of LIKE CAUSES IN ACTION, now as for- 
merly. The whole mass of Effects, which 



107 

those causes once produced, must necessarily 
be again capable of being exhibited in like 
appropriate circumstances. 

It may also be added, that when an ob- 
ject in nature is, on account of some 
governing circumstance relating to it, con- 
sidered as a similar object with another; 
because that governing circumstance points 
out the creating causes of it; then the 
" Effects," as well as the apparent qua- 
lities, enter into its definition, and bread 
stands as a sign of all the ideas under the 
term, and of nothing but the ideas. 
' 

It receives that name on account of its 
tried qualities, and it retains it, when known 
to have been formed by those creating causes, 
that necessarily can only determine similar 
effects. 
I 

If the human body is in the same state 
on any occasion, as on that when bread 
nourished it ; there is as great a necessity it 
should again nourish, as that it should be 
white. 



108 

Thus all experimental reasoning consists 
in an observation, and a demonstration, as 
has before been shown; an observation, 
whether the circumstances from which an 
object is produced, and in which it is placed, 
are the same upon one occasion as upon 
another ; and a demonstration, that if it is 
so, all its exhibitions will be the same. But 
Mr. Hume asks in another question of the 
same nature, why we judge otherwise con- 
cerning the " Effects/' (or untried quali- 
ties), following the apparent qualities, in 
some other objects. 

" Nothing, says he, so like as eggs ; 
" yet no one, on account of this apparent 
" similarity, expects the same taste and 
" relish in all of them ;" " Now where is 
" that process of reasoning, which from one 
" instance, draws a conclusion so different 
" from that which it infers from a hundred 
" others?" 

The reason is, because it is one of the 
tried, known, qualities of eggs, to become 
soon changed in their flavour ; without any 
great indication of such change becoming 



109 

apparent to the eye ; therefore again, 
there is not a connexion between the ap- 
parent qualities, and " secret powers/' and 
we should enquire if we doubted; concern- 
ing some circumstance before tasting that 
might afford a discreet judgment, some 
ground for conceiving that only those causes, 
had hitherto been in action, which had been 
likely to produce fresh eggs. 

This instance forms an argument on my 
side of the question, rather than on Mr. 
Hume's ; as it shows there is not an abso- 
lute connexion, (and that the mind never 
thinks there is,) between the mere APPEAR- 
ANCES, and the "Effects" of an object; 
but that we judge concerning the proba- 
bility of the method in which an object has 
been formed, and of the circumstances it may 
have been placed in afterwards, as likely or 
not to alter it; before we announce, whether 
the apparent qualities are indications of 
those " secret powers, on which the Effects 
entirely depend" 

Thus I not only assert, that these are 



110 

"the steps" the mind takes, from experiment 
to expectation; namely, ONE OF A HIGH PRO- 
BABILITY, that the prevening circumstances 
which determine those masses of Effects, (or 
qualities) called objects, have rendered them 
the same upon a present occasion, as upon 
a past ; AND ONE OF DEMONSTRATION, that IF 
they are the same objects, all the unexhi- 
bited qualities, or effects, must also be THE 
SAME ; but I also affirm, that " custom" is 
not, cannot, be the principle on which the 
notion of necessary connexion between 
Cause and Effect is really founded ; and 
that with respect to the most familiar ob- 
jects of our life it has only a partial opera- 
tion, in governing our expectations of the 
future. I grant that custom or an associa- 
tion of ideas, arising from those habits 
which infix ideas in the mind, is the foun- 
dation of all memory; and therefore similar 
appearances, suggest the remembered unex- 
hibited accompanying qualities of objects ; 
but it will not suit all the phenomena; it 
will not give the assurance that the accom- 
panying untried qualities, must of necessity 
take place ; and that the object in question 



Ill 

merits the name assigned to it. In order 
to prove this proposition, let us try any of 
the various strongly associated circumstan- 
ces, which govern the mind, where clearly 
the suggestion to the imagination, can arise 
from nothing else but association of ideas. 
The ideas of these may always be disjoined 
from each other, without any apparent in- 
conceivableness to the fancy ; which is al- 
ways the case in endeavouring to imagine 
a similar cause to take place with one we 
have before known, and a different Effect 
follow, from that which had previously fol- 
lowed it. 

Let any school -boy, who always joins 
the first two lines in Virgil together, endea- 
vour to imagine one line only written, with- 
out the other ; he can do it ; or that Virgil 
might have made another line, the first re- 
maining the same ; he can ; one is not the 
cause of the other ; nor, are they neces- 
sarily connected. But when he says, twice 
2 are 4, he finds that the consequence of 
two units being taken two times over, 
necessarily exhibit four units to the mind ; 
and cannot be disjoined from that result, 



112 

while the terms are spoken of in the same 
sense. 

Like Causes : necessarily include, and 
therefore produce and exhibit their Effects. 
The mind indeed may be forced from every 
recollection of habit, and consider the qua- 
lities of an object apart from each other, 
as in any other association : but the mind 
never can consider them as possible to exist 
apart in nature ; it never for a moment sup- 
poses it but inconceivable, and impossible, 
that they should be " non-existent this mo- 
ment, and " existent the next" without 
conjoining to them the idea of a cause or 
" productive principle." 

The only difficulty the mind has to do 
with, in forming a right judgment con- 
cerning its expectations of the qualities of 
objects, iS the probability, or the con- 
trary, whether the circumstances which 
formed them, are the same as heretofore or 
not. But this part of the question, we 
always consider with more or less nicety of 
induction ; and do not believe them to be 
so, from external appearances only, but 



U3 

from those circumstances which enable us 
to know, what course nature was taking, 
when she stamped them such as we see them. 

We judge in short that nature, in the 
continuance of her plan, is constant still to 
her own great ends ; where the first begin^ 
nings of the work are wholly out of our 
cognizance. 

We judge from the memory, of the pails 
we have ourselves taken in the disposition 
of Causes. 

We judge from the knowledge we have 
had of the actions of others, and of the 
parts they have also been performing in 
their disposition; and when these are 
all in the affirmative, towards the pro- 
bability of like Causes having been in ac- 
tion, in the formation of any object imme- 
diately concerning us ; then we judge that 
the similar appearances, are qualities, of a 
like object, which only remains to be tried, 
to justify the assumption that it is the same; 
and that it deserves the name which has 



114 

been bestowed on it accordingly. I think 
this answers the whole argument, and is suf- 
ficient to prove, that " reason" not " cus- 
tom" is the great guide of human life; 
convincing us, that the " instances of 
which we have had no experience, must 
resemble those of which we have had ex- 
perience, for that the course of nature 
must continue uniformly the same." 

SECTION THE SECOND. 

In the course of writing these pages, I 
have met with some passages in the works 
of Mr. Locke, which when compared with 
the whole of Mr. Hume's argument, (a pos- 
teriori,} must be considered as forming the 
basis of that elaborate and inconclusive 
reasoning. Mr. Locke says, " there is a 
" supposition that nature works regularly 
" in the production of things, and sets the 
"boundaries to each species; whereas 
" any one who observes their different qua- 
" lities, can hardly doubt that many of the 
**- individuals called by the same name, are 
** in their internal constitution different from 
4 * one another." 



115 

Again ; " Let the complex idea of 
" gold, be made up of whatever other qua- 
" lities you please, malleableness will not 
" appear to depend on that complex idea. 
" The connexion that malleableness has 
" with those other qualities, being only by 
" the intervention of the real collection of 
" its insensible parts ; which since we know 
" not, it is impossible we should perceive 
" that connection, &c." 

In another place he has ; " But we are 
" so far from being admitted into the secrets 
" of nature, that we scarce so much as ever 
" approach the first step towards them." 
,yA- 

The parallel passages in Mr. Hume's 
writings I need not again quote, espe- 
cially as, if the reader has been interested 
in the course of this discussion, they will 
immediately recur to his memory. 

Now Mr. Locke never meant to say 
that the differences of species could take 
place, excepting by the regular operations 
of CAUSES, necessarily connected with their 
EFFECTS ; for he considered the sensible 

i 2 



qualities of bodies, as dependant upon their 
internal constitution ; which is both to ac- 
knowledge the relation of Cause and Effect, 
as also to conceive the sensible qualities, to 
be the EFFECTS of the secret powers*. 

Both of these principles Mr. Hume 
denies ; saying expressly of the latter " It 
" is acknowledged on all hands, there is 
" no connection between the sensible qua- 
" lities, and those secret powers of objects, 
" on which the effects entirely depend." 
Which latter remark I consider not only 
as erroneous, but astonishing ! in as much 
as the ideas in this part of his Essay, are an 
obvious expansion of those of Mr. Locke, 
who is an exception to the notion of an uni- 
versal agreement to this opinion; (being one, 
at least, and in authority equal to many, who 
does not acknowledge it.) The doubt how- 
ever which Mr. Locke throws out, although 
it does in no respect affect the general prin- 



* " That every thing has a real constitution, whereby it 
" is, what it is, and on which its sensible qualities depend, 
" is past doubt." Locke's Essay on the Human Under- 
standing. 



117 

ciples concerning causation ; yet it regards 
the difficulty there is in the detection of like 
objects, on account of our inability to form 
a judgment concerning their internal con- 
stitutions, from the mere appearance of their 
sensible qualities. 

I consider Mr. Locke renders the diffi- 
culty something greater than it need be ; 
although he acknowledges that a simi- 
larity in the sensible qualities forms an 
argument of high probability, (though 
short of demonstration,) in favor of the 
presence of truly similar objects. 

For as the secret, external, unknown 
powers or qualities, in nature; deter- 
mine the sensible qualities as their effects, 
as well as every other effect, or property ; 
so when we perceive the sensible qualities 
in any instances to be like, we know that 
as far as they go, they are LIKE Effects, from 
like SECRET constitutions; which secret con- 
stitutions having been once able to de- 
termine certain effects, may do the same 
again; and not only may, but must do 

i 3 



118 

so again, wiless something has occurred 
unobserved to make a difference among 
them. 

In order to form a judgment if any 
thing is likely to have occurred towards 
making such an alteration ; the mind has 
recourse to several observations and rea- 
sonings. For considering that a certain 
figured, limited, portion of extended mat- 
ter in nature, does by the action of the 
self same particles, exhibit different quali- 
ties, according to the different senses they 
meet, or variety of objects, with which they 
mix ; so it applies these masses to the 
examination of more senses than one, for 
an higher certainty in this matter : knowing 
it to be very rare, but that a diversity is 
detected among the particles, by some 
one sense, at least. The senses, therefore, 
are considered capable of nearly detecting 
the similarity of internal constitutions ; and 
this upon such a regularity in fact of the 
course of nature, which must itself be looked 
upon as a general Effect, from a general 
Cause. 



119 

Nevertheless the proposition founded 
on these trials, is but a probability, although 
a high one. 

But, 2dly. The mind has always a regard 
to the metkod taken by nature and art in 
the FORMATION of an object. When these 
are similar; the MASSES of Effects, or objects, 
are necessarily similar; and SUCH therefore 
will be their Effects in their turn. Then these 
forming objects are still silently traced back- 
wards ; in order to perceive if their produc- 
tion hath been similar till we rest at last, 
in those grand objects and operations in 
nature, which we have found so universally 
regular to certain ends, that upon the gene- 
ral relation of Cause and Effect, (as applica- 
ble to this particular case,) we conclude, 
that such a regular like Effect, can only be 
the result of a like continual cause ; which 
shall not alter as long as the GREAT FIRST 
CAUSE doth not alter his pleasure therein. 
Thus we trace the sensible qualities of bread 
to the SECRET coiNSTiTUTiONS which have 
partly been put in action, by the sower and 
reaper of corn, the operations of the miller 
and the baker; and beyond these to the 

i 4 - 



120 

influence of the air, the sun, and the juices 
of the earth ; which objects as they origin- 
ally seem to have " come forth from the 
Father of man" for his use, so have they 
ever continued too true to their destination, 
not to be considered as dependant on that 
" God of seasons," who has ordained the 
nourishment of his children to arise from 
" bread, earned by the sweat of their brow." 

It is, on account of these reasons, (that in 
answer to Mr. Hume) I say, that " other 
bread will also nourish, when a body of a 
like colour and consistency has frequently 
done so ; and which remains free from the 
suspicion of any other beings having been 
concerned in its FORMATION than those al- 
luded to. Frequency of repetition, abstracted 
from the principle of CAUSATION as a CONCLU- 
SION already drawn from " general reason- 
ing" is not a circumstance sufficient to 
generate such a principle, either from cm- 
torn, or aught else; but being previously 
known and believed in ; frequency of re- 
petition becomes legitimately to be con- 
sidered as axisJEffect, from a Cause, equally 
constant and general in its exhibition ; and 



121 

thereby begets a reasonable, as well as a 
customary dependance, upon the necessary 
connexion, that is between such regular 
Cause and Effect. 

Thus the most ignorant conceive ; first 
that qualities cannot begin of themselves ; 
for there is as quick and accurate a percep- 
tion, of natural contradictions in terms, 
amidst the least as the most learned of men : 
they therefore believe in Cause, as a " pro- 
ductive principle" in general. Secondly, 
they believe that regularity in nature is an 
Effect whose Cause they may regularly 
depend on, as a corollary with the preced- 
ing principle. Thirdly, they believe there 
is the intimate connexion of Cause and 
Effect between the secret powers, and sen- 
sible qualities of objects ; conceiving that 
an OUTWARD indefinite object, which when 
it meets with the eye presents to it a certain 
colour, and with the touch a certain consis- 
tency, and which they believe to be FORMED 
from certain materials, will also, upon 
trial, be palateable to the taste, agreeable 
to the stomach, and nourishing to the 
body, 



122 

Thus when Mr. Hume says, ".I require 
for my information what reasoning it is that 
leads men, from the mere sensible qualities 
of things to expect their future Effects?" 
he requires the statement of an argument, 
which in fact is never made ; for men con- 
ceive that it is something indefinite ; i. e. a 
certain mass of particles determined into 
that mass by forming powers equivalent to 
it, which meeting with the eyes, is seen 
of a denned colour, with the touch 
yields the sense of a certain consistency, 
and when entering the stomach shall be 
enjoyed as a satisfaction to hunger*. None 
ever suppose, that it is what is first seen 
and felt that it is colour and consistency 
which afterwards NOURISHES. They suppose 
it is that which is sown and reaped, and 
kneaded and baked ; which seen, or unseen; 
touched or untouched; is FITTED TO NOURISH ; 
but being seen, shall be white or brown ; 
and being felt, shall be of a less or greater 

* This part of the subject again touches upon the 
Berkleyan theory, concerning external nature; and the 
opinions ordinary minds have of the external existence, or 
the contrary, of the sensible qualities : upon which point 
Hume and Berkeley are at variance. 



1,23 

compressibility. The sensible qualities are 
only considered as SIGNS of the secret 
powers, which secret powers are under- 
stood to be determined by certain similar 
processes of art, mixed with the grand and 
regular operations of nature. When the 
formation of objects can be less accurately 
detected ; their similarity of internal con- 
stitution becomes more doubtful, from the 
mere appearance of some of the sensible 
qualities only ; for, the greater number of 
qualities which are exhibited as similar to 
the senses, the higher does the proof be- 
come, of the secret powers being also 
similar. 

Fourthly. The mind, (of ordinary per- 
sons especially), though appearing to reason 
upon this subject in a circle, yet in reality 
escapes the sophism and proceeds by a me- 
thod involving much practical result and ra- 
tional evidence. For instance ; if there were 
an appearance of fire, doubted, as to its being 
more than a mere appearance of it ; the 
moment it were known to have been eli- 
cited from the concussion of flint and steel, 
there would no longer be a doubt on that 



124 

matter. Then if in any case did the ques- 
tion arise, whether those objects usually 
considered as JIM and steel, were truly such, 
it would be thought a proof in the af- 
firmative, if upon their concussion they 
could elicit a sensible spark. Philosophers 
might imagine the secret powers of the 
whole to be altered ; but plain understand- 
ings would consider the entire coincidence 
to be too great and remarkable to arise 
from chance. Such sensible causes, giving 
birth to such sensible effects, they would 
suppose formed a connection of the high- 
est probability, whence to form a judg- 
ment, that the whole secret powers of each 
were similar. And in cases of high pro- 
bability the mind is as much determined to 
action, as by demonstration. It cannot 
stand hesitating, and therefore " takes a 
step/' (in arguing from the sensible quali- 
ties to the future effects of things,) governed 
by a high probability founded on REASONING 
" that they ARE" connected with like secret 
powers, on which the Effects entirely depend. 

Nor is this argument in a circle, for the 
mind does not reason from the Effects to 



125 

the Causes; and from the Causes back 
again to the Effects, but considers in each 
of these cases, that the invariable regularity 
of nature is a POWER that may be depended 
upon ; and from which fact of invariableness 
the reasonable argument is framed, that 
the same secret powers will accompany the 
sensible qualities which have ever done so, 
when elicited from like apparent Causes. 
It is an additional proof added to the AP- 
PEARANCE of fire , that it is REALLY such, if 
found to be the result not only of apparently 
like Causes in action, but of such that have 
never been known to MISS FIRE, when they 
have seemed to kindle it. Whilst should the 
temper of steel lie under any suspicion, of 
incapacity as to the determination of its 
Effects ; if upon trial, the spark be immedi- 
ately emitted, the conclusion is as imme- 
diate that this Effect is similar in the secret 
powers, which nature in no instance ever 
failed, to determine along with such sensi- 
ble qualities. 

In moral feelings also, I might argue 
that had I a friend whose absence might 
suggest a dread, lest the powers of his 



1-26 

friendship had become weakened ; if upon 
his return I observed the same sensible 
manifestations of regard as heretofore I 
should have very reasonable ground to 
judge, that they were the symptoms of a 
heart, as true to me as ever, whose faith 
was always found to shew itself in similar 
demonstrations of kindness. 

It is one of the most ordinary modes of 
reasoning that the generality of mankind 
possess ; to consider invariability of recur- 
rence as incapable of arising from chance. 
The meaning of which is, that having the 
principle of general causation already in 
their minds, they judge that invariable regu- 
larity cannot be undesigned and without an 
end in view, (as well as that it is itself an Ef- 
fect, and must therefore have its own Cause, 
i. e. a regular invariable Cause of whose 
very essence it is, only to determine simi- 
lar Effects.) And it is remarkable that this 
idea and in the very same language express- 
ing it, is used at the beginning of Mr. Hume's 
" Treatise" as the sole foundation of a sys- 
tem expressly undertaken to prove that the 



127 

mind never reasons., from experience to ex- 
pectation. His words are to this purpose ; 
" this coincidence," (viz. of an IDEA always 
requiring an IMPRESSION toprevene it,) " is 

TOO GREAT TO ARISE FROM CHANCE !" 

To return to Mr. Locke, he merely 
meant to say, that nature in her regular 
and usual modes of operation, from Cause 
and Effect might form irregular collections of 
qualities, not to be detected by mere ap- 
pearances ; and therefore unworthy on that 
account only, of retaining the names of 
regular species, which are also named on 
account of their tried Effects and proper- 
ties. But every man acquainted with Mr. 
Locke's writings must consider him, as far 
from wishing to authorize in future times 
such a scheme as that of Mr. Hume's. 
Nor do I think he would dissent from my 
notions, that the method the mind takes 
to judge of the kind of objects which are 
present is : 

Istly. By tracing the manner of their 
formation. 



1-28 



idly. By considering an invariable re- 
gularity in nature as reasonable to be de- 
pended upon, being itself an invariable 
effect from an equal Cause. 



. By the application of various 
senses to the affections of the particles. 

4thly. By the consideration that the 
sensible qualities being similar is a pre- 
sumption in favor of similar secret powers, 
as truly similar objects would necessarily 
appear the same. 

5thly. That in like manner when Ef- 

fects are apparently similar a presumption is 

formed in favor of apparently similar causes, 

having given birth to like secret powers in the 

EFFECTS, as well as their sensible qualities. 

6thly. That the mind quickly and ha- 
bitually surveys these things ; so that the 
understanding being accomplished in such 
latent, and constant reasoning; may uni* 
formly blend and use it, although it may 
find a difficulty of analyzing it when call- 
ed for. 



129 

7thly. That after the application of an 
exact experiment, it is imposible to ima- 
gine a difference of qualities to arise under 
the same circumstances. 

It is strange that a system at once so 
unstable and confused, as Mr. Hume's, 
should ever have been built upon any no- 
tions of Mr. Locke, whose moral conclu- 
sions are so much at variance with his. 
Divest Mr. Hume's ideas of the air, of 
science and grace, which he throws around 
them, and present them in a plain and po- 
pular manner, they will appear thus. " The 
mind cannot become acquainted with the 
knowledge of a necessary connexion be- 
tween Cause and Effect ; for there exists 
no relations amidst things, of which an idea 
can be conveyed to it, except by the means 
of an original impression" 

" But in nature events are entirely un- 
connected, therefore not capable of convey- 
ing an impression of necessary connexion, 
or of POWER; yet men conceive that events, 
are not thus unconnected in which idea 
they are mistaken ; as experience, which is 

K 



130 

the ONLY field for their observation in this 
matter, merely offers to view certain similar 
sensible qualities, which are frequently, al- 
though not invariably followed by other 
similar sensible qualities. In certain cases, 
however, there have been such invariable 
sequences (though " of loose, casual, un- 
connected events") that a definition of Cause 
and Effect, as of an invariable sequence, 
may be framed thereon." 

"In as much as it is only like sensible 
qualities with which we are acquainted, 
so they alone are considered as like Causes 
or antecedents ; and they have no connexion 
with the secret powers of objects, which 
secret powers, are nevertheless the only true 
Causes on " which the Effects entirely de- 
pend ; therefore like sensible qualities NOT 
being like Causes might be followed by 
different Effects." 



" Hence the Custom of the observance 
of those sequences of sensible qualities, 
which are similar, can alone convey the 
impression, whence the idea of causation 
results ; and thence necessary connexion is a 



KU 

" fancy of the mind," not a relation in na- 
ture." 

" To prove that Custom is the only 
" Cause" of our belief in causation; it is 
perfectly reasonable to suppose, that such 
an invariable sequence might be interrupted, 
for there is no contradiction in imagining an 
" ARBITRARY" change in the course of nature. 
Yet should a contrary imagination resist 
reason, and not conceive in fact this inter- 
ruption as possible to take place ; she may 
again reconsider the possibility of nature 
altering her course, forming no contradic- 
tion to reason." 

I appeal to those who are acquainted 
with Mr. Hume's Essays, if this statement 
be not the sum of the argument and I 
also appeal to every man capable of logical 
accuracy, if it doth not involve every 
species of illogical sophistry ; for, 
'Ofr>*f."yifj, 

1st. There is drawn a general nega- 
tive conclusion; from an examination of 
particular instances only. If the adversary 
may not draw from particular experience 



132 

the general affirmative conclusion, that 
there is a necessary connexion; neither can 
Mr. Hume infer a general negative position, 
that there is not a necessary connexion be- 
tween Cause and Effect. He also de- 
duces a general affirmative conclusion, 
viz. " that the future shall invariably re- 
semble the past; from particular instances 
only *. 

2dly. The mind is directed to infer a 
conclusion against the general relation of 
Cause and Effect, by the demonstration of 
a proposition in nowise inconsistent with 
it; namely, that like sensible qualities, 
NOT being like Causes, might be followed 

by DIFFERENT Eflfectsf. 

3dly. A general negative conclusion 
is in fact drawn from negative premises, 
merely; (however the illogical method 
may be disguised both as to manner and 
diction), for it is concluded there is no 
proof for the existence of the general rela- 

* See p, 66, of this Essay, 
f See p. 76, ibid. 



133 

tion of Cause and Effect between objects 
because experience shows that like sensible 
qualities are not like Causes ; and are there- 
fore not necessarily connected with like 
Effects* ! 

4thly. The question is shifted from 
the examination of the general relation 
of Cause and Effect, to that of the crite- 
rion for ascertaining the presence of like 
Causes f. 

5thly. The very proposition is ad- 
mitted, which is in dispute; in order to 
serve the purpose of his argument ; first, 
in the statement that impressions are the 
productive Causes of ideas; secondly, in 
supposing the secret powers of an object 

* It may be seen, that on account of these particular 
and negative propositions, (which after all include that 
proposition which is in question) he really deduces there 
is no such existence^ in this relation AMIDST THINGS 
for in the place of the reality of its existence in nature, 
(supposed by their statement to be disproved to reason, 
and therefore disproved altogether) a ''fancy of it in the 
mind alone"" is obliged to be substituted in its stead. This 
" FANCY'' is no connexion between objects. 

f See further, p. 60, and 62, of this Essay. 
K 3 



134 

to be alone the real productive Causes of its 
future properties; thirdly, in conceiving 
Nature may alter her course for the express 
purpose of changing the secret powers; 
and that they are changed by such alteration; 
and lastly, in alleging custom to be the 
sole Cause (i. e. producing generating prin- 
ciple) of the IDEA of causation*.-^ 

fithly. The proposition that the course 
of nature may be supposed to change/' is 
used ambiguously, signifying indifferently 
either an uncaused alteration of the SUBSE- 
QUENT sensible qualities or of the ANTECE- 
DENT secret powers^. 

7thly, and lastly. The two chief pro- 
positions of the argument are in opposition 
to each other ; for Mr. Hume attempts to 
establish, that CUSTOM not reason is the prin- 

* In these several instances it cannot be contended that 
Mr. Hume's idea of Cause, is only that of an antecedent ; 
IMPRESSION is supposed not merely to go before, but to 
create IDEA ; i. e. to be an object absolutely necessary and 
completely efficient to its production, &c. 

f See pages 76, 90, and 146, &c. of this Essay. 

J See p. 73, ibid. 



135 

cipal of causation, whilst he allows REASON 
to be the sole ground and necessary Cause 
of this belief. 

In presenting the foregoing observations 
to the reader's attention, I have endea- 
voured, I hope, without presumption, to 
show that Mr. Hume's reputation for logi- 
cal correctness has been overrated. The 
effect of his work is to astonish by its bold- 
ness and novelty ; to allure us by its grace 
and lightness ; his propositions are arranged 
so artfully, that their illogical connexion is 
not perceived, and the understanding, with- 
out being satisfied, is gradually drawn into 
inferences from which it would gladly but 
cannot readily escape. 

If any reader should agree with me in 
conceiving this scheme to be fallacious, 
when minutely analyzed, and is thereby 
enabled to overcome its influence on his 
mind, I shall consider myself more than 
repaid for the labour of thought spent in 
an endeavour towards so desirable an end. 



136 



CHAPTER THE FOURTH. 

OBSERVATIONS ON DE. BROWN*S ESSAY ON THE 
DOCTRINE OP MR. HUME. 

DR. Brown's theory merits a particular in- 
vestigation, and I shall follow him very 
shortly through each observation he makes 
on Mr. Hume's doctrine, which he states 
m five propositions. He first of all be- 
gins however with his own definition of 
the relation of Cause and Effect; which 
does not differ materially from that of Mr. 
Hume ; and has the same inconvenience 
attending it ; viz. that it will apply to other 
regular sequences, than those which belong 
to this relation. " A cause," says he, " is 
" an object, which immediately precedes 
" any change, and which existing again in 
*' similar circumstances, will always be im- 
" mediately followed by a similar change." 

And again, " invariableness of antece- 
" dence, is the element which constitutes 
" the idea of a cause." 



137 

But I ask, how do you get acquaint- 
ed with this fact? Mr. Hume says he 
knows it ; " because of the habit arising 
" from past custom, carrying the thought 
"to an expectation of the future, with a 
" liveliness of conception equal to the ex- 
" perience of the past," i. e. there is un- 
certain certainty ; for, a lively idea hath 
not, in awaking any more than in a sleep- 
ing hour, CERTAIN EXISTENCE for its resem- 
blance, without some other notion than 
merely its vivacity to support an argument 
for its reality*. 
-ii: . 

Dr. Brown says, " I know it from instinc- 
tive belief, arising from the observation of 
seeing in any one instance, certain Effects 
follow given Causes/ ' 
si 

Now I confess, I do not know what 
" instinctive belief" means, except as ap- 
plied to the mysterious manner in which 
animals know of the qualities of bodies 
previous to experience, by some laws be- 

* This notion is intended to be fully discussed in a 
future Essay on the nature of external objects. 



138 

yond our scrutiny ; or at most our con- 
scious belief, of the existence of a simple 
sensation. 



Intuitive belief, I understand ; and by it is 
meant, that in the relation of the two mem- 
bers of a proposition, the truth is contained 
in the definition of the terms ; and cannot 
be altered without altering the signs of the 
ideas, which have been just allowed to 
stand for them. But to say that instinc- 
tive, or intuitive belief, can arise in the 
mind, as a conclusive proposition, when it 
requires experience, in order to form some 
DATA for its premises ; is to say you be- 
lieve a thing, without a reason for it, and 
that you are sure of it, because you are 
sure of it, although you do want an experi- 
ment, in order to form a basis for the 
proposition, wliich is to be a reason for 
your instinctive conclusion. This is Dr. 
Brown's Theory. 

He is excellent in detecting some of 
Mr. Hume's fallacies ; but in not allowing 
that the proposition, " like Causes must 
have like Effects/' to be founded on reason, 



139 

is equally guilty of a most important one 
himself. 

The first proposition of Mr. Hume 
which he examines is, that the relation of 
Cause and Effect cannot be discovered a 
priori. 

To this Dr. Brown assents ; and I grant, 
that the particular qualities which will 
arise, under new circumstances that bodies 
shall be placed in, cannot. But the exact 
nature of the question is here rendered 
very ambiguous : for the general relation 
of Cause and Effect, is the subject in ques- 
tion ; but the question answered, is whether 
the particular Effects arising from particu- 
lar Causes, can be known ; and in which- 
ever way it is answered, it does not form 
an ansiver to the GENERAL one ; for, like 
Causes in general, might necessarily be con- 
nected with like Effects (of whatever kind 
they might be); and this proposition known, 
from some process of reasoning : although 
neither before nor after experience, the 
particular kind of Effects from given Causes 
should be discovered. This ambiguity 



140 

renders the argument nugatory, and it 
would be tedious and unnecessary to say 
any thing more upon it. 

The second proposition of Mr. Hume's 
Theory is, that even " after experience the 
relation of Cause and Effect cannot be dis- 
covered by reason." To this Dr. Brown 
also agrees. The same ambiguity, con- 
cerning the nature of the question again 
prevails ; for reason might be able to teach 
us after experience, that the same qualities 
must arise out of the same objects, when 
there was nothing to make a difference, 
although she should not inform us of the 
" secrets of nature," and explain to us any 
better, the mode of the connexion in each 
particular instance ; for if the contrary were 
true; if we could know those " secrets" in 
every particular instance, it could not form 
a ground, for concluding that " all like 
Causes must have like Effects." General 
conclusions cannot flow from particular pre- 
mises, whether they be formed by reason* 
or custom, or instinct. 



141 

But Dr. Brown's argument, against rea- 
son, must be examined more minutely ; 
these are his words ; "he who asserts that 
" A WILL always be followed by B, asserts 
" more than that A always HAS BEEN/O/- 
" lowed by B ; and it is this addition which 
" forms the very essence of THE RELATION 
44 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT; neither of the 
" propositions includes the other; and as 
" they have no agreement, reason, which 
" is the sense of agreement, cannot be ap- 
" plied to them." 

To represent the relation of Cause and 
Effect, as A followed by B, is a false view 
of the matter. Cause and Effect, might 
be represented rather by A x B = C, there- 
fore C is INCLUDED in the MIXTURE OF THE 
OBJECTS called CAUSE. If C arises once from 
the junction of any two bodies; C must upon 
every other like conjunction, be the result; 
because there is no alteration in the propor- 
tions of the quantities to make a difference; 
C is really included in the MIXTURE of A 
and B, although, to our senses, we are 
forced to note down (as it were) the SUM 
arising from their union, after the observance 



142 

of their coalescence. In like manner the 
results of all arithmetical combinations are 
included in their statements; yet we are 
obliged to take notice of them separately 
and subsequently, owing to the imperfec- 
tion of our senses, in not observing them 
with sufficient quickness, and time being 
requisite to bring them out to full view 
and apparent in some DISTINCT shape. In- 
deed my whole notion, of the relation of 
Cause and Effect, is aptly imagined, by 
the nature of the necessary results, inclu- 
ded in the juxta-position of quantities. 

But as long as Cause shall be con- 
sidered ONLY as an antecedent; the FUTURE 
can never be proved to be included in 
the PAST, which yet is truly the case. 
For when it comes to be observed, that 
Cause means, and really is the creation of 
NEW QUALITIES, (from new conjunctions 
in matter or mind,) then it is perceived 
that the future is " involved in the past ;" 
for when existing objects are the same, 
they must put on SIMILAR QUALITIES ; 
otherwise contrary qualities or differences, 
would arise of themselves ; and " begin 

4 



143 

their own existences," which is impossi- 
ble, and conveys a contradiction in terms*. 
All that experience has to do, is to show 
us, by what passes within ourselves, that 
there is a contradiction in the supposition 
of qualities beginning their own existence ; 
and A CONTRADICTION is never admitted 
in the relation of any ideas that present 
themselves. The very act of reason- 
ing consists, in such a comparison of our 
ideas, as will not permit of inconsistent 
propositions^; which would be the case, if 
" like Causes could produce other than like 
Effects." 

So then REASON does establish this 
beautiful and certain proposition, which 

* No mathematical reasoning can ever be driven fur- 
ther back, than by showing that the contrary of an asserted 
proposition is a contradiction in terms. 

f- The beginning of every quality is perceived to be 
only a change, upon some objects already in existence ; 
and therefore cannot convey the same notion to the mind, 
as the beginning of a quality, supposed to be independent 
of other objects and NOT to be a change. THE BEGINNING 
OF EXISTENCE, therefore, cannot appear otherwise than 
contrary to the idea of its independency of those objects of 
which it is a change. 



144 

is the foundation of all our knowledge ; 
That like Causes must ever produce like 
Effects. 

The third proposition is ; that the rela- 
tion of Cause and Effect is an object of 
belief alone. To this Dr. Brown also agrees, 
saying, " any quality which is incapable of 
being perceived, or inferred, can result only 
from an instinctive principle of faith." 
But I ask how do you know the future 
is invariable ? You say from an instinctive 
principle of faith in observing the present. I 
reply, that it is as impossible to draw an 
INSTINCTIVE general conclusion, from particu- 
lar premises, as a REASONABLE one. That 
A follows B, can no more form an instinct 
than a reason, for universal certainty of a 
similar sequence. 

The fourth proposition, that the relation 
of Cause and Effect is believed to exist be- 
tween objects only after their " customary" 
conjunction is known to us; Dr. Brown 
combats with such ingenuity, reasons 
against with such severity of logic, and 



145 

vanquishes with such skill and power, that 
all I should attempt to say upon it, would 
be useless. I can only express my re- 
gret, that he could suppose, a notion of 
belief, founded upon the influence of the 
imagination, rather than of reason, to 
be a rock, on which we might build our 
house, without " danger of the storm and 
tempest." 

Nor is Dr. Brown's " blind impulse of 
faith" a much more secure one. He ima- 
gines such a principle to be the foundation 
of all demonstrative reasoning ; but it is 
really not so. Intuitive propositions are 
those included in tJie very terms, given to 
our impressions ; and are as true as they 
are, whose truth arises from simple con- 
scious feelings, ARBITRARILY named. But IN- 
STINCTIVE propositions, not so grounded, 
and which require some DATA, some experi- 
ence, some premises, in which it is con- 
fessed they are not included, are an abso- 
lute contradiction to philosophy and com- 
mon sense. 



The fifth proposition is, " that when 
" two objects have been frequently observ- 
" ed in succession, the mind passes readily 
" from the idea of one to the idea of the 
" other ; the transition in the mind itself 
" being the impression from which the 
" idea of the necessary connexion of the 
" objects as Cause and Effect is de- 
" rived." 

This opinion, namely, " that an easy 
transition of thought," is the only founda- 
tion of the idea of power, Dr. Brown also 
combats, and conquers ; showing in a mas- 
terly manner the illogical CIRCLE in which 
Mr. Hume argues. Indeed it is matter of 
surprise to reflect on Mr. Hume's reputa- 
tion, for logical precision, when the whole 
superstructure of his work is built upon the 
denial of a proposition, which is assumed 
as true in the premises ; for in the ori- 
ginal inquiry, concerning the method by 
which we gain ideas'; Mr. Hume says, it must 
be from IMPRESSIONS as their Cause ; i. e. 
as a " productive principle;" for " their con- 
" stant conjunction is too frequent to arise 



147 

" from chance*;" then examining the na- 
ture of the idea of cause, or power ; he 
asks, " from what impression (as its cause) 
this idea arises" (as its effect) ? Thus prov- 
ing ideas to be " derived" from impressions, 
on account of the necessary connexion there 
exists between them ; and then, disproving 
this doctrine of necessary connexion, from 
the very notions previously built upon it. 
It is considered, however, by Dr. Brown, 
that Mr. Hume's idea of power, although 
false, and only resolvable into a strong ima- 
gination founded on custom; " a belief not 
different from that we have in fiction, save 
-dour 

* " Let us consider how they stand with regard to 
" existence, and of the impressions and ideas, which are 
" Causes and which Effects." TREATISE " Such acon- 
" stant conjunction can never arise from chance, but 
" proves a dependence of the impressions on the ideas, or 
" of the ideas on the impressions." TREATISE. These 
notions, although not expressed in the very same words, 
are plainly found in the Essays. " Every idea is 
" copied,"" or is " derived" from an impression, is precisely 
the same thought, and which as completely begs the ques- 
tion in dispute, as the passages do which I have quoted 
from the Treatise ; evidently arguing that IMPRESSION is 
the " productive principle" of idea. 

L 2 



148 



in the vivacity of the conception of its ob- 
jects ;" is nevertheless sufficient to guard 
the doctrine from any charge of excluding 
the necessity of Deity for the creation of the 
universe. 

He seems to think, that as Mr. Hume 
got hold of the idea of POWER, by some 
means or other, it is immaterial by what 
means; as any idea of power whatever, 
would show that a Deity was alike ne- 
cessary. 

But this is false reasoning ; if, accord- 
ing to Mr. Hume, we really did, from ob- 
serving one object always follow another, 
fall into so strong a fancy, that one was 
necessary to produce the other, as to be unable 
to avoid the conclusion of their invariable 
and absolute dependence on each other; 
yet upon the supposition of once knowing 
this conclusion to be only the effect of a 
habit of mind, arising from an association 
of ideas ; (a fancy, a custom of thought) ; 
we should nevertheless consider that the 
objects in nature might be perfectly inde- 



149 

pendent of each other ; and therefore could 
not draw any conclusion in favour of the 
necessity of a Creator, as the " productive 
principle" of the universe. 

For should the circumstance of B fol- 
lowing A, in all alphabets, generate in our 
minds the false notion that A causes B, 
yet if afterwards we should discover that 
these letters were not truly necessary to 
each other, and that in nature any other 
letter than B might follow A; although 
after such discovery, B might always be 
suggested on the appearance of A ; yet 
not only would the notion of causation 
be really destroyed, if it arose from the 
invariableness of their antecedence and sub- 
sequence ; but upon the supposition of the 
contrary, and that notwithstanding the 
conviction of the judgment, the fancy of 
their mutual necessary dependence held its 
ground; still we should not justify such 
an example as fit to be followed in ALL 
our other expectations ; or thence conclude, 
that all things we know of, required ne- 
cessarily their antecedents. No ; this fancy 

L3 



150 

of power, without knowledge of it; this ima- 
gination of productive principle, without an 
enlightened judgment concerning its ab- 
solute necessity, cannot be all that is neces- 
sary, to any arguments that are founded 
on the belief of POWER." 

A false and fanciful idea of power, of 
cause, and of connexion, is just as unsub- 
stantial for their support, as though these 
words were absolutely " without any mean- 
ing." 



The denial of the idea of power, as of 
truly a " productive principle," as of & for- 
mer and generator of new qualities in mat- 
ter, and the consideration of it as only " a 
custom of mind," does not prevent the doc- 
trine, as Dr. Brown seems to think it may, 
from involving the most dangerous conse- 
quences. 

^up.i:' L ?or;. ihjoi.^ 'ow lir-: ;Su\iw 

How such an idea of power as Mr. 
Hume's, should give us the " consolation, 
and the peace, and the happiness, and the 
virtue of a filial confidence in the great 



151 

Father of mankind," is hard to discover? 
A faith like this, would not go far in af- 
fording men that " security which has more 
to do with our happiness, than any present 
earthly enjoyment!" 









L4 



CHAPTER THE FIFTH. 

OBSERVATIONS ON MB. LAWRENCE* S LECTUKES. 
SECTION THE FIRST. 

I SHALL now proceed to offer a few obser- 
vations on a modern author, (Mr. Law- 
rence,) who in his Physiological Lectures, 
eagerly seizes upon Dr. Brown's definition 
of the relation of Cause and Effect ; which 
he imagines well adapted to an explanation 
of the properties of life. 

In his 3d Lecture, p. 81, Mr. Lawrence 
says, " we can only trace, in this notion of 
" necessary connexion, the Tact of certainty 
" or universality of concurrence ; therefore 
" it is we may assert the living muscular 
" fibre is irritable, and the living nervous 
4< fibre is sensible. Nothing more than this 
" is meant when a necessary connexion is 
" asserted between the properties of sensi- 



" bility, and irritability, and the structures 
" of living muscular and nervous fibres." 

And again, page 79, ** The only reason 
" we have for asserting in any case that 
" any property belongs to any substance, 
<c is the certainty or universality with which 
" we find the substance, and the property 
" in question, accompanying each other. 
" Thus we say gold is ductile, yellow, solu- 
66 ble in nitro- muriatic acid, because we 
" have always found gold when pure to be 
" so we assert the living muscular fibres 
"to be irritable, and the living nervous 
" fibres to be sensible for the same reason. 
" The evidence of the two propositions 
"presents itself to my mind as unmarked 
" by the faintest shade of difference." Ac- 
cording to the theory of the foregoing pages 
of this Essay, there is the greatest difference 
between the evidence of the two proposi- 
tions just quoted. 

An object is here defined; " a com- 
bined mass of qualities, determined to 
the senses from unknown causes in nature, 
to which an arbitrary name is affixed." But 



154 



property which is synonymous with Effect, 
" is the yet untried, or unobserved quality, 
which will arise upon the mixture of that 
mass with other objects." 



The necessary connexion, therefore, of a 
name, with the qualities which it designates, 
is no more than the connexion of an arbi- 
trary sound with an object, or in other words 
with the unknown causes in nature, which de- 
termine the qualities that affect our senses ; 
and which must be " necessarily con- 
nected with it" so long as we do not con- 
tradict ourselves in terms ; or at least 
whilst we agree not to alter our terms. 
But the necessary connexion of an object, 
and its further properties, (or effects,) viz. 
those which are produced by its union with 
another object, arises from the obligation 
that certain combinations of qualities have 
to beget upon their junction with other 
combinations, certain NEW QUALITIES ; and 
this necessary connexion must take place 
between the like objects on all future occa- 
sions, from the obligation that like Games 
have to produce like Effects. The connexion 



of gold with fusibility, ductility, &c. is of 
the former kind of connexion, viz. that of 
a name for certain enumerated qualities, en 
masse *. The connexion of sentiency with 
the live nerve, is of the latter kind. The for- 
mer is a necessary but arbitrary connexion ; 
the latter is considered as a NECESSARY Ef- 
fect, from certain combined and efficient 
causes. 

SECTION THE SECOND. 

Should it be objected, the word gold, does 
not stand as a mere arbitrary sign for certain 
enumerated qualities, but as a term, for a 
portion of extended matter, which will exhibit 
upon trial, certain properties peculiar to it- 
self, I admit, that it is perfectly philosophi- 
cal to consider the subject in this point of 
view; 'for either a noun as a name, may be 
considered as a sign, for all the qualities 
and properties understood to be under the 
term; or as a sign, merely standing for 



* See Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, 
Chap. 3. b. 6. Sec. 35. 



156 

the qualities of the genus ; then the noun 
is still only necessarily connected in the 
sense of an arbitrary connexion, with the 
qualities which compose the genus, and 
the mass of qualities, which combine to form 
this object, are afterwards necessarily con- 
nected as a Cause; when in its conjunc- 
tion, with any other objects; it puts on 
further qualities, which then are its effects, 
or properties. In this sense, gold* mixed 
with light, (some of whose rays it reflects,) 
is necessarily yellow; mixed with heat, 
(in different degrees,) it is ductile, and 
fusible ; mixed with N. M. acid, it is so- 
luble. 

If this should be the sense, which I do 
not think it is, of Mr. Lawrence in his pas- 
sage on gold it is true there may be " no 
difference between the evidence for the two 
propositions;" for both objects axe neces- 
sarily and invariably connected with their 
effects or properties. 

But neither of them are to be regarded, 
as only so connected with their properties 



157 

in future, because they have been invariably 
concurrent in past time. 

Mr. Lawrence, no more than Dr. Brown, 
or Mr. Hume, can predicate of the FUTURE, 
from the past, unless under the relation of 
Cause and Effect, as of a truly productive 
principle, with a quality produced. 

I would further observe, that the arbi- 
trary connexion of a name, with a certain 
number of similar enumerated qualities, re- 
quires no proof for its assertion ; such 
qualities shall be gold, and such others lead 
and copper, if we please to call them so. 
But the necessary connexion of an object 
and its further properties, when combined 
with other objects, requires experiment to 

prove its truth. 

- ~\ 

Also the definition of the arbitrary name, 
is absolute. Because the proposition in 
which it is contained is identical ; such 
qualities, are gold and gold is the enu- 
meration of such qualities. But the de- 
finition of an object in respect to its exhi- 
bition of further qualities in different combi- 



158 

nations with other objects, is conditional; it 
being understood that it will not hold, un- 
less the circumstances are similar upon each 
occasion, that have any power to affect 
them*. 

i IA\\ rtif\'$ 
k> |icU: IT! yxl. v '\ * 

SECTION THE THIRD. 

<Wy*Y.U*yu\ V*iJ'- *> 

It is plain that Mr. Lawrence has over- 
looked these distinctions, where there are 
such manifest differences, on account of his 
" becoming acquainted with Dr. Brown's 
Essay on Cause and Effect," which he con- 
siders as " so simple and logical that any 
attempt at direct opposition would "be 
utterly hopeless;" and has quoted along 
passage in a note as a proof of this, and as 
a support of the doctrine he is laying down 
in the text. 

'.A\W\ *.Y* WW\ \ 

In this passage are the three following 
sentences, which I shall not apologize for 
inserting; since the consequences of a 
hasty adoption, of what I consider FALSE 
instead of LOGICAL deduction, and confused 

* See Locke's Essay, Chap. 6. Book 4. Sec. 8 and 9 ; 
where unexpectedly I find he perfectly cqincides with me. 

4 



159 

instead of " simple" argument into im- 
portant practical theories, cannot be too 
strongly deprecated, and I wish to give my 
reader full possession of the grounds of my 
reasoning. 

Jc , ' 

The 1 st consists in the definition of the 
relation of Cause and Effect, which I have 
already commented on, in the former 
Chapter against Dr. Brown. 
.0' 

" A cause is that which immediately 
" precedes any change, and which existing 
" at any time in similar circumstances, has 
" been always, and will be always followed 
" by a similar change." 



" Priority, in the sequence observed and 
" invariableness of antecedence in the past 
" and future sequences supposed, are the 
" only elements combined in the notion of 
" a cause." 
inivil 'io .-.-asm i.'ua v 

2dly. Of property, ". the words property 
" and quality admit of exactly the same de- 
4 ' finition, expressing only a certain relation 
" of invariable antecedence and conse- 



160 

" quence in changes that take place on the 
" presence of the substance to which they 
" are ascribed/' 
*'*" 

3dly. " The powers, properties or qua- 
" lities of a substance are not to be re- 
" garded as any thing superadded to the 
" substance, or distinct from it. They are 
" only the substance itself considered in re- 
" lation to various changes that take place 
" when it exists in peculiar circumstances." 

Hence Mr. Lawrence concludes, p. 81, 
" That although induced to ascribe the 
" constant concomitance of a substance 
" and its properties to some necessary con- 
" nexion between them, yet we can only 
" trace in this notion, the fact of cer- 
" taiuty or universality of concurrence. 
" Nothing more than this can be meant 
" when a necessary connexion is asserted 
" between the properties of sensibility, and 
" irritability, and the structures of living 
". muscular and nervous fibres." 

Now I must shortly bring to my readers 
recollection, that I have already shown that 



161 

Dr. Brown's definition which predicates in* 
variableness in relation to future sequences, 
is not supported by his argument, as no 
past experience merely, could prove it ; it 
being illogical to draw general conclusions 
from particular premises. I have also, 
I think, shown that our knowledge of the 
future, arises from its being " involved" in 
the past ; on account of Cause being truly a 
productive principle, and Effects or proper- 
ties truly produced qualities, so that neces- 
sary connexion becomes a very different 
relation from either a past or future sequence 
of events, and signifies the " close bond" 
between the creator and created. 

Had Mr. Lawrence, however, paid more 
attention than he has done to the conclud- 
ing sentence I have quoted from Dr. 
Brown, he had not engrafted these errors 
into his system : for nothing can be more 
just and beautiful than to say of the pro- 
perties of a substance, " that they are only 
*' the substance itself in relation to various 
" changes which take place, when it exists 
** in peculiar circumstances" But such an 

M 



162 

idea is at variance with all his own previous 
definitions and arguments on the subject, 
for if " the powers, properties, or qualities 
" of a substance are not to be regarded as 
" any thing superadded to the substance, 
" or distinct from it, but only the substance 
" itself, considered in relation to various 
" changes which take place when it exists 
" in peculiar circumstances," then these 
properties and qualities cannot be after 
itself; but are necessarily connected with, 
because inhering in it, and brought out to 
view when mixed with the qualities of other 
objects. 



SECTION THE FOURTH. 

Now as the muscle and nerve can and 
do exist as organized beings, without irri- 
tability and sentiency when under death, 
so when as substances, they are placed 
under that condition called life, and are then 
only capable of putting on these qualities 
of irritability and sentiency, it must be by a 
truly necessary connexion, between life and 
these qualities. Irritability and sentiency 
are verily new powers and beings created 
by efficient, creating circumstances. Sen- 



163 

sation and all its variety, is not an effect 
without a cause ; and life is that object 
without which it will not exist in the nerve; 
and therefore according to the doctrine laid 
down in this Essay, is a true cause for it : 
being one of the objects absolutely necessary 
and efficient to that result in certain circum- 
stances ; although what the WHOLE of those 
conditions may be, the combination of which 
is needful, may possibly ever remain beyond 
the scrutiny of man. Should Mr. Lawrence 
retort, that the phrase " the living nerve," 
stands merely as a sign of enumerated qua- 
lities and properties found together, in the 
way that I have said gold may stand as a 
sign for those that lie under that term ; 
that it is in this sense he compares the two 
propositions concerning them ; and in this 
sense, he alleges there is no difference in 
the evidence for the only kind of necessary 
connexion there exists between an object 
and its properties ? 

I answer the very statement of the pro- 
position " the living nerve is sentient," as- 
signs a cause and producing principle for 
sensation ; for by placing an adjective before 

M 2 



164 

a noun, it becomes a qualified noun. And 
the qualities beneath the whole term are a 
mass of altered qualities, which alteration, 
is alleged to be efficient to the production 
of a new mode of existence ; viz. that of 
sensation. 

Thus (to use a familiar illustration) the 
saying a bilious man is choleric, assigns vile 
as the cause of anger, and it would be pue- 
rile after such a proposition, to add, that 
" however strong the feeling may be, that 
" there is the close bond of Cause and Ef- 
" feet between these objects, yet it is a 
" mistake to suppose it." This would but 
be a subsequent denial of what the statement 
previously asserted. 
r'fit lii bir, : . t>.ij .^ii'a'VJ^U'.; 8UoiJfeoqo'Ki% 

Whereas gold, or any other noun, when 
it stands as a sign for any collection of qua- 
lities, and properties ; is neither a cause 
nor an object ; it is a word, a name merely, 
and when thus placed as the subject of a 
proposition, of which the qualities stand as 
the predicate, signifies, that by such a 
name, shall such masses, being found to- 
notad evil o'jjj}*; #K tjniojjkf vd.wl > aojte^nsa 



165 

gether and set apart from other collections, 
be signified*. 

This distinction between a qualified, and 
unqualified noun, on account of the different 
nature of the connexion of the predicate of 
the proposition, with its subject, Mr. Law- 
rence did not take notice of; or he would 
not have thought " there was not the faint- 
est shade of difference" between the two 
propositions he states, in this respect. 

SECTION THE FIFTH. 

But this is not the most important error 
in Mr. Lawrence's system, arising from 
false notions, concerning the relation 
of Cause and Effect ; for by a strange sort 
of contradiction, in philosophy, although 
he denies that any cause can be found, 
among those things which are invariably 
together, for the properties they exhibit; 
yet he makes no difficulty in inferring that 
the whole causes are supposed to be found 

* See Locke's Essay in several places, especially Book 
3. Chap. 8. Sec. 2. compared with Chap. 9. Sec. 12, 13, 
and 17. and Chap. 10. Sec. 20, 21, and 22. 

M 3 



from the mere circumstance of their in- 
variable coalesence ; insomuch that no 
extraneous cause need be sought for. 
The sum of his argument is, " There is 
no such thing as CAUSE and EFFECT, to 
be perceived between the objects with which 
we are acquainted. It is idle to say we 
have found a Cause; it is still more idle to 
look for it. Objects are found to be amassed 
qualities and properties, which have invaria- 
bly existed together in past time, and for that 
reason will do so in future; but as for a pro- 
ductive principle, it is unwwihy of a philoso- 
pher to expect it, or to seek for it; or to need 
it, in order to account for any appearances. 
We have objects, variously diversified t his 
is all and this is enough /" 

It is hence, (so Mr. Lawrence argues,) 
absurd to seek a Cause for sensation or 
thought, although no efficient one is pre- 
tended to be assigned, in the union of the 
powers of life with organization. The liv- 
ing nerve is an object having sensation 
" this is all and this is enough." Whereas 
there must be causes for every thing, and 
sometimes a vast multitude of objects are 



wanted^ before their mutual bearings and 
mixtures with each other operate so as 
to produce any peculiar existence. The 
highest, and the greatest we know of is, 
sensation, and its varieties; and although 
we know that life is wanted as a cause with- 
out which it cannot exist in this world in 
the nervous system; yet we have no notion 
of all the objects that may be necessary to 
its creation. 

Of all philosophical errors, the substitu- 
tion of false, partial, or insufficient causes 
for the production of an end or object, is 
the most dangerous, because so liable to 
escape detection ; and the idleness of the 
mind which prosecutes with reluctance dif- 
ficult researches into remote proofs ; its 
impatience which eagerly grasps at the 
readiest solution of a doubt ; and its pride, 
so prone to triumph indiscreetly at the 
glimpse of a discovery supposed to be com- 
plete ; for ever occasion it to be guilty of 
that mode of sophistry scholastically termed 
non causa pro causa. 



M 4 



168 

And this is truly the amount of Mr. 
Lawrence's error for with all his denial 
that there are such things as cause and ne- 
cessary connexion, he virtually assigns a 
"false cause 1 ' for sensation, because he 
asserts that all is found that is necessary in 
order to it*. 

Now the truth is, that nature affords 
not experiment, or data enough to show, 
what are the whole causes necessary ; i. e. 
all the objects required, whose junction is 
necessary to sentiency as the result. For 
as the words life, and nerve, stand only 
for a few sensible qualities, whereby they 
affect us ; so does it appear there is no 
existing definition of them, no possible 
experiment which can be made on their 
nature, sufficient to afford premises wide 
enough to admit the conclusion, that sen- 
tiency shall result from their conjunction 
only, and shall not be able to exist without 
them. 

' Mr. Lawrence says, there is no more reason to 
search for a cause for sensation or life than for attraction 
or electricity yet these powers must have Causes, and phi- 
losophers have searched for them ; and if they have given 
over the inquiry, it is because they despair of success. 



169 



SECTION THE SEVENTH. 

If indeed the powers of matter in gene- 
ral, (whatever matter may be,) were suffi- 
cient to elicit sentiency when placed under 
arrangement and mixed with life, then the 
true causes for it are assigned, and found. 
But we cannot prove this. If on the con- 
trary, the essential qualities of matter 
arranged and in motion be not thought 
sufficient to account for so extraordinary a 
difference as that between conscious and 
unconscious being, then there must be a 
particular cause for it : which cause must 
be considered an immaterial cause, that is, 
a principle, power, being, an unknown qua- 
lity denied to exist in matter. This must 
have a name, and may be called soul, or 
spirit. And this statement, really contains 
the whole argument either way. It is on 
this point, that not only here, but in an after 
Lecture (" on the functions of the brain,") 
Mr. Lawrence betrays a want of philoso- 
phical precision, by denying that any 
cause beyond the brain is necessary to 
thought, on account of the impossibility of 
assigning the time of its union with the 



170 

body ; whereas a Cause must have origi- 
nally been necessary, upon the creation of 
man, for the phenomenon in question; 
and the capacity of sensation may, as a 
component part of the whole animal mass, 
be always generated with it, yet retain its 
individuality, after having once been formed 
with each being ; analogous to the whole 
plan of nature, in other respects ; analo- 
gous to the physical individuality of all the 
millions of mankind, each of which was 
formed of the general clay ; analogous 
to the separate, and particular properties, 
which wait upon the differences of vegeta- 
ble life, where every various plant is ex- 
panded from similar juices. 

But I must be true to my own doctrine 
in all its bearings ; and as I have said, that 
in order to form the proximate cause of any 
event, a junction or mutual mixture of all the 
objects necessary to it must take place; so I 
conceive it to be impossible, but that a 
distinct and different action of the brain 
(without which organ there is no sensation 
in man, and all thought is but a mode of 
it) must be synchronous with whatever other 



171 

powers are also necessary for that result ; 
viz. sensation and thought with their varie- 
ties. I say, the junction must be synchron- 
ous for sensation is an effect, and must 
require the union of those objects whose 
mixed qualities elicit it. 

Now those causes not contained in 
matter, may be called mind, or soul. I 
have said also, that a different action of 
brain is wanted for each variety of thought 
and sensation; and so it must, because 
there must be a separate or different cause, 
for every separate or diverse Effect in na- 
ture, as before discussed. And thus the 
brain becomes the exponent of the soul; 
or is in the same proportion in its actions, 
as the actions of mind : and thus what 
is termed association of ideas, must have 
corresponding unions, in the actions of the 
brain. 

Now Mr. Lawrence contradicts at 
once his own arguments for materialism, 
as well as nature, and fact ; when he says 
(tauntingly) 4 ' thus we come to diseases of 
" an immaterial being! for which suitably 

4 



172 

" enough moral treatment has been recom- 
" mended," inferring thereby the absurdity 
of moral treatment, to a material mind. 

.-i/.;' .;>; ." *-Vj i;fi- ' :''.-.':' : 

Now moral treatment, according to his 
own notion of only a material capacity for 
thought, might still be proper, as it. would 
still act on that material capacity for 
thought, and though " arguments, syllo- 
gisms, and sermons," might not reach it, 
of an ordinary kind; yet, the persuasions 
of friendship ; the influence of beauty, and 
of love; the pleasures of social inter- 
course; the calm discussions of reason; 
scenes that please the imagination, or en- 
chant the sense, will reach it, and do. 
Nevertheless all this is " moral treatment,' 1 
and which yet requires the brain and ner- 
vous system. In short, to address the mind 
is to address the body, which instantly acts 
along and with it, not after it. And to ad- 
dress the body is to address the mind for 
every sensation, however popularly called 
bodily; requires mind, equally with thought 
as a cause for it, and is not merely to be 
considered as a simple being, or feeling, 
beginning and ending in itself; but as inti- 



173 

mately associating with those of a LIKE KIND, 
which certain THOUGHTS are capable of ex- 
citing, and as having, therefore, a most 
material agency, when first in order, by sug- 
gesting such specific thoughts. This mode 
of thinking on the subject I know not that 
any have sufficiently heeded, much less cul- 
tivated. 

It is to be lamented that the use of 
pure metaphysics has not been more strictly 
adopted into the researches of physiology, 
since the just application of these sciences 
to each other, would tend to the advance- 
ment of both. Nor have the talents and 
genius of Mr. Lawrence exempted him, in 
this respect, from the common failure. 

For (in his Lecture on the functions of 
the brain,) he is guilty of a very great 
oversight in supposing philosophers speak 
of an immaterial being as wanted for thought, 
and not for sensation, Instead of which 
Mr. Locke, Bishop Butler, David Hartley, 
Bishop Berkeley, all distinctly argue that 
matter in motion, not seeming cause suffi- 
cient for the most simple sensation, there- 



174 

fore spirit is wanted to that end ; which is 
merely a name for the cause desired : and 
this mistake shows the little attention he 
has paid to these authors. But I consider 
it as impossible that any material improve- 
ment should be made in the method of ap- 
plying philosophy to physiology, as long as 
men argue, that in every action of the senses, 
the body acts BEFORE the mind and UPON it. 
And vice versa, as I have heard it contend- 
ed in argument " that the actions of the me- 
mory, the imagination, and the reasoning 
powers, begin in the mind, exist entirely in 
the mind, act before the body, and upon it." 
Nor will it advance, as long as any anxiety 
among materialists makes them wish to 
show all is body. Or, on the contraiy, if 
whilst religious men are fearful that their 
dearest hopes may fail them, in case any 
thing of body is wanted, in order to thought. 
Whereas religion is not concerned in this 
matter so much as they imagine. If im- 
mortality is- man's inheritance, it is not as 
a natural birthright. The meanest worm 
must feel and think as well as man, and yet 
may not be immortal If it is his,* it is a 
gift, whfeh the Giver has power enough to 



175 

make good by ways unseen to us ; but not 
surely by conveying to man a power so in- 
discerptible, indivisible, Sfc. that he becomes 
a rival to his own omnipotence and " shall 
not surely die. 1 ' 

SECTION THE EIGHTH. 

But to return from this digression which 
yet was necessary, in order to represent, 
the whole of Mr. Lawrence's mistaken 
reasoning on this branch of the subject, 
I shall only at present further observe, 
that as the nature of life is become a ques- 
tion of great interest, I must reserve a few 
more observations upon it for another chap- 
ter, as Mr. Lawrence has given various, and 
apparently, inconsistent definitions of that 
word. Nor must it be supposed irrelevant 
to the present subject so to do, for I think 
his erroneous views in this respect arise 
also on account of his not supposing that a 
real efficient cause is necessary to be as- 
signed for life any more than for sensation. 
Therefore all philosophers are reckoned 
absurd, who have hitherto endeavoured, or 
who still continue, to seek for the proximate 
cause of it; it being considered by him 



176 

quite sufficient to look upon it as a circum- 
stance only concurring with organization,- 
whereas " there must be a cause for every 
thing," and a cause for that cause, back- 
wards towards an uncreated Essence. 

But every step gained in the knowledge 
of causes, (i. e. of what objects are neces- 
sary in order to the production of another) 
is of exquisite value, and it is pity if a false 
philosophy should succeed in slackening 
the emulation of inquiring minds upon this 
subject, which is one of the highest mo- 
ment to human health and happiness. 

I shall therefore, in order to show that 
I do not mistake my author, take an op- 
portunity of placing together these defini- 
tions, &c. in his own words : but in order 
to be brief, leave out entirely all foreign 
matter with which they are interspersed, 
and which prevent the exact noticing of the 
contradictions that appear to be among 
them. 






177 



CHAPTER THE SIXTH. 

SECTION THE FIRST. 

. 

1 HESUME the subject by saying, that it is 
difficult to controvert Mr. Lawrence's 
opinion of the nature of life, because his 
definitions bear no resemblance to each 
other. They are as follows : 

\ 

(Lecture 1st, p. 7.) " That life then, or 
" the assemblage of all the functions, is 
*' immediately dependant on organization, 
" appears to me as clear, as that the pre 
" sence of the sun causes the light of day; 
" and to suppose that we could have light 
" without that luminary, would not be 
" more unreasonable than to conceive that 
" life is independent of the animal body, in 
" which the vital phenomena are observed/ 

Lecture 2d, p 61. " To talk of life as 
" independent of an animal body, to speak 
*' of a function without reference to an ap- 
" propriate organ, is physiologically absurd 
" it is looking for an effect without a 
" cause." 

N 



178 

(Lecture 3d, p. 81.) " The living mus- 
" cular fibre is irritable. The living ner- 
" vous fibre is sensible/' (p. 82.) " To 
' ' call life a property of organization would 
" be unmeaning, it would be nonsense. The 
" primary or elementary animal structures 
" are endowed with vital properties ; their 
" combinations compose the animal organs, 
" in which by means of the vital proper- 
" ties of the component elementary struc- 
" tures, the animal functions are car- 
" ried on." 

"i. 

Lecture 4th, p. 92. " The body is com- 
" posed of solids and fluids ; the compo- 
" nent elements of which nitrogen is a prin- 
'-' cipal one, united in numbers of 3, 4, or 
" more, easily pass into new combinations ; 
" and are, for the most part, readily conver- 
" tible into fluid or gas." 

(P. 93.) " Life presupposes organiza- 
" tion." 

(Ibid.) Again ; " Living bodies exhibit a 
" constant internal motion ; whilst this 
" motion lasts, the body is said to be alive 



179 

i4 when it ceases, the organic structures 
" then yield to the chemical affinities of 
*' the surrounding elements." 

SECTION THE SECOND. 

Now, surely, it is a contradiction to say, 
life is " dependant on organization," as light 
is upon the sun, and yet that it is " un- 
meaning" and nonsense, to call life a pro- 
perty of it*. It is a second contradiction to 
say, that life is dependant as a function, 
upon an animated bodyf ; when the body 
could not be animated without it ; or that 
as " assembled functions," it is " dependant 
" on organization, as light is dependant on 
" the sunj." When life is so far from con- 
sisting in " the assembled functions," that 
none of the functions can take place with- 
out life, and thus it is wanted as a quality, 
or being , first in order to coalesce and form a 
junction with the organs in order to their ac- 
tion. Accordingly, although life may never 
be found without organization, because 
life requires its co-operation in order to a cer- 
tain result, yet life is not thence dependant 

* Lect. 3. p. 82. f Lect. 2. p. 61. 

| Lect. 1. p. 7. 

N 2 



180 

on it, as an effect upon its cause, as light is 
upon the sun, which is never above the ho- 
rizon without its brilliant attendant. But 
many a beautiful and youthful set of or- 
gans are perfect^ without animation. This 
error arises entirely from considering that as 
Cause and Effect are things that go toge- 
ther; so things that go together are to be 
considered as in that relation. Whereas 
vast varieties of objects, have been inva- 
riably together in past time, which are not 
Cause and Effect ; and as past invariable- 
ness will not answer for the future, may not 
in future be so found. Joint Causes are 
always found together; joined qualities also 
from a common Cause: and many objects 
have hitherto always been found together, 
from an arbitrary position of them, inde- 
pendent of the relation of Cause and Effect, 
as the letters of the alphabet, &c. 

It is a third contradiction to say, that 
the elementary structures are endowed with 
vital properties*, and yet to reduce them 
into the inorganic matters of nitrogen and 
gasf. 

* Lect. 3. p. 82. f Lect. 4. p. 92. 



181 

In my opinion, the only clear and valua- 
ble definition is the latter one ; viz, " life 
is a constant internal motion, which ena- 
bles a body to assimilate new and separate 
old particles, and prevents it from yielding 
to the chemical affinities of the surrounding 
elements." Such a definition as this, com- 
prehends all the ideas under the term, with- 
out begging the question of its cause, or 
mentioning what it is found with. 

It has also the merit of universal compre- 
hension, as it comprehends vegetable as well 
as animal life and of exclusion, not suiting 
any thing else but itself. It thence leaves 
free the varieties of the functions, to arise 
from appropriate organs; and it proves 
that either all living beings must be sentient, 
or else a farther cause must be sought for 
sensation than mere life. 
'.: 7 - : i?*5 

SECTION THE THIRD. 

That " life must presuppose organi- 
zation*," is another proposition of Mr. 
Lawrence's, which I must also deny; 

* Lect. 4. p. 93. 
N3 



182 

and that because life is absolutely neces- 
sary both for its formation and support. 
Without life in the parents, the organs 
could not have been formed ; and without 
life they cannot act in their juxta-position, 
upon the surrounding elements, either be- 
fore or after birth, in order to their growth 
and support. Yet when life is once given, 
the use of the organs is absolutely necessary 
to keep it up. 

Thus combustible matters may be heap- 
ed upon each other, yet neither warmth 
nor light succeed ; but let an " extra cause" 
kindle the pile, then the flame may be 
kept alive for ever, by the constant addi- 
tion of such substances. In like manner 
life as we find it, as a perpetual flame, 
must be kept up and transmitted, whilst 
the proper objects for its support are ad- 
ministered : but for its original Cause, we 
must go back, until some extraneous power 
is referred to as its first parent. It is an 
^Effect ; it begins to be in all we know and 
have known, yet it is wanted in its own 
turn as a cause, and as a quality already 
in being, to mix and unite with the gross 



183 

elements of brute matter, for the formation 
and continuance of all animated nature. 

We are told that " God breathed into 
man the breath of life," and here philosophy 
supports Scripture, for the organs must 
originally have been kindled into life by a 
power, equal to giving them that internal 
vigour and motion, capable of enabling them 
to act afterwards for themselves, upon the 
objects which surrounded them. Then the 
living lungs could play upon the air, the 
living stomach be hungry and assimilate 
its food, the living heart beat, and the 
living blood circulate through every vein, 
and become capable of transmitting the 
principle communicated to it, to similar 
natures, without any assignable termina- 
tion. 

My notion of life therefore agrees in this 
respect with that of Mr. Lawrence, viz. 
" That it is a peculiar inward motion of the 
" organs. "And I consider it further, as 
continually propagated through the species, 
and mixing with the newly evolved forms of 
arranged matter ; and that it is kept up, as 

N 4 



184 

long as the organs remain sound, and they 
are placed in Jit circumstances for their re- 
spective actions. 

But men and animals are all of them 
Effects, and the first of each kind and its 
life could not have begun of itself, nor yet 
as Effects, could they go back to all eter- 
nity, for they might as well be here in time 
without causes, as in eternity ; Effects, how- 
ever far removed from the present date, 
are still Effects ; are still only new qualities 
from the junction of previous objects ; which 
objects (the Causes) could not have been 
the same with the qualities, (the Effects). 

Thejirst cause of life therefore must be 
" extraneous" to any of the bodies among 
which it is found. For at their first crea- 
tion, and in order to act their parts as it 
were, the organs must not only have been 
arranged but have lived, and this life com- 
municated to them at the same time, and 
probably by the same forming powers, as a 
joint quality with their arrangement. Thus 
a clock may be ever so well put together, 
but the different instruments will not per- 



185 

form their functions, without an " extraneous 
power" originally to put the pendulum in 
motion : then afterwards the pendulum 
by the natural physical laws between it and 
the surrounding objects, will continue to beat ; 
whilst also the motion of the other me- 
chanical instruments forms a part of the 
whole power necessary to keep it going, 
though not wanted at first to that end. 
This would form such a circle of Cause and 
Effect, as would be inexplicable, except 
upon the principle of the original former 
and mover being " extraneous* to both. 

In like manner, all qualities of existing 
objects, which now play on each other as 
mutual Cause and Effect, the lungs, which 
are necessary to the heart, and the heart to 
to the lungs, and both to the action of the 
brain, and the action of the brain to both ; 
life which is necessary to sensation, and 
the movement of the whole; and sensa- 
tion, and the movement of the whole to 
life, must all of them (in order to explain 
such phenomena) have originally had their 
builder, and mover, not contained in their 
own powers. 



186 

Now the proximate cause for the prin- 
ciple, or motion termed life, may, and ought 
to be inquired into by physiologists. 

But that it is only, and essentially, the 
result, and consequence, or property or 
element, of the being to whose results, qua- 
lities and finest elements, it is necessary in 
order to give them birth ; is a contradiction, 
inadmissible in the application of abstract 
demonstration to the objects of life. 

SECTION THE FOURTH. 

But as long as the notions of Mr. 
Hume shall prevail, inquiries of this na- 
ture will be instituted in vain ; nor indeed 
is there any received doctrine upon the 
relation of Cause and Effect, which can be 
securely used, as an efficient instrument in 
the advancement of science. 

Bishop Berkeley thought a Cause must 
necessarily be active, and so a spirit ! And 
it is universally imagined that a Cause is, in 
its very essence, before its Effects. 



There is also, a notion that one object 
is sufficient to an event ; when many are 
perhaps wanted in order to produce it. 

I pretend not to have found the whole 
nature of this relation ; But I shortly re- 
capitulate what I have advanced. 

1st. The junction of two or more qua- 
lities or objects is wanted to every new 
creation of a new quality. 

2dly. That any one of the qualities or 
objects needful in order to the formation 
of another, may be termed a Cause, be- 
cause absolutely necessary, and, when all 
the other needful circumstances are duly 
placed with which it is to unite, efficient 
to its production. 

But, 3dly. The whole number of objects 
existing, which are necessary to it, may 
also, under one complex idea, be deemed 
the one whole cause necessary. 

. 

4thly. The union of these, is the proxi- 
mate Cause of, and is one with the Effect. 

4 



188 

5thly. The objects therefore are before 
the Effects, but the union of them is in and 
with the Effects. 

This ambiguity, arising from the neces- 
sity of naming each object, wanted to an 
end, and all that are wanted to it, and the 
junction necessary to it, the Cause of it, is 
a fruitful source of error in every branch of 
analytical philosophy. 

6thly. When Effects or new qualities 
are once formed, they may re-act as Causes, 
in order to keep up the original objects, 
which contributed to their formation. 

7thly. Although the very word Effect 
implies a change in qualities, yet among 
a set of new qualities formed, all of them 
are not therefore entirely changed. 

> >' '>j',; ,\\^l 

The spark first elicited from the tinder, 
is kept separate, as to its appearance, its 
warmth and light, amidst all the alteration, 
in which it involves the objects it ap- 
proaches. 



189 

Sthly. It is not necessary, however, that 
any of the Effects, should resemble any of 
the objects, by whose union they are caused ; 
and in general, an entire mixture, junc- 
tion and concussion of qualities, involves 
the whole original objects in ruins, whilst 
it strikes out a vast many new and altered 
ones, creating other masses, other complex 
objects, to tally unlike those whose union was 
their Cause. On the other hand, it some- 
times appears that nature intends to render 
one individual essence, the prime object 
intended to be preserved ; and therefore in 
its mixture with others, ordains that they 
shall only administer to it, by contribut- 
ing to the perpetual nourishment, support, 
and increase of its qualities ; as in the 
growth of plants and animals ; or the vigour, 
improvement, character, individuality, &c. 
of the sentient principle. 

SECTION THE FIFTH. 

But to conclude ; Mr. Lawrence's error 
lies, 1st, in the adoption and application 
of the principle, that invariability of con- 
currence, is of the samenature as the rela- 



190 

tion of Cause and Effect, object and pro- 
perty ; which is the result of an argument 
in a circle, and which cannot be too severely 
deprecated, however authorized, by the 
illogical definitions of Mr. Hume and Dr. 
Brown. 

And, 2dly. In concluding that because 
one or more Causes known to be necessary 
to an end, are discovered, therefore all are 
discovered, which is to draw general con- 
clusions from particular premises. Did an 
ignorant person, unacquainted with the 
method of forming a mirror, consider it as 
no more than polished glass ; did he only 
observe that it reflected images when po- 
lished, and that injuring the polish pre- 
vented their reflection, he might form a 
proposition very similar to that of Mr. Law- 
rence, and say; polished glass reflects the 
images when presented to it; polish, and 
glass, and reflection, always go together ; 
and as this is the case, we need not seek 
for any " extrinsic aid" to the production of 
reflected images from its surface. But we 
know that extrinsic aid is wanted to the whole 
Effect. And indeed before a reflected 



191 

image from a mirror can be attained, let 
the mind pause, arid wonder at the 
great variety of objects necessary to cause 
it. Can we much better enumerate those 
that may be requisite, to the formation of 
the most simple modes of sensation ? Do 
we know the qualities of matter, when we 
use the term ? Do we know the reason of 
all its varieties when we name them by 
some feeble impressions they make on our 
organs ? As unperceived by the senses, 
have we the least idea of what is in matter 
in general, or in the nerve in particular, or 
in the formation of animals, or in the na- 
ture of life, that we should suppose nothing 
more is made use of for so extraordinary a 
difference, as that between sentient and 
insentient beings, than arrangement, (i. e. 
organization,) and motion, (or whatever 
other mode of being is termed life ?) Cer- 
tain it is, there is no experiment can be 
made on animated nature, which shall 
prove what are all, and only those objects, 
which may be necessary to SENSATION ; or 
whether the sensient principle be like, or 
altogether unlike the Effect, SENSATION; 
and indeed in any experiment which de- 



192 

stroyed the life and the nerve, if this prin- 
ciple should continue to exist, our senses 
could not descry it. 

SECTION THE SIXTH. 

What probable arguments may be ad- 
vanced upon the matter, is foreign to the 
object of this Essay, and I shall not now 
enter upon them; but conclude by ex- 
pressing my astonishment, that Mr. Hume's 
and Dr. Brown's definition of the rela- 
tion of Cause and Effect, should have con- 
tinued so long, admired, adopted, and un- 
answered. 

The necessaiy connexion of Cause and 
Effect, and our knowledge of it, in oppo- 
sition to mere fancy or custom, is the go- 
verning proposition in every science. In 
vain should we look for improvement in 
any, could we run the risk of so vital a mis- 
take, as to suppose that objects, however 
frequently conjoined, were therefore neces- 
sarily connected, or, on the contrary, that in 
the necessary production of qualities, there 
was no more than an experienced conjunc- 
tion of them, and that they might change 



193 

their places by a " change in the course 
of nature/' 

I have endeavoured to show, that any 
one junction of bodies in fit circumstan- 
ces for what is termed the experimen- 
tum crucis, may be sufficient to establish 
where the power lies towards the produc- 
tion of certain qualities, that ordinary life 
affords such experiment to the mind ; and 
that without it, constant conjunctions of 
antecedent and subsequent objects, will not 
prove where the Cause of an Effect is. 
Conjunctions, however frequent, may be 
separable both in fact and fancy; Cause 
and Effect, a changed object with its 
changed qualities, are inseparable in both. 

Let then the following just propositions 
be again received 

That objects cannot begin their own 
existences. 

That like objects, must ever have like 
qualities. 



o 



194 

That like Causes, must generate like 
Effects. 

And that objects, of which we have 
had no experience, must resemble those 
of which we have had experience, for that 
the course of Nature continues uniformly 
the same. 

These are the only true foundations of 
scientific research, of practical knowledge, 
and of belief in a creating and presiding 
Deity. 



THE EiND. 



Printed by S. GOSNELL, Little Queen Street, Holborn, London. 



ERRATA. 
Page 12 line 16 for a," read " or." 



37 32 rfefc 

51 25 

52 1 
577 for 
74 13 dele 
77 22 
90 22 /or 



104 



2 



' by." 
of." 

' exists," read " exist." 
with." 
' else." 

' shew," read " shewing." 
' excited," read elicited." 



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