Infomotions, Inc.St. Augustine's philosophy of beauty. / Chapman, Emmanuel

Author: Chapman, Emmanuel
Title: St. Augustine's philosophy of beauty.
Publisher: [1934]
Tag(s): aesthetic; unity; atque; augustine; aesthetic experience; illumination; art; aesthetic object
Contributor(s): Eric Lease Morgan (Infomotions, Inc.)
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Identifier: staugustinesphil00chapuoft
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Toronto, University of 
These-, Ph.D., 1934, 
Chapman., Emmanuel 
St. Augustine's 
philoso-phy of beauty 



£ ii i i s a £ I I OH BEAiiSX 

B y 

BoBanuel Chapman, U»k, 

A Thesis submitted In conformity 
with the requirerabnts for th« 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
In the University of Toronto. 

May, 1934. 

••S«ro te amavl, pulchritudo 
tam antlqua et tarn novaj 
sero te amavi!** 




Introduction Pa«« 6 


BEAUTIFUL. ..." 11 


1. NUMBER " 6« 

2. FORM " 86 


4. ORDER " lis 

Chapter III- THE NATURE OF BEAUTY ... " 166 

Chapter IV - THE AESTHETIC JUDGMENT . . •• 211 


1. WHAT ART IS " 262 


3. ART AND MORALITY. ... •* 278. 


The answer to St. Au^stlne*8 queetlon* 
"What, then. Is the beautiful, and what Is beauty?'^ 
can be found in the responses so frequently articulated 
by him throughout his entire works. Many philosophers 
have asked this question, but few have been better 
•quipped to give as full an answer: for In addition 

to the Intellectual powers enabling him to attain 

truth* St. Augustine had the genius to create beauty, 

and as a contemplative the gift of being united to 

Uncreated Beauty. Had Augustine's early treatise 

De Pulchro et Apto not been lost, It would still 

have been necessary to gather together his 
reflections on the nature of beauty from the differ- 
ent fields of inquiry which he cultivated j for 
besides his separate treatise the De Musicu where 
he treats the problem directly, i»t. Augustine 
touches obliquely on the beautiful where it is 
least expected. In his epistles, sermons, diverse 
questions, and commentaries on the Scriptures, as 
well as in his dogmatic wrltln^js and polemics, St. 
Augustine's mind overflowed arbitrarily Imposed 
limitations into digressions on the beautiful 
which have only to be culled and presented in a 
systematic order. 

^-The figures in the text refer to note which will be 
foiuid at the end of each Chapter. 


To bri2ig out St. AvtguB tine's 
philosophy of the beautiful, inquiry must be made 
Into his recurring and Interoonneoted concepts of 
number* fom» unity* and order* These terms were 
never hardened Into meaning which remain fixed 
throughout Augustine's writings, but were more 
like seminal Ideas unfolding into greater uraplltude 
and pushing forward to further consequences. Yet no 
matter from what direction analysis is pursued to 
its ultimate principles, St. Aiigustine's doctrine 
of divine illumination is reached: the aesthetic 
object is an illumination of number, form, unity, 
and order shining out in beauty^ which is a 
synthesis of the formal aesthetic elements, 
expression, and illumination; the truth of the 
aesthetic Judgment requires u noetic illumination; 
art Is an Illumination which integrates the lights 
of the noetic order and the order of making. 

The intellectual climate of the 
present appears to be favourable for ^t. Augustine's 
contribution to aesthetics as his philosophy of the 
beautiful contains the principles which can again 
bind together into an organic whole the fragments 
of a broken hierarchy wherein faith has been 


separated from reason, reason from beauty* beauty 
from all the arts except the fine arts, and art 
from morality. These are distinguished but not 
separated by St. Atigustlne, sbo In bendinij his 
ga«e on the central problems of philosophy, /fu^c«s^'A7e 
grasped the beautiful from different angles of 
vision so as finally to encompass the whole arc 
stretching from the beauty of least decree of being 
almost verging on nothingness, to the fulness of 
Self-Subsistent Beauty. 



^Oonf. , IV, XIII, 20; P.L. V, 32, col. 701. 

^If for no other book but the ConfesBions, St. 
Au^stine'8 place among great artists would 
be assured. 

''To cite only one Instance, seu the prayer at 
the beginning of one of Augustine *s earliest 
philosoplrxical writinj^s, the Solilociuiorum 
(P.L. V. 32, ool. 808 ff. ). 

*Oonf., IV, XIII. 20; P.L. V. 32. col. 701. 
Aw]^stine did not regret the loss of this 
separate treatise devoted to the beautiful 
and fit, nor was there any reason to regret 
it since his more mature reflections on the 
beautiful abound in his later works and amply 
make up for the loss of a work \^ritten as a 
young man when he was still under the influence 
of the materialism of the Maniohaeans. 






In attempting to detertalne what 
dlfftrentiatfls th« aesthetic from other varieties 
of experience , St. Augustine's charucteristlo 

method of starting from tl^ie thing wiUiout and 


proceeding within to man will be employed. In 

this way^ account will be taken of the two 
irreduoible factors^ the object and the self, upon 

the natures of which any description of the 

aesthetic experience will depend. Following 

Augustine's empiricism which always begins with 

an Investigation of concrete experience, the 

Inquirer should place himself in the ixamediat* 

prosanoe of the object. Fixing attention on the 

object ie to interrogate it, and the object seen 

will yield sufficient evidence to all questioning.' 

The first query, then, will be as to vtliat are the 

objects of the aesthetic experienoe. 

At first tiight^ It would seoia that 

any object whatsoever may be an object of the 

aesthetic experience since every object in its 

metaphysical structure possesses in so far us it 


has being some unity, beauty, and order; but there 
are certain limiting conditions on the part both of 
the object and the subject which make this Impossible. 
Henoe, the first task which imposes itself is to 
detemlne the minimum conditions which must b« 
satisfied before the aesthetic experience can 
take piece at all* In thus attempting to discover 
the factors necessary for experiencing the beauty 
of an object, the constitutive elements peculiar 
to the aesthetic experience will be fixed in terms 
precise enough to distinguish it from any of the 
other experiences common to man. 

Althou^ no object can be 
absolutely deprived of some unity, beauty, and 
order, since that would mean the loss of its 
being, ^ not every object can be experienced 

aesthetically. Object* which are enjoyed are 

dietinguiehed from those which are used. Ihe 

object which is enjoyed is loved for its own sake, 

while that which is used is jaade to aei've as a 

means for attaining an object loved for its own 

sake. On the basis of Joy, a distinction is made 

between those thin^ja which have the iuality of 

standin>3 by themselves, and those which are a 

means to sowethin:', els';*. Unless a thing is 

enjoyed for its own sake and for no other reascHi 

it cannot enter into the aesthetic experience. 


An Indisponsable re^ulreiaent Is that tha object 
be anjoyed for Itself, Instruments cannot enter 
into the aesthetic experinnoe because they are 
not delightful in themselves but ore only means 
to a further step in the process of utilization. 
The foregoing distinction, however, should not be 
held too rigidly as an instruraent may btjoome an 
object of the aesthetic experience when it is 
enjoyed for its own sake, and an aesthetic object 
may prove from another point of view to be an 

instnunent for the iiltimate purpose in the journey 

of life. 

On the principle of joy, objects 

considered for their own sakes are discriminated 

from those serving as a means, and once the meaning 

of Joy is fully grasped one of the distinguishing 

marks of the aesthetic experience will be 

definitely fixed* Without joy in an object 

pleasing for its own sake the aesthetic experience 

could not take place at all, and the next thing is 

to discover whether any kind of joy will constitute 

the aesthetic experience or whether there is a 

special kind of joy peculiar to this experience and 

to no other. If delight is required what is the 

nature of aesthetic delight? 


In distitii^ishing between different 
kinds of objects, not on the basis of joy this time 
but from another principle of selection, namely that 
of the inteHl.^encd, a kind can tie pointed out 
vihidh is founded on deli^jht. Delight in the 
object is based on a^greeaant between the object 
dwelt upon and the nature of nan. Ihia a^^reeaent 
is rin indispensable condition failing which there 
oould be no pleasure vrhatso^^ver, anX to under- 
stand uihat is peculiar to aesthetic delight, the 
nature of man, ihe vfhole man body and soul, must 
be taken into account* As the body is purt of 
man* 8 nature, and as the object falls within the 
grasp of the senses, the part played by the senses 
will first be considered, and proceeding Inductively 
an atted^t will be made to build up a true account 
of the kind of delight proper to the aesthetio 
experience • 

The aesthetio object is enjoyed 
and loved, and though there are some who seem to 
love ugly thin ',s, it is important to find out to 
what extent they are less beautiful than the 
things wliich give pleasure to the majority since 
no one loves those things which offend the senses. 

. f. 

I • • 

■ «..>■! ^: 


What delights In visible li^t I wv i nfl the prlmHoy 
flmonfl nnlmiTTi eliciting delight in sensible forms, 
what else charms in light and oolours but that 
measure whldh Is in agreement with the senses? 
Bxoesslve brightness is turned away from, and 
the eyes refuse to penetrate Into too thick 
obscurities. There is also a shrinking from too 
loud sounds, and disploasuro In too vreak sounds, 
the pleasure or displeasure being due to sound 
which is, as it were, the lir,ht of rausic and in 
opposition to aildncQ as colours are to darkness* 
In seeking in these things what Is in agreement 
vrith nan's nature, and rejecting what is not 
proportionate to it, delight is had in agreeaent 
and a certain 8q,uality between liko thinjs. This 
can be observed In odours, tastes, and touch, 
which sensations may be saaily experionoad, though 
difficult to analyze with profoundity. These 

senrjible things please by likeness and Ofiuality 


and where these are present hurraony results. 

The senses enjoy v:hatever is 
suitably proportioned to th^ra by rcuKjon of the 

pleasure principle th;it agreement al?»ays produces 

pleasure and disii^jreQaont its opposite displeasure. 

ienae derives pleasure fron tiiiiigs duly proportioned 


as being similar to its«iir, for sense, having its 

own numbers and in a way being measure and 

proportion,i$ ^»i i S it w«r e ^ a kind of reason. In 

this explanation of the pleasure of sense, the 

principle is already touched upon wliich will help 

to differentiate uesthetio from mere sensuous 

pleasure. All pleasure, even th£tt proom^ed by sint 

may be a means of helping the soul recall its 

pristine beauty, but not all pleasure is 

aesthetic pleasure. Something else is needed to 

distinguish between the two, and this required 

element will be seen to emerge from the very 

analysis of the pleasure experienced by th« 

senses in contact with an object. 

In the works made by men which 

are seen, and in words which are heard, the force 

and power of reason are accessible to the senses 

themselves. When an objact is seen in which the 

parts are well proportioned it may be said that 

it appears rational. Likewise, msisic is said to 

be rational when it strikes the ears hanaoniouslyi 

but no one says a rational odour, or a rational 

taste, or a rational softness to touch. ^That man 

smelling a rose in the garden would call the smell 


rational? Whan an intemperate person who seeks 
the pleasures of taste Is asked why ho takes to 
•west things, he will say that he does so because 
he finds his pleasure in it, but no one will say 
that sweetness is rationalist least if the pleasure 
procured by it does not lead to an end or if its 
elements were not prepared with an end in view. 

Vestiges of reason are discovered 
in the pleasures of si^t and hearing which do 
not depend on utility or profit, but reason doss 
not manifest itself in the pleasures of the other 
senses except in the end, utility or profit 
proposed to be attained through them by a z^tional 
being. The object which strikes the eyes agreeably 
is called beautiful, and that which strikes the 
ears is called harmonious when reason presides 
in right measure ; but reason does not come in 
when the eye is flattered by a beautiful colour 
or the ear is rejoiced by a single pure sound 
sin^e in the pleasures of sight and hearing reason 

is not manifested unless proportion and harmony 

are found. 

The pleasures of the sensss of 

sight and hearing^ which -^ dp not depend) on profit 

or utility, are ofett&ifed reason, and by following 

.► ' ' 1 


up some of the vestiges of reason which have been 
disengaged from the consideration of the pleasures 
of these senses a more precise understanding will 
be had of the new factor which Is a necessary- 
ingredient in aesthetic pleasure. It Is Important 
to mention St. Augustine's vmltary teaching on the 
nature of sensation since the manner In which 
sensation is understood will affect the imder- 
standing of the kind of dell^jht required and also 
the nature of the aesthetic experience. The 
theory of sensation developed by St. Augustine 
arises out of a careful analysis of what happem 
in the concrete Instance of hearing the recitation 
of a verse, in this case the Deu, ^ area tor Bianium 
of St. AabEose.^^ 

The explanation of sensation 
elaborated by Au^stine is based on his doctrine 
of the interrelation of soul and body. Man is 
composed of soul and body, and this union which 
is both natural and necessary is for the benefit 
of the body /\ te nrt w g life und movement given to It 


by the soul naturally loving its body. The 
soul la never wovsa than the body, and it would 
be absurd to subject the soul td the body as 


Datter to lui artificer, slnco It is superior to 

the body in every way and oannot be subjected to 

it* In order to know bodily eubstances 

eensation ie neceesary, and there is certainly an 

action of the external object on the body with a 

corresponding passion of the body; but as the 

soul i£. superior to the body and cannot suffer 

anything firom what is inferior to it, how is 

sensation possible? The soul does not suffer 

anything from the body but acts in it and 

concerning it, sometimes with ease and at other 

times with difficulty, depending on whether the 

corporeal things brought to the body or cast 

out from it are suitable or opposed to the work 

of the body. The soul allied to its body in so 

intimate a way by its very nature takes care of 

its body and is viijllant for its welfare. If 

an impact on the body escapes the soul's notice 

when one of the physical organs of sense is 

affected there is no sensation as yet. Sensation 

is only had when the observing soul dynamically 

on guard thx^oughout the body in the exercise of 

Its vigilance is vitally attentive to the cheaige 


suffered by th« body, and on the oooasion of a 

modification In Its body the soul produces a 

change In itself. Ensconced in its own spirit- 
uality but living in conjunction with a body, 
the attentive soul joins Its own body>.to the body 

(with pleasure) from without and resists with 

difficulty thinf?s unsuitable. In brief, the soul 
does not suffer anything from the body but acts 
with more attention in the passions of the body, 
and these actions whether easy or difficult which 
do not escape the soul are called sensations. 
Sensation belongs not to the body but to the 
■oul through the body.*" 

The power of sensation may 
fittingly be given the name of light, since vdiat- 
ever makes things manifest may rightly be called 
light. Sensation, the light of sentient life 
opposed to the darkness of insensibility, can 
discern what is presented to the judgment of the 
soul, such as white and black, harmonious and 
discordant soiuids , good and bad odours, sweet 
and bitter, hot and cold, and the like. What 



is transmitted through the body Is made manifest 
by the li^ht of sensation whioh is in the soul, 
and throui^h the corporeal senses affirmations are 

madtt as when it is said, it is manifest that this 

is harmonious, sweet, oold, and so forth. In 

every act of sensation which is of the mlndi through 

the senses there is the oompresence of intellect 

whioh is, as it were, immediately at the tip of the 


Without the compresenoe of mind 

the verse i:)e , us Creator dmniixm could not be heard 

nor for that matter not even a word or syllable 

of it* A syllable is a sovind of a certain duration 

with a beginning middle and end, and it could not 

be heard unless at the end of the senation of 

hearing the memory retained its beginning as well 

as all the intermediate 8ta-;&s* The memoiry is 

involved even in the briefest sensations in hearing 

the shortest possible syllables* Appreciation of 

the way a verse is recited depends on the rhythaa 

conserved in the memory assembling the elementary 

sensations of sound, comparing and uniting them as 


tha ayes assemble in a single field of vision a 
multiplicity of objeots and points in space. 
Memory which is. as it were, the li^t of 
Intervals of duration makes possible the co- 
existence of a succession of instants which 

otherwise would be dispersed* 

From the analysis of sensation 

there emerges the element which is a necessary 

ingredient in all aesthetic pleasure. Aesthetic 

pleasure is saturated with intolll^^ibility and 

by that very fact is niuch more after the nature 

of man. Man is primarily an intelligence using 

a body, and aesthetic pleasure is not simply 

sensual pleasure , but rather the pleasure of the 

intelligence rejoicing in what is after its own 

kind. If, as it was already pointed out, 

pleasure in the object is founded on a/^reement 

with laan's nature, then it is not enough that 

It be in agreement with part of his nature only, 

but there must be agreeioent with the whole of 

man* 8 nature, mind and body. A deeper insight 

into what is meant by agreement between the 


objeot and the nature of man Is needed to bring 
out the nature of aesthetic delight. Delight 
of the eye or ear Is Implied In all aesthetic 
pleasure, yet aesthetic pleustu'S, however niuch 
it may be accompanied by the right and proper 

cLiii rife r e sTe c(. 

pleasure of the senses, la a/j)leu8ure of the 
nlnd^ whlnh does not depend upon profit or 
utility, and in thi s se ns e Is dl o lntorootGd^ 
The uosthotie object wust be deli^jhtful not 
to the senses only, but to the mind through 
the senses* 

Objects in agreement with the 
whole naturo of man are contemplated with 

delight, and the simple expression Joyful 

contemplation contains the two essential 

characteristics of the aesthetic experience, 

not ajajr Joy but Joy in contemplating an object, 

not any contemplation but contemplation with 

delight* » delightful contemplation, that is 

to 3 ay, ^ hen the re i^ the concurrence of Joy 
and a vision, intuitive knowledge and delight^ 


only then Is an object experienced aesthetically. 
If a thing delights by the fact of its being 
given to intuition it is the proper object of 
the aesthetic experience, and only those objects 
which are essentially delightful and loved for 
their own sakes can enter into it. Whenever an 
object delights the mind by being contemplated 
and is such that being seen it gives delight 
to the mind it is a proper object of the 
aesthetic experience. 

The comp res once of joy and 
conjfcwnplation absolutely essential for the 
aesthetic experience accounts for the difficulty 
In describing it, and what must be always found 
together in its composite nature was considered 
apart only for the sake of convenience of 
exposition which should be conducted in such 
a way that either one separately always rejoins 
Its oo-prinoiple. Delight in knowledge constitutes 
the aesthetic experience as such, and this can be 
verified in any of the innumerable instances of 
its occurrence. 


When all the parts of an edifice 
are considered attentively. Is not offense 
taken In seeing one door at the end and another 
nearly In the center without being In the very 
center Itself, and Is this not so because 
Irre^^'ular measures without any neoessary reason 
offend^ the eye? Within the edifice there are 
three windows, one In the center and two at 
either end equally distant from each other tm^ 
distributing the light evenly; pleasure is 
experienced by the mind when they are regarded 
with particular attention, and this matter is 
so evident that It is unnecessary to discuss 
it at greater length. Architects viould say 
that such an arrangement has a reason for 
being as they would also say that a construction 
is unreasonable when its parts are distributed 
without order* These observations often may 
be made and applied to almost all the works of 
men. In poetry, reason has in view the pleasure 
of the ears which is produced by measure. The 

( . 


w«ll-cadenoed movementa of the dano«r delight 
the sight by the measure which they realize, 
and the intelll,ient spectator understands what 
they signify and manifest* Considered apart 
from the delist procured by the senses the 
dance Is said to be rational, and If wlajs were 
given to Venus or a cloak to Cupid, and these 
pretended divinities represented with all the 
suppleness and grace possible, the eyes would 
not be hurt but the mind* Such a representation 
would hurt the eye of the Intelllii-ence, but the 
eyes would not be shocked unless the movement 
lacked harmony since the movement Is made for 
the senses and the pleasure of the soul In so 
far as It animates the body* Other Is the 
pleasure of the senses from that which Is 
procured by the senses: the senses are pleased 
by a beautiful movement, amd that which the 
mind receives from thom with pleasure is delight- 
ful knowledge of what the movement signifies* 
These observations may be applied still more 


•aslly to the sense of hearing* The ear Is 

charmed by every melodious sound, but though 

transmitted by the ear the beautiful thought 

expressed by the sound is addressed to the 

intelli.^enoe. In hearing the verse from 


**4uid tantuffl Ooeano properent se tingero 
Hiberni, vel ciuae tardis mora noctibus 

praise of the beauty of the meter and the beauty 

of the thought are not confounded, nor is tt 

said from the same point of view that it sounds 

rationally and is rationally expressed. 

The object of the aesthetic 

experience is essentially the object of 

intelligence, for what contemplates in the full 

meaning of the word is the mind. The intelligence 

knows delight, and there is also pleasure of the 

senses in the measure that in man they serve the 

intelligence and can have pleasure in agreement. 

This explains why the eye and ear, the most 

disinterested of all the senses, are the primary 

).■■>■■ ■ J I 


■enses of the aesthetic experience* The proper 
Joy of the aesthetic experience Is a Joy of the 
mini In which the Intelligence rejolo&s In the 
object because of its agreement with its own 
nature. The mind, without any effort of 
abstraction, is irradiated by an intelligible 
liijht which is delightfully apprehended. " 

As spectator man is enli^^htened; 


as participant he is gladdened; in the 
aesthetic experience man sees and loves: 
contemplation and deli^^t are integrated, and 
aqy possible dichotomy is bridged between the 
Intelli ;6nse which contemplates and the v/ill 
which deli(/ht8» between enlightenment and 
gladness* In the experience of beauty a unity 
is achieved between the twofold pov>ers of knowing 
and loving, between the intellect v.hloh is 
enlightened by the apprehension of truth, and 
the will which has Joy and gladness in the good 
desired and loved by it. I^e experience of the 
aesthetic object involves the true, but if its 


truth only were known the aesthotlo experience 
would not be had because the object appr^ ended 
must bring delight to the mind and joy in being 
contemplated. Likewise, there would be no 
aesthetic experience If only the good of the 
object were enjoyed since there must be enjoy- 
ment in the vision or aj^prehenslon of the 
object. The aesthetic object is not only loved, 

but loved and seen, and this implies both its 

tznith and goodness. The mind delightfully 

apprehends the object as having an order both 

right and good, and the delight of contemplation 

is derived both from the mind's appreciation of 

the object in Its&lf and its appreciation of the 

thing in relationship to nan. Between the 

Intellect and the will there is a radiant 


All men desire to be happy, and 

the oontemplBtion of truth is a sine qua non 

for happiness. The intellect sees but it 

does not suffice for love which is a desire and 

' I 


does not belong to thought as such* Happiness 
Implies as an essential condition the knowledge 
of truth, truth pursued as givinij joy jaad desired 
with a view to happiness, strictly Inseparable 
from txnith happiness is attained throu^ 
knowled^je and Is a joy bom of truth. 

Tl-ie integration of the intelli- 
gence atil will on the metaphysical plane aakes 
the aesthetic experience so importanti and a 
variety of terms is used to describe the 
repose produced by the eciviilibrium of these 
two powers* All the powers of the mind are 
brought into play and their exercise procures 
a happy equilibrium. Kot aloof in Indolence 
but In the intense activity of contemplation, 
the mind/\knows truth and loves the good 
delli^ts in contemplating reality. The whole 
mlna is engaged in the presence of the object 
which is both seen and loved. The aesthetic 
experionce is valuable not only because it is 
founded on joy in contengplating the real but 

V. 'I 

i*l . 


also because love Is involved. It Is of th« 
nature of love that the lover is acted upon 
by the object loved and is in some may traus- 
forined to its image. If the lover becomes In 
some way like the object loved then it is of 
Bupreme importance what objects are loved. 
To love lower thiti^s is to Uhteriali^e oneself, 
and to love eternal thln^^is is to become eternal. 

The aesthetic experi6nce is had 
whenever being is contemplated with delight, 
and its range extends from the delightful 
contemplation of the least being to the joyful 
oon tempi at Ion of Supreme Bolnt^j;. Any object 
contemplated with deli^'^ht may enter into the 

aesthetic experience whether it be a nork of 

31 32 

art, a worm, a cock fight, the universe as 

33 34 
a whole, or God. If the aesthetic experience 

is essentially an act of joyful contemplation, 

then its importance must eventually depend on 

the thing contemplated, thara being as many 

different grades of aesthetic objects as there 


are different grades of being. Delight should 
correspond to the object which elicits the 


delight, and true aesthetic pleasure rill 
consist in the adequation between the deli/^t 
experienced and the object from which the 
deliglit is derived. In bringing about on 
ade;4uatlon bet^veen love and the objects which 
elicit that love, the aesthetic experience 
puts love in order and through delight which 
la, as it were, its spiritual wei^jht the 
soul is put In order. The aesthetic experi^>nce 
is good, for to love with a love that conforos 
to ordar is good, and by this very fact it is 
also beautiful, for ^rhatevor is in order is 
beautiful. ^"^ The mind which delightfully 
contemplates a thin^ is at peace and enjoys 
the tranquility of order. In this delightful 

contemplation of beiiig, raan's nature finds its 

true satisfaction and this jives the aesthetic 

experience a plenitude other experiences 

usually do not possess, no experience being so 


•ffectlTe for the unification of the whole 
self through a unified object. 

The pux% aesthetic experience 
is that which takes the object objectively, 
and its maximal intensity is the moment of 
completest dedication to the thing itself. 
Its value will depend upon the object exp« r- 

ienoed stretching from the lowest degree of 

being to the Self-Subsistent Beincr of God. 

Indeed, the Beatific Vision, which is perfect 

Joy in the contempletion of the Supreme Object, 

lifted as it is above the whole created order, 

is the aesthetic experienct* par excellence and 

the perfect archetype of all the aesthetic 

•xperi canoes achieved in this life. 



Although St. Augustine does not treat of 
tha aasthetio experience aoparatoly, he 
does distin,'?uish It from other experience 
as this chapter will shov, ?/liat is meant 
by experience, a word charfjed with so many 
raialeadiiis assocsiations, will be underatood 
from what follows. Aesthetic, an even more 
ambiguous taiTa, is used here not in the 
restricted sense of pertaining to feeling 
only, but in the roach wider sense of 
including the whole domain of tha beautiful 
jipprehondad both by tha mind or x;hc senses. 

'^ ab exte:cioribus ad interiora ab inferioribus 
ad supreraa. Rnnar. in Ps., 14,5; P.l. V.37, 
ool. 1887. 

This characteristic method has been called 
Auguatlnian empiricism, cf. Etienne C-il3on, 
Tlio Putura of Aujt;ustinian Met'-iphysics, pp. 
302, 306, in A Monument to St. A'Jiiustins, 
Toronto, Lon/^mans Qroen, 1930; Another recent 
writer among others who stresses Augustine's 
empiricism is Karl Adam, 3t. Au^stine, Eng. 
trans, by Dom Justin Mc Gimn, Sheed and Ward, 

The term object as it occurs lierw and else- 
where in this thesis is employed metalo^ically 
as meaning a thing objectified eilher tf) the 
senses or the intellect. In this sense object 
is not to be severed from its ontological 
reference lo a thing existing or capable of 
existing extramentally. This is not the 
place to undertaice an epistemological defense 
of this use of the term object, 
but for an interesting discussion of the 
epistemological difficuiLifeS involved in the 
separation of object and thing see Jacques 
Mci-itiiin, Distin, Pour Unir Ou Les Degree 
Du Savoir, Paris, 1932, pp. 176 ff. 



NOTES (Cofttlnuad) 

Interrogatlo mea, Intentlo mea; et responslo 

6orum, species eorum. (Conf., X,d,9; P.L. V. 

32, c. 783. ) 

Et vox dlcentliim est ipsa evldentla. (Conf., 

XI, 4, 6; P.L. V.32,c.811.) 

Vox quaedam est mutae terras, species terrae. 

Attendls et vldes ejus speclem, vldes, 

et considerations tua tanquam Interrogas earn; 
et Ipsa Inqulsltlo Interrogatlo est. (Enn. In 
Ps. OXLIV, 13; P.L. V.37, o. 1878.) 

Haec Igltur omnia, quae arte dlvlna facta sunt, 
et unltatem quamdam In se ostendunt, et speclem, 
et ordlnon. Quldquld enlm horum est, et unum 
allquld est, slcut sunt naturae corporum, et 
Ingenia anlmartun; et allqua specie formatur, 
slcut sunt flgurae vel qualltates corporum ac 
doctrlnae vel artes anlmarum; et ordlnem all- 
quem petit aut tenet slcut sunt pondera vel 
collocatlones corporum, atque amores aut del- 
ectatlones anlmarum. (De Trln. VI, 10, 12; 
P.L. V.42, c. 932.) 

Omnis enlm res, vel substantia, vel essentia, 
vel natura, vel si quo alio verbo melius en- 
untlatur, slmul haec trla habet; ut et unum 
allquld sit, et specie propria dlscernatur a 
caeterls, et rerum ordlnem non excedat. (De 
Vera Rellglone 7, 13; P.L. V.34, col. 129.) 

non enlm est ulla natura etlam In extremis 
Inflmlsque bestlolls, quam non llle constl- 
tult, a quo est omnls modus, omnls species, 
omnls ordo, sine qulbus nihil rerum invenlre 
vel cogltare potest. (De Glvltate Del, XI, 
XV; P.L. V.41, c. 331.) 



NOTES (Continued) 


Res ergo aliae siuit qulbus fruendiim eat, 
aliae qulbus utendum, aliae quae fruuntur 
et utuntur* Illae quibus fz*uendtun est» 
beatos nos faciunt. Istis quibus utendum 
estf tendentes ad beatitudinem adjuvamuri 
et quasi adminiculamur, ut ad illas quae 
nos beatos faciunt, pervenire, atque his 
inhaerere possimus. Nos vero qui fruimur 
et utimur, inter utrasque const ituti, si 
eis quibus utendum est frui voluerimus, 
impeditur cursus noster, et aliquando etiam 
deflectitur» ut ab his rebus quibus fruendum 
est obtinendis vol retardemur, ^el etiam re- 
vocemur, inferiorum amore praepediti. (De 
Doct. Christ. I, 3« 3; P.L. V.34, c. 20.) 

Frui enim est amore alicui rei inhaerere 
propter seipsam. Uti autem, quod in usum 
venerit ad id quod amas obtinendum referre, 
si tamen amandum est. Nam usus illicitus, 
abusus potius vel abusio nominandus est. 
Quomodo ergo, si essemus peregrin!, qui 
beate vivere nisi in patria non possemus, 
eaque peregrinatione utique miseri et 
miseriam finire cuplentes, in patriam re- 
dire vellemus, opus esset vel terrestribus 
vel marinis vehiculis quibus utendum esset 
ut ad patriam; qua fruendum erat; pervenire 
valeremus; quod si amoenitates itineris, et 
ipsa gestatio vehiculorum nos delectaret, et 
conversi ad fruendum his quibus uti debuimus, 
nollemus cito viam finire, et perversa suavi- 
tate implicati alienaremur a patria, cujus 
suavitas faceret beatos: (De Doct. Christ. I, 
4, 4; P.L. V.34, c. 20-1.) 

As Ood alone is a proper object of fruition 
so too God alone is absolutely beautiful, but , • 
this will be more eloseigff^seen^ in the chapter *^ ^**"^ 
on the nature of beauty. 

« '' • 


NOTES (Continued) 





Ergo jam tria genera sunt rerum in qulbus 
illud rationabile apparet. Unum est in 
factis ad aliquem finem relatis, alteram 
in dicendo» tertium in delectando. Primum 
nos admonet nihil temere facere; secundum, 
recte docere; ultimum, beate contemplarl* 
(De Ordine, II, 12, 35; P.L. V.32, c.lOll.) 

In his ergo cum appetimus oonvenientia pro 
naturae nostrae modo, et inconvenientia re- 

spuimus (Da Musioa, VI, 13, 38; P.L. 

V.32, C.1184. } 

Nihil invenimua araplius in homine quam camem 
et anlmam: totus homo hoc est, spiritus et 
caro. (Enn. in Ps. CXLV, 5; P.L. V.37,c.l887. ) 
Unde constarnus? Ex animo et cor pore, r^id 
horum melius? Videlicet animus. Quid laudant 
in corpore? Nihil allud video quam pulchri- 
tudinem. (Epist. Classis I, HI, 4; P.L. V.33, 
C.65. ) 

ex anima et corpore nos esse oompositos. (De 
Mor. Sec. Cath. I, iv, 6; P.L. V.32, c.1313.) 
Haec enim non ad ornaraentum vel adjutoriiua, 
quod adhibetur extrinsecus sed ad ipsam 
naturam hominis pertinent. (De Civ. Dei. I, 
xiii, P.L. V.41, C.27.) 

Die, oro te, nam possumus amare nisi pulchra? 
Nam etsi quidam videntur amare deformia, quos 
▼ulgo Qr&eot sci.Tj9o^isous vocant, interest tamen 
quanto minus pulchra sint quam ilia quae pluri- 
bus placent. Nam ea neminem amare manifestum 

est quonun f oeditate sensus of f enditur 

Quid in ipsa luce visibili quae omnium coloz*um 

, . i . 




NOTES (Continued) 

habet prlnolpatum« nam et color nos delec- 
tat in oorpoirum formls; quid ergo allud in 
luce et coloribus, nisi quod nostris ooulis 
congruit, appetimus? Etenim a nimio fulgore 
aversamur, et nimis obscura nolvuuus oemetre, 
sicut etiam in sonis et a nimivun sonantibus 
abhorremus, et quasi susurrantia non amamus. 
Quod non in temporum Intervallis est, sed in 
ipso sono, qui quasi lux est talivun numerorum, 
cui sic est oontrarium silentium, ut colori- 
bus tenebrae. In his ergo ovaa appetimus con- 
venient ia pro naturae nostrae mode, et incon- 
venientia respuimus, quae aliis tamen animall- 
bus oonvenire sentimus* nonne hie etiam quodam 
aequalitatis Jure laetamur, cum occultioribus 
modis paria paribus tributa esse cognoscinius? 
Hoc in odoribus et in sapor ibus, et in tangendi 
sensu anlmadvertere licet » quae longum est 
enucleatlus persequi, sed explorare faclllimum; 
nihil enim est hor\im sensibilium, quod nobis 
non aequalitate aut similitudine placeat. (De 
Muslca, VI, 13, 58; P.L. V.32, c. 1183-4.) 

Quaere in corporis voluptate quid teneat, 
nihil aliud Invenies q^usm convenient! am; nam 
el res is tent ia pariant dolorera, convenient ia 
parlunt voluptatem. (De Vera Relig. I, xxxix, 
72j P.L, V.34, C.154.) 

Hon facile dixerim, carere sensum numeris 
tallbus in se constitutis, etiam antequam 
all quid sonet; non enim aliter aut eorom 
mulceretur concinnitate, aut absurdltEite 
offenderetur. Idipsum ergo quidquid est, 
quo aut annuimus aut abnorremus non ratione 
sed natura, cum aliquid sonat, ipsius sensus 
numerum voco. Hon enim tunc fit in auribus 
meis, cum sonum audio, haec vis approbandi 
et improbandi. Aures quippe non aliter bonis 
sonis auam mails patent. (De Mus. VI, 2, 3; 
P.L. V.32, C.1164. ) 

« t « 




NOTES (Continued) 

Quid igitur res tat, unde non posslt anima 
recordarl primam pulchritudinem quam reli- 
qult, quando de Ipsls suls vltils potest? 
(De Vera Relig. 1, xxxlx, 72; P.L. V.34, 
C.154. ) 

Duo ergo video, in quibus potentla vieque 

ratlonis posslt Ipsls etlam senslbus ad- 

moveri: opera homlnum quae videntur, et 

verba quae audluntur* In utroque autem 

utltur mens gemlne nvmtlo pro corporis 

necessitate: uno qui oculorum est, altero 

qui auriura. Itaque, cum allquid vlderaus 

con,^3ruentlbus sibl partlbus flguratum, 

non absurde dicimus rat ionabil iter molle 

est apparere. Itemque, cum aliquid bene 

conoinsre audlmus, non dubitaraus dicere 

cuod ratiorablliter sonat. Nemo autem non > a«^ 

rideatur, si dixerlt, rationablliter olet;«^^tA<^^'e"«^'^'^"^'^ ^^' '^ ' 

nisi forte in lis quae propter allquid ab v*.+'.o«aV.\i*^^ «^oie ^ ; 

nominlbus prociirata sunt, ut ita olerent 
vel saperent vel ferverent, vel quid allud. 
Ut si quls locum, unde gravlbus odorlbus 
serpentes fugantur, rationablliter dicat 
ita olerc, Causan intuens quare sit factum; 
aut poculura quod medicus confecerit, ratio- 
nablliter araarura esse vel dulce; aut quod 
temperciri languido solium jusserlt, calere 
rationablliter aut tepere. Nemo autem 
hortum ingressus, et rosam naribus admovens, 
audet ita dicere. v^uam rationablliter fra- 
grat! nee si medicus 111am ut olfaceret 
jusssrit. Tunc enlm praeceptum vel datum 
illud rationablliter, non tamen olere ratio- 
nablliter dlcltur; neo propterea, quia natu- 
ralis ille odor est* Nam, quamvls a coquo 


WOTBS (Continued) 

pulmentum condiatur, rationabiliter oondl- 
tum possumus dlcere: rationabiliter autem 
sapere, cvun causa extrinsecus nulla sit, 
sed praesenti aatisfiat voluptati, nullo 
modo ipsa loquendi consuetudine dicitur. 
Si eniin quaeratur de illo cui poculum medi- 
cus dederit, our id dixlciter sentira debuerit 
aliud infertur propter quod ita est, id est 
morbi genus, quod jam non in Illo sensu est, 
sed allter esse habet in corpora. Si autem 
rogetur liguriens aliquid, gulae stiraulo con- 
oitatus, cur ita dulce sit, et respondeat, 
<^uia libet; aut quia delector; nemo illud 
dicet rationabiliter dulce, nisi forte illius 
delectatio alioui rei sit necessarla, et illud 
quod mandit, ob hoc ita 3onf actum sit. 

Teneimis, luantum inveati.iare potuiuus, 
quaedam vestit^ia rationis in senciibus; et quod 
ad visum atqua auditum pertinet, in ipsa etiam 
voluptfita. Alii vero sensus non in voluptate 
sua, sad propter aliquid aliud solent hoc nomen 
exigere: id autem est ratlonalls animantis 
factum proter aliquem finem. Sed ad oculos 
quod pertinet, in quo con^-irueutia partium ratio- 
nabilis dicitur, puleiirum appeilari solet. Quod 
vero ad aures, quando rationabilem concentiun 
dioimuB, caiitumque numerosum rationabiliter esse 
compos itum; suavitas vocatur proprio jam nomine* 
Sed neque in puloiiris rebus cum nos color illi- 
cit, neque in aurium suavitate cum pulsa chorda 
quasi liqulde sonat ataue pure, rationabile 
illud dlcere solemus. Restat er^t^o ut in isto- 
rum seusuum volupi;ate id ad rationem pertinere 
fatbumur, ubi quaedam dimensio est atuue modu- 
latio. (De Ordine, II, 32; P.L. v. 32, col. 


NOTES (Oontlnued) 

hi^ti^^ gives pleasure to the eye or ear t«^ 
boautifu l was first maintained by Plato 
(Republic, III, 401 0; Timaeus, 47 A), 
but in the Hippias Ma jor ( 297 E f f . ) pro- 
fitableness differentiates these pleasures 
from other pleasures and not reason as in 
St. Augustine's analysis. Augustine thus 
avoids falliiig into the moi'aliatic "heresy". 
Plotlnus (Enu. I, 71, 1) following the 
Hippias Major (2970-2983) says that beauty 
affects the sense of sijht and hearing, 
without tiiving any reasons for this. After 
oritioialng the Stoic definition vhloh made 
beauty consist in proportion of parts in a 
whole to which the charm of colour is joined, 
Flotlnus speelis of beauty being perceived at 
the very first ^^lance and recognized by the 
soul as Icindred to its nature. Carrying 
out ail analysis omitte^? by Plotinus, Augus- 
tlno SHW that proportion and the other formal 
aesthetic elenants are a Xind of reason as it 
were. Tills did not pro^r6nt,<j'however7~n5^ 
attributing beauty to a single colour or 
sound even though reason or proportion could 
not bo attributed to it. The beauty of simple 
tjain<^s ar. well as the beauty consisting in 
proportion was accepted by AiJigustine. Compare 
this 'flith Plato who points out in the Philebus 
(51 0) that <[;eoraetrical figures, pure colours, 
and clear tones are always beautiful in them- 
SQlvds independently of their ralution to 
anotn&i', those procuring pure pleasures; and 
in th(& same dialogue 26E, 64D, 66A, admitting 
that bsauty consists in proportions. For 
Augustine *c general criticisra of Matonism on 
important doctrines see the texts broxoght 
together by Nourrison, V.l, pp. 60-78, and 
E. Portalie, Diet. d« theologle Gatholique, 
V.l, ool. 2327-2331. ( For the relations 


H0T5S (Continued) 

between St. Augustine and the Neo-Platonists 
cf. L. Grandgeorge, St. Au^^^ustin et Le Neo- 
Platonisme, Paris ;, 1896; Charles Boyer, La 
Formation de St. Augustin, Paris, 1920, pp. 
193ff.; R. Jolivet, Essai Sur Les Rapports 
EIntre La Pensee Greque et La Pensee Chreti- 
enne, Paris, 1931. All these authors agree 
that the influence of Plotinus on Axxgustine 
was much less than is usually supposed, and 
although there are some common elements these 
are transformed by Augustine from within and 
unified from a different center, the Christian 
center which was the source of his entire 
thought. An opposite view is maintained by 
P. Alfario, L*Evolution Intellectuelle de St. 
Augustin, ?aris, 1913, pi*. 179ff. On the 
relation between Plotinus and Au,-r.istln in 
tliat v.hir.i; conoems thoir theories of the 
beautiful, cf. Perler, Dwr Hue 3ei Plotin Und 
Das Verbom Bei Augustinus Ais Vorbildliche 
Ureache Der V.'elt, ?reiburh, 1931, pp. 15 and 
pp. 37ff. 
Vfca-AxifeUStine develops his complete thaor;/^ of 
sensation in Oh-apter 5 of the Sixth Book of 
the De Musica (P.L. \^.32, col. 1167ff . ) , 
starting in his usual Stepirical manner by 
askin/-;, "Quid est ergo quod in audi ante oon- 
tlnget?" (De :fus. VI, V.8; V,32, col. 1188.). 
From his epistles «re know that he '.ras com- 
batting the materialistic sensualism cf Demo- 
critus and Epicurus, (tipist. 118, 29; P.L, 
V.33, col. 446.) For an excellent account of 
tne Aui-^stinian doctrine of sensrtlon, cf. 
Etienne Gilsors, Introduction a L'Etude ds St. 
Au^-astin, Paris, 1931, pp. 71ff. 







HOTES (Continued) 

De Immortalltate Anlnsae, XV, 24; P.L. V.32, 
c. 1033. 

D« Musica, VI. V, 8; P.L. V.32, c.1167. 
De Morlbus Eoc. Oath. I, V, 7; P.L. V.32, 
0. 1313. 

De Genesl ad Llteram, XII, XVI, 33; P.L. V.34, 
C. 467. 

This action of the external object on the body 
precludes any occasionalism. Sensible know- 
ledge requires the material object which is a 
partial cause (Epist. XIII, 4; V.33, c. 178; 
De Trinit. XI, 5, 9; P.L. V.42, c.991) con- 
curring with the senses, sensation being 
brought about simultemeously by the thing 
and the knower (De Trinitate, IX, 12, 18; 
y. 42, col. 970). A thing which was not 
previously perceived could not even be im- 
agined (Epist. 7; P.L. V.33, col. 68-71; De 
Trinit. XI, 8, 14; P.L. V.42, col. 996; op. 
cit. XI, 9, 16; V.42, col. 996). For the 
formation of images, cf. op. cit. XI, 3, 6; 
col. 989; De Musica VI, 11, 32; P.L. V.32, 
col. 1180. 

De Q,uantitate Animae, I, XXXII, 71; P.L. 
V.32, C.1074. 

Alia est enim lux quae videtur his ooulis 
corporeis, etiam ipsa corporea; ut soils, et 
lunae, et stellarum, ei si quid hujusmodi est, 
cui contraria simt tenebrae, ciun aliquid locus 
ea ea luce caret. Alia item lux est vita sen- 
tiens, et valens discemere quae per corpus ad 
animae judicium refenuittir, id est alba et 
ntgra, canora et rauca, suaveolentia et grave- 

• I 



NOTES (Continued) 

olentia, dulcla et amara, oalada et frlglda» 
et caetera hujusmodl. Alia est enlm lux quae 
sentltur oculls, alia quae per oculos agitur 
ut sentlatxir* Ilia enlm In corpora* haec 
autem quamvls per ^corpus ea quae sentlt per- 

ciplaty in anima^^amen 

Insenslbilltas ergo tenebrae hujus lucis, 
qua quidquid sentitur* (mm ipsam vim eenti- 
endi non habet vita quaelibet. Convenienter 
autem luoem hanc dici ooncedi, quisquis con- ^ajeao^ 
oedlt recte dici l^lcem, qua res^manifes^a *\ **• " 
est. Cum autem dioimus» Manifestum est hoc 
hoc canorum esse, manifestum est hoc dulce 
esse, manifestum est hoc frigidum esse, et 
quod forte hujus generis per corporales 
sensus attlngimus; haec lux qua ista manl- 
festa sunt, utique intus in anima est, quam- 
vls per corpus inferantur quae ita sentiuntur* 
Tertixim lucis genus in creaturis intelligi 
potest, quo ratiocinamur. De Genesi Ad Lit- 
teram, Imperfectus, 24; P.L. V«34, col. 228-9. 

De Genesi Ad Litt. I, XII, 16, 33; V.34, col. 

Homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima ratio- 

nalis est mortali atque terreno utens corpore. 

(De Moribus Ecc. Cath. 1, 27, 62; P.L. V.32, 


Cf. quid est homo? Anima rationalis habens 

corpus. (In Joeui. Evang. XIX, 5, 16; P.L. 

V.35, c.1553.) 


beate contemplari De Ord. II, 12, 36; P.L. 
V. 32, c. 1011. 

• . V, ,. ^ 

* t • 

f ' -* t 

« *- I 


lOTES (Continued) 

24 (Cont'd) 

Jam vero ouncta spectacula, et omnis ilia 
quae appellatur curiositas, quid aliud 
quaerit quam de rerum co^cnitione laetitiam ? 
(De Vara Relig. I, XLIX, 94, P.L.'V.34, 
0. 164). 

De quibus multis elegit quisque pro 
voluntate quo fruatur per oculorum sensiun. . . . 
et eo gaudet aspectu; . . . ,vel quaedam horua 
eiiaul pulchra conf art ad laetitiam videndi. 
(De Libero Arbitrio, II, IX, 27; P.L. V.32, 
0. 1266). 


Itaque in hoc ipso aedificio singula bene 

considerantes, non possumus non offendi 
quod unum ostium videmus in latere, alteram 
prope in medio, neo tamen in medio collocatum. 
quippe in rebus fabricatis, nulla cogente 
necessitate, iniqua dimensio partium facere 
ipsi aspectui velut quamdam videtur injuriam. 
Quod autem intus tres fenestras, una in medio, 
duae a lateribus, paribus intervallls solio 
liamen infundunt, quam nos delectat dili- 
gent ius intuentes, quamque in se aniraum rapit, 
manifc stares est, nee multis verbis vobis 
aperienda. Unde ipsi architecti jam suo 
verbo rationem istam vocant; et partes 
discorditer collocatas, dicunt non habere 
rationem. Quod late patet, ac pene in omnes 
artes operaque humana diffunditur. Jam in 
carminibus, in quibus item dicimus esse 
rationem ad voluptatem aurium pertinentem, 
quis non sentiat dimensionem esse totius 
hujus suavitatis opificem? Sed histrione 
saltante, cum bene spoctantibus gestus illi 
omnes signa sint rerum, quamvis membroznom 

• I 

■ r^ I - 

;■.:•• f •', 


HOTES (Continued) 

26 (Cont*d) 

niimerosus quidam notus oouloa ea dem 
ilia diiaensione delectet, diAitur 
tamen rationabilis ilia saltatiOt q}X)d 
bone aliquid significet at ostendat, 
excapta sensu\im voluptate* Non eniia» si 
pennatam Venerem faciat, et Cupidenem 
palliatum, q.uaiavis id mira mambroz*uin 
motione atquo coliocationa depiiagat, 
oculos videtur offendere; sad per- oculos 
uniraum, oui reruia sign&illa monstrbntur: 
nam oculi offenderttutur, si non pulchre 
movel:etur. Hoc enim pertinebat ad sensvim, 
in quo anima eo ipso quod mixta est cor- 
pori, percipit voluptatom. Aliud ergo 
sencus, aliud per sensum: nam sensum 
mulcet puloher motus; per sensum autem 
animum solum pulchra in motu significatio. 
Hoc etiam in auribus facilius advertitur: 
nam quiquid jucunde sonat, illud libet, 
atque ipsum auditum illicit; quod autem 
per atiradam sonura bene slgnificatur, 
niintio quidem aurium, sed ad solam mentem 
refartur. Itaque cum audimus illos versus: 

Quid tantum Oceano properent se 
tingere solas 

Hiberni, vel quae tardis mora 
noctibus obstet; 
(Virgil Georg. lib. 2, vers. 480-481). 

aliter metra latidanua, aliterque sentantiam: 
nee sub eodem intellectu dicimus, 
Raticnabiliter sonat; et, rationabillter 
dictum est. :) c 

(De Ordine II, 34; P.L. V.32, col. 1011). 

.!.; I 

• • , * - \ 


KOTES (Continued) 

For further discussion see Chapter IV, 
pa^^e ^\3 £ind note 10 to the same Ch&pter. 


contemplans illustratur, inhaerens 

jucundatur; est, videt, amat. (De Giv. 

Dei. XI, 24; P.L. V.41; c. 338). 

^® See Chapter III, pp. 'Stff. where the 
relationship between the tjrue, the good, 
and the beautiful are further developed. 

Beata certe oujnes vivere volunus (De Mor. 
Boo. Oath. I,iii,4; P.L. V.32; c. 1312). 
Beatos esse se velle, omnium hominum est. 
(De Trin. XIII, xx, 25; P.L. V.42; c. 1034). 
Beata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate 
(op.cit. X, XIII, 33; P.L. V.32; c. 793). 
See Confessions Bk. X, Ch. XXIII, 33. 
Id autem est quod nihil est aliud habere 
quam nosse. De div. quaes t. 83, 35, I; 
P.L. V.40, c. 24.) 
Cf. (op.cit. 555 2; c. 24-25). 
Philosophy for Augustine was not only a 
speculative research and a disinterested 
knowledga of nature » For him, wisdom, 
the object of philosophy, was always 
identified with happiness vJiich implies 
knowledge as an ssasntial condition, and 
truth is pursued in so far as it can bring 
happiness. In this sense it can be said 
that all of Auiiustine's thought is 
aesthetically orientated. 

, -I-.- 


HOTES (Continued) 



Et quonlam Id quod amatur, afflciat ex se 
Guaantem necesse est; fit ut sic amatum 
quod aeternuoi est, aeter-nltate anlimim 
afficiat. (De Div. quaest.IiXXXIII,35,2; 
P.L. V.40, 0. 24). 

Talis est quisque, quails ejus dilectio 
est. Terram dlligis? Terra eris. Deus 
diligis? iiuid dicam, Deus eris. In Epist. 
Joh. ad Parth. , 11,2,14; P.L. V.3S, c.1997). 

De Vera Religione I, XLI, 77; P.L. V.34; 
0.156-157. See Gxiapter III, p. 

Cum ecae ante fores advertimus ^allos 
gallinaceos ineuntes pugnam nimis a cram. 
Llbuit attendere. Quid anim non ambiunt, 
qua non pera^trant oculi amatiUQ, ne quid unde 
unde irniuat pulchritudo rationis cuncta 
scientia et nescientia modlficantis et 
gubemantis, quae Inhiantes sibl sectatores 
SU08 trahit quacxainq,ue atque ubicumque se 
quaeri jubet? Nam unde aut ubi non potest 
sigaum dare? Ut in eisdera ipsis gallis erat 
vldere, intenta projectius capita, inflatas 
comas, vehementea ictus, oautiseimas 
evitationes, et in omni motu animalium 
ratioixis expertium uihil non decorum, quippe 
alia ratiune desuper uiania moderante. Postremo 
legem ipsam viotoris; superbum cant;im, et 
membra in uuura quasi orb^m collecta velut in 
fastum domiuatiunis. SxgniUD aux^era victi; 
elatas a uervice pennulas, et in voce atque 
mu'cu dii.roriiae tutum, et ao ipso naturae 
leglbus neucio quomoao concinnum et pulchrum. 


KOTSS (Continued) 

32 (Cont'd) 

Multa QLuaerebamus : . . . . cur. . . • Istam con- 
slderatlonem duoerat In voluptatam 
spectaculi: 41 Id In noble essst >^uod a 
senslbus remota multa ciuaeraret; c^uid 
rursitm quod ipsorum sensuum invltatione 
oaparatur. . *.ubl non imltatlo verisslmaa 
illius puichritudiiiis? ubi non Jiodus? 
(C© OrviiiiQ, I, viii, 25-d; ?.L. V.oii, 
0. 95.5« ) 

Quid sordlvliuSf luld inanlus dacoris at 
turpitadiiis plaaius mdrotricibus, leonlbus, 
caetatlB'^ue hoc QenvLs pes Gibus dici potest? 
Aufar maretricas da rebus humanio, turbaveris 
oaoni:-:. libidinibus: constitue mafcronaram loco, 
labe ac dedecore dahonestaveris. Sic igitur 
hoc genus homlnum per suos mores Impurissimum 
vita, per ordinis leges conditione vilissimum. 
Konna in corporibus animantlum quaadam membra, 
si sola attendas, non possis attendare? Taman 
ea naturae ordo, nee quia necessaria sunt, 
deesse voluit , nee quia indecorr, eminere 
parmisit* Quae tamen deformia suos locos 
tenando, melioram locum concessera melioribus. 
(^id nobis suHvius (mod agro villaequa 
spectaculum congruentius fuit yugna ilia 
confl-LC tuque gallinaeeonim galloruia, cujus 
super iore libro feciratis rneutionera (Gap. 8, 
n. 25). (^id abjectius taraeft deforraltata 
subjeoti vidimus? Kt per ipsam tamen ajusdam 
sertanDinis rerfectior pulchritudo provanarat. 
(Da Ordine, II, iv, 12; P.L, V.32, c. 1000). 

c . * 



HOTES (Continued) 



Ita enlm animus slbl reddltus, quae sit 

pulchritude universltatis intelleglt; 

quae prof ec to ab uno cognominata est. 

(De Ordine,I,II,3; P,L. V.32, c. 979). 


Oonfessionum, Liber V, I, I; P.L. V.32, 

C. 705; X,VI,8; c. 784-785). 

Ennarratio In Psalrauia, GXLVIII,15; 

P.L, V. 37, C. 1946). 

See Chapter II, pp. w.^.^^. >*•»«'- notes to 

same Chapter. 

The beauty of God has seldom been praised 

more beautifully than by Augustine. See 

Chapter III, p. Hare a few quotations 

from the Confessions only are given: 

Pulcerrime (Oonfessionum I, IV, 4; P.L. V.32, 

col. 662). 

formosissirae (Op.cit. I, VIII, 12; col. 666). 

pulchra et decora (Op.cit.II,X,17; col. 682). 

pulchrltudo pulchrorum omnium (Op.cit. Ill* 


•t tua pulchrltudo tu ipse sis (op.cit. IV, 


pulchrltudo tarn antiqua et tam novai (op.cit. 

X,Xr/II,37; col. 795). 

pulcher es (op.cit. XI, IV, 5; col. 811). 

K. Eschweiler in Die Aesthetischen Elemente 

In der Religion philosophic des W. Augustln, 

1909, Is aware of the importance of the role 

of beauty in Augus tine's thought but has 

hardly succeeded in bringing out its full 


. . J. 

•f;-; r. 


ypTES (Continued) 


Cum ergo quatuor sint diligenda, unxim quod 

supra nos est, alteram quod nos sumus, 

tertium quod juxta nos est, quartum quod 

infra nos est. 

(De Doct. Christ. I,xxiii,22; P.L. V.34,c,27). 

Ille autem juste et sancte vivlt, qui rerum 

integer aestiiaator est; Ipse est autem qui 

ordinatam dileotionem habet, ne uut diligat 

quod non est diligendum, aut non diligat 

quod est diligendum, aut araplius diligat 

quod minus est diligendum, aut aeque diligat 

quod vol minus vel araplius diligendum est, 

aut minus vel amplius quod aeque diligendum 

est. (Op.Cit.xxvii, 28; o. 29). 

Cum eniin adest quod diligitur, etiam 

delectationem SQo-om necesse est gerat. 

(Op.Oit.xxxiii, 37; c. 33). 

Non igitur numeri qui sunt infra rationem 

et in 2U0 genere pulshri sunt, sed amftr 

inferiorls pulohrltudinis animam polluit.... 

(De.Mus. VI, XIX, 46; P.L. V.32, c. 1187). 

Et haec est perfocta justitiaqua potius 

potiora, et minus minora dilii^inras. (De 

Vera Religione, 0XVIII,93; P.L. V.34, c.l64). 

Delectio quippe quasi pondus est animae. 
Delectatio ergo ordinat animam. (De lAisica, 
VI,xl,29; P.L, V.32, C.U79). 
Pondus mavua amor meus. (Conf. , XIII, IX, 10). 
Analogously to bodies each .iaving its 
"pondus" or natural waijht by vhlidi it is 
drawn to its pi^oper plaoe in the universe, 
so too the soul has its "pondus" or weight 
which moves it to seek its natural place of 
repos^3, and this principle is love. Love is 
as it were a spiritual weight within the soul 

I • 

r V 


N0T5S (Continued) 

36 (OontM) 

drawing it to the object loved, Greek 
physical speculation, th;!it of Aristotle 
especially, assigned to bddiea a natural 
tendency v-hioh moved them towards their 
proper places, the element fire, for 
example, mounts ux)wards, a stone falls 
Upwards the :;entQr of tho earthy ate, 
Augiistine often spoa^-cs of this natural 
weii3ht of "bodies "by which they tend 
t0''f^rds th^ ropose and stability of their 
right place in tbe world (Pondus omnem rem 
ad iul<^tem ac stpbilltatem tr^hit, De 
aenesi ad Lit., IV, III,7;P.L. 7.34,001.299); 
and also d-valls often on the analogous 
spiritual weli;}it of the soul, the love by 
which it is drawn and by which it draws all 
thint^s to the object loved (Nee aliquid 
appetunt etiam ipsa corpora ponderibus 
suis, nisi luud animae amoribus suis, 
Kpist., 55,X,18; P.L. V.33, col. 212-13; 
Animus (*iippe, velut pondere, umore fertur 
quocumque fertur, op.cit., 157, II,9;col.677; 
cf. De Jivitate Dei, XI, 28; P.L. V. 41, col. 341- 
342). liove is closely associated with that 
of d«lectation in Augustine's tliought, delight 
too is. as it were, a spiritual weight of the 
soul which orders the soul (De llus., VI, 11,29; 
P.L. V.32, 001.1179). For further remarks on 
pondus see Chapter^'? '^'^ 
On the primacy of love in St. Au.fnistine*a 
philosophy see Jacques Maritain, De La Sagesse 
Au^^ustinlenne in Les D9g,reB Du da voir. Chap. 
VII, pp. 677 ff. and also his preface to 
Cayre Les Sources De L'Amour Divln, Paris, 1933, 
pp. I-VIXX. Sea also Gilson concluding chapter 
to hi.s Introduction A L'Etude De Saint Augustln, 
especially pp. 295, ff. 


WOTES (Continued) 





Nee miremur quod adhuc pulchritudlnes 
nomlno: nihil enim est ordinatum quod 
non sit pulchrum; (De Vera Relig. I, 
xli, 77, P.L. V.34, c. 166). 

tranquillitas ordinis (De Givitate Dei 
XIX, XIII, I; P.L. V.41, C.640). 

We oan compare the aesthetic experience 
in this regard to wisdom, sapientia 
igitur plenitudo, in plenitudine autem 
modus. (De beata vita, IV, 32; P.L. V.32, 
c. 975). 

De libero Arbitrio, III, IX, 24, 25; P.L. 

V.32, C.1283). 

Non enim f rustic et inaniter intueri 

oportet pulchritudinem coeli, ordinem 

siderum, candorsm lucis, dierum et noctiura 

vicissitudines, luna manstrua curricula, 

anni quedrifarium temperationem, quadri- 

partitis elementis congruentem, tantam via 

semlnum species numerosque gignentium, et 

omnia in suo genere modum propriiim naturamque 

servantia. In quorum consideratione non vana 

et perittira curiositas exercenda est, sed 

gradus ad immortal is et semper manentia 

faciendus. (De Vera Religione XXIX, 52; 

P.L. V.34, c. 146). 

Undique pulchritudo operis, qtiae tibi odmnendat 

artificem... . (Ennar. In.Ps.CXLV,5;P.L. V. 37, 1887). 

^ ' 

I .,.'. . 

J )■ 

tJ ■.' ■-.' i i 'y^.. ., 


HOTES (Continued) 

40 (Cont'd) 

Cxm autem se composuerlt et ordlnaverlt, 
ac concinnam pulchramque reddlderlt, 
audebit jam Deum videre,.... Hihil amplius 
dlcam, nisi promitti nobis aspectum 
pulchritudinis, oujus imitations pulchra.... 
(Ds Ordine II,XIX,6l; P.L. V.32, c.lOlt). 


Ecce tibi est ipsa Veritas; amplectere 

illam si potes, ot fruere ilia,.... Quid 

enlm jpetis amplius quam ut beatus sis? 

Et :^uid beatius eo qui firuitur inconcussa 

et incommutabili et excellentissima veritate? 

An vero clamdnt homines beatos se esse, cum 

pulchra corpora magno desiderio concupita, 

sive Gonjugum, sive etiam meretricum 

amplexantur; et nos in amplexu veritatis beatos 

esse, dubitamus. . . . et nos in amplexu veritatis 

beatos esse dubitabimus?. . . .et nos negabiraus 

beatos esse, cum irrgamur pascimurque veritate? 

....(De lib. Arhitrio, 11,13,35; P.L. V.32, 

c. 1260). 

Imo vero ^uoniam in veritate cognoscitur et 

tenetur suomuiii bonum, ea:iue Veritas sapientia 

est, cernamus in ea, tenemusque summum boniun, 

eaque perfruainur. Bsatus est quippe qui 

fr-Jitur summo bono, (op.cit., 36,* c. 1260). 

Num aliam putas esse sapient iam nisi verltatem 

in qua cemit-ar et tenetur summum bonum? (op. 


De Beata Vita, IV,34;P.L. V.32, c.976). 

.V' J 

I t . « 

, • . • 





£• FORM 







The aesthetlo experience being 
a vital trausuctluii between the self and an 
object, it is important to investigate the 
nature ot the object ana dotonalne the 
priuary eleiuents y<hlch constitute it 
Intriusicully. Analysis could bOijin with 
eithor joy or contemplation intersoctinj in 
the aesthetic cxperiGact, but for convenience 
of oxpoBition the line of joy followed in the 
precedinni chapter will be ouitiauod, and an 
attempt made to discover in the imcediute 
presence of the object the characturicLics 
eliciting delit^ht. This is to bo faithful 
to Augustine's method which does not proceed 

I. i- 


deductlvely from abstract prinoiples but starts 
with a concrete fact« a method used with suoh 
happy results oa pe olally in the Ss. ^sica whez^ 

starting from things corporeal the analysis 

pasces on to thiugs incorpoz>eal. 

As the considez*ation of any 

aesthetic object could yield the desired 

results, the first object to be interrogated 

will be the versa De^s oreat^or omniom taken by 

Augustine from St. Ambrose's ma,3nlflcent hymn. 

The free movement of the verse has no other end 

but its own beauty. The number of feet of 

which it is composed doP not run over a. given 

limit* and froci the fact that there is always 

a return from a eiiv^n limit the etj^mulogy of 

the worl verse may be traced. The movement 

of lon^ c.nd 3hort syllables » a movement which 

tends to come to rast, is taken up a^ain, carried 

oUf and concluded only when finally resolved in 

its diffusion throut^out the whole jives the 

poem its rhythm. Tl^e Latin word for rliythm 

:- }' 


sl^cpilf les mimfeer^ and number is the first 
irreducible element which enters into the 
hierarchic structure of the aesthetic object* 
Kumber plays an important role not only in 
poetry but in all the arts, and had any other 
aesthetic object been selected it would &lso 
have been necessary to be^^in with this 

Searching the heavens and 
earth, reason finds beauty only pleasing and 
what pleases it in beauty is form, in form, 
proportion, , and in proportion, number, 
number in not only an aesthetic constituent, 

but, as it Rill be shown further on, is present 

in all things* Talie away niimber from beings, 

inanimate or unimute, rational or irimtional* 

and thcj vill ffeill into uothin^iness ;3ince they 

have existence la so far as thoy are numbered* 

Measure is to be preferred to the indefinite, 

and number for Ai]£;ustine was not an arid 

mathematical abstz*action but an intelligible 

.-j 1 

, ) 

: ,-W .,..> 

.-. > 1 


Ingradlsnt entering Into the ontolo^loal 
structure of the object.® In Augustine's 
•yes, number is endowed with an eminent dignity, 
so much so that he admires Plato because in the 
Timaeus he shows God composing the universe 
according to the lews of number, which Augustine 
claims is also taught b3' Scriptures: qui profert 
numnrose saeculum (Inai. XL, 26, sec.LXX) and 
omnia in mensura et numero et pondere 
dieposulsti (Sap. XI, 21). To understand the 
aesthetic object it Is necessary to atudy the 
nature of number so worthy of respect and full 
of the most profound inysteriee even though in 
the end it may be found that nunoer cannot be 
fully explained, and this will be done by 
investigating the mv^bers retilised sensibly 
In the verse of A^^brose'ii hymn. 

In the aixth book of the £§, 
gfr ^ 6 [i ca ^ interrogation on the part of th« 
master britigs the desired answers froni the 
disciple, not ho\«ever without hesitations. 

V. -?„.■■' 

( , MI 



that when the verse 3eus oyeu^qy onmlma is 
pronounced the numbers const! tutlng Its four 
iambics and twelve times are in the sound 
heard, in the sense of the hearer, in the 
activity of the one pronouncing, in the 
memory, and in the natural jud^^aent of the 
senae of hearing* These five claBses of 
numlK rs ore carefully examined to see wliether 
one Kind can exist without the ot^ier. l^ound 
Itself hui^ number ^van hhGii no auuxtor is 
present. Niiiabers in the sense cf the hearer 
last us long as the sound lasts ana cannot 
exist without the sounding numbers* Niuubers 
in the activity of the reoitar which are in 
the very use unii operut^ion of the cnu pro- 
nouncing have no need of thb nurabcrs in sound 
or in the act of heuiin^. Th&se nuiubei's in 
activity can he furthtr obsejrveti in the beating 
of the pulfjci, in breathing, end similar 
activities which cannot be changed voluntarily # 
nor do these nuiaoere produced by the soul in its 

. ' Jt 


>, .1 


operations have any need of the other numbers 
80 far mentioned. The numbers In the memory 
although formed on the basis of the numbers 
heard or thought can exist without them, and 
this can be seen from the fact that even in 
silence certain numbex^s can be executed with 
the time-pauses with which they would be 
executed by the voice. The numbers in the 
natural Jud^^ent of sense are not received 
from without or from reason, and if there were 
no numbers in the sense of hearing it could 
not b« pleased with harmony or displeased with 
discord. That very thing by which thez^ is 
agreement or disapproval, prompted not by 
reason but by nature, when something sotmds is 
called the number of that sense. When a sound 
Is heard the power of approving or disapproving 
is not then produced in the ears which are open 
both to /^ood and bad sounds. A numbered sound 
affects the organ of hearing possessing numbers, 
and that accounts for the approval of harmony and 

t I 


the rejection of discord* The natural power* 
judicial as it were, present within the ear 
does not cease to exist in silence* nor does 
sotmd bring it in but is rather received by 
it to be approved or condemned. This kind of 
number is in the natural Jud^^ent of the one 
experiencing soiuid whereby he is pleased with 

the equality of numbers or dis^^leased 1»y their 


To pronounce sentence by 

approving or disapproving as though by a kind 

of natural law is one thing. It is still 

another thing to produce and remember numbers. 

These numbers in turn differ from the numbers 

present in the act of hearing which are finally 

differentiated from the sounding numbers 

attributed to corporeal bodies. These five 

different kinds of numbers are distinguished 

and for convenience sake are named: Judicial or 

Judging nvunbers (iudicales); active or progressive 

numbers (progressores) ; confz*onting or occurring 


numbers (ocoujpores) ; reraemborin^j numbers (re- 
oordablles) and soiindln^ niuabers (sonantes). 

Mors difficult than naming 
these numbers Is the task of class ifyliv; them 
according to their worth and detemlning which 
of the five classes of number ranks highest* 
On the principle tiat to judge is more exoell- 
ent than to be judged, the judicial numbers are 
ranked highest. The judging numbers of the 
sense presupposes all the others, otherwise 
it could not judge them. The same principle 
cannot be used for the other kinds of number 
and their values are graded on the principle 
that things making are superior to things 
made. To understand the classification that 
follows it is necessary to keep in mind St. 

Aiagustine's doctrine of sensation which will 

be briefly touched on a^^ain in passing. 

According to the principle 

that mnKlng is superior to the made it would 


■••m that sounding niuabers should be grunted 
the next highest place for these produce the 
passion suffered by the ears In the sensation 
of hearing ,^ K^lrSh in turn produce numbers in 
the memory* If this is so, then it would 
appear that the sounding numbers which are 
surely corporeal must be praised more than 
those which are found in the soul when sensa- 
tion is experienced; but such an embarrassment 
is overcome with the aid of the distinction 
that the true must be preferred to the false. 
The spiritual is not always superior to the 
corporeal, for a false tree in a dream is not 
better than a true material tree. Vhy then 
should there be any hesitation in preferring 
soundinij and corporeal numbers to those which 
az^e taade by them even though they are made in 
the soul which is better than the body, for 
in so doing numbers are preferred to numbers 
and things making to things made, not body to 


80ul? But the soundln^^ numbers are placed 
last because they do not act on the soul for 

sensation is never passive but an activity 

of the soul. In the act of hearing, num- 
bers are not produced in the soul by those 
which are perceived in sound. The soul 
cannot be subjected to the body woriiing and 
imposing numbers on it in such a way that 
the body does the fashioning; and the soul is 
the matter from which and in which something 
numbered is fashioned. The soul does not 
suffer anything from the body but acts con- 
cerning it. Corporeal things brou~^t into 
the body produce something not in the soul 
but in the body, and this is either suitable 
to the work of the soul or opposed to it. 
When the soul stro^^les against that which 
opposes it and strides with difficulty 
against the matter subjected to it on the 
path of its own work it becomes more attentive 

l^' f 


.1 . 

\.. ? 

.,* 'i L ,1',* -J ■ 


because of the difficulty towards action, 
and this difficulty which does not escape 
the attention of the soul is called the 
sensation of pain* When, however, that 
which is brou^i^ht in or lies close to the 
body suite the soul, the action by which it 
joins its own body to a body from without 
suited to it does not escape the soul and is 
experienced voluntarily because of its suita- 
bility. When the soul feels in the body it 
does not sviffer anything from it but acts 
with more attention to the passions thereof 
and these actions, whether easy on account of 
their suitability or difficult on account of 
their unsuitability, do not escape the soul. 
By these actions, called sensations, the 
soul Joins with pleasure thini^s suitable and 
resists with difficulty thiajs harmful. The 
soul, then, suffers from itself and not from 
the body, Au^stine's teaching on sensation 

I . I <., -; 

, J 


helps to explain why oorporeal and Inaninat* 
sounding nuxabero ar« ranked lowest. 

Of the three remaining kinds 
of number which are in the soul , A\;f;ustlne 
puts the numbers of activity in the hl^^hest 
place because they are freer and more active. 
Thien come the numbers in the ear which react 
against the physical Irapact of sound In the 
act of hearing, '.ower still are the numbers 
of memory because of their passivity. 

Sounding numbers, the numbers 
of memory, occurring and progressive numbers 
are all submitted to the judicial numbers 
surpassing them all by the v^ry fact that it ^^'"^ icx.H^,' k,>^d 
judges them. IViere is no question of the 
subordination of these numbers to the Judi- 
cial numbers as a cursory examination of them 
shows. The active numbers obey the judicial 
numbers and this explains why uneiual steps 
are avoided in walking, unequal strokes In 

-. i 


the movement of the hands, unequal movementB 
of the Jaws in eutin^; and drinking;, unequal 
movements of the nails in scratching, and 
so forth. The progressive or active numbers 
striving after some numbered operation of the 
body are kept within bounds by the Judicial 
numbers which silently command a certain 
equality and prevent unequal movements in 
anything that is done through the members of 
the body. The ocourrin^j and progressive 
numbers are likewise submitted to the judi- 
oial numbers* 

The next question is whether 
all of these numbers perish and pass away 
or whether some are lasting. The Judicial 

numbers bein^j the hi-^hest, only these are 


examined , for of the remaining four classes 

subject to them there is no question of their 
passing away and perishing. 

The Judicial niunbers which 
excel by Judging are not limited by time. 


for no matter how ^reat the duration it can 
always ba judged. These numbers must surely 
abide in the vejry nature of raan who is capable 
of Judging things offered^ no matter how varied 
their brevity or len,:ith, and approving in them 
what is numbered and condemning what is con- 
fused. Yet movement^ which is too long^ can- 
not be recognized since the sense of space and 
time in man is conformed to his actions and 
needs ( and consequently this sense cannot Judge 

of that which exceeds the nature of his actions 

and needs. Althou^:^ time spaces do not seem 

to be in the Judicial numbers, those thin^,'S only 
which are produced in a space of time are Judged 
by them^ so in all probability these numbers are 
mortal and perish with the death of man* 

A more diligent search is re- 
quired to discover whether anything more ex- 
cellent than the Judicial numbers can be found 
in the hiuaan soul.^^ 'hen the verse Deus 


gr»ator Omnium is suivi, the sounding numbeni 
are heard by the occurring numbers* reco^^nissed 
by reraemberin/j numbers, pronounced by progres- 
sive numbers, and deligyit is taken in it by 
the Judicial numbers. Now this delectation 
which is the verdict as it were of the judi- 
cial niimbers is evaluated by other more hidden 
numbers, for to be delighted by sense and to 
evaluate by reason are not one and the same 
thing* To be moved/^owards those thin/^s which 

the body suffers aooofaplioh o d (^n sensation} is 
quite different from the soul's movement to- 
wards the body accomplished in operation. 
Preserving; what has been accomplished from 
these movements differs from approving or 
disapproving these movements when they are 
first put forth or revived by remembrance, 
and this happens in the delight at the fitness 
of such movements or affections and in offense 
at their incon^;ruity. Finally, it is still 

. * . 1 ^ ." I 


another thln^ to estimate whether these things 
delight rightly or otherwise and this is ac- 
complished by reasoniriij. Unless the very sense 
of delectation had been impressed by certain 
more lively numbers it could not approve of 
equal intervals and reject that which disturbs 
it. Reason which is placed over this delecta- 
tion cannot rightly jud^^e of the numbers below 
it without these more lively numbers of reason* 
In seeking to discover which if any of the five 
classes of number were immortal, this sixth 
class, the numbers of reason, emer-^e* Tnis 
sixth and hi^^her kind of numbers should rightly 
be called judicial and all the others sensuous. 
The sensual judicial numbers produce the aware- 
ness of pleasure or displeasure, whereas the 
Judicial numbers of reason evaluate this sen- 
suous awareness. It will take but little 
investi -at ion to Khow that these more excellent 
numbers of reason are immortal and do not perish 


or pass away like the others. 

The n\imbers of reason are im- 
mortal, and this can be shown not only by 
considering their truth which is eternal, 
necessary and immutable, but even from a rapid 

examination of the rhythmic or metric art used 

by the makers of verse. Verses are fashioned 

according to numbers which do not pass away with 

the verse but remain? and thus perishing numbers 

are fashioned by some abiding numbers. These 

abiding humbers by which the perishing humbers 

are fashioned are not changeable, and being \xn~ 

changeable they are eternal. 

All reasoning beings i^eeVcommonly^, 

each by his own mind, the reason and truth of 

numbers: it can be seen more easily by one, with 

more difficulty by another, yet in being seen it 

does not change into the mbq of those to whom it 

is present like food or drink but remains un- 

corrupted and entire. Whether we consider the 

mathematical truth 743*10, or the niimerical 

.(..■..; ■ J .i, 

X ^ ' 

■•f -i t. 

,:■ : i. tJ •; . -lo 

. t. 

G. ) 

..,1! ;■; J ; , ; . 

i» . ^ I 

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proportlon where number appears with more 
eclat 1:2!:2:4, they are uiiohaiu;eable and 
eternal. The idea of number, it may be ad- 
mitted, has been derived from sensible things, 
but it cannot be held that the laws of the 
composition of numbers have been derived from 
sensible thin^js, strictly speaking; , even the 
ideas of nurabers have not been drawn from 
sensible thin^js, since a number is a sum of 
unities or unity taken many times over. But 
as it will be shown later, a sensible body is 
multiple by reason of its divisibility into an 
indefinite multitude of parts, and hence the 
idea of unity cannot bo drawn from it. In 
oMer to know that a body is multiple the 
idea of unity must already be present, for 
othez^wlse its multiplicity could not be per- 
ceived. If numbers are not drawn in by the 
bodily senses which only perceive the con- 
tingent and passing, is the source of the 

f (, 

■). • " 

4. i: 

■^■i- ! 

I", f' 


unchan^jeable and neoessary truth of numbers 
the mind itself? But the mind of man is 
itself contintjent and rautable and henoe cannot 
give what it does not possess. Ideas not bein^ 

innate nor remembered from a previous existence 

of the soul, how account for them? If the 

intellie^ible laws of numbers are entirely in- 
dependent of any sensible ori^in^ and cannot 
come from the raind^ then from whence does the 
truth of numbers hold these makks of necessity* 
iiamutability, and eternal ity? This source must 
be hi;;her than the soul and can be none other 
than the one eternal and unchaiv;sable God, the 
true lijht wnich enlighteneth ev9ry man that 
Cometh into ti^M world. He who Knows truth 
sees this natural light present to all men. 
Man in so far as he is endowed with intellect^ 
is a being naturally illumined by God Who may 
be compared to an intelligible sun. The act 
by which thought icnows truth is comparable to 


that by whioh the «yd sees bodies, and as 
objects nuBt be made visible by lij^ht if they 
are to be perceived, so too truths muot be 
rendered ixitelli^lble by an immaterial lijht. 
The laeta^jhor of divine illumination ueed by 
Au^stine also suppos&s that as the sun is 
the source of corporeal li^^ht rendering things 
visible, so too God is the source of spiritual 
licjht renderiiit: nticessary, im^^ utable and eter- 
nal tarutlis intelllf^lble to thought* God is to 
our thoughts what the sun is to our eyes; as 
the sun is the source of li^;ht so God Is the 
soui'ce of truth. To compare God to an intelli- 
gible sun is to mark at once the difference 
between that which is intelli/^ible in itself 
and that which has to be rendered Intel ll^^ible, 
and no confusion between huraan thought and 
divine ll^.-ht is here possible. Divine Illu- 
mination does not dispense man from having an 
intellect but rather supposes it. The intellect 


do68 not create but finds the laws of niunbers 
to whloh it submits. This submission of the 
intellect is nothiiie^ other than seeing in- 
telligible realities, not with the bodily 
•yes, but with an immediate intuition of the 
rO/^ulae nximeroruia . These rules of number, 
essentially re^^ulative and normative, do not 
carry any content, and thus ontologism is not 

possible* Vv'ithout any intermediary, the 

human intellect is submitted in its operations 

to intellit^ible realities which are immutable, 

necessary and eternal, and this submission is 

called by Au^stine divine illumination. 

An analysis of Deus creator 

oinniuiq has led from sensible number to intelli- 

gible number and thence to CfOd. Any other 

object could have yielded the same results and 

illustrated Au^^oistine's dialectic which starts 

from the exterior, passes into the interior, 

and thence on to God, in this instance from 


tamporal nuiabers to the numbers of reason 
which reciuired divine illumination. In 
seeicing the reaeon of deli.^t the discovery 
was made that number pleases, and this is 
found not only in the beauty of sounds which 
pertain to the ears, and in the movement of 

bodies, but in those visible forms in which 

beauty is more commonly said to be. Number 

is not only found in sounds, visible movements, 
and foxnas, but is found in all thin<^s that have 
any beln^ whatsoever. Humber has been conferred 
on all things and extends from the lowest degree 
of bein^^ to the hi^^hest. Numbered thin/;s, how- 
ever, are not number, and la order to understand 
the numbers found in matter it is necessary to 
penetr^ite into deeper and more secret regions 
where intelligible number is found far removed 
from bodies yet so difficult to understand that 

weariness compels the mind to return to the 

world of bodies in which nuiabers are found. 


Onoe sltuuted in the seoret 
region where intelligible numbers dwell, it 
will be seen that nunber and wisdom are ulti- 
mately identical, and that tholr difference is 
not in their origin but in the objects to which 
they apply* Bodies which are least in being 
have their numbers; wisdom, on the contrary, 
does not pertain to ar^ body whatsoever, nor 
even to all minds, but to those to whom wisdom 
has been /panted. The raind capable of ^^rasping 
Intelligible number sees that ultimately there 
is no difference between numbers which flow 
from wisdom and wisdom itself. The numbers in 
sensible objects are a participation of wisdom 
possible to bodies incapable of icnowin^^; wisdom 
and unable truly to possess number* Lacking 
knowledge, bodies can at least receive nunbers, 
and the 11 :ht of nimiber;s is poured over matter* 
As the one firo both wartas bodies close to it 
and limits up those farther away, so the same 


souroe warras minds with the warmth of wisdom, 
and floo d a by th« li;?ht of numbers/^ bodies 
whose very materiality removes them from 
wisdom. In one fire^li^^t and heat are ex- 
perienced consubstantially so to speak, nor 
oan they be separated from one another. Never- 
thelessy' heat domes to things inearer, but li^jht 
is diffused over those farther away. So things 
nearer such as rational beings are warmed by 
wisdom, but bodies farther away, not reached by 

the heat of wisdom, are flooded by the li^arht of 


For Augustine there is a physical 
illumination corresponding to the noetic illu- 
mination and resting on the same metaphysical 
basis. As man in the order of knowing is not 
sufficient unto himself but must receive a 
natural li^t, so in the order of being a phy- 
sical Illumination Is required. Bodies oould 
not subsist without this physical illumination 


whioh gives all beings not only their number 
and measure, but as it shall be seen later* 
their unity and order also. A body is more or 
less perfect in so far as it receives more or 
less of this physical illumination. 

The aesthetic and ontolo>:ical 
approaches are often identified in St. Aui^stine, 
and for him number is not only a primal consti- 
tuent of the aesthetic object, but is as it wore 
an ontolo<^ical ingredient enterin^^r into the in- 
telli/^ible structure of the object. A thin-j is 
what it is in so far as it is more or less 
flooded by the li,?ht of numbers. Things have 
existence in proportion as they are numbered, 
and deprived of number would fall into nothin/j- 
ness. Material things are real by participation 
in the everlasting and \mohmv5©able intolli/jible 
numbers identical with VJisdora identified by 
Augustine with God. 

Nothing? could better summarize 
this section on number than St, Augustine's own 


J '■ J --.J ^ ■ ■•■; 


words* "Wherever you tuzn, by oertaln 
traces whioh wisdom has impressed on her 
works* she speuks to yoUf and reoalls you 
within, ^lidin/T baok into exterior things 
by the very forms of exterior thin^^s; so 
that whatever deli-^ts you in a body and 
allures through the bodily senses, you see 
to be numbe^d and you ask whence it is and 
you return into yourself end you understand 
that you cannot either approve or disapprove 
of that which you touch by the bodily senses, 
unless you have certain laws of beauty to 
which you refer wi^iatever beautiful thin^^s 
you experience exteriorly. 

Look upon the firmament, a»d 
the earth, «nd the sea^ and whatever in them 
shines from above, or creeps benenth, or 
flies or swims; they have forms because they 
have numbers: take away these thln^js from them^ 
and they will be nothin^j. From what^ therefore^ 


ar« they unless from {im from whom number 
Is; since exletenoe Is to them in proportion 
as they are numbered? And too, hunan artisans 
of all oorporeal forras have nnnbers in their 
art to whioh they adapt their works; and hands 
and instruments move in working, until that 
which is formed withoiit, referred to that 
light of number which is within, obtains com- 
pletion in so far as is possible, and is 
pleasing: to the intrmal jud^^e ^azinc upon 
supernatural numbers throu:^ the Interpreting 
sense. Seek ^ then^ wha t moves the members of 
the artisan himself; it will be number: for 
those also are moved numerically* And if 
you withdraw Work from the hands, and from 
the soul the Intention of nakln^^ and that 
movement of the member be referred to plea- 
sure, it will be called dancixvj. Seek^ 
therefore what i^ives pleasure in dancing: 
number will make answer to you: behold it is I. 


Examine how the beauty of the formed body; 
numbers are confined in place. Kxainine the 
beauty of movement in;\body; nuubers are 
whirled about in time. Enter into the art 
whence these proceed, seek in it time and 
place; at no time will it be, at no place 
will it be; nevertheless number lives in it; 
its region is not of spaces, nor is its age 
of days: und nevertheless when they who wish 
to become artists ap^ ly tiiemselvee to the 
learninii; of art, they move their bod^-^ through 
places und tites, but their soul through times: 
with the increase oi' time to be sure they be- 
come more skilled. Transcend, therefore^ also 
the soul of the artisan in onier that you may 
see everlatstln,; nunbcr; now wisdom shall shine 
upon you from the interior seat itself and 
fx'om the vejry inner chaiaber of truth: if she 
repel your still too lan<;uid gase, carry back 
the eye of the mind to that way where she 

I . 


8hows herself cheerfully. Kamember well that 
you have ^d iffered a vision whioh you,/( Btron^^er 
and more healthy, may a^ain seek.** 


As form Is a ooneequence of 
number It will be oonsidored next in order. 
The sKy, the earth, what shines above and 
what creeps In the lowest regions have foiras 
because they have numbers, and once deprived 
of the "melody of their numbers" they would 
no longer exist. 'Hiings ajre what they are 
by reason of their form which permits them 
to accomplish as it were "verses of time** 
by their measured movenents. A ohanfceable 
t'lin^:? cannot be held either by the seases or 
the mind unless it be held by some form of 

numbers^ without which it would fall into 


nothingness. Without forra^thin/js could not 

be in any way w^iatsoever, and they have being 
in so far as they possess form. It is not 
matter which makes a body, but form, yet 
matter which is a complete privation of form 
is not evil for it can receive form which is 


always a tjood. A form loay b« called bad only 
In the special sense that a thln^; has not the 
form it should have. No creature is wholly 
formless, and In so far as it has form it is 
beautiful. Axi/^s t ine^ who sornetimes identifies 
beauty and form held that the body is so much 
the more a body in the degree that it is beauti- 
ful, and so much the less a body In the decree 
that it Is ugly. Ugliness la the absence of ^^^ 
foinn a thinj? should have, but this lack of 
form which is ugliness, as well as the identi- 
fioation of form and beauty, shetM. both be 

considered in the ^ hapte rj followingjon the 
nature of beaity. Here it is enou/^h to 
indicate that a body must possess form if 
it is to be, and that its beln^; is in pro- 
portion to its possession of form* 

A thing is forma ble by the 
very fact that it is chan^-eable, and as any- 
thing which can be chan^^ed is called ohanfje- 


able, so anything which oan bo fornied Is 
oalled formable. a thin^; is formed so that 
it may have form; but no thing can form itself 
because no thin,: can cive to itself what it 
does not have* and if it already had form 
there would be no need for it to receive what 
it already possesses. The sufficient explana- 
tion for all formable and, hence »chan,reable 
thln^--8 is H fora unchian/^eablc which iias formed 
ever:/thin,.r that has received form. This un- 
ohan;T«6ble and eternal forra, the V^ord by 'fhom 
all thln,^« were made, which has not been 
formed but has formad all that is, is neither 
contained and diffused through places nor 
extended and varied by time. Tliis irarautable 
and eternal form, unrestricted in space or 
time, throTA^h which everything has been fonned, 

is the ground upon which Aall forms circumscribed 

in space and time. d e pend . 


Thin^s would fall into nothing- 
ness were fona oomplotely taken away, and no 
matter how deficient and tending towards non- 
bein^^ a failing thing may be, something of 
form remains to it in order that it nay be in 
any way whatsoever. But whatever of form re- 
mains to anything in the act of failing', it 

■thai '5 
is throu<;h that self-subslstent form/\without 

failing or decline. Through this unfailing 
form, the forms of all failin^^ and progressing 
things fulfil the numbers of places and times 
without ever exceeding the laws of numbers, 

and throu.^ it the forms of changing things 

are brought to fulness and completion. 

Augustine also calls this vinoliangeable form 
througii which all things are carried to ful- 
ness and completion their Providence. No 
being could subsist if robbed of its form, 
and this subsistence is possible through the 
immutable form which not only makes changing 

I I 

u { 


things to be, but penetrates with harmony 

their being and aotlon, and this form is 

their Providence. 

Form exists in two ways: in 

the thin^t and in Ood. In the mind of God, 

forms, not having been formed, are eternal 

and unohan^^ing. These principal forms or 

divine ideas or reason^, for it is of little 

importance by what naae they are called, but 

of the greatest importance that they be known, 

are neither born nor do they pass away, but 

everything which comes to be or passes away 

is said to take form from the forms which do 

not change. These foztos, ideas, or reasons, 

are the fixed and Imriutable essences of thin^:s. 

Things exist both in their eternal ideas in the 

Divine intellect, and in themselves and their 

own proper natures, and this double existence 

is simultaneous. The carpenter, for example, 

first has in his intelligence the form or idea 

.1 -.),;' 

i I 


of what he Is /joing to fashion which is thon 
realised in the thing made. Likewise, the 
forms or ideas of all things actually existing 
in the world are in the Divine mind and in the 
things themselves. For God, to create and/fonn 
are one and the same thing, but for man these 
two must be distinguished. In the strict 
sense of the word, man cannot create, ^he can 
Illuminate with form a matter already in ex- 
istence; only God can bring matter and form 
into existence from nothingness. iTor nuist 
God bo supposed first to have made formless 
matter, and after an interval of time to have 
formed what He had first made formless. A 
discussion of this problem is not within the 
scope of this section, but the examples given 
by Augustine may be of interest. In the 
intelli<.^ible sounds made in spealcin^j, ths 
sounds do not issiie at first formless, where- 
upon they af tnrjvtrt te receive foitns, but are 

" J .' 

J 1 ■ 

I J 


uttered already formed. Likewise in the 
sounds heard in sin^^'ing formless sounds are 

not first heard which are afterwards formed 

into a song. 

To be truly formed is to 

becoiM a whole because the principle of 

every form is eminently one^', aad fhe 

nature of unity ^will be inveetih'ated next, 

n nj ir i rl il 1 ]- no n inrw eirrrji f ^M m \ ^ .gp^^j fj^^Ti^ fl 

aftftr -tiiu i",il¥ uf uiiity v- vithout form order 

is impossible, so after considering unity 

there will follow an examination of order, 

but not before the doctrine of the iraai^e has 

been presented, for form is also said to be in 

the iiaa^e* 

., 1 ~ 

■J ,. -. --ff 

i 't. 

'.. '- -J 



Man's search for unity^ can 
perhaps nowhere better be seen than In the 
aesthetic experience which le the experience 
of a unified self throu^ a unified object. 
3o firmly is this desire for unity Implanted 
In man that even the enquiry now to be pur- 
sued on the unity of the object can sez^e us 
an Illustration of the universil cravlmj for 
unity on the part of all beln^^s* Recourse 
is hud to synthesis or analysis because unity 
is sou^t and loved* Analysis renoves for- 
el^;n elt^mentSt synthesis unifies hoiQo^;eneou8 
parts and both aim at the perfection of unity. 
The very pleasure of the senses can further 
Illustrate this desire for unity as such 
pleasures ^re most vividly felt when bodies 

>■ ->• 


whioh love one another are united; liOve 

dLe%\ I' e s 

d e g l rlng to unite to Itself the object loved, oLnd 

pain r««uXLin^j from the separation of that 

which is united. 

Investigation of the pleasure 
experienced by the recitation of the verse 

Deus creator omniuci led to the discovery of 

number* Measure and number result from 


successive repetitions of unity » and at- 
tention will now be fixed upon unity, so 
essential an aesthetic element* 

Without unity nothing could 
exist since to be is no other than to be 
one, and the more unity a thin^i has so much 
the more being does it possess* In dis- 
cussing number it was pointed out that no 
material object is really one because a 

body as such is indefinitely divisible* 


potentially if not actually* No material 

thin<j can possess perfect unity, yet if it 

I ■. 

i .' .;..' k't.. 

■ i <■' i 



did not have some traces of unity, if it 
were not to some extent one, it could not 
exist at all but would fall into nothin^jness. 
If to be is to be one, aiid no body is absolutely 
one, how do bodies exist? 

In oonslderin^; the elements, 
earth, for example, is said to be truly earth 
because all its constitutive parts are alike. 
Each constitutive part of water is 11 le its 
other parts, and without this likeness water 
would not be water. A quantity of air is 
like another, otherwise air would not be it- 
self. The same is true of the least spark 
of fire or ray of li^jht. Earth which -Danl- 
feats something one/' no part bein,^ unllite the 
whole^ holds the lowest place. Above earth, 
and in an ascending series each stru^ling 
towards unity, are plaoed water, air, and 
fire because of the /greater inter-likeness 
of parts in each of these elements. 

, .T.. .^? , 

'. "k ■ 

r . 

. • V 




Whut is true of the elements 
Is likewise true of stones, trees, or animal 
bodies of any kind. Likeness of constitutivs 
parts tjives a thing its eharaoter of unity, 
and the more alike the parts the more unity 
does the object possess. xherever there are 
objects there Is some kind of unity, expressed 
by likeness, and thin^^s are in the decree that 
they attain to unity. 

T!ia inter-likeness of parts in 
each thin^j is the ground of the relBtive unity 
of the individual. The unity of the species 

consists in the llIienoBS of the individuals 

coi.aposlng It. 5b ^'acsin^^ from the na to rial 

to the spiritual order, a soul remains con- 
stant with itself by aanix^estlng iregularly 
liite virtues end accoiaplishiiv? like acts, 
and this interior likeness corresponds to 
the likeness of parts which makes the tmlty 
of the body* Likeness of ocimers Is the 

.. J 

: . •: , J 


r«ason for the spiritual unity of friendship, 
and the unity of the city le in the union of 
all its members in the love of the same ^ood. 
Any object » whether presented to the senses 
or mind, owes its character of unity to like- 
ness* Things uncompounded are in themselves 
because they are one, but thini:;8 composite 
imitate unity by the harmony of their parte." 

Harmony and proportion are 
particular cases of likeness, for harmony 
seeks unity either in the likeness of equal 


parts or in the proportion of unequal parts. 
Both harmony and proportion are produced by 
unity which is their principle, and so too 
are equality and symmetry. Hanaony of parts, 
proportion, symmetry, and equality express 
the unity which no composite thing by its 
very nature can possess. But these fozraal 
elements of the aesthetic object find their 
sufficient explanation in Augustine's doctrine 


I t 


of expression whloh will be considered In 
another context* 

If the artisan In oonstiructlng 
an aroh Is asked why he desires one side to 
be like the other, he will undoubtedly say 
that he wishes to establish equality between 
the corresponding sides. If further ques- 
tioned why this symmetry is desired, his 
answer will be that it is denianded by the 

eye, that it is agreeable, beautiful, and 


after this response/iwill not hazard another 
explanation, but will remain like a man with 
eyes turned to the ground who does not see 
above him. The artisan should be stimulated^ 
however^ by further questioning, and urg«d 
to explain the reason of the natural pleasure 
he finds in beautiful objects. Do these ob- 
jects please because the parts are well pro- 
portioned and all the details bound together 
in harmony and concord by a sln^^le thought? 

■ ^^- 

(■• t. 

i ' I 

\ I 

: 1 : i 

1. > ' 

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I ...- i 

:<^.■■^' .:■. 



i« iSsreBine to this, the artisan should n«xt 
be asked whether objects made up of parts 
perfectly realize unity, or whether they are 
far removed from it, V/hat man, little as he 
may be instructed, will not admit that there 
is no body in which some traces of unity are 
not met> and yet beautiful as a body may be 
it never attains the ideal unity it seeks 
since it necessarily nas diverse parts in the 
diverse points of extension it occupies* This 
bein^ admitted, the artisan will have to say 
further where he has seen this unity, for 
otherwise how can he luiow how much each body 
approaches unity and ho\v far removed it is* 
Bodies could not be if some bond did not 
contain them in unity, but if they were 
perfect unity by that very fact they would to be bodies. .Vhere, then, is this 
perfect unity discovered according to which 
it is affirmed that objects more or less 

I i. I 

«'• . 

^ ,.':fi;.'! :? .. 


,U I 

H s. 

\ . ♦ , 4 ■'• i i^ 

, 'vj,;:' ■ . ; .,v,,v 


realise unity? 

As WDO tho o a ae with nurabar* 
divine illumination explains how the mind 
sees this perfect unity which can neither 
be given by sensible thln^js nor/, the mind 
since neither possesses it. The noetic 
illumination by which absolute unity illu- 
minates the intellect will be treated in 

the chapter on the aesthetic jud^jnent ; 

here the interest is with the physical 

illumination whereby things participate 

in more or less degree in the absolute 

unity which is God. 

God only is absolutely one 

and by that very fact absolute being. Nothing 

could exist apart from God, Who is absolute 

unity and being, if it were not for likeness 

which makes possible the existence of things 

not truly one but sufficiently one to exist 

by reason of the homogeneity of 1*« constitutive 

. ^ — . 1^< 

-X 3- 

I '" 

; , ! -.: 

■< :. ,-. 

I ' J a 


parts. Mkeness plays the iiitenae diary role 
between the absolute unity whioh is (rod, and 
pure multiplicity which at its outermost 
limit oonverfjes dnto nothingness. Likeness 
takes the place of the perfect unity which 
belon>,'8 to God alone, and is the s uooedane 
of perfect unity which a body as such cannot 

Likeness, however, has a two- 
fold role In the Au^stinian doctrine. Things 
are, not only because likeness of their consti- 
tutive parts confers on thera the unity which 
they are capable of receiving, but also be- 
cause they are like God. Likeness is a middle 
terra between absolute identity and otherness: 
to be like another thin^j is in a certain 
measure to be that thin,;;, and at the saine time 
not to be it since it is only like that thing 
and not the thin^; itself. 

Each thing is like fxod in the 
degree that it is like the divine ideas, and 

t'- -h ••, ...t O 

, .1 

1 ■ .. f 

»V. I '..{o? 

.! I. ■: 

I' U :.,i 



the fundeuaental bond whioh binds the object 
to the divine Ideas is likeness. As with 
number and forny whioh were aeen to be parti- 
cipated, so too with likeness. Thlng-likenessos— 
and by this is meant the double likeness of con- 
stitutive parts and likeness to God— are real by 
virtue of a self-subsistent likeness whioh f^ives 
all likenesses their subsistence. Not only is 
there a likeness in itself participated by all 
likenesses, but there is also a self-subsistent 
participation which ^ives to all participations 
their reality and subsistence as participations. 

The thing-likeness— or likeness- 
thing if that term is preferred, the word 
semblance or resemblance bein^' too e luivooal— 
differs from likeness itself as the chaste man 
differs from chastity or the strong man differs 
from strength. As that which is strong parti- 
cipates in strength* and thtit which is chaste 
is so by participation in chastity* so the 

J L ' . 

; ,' . . 1 i «i« "VjI.h 

; ■ .;.''.. 1 ■ -, 

■!- , J • ,1 


. iiA 


thing-likeness participates in likeness thun 
which there is nothing more like, as there is 
nothing; more chaste than chastity or more wise 
than wisdom. Vhat is true of (Chastity or 
wisdom, which in their absolute perfection in 
God are unpurticipated but render chaste or 
wise all that participate in them, is also 
true of likeness which renders like all thing- 
likenesses. Souls are called wise in so far 
as they participate in wisdom, and this wisdom 
eannot be participated by irrational creatures 
even thou<^ these beings subsist through the 
wisdom of God} but men, irrational creatures 
and inani'i.ate beings can all participate in 
likeness. All thln^?-llkenesses participate 
in a primary and absolute likeness, and 
without this self-subsistent likeness all 
likeness- thln^js would lose their reality* 

The superemlnent , iraioutable, 
and eternal likeness is the Second i erson of 


';,J •■>■;.<.'( 

)- i I 

' *. \ i 

li ' . ; 'V 

iH. ~nd'if } 

lA S '.■ :-iV' 

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, /'.■.-»;; j^ii 1 v:5i .1 

4 '« :. 


the Blessed Trinity Who is the Perfect 
Likeness of God the Father. God the Father 
in expressing Himself to Himself has en- 
gendered His perfect likeness^ nhioh totally 
expresses the entire plenitude of God the 
Father, for if there were anythin/^ iuore or 
less than Himself in the Son it would not be 


the expression of Himself. 

The irafti^e is distincuishod from 
likeness. A species of likeness, ana ima^e 
is essentially a likeness expressed, i'^rery 
iina»je presupposes likeness, but not every 
likeness is an ioa^re. To be an iciQi.te it is 
necessary that the likeness be the expi^ssion 
of the thin.j of which it is the likeness. A 
man's likeness of hii.iself in a mirror, for 
example, is an ima/^e because it is engendered 
by him. /^n ima^-^e may be of the same substance 
as its begetter as in the case of a son who is 
the image of hie father, or it may not be of 

4 '■.. / . .... ,,f . ■.>■-;■. 

J .1 , 

., . .1 j 

( ...••-, , . 

'"' • .f. 


the ssme substance as in the case of a 
painting which is the irra^e of the idea in 
the artist who begets it* ^^en the likeness 
adequately expresses that of whioh it is the 
ima^;e it realises a perfect likeness/ and 
equality; between the model and the image 
there is no difference, Inequality, or dis- 
a£x*6eui6nt; but such a perfect ima,:T6 can only 
be found in God the Son vho is the perfect 
expression and image of the Father. 

Images of the Divine ideas • 
thin^^s are in so far as they realize and 
express the ideas in God's mind. The world 
Inhabitsd by man is composed of imaros whioh 
express and ima^je ideas, but it can be further 
said that these imtigsa of which the world is 
oomposed get their subsistence fran the exist- 
ence of a self-subsistent iina^^e* v;ere this 
solf-subsistent ima,<^e lacking, reality would 
go out of all the ixnages whose subsistence 


(l«p«od8 on it. All partiolputed liken«*««« 
and Images would lose their reality if there 
were no Iraa^^e, Likeness, and Participation 
in itself, self-subsistent and perfect in 
God* Likenesses and im£Uj;e8 in the world 
are not illusory appearances with a shadowy 
existence, but are real by virtue of the 
self-subsistent likeness and iiaa,;e ith^^eh ^■^''''g 

gives them their subsistenoey failing; which 

they would lapse Into nothingness. 

The initial relation of God 
to Himself by which He expresses Pllmself 
totally in the primary likeness and perfect 
iina^;e is the source and model of all the 
relations which permit b«g^8 to come into 
existence and to subsist. Numbers, propor- 
tions, harmonies, equalities, symmetry and 
likeness are efforts on the part of beings 
to imitate the primal llceness by which is 
posited the perfect equality of God with 


.,,,, « Jit"l»,j 


Hlmself , His essential and indivisible unity. 
Ihe aesthetic object has its metaphysical 
structure in a complex participation in the 
nature of the £)ivine ^ein^; which is based 
on the transcendent relations of the Divine 
Persons anions themselves. 

Things are in the measure 
that they are intakes of God» and lack being 
in so far as they fail to express that which 
they ima;3e. Things are to the extent that 
they express tji© unity which is their prin- 
ciple, the unity of God Tio in expressing 
Himself to Hiiaself posits Himself as the One* 
the Absolute Likeness and Ima^e, Perfect 
Equality and Form. The Supreme Form of all 
that is or can be has conferred on all thin,::8 
their numbers, form, and unity. In so far 
as they are one, thin/^s are and their unity 
is expressed by likeness, symmetry, proportion, 
harmony and equality. 

!: •. y 

i .;•. • 

i ' . 1 

U J . ," 

i ; ■; .■■' i 


i ;■» 


. . f •■ 


What was said of likeness 
Is also true of equality, and this »k»il 
be Illustrated by the conorete instance 
taken a/;ain from the hjoan Deus oreator 
9T1iVl"l- Tlie pleasure procured by St. 
Axabrose' h|iiiin already raanifcsts on 
various levels the law of eiiuallty. With- 
out a oertain equality between the sounds 
heard and the sense organs, the hytan oould 
not even begin to .^ive pleasure. It will 
also be remembered from the discussion in 
the chapter on the aesthetic experience 
that pleasure ensues when the sensible 
object is proportioned to man's nature* 
and the pleasure in the sounds of the hymn 
shows that he is fjladdened by the law of 
equality. In these sensible sounds like- 
ness and equality please, and the pleasure 
is had not only in these/ but as it was 
pointed out earlier^ in number as well, for 

■' t. •'■■.>. 


where equality and likeness are presenty 
so too is number. 

In the pleasure had in 
sensible harmony, reason discovers that 
it pleases by a oertain eiuality and iiiter- 
vals equally divided. Certain feet of 
poetry would /jive no deli^jht unless they 
were Joined equally, and oertain other 
feet could not be said to have beauty if 
their major part were not divided by their 
own minor part into two equal parts. The 
measure of all feet is based on agreement 
in equality, and the very fact that the 
sense is not offended at intervals of 
silence shows that the law of equality is 
respected by spaces of time if not by sound. 
Numbered equality pleases vtihan equal parts 
two at a time correspond to equals, or when 
a part which is sin./^le holds a middle place 
so that equal intervals are preserved in 

•A > J 

•■Xiif. , ■■•. 



regard to it from each of the two parts. ^® 
Equality is also sou^^ht after in visible 
forms which please by number. Keason in- 
quiring into the deleotation experienced 
discovbrs that it is found in equality. 
But reason also discovers that the perfect 
equality which the soul desires is not found 
either in space or in time. Nor is it found 
in the form of bodies which, on careful con- 
sideration^ can never be declared absolutely 
equal. The soul would never desire fixed 
and abidin.^ equality unless it were ktiown. 
If not in bodies, nor in the soul of man 
himself, where is that perfect equality 

seen^ the si.;ht of which instils the desire 

for equality in bodies or movements? This 

oan only be explained by the illumination of 

man's intellect by unohan/-eable and soverei^jn 

Equality, the v/ord of God equal to the Father 

In everything. Tl^iie illumination is two- 
fold: besides the intellectual illumination 

:r I 


), .V I 


in the noetic order there is the ph/sioal 
illumination whereby bodies participate in 
unparticipated e.iuallty, and in so far as 
they imitate equality they cannot be denied 
beauty in their own genus and order. 

If the equality of bodies 
which can never be perfect is loved, how 
auoh more so should perfect equality be 
loved. Is it easy to love colours, sounds, 
sweets, roses, and bodies i^ently soft, in 
which the soul desires nothing but equality 
and liReness and in which nith a little more 
dilit^ent consideration it iiardly recognizee 
the faintest shadow and trace, is it easy to 
love these things and difficult to love God 
in Whom there is nothing unequal, nothing 
unliice Himself, nothin/j separated by distance, 
and varied by time? Deli,;ht le had in build- 
ings and other works of art in which numbers 
please, yet objects called equal and like never 

i J ■ ' \ ' 'J.» i'l*,' 

■J - ' . r- 

Ml, , ( ■■ , 

t : . ..>, . > . . 

I ^ • . 

.Mi .', i 

\ ,... »■■ 


realizes absolute eciuality and llkeneBS. 

Any beautiful object whatso- 
ever is more worthy of praise in its totality 


as a whole them In any one of its parts. 

So great io the power of inte^jrity and Unity 

that what pleases as/iparti; pleases touch oora 


BtB a unified whole. 'hen any sin^jle thin^; is 

composed of many parts, more deli^jht is had If 
thty aro perceived all to^'ether 8i;aultaneously. 
\Vfi<MB.|aal parts alike or contrary are bound to- 
gether by a mutual accord or iuirmouy^ una th e n 
order presides and there is a unified whole 
which is more beautiful than the parts* 

If the syllables or even the 
letters which pass as soon as their sound is 
heard are considered in a poom, nothin.g would 
be found in it which pleases and deserves to 
be praised. For the beauty of a poem does 
not come from each syllnble or letter but from 
^e unity and arran^remeni of them all. ™hat is 

, ... I 


trua of a work of art applies to the whole 
order of creation which is God's work of art. 
Every bein.^^ desires unity so that it may be 
whatever it is, endeavours to remain like 
itself in GO far as it can, and seeks to 
preserve order and enuilibrium in space or 
In time. This is so because all bein^^s have 
been brou.:ht into existence by the one prin- 
ciple^ expressln^j Hl-nself in the perfect 
imajje, equal and likeness of "iraself, by 
God in Whom the one, ?md the one iss'ied from 
the one, are lautually joined by I/:>ve, the 
Third. Person of the Holy Trinity. ^^ The 
j/oining is acconpllshed by order, and this 
will be investi'jated in the following section. 



Enquiry into the delectation 
procured by the verse Deu9 crea, to.p OEm iuia 
led to the discovery In the aesthetic obj&ot 
of nvunb«r which in turn yielded some important 
findin^js on form, unity, and its derivates: 
likeness, harmony, proportion, symmetry, and 
•quality. Qther succedtnes of unity are 
variety (related to equality sometimes), 
gradation, distinction, and cor>trast|which 
will be touched on in passing: in other 
contexts. Yet with the presence of all the 
aesthetic elements so far articulated, the 
aesthetic object or for that matter any object 
could not be constituted if order were lacking;. 

For Au^stine who often 
identified the aesthetic with the ontolo^ical 
constituents, order is not only fi prim&ry 
aesthetic element which binds to^ath^r and 
Integrates the aesthetic elements already 

'/ i'. 


enumeratedp but is an ontologloal principle 
found in all bein^is. Imbibed by all things, 

order is everywhere attested to^ in nature 

as well as in art. The investigation of the 

nature of order will be<;in, as did the pre- 
ceding analyses, for convenience of exposition, 
with its manifestation in St. Ambroees hjonn* 

The delectation of the verse 
DejiP Qr ea . tor omniiart is procurec* not only by 
the numbers and equality reall'wd in it, but 
also by its order. The study of number which 
beiiins from one, is beautiful by equality and 
likeness, and is Joined tOi^ether by order, 
could throw some li/^t on the pleasure procured 
by order, but more effective in proving that 

the Roul loves order is the study of the 

numbers realised sonsibly in the poem. In 

examining certain rasters and feet, reason 

discovers that it is not the nunbered etiunlity 

which explains them and the plesisure procured 


by them, but the bond of order. Reason in 

. K i 

' "-'i' • 

:■>-. ,.iiv'- 

. i 



'; ^^T.^^ 



judjing th« senee of hearing finds in the 

pleasure produced by these feet nothiHQ else 

than the beauty of order. Many examplea 

taken from prosody show this to be true, but 

the example from another medium oth e r than 

poetry adduced by the protaifronist of the De 

Musioa shows that sc^nse itself spurns visible 

forras bending forward contrary to what is 

fitting, or with their heads dovn, and so 

forth. Thes disapproval does not come from 

the inequality of those forms since the 

equality of parts remains, but/) the untoward- 

ness resulting from a violation of order. 

When , by certain degree s^iinusual thin<?s .-ire 

adopted with tolex^ition at first and then 

freely, pleasure is united with order, -md 

man would shrink from these objects unless 

the be/?innin/?s were Joined with the loiddles, 

and the middles with the extremes. 

When this joining tokes place 

order is present. Order is the distribution 



whloh allots things tti^ual t^nd unequal eaoh 

to Its own plac6» and Integrates an enseable 

of >>arts in accora with an and, Ordtir submits 

Ui« inferior to the superior, and rbduoes 

that which it disposes into harmony and the 

peaceful concord of composition. By this 

co-ordiuatioii and suborciint-itionf a thing made 

up of parts is .vorked into an orderod whole 

which bticomtis ua aesthetic objuct in so far 

as it is an orcdnated unity. 

Wherever there are objects 

therti is order which is onlolOoically invisoer- 

ated lik& number and unity > in boin^^. M4^R e, as 

much '.n ontulo^tical constituent of the object 


as it is/)aosthetic. it can h^i asserted that to 
tend to being is to tbnd to oruer, una to 
attain oi^der is to attain bein^ in t,o fur at 
least cn it is ptiirmitted to a credtur«£* Order 
secures bein^i; disorJer, uon-bein^. Disorder 
is a perversion of beln,;, but even Uiat which 
is perverted laust of necessity be in honaony 

•; .1- .' J 

>' : >:. li J J , 

1; .i .- v,i ,( . 

,. . 0«*-l i 


wlth^ and In dependenoe on, and In some way 

pftrt of the order of thin-js, for otherwise 

It could h&ve no existence at all. In the 

•anse that goodness implies existence and order, 

order and the good converge, ^Qlthou^jh not 

completely identical vfith the good in all 

respects* order issues from it; and as no 

being can exist without some i^oodness, so '^■^ ^e.og 

nothing is or can be without order. 

Just as all beings in the 

Auguetinian universe are illuminated by number^ 

and participate in unity, likeness, equality, 

Image, and participation!^ which are oJdl eelf- 

subsibtent, so all beings participate in a 

selfosubsistent Order wriich is the iSoly Spirit, 

the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity. The 

union of the Father, and the Son issues in a 

self->subsi8tent Love which is the nutual binding 

of the Persons of the Trinity, a linion which 

results in joy. This Order in Itself is 

participated by all beinjs which are kept in 




their plaoe by th« participated order poured 

into them generously and abundantly. This 

inpouring of order corresponds to the 

illumination of all beings by the light of 

numbers flooding them. Like the illumination 

of number, the illunination of bein^.e with 

order nas a twofold asiject, physical end 

noetic, but hero the concez-n is with the 

physical llluxaination as the noetic illumination 

will be treated in the chfipter on the aesthetic 

Judgment . 

Because beinA?s are by reason of 


their participation in a Triune Ood, vestiges 

of the Trinity can be found in them in greater 
or lesscK: degree. The ontological principles 
determining an object are always stated by 
Augustine in triads after their uodul in the 
Trinity, and though the terns in any given 
triad vary^ this triune participation of Ood 
is kept in mind* 

• i 


Kvery bciiiij as fcuch iitiB a 

oertalzi kl^id of unity « tonds to a certain 

Order* and ke'ps ordcji by ite weifeht^ 

wliloh is soi36tlnj«& Identified with ord«x*. 

In all bodies;, tind jsouIb too, t ^br e la weight c^j ^^ '<'"'''- 


which always mov«.s fcfe to seek thb places i** 

they fhi'ir 

which %^ find^ t** natur;..! repoa*, and this 

Mei I' •• •• 15a 
w«lght is also y^^ love, "Poadua fneus 

amor maus" may be applied to inaniiaute beings 

aaalooi'ouslyy in thcit the objectivo joy in 

thiRtis would ooutjiet in tho union of jj^rts in 

the rrholey mnintiii/iini; thorn in eiuilibilum. 

Order is also idexitific-O with 

paa'ia: the pe-aco of tha Lodj? if. tiie wt;ll 

ordinated eciUllibriuiu of all its organs; the 

piacQ of anitml llf« ic the ordered agreement 

of the sppetites; the peaco of the rational 

soul is the agreement of i-ntolloct and willy -^^'^ 

»Mirfi by the way^aptly desorit<5J the aectJiotic 

t-xperifincs. The peace of the home is the 

concord of its m**mbero, and the peace of the 

t . 


City is the concord of the family extended 
to all its citizens. The peace of the 
Christian City is a perfectly ordered 
society of men enjoying God, and loving 

one another in Him. In all things peace 

is the tranquillity of order. Order 

pervades every realm of being, the 

immaterial as well as the material. 

Virtue is the order of love; the good is 


a love of things conformed to order; 
and so much meaning has the splendour 
of order that to love order is 
ultimately to love God Who has eet in 
order all things in number, weight, and 

If order is tunbodied micro- 
cosmically in each individual object, much 
more so is it realized macrocosmically in the 
universal order which binds all nature together, 
and governs alike the movement of the stars and 
the rise and fall of kingdoms. Order penetrates 

I c 

. J 

■ I,., .' 

-■< I , -1 


th« Intimate structure of all things considered 
either separately In theno elves or as they 
ccntrlbute to the order of the whole, tout either 
singly or in concert all bbin^s sing the praises 
of the beauty of order. 

If each thing possessing 

measure, number, and order is worthy of praise 

(and this includes praise of the flea, the worm, 

the intestines, veins, and muscles hidden in 

man and beuutiful by their numbers) so much 

more worthy of praise are all things taken 

together. The whole body of man, for example, 

is more beeautiful than the parts composing it, 

and were a beautiful part separated from the 

body not only would it lose its own beauty but 

the beauty of the body would be destroyed, A 

beautiful hand severed from the body would not 

be as beautiful as when seen situated in the 

body, and likewise if an eyebrow were shaved 

off, althou^ the body ould not be injured, 

its beauty would be marred. The body composed 

. >- 

■ ) : 

■;t' T, .T 

,,>-t-'. :v.:-: 

•' •!<•• •;. 

/ !■ 

■* •■' 

1 %$;; ,1 •> /■• 

;, , -...• .f, 


of beautiful and ordered parts is laore beauti- 
ful than its parts, for all beauty oonsi sting 
of parts is greater in the whole th^n in the 
parts. So too, the whole of creation is more 
beautiful than its parts. The imiverse is 
beaitiful and that which does not please as a 
part can please the whole when it is brought 

a_,^d. loses. 

into relation with the whole^ thus l ^ oain g 

its offensivcness by contributing to the 


beauty of the whole. 

The beauty of the order of the 
univerae— and the word universe derives from 
the ft&ri A one— can be perceived only by those 
whose souls are unified; men with dispersed 
souls cannot perceive the rautual harmony of 
thin^s^ if a part displeases then they blame 
the universe for its defects. Such men may 
be compared to the kind who in observing only 
a single stone of a mosaic and overlooking all 
the stones harmonised together into the whole, 
blame the artist for having marred the variety 


of the fflosaic. The beauty of a building in 
lt8 entirety oannot be grasped by a person 
plao«d in on* of its oomers like a statue. 
Neither can a soldier perceive the order of 
the whole ar^. Likewise if a syllable were 
to be supposed to live and feel it would not 
be able to grasp the riiythm and beauty of the 
whole poem it helps to create. Beautiful 
either in repose or movorobnt» things composed 
of imperfect parts should be seen as u whole 
if they are to be well Judged. A building 
should not be judged from one of its angles 
only* n e ither from his hair alone should a 
man bo judged, nor an orator only by the 

movement of his hand, nor the moon from one 

of its phases only. 

? Those who deny the order of the 

universe by s lg&alliH^ out obvious defects^ 

should be shown that the evil and suffering in 

the world find their aesthetic justification 

in the fact that order maintains through 

"; i .»■. 

'■-..■ 1 ■{ r.::..« 

, -• • I 

•' ■■•^ 

■-. < I ■■«; -i^v 


dlstlnotions the liarmoiiy of the luilverse. 

A sinful soul In Ics punishment contributes 

to the beauty and order of the universe. 

Even the punisliraent of sin Is beautiful slnoa 

It is In oroer, and all that has order is 

beautiful. As the beauty of a picture is 

increased by well managed shadows/ which please 

by their order and not their form, so to<yl the 

eye sKllful enough to discern It the luilverse 

iti beautiful even by slimers though considered 

by theoBselves their deformity is a blemlslu 

The beauty of day is augmented by its 

coiqparlson with )aight» a white color is more 

beautiful then it is next to black, the han^;man 

and the prostitute are necessary in a cocBounity, 

and the ugly parts of the body are also necessary. 

So great is the power of t^ wholeness that 

thin^^s which are not good in themselves please 

when they are joined together and considered 

in thoir entirety. As the color black is 

beautiful in a painting seen as a whole, so the 

. J 

. % !;;• 


:-: :. A ' ". 


oonfliot in the unlvars© with its conquerors, 
t*« conquered, and spectators, contributes to 
tha beauty or the whole* A cock fight can be 
beautiful even Uriou<^ the ugliness of the 
defeated i& neoeesury.^^^ As the antitheses of 
a discourse are agreeable, so too the beauty of 
things results froia contrasts. Poets love 
solecisms and barbarisms In their poetry. In 
prose ^h« beauty is brou^t out by a simple 
cilctiua alternating with taat^nlficbnt passages* 
As the opposition of contraries lenas te auty 
to langua^^e, so the beauty of this world is 
achieved by the opposition of contraries 

arrant;ed as it were by an eloquence not of 

words but of things* 

Tixe passing of things does 

not break the beauty of the universal order. 

Nature has been ordered in such a way that the 

woaicer give way to the stronger, the fragile 

to the taorc durable, the less powerful to the 



Dore powerful, the earthly to the heavenly, 

and from this £:en6ral dependence results 

the harmony of the whole. In the natural 

order, things appear and disappear to make 

place for the others, and as variety is one 

of the principle cliaracters of beauty, the 

passing of thin^js is beautiful althoxii^Jri of 

an inferior kind. IVhatever perishos or 

ceases to be does not affect the neasure, 

beauty, euid order of the whole. In a discourse 

each sjtllable and sound is bom and disappears* 

and beauty results from this succession. So 

too creatures subject to chan^;e having the 

seeds of death in them ocmie and go, but in 

their passing they linger as in a piece of 

music or a poem, and so contribute to the 

beauty of the whole. The whole course of 

the ages Is like an extjulsite poem set off 

with antitheses, and the beauty of the completed 

course of time shall be finished like the grand 

melody of some ineffably wise master of son^. 

I ' , ''1l 


oould not ttxlst) With- 
out nximber^f, unity and order /rand they have 
their yy9ing from their fontjs, the order of 
parts » and their numerical relations. Any 
object whatsoever, material or spiritual, 
Individual or social. Is constituted by 
numbers, relations of jarts, proportion, 
harmony, equality and lliceness;^ which seek 
to express unit^, and In so far as this Is 
realized the object is snid to have more or 
less being. These aesthetic con^tituentB uJW.tK 
conver^**g with the ontolo^loal enter into 
the netaphyslcal structure of the aesthetic 
object. Now that those Intallljlble co- 
Ingredlcnts of the aesthetic object .^mve 
been articulated, it is possible to proceed 
to an inves titration of what constitutes its 
beauty, for beauty is aot something; super- 
added but is the shining out of all the 
•laments which enter Into the In tell legible 


struoture of the aesthetlo object. In the 
ontologlcal illuralnation whioh is beauty, 
the aesthetlo constltiients of the objeot are 
manifested oonspiouously in resplendent 



The first five books of St. Auijuetine's 
De Musica are devoted to a thorough- 
going discussion of prosody, meter and 
rhythm wherein the former rhetorician 
gives ample play to his knowledge. 
Havlnjp; treated moveiaent from a mathe- 
matical poini of view in the first booK, 
Augustine presents a complete system of 
muter in Books II-V. On the metrical 
aspects of the De Musica, Cf. the French 
composer J. Hure, Saint AUi^oistin musicxen, 
1924; W, Scherer, Kirchen mus. Jahrb. , 22, 
1903, p« G3 ff. Special atudieB on ri'>,thm 
and meter in which Augustine's contribu- 
tion is treated enumerated by K. Svoboda in 
his L'Esthetique De Saint August in et Ses 
Sources t-re: K, -'eotphf;!, Die Fraijutiii jo und 
Lehrsatze der griechischen Rhythmiker, 1861; 
n. '.Veil, Jahrb. f. Ihil,, 1862, p. 322; E. 
Graf, Rythmias und Metrum, 1891; etc. A few 
worka iiave bfcen especially devoted to the 
De Musica by P. Amerino, "11 De TJusica" di 
S. Ao^stlno, 1929; cxud by a diociple of 
Husserl, H. Edelstein, Die Musikanschauung 
Augustius nach seiner ochrift De Musica, 

Of the many things of interest in the fii'St 
five books of the De Musica the following 
may be nvjted: '..lie pieatsui'e taxp'.i'ier'Ceu in 
hearing verse depends on the duration of 
the syllables fixed by nuiabers (II, 20); 
a foot composed of syllables has parts 
between which tiiei'e is f numericui relation 


NOTES (Continued) 

(Cont'd. ) 

and accord (II, 3-6; V,2); a precise order 
must be observed in establishing the dif- 
ferent kind of feet — equality and likeness , 
are superior to inequality and unlikeness 
(II, 16; V,2) and this determines the 
joining of certain feet; the union of 
variety and equality gives an agreeable 
impression (II, 16, 24): an object having 
parts is beautiful when the parts harmonize 
in some kind of equality (V, 2, 27), etc. 
St* Aiigustine avows that he has lingered 
throughout five books on the path of num- 
bers and time-pauses for the purpose of 
showing those who are given over to lit- 
erature what truly delights them in it, 
and in this "common way" leading them to 
an "uncommon possession". (De Mus. VI, I, 
1; P.L. V.32, c. 1162-63.) 



Op. cit., VI, II, 23; C.1163. 

Age, nunc aspice in vim potentiamque rati- 
onis, quantxan ex operibus ejus aspicere 
possumus. Ipsa enim, ut id potissimum 
dicam quod ad hujus operis susceptionem 
attinet, primo quid sit ipsa bona modulatio 
consideravit , et earn in quodam motu libero, 
et ad suae pulchritudinis finem converso 
esse perspexit. De Musica VI, X, 25; P.L. 
V.32, 0.1177. 


NOTES (Continued) 

modiun statult unde rever^etur* et ab ^^ 

Ipso versvun vocavit. iuod autem non eeset 
certo fine moderatum, sed tamen rationa- 
biliter ordinatis pedibus curreret, rhythral 
nomine notavit: lui latine nihil aliud quam 
numerus dici potuit. In hoc igltur^gradu, e*^*""'^ 
sive in rhythmis, sive in ipsa modulatione 
intelligebat regnare numeros, totumque per- 
ficere: inspexit diligentissime cujusmodi 
essent; reperiebat divinos et sempiternos, 
praesertim quod ipsis auxiliantibus omnia 
superiora contexuerat. De Ordine II, XIV, 
39-41; V.32, c. 1013-14. 

In his igitur omnibus disciplinis occurre- 
bant ei omnia numerosa, quae taraen in illis 
dimensionibus manifestos eminebant, quae in 
seipsa cogitando atque volvendo intuebatur 
verissimas: in his autem quae sentiuntur, 
umbras earum potius atque vestigia recole- 

bat Tractavit omnia diligenter, 

percepit prorsus se plurimum posse et quid- 
quid possit, numeris posse, etc. De Ordine 
II, XV, 42; V.32, C. 1014-16. 
Though recognizing the importance of number 
as one of the constitutive elements of the 
aesthetic object, Augustine does not fall 
into the error of reducing all the aesthe- 
tic constituents to formal numerical re- 
lations, a reduction which iias tempted 
those who have tried to find in art geo- 
metrical laws, the golden section, etc. 
Herbert Read in his Meaning of Art, 1931, 
still finds it necessary to warn against 
this fallacy, although pointing out that 
in the plastic arts certain geometrical 

- .:.!- 

. , : J : 'I' iC .. 

X . •■' .: 


NOTES (Continued) 

6 (Cont'd.) 

proportions which are the proportions In- 
herent In the structure of the universe 
may be the regular measure from which art 
departs in subtle degrees; art Is not only 
a relation of numbers but living movement, 
movement ordained in numbers, and mass 
confined in measure. Compare Baudelaire's 
saying (Mon Ooeur mis a nu), "La musique 
donne I'idee de I'espace. Tous les arts, 
plus ou moins, puisqu'ils sont nombre.A 


Hinc est profecta in oculorum opes, et 
terram coelimque collustrans, sensit nihil 
aliud quam pulchritudinem sibi placere, et 
In pulchritudine figuras, in figuris di- 
mension's, in dimensionibus numeros. De 
Ordine, II, XY, 42; 7.32, c.1014. 


Sed quia dedit numeros omnibus rebus etiara 
infimis, et in fine rerum locatis; et cor- 
pora enira omnia quamvis in rebus extrema 
sint, habent numeros suos. De Libero 
Arbitrio II, XI, 31; V.32, c.1268. 


Imo et arboris locales nameros, temporalis 
numeri antecedant necesse est. Nullxim est 
enim stirpium genus quod non cert is pro suo 
semine dimensionibus temporum et coalescat, 
et germinet, et in auras emicet, at folia 
explicit, et roboretur, et sive fructum, 
sive ipsius ligni occultissimis nuraeris vim 


r, r; 1 . 

) ( 

1 ^■^ 

i. 1 ;.. ^ 


NOTES (Continued) 

8 (Cont'd.) 

jrursus ia semine referat; quanto magie 
animalliun corpora, in quibus intervalla 
membrorum niimerosam parilitatem multo 
magis aepectibus offerfrunt. 
Quasi, vero quidquam sit in eis viliue 
et abcect)jis quam terra est. Quae primo 
generalem speciera corporis habet, in qua 
unitas quaedam et numeri et ordo esse 
convincitur. Atque haeo si terrae ad- 
emeris nihil erit. De msica VI, XVII, 
67; P.L. V.32, c.1192. 




De Civ. Dei XII, 18; t.L. V.41, c. 367-68. 
Augustine's reference to the Timaeus is 
general, he probably had in mind the 
account of the Deraiurge combiniig and 
dividing the mixture of the soul of the 
world according to certain numbers and 
proportions. (Timaeus, 34c ff.) 

sed nescio utrum possint cuncta ad 

litteram convenire, pi'aec^ue in numeris.., 
Quaestionum in Heptateuchum I, CLII; P.L.. 
V.34, C.589; of. also Epibtolarum CI. 1, 
Ep. Ill, 2; P.L. V.33, c.64. 

De Musica VI, Chaps. II, III, IV, VI, 
70s, B-7, 16-17; P.L. V.32, c. 1163-67, 


See also De Libaro Arbitrio II, V, 12; 
P.L. V.32, c.1247, for a further dis- 
cussion of the natural jud/paent of sense. 

...A J.' 

, . .1 

I • < • « 



ROTES (Continued) 



The exposition of Augustine's doctrine 
of sensation is based on his account in 
the De Mus. VI, V, 8-15; P.L. V.32, c. 

See Chapter I, p. >f ff. 

De Mus. VI, VII, VIII, 18-22; P.L. V.32, 


This is quite different from the Kantian 
a priori forms of space and time imposed 
on the matter furnished by sensation. 



op. Cit. IX, 23-24; C. 1176-77. 
op. Cit. XII, 35; C.1182. 


De Lib. Arb. II, VIII, 20-25; P.L. V.32. 
c. 1261-53. For a short discuesion of 
number see Charles Boyar, L'Idea de Verite 
dans la Philosophie de Saint August in, 
Paris, 1920, pp. 53-62; also J.F. Nourrison, 
La Philosophie de 3t. Au/^stin, Paric 1886, 
pp. 116-132. 

The innateness of ideas in the sense of 
their being present in the soul implied in 
the ^Platonic doctrine of reminiscence (Meno, 
Phacdo) that the soul in an anterior 
existence contemplated the ideas but forgot 
them when united to a body, exterior 

f • 

. >ii , 

i ■>, 'i^.:'!. 



19 (Cont'd) 

stimulations being occasions for remember- 
ing them. In such a doctrine nothing 
enters from without into the soul which 
finds everything within itself. Whatever 
Augustine's earlier thought was on the 
problem of reminiscence and its logical 
corollary of the pre-existence of the 
soul (see the discussion of this in 
Gilson's ^tude a L* Introduction de St. 
Augustin, pp. 94 ff.), there can be no 
question that freed ,from the hypothesis 
of the pre-existence of the soul ,the 
Platonic doctrine of reminiscence under- 
went a profound transformation in Augustine. 
The Platonic memory of the past becomes for 
Augustine a memory of the present by which 
God is present to the soul. Much more is meant 
by memory than is usually understood by that 
term. For Augustine a memory in one of its 
meanings is a spiritual reality present to the 
soul in a latent way. The soul is present 
to itself, but man is seldom conscious of 
his own soul; so too God is present to the 
soul, but this the soul often forgets. 
How God teaches the soul will be seen in 
the subsequent accounts of St. Augustine's 
doctrine of illumination. 


The doctrine of divine illiimination is not 
the vision of the First Cause, but its 
induction starting from an effect, namely 
truth. "Precisely because St. Augustine 
was at the very antipodes of ontologism, 
he is poorly protected against it. He 
never dreamt of restraining those who 
might go off at the tangent followed later 
by Gerdil and Gioberti. This deviation 
begins from the end of the twelfth century 
onwards, under the influence of Arabic neo- 


NOTES (Continued) 

20 (Cont'd) 

Platonism, and especially of Avicenna; 
damned in by the efforts of St. Bonaventure 
and of St. Thomas AcLuinas, it spreads in 
the seventeenth century with Malebranche, 
thanks to the influence of Cartesian 
ideulism, and reaches its height in the 
nineteenth century under the impulse of 
German idealism" Gilson, The Future of 
Augustinian Metaphysics, op.cit.p. 301. 




Augustine's doctrine of divine illumin- 
ation has been variously interpreted by 
different commentators depending as it 
so often happens on their own philosophical 
parti pris, and without sufficient 
fidelity to the texts. The presentation 
given here is in entire agreement with 
that of M. Etienne Gilson who discusses 
the different interpretations and the 
difficulties following from them in his 
Introduction A L'Etude De Saint Augustin, 
(Paris, 1931) pp. 114 ff. See also the 
summary of the different interpretations 
of Augustine's moderate illuminism in 
R.P.F. C^yne, Les Sources De L 'Amour Divin 
(Descl6e De Brouwer, Paris 1933, cf. the 
contrary account by E. Portalie, Diet, de 
theologie Catholique, V. I, col. 2336-2337. 

De lliaa, VI, XIV, 43-49; P.L. V, 32, c. 1186-88. 

Haec igitur pulchra numero placent.... Non 
enim hoc tantum in ea pulchritudine quae ad 
aures pertinet, at que in motu corporum est, 
invenitur, sed in ipsis etiam visibilibus 
formis, in quibus jam usitatius dicitur 
pulchritudo. De lv!us. VI, XHI, 37; P.L. V.32, 
c. 1184. 



NOTES (Continued) 


D€ Lib. Arb. LL, XI, 30-35; P.L. V.32. 
c. 1257-60. 

lumine numerortun op.cit. c. 1268. 

De Libero Arbitrio II, XVI, 41-43- 
c. 1263-64. 




NOTES (Continued) 

2. FORM 

lutuare coelum et terrain et mare, et uuae- 
ciimquQ in eis vel desuper fulgent, vel 
deorsum repunt vel volant vel natant^ 
formas habent, iiuia numeros habent: adime 
lllis haec, nihil erunt. A quo ergo sunt, 
nisi a quo numerus; quandoquidem in tantum 
ixiis est esse, in quantum numerosa esse? 
c! 1263)'? ^""^^^^^^ ^^' ^^' 42; P.L. V.32, 

Si ergo quidquid mutabile aspexeris, vel 
sensu corporis, vel animi cons ide rati one 
capere non potes, nisi aliqua numerorum 
rorma teneatur, qua detracta in nihil 
recidat; noli dubitare, ut ista mutabilia 
non intercipiantur. sed dimensis motibue, 
et distincta varietate formarum, quasi 
quosdam versus temporum peragant, esse 
aliquam formam aetemam et incomroutabilem- 
quae neque contineatur et quasi diffnmdatur 
locls, neque potendatur atque varietur 
temporibus per quam cuncta ista formari 
valeant, et pro suo genere implere atque 
agere locorum ac temporum numeros. od. 
cit. 43, 0. 1264. ^ 


Habet enim et ipsa capacitatem formarum- 
nam si capere impositam ab artifice formam 
non posset, nee materies utique diceretur. 
Porro si bonum aliquod est forma, unde qui 
ea praevalent, formosi appellantur, sicut 
a specie speciosi, procul dubio honum 
aliquod est etiam oapacitas formac. De Natura 
Boni Contra Manichaeos, XVIII: p.L. V.42 
c. 556-57. ' 



NOTES 3ontlnued) 

et 1 

non < 





De ai 








non 6 

Cf. E 


. . .qu 
Quae I 
non s; 
ut :^xc 
est qi 
def 1 :j 



■^que ut habeat formam, forraatur aliauid. 
jpter quacllbet res si quam habet formam, 
: opus est accipere quod habet; si qua 
ion habet formam, non potest a se 
're quod non habet. Nulla ergo res, ut 

s, formare se potest forma quadam 

lutabiii et semper manente formentur. ... 
■■ item forma dictum est, ^od in seipsa 
: Innjvet omnia. Hinc etiam comprehend itur 
providentia gubernari. Si en im omnia 
unt, forma penitus subtracta nulla erunt. 
ipsa incommutabilis, per quam mutabilia 

subsi stunt, ut forma rum suarum numeris 
ntur et aguntur, ipsa est eorum 
^"J^^'./.°?..|?i° ista essent, si ilia 
set. op.oif.'^XVII, 45; c. 1265. 

Civ. Dei, VIII, VI, P.L. V.41, c. 231-32. 

liam formabilia sunt, slcuti superius 
locuerunt, aamiss^que omnino forma in 
a recidunt, satis ostendunt se ex ilia 
JUbsistere, quae semper ejusraodi est... 
lantumlibet deficient, et eo tendant ut 
it, tamen aliquid formae illis reraanet, 
luo modo sint. luidquid autem formae 
1 rei deficienti renanet; ex ilia forma 
e nescit deficere, motusque ipsos rerum 
ntium vel proficientium excedere 
um suorum leges non sinit. op.cit. 46, 
^■'"^ cf. De Immortal itate Animae VIII, 
"• c. 1029. 

kll, 45; c. 1265. 
(that Plotinus showed that 
and leavers vreve "^-♦^ 

t providence extended 
,ng6: De providentia 
,cus disputat, eamque a 


NOTES (Continued) 

3 (Cont'd) 

As there can be no absolute evil for Augustine so 
there can be no absolute u^^liness, hence he 
would not agree with Plotinus* statement 
(Enneads 1,6,2) that "that which remains 
completely foreign to all divine reason 
is absolute ugliness. 


Malus ergo modus, vel mala species, vel malus 

ordo, aut ideo dicuntur, quia minora sxint* 

quam esse debuerunt aut quia non his rebus 

accommodatur quibus accommodanda sunt; ut 

ideo dicantur mala, quia sunt aliena et 

incongrua: .... 

Item species mala vel in comparatione 

dicitur formosioris atque pulchrioris, 

quod ista sit minor species, ilia major, 

non mole, sed decore aut quia non congruit 

huic rei cui adhibita est ut aliena et 

inconveniens videatur: tanquam si nudus 

homo in foro deambulet quod non offendit 

si in balneo videatur. . . . 

De Natura Boni,XXIII; P.L. V.42, 

c. 558. 



De Immortalitate Animae, VIII, 13; P.L. V.32, 
c. 1027-28. 

See Chapter III, p. '7a. and note 14 to the 
same chapter. 

Omnis enim res mutabilis., etiam formabilis 
sit necesse est. Sicut autem mutabile 
dicimus quod mutari potest, iti formabile 
quod formari potest appelaverim. Nulla 
autem res formare seipsam potest: Quia 
nulla res potest dare sibi quod non habet; 



NOTES (Continued) 


et utique ut habeat formam, formatur aliquid, 
Quapropter quacllbet res si quam habet formam, 
non ei opus est acclpere quod habet; si qua 
vero non habet fo«aam» non potest a se 
acclpere quod non habet. Nulla ergo res, ut 

diximus, formare se potest forma quadam 

inoommutabili et semper manente formentur. ... 
De hac item forma dictum est, ^od in seipsa 
manens inn^vet omnia. Hinc etiam comprehend itur 
omnia providentia gubernari. 31 enlm omnia 
quae sunt, forma penitus subtracta nulla erunt , 
forma ipsa incommutabilis, per quam mutabilia 
cuncta subsistunt, ut formarum suarum numeris 
impleantur et aguntur, ipsa est eorum 
providentia; non enim ista essent, si ilia 
non esset. 'c4)VGi£'."XVII, 45; c. 1265. 
Gf. De Civ. Dei, VIII, VI, P.L. V.41, c. 231-32. 



...quoniam formabilia sunt, sicuti superlus 
diota docuerunt, auamiss^que omnino forma in 
nihilum rccidunt, satis^ ostendunt se ex ilia 
forma subsistere, quae semper ejusmodi est... 
Quae quantumlibet deficiunt, et eo tendant ut 
non sint, tamen aliquid formae illis remanet, 
ut quoquo modo sint. Quidquid autem formae 
cuipiam rei deficienti remanet; ex ilia forma 
est quae nescit deficere, motusque ipsos rerum 
deficitntium vel proficientium excedere 
numerorum suorum leges non sinit. op.cit. 46, 
c. 1265-66. cf. De Immortalitate Animae VIII, 
16; P.L. V.32, c. 1029. 

De Lib. Arb. II, XVII, 45; c. 1265. 
Au,i'ustine also says that Plotinus showed that 
the beauty of flowers and leave/'s w^e^e ^*s 
sufficient to prove that providence extended 
even to the lowest things: De providentia 
certe Plotinus Platonicus disputat, eamque a 


NOTES (Continued) 

9 (Cont'd) 

summo Deo, cujus est intelligibilus atque 
ineffabilis pulchritudo, usque ad haec 
terrena et ima pertingere, flosculorum 
atque folioiTira pulchritudine comprobat: 
quae omnia quasi adjecta et velocissime 
pereuntia decentissimos formarum suarum 
numeros habere non posse confirmat, nisi 
inde formentur, ubi forma intelligibilis 
et incommutabilis simul habens omnia per- 
severat (Enneadis,3, lib. 2, cap. 13) De 
Civ, Dei X, xiv; P.L. V.41, c, 292, a^ (^vin^t. 
He does not say anything of the passages 
that follow where Plotinus says that these 
things are continually produced with 
variety, because the stars in their 
courses do not always exert the same 
influence on things here below. (Enneads 
HI, 2, 13). 

For the differences between Aa^ustine and 
Plotinus on their doctrines of providence 
see K. Jol^et, op.cit. pp. 123 ff. 


De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, Quaest. 
XLVI, De idels, P.L. V.40, c. 29-30. In 
this question Augustine points to Plato as 
the creator of the doctrine of idea: , but 
adds thst this does not mean that the doctrine 
did not exist before him as Plato travelled 
and met many wise men from whom he received 
many ideas § so great however is the doctrine 
of ideas in its nature that no man can be 
called wise without being familiar with it. 

The ideas are defined as: "Sunt namque ideae 
priiicipales forraae quaedam, vel rationes reru'M 
stabiles atque incomniutabiles, quae ipsae 
forma tae non sunt, ac per hoc aeterne ac 
semper eodem modo sese habent&s, quae in 
divina intelliijentia continentur. Et cum 


WOTES (Continued) 

10 (Cont'd) 

ipsae neque oriantur, neque intereant; 
secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne 
quod oriri et interlre poteBt, et omne 
quod oritur et inlerit." 

Autjustine identifies the ideas with the 
creative thou^jhts existing eternally in 
the mind of God according to which all 
things created and to be created are made. 
Aa.;ustin6 does not refer to the difference 
between himself and Plato for whom the 
ideas were outside God (see H, Meyer 
Geschichte der alten Philosophic, JAinchen 
1925, pp. 139-155). Aiigustine received his 
view of the Platonic doctrine through neo- 
Platonic sources. Philo before him had 
said that the world of ideas is in the 
divine "lo^^os", cf. Ueberwsf^-Prachter, 
Grundriss, Berlin, 1920, p. 602; also ibid, 
p. 630 for Plotinus' doctrine (Knneades, 
S,5); end. Zeller-Nestle, Geschichte der 
griechischen Philosophie , 1928, p. 363. 



Quoniam de lllo et in illo est omnium 
speciossima species immutabilis, et ideo 
ipsa unus qui cuilibet rei, non solum ut 
pulchra sit, sed etiam ut pulchra esse 
possit attribuit. Quapropter rectissirae 
credimus omnia Deum fecisse de nihilo. 
De Fide et Symbolo, 11,2; P.L. Y.40, col. 

Conf. XII, XXIX, 40; P.L. V.32, col. 842-43. 
cf. De Gen. ad Lib. I, XV, 29j P.L. V.34, 
col. 257, and Contra Adversarium Le^jis et 
Prophetarum, I, VI, 9; P.L. V.42, col. 607. 


HOTES (Continued) 


Hoc est enim vere formari, in unura aliquid 

redigi; quoniam sumrae unum est omnis formae 
principium. De Gencsi Ad. Lit. Liber Imperf, 
X, 32; P.L. V.34, C.234, 


HOTES (Continued) 


....cum ema natura sua cogit ubique unum 
quaerere, et multitude invenire nongsinit. 
De Ordine I, H, 3; P.L. V.32, c. 980. 
Excipit enim banc eruditionem jam ipsa 
philosophiae disciplina, et in ea nihil 
plus invenit quam quid sit unum sed longe 
altius longeque divinius. De Ore. II. 
XVII, 47; C.1017. 

Item, cur quid connectendum est, nisi et 
unum fiat, quantiun potest? Ergo et in 
discern'.ndo et in connectendo, unum volo, 
et unijm amo. Sed cum discerno, purgatum; 
cum connecto, integrum volo. In ilia parte 
vitantur aliena, in hac propria copulantur, 
ut unum aliquid perfectum fiat. Lapis ut 
esset lapis, omnes &jus partes, omnisque 
natura in unum solidata est. Quid arbor? 
nonne arbor non esset, si una non esset? 
Quid membi-a cujuslibet aniraantis ac 
viscera, et quidquid est eorum e quibus 
constat? Gerte si unitatis patiantur 
divortium, non erit animal. Amicl qiild 
aliud quam unum esse conantur? Et quanto 
ma^is unum, tanto ma^is amici sunt. 
Populus una civitas est, cui est periculosa 
dissentio: quid est autem dissentere, nisi 

non unum sentire? Quid amor omnis? 

nonne unum vult fieri cum eo quod amat.... 
Voluptis ipsa non ob aliud delectat 
veheraentius, nisi quod amantia sese corpora 
in unum coguntur. Dolor umde pemiciosus 
est? Quia id quod unum erat dissicere 
nititur. De Ordine II, XVII, 48; P.L. V.32, 
0. 1017-18. 


NOTES (Continued) 

Si ergo voluptas carnis dili^^itur, ea ipsa 
diligentius consideretur; et oum ibi 
recoijnita fuerint quorumdam vestigia 
nuinerorum, quaerendura est ubi sine tumore 
sint. Ibi enim rnagis unum est quod est. 
De Vera Rel. XLII, 79; P.L. V.34, c.l58. 


De Libero Arbitrio II, VIII, 22; P.L. V.32, 
col. 1252. 

Nihil est autem esse, quam unum esse. Itaque 
in quantum quidque unitatem adipiscitur, in 
tantum est. Unitatis est enim operatio, 
convenitntia et concordia, qua sunt in 
quantum sunt, ea quae coraposita sunt: nam 
simplicia per se sunt, quia una sunt; quae 
autem non sunt simplicia, concordia partium 
imitantur unitutem, et in tantum sunt in 
quantum assequuntur. De Moribus Manichaeorum 
II, VI, 8; P.L. V.32, c.1348. 


See Chapterll, p.7J 


Quid porro? ipsa species qua item a caeteris 
elementis terra discernitur, nonne et unum 
aliquid quantum accepit ostentat, et nulla 
pars ejus a toto est dissimilis, et earumdem 
partium connexione atque concordia suo genere 
saluberrimam sedem infimam tenet? Cui super- 
fundltur aquarum natura, nit ens et ipsa ad 
unitatem, speciosior et perluc^dior propter 
majorem simiiitudinem partium, et oustodiens 
locxim ordinis et salutis suae. Quid de aeris 
natura dicam, multo faciliore complexu ad 
unitatem nitente, et tanto speciosiore aquis. 


ycfrKSi (Continuod) 

6 (Cont'd) 

quam illae terris sunt, tantoque superiore 
ad salutem?.... De llusica, vVI,XVII,58; c. 
1192. P^"- 

7 consideremus oninem naturam, sive quae 

sentientibus, sive quae ratiocinantibus 
occurrit, similibus inter se partibus servare 
unitatis effi^j^em. 

....At vero similes inter se at lapides dicimus, 
et animalia, et homines, et Arvcalos. Jam vero 
in sin^^lis rebus, et terram. eo quod similes 
inter se habeat partes suas, fieri ut terra 
sit; et aquam qualibet quoque parte similem 
esse caeteris partibus, nee aliter aquam esse 
potuisse; et quantumlibet aeris, si si caetero 
ess£-t dissiraile aullo pact > aerera esse potuisse; 
et l^nis lucisve particulam; eo quod non sit 
dissimilis reliquis partibus, fieri ut sit 
quod est: ita de unoquoque lapidum vel arborum 
vel oorpore cujuslibet animantis discemi et 
intellifii potest, quod non soliim cum aliis sui 
generis rebus, sed in seipsis singulis non 
essent, nisi partes inter se sinilies haberent. 
Et tanto 63t puldirius corpus, juanto similior- 
ibus inter se partibus suis constat. Jam porro 
anlmarum, non solum allanojn cum aliis amicitia 
similibus raorlbus confit; sed etiami^Iinaquaque 
aniraa similes actiones atque virtutes, sine 
quibus constantia esse bon potest, beatam vitam 
indicsnt. Qua^ropter, si rebus inter se 
slrailibus univarsitas constat, ut sin^lae sint 
quidquid sunt, et omnes ipsara universitatem 
compleant, quam Deus et condidit et gubemat; 
per similitudinem ejus profecto, qui condidit 
omnia, super eminent em atque incommutabilem et 
incontaminabilem talia facta sunt, ut siiiilibus 
inter se partibus pulchra sint.... De Genesi 
Ad. Lit. Liber Imper. XYI,59; P.L. V.34, c.243. 


NOTES (Continued) 


3ed cum in omnibus artibus convenientia 

place^t, qua una salva et pulchra simt 
omnia; ipsa vero convenientia aequalitatem 
unitatemque appetat, vel similitudine parium 
partium, vel gradatione disparium: 
De Vera Rel. XXX, 55; P.L. V.34, c.146. 






Quaeram ergo deinceps, quare sint pulchra; 
et si titubabitur, subjiciara utrum ideo quia 
similes sibi partes s\Ant, et aliqua copulatione 
ad unam oonvenientiam rediguntur. De Vera Rel. 
XXXII, 59-60; P.L. V.34, c. 148-49. 

See Chapter III, p. C"' 

De Vera Religione XXXII, 59; P.L. V,34, 

c. 148-49. 

See note ih to Chapter IV. 

See Chapter IV, p. ^^^^ 

De Vera Religione, XXXVI, 66; P.L. V.34, 
c, 151-52. 

An aliud est simile, aliud similitudo; sicut 
aliud est castus, aliud castitas; aliud fortis, 
aliud fortitudo; ut quemadmodum quaecvBnque sunt 
fortia, fortitudine sunt fortia; et quaecumque 
sunt casta, castitate sunt casta: ita quaecum- 
que sunt similia, similitudine sunt sinilia?. . . . 
ut ibi sit ea similitudo, qua similia sunt 
quaecvBuque similia, ubi est et castitas, qua 
casta sunt quaecumque casta sunt. Castitas 
autem nullius participatione casta est, sed 
ejus participatione sunt casta quaecumque casta 
sunt. Quae utique in Deo est, ubi est etiam 


NOTES ( Cont Inue d ) 

11 (Cont'd) 

ilia saplentia, quae non participando 
sapiens est, sed cujus participatione 
sapiens est anima quaecumque sapiens est. 
Quapropter etiam similitude Dei, per quam 
facta sunt omnia, proprie dicitur 
similitudo; quia non non participatione 
alicujus similitudinis similis est, sed 
ipsa est prima similitudo, cujus partic- 
ipatione similia sunt, quaeciiraque per illam 
fecit Deus. 

....sed hanc ipsam esse similitudinem, 
oujus parti ciparent omnia quae diciintur esse 
similia. Sicut ipsa est et castitas, cujus 
participatione castae sunt animae; et 
sapientia, cujus participatione sapientes 
sunt animae; et pulchritudo, cujus partic- 
ipatione pulchra sunt quaecumque pulchra 

....Ut autem nihil castius ipsa castitate, 
et nihil sapientius ipsa sapientia, et 
nihil pulchrius ipsa pulchritudine; ita 
nihil similius ipsa similitudine dici, aut 
cogitari, aut esse omnino potest. Unde 
intelligitur ita Patri esse similem similitud- 
inem suam, ut ejus naturam plennisime 
perfectissimeque irapleat. 
Quantiim autem ad speciem rebus imponendam 
valeat Dei similitudo, per quam facta sunt 
omnia, etc, De Genesi Ad Lit. Lib. Imperfectus 
XVI, 57,58,59; P.L. V.34, c,242. 


....Imai^o enim si perfecte implet illud cujus 
imago est, ipsa coaequatur ei, non illud 
imagini suae. In qua imagine speciem 
nominavit, credo, propter pulchritudinem, ubi 
jam est tanta congruentia, et prima aequalitas. 


NOTES (Continued) 

12 (Cont'd) 

et prima similitude, nulla in re dissl- 
dens, et nullo modo inaequalis, et nulle 
ex parte dissimilis, sed ad identidem 
respondens ei cujus imago est. De 
Trinitate VII, X; P.L. V.42, c.931. 
of. op.cit. XV, XIV, 23; C.1076. 


Omnis imago similis est ei cujus imago 

est; nee tamen omne quod simile est alicui, 

etiam imago est ejus: sicut in speculo et 

pictura, quia imagines sunt, etiam similes 

sunt: tamen si aliter ex altero natus non 

est, nullus eorum imago alterius dici 

potest. Imago enim tunc est, cum de 

aliquo exprimitur. 

De Genese ad Lit. Lib. Imperf. XVI, 57; 

P.L. V.34, 0. 242. 

of. Quaestionem in Hept., V, IV; P.L. V.34, 

C.749; also De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII; 

P.L. V.40, c. 85-86. 


This sense of the loss of reality of the 

image has been given admirable poetic 
expression by T.3. Eliot in The Wasteland 

.-JiliVhat are the roots that clutch, what 

branches grow 
Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man 
You cannot say, or guess, for you know only 
A heap of broken image s, where the sun beats," 

It would be interesting to contrast 
Augustine's doctrine of the image with the 
cosmological as well as epistemological 
exaggerations arrived at independently by 


NOTES (Continued) 

14 (Cont'd) 

Iwdwig Klages/ described by Gustave 
Thibon, La Science Du Caractere (L'Oeuvre 
de Ludwig Klages) , Paris, 1933, pp. 93 ff. 




....quid est quod in sensibili numerositate 
diligimus? Num aliud praeter parilitatem 
quamdam et aequaliter dimensa intervalla? 
etc. De Musica VI,X,26; c.1178. 

op.cit. 27,28; c. 1178-79. 

Quis est qui sumrnam aequalitatem vel 

similitudinem in corporibus inveniat, 

audeatque dicere, cum diligenter consider- 

averit quodlibet corpus vere ac simpliciter 

\inum esse; cum omnia vel de specie in speciem, 

vel de loco in locum transexindo mutentur, et 

partibus constent sua loca obtinentibus, per 

quae in spatia diversa dividuntur. 

De Vera Rel.XXX, 55; P.L. V.34, c.146. 

cf. op.cit. XI, 29; c.1178; and XII, 34,0.1181-82. 

ibid. It is interesting to compare the 
answer given by Augustine here in the De 
Musica with that of Plato who in seeking to 
explain how the diverse and variable equalities 
of sensuous experience awakens the thought of 
a perfect, unchangeable, unique, Equality 
which exists in itself, invisible, apart from 
equal things and as something other, expounds 
his theory of reminiscence (Phaedo 74a, c, 79a) 
whereby the soul has previously known equality 
which sensible eqioalities imperfectly resemble 
and towards which they aspire without ever 


NOTES (Continued) 

18 (Cont'd) 

reaching it. The account of 

in the Meno proceeds from an interrogation 

on mathematical tjruths. 

Quid ergo facile est? an amare colores, 
et voces, et placentas, et rosas, et 
corpora leniter mollia? haeccine amare 
facile est aniiaae, in c^uibus nihil nisi 
aequalitatem ac similitudinem appetit, et 
paulo diligent ius considerans, vix ejus 
extremam umbram vestigivunque cognoscit; et 
Deum amare difficile est, quern in quantxun 
potest, adhuc saucia et sordida cogitans, 
nihil in eo inequale, nihil sui dissimile, 
nihil disclusum locis, nihil variatiom 
tempore suspioatur? An extruere moles 
aedif iciorum, et hujuscemodi operibus 
delectat extendi, in quibus si niomeri 
placent (non enim aliud invenio) quid in 
his aequale ac simile dicitur, quod non, 
derideat ratio disci plinae? De Musica VI, 
XIV, 44;^c. 1186. "^ 

20 Omnis enim pulchritudo quae partibu? constat 
multo est laudabilior in toto quam in 

partes De Gen.Cont. lianic. I,XXI,32; P.L. V.32^ 



Quamobrem quisquis fatetur nullam esse 
naturam, quae non ut sit quidquid est, 
appetat unitatem, suique similis in cpantum 
potest esse conetur, atque ordinem proprium 
vel locis vel temporibus, vel in corpore 


HOTES (Continued) 

21 (Cont'd) 

quodam libramento salutem suam teneat: 
debet fateri ab uno principlo per aequalem 
illi ac similem speciem divitiis bonltatis 
©jus, qiia inter se xinuin et de uno unum 
charissima, ut ita dicam, charitate juguntur, 
omnia facta esse atque condita quaecumque 
sunt in quant\iiaq.ue sunt. 
De Musica VI,XV'il,56; P.L. V.32, c.1191. 


NOTES (Continued) 



Axigustine's intense awareness of universal 
order already expressed in tone of his 
earliest treatises, the De Ordine, finds 
its fullest expression in the De Civitate 
Dei. Deep insights into its meaning are 
revealed in many other of his writings, v.g. 
De Liber Arbitrio I, VI, 16; c.1229: ut omnia 
sint ordinatissima. . . .etc. Christopher 
Dawson (St. Augustine and His Age, in A 
Monument to St. Augustine, p. 65) cites 
P. A, Schubert,( August ins Lex Aeterne Lehre 
nach Inhalt und C^uellen ^(1924) to support 
his view that Augustine's fundamental 
concept of ttee universal order is derived 
from Hellenic sources, but he does not 
sufficiently bring out how this view was 
transformed by Augustine in the light of 
revealed truth, especially in that which 
concerns Christian providence. For the 
difference^ between Augustine^and the Greek 
view see Etienne Gilson, L'Esprit De La 
PhiJosophie Medievale, Paris 1932, Bk. I, 
Ch.VIII, pp. 153 ff. 

Numerus autem et ab uno incipit, et 
aequalitate ac similitudine pulcher est, 
et ordine copulatur. De lAiSica VI, XVII, 
56; P.L. V.32, G.iif/ 

An fortasse ordinem non diligit anima illis 
etiam numeris sensualibus attestantibus? etc. 
De Nfus. VI, XIV, 47; c.1187. 


NOTES (Continued) 

Nee in his aequalitatatis numerus, cui 

nihil depefit, sive illud sive aliud sit. 

Bed ordinis vlncinum reperitur. . . . De Mus. 


nihil aliud hie valere invenit, quam 

ordinationis potentlam. . . .op.cit. De Mus. 

VI,XIV,47, 0.118^. 





Nec miremur quod adhuc pulchritudinis nomino; 
nihil enira est ordinatum, quod non sit 
pulchrtun De Vera Rel., XLI,77; P.L. V.34, 

Sed nempe etiam formas visibiles sensus ipse 
aspematur, aut pj^onas contra quam decet, 
aut capite deorsum, ot similia, in quibus 
non inequalitas, manente partium parilitate, 
sed perversitas improbaAur. Postremo in 
omnibus sensibus et operibus nostris, cum 
insolita pleraqua, et ob hoc injucunda 
quibusdam gradibus appetitul nostro concil- 
iamus, et ea primo tolarabiliter, deinde 
libenter accipimus, nonne ordine conteximus 
voluptatem, et nisi priora raediis, et media 
postremis concorditer nexa sunt, abhorremus? 
De Mus. VI, XIV, 47; P.L. V.32, col. 1188. 

Ordo est parium dispariuraque remim sua cuique 
loca tribuens dispositio. De C!iv. Dei XIX, 
XIII, 1; P.L. V.41, c.640. 

Non enim ordo rectus, aut ordo appellandus 
est omnino, ubi deteri^fibus meliore 
subjiciimtur. . . . De Libero Arbitrio, I,VIII, 
18; P.L. V.32, c.1231. 


WOTES (Continued) 


. . . .membrorum dispositlonem, calutem 
concordiae. . . . De Civ. Doi,V,XI; 
P.L. V.41, col. 153. 

^^ Haec vero quae tendimt esse, ad ordinem 
tendunt: ciuem cum fuerint consecuta, ipsum 
esse consequuntur, quantxim id creatura 
consequi potest. Ordo enim ad convenient iam 
quamdRDi quod ordinat redigit.... Quare 
ordinatio esse cogit, inordinatio vero non 
esse; quae perversio etiam norainatur atque 
corrupt io. De Morib.Manich. II,VI,8; P.L. 
V.32, C.1348. 




quia ordo ipse aut 'bonuin est, aut ex bono 
est, numquam aliquid sine ordine fuit, nee 
erit aliquando. De Ordine II,VII,23;^c.l005. 

»...Ille igitur ineffabills quidam complexus 
Patris et imaginis non est sine perfru6tione, 
sine charltate, sine gauCio. Ilia ergo 
dilectio.... iiii^enti largitate atque ubertate 
perfunc ens omnfcs creatura s pro captu earum, 
ut oroinem suum teneant et locis suis 
acquiescant. De TrinitatepX,XI; P.L. V.42, 

....a quo est omnia modus, omnis species, 
omnis ordo; a quo est mensura, nuraerus, 
pondus, a quo est quidquid naturaliter est; 
cujuscvunque generis est, cujuslibet 


SOTES (Continued) 

13 (Cont'ci) 

aestimationis est; a q.uo sunt semina 
forma rum, foruiae seminum, motus eeminum 
ati^ue forraarxuQ: t^ui dedlt et carni 
originem, pulchrituc^inem, valetudinem, 
propagationis fecund! tatem, membrorum 
dispositionem, aalutem concordi&e, , . .sed 
nee exigui et contemptibilis animantis 
viscera, nee avis pennulam, nee herbae 
flosculum, nee arboris folium sine suarum 
partium convenientia, et quadam veluti 
pace dereliquit. . . . De Civitate Dei V,XI; 
P.L. V.41, c. 153-64. 



The triads are given variously as: mensurs, 
numeius, pondus (De Trinitate, XL, 11,8; 
P.L. V.42, C.998); unitac, species, ordo 
(De Vera Rel. VII, 13; P.L. V.34, c.129; 
modus, species, ordo (De Nature Boni Cont. 
Manic. Ill; P.L. V.42, c.653); etc. 
Schmous in his Die Psychologische Trinitat 
slebve des HI. Augustinus (1927) pp. 190 ff. 
points out more physical triads. For a 
comparison with Plotinus cf. La Notion 
Philosophique de la Ti'inite chfcz St. 
Augustin, 1930, pp. 38 ff. 

Haec igitur omnia, quae arte divina facta 
punt, et xmitatem quamdam in se ostendunt, 
et speoiem, et ordinem. Quidquid enim horum 
est, et unum aliquid est, sicut sunt naturae 
corporum, et ingenia aniraarum; et aliqua 
specie fonnatur, sicut sunt figurae vel 
qualitates corporum, ac doctrinae vel artes 


H0TE5 (Oontinued) 

15 (Cont'd) 

aniinariam; et ordinem aliqueu petit aut 
tenet, sicut sunt pondera vel collocationes 
corporujn, atiiue amores aut delectiones 
animaruia. De Trin. VI,X,12; P.L. V.42, 

D«lactatio ciuippa quasi pojidus t^st animae, 
Delectatio ei'go ordiuat aniiiara. De Mus. 

^^^ Sea note^''to Chapter I, 

^^ Pax itaque corporis, est ordiiiata tempera tura 
partium. Pax aninae irrationalis, ordinata 
requies appetitionum. Pax animae rationalis, 
ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio. 
Pa0 corporis et animae, ordinata vita et 
salus animantis. . . . Pax omnium rerum, 
tranquillitas ordinis. De Civ. Dei XIX, XIII, 
1; P.L. V.41, c,640. 

Unde raihi videtur, quod definitio brevis et 
vera virtutis: ordo est amoris. De Civitate 
Dei, L,XV,22; ? ,1,. V.41, col. 46?. 



....ille autem juste et sancte vivit qui 
ordinatam dilect.tonera ha bet. De Doctrina 
Christiana, I,27,28j P.L. V.44, col. 29. 

Nee attendunt, qiiam vel in suis locis naturis- 
que vigeant, pulchroque ordine disponantur; 
quantumque universitato rerum pro cuis portion- 
ibus decoris etc. De Civ. Dei XI, XXII; P.L. V.41, 

• i 


HOTBS ( Continued) 





Habent enira omnia, quamdiu sunt, mensuras, 
nuJTieros, ordincs suos; iuaa cuncta merito 
conaiderata laudantur, neo sine occulta 
pro suo genorc mods ration© pijilchritudinis 
temporalis, ctiani ex ?^.lio in allud trans- 
eundo, wutantur. (De Genesi ud litteram, 
HI, XVI, 25; P.L. Y.34, c.28^), 

Jee Chuptar III, p» 17/-3. 

Si enim sin^jula opera Dei cun considerantur 
a prudent ibus, invoniuntur habere laudabiles 
mensuras at numeros et ordinec m suo quae- 
4U0 (ienex'e constituta; quanto magia omnia 
simul, id est ipsa -Luaiversitas quae istis 
singulis in unum coliectis impletur? Omnis 
-nim pulcluritudo quae part ibus constat, multo 
est laudabilior in toto quara in T^arte; sicut 
in corpcrc huiaano, si laudaraus oculos solos, 
si nacum solum, si solas gGnas, aut solum 
caput, aut solus manus, aut solxxo pedes, et 
caetera si pulchra oin^:ula et isola laudamus; 
quanto magie totura corpus, cui omnia membra,' 
quae sin/-ula pulchra sunt, confei-iint pulchri- 
tudixicu suam: ita ut manus pulchra, quae etiam 
sola laudabatur in corpore, si separetur a 
corpore, ot ipsa amittat gratiara suam, et 
caetera sine ilia inhonesta sinr.? (De Gen. 
Cont. Kfenich. I,xxi.32. P.L. V.43, c. 188-89). 

....Universum autem ab unitate nombn accepit... 
ad universi pulchritudinem. . . . Quia etieja in 
sermone aliquo ornato atnue conpcsito si con- 
sidarcmus sin^.-ulas syllabas, vel etiam singulas 


HOTKS (Continued) 

22 (Cont'd) 

litterasquae c^jim sonuerlnt statim 
transeimt, non in eis inveniraus quid 
cielectet at quo lauciandum sit. Totus 
enira ille senao non de sin/rulis syllabis 
aut litteris, aed de onuiibus pulcher est. 
(Da Gon.'Jont.Manich. ,I,xxi,3P.; P.L. If. 43, 
c. 138-9) . 


Sed hoc pacto si quis tarn minutum cemeret, 
ut in vermiculato pavimento nihil ultra 
usius tesse lae noduluiu acies ;3juB valeret 
ambire, vituperare': artificom Volut 
ordinatioriis et coiapoaitionis ignarum; eo 
quod varietatam lapilloruia porturbatum 
putaret, a quo ilia QM"olQrnu«a in unius 
pulchritudiniij facit^ra contjrutjiitia simul 
oenii collus'i;rfiri quo non possent. Nihil 
cnim aliud minus eruditic honiinibus accidit, 
qui univarsam rerum coaptationem at que 
ooncentum iiabuoillu moute cociplbc'ci et 
oonsiderare non valentee, si quid eos 
offenderit, quia siiae oo^itatioiii mc^niim 
est, mtXi^n&m putant v-ebus iniiaert re 
fOGdltatcm. De Ordine I,I,2;,'^c.979. "^ '''^^ 
propterea quia nomo ect, qui non facile non 
modo toturn ver.?um, sed etiam totura carmen 
por.sit au.djre; totum tuitem ordir.em saeculorum 
sentire nullus hominum j^otest. Hue accedit 
quod cariiiinis non siiirrus partes iiaect^lorum vero 
partes dymnationts facti i2i.u:u:.r-. . . .ergo canitur 
sub judicio nostro, ista pera^ntur de labore 
nostro.... (De Vera Relig. I,xxii,42; P.L. V.34, 


ITOTES (Continued) 

23 (Cont'd) 

Nam 6t species vocis emissae praeterit, et 
Bilcntic ptrinitur; et tarnen eermo noster 
ex pratitfcreuntiani vei'borarn decetisione ac 
eucct£.£lone pera^itur, et moderetis 
silfatioruit intervallis decenter suavlterque 
distin;;ui tar; ita seee hnb^t fctiam tempor- 
alium r-aturarixm infima pulchritude, ut rerum 
transitu peragatur, et dlstlnti^atur raorte 
nescentium. Cujus pulchrltudlnie ordinem 
et modos si posset capere sensus noster atque 
memorie, ita nobis placeret, ut defectus 
quibus distinguitur, nee corrupt iones vocare 
auderemus. (Contra Eyistolam tfenichaeei, XIL, 
47} P.L. V.42, C.205). 

Ita ordinantur omnes offlciis et finibus suis 
in pulchrituainem uaiversitatie, ut quod 
horrcmus in parte, si cum toto consideremus 
plurimaiij placeatj ^uia neo in aedificjtiio 
judicando unun tantum ai\ oonsiderare 
debeaiUB, nee in hoaine pulonro goIos capillos.. 
Sed sicut nl^er color in pictura coiii toto fit 
pulciier. . . . 
(De Vera Reli'>I,xl,76; P.L. V.oi, c.l56). 


....quia ista infima pulchrltudo temporalium 
vicissitudinum, quae cum ipsa peragebatur, 
sub Ipsa peragetur. . . . St est pulchrltudo 
uuiversae creaturae per haec tria inculpabilis; 
da.Tuiation-srn peccatorura, excorcitationem 
justoi'ura, perfect ionem beatorum. De Vera Rel. 
XXIII, 44;,''c. 141 PA. r»^ 

....sed in suo genere, quamvis extremam, 
pulchritudinem sine ullo errore raonstabit. . . . 
quia rapitur in ordinem successionis extrema 
corporum pulchrltudo. De Vera Kq1.11XL,41; 
c. 139-40. 



NOTES (Continued) 

24 (Cont'd) 

....sed etiam ordinem dlligat, amisit ipsa 
ordinem suum; nee tamen excessit ordinem 
rerum, quandoquidem ibi est, et ita est, 
ubi esse, et quomodo esse tables, 

ordinatissiraum est Quapropter quiciun- 

que de nostra quoque poenali mortalitate 

n\imeri facti sunt, non eos abdiceraus a 

fabricatione divinae providentiae, cum sint 

in genere suo pulchre. De Mus. VI,XIV,46; '"- ''^' 


..♦.ut quodlibet elegerit, semper sit pulchra 

universitas decentissimis partibus ordinata... 

(De Lib. Arb. III,ix,27; P.L. V.32, c.1284). 





See note 3 7, chap.x. 

Quoniam si cut pictura cum colore nigro, loco 

suo posita, ita universitas rerum, si quis 

possit intueri, etiam cum peccatoribus pulchra 

est, quamvis per se ipsos consideratos sua 

deformitas turpet. (Op.cit. XI,xxiii,l, c.336) .f & =<^ ec 

That even the shadows are necessary to the 

perfection of a picture is also mentioned by 

Plotinus Enn. Ill, 2, 11). 

Se« no^ or oRpi/vc jJ.jx, /2;pt. v.i2, c. /ooo 

Cf- hrOTE. IX, CHAP-I 

See note hx.c m apx. 

....atque ita ordinem saeculorum tanquam 
pulcherrimiim carmen ex quibusdam quasi 
antlthetis honestaret. . . . 

Sicut ergo ista contraria contrariis opposita 
sermonis pulchritudinem reddunt: ita quadam, 
non verborum, sed rejrum eloquent ia contrarioriim 

u i ^ ' 

". -J * V. 


NOTES (Continued) 

27 (Cont'd) 

oppositions saeculi pulchritudo componitur. 
(De Civ. Dei; XI,xviii, P.L. V.41, c.332). 




temporalis autem pulchritudo rebus decent- 
ibus sue ce dent ibus que peragitur. (De 
Diversis C;uaest. 83, XLIVj P.L. V,40, c,28). 
Cum ergo in his locis, ubi talia esse 
competebat, alia aliis def icientibus 
oriuntur, et succumbunt minora majoribus, 
atcjue in qualitates superantium superata 
vertuntur, rerum est ordo transeuntium, 
Cujus ordinis decus propterea nos non 
delectat, quoniam parti ejus pro conditione 
nostrae mortalitatis intexti, universum, cui 
parti culae quae nos offendunt, satis apte 
decenterque conveniunt, sentire non possumus. 
(De Civitate Dei XII,iv,^.5S2) . 

....Fit autem decedentibus et succedentibus 
rebus temporalis quaedam in suo genere 
pulchritudo, ut nee ipsa quae moriuntur, vel 
quod erant esse desinunt, turpent aut turbent 
modura et speciem et ordinem universae crea- 
turae: si cut seimo bene ccsnpositus utique 
pulcher est, quamvis in eo sjcllabae atque 
omnes soni tanquam nascendo et moriendo 
transcurrant. (De Nat. Boni Contra Manich. 
I,viii,P.L. V.42, c,554). 

quasi carmini liniversitatis associant 

De Mus. VI, Xl,29 if c, 1179, PJ^- ^-s^ 

....Ita moderator, donee universi saeculi 

pulchritudo, cujus partieulae sunt quae quis 



HOTES (Continued) 

30 (Cont'd) 

qiiibusque temporibus apt a sunt, velut 
magnum carmen cujusdam ineffabilis 
modulatoris excurrat.... 
(Epistolarum Classis III» Ep. , 
CXXXVIII,5; P.L. V.33, c.527.) 
The contemporary poet Paul Glaudel using 
these lines as an epigraph has beautifully 
developed Augustine's profound insight in 
his Art Po6tique, Pai-is, 5th ed. no date. 


— oOo — 




The answer inq)llcitly contained 

In the preceding chapters to St. Augustine's 

question "Do we love anything but the beautiful, 

what then is the beautiful, and what is beauty?" 

can now be given more explicitly. Had Augustine 

felt that this fundamental question could be 

sufficiently answered by one brief response 

he might have provided it, and aesthetics 

would have been so much the poorer in not 

having his abundant reflections on beauty 

at different intervals throughout his whole 

2 ihaf 's 

life time. Always aware of beauty/; found 

differently in every realm of being awL-l-evei- 

o f CKlKtcnoo — sensible and intelligible beiuty, 

the beauty of art and nature, of all created 

thin^^s, the universe as a whole and its 

creator, the beauty of man in his body, his soul/'^'^^ 

the virtues which give his soul life, the beauty 


of justice, truth, wisdom, and God Who is 
Supreme Beauty -jAu^justine may have felt that 
no one response could sufficiently exhaust its 
ontolOfjical richness, but challen^jed anew in his 
fresh encounters with beau ty^^ issued copius re- 
sponses rich in thought and praise. All beings 
have some traces of unity, beauty, and order, 
and because beauty can be found in everything 
that is in the measure that it has being it is 
extremely difficult to say fully what it is. 
Beauty is so difficult to define because it 
cannot be confined to ar^ one kind or class, 
but variously present everywhere /ipre vails 
wherever there is being. Beauty is said 
differently of the different things in which 
it is found^ and that is why one saying cannot 
be articulated which will apply in the same 
way to all the different kinds of beauty. 
Nevertheless^ in his many responses^ Avigus tine 
has provided the necessary elements which once 


brought tOijether will do much to answer the 

question on the nature of beauty. 

To discover what beauty is 
requires a profound penetration into the 
meaninc of the aesthetic constituents so 
often and variously dealt with by St. Aug- 
ustine, and much profitable tine could be 
spent in further investigating number, fozro, 
order, unity and its derivatives: equality, 
likeness, harmony, proportion, gradation, 
variety, distinction and contrast; but such 
an investigation of the formal aesthetic con- 
stituents and their interrelations is not the 
purpose of this present chapter for no natter 
how exhaustively investi^jated^ these formal 
constituents considered in themselves would 
not yield the desired results. To understand 
the structure of the aesthetic constituents 
and their integration into a unified whole a 
deeper insight is needed. In examining the 


ontological constituents of the aesthetic 
object In the precedln^j chapter, the discovery 
was made that number, form, order, and unity 
get their real meaning when they are related 
to illumination and expression, and only in 
Keeping these together can the much sought 
after answer be provided on the nature of 
beauty. Fonn, order, and unity are formal 
elements it is true, but if they were only 
that; their integration into an aesthetic 
structure would not adequately explain what 
beauty is unless it were realized that these 
fonnal elements are at the same time lllu- 
minational and expressional. The difficulty 
of holdin^^ together the formal elements, 
illiiminationand expression is obvious, and 
although Augustine did not actually present 
them simultaneously^ the direction of their 
convergence can be fovmd in his various re- 
sponses which will now be examined more closely. 


At the very outset, the beauti- 
ful should be differentiated from that with 
which it differs, and in doin^^ so there will 
ernertje sane of the positive notes which enter 
into its complex notion. As the aesthetic 
experience showed ^ the beautiful is enjoyed 
and loved for its own sake and by that very 
fact is distinguished from the useful which 
is a means to somethinij else. Althou^ 
beauty and usefulness are distine^ished^ this 
does not mean that an object having utility 
cannot be beautiful when it is enjoyed for 
its own sake and not regarded roerely as a 
means to soniethin,'^ else. A ^'jood example of 
this is the hxiraan body in wliich the organs 
of sense and the I'ost of its members are so 
fashioned and placed that its fonn, stature, 
and appearance indicate that it was made for 
the service of a reasonable soul. The mar- 
vellous nijrahleness of the tongue and hands 


fittiiv^ them for speakintj, writing;, the 
execution of many tasks, and practice in 
the arts show the excellence of the soul 
for which such an assistant was provided. 
But even apart from its adaptation to the 
work required of it, there is such symmetry 
in its various parts and beautiful proportion 
that one is at a loss in deciding; whether in 
the creation oT the body greater regard was 
paid to utility or beauty. Assuredly, no 
part of the body has been created for the 
sake of utility which does not also contri- 
bute soraethiriij to its beauty, and this would 
be all the more apparent were it better known 
how all its p.irts are related and adapted to 
each other. All the relations which form the 
concord, or as the Greeks termed it, the 
harmony, of the whole body both without and 
within have not yet been discovered because 
no one has been audacious enou^;h to seek for 


them, but if these could be known, then even 
tiie inward parts which seem to have no beauty 
would delii^t us with their exquisite fitness, 
and would afford a more profoxind satisfaction 
to the laind ministered to by the eyes than 
the more obvious beauty which ^jratifies them. 
There are moreover some thin^^s so placed in 
the body that they obviously sejrve no usefiol 
purpose but are solely for beauty such as the 

teats on a man's breast, or the beard on his 

M/5 be'ina 
face I which x s- for ornament and not protection 

as can be seen from the bare faces of women 

who as the weaker sex should have been more 

amply provided with such a defense. If, 

therefore, of all those members exposed to 

view there is certainly not one in which 

beauty is sacrificed to utility, while there 

are some which serve no purpose but only 

beauty, it can readily be concluded that in 

the creation of the human body coiiieliness was 

more re^^arded than necessi^. Necessity is 

transitory, and the tine will come when the 


beauty of bodies will be enjoyed without 

There are many other things 
illing the uni versey^hich being both beauti- 
ful and useful can be delightfully contem- 
plated or used: the splendour of light, the 
magnificence of the sun, moon, and stars, 
the sombre beauties of forests, the colours 
and perfumes of flowers, the multitude of 
birds differing in song and pituaage, the 
infinite diversity of animals among which 
some of the smallest are the most admirable, 
the works of a worm or a bee /more surprising 
than the gigantic body of a v/hale, the sea 
which provides such a great spectacle with 
the different colours clothing it like so 


many different costumes^ sometimes green^iat 

firry e--^ 

others^ blue and purple (what pleasure there 
is in seeing the sea raging and storming if 
one is safe from its waves.'), the multitude 


of vestments furnished by trees and animals, 
and so many other thin^^s which can hardly be 

listed let alone described so iirach time would 

it take to include them all. 

In differentiating the useful 

from the beautiful there emerges again one 

of its inetparable notes already dealt with 

in the aesthetic experioince^that beauty is 

enjoyed and loved for its own sake. The 

mind in its seai'cb throu£;hout the earth and 

heavens discovers that only beauty is agree- 

able to it. Those sensible objects which 

show reasonable proportions and strike the 
eye agreeably bein^j called beautiful, and 
likewise harmonious sounds strikin£; the ears 
agreeably. If it be asked whether an agree- 
able onject is beautiful because it pleases 
us or whether it pleases us because it is 
bcav.tiful, the answer is that it pleases us 
because it is beautiful.^ ^ ^^^^ ^^ "°* 


beautiful because we are moved by it but 
on the contrary we are moved by it because 
it is beautiful. The objectivity of beauty 
is taken for granted^ but embarrassments arise 
when the question is asked why a thing is 

Without beauty things could 
not be enjoyed or loved, and in seeking to 
discover what unites us to the things we love 
it can be perceived that in bodies themselves 
there is beauty from their fonaing a kind of 
whole, and another from mutual fitness as one 
part of the body with its whole or a shoe with 
its foot. The beautiful which is so in it- 
self is distinguished from the fit which cd(- 
^responds to some other thing, and the im- 
portance of this will not escape anyone who 
understands the distance between the two. 
The beautiful which is considered and praised 
in itself differs not only in degree but in 


kind from the fit which depending as it does 
on another is judged on the basis of that to 
which it is related. The contrary of the 
beautiful is deformity or unsightliness 
whereas the opposite of the fit is the un- 
suitable. Beauty is seen and loved for its 
own sake ^ and in thJ3 sense can be called 
absolute as differentiated from the fit 
which is relative. 

Differing not in kind, as 
doe the ^flf^^ but in degree, is the ugly 

which was already seen to consist in a lack 

of form or a lesser degree of beauty. Ugli- 

ness is the absence of y)form or beauty a thing 
should have ^ but as no being is wholly form- 
less it has beauty in so far as it has form. 
A body is so much the more a body in the degree 
that it has form or beauty, and so much the 

less a body in the degree that it is ugly by 

lacking the beauty or form it should have. 


To be truly formed is to become a whole^ and 
in so far as a thing has wholeness it is 

beautiful^ for every form of beauty proceeds 

1 fi 
from unity. Uncompounded things are be- 
cause they are one, but composite things, 
unable to possess perfect unity or wholeness 
by the very fact that they are composed of 
parts, express unity by the harmony of their 
parts. Unity works congruity and harmony 
whereby things composite are in so far as 
they are, for to be is no other than to be 
one, and a thing is in so far as it attains 
unity, order and jrule/isecuriftT^ being, disorder 
tending to non-being. ^"^ Corporeal beauty, then, 

is defined as a congruence of parts with a 

certain delightfulness of colour. Congruence 

- - /-^"^ 
of parts is the succedane of/junity which mat- 
erial objects composed as they are of parts 
cannot possess perfectly. Any beautiful object 
formed of parts is more laudable in the whole 


than in the parts, and so great is the power 
and force of wholeness and unity that parts 
beautiful in themselves separately, please 
more when they are blended into a whole. 
The whole is more agreeable than parts 

pleasin^; in themselves either in time or 

in space. The beauty of material objects 

20 V. ^ 
does not consist in greatness or size^ but 

in wholeness produced by proportion and 
harmony of parts with the addition of agree- 
able colour. The eyes love soft and bright 


colours as they do fair and varied forms, 

and if harmony has not been violated light — 

the queen of colours — bathing all which is 

beheld adds its colour. Visible light which 

illuminates the earth, forms the day, gives 

objects their beauty and brings out their 

various colours, had much meaning for 

Augustine who confesses he was deeply 

affected by it throughout his life, and he 


not only praised it for what it is in it- 
self but used it metaphorically in des- 
cribin^j the invisible and spiritual li^jht 
which brin/js out truth by illuminating 

minds and confers on bodies the lijht of 

numbers, form, order, and unity. 

That a thin^j exists in so 

far as it is one and that overy form of 

beauty proceeds from unity would seem on 

the surface to be merely formal; l^tt it ,jets 

its real meaninf^ only when it is reco^jnized 

that unity is an ontolo^jical illiuaination 

ij- ii a./ So 

as n ns - ll as expression. Keeping? to^jether 
the formal elements with illumination and 
expression provides the key which will 
open up the deeper meanin/^s contained in 
some of the simplest utterances as to what 
beauty is. That unity is the form of all 
beauty, and n in bodies Wiemselves U i eirr is 
a beauty from their formin^^ a kind of whole ^ 


involve^ not only harmony and proportion 
but illumination. Corporeal beauty will 
then be said to consist in the splendour of 
form shining over the harmonious and pro- 
portioned parts of matter. V/holeness assiwaes 
deeper and deeper meanin^j as the scale of 
being is mounted and progressively higher 
unity is realized by the higher grades of 
being which will be considered briefly. 

Beauty in bodies endowed with 
life is due not only to colour supervening 
on the harmony of partS;,but to life itself 
which gives living bodies their beauty. Such 
a miserable creature as the worm, for example. 
Shows a splendour of colour, delicacy of form, 
perfect accord between the head and middle, 
the middle and the extremes. There is nothing 

on one side which is not <€quallv) seenV>n the 
other, and unity gives this humble creature 
being in so far as its nature permits. The 


life animating; this small body, moving it 
with measure, seeking; what is a^jreeable, 
avoiding or conciueriiv; obstacles, and con- 

servin^j it in bein^j, reveals even better 

than the body a hif^or unity. The beauty 

of man's body has already been commented^'"!, 

but the soul of man with the added powers of 

knowing and loving reveals a still higher 

unity and hence more beauty. The soul has 

its own and proper beauty in each of its 

seven sta^jes^ animation, sensation, reason 

or art, virtue, tranquillity, approach and 

contemplation — throui^h which it mounts from 

beauty to beauty; in the first three stages 

the soul takes successively higher attitudes 

towards matter, in the next two it deals with 

Itself before it approaches God^and then 

abides in Him. In these stages the soul acts 

beautifully of another, beautifully through 

another, beautifully about another, beauti- 



fully towards a beautiful, beautifully in 

a beautiful, beautifully towards beauty, 


and beautifully in Beauty. 

Measure, number, and balance 
are not only properties of physical bodies 
which can be observed on earth and in heaven; 
^^ moral acts admit a just measure wliich 
prevents them from goini; to excess; aael 
feelini^s and virtues are susceptible of 
harmony which^^anisliini;; from the soul the 

disorder of the passions introduces into it 

the rule of wisdom in all its beauty. The 

virtues have beauty: ^ j(lo quote only on^ 

Juit'K.e IS 

instance out of many^, boinf; - a certain beauty 

of the soul rendering beautiful even those 

who have twisted and deformed bodiesf but 

as the eyes cannot see the soul neither can 

they see its beauty. The exterior eyes can 

fix themselves on sensible be uty^ but it is 

the interior eye which sees the beauty of 


justice, and so seenpthe splendour of jus- 

tics is loved, for its charm* 

If^beauty of spectacles 

charms us, let us aspire to see that "'isdora 

which reaches to all thin^js and disposes all 

delightfully, for what, in effect, is more 

adraiiable and beautiful than this invisible 

power which creates, governs, orders, and 

makes beautiful the visible world. Beauty 

shines in the wisdom of God, and it is this 

wisdom which ^^ives charm to all that wiitG*^ 

attracts our eyes. V/holly admirable is the 

true beauty of God from '.Vhom is all bein^;, 

beauty, fonn, niirnber, wei^t, and measure; 

He from Whom all natures mean and excellent, 

all seeds of form, all forms of seeds, all 

motions both of forms and seeds have their 

beauty; He having left neither heaven, nor 

earth, nor angels, nor man, nor the most base 

and contemptible creature, neither the bird's 


feather, nor the herb's flower, nor the tree's 

leaf without the true harmony of parts and 

peaceful concord of composition; the un- 

chanf:;eabl6 ^jovernor and creator of nutable 

thin^js ordering all events in His providence 

until the beauty of the completed course of 

time shall be finished like the ^;rand nelody 

of some ineffably wise master of son^i. 

Axif'justine could not speak of 
the beauty of God without sini^in^; the praises 
of eternal and imperishable Beauty without 
increase or diminution, and his impassioned 
utterances are often sublime prayers to God 
through Whom all things which would not have 
existence by theraselves tend to exist, V'ho 
created out of nothing the world which is 
regarded by the eyes of men as His most 
beautiful work of art; God Who is goodness, 
-aae beauty, truth, wisdom, life, joy, sov- 
ereign concord; through, of^ and in Whom are 


good and beautiful every thine;; which possesses 


goodness and beauty. 

'""' God Who ds supreme Unity is 

also supreme Beinfj mid Beauty/ is the source 
of all participated bein.js which possess 
beauty in the laeasure that they have unity^ 
and the greater the unity attained the greater 
the degree of being and beauty attained. 
Created beings which are images of the 'Friune 
God are beautiful in the measure in which the 
image is expressed , but no ixaage is perfectly 
expressed except God Who expresses Himself 

wholly in His Image, the Fulness of Beauty^ 


and the source of all ifirticipated beauty. 

Tliere is no nature no matter 
how inferior whic}i is not the work of Him 
from V/hom comes all measure, beauty, and 
order which give things their being and in- 
telligibility.^^ Participated beings whether 
spiritual or naterial are what they are by 



the good. Tiithout the synthesis of the 
fortoal elements with expression and illumin- 
ation, no adequate account can be ^iven of 
beauty which is an ontolo.jical illumination 
of the formal constituents which £ re expression. 

Tiruth itself the lustre of in- 
telligibility may illuminate the intellect 
without brin^jing delirjht, but beauty which 
implies truth is a deli^^tful illxAraination. 
The good may brin^^ delectation to the will, but 
unless this /^ood has splendour — as when the 
splendour of order is spoken of — and brin^js 
delijht throu^ih the illumination of the intel- 
lect, beauty is not had. Beauty is the dili^jht- 
ful illumination of i^odness and truth siraul- 
taneously enli^jhtenin,^ and ^jladdening. The 
delii',}itful splendour of bein^; which is beauty 
is the shinin^^ out of truth and , goodness in 
which fjoodness is made visible, and truth 
brings joy. Joy implies^ as an essential 


condition^ the contemplation of truth, fldeli^jht 
of beauty is a joy born of truth. Haauty 4-s 
an illumination of both truth and f^oodness 
and as the splendour of bein^; delist fully 
illuminating the mind with its two powers of 
knowing and loving, ^can be stated in terms of 
unity which is the form of all beauty^ and in 
these terras it can be said that beauty pro- 
ceeds from the unity of goodness and truth. 
This unity of truth and ,;oodness issuing in 
beauty can be further brought into unity with 
man who in his experience of beauty enjoys the 
unity of intellect and will, mind and body. In 
the experience of beauty not only is the unity 
of the object involved but also the larger 
whole of man and the object, and these two in ^^^e. 
turn involve the still larger whole of the 
object, man, and God Who alone is Perfect 
Wholeness, Completeness, 9 aenes» , Unity, and 
hence Perfect Beauty. 



Num amanius aliquid, nisi pulchrum? Quid 
est ergo pulchrum? Et quid est puichritudo? 
Quid est quod nos allicit et conciliat rebus 
quas amamus? Nisi enira esset in eis decus at 
species, nullo modo nos ad se mover^nt. (Gonf. 
IV, XIII, 20; P.L. V.32, col. 701.) 
"How does it happen that the same philosopher 
who twice wrote, "Num amamus aliquid nisi pul- 
chrum (Gonf. IV, 13; De T-Iusica vi, 13) could 
have written what seems to contradict it 
namely "non amatur certe nisi bonum solum" (De 
Trinitate, viii, 3), asks Edouard Krakowski in 
the chapter comparing St. Augustine's aesthetic 
with that of Plotinus (L'Esthetique De Plotin 
et son Influence, Paris, 1929). In seeing a 
contradiction between these statements Kra- 
kowski willingly believes that Augustine had 
turned against his former affirmations as he 
progressed in Ghristianity and that in the 
Confessions (C.400) he is blaming the principle 
that beauty only is loved which was enunciated 
when Augustine was plunged in culpable loves 
and an abyss of error. There is no justifi- 
cation for gratuitously construing that Aug- 
ustine only held this principle when he was 
pursuing gross beauties and later abandoned it, 
as his Christian faith deepened. Had Aiigustine 
retracted from the saying in the Confessions 
he certainly would have said so in his Re- 
tractions (426-427) where he is so careful to 
point out the opinions to which he no longer 
would assent in his own writings, nor would he 


NOTES (Continued) 


have insisted on the love of the beautiful 
in the De Musica (387-391) and in his other 
writings from which Excerpts have been given. 
The evidence shows clearly that Augustine did 
not change his mind on this important matter, 
and furthermore there is no contradiction 
between this principle and the statement in 
the De Trinitate (400-416) that the good only 
is loved since beauty and good are not mutually 
exclusive. Just as truth from a certain aspect 
can be considered as a good of the intelligence 
so too beauty is a good of the intelligence and 
will. In so far as beauty is loved and enjoyed 
it is a good, but not every good is beautiful as 
will be seen further on in this chapter. As to 
the charge that Augustine turned against the 
love of the beautiful as he became more pro- 
foundly Christian it would be more correct to 
say that the opposite is true. For Augustine 
as indeed for all those who adore God as supreme 
Goodness and Beauty from Whom all participated 
beauty and goodness derive, there is no problem 
of reconciling the claims of beauty and morality. 
"We Catholics", says St. Au;justine in De Natura 
Boni (405) ( ch. iii, P.L. 7.32, c.553) "worship 
God the principle of all good great or little, 
the principle of all beauty great or little, 
the principle of all order great or little. 
The more measure, beauty, and order shine out 
in the created things the more are they good, 
the less the shining out of measure, beauty and 
order the less are they good. Measure, beauty, 
and order are three general goods that we find 
in all created things whether spiritual or 


NOTES (Continued) 


corporeal. God infinitely surpasses every 
creature in measure, beauty, and order from 
Whom flows all measure, beauty and order. 
V/here these three are present in a high 
degree there good is in the same proportion, 
and similarly good is mediocre where they 
are present in a weal: degree, if completely 
absent so too is the good. 'Vliere these three 
are great the natures are great, where weak, 
so too the natures, and if completely absent 
there will be no nature since every nature is 
a good." 

Bosanquet who credits Augustine with en- 
larging and advancing aesthetic appreciation 
especially in his decided emphasis of the 
ugly as a subordinate element in the beautiful 
(History of Aesthetic i-oi^ee^^, /s*<» pp. /3j ff) re- 
grets that Augustine allowed his early De 
Pulchro et Apto (c.380) "which we should value 
so highly" to perish as trivial; (but. St. Au^;- 
ustine should be the better judge of this) 
this loss is felt so keenly by others that K. 
Svoboda (L'Esthetique De S. August in Et Ses 
Sources, 3mo, 1933) not only attempts to tell 
us what this lost work contained but in his 
preoccupation with sources even goes so far as 
to trace the sources of this work the loss of 
which did not bother Augustine himself as he 
tells us in his Confessions (IV, 20). That 
Augustine throughout his life time was in- 
terested in the beautiful and treated it in 
many of his writings on other matters can be 
seen from the many texts brought together by 
K. Svoboda (op. cit.) who is so concerned with 


NOTES (Continued) 

(Cont'd. ) 

sources and the reproduction of texts that 
he hardly attempts to ^cive a systematic ex- 
position of Augustine's aesthetic thought. 
Although Svoboda admits that there are hardly 
any changes in Augustine's aesthetic ideas 
throughout his long life (this is true of al- 
most all his thinking in which there is a 
psychological development but no essential 
change. Gf. Charles Boyer, op. cit. and E. 
Gilson, op. cit. p. 293), he too succumbs to 
the view that Augustine turned away more and 
more from sensible beauty, to intelligible 
beauty and from the artist here to God the 
Artist-Greator, as he advanced in his Chris- 
tian faith. V/e should say that as Augustine 
entered more profoundly into the mystery of 
the Incarnation (sed quia Verbum caro factum 
est et habitavit in nobis, non ibi legi. 
Gonf. VII, 9, 14) his appreciation of con- 
tingent and passin|f*wa's not diminished but 
on the contrary became more profound. 

The praises of these different kinds of beauty 
are constantly sung by St. Augustine through- 
out his entire works, the following quotation 
showing how many kinds are included in one 
instant^; .<i ".*.'?? .quid me in furto delectaverit, 
et ecce species nulla est: non dico sicut in 
aequitate atiue prudentia, sed neque sicut in 
mente hominis atque memorla et sensibus et 
vegetante vita, neque sicut speciosa sunt 
sidera et decora locis suid^ et terra et mare 
plena fetibus, qui succedunt nascendo decenti- 
bus; non saltem ut est quaedam defectiva species 


NQTES (Continued) 

(Cont'd. ) 

et umbractica vitiis fallentibus. (Conf. 
II, VI, P.L. V.32, cui^ 

Augustine's beautiful praises of the world 
and its multiple beauties especially in 
many passages of the Confessions (e.g. IX, 
10, 23--26) and the De Libero Arbitrio (II, 
16, 41 & 43; P.L. V.32, c.1263 & 1264) in 
which the beauty of sensible things is diown 
by their imprints to unceasingly proclaim 
Divine V/isdom have led some to hold that in 
Augustine the beauty of sensible things 
offers sensible evidence for the existence 
of God. Augustine however always proceeds 
from without to the soul within and from the 
soul within to God above the soul. As in 
the De Musica sensible number and harmony 
led through the soul to supreme Harmony and 
Equality, so the niimber, order, measure, and 
beauty of things leading through the soul to 
God is one of the stages of Augustine's proof 
of the existence of God, but to isolate this 
stage from the others and to speak of a kind 
of abridged and poetic proof of the existence 
of God is to arrest at one of its stages the 
dynamic structure of Augustine's proof. As 
in the middle ages certain mystics were in- 
spired to a mystical symbolism of the sensible 
world by these passages from St. Augustine so 
other thinkers by paing attention to the in- 
wardness and the necessary passage through 
thought and the soul in Aiigustine's proof were 
inspired to find a more abstract proof for the 
existence of God such as the ontological argu- 
ment of St. Anselm. . Cf . Et. Gilson, op. cit. 
pp. 25-27. 


NOTES (Continued) 

The failure of brin^jing together the formal 
elements, illumination, and expression ex- 
plains the inadequacy of the few works 
devoted to 3t. Augustine's theory of beauty. 
The pregnant conception of expression contri- 
buted by the moderns according to Bosjsanquet 
(op. cit.) V* ^ ^ ^ ) had already been combined 
by St. Augustine not only with the formal 
elements of rhythm, symmetry, harmony of 
parts, etc., but with illumination as well. 
This synthesis achieved by Au/^stine could 
do much to reconcile the conflicting views 
which divide contemporary aesthetic thou.^t 
such as those pointed out by E.F. Garritt 
(The Theory of Beauty) as intellectualist, 
emotionalist, expressionist, formal and 
expressive, etc. 



De Givitate Dei XXII, XXIV, 4; P.L. V.41, 

Jam caetera pulchritudo et utilitas creaturae, 
quae homini, licet in istos labores miserias- 
que projecto atque daranato, spectanda atque 
sumenda divina largitate concessa est, quo 
sermone terrainari potestL in coeli et terrae 
et maris rauitiraoda et varia pulchritudine, in 
ipsius lucis tanta copia tamque mirabili specie, 
in sole ac luna et sideribus, in opacitatibus 
nemorum, in coloribus et odoribus floriim, in 
divers itate ac multitudine volucrura garrulariim 
atque pictarum, in multiforrai specie tot tan- 
torumque animantiura, qiiorum ilia plus habent 


NOTES (Continued) 

6 (Cont'd.) 

admirationis, quae molis miniraum (plus enim 
formicularum et apicularum opera stupemus, 
quam imaensa corpora balaenarum) ; in ipsius 
quoque maris tam /jrandi spectaculo^ cum sese 
divers is coloribus induit velut vestibus et 
aliquando viride, atque hoc raultis raodis, 
aliquando purpureuri aliquando caeruleum est. 
T,uam porro delectabiliter spectatk'r etiam 
quandocumque turbatur, et fit inde major sua- 
vitas, (luia sie demulcet intuenten, ut non 
jactet et auatiat navifjanten? (De Civ. Dei; 
XXII, xxiv, 5; P.L. V.41, c,7%^,) 


Hinc est profecta in oculorum dpes, et terrain 

coeluraque collustrans, sensit nihil aliud quam 
pulchritudinem sibi placere; (De Ordine, II, 
15, 42; P.L. V.32, C.1014. ) 


Sed ad oculos quod pertinet, in quo congru- 
entia partium rationabilis dicitur, pulchrum 
appellari solit. Quod vero ad aures, quando 
rationabilem concentura dicimus, canturaque 
numerosum rationabiliter esse compos itxim; 
suavitas vocatur proprio jam nomine. (De 
Ordine II, xi, 33; P.L. V.32, C.IOIO.) 

Et prius quaeram utrum ideo pulchra sint, quia 
delectant; an ideo delect-ant, quia pulchra 
sunt. H^c raihi sine dubitatione respondebitur, 
ideo delectare quia pulchra sunt. (De vera 
reli.^ione, >:XXII, 59; P.L. V.34, col. 148.) 


NOTES (Continued) 



Et animadvertebara et vldebara in ipsis cor- 
poribus aliud esse quasi totum, et ideo 
pulchrum; aliud autem quod ideo deceret, 
quoniam apte accommodaretur alicui, sicut 
pars corporis ad universum suiom, aut cal- 
cearaentum ad pedem, et similia. (Op. cit. 
IV, XIII, 20; P.L. V.32, col. 701.) 

et ibat animus meus per forraas cor- 

poreas; et pulchrum quod per seipsum; aptxim, 
autem, quod ad aliquid accommodatiim deceret, 
definiebam et distinguebam, et exemplis cor- 
poreis astruebam, (Gonfessionum, IV, XV, 24* 
P.L. V.32, col. 703.) 

It is interesting to note that this distinc- 
tion between the beautiful and the useful in 
the lost treatise De Pulchro Et Apto made 
when Augustine was a materialist as he tells 
us in the Confessions (IV, XIII, 20), con- 
tinued to be held but from another point of 
view after he overcame ^-errors of materialism. 


Haec quaestio quam late pateat, profecto 
videt quisquis pulchri aptique distantiara 
sparsam quodaminodo in universitate rerum 
valet, neque negligit intueri. Pulchrum enim 
per seipsum consideratur atque laudatur, cui 
turpe ac deforme contrarium est. Aptum vero, 
cui ex adverso est ineptum, quasi religatum 
pendet aliunde, nee ex semetipso, sed ex eo 
cui connectitur, judicatur: nimirum etiam 
decens atque indecens, vel hoc idem est, vel 
perinde habetur. (Epistolarum Classis III, 
Epistola cxxxviii, v; P.L. V.33, col. 527.) 


NOTES (Continued) 



This distinction between absolute and re- 
lative beauty could be used to explain the 
difference between the relative beauty of 
vases, rugs, pots, machines, etc., and the 
absolute beauty realized in works of art 
beautiful in themselves and for no other 
reason. This distinction could also be 
extended to explain the claim made that 
there is a difference in kind between art 
in which beauty depends on something else 
whether it be faithfully copying the ap- 
pearances of nature or representing vita- 
listic illusions such as can be found for 
example in a great deal of naturalistic 
painting and such art be it Egyptian, 
Byzantine, Mediaeval or Post-Impressionist 
since Cezanne in which beauty is absolutely 
affirmed. In this connection see T.E. 
Hulme's Speculations: Essays on Humanism 
and the Philosophy of Art, New York, 1924, 
especially the chapter on Modern Art and 
Its Philosophy. 

The English sculptor Eric Gill has also 
insisted on this distinction in his in- 
teresting writings on aesthetic problems, 
more especially in his Art Nonsense and 
Other Essays, Gassel & Co., London, 1929, 
Beauty Looks After Herself, Sheed & Ward, 
London, 1932. 

See Chapter II, p,s^^ 

The strictures of VJ.T. Stace (The Meaning 
of Beauty, pp. 67ff . ) on the disastrous 
worship of symmetry on the part of philo- 
sophers which has prevented them from 


NOTES (Continued) 

13 (Cont'd.) 

including the ugly in their treatment of 
beauty would certainly not apply to St. 


Quod si non id quod est in mole corporis , 
sed id '^uod in specie facit corpus esse, 
quae sententia invictiore ratione approbatur: 
tanto enim magis est corpus, quanto speciosius 
et atiue pilchrius; tantoque minus est, quanto 
foedius ac deformius; quae defectio non prae- 
cisione molis, de qua jam satis actum est, sed 
speciei privatione contingit: De Immortalitate 
Animae, VIII, 13; P.L. V.32, c. 1027-28. Gf. 
also op. cit. XVI, 25;fc.l034. pa- v^j. 
Deinde in ipso solo corpore corruptio pulchri- 
tudinis, foeditas.... Contra Epistolam Main- 
chael, XXXV, 39; P.L. V.42, c.201. 
Augustine's treatment of the ugly is parallel 
to his handling of the problem of good and 
evil. As evil is a privation of being so too 
is ugliness a privation of form or beauty. 
'Vithout beauty, form, and harmony of parts 
the existence of any nature could not even 

be conceived: "quod videre non potuit non 

esse naturam, sed contra naturam; et ipsum 
malum tanta specie et forrais et pace partium 
in singulis naturis vigente decoravit, quia 
sine his bonis nullam poterat cogitare naturam, 
ut ea mala quae ibi reprehendit, innumerab ilium 
bonorum copia sepeliantur. " (Contra Epist. 
Manich. XLJII, 49, Conclusio; P.L. V.42, c.206.) 
Evil is nothing else but the corruption of 
measure, beauty, or natural order: "Proinde 
cum quaeritur unde sit malum, prius luaerendum 
est quid sit malum; quod nihil aliud est quam 
corruptio, vel modi, vel speciei, vel ordinis 
naturj.s" (De Natura Boni IV; P.L. V.42, c.553). 


NOTES (Continued) 

14 (Cont'd.) 

Quoniam quidquid est, quantulacuraque specie 

sit necesse est; nam quoniam svunma 

species summum bonum est, minima species 
minimum bonum est.... Sane quod de specie, 
hoc etiam de forma dici potest. Neque enlm 
frustra tam speciJssimum, quam etiam formosis- 
simum in laude ponitur.... quod nullam speciem 
habet, nullamque formam; De Vera Religione 
XVIII, 35; P.L. V.34, C.137. 

See also op. cit. XI, 21; c. 131-32; De Diversis 
Quaestionibus LXXXIII, q.VI, c.l3 and q.X, c.l4; 
P.L. V.40; Contra Epistolam Manichael, XXX, 33, 
c.195 and XXXIII, 36, c. 198-99; P.L. V.44. 
Augustine's insistence that "mala in ordinem 
redacta faciut ad defforem iiniversi (De Ordine 
II, 4) contains the principle which would help 
solve the problem as to how far the artist may 
go in his treatment of evil. Evil may be 
dealt with by the artist if it is brought into 
order, and once brought into order the beauty 
of the whole would be assured. 

15 ^ 

See note 19 to Chapter H, ^ 

1 fi 

Cum autem omne quod esse dicimus, in quantvim 

manet dicimus, et in quantum unum est, omnis 

porro pulchritudinis forma unitas sit. 

Epistolarum, Glassis,!, XVIII; P.L, V.33, c.85. 


See Chapter II, pp. f^ and note 7 to Chapter II, S 


Quid est corporis pulchritude? Congruentia 

partium cum quadam coloris suavitate. (Epist. 

Classis 1,111,4; P.L. V.33, c.65. 

Omnis enim corporis pulchritude est partium 

congruentia ciim quadam coloris suavitate. 

De Civ. Dei, XXII, XIX, 2; P.L. V.41, c.781. 


NOTES (Continued) 

18 (Cont'd) ^ 

Bosanquet (op. cit.p. /i^ ) says that suavitat« 
was replaced by claritas used eight hundred 
years later by St. Thomas. 
Augustine tells us (Conf .III»4,7) that he 
was awakened to the love of philosophy by 
the reading of Cicero's Hortensius, and it 
may be that Augustine became acq.uainj|ed with 
some of the stoic's views on beauty concern- 
ing which so little is known today through 
his reading of Cicero's and also through 
his reading of Plotinus' attacks on some 
of the stoic doctrines. The definition of 
corporeal beauty given by Cicero (Tuscul., 
iv,xiii) as "et ut corporis est quaedam 
apte figura membrorum ovm coloris quadam 
suavitate" stresses the addition of agree- 
able colour. It is interesting to note that 
in the De Finibus (III,V,18) Cicero speaks 
of the teats and beard of man which were 
previously cited by St. Augustine as 
examples illustrating that the body was 
built more for beauty than utility. 
Augustine's views on the beauty of virtue 
has some resemblance to that of the stoics 
who held that the beauty of the soul is the 
symmetry of reason and i^^'^parts in relation 
Tot. the whole but while there is a question 
of the materialism of the Stoic doctrine, 
St. Augustine's spiritualist is strongly 
affirmed. "^ 


Omnis enim pulchritudo quae partibus con- 
stat, multo est laudabilior in toto quam in 

parte tanta est vis et potentia in- 

tegritatis et unitatis, etc. ( De Genesl 


NOTES (Continued) 

19 (cont'd.) 

Contra Manldi., I, XXI, 32; P.L. V.34, 
c. 188-89. 

In hoc enim sensibili mundo vehementer 
consideranl«^ est quid sit tempus et locus; 
ut quod delectat in parte, sive loci, sive 
temporis, intelligatur tanen multo esse 
melius totum, cujus ilia part est; et 
rursus, quod offendit in parte, perspicuum 
sit homini docto, non ob aliud offendere, 
nisi quia non videtur totum, cui pars ilia 
mirabiliter congruit: in illo vero mundo 
intelligibili, quamlibet partem, tanq.uam 
totum, pulchrum esse atque perfectam. De 
Ordine II, XIX, 61; P.L. V.32, c.1019. 
De Genesi Contra Manich. , I, XXI, 32; 
P.L. V.34, c. 188-89. 
Confessionxim IV, XI, 17. 
De Vera Rel. XL, 76; P.L. V.34, c.l56. 

plus delectant omnia quam singula, 

si possint sentiri omnia. Conf, IV, XI. 


Unlike Aristotle for whom magnitude was 
one of the conditions of beauty for 
(Poetics, VII, 8) on more than one oc- 
caBion Augustine r-i^pe^^is- that corporeal 
beauty does not consist in size. 

sicut in specie visibilis hominis, 

si unum radatur supercilium, quam pro- 
peraodum nihil corpori, et quam multum de- 
trahitur pulchritudini; quoniam non mole 
constat, sed parilitate ac dimensione 
membroinim. De Civ. Dei XI, XXII; P.L. 
V.41, c.335. 
......non enim corpora pulchritudine molis 

aut magnitudine superat Epistolarum, 

Glassis II, CXX, 12; P.L. V.33, c.458. 


NOTES (Continued) 




Pulchras formas et varias, nitidos et 
amoenos colores araant ocnuli.... Et 
tan/^unt me vigilantem totis diebus, nee 
requies ab eis datur mlhi, sicut datur 
a vocibus canoris, aliquando ab omnibus 
in silent io. Ipsa enim re^^ina colorum 
lux ista, perfundens cuncta quae cernimus, 
ubiubi per diem fuero, raultimodo allapsu 
blanditur mihi aliud agenti, et earn non 
advertenti. Insinuat autem se ita vehe- 
ment©, ut si repente subtrahatur, cum 
desiderio requiratur: et si diu absit, 
oonstristat animum, Conf essionum, X, 
XXXIV, 51; P.L, V.32, c. 800-801. 

luce coloris adjuncta. De Veri Relisione 
XL. 74; P.L. V.34, c.156. 



Epistolanim, Classis II, GXX, 15: P.L. 
V.33, C.457. 

Conf. VII, 10, 16; P.L. V.32, c.742. 

Necesse est autera fatearaur raeliorem esse 
hominem plorantem, quam laetantera verrai- 
culum: et taraen vermiculi laudora sine ullo 
mendacio copiose possum dicere, considerans 
nitorem coloris, figurara teretem corporis, 
priora cum mediis, media cura oosterioribus 
con^ruentia, et unitatis appetentiam pro 
suae naturae humilitate servantia; nihil 


NOTES (Continued) 

25 (Cont'd.) 

ex una parte forraatum, quod non ex altera 
parili dimensione respondeat. Quid jam 
de anima ipsa dicara vegetante modulum cor- 
poris sui, quomodo eum nuraerose moveat, quo- 
modo appetaCconvenientia, quomodo vincat 
aut caveat obsistentia quantua potest, et 
ad unura sensum incolumitatis referens omnia, 
unitatem illam conditricem naturarum omnium, 
multo evident ius quara corpus insinuet? Lo- 
quor de vermiculo animante qualicumque. 
Cineris et etercoris laudem verissime atque 
uberrime plerique dixerunt, (Gato apud 
Ciceronera, in Gatone majore. ) 'iuid ergo 
mirum est, si hominis animam, quae ubicumque 
sit et qualiscumque sit, omnl corpore est 
melior dicam pulchre ordinari, et de poenis 
ejus alias pulchritudines fieri cura ibi non 
sit quando misera est, ubi beatos esse decet, 
sed ibi sit ubi esse miseros decet? (De Vera 
Reli^. I, Xli, 77; P.L. V.34, c.156-57,) 



Haec igitur primo, quod cuivis animadvertere 
facile est, corpus hoc terrenxom at.iue mortale 
praesentla sua vivificat; colligit in unum, 
atque in uno tenet, diffluere atque contabe- 
scere non sinit; alimenta per membra aequall- 
ter, suis cuique redditis, distribui facit; 
congruent iam ejus modumque conservat, non 
tantum in pulchritudine, sed etian in cres- 
cendo atque t-^ignendo. (De Quantitate Animae, 
JIXXIII, 70; P.L. V.32, c.1074.) 

Ascendent ibus igitur sursum versus, primus 
actus, docfcndi causa, dioatur animatio; 
secundus, sensus; tertius, ars ; quartus, 
virtus; quintus, tranquillitas; sextus, 
ingressio; septiraus, contemplatio. Possunt 


NOTES (Continued) 

27 (Cont'd.) 

et hoc raodo appellari| de corpore; per 

corpus, circa corpus; ad selpsain; in 

seipsa; ad Deum; apud Deum. P,ssunt et 

sic: pulchre de alio; pulchre per aliud; 

pulchra circa aliud; pulchre ad pulchrum; 

pulchre in pulchro; pulchre ad pulchri- 

tudinem; pulchre apud pulchritudinem. 

(De viuantitate Animae, XXXV, 79; P.L. 

V.32, col. 1079.) 

ITiese seven statues by which the soul 

climbs to its perfect ion lln each of which 

it has its own and proper beauty is also 

found in the Confessions and The City of 


"What aesthete could be more intense? 

This aesthetic contemplation, this dwelling 

on beauty ", exclaims E.K. Rand (Founders 

of the Middle Ages, Gh.VIII, St. Augustine 
and Pante, p,264), "an aestheticism which was 
not reproved in the Retractions'" (op. cit. 
note 29, p. 345). It would be Interesting 
to compare this ascent of the soul in beauty 
with those given by Plato (Phoelirus and 
Sympositun) and Plotinus (Enneads VI, 1). 


Neque enim mensura et niiinerus et pondus in 
lapidlbus tantumniodo et 1 ignis atque hu jus- 
modi molibus, 6t quantiscumiue corporalibus 
vel terrestrlbus vel coelestibus animadverti 
et cot^itari potest. Est etiam mensura aliquid 
agendi, ne sit irrevocabilis et imioderata 
progressio; et est nuraerus at affectionum 
animi et virtutum, quod ab stultitiae deformi- 
tate ad sapientiae formam decusque colligitur; 
et est pondus voluntatis et amoris, ubi apparet 
quant i quidque in appetendo, faciendo, prae- 

ponendo, postponendoque pendatur De 

Genesi Ad Litteram, IV, IV, 8; P.L. V.34, 
c. 299-300. 


NOTES (Continued) 





Pulchritudo virtutis, etc, De 

Diversis Quaes tionibus, LXXXIII, q.xxxvi, 
P.L. V.40, C.26. 

Est enlm quae dam pulchritudo animi jus t it i a 
qua pulchri sunt homines, plerique etiam qui 
corpore distortesi*^ atque deformes sixnt. Sicut 
autem animus non videtur oculis, ita nee 
pulchritudo ejus. De Trinitate, VIII, VI, 9; 
P.L. V.42, C.954. 

Est enim quaedan pulchritudo justitiae. .. . 
Habet justitia formara suam, oculos quaerit, 
accendit amatores suos.... Ametur, sed ilia 

pulchritudo quae cordis oculos quaerit 

Justitiam viderunt in qua pulcher est cur- 

vus senex 

Et ipsa justitia qualis est? quis illam pin- 
git? Sapient ia Dei quam pulchri tudinem 
habet? Per illam pulchra sunt omnia, quae 
oculis placent..... Enarratio In Psalraum 
XXXII, I, 6 & 7; P.L. V.36, C.282. 
Cf. Enarratio LXIV, 8; 0.780. "Intus, inquam 
est oculos unde videatur pulchritudo justi- 
tiae, etc., and Sermo IX, X, 16; P.L. V.38, 

Summa est vera pulchritudo justitia est: ibi 
ilium non videbis pulchrum ibi deprehendis 
injustum: si ubique Justus, ubique decorus. 
Ennaratio In Ps., XLIV, 3; P.L. V.36, c.496. 

Si nos miracula spectaculorum et pulchritudo 
delectant, illam desideremus videre Sapientiam, 
quae pertendit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, 


NOTES (Continued) 

31 (Cont'd.) 

et disponit omnia suaviter (Sap, vi, i, 1). 
Quid enim mirabilius, vi incorporea mundum 
corporeum fabricante at administrante? aut 
quid pulchrius ordinante et ornante, (De 
Vera Rel., LI, 100; P.L. V.34, c.166.) 
See also note 3 to this chapter. 



Ceus unus omnipotens , creator et 

factor omnis animae atque omnis corporis: 

cujus sunt participatione felices a quo 

est omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo; a 
quo est mensura, numerus, pondus; a quo est 
quidquid naturaliter est, cujuscumque generis 
est, cujuslibet aestiraationis est; a quo sunt 
semina formajrura, fownae seminum, motus seminum 
atque formarum; qui dedit et cameia originem, 
pulchritudinem, valetudinem, propagationis fe- 
cunditatem, membrolum dispositionem salutem 

concordiae qui non solum coelum et terram, 

nee solum angelum et hominem; sed nee exigui 
et contemptibilis animantis viscera, nee avis 
pennulam, nee herbae flosculum, nee arboris 
folium sine suarum partium eonvenientia, et 

quadam veluti pace dereliquit (De Civ, 

Dei, Y, XI; P.L. V.41, c. 153-54. 


Soliloquiorum I, I (Preeatio ad Deum) ; P.L. 
V.32, c. 869-872. 

This prayer prefaced to the De Soliloquiis 
one of Augustine's very early philosophical 
works (387) is all the more remarkable in 
that it already shows almost all of Aug- 
ustine's central themes which were oRly to 
be developed in later works. 


NOTES (Continued) 




See Chapter II. f> 



non enim est ulla nature etiam in 

extremis infimisque bestiolis, quam non 
ille constituit, a quo est omnis modus, 
omnis species, omnis ordo, sine quibus 
nihil rerum inveniri vel cogitari potest. 
De Civ. Dei, XI, XV; P.L. V.41, c.331. 

De Immortalitate Aniraae, XII, 19; P.L. 
V.32, C.1031. 

De Vera Reli,iione, XI, 21, P.L. V.34, 
0.131-32; De Diversis ;>uaestionibus LXXXIII, 
q. vi & X, P.L. V.40, c.l3 & 14; Contra 
Eplstolam Maniohael, XLIIV, 49; c.206, XXX, 
33, C.193 and XXXIII, 36, c. 198-99, P.L. 
V.44; De Natura Boni IV; P.L. V.42, c.553. 

That there are intimate connections between 
the true, the good, and the beautiful which 
are distinct but not separate is often readily- 
seen by the artist, the poet Baudelaire, for 
example, having given expression on more than 
one occasion to the correspondences which at 
the same time do not confound the differences, 
e.g. the following: 

!• Intellect pure vise a la Verlte, le Gout 
nous montre la Beaute, et le Sens Moral nous 

enseigne le Devoir Aussi ce qui ex- 

aspere surtout I'homme de gout dans le 


NOTES (Continued) 

38 (Cont'd.) 

spectaole du vice, c'est sa difformite, 
sa disproportion. Le vice ports attelnte 
au juste et au vrai, revolts 1 'intellect 
et la conscience; mais comme outrage a 
I'harmonie, comme dissonance, il blessera 
plus particulieremen de certains esprits 
poetiques; et je ne crois pas qu'il soit 
scandilasant de considerer toute infraction 
a la morale, au beau moral, comrae une espece 
de faute contre le rythrae et la prosodie 
universel?" /preface to Histoires extra- 
ordinaire d'Kd^ar Poe.) 

It would be interesting to show how close 
Baudelaire is in some of his main aesthetic 
insights to St. Au^justine's aesthetic 
thought for on many important points there 

is a surprising agreement, v.g. " La 

passion frenetique de I'art est un chancre 
qui devore le rests; et, comme 1 'absence 
netted du juste et du vrai dans I'art equi- 
vaut a 1 'absence d'art, I'homrae entier 
e'evanouit; la specialisation excessive d'une 
faculte aboutit au neant. Je comprend les 
fureurs desiconoclasts et des musulmans 
contre les images. J'admet les remords de 
saint Augustin sur le trop grand plaisir des 
yeux. Le danger est si grand que j 'excuse 
la suppression de 1 'object. La folie de 
I'art est egal a I'abus de 1 'esprit. La 
creation d'une de ces deux suprematiees 
engendre la sottise, la durete du coeur, 
et une iiiunensite d'orgeuil et d'egoisme. . . . " 
(L'Art romantique.) 

And how Augustinian is the following from 

"c'est oet imiaortel instinct du beau qui 
nous fait considerer la terre et ses spec- 
tacles comrae un apercu, comme une corres- 
pondence du ciel. La soif insatiable de 


NOTES (Continued) 

38 (Cont'd.) 

tout ce qui est au dela, et que revele la 
vi est la preuve la plus vivante de notre 
immortalite. C'est a la fois par la 
poesie et a travers la poesie, par et a 
travers la musique, que I'arae entrevoit 
les splendours situee derriere la tomboauj 
et quand un poerae ex^uis amene les larmes 
au bord des yeux, ces larmes ne sont pas la 
preuve d*\in exces de jouissanco, elle sont 
bien bien plutot le temoina^e d'une melan- 
cholie irrite, d'une postulation de nerfs, 
d'une nature exilee dans I'iraparfait et 
qui voudrait s'emparer imxnediatement , sur 
cette terre meme, d'une paradis revele." 
L'Art romantique (preface Nouvelles His- 
toires Extraordinaire), this passage is 
inspired by Edgar Allan Poe's The Poetic 
Principle, who here touches on one of the 
dynamic themes of St. Augustine's aesthetic 
thought . 

No special work has been written on the 
influence of St. Augustine on Baudelaire's 
aesthetic thought but valuable indications 
can be found on the catholic inspiration of 
Baudelaire in Stanislas Furaet's "Notre 
Baudelaire", Paris, 1926. See also the 
many references to Baudelaire in Jacques 
Maritain's "Art et Scolastiquey Paris, 1927. 



— oOo — 




In the vital encounter between 
man and the object in the aesthetic experience, 
both what constitutes the aesthetic entity and 
the nature of nan had to be taken into account; 
and now that these have been considered the 
aesthetic judt^raent can be investigated. The 
dynamism of the aesthetic jud^paent will ai^ain 
manifest the polarity of St, Autjuatine's 
dialectic. familiar by now, which alv/ays 
starts from the exterior, passos into the 
interior, and thence on to God, the basic 
poles energising this dialectic being the 
object* man, and God. If man leans to the 
exterior, the very forms of exterior things 
bringal him back within, and the approval or 
disapproval of objects perceived by the 
senses already supposes the laws of beauty 


to which whatever beauty seen in the external 
world is referred. Enquiring why the beauty 
of terrestrial or celestial bodies is admired, 
and what supports the mind in judjin^ correctly 
of mutable thin^js, "this should be thus; this 
not", and seeking to know how such a jud^^ment 
is pronounced, man discovers above his chan^e- 
able mind unchanseable truth. ** Beauty is not 
only perceived but judged, and the dynamism 
implied in every true aesthetic judgment is 

such that it is no exat^eration to say that 

by beauty man is bom up to God; for given 

any aesthetic object ^without divine 

lllurainution true judgment cannot be pro- 

noiincod on ar^y aspect of it whether it be 

its nuinber, foz*m, unity, harmony, proportion, 

equality, symmetry, likeness^ j^^ order, or 

the shining out of all these intelligibles 

togetirier in beauty. 

In an earlier chapter It 

was remarked that there is an eiapirical 


judgnent of sense in its acceptance or 
rejection of objects which please or die- 
please, but this awareness of pleasure or 
displeasure can hardly be called a judgment 
proper for what is perceived throu/ih the 
senses is properly jud,jod by the mind. Sense 
has a kind of direct judgment of sensible 
beauty in its acceptance of agreeable colours 
or sounds and its rejection of those which 
are disagreeable, but the jud/?nent proper of 
the pleasure or displeasure experienced by 
sense belongs to the mind. Sight and hearing, 
the hiijhest senses, are capable of this sensible 
judgment because their objects are more 
saturated with reason than are those in which 
the other senses take pleasure; and these two 
hiijher senses excel all the others not only 
because their objects manifest greater 
imprints of reason but also because unlike 
the other senses sight and hearing are able 



to grasp their objects as a whole. IJiany 

animals. Tor that matter, have more perfect 

senses than man, but man alone possesses 

reason which is above sense by the very 

fact that it judges not only the objects 

percelvfed throuL;h the senses but also the 

senses themselves. The jud^^nent of the 

mind evaluates the si^jnificance of the 

sensations empirically jud^jed by sense, 

Sound is jud^jed by the empirical jud^.aent 

of sense but tiiat which it si^^nifies is judged 

by the mind. Poetry, for example, is not only 

the harmonious and rhythmical flow of sensuous 

sounds pleasing the ears; in a poem the sounds 

signify meanin.^s which cannot be dissociated 

from the sound values. There is a distinction 

between sound and tliat which it signifies. 

Likewise the dance has a si^^iificance besides 

the rhythmical motions of the body which pleases 

not only the senses but through them the mind. 


All sensation, it will be recalled, is of 
the mind through the senses, and in tha 
aesthetic experience where the whole man, 
mind and senses^ is involved/ this is more 
especially seen. In the presence of the 
aesthetic object, a matter impre^jnated with 
intelli/jibility, althou^ the senses take 
pleasure in the objects proportioned to 
them, it is the mind which directly reads the 
intelli^iible without having recourse to 
abstraction as there is no problem of the 
passage from the sensible to the intelligible. 
Confronted with an aesthetic object permeated 
with ntunber, unity, order, nnd the other 
aesthetic constituents, the mind enjoys the 
radiant presence of the intelli^ibles which 
are ultimately derived from the intelliijibility 
of the Divine Ideas. V/ithout ai^ effort of 
abstraction or discursive work, the mind enjoys 
the intelligibles which it does not liave to 


dlsenga^e from matter* In its joyful 
contemplation of the object, the mind by 
intuition is flooded by the light of being 
in the ontoloijical illiimination of beauty. 
The appreciation of beauty is no syllOijistic 
process, but this Immediacy in no way makes 
the perception of* the beautii'ul irrational. 
The joyous apprehension of beauty is/^ cognitive 
experience, and it is essential to 
Investigate what kind of cof^nition Is expressed 
In the aesthetic judgment. 

In knowing; an object It is 
sufficient to know that it is in such a way 
and not another, but in appreciating an 
object something is added to bring out that 
it could have had other Ciiaracters as when 
it is said, this laust be this way, that 
should have been that way, or this must be 

otherwise, as artists uo in speaking of their 

works. The mind in knowing ascertains what 



is but in the judgment which goes beyond the 
Bimple ascertainment of what is the mind 
posits what things must be. Instead of 
simply ascertaining what things are as in 
knowing, the judgment implies that the thinfis 
could be otherwise and involves what things 
ou^t to be. In the truth of the judgment 
somethinii; is discovered which cannot be 
accouiited for either by the object or by 
the mind, and the problem arises whence comes 
this foiiaoal character of nectssity and 

universality in the jud.j;m6nt pronounced by 

, . 13a 

the mind« 

This note of jughtness or 
necessity may be disengaged by further 

questioninj the artisan who was already 


interrogated in a preceding cliapter. The 

artifex who has constructed similar arches on 
the corresponding sides of a building because 
in so making them he finds them agreeable. 


beautiful, when asked whether these are 
beautiful because they please us or whether 
they please us hecrtuse they are beautiful 
answered that these objects please us because 
they are beautiful. So certain of the 
objectivity of beauty, the artifex will be 
embarrassed, however, in being asked why 
these objacts are beautiful and he can be 
helped by having it pointed out to hiia that 
the phrte are v;ell proportioned aixi that all 
the details have been harmoniously worked 
into unity. The artifex, it will be remembered, 
will adroit that no object, beautiful as it may 
be completely realizes perfect unity. But where 
has he seen this complete unity never attained 
by things for without the perception of perfect 
unity how can he know how far each body 
approaches or how far removed it is from this 
unity, 'Vhere has the artifex discovered this 
unity according to which he judges bodies, and 


whence cones the certitude of what this unity 
laust be. Statistical or empirical methods 
are of no avail, for no matter how groat the 
number of observations no one can deduce 
from what a thine is ^ that which it must be. 
The id6iil unity according to v/hich bodies are 
judfjed cannot be perceived by the senses 
because^ unlimited by space and time, it is 
present everywhere by its power and helps all 
who judtje no matter v?here the objects judged 
are found. 

In all the arts ^harmony which 
assures to each v?ork beauty and wholeness is 
lovea. Harmony in its turn seeks ecjuality 
and unity either in the likeness of equal 
parts or in the gradation of unequal partsi 
but who can show absolute exuality or likeness 
in bodies? Who after having well reflected 
will dare affirm that a body is truly one? Do 
not all bodies chan^^e either in aspect or 


poeition, and are they not all composed of 
parts each occupying its place and divided 
by space? Purthernore, time equality and 
likeness, primary ami absolute unity are not 
accessible to the eyes nor to any of the 
other senses but cones imder the regard of 
the mind. If those aesthetic constituents 
were not seen by the mind they would not be 
looked for in bodies, and unless known to 
the intelligence it could not be determined 

how far bodies fall short of them or 


approach them. 

The sensible beauty produced 
by nature or art cannot be conceived without 
space and time, but equality, unity, and so 
forth, which are neither extended in space 
or changing in time reveal themselves to the 
mind which judges all corporeal beauty 
throuf;h the senses. The same unchanging unity, 
or equality, serves for the appreciation of the 
roundness of a wheel as it does for that of a 


vase or coin, and the equality of the years 
is judged as well as that of months, days, 
and atill shorter intervals. If the same 
law of equality, likeness, and harmony makes 
possible judgments of greater or lesser foims 
and movements, then assuredly this law is 
above everythine judged throu^ it. Ttiis 
law unrestricted by places or times, or by 
greater or lesser bodies is in itself neither 
greater or less: if it were greater it could 
not i:<ppreciate in its entirety that which 
is smaller; if it %erft lees that which is 
greater could not be judged by it. To 
appreciate the squareness of a public place, 
a stone, a p^intlixg, e jewel, the whole law 
of quadrature must be had in its entirety, 
and^ likewise/ the whole law of equality must 
be had to appreciate the harmony in the 
multiplied steps of a worm a>r the march of 
an elephant. The law is not only above all 


places and times, but is uncharii^eable; 
and as this law which presides over all the 
arts is unchangeable whereas the human mind 
capable of understanding it is exposed to 
variations of error it raust be concluded 

that this invariable law is above man's 

J i T -. • i '"^ 

The example of an arch 

seen at Carthatje offers a ijood illustration. 

It is only natural that the raind should have 

an idea of the arch^ aeon at Cartliage^ but 

tiiat this beautiful arch should please and 

be judijed beautiful cannot be explained by 

experience alone. Something else raust be 

seen by the mind according to which the work 

of art pleases iind according to vrhich it would 

be corrected v/ero it to displease. In judging 

beautiful things, the mind in intuition grasps 

by simple intelligence the unspeakably beautiful 

forms seen in the eternal form of truth. 


Without the possession of 
these superior forms unlimited by space or 
time, the mind could not jud^^e any corporeal 
beauty whatsoever. Some minds judge better 
than others; cleverer, more skilled, and 
better practiced people judge better than 
slow, tinskllful, and vinpractlced perons and 
even the same person judges better after 
having gained more experience. All this shows 
that the mind Is mutable since that which Is 
capable of more or less Is certainly mutable. 
It also shows, as able men who have thought 
deeply on these matters recognize, that these 
forms are not to be found In the things whose 

forms are chan,,'eable, but In a first fona upon 

which all forms depend. 

The mind which Is variable Is 

submitted to the Immutable and necessary 

regulative ideas, and the Immediate intuition 

of these forms is called illiuainatlon. In the 


oase of images of thin^js corporeal which 
are drawn in throiagh the bodily sense and 
in some way infused into the memory, as well 
as that of things which have not been seen 
but imai^ined, there is acceptance or rejection 
within ourselves by norms which remain 
altogether unchan^^eable above our minds when 
we approve or reject anything rightly, i/hen 
the mind recalls the walls of Carthage which 
have been seen or ttxe walls of Alexandria which 
have not been seen but imagined, and prefering 

this to that among forms makes a preference, the 

judgment rests firmly upon indestructible rules. 

Some ideas auch as number, 

likeness, unity, equality, beauty, e^e, , not 

having a sensible origin nor being innate must 

be given thi^ough divine illumination which is 

the action of the divine ideas on the mind. 

The immediate action of the divine ideas, it 

has already been observed, does not imply any 


ontolo^lsm because It Is essentially regulative 
and does not carry with it any content. These 
regulative Ideas or norms do not pass into the 
mind of man all made, but act as an unchangeable 
law which binds his intellect under its proper 
necessity. The divine Illumination does not 
dispense with the role of the senses, nor is 
it concerned with the formation of the concept 
which can be explained by experience. The 
concept presents what a thing is, but the 
judgment involves what must be, and what a 
thing must be cannot be deduced from what is. 
Sensible unity can be known without any diffi- 
culty throu^^ sensation and the mind, but to 
say what intelligible unity must be requires 
an illumination without which no judgment 
would be possible. The normative and directive 
ideas given in immediate intuition are impressed 
on the mind by divine illumination. The 
illuminative presence of the invariable law of 


a.nd ^° ) 

equality, \inity, «^, called also the law 
of truth, makes possible the truth of the 
aesthetic jud^iinent and ^jives it its objective 
character of necessity and universal validity. 
Vifhat the mind sees in the natural light of 
the illumination is the necessary truth of 
its judisment. This necessity does not come 
from things or the mind but from a source 
higher than the mind which can only be 
explained by divine illumination* In the 
light of imnutable truth the mind judges, 
and its judgment has the characters of 
oughtness and necessity. 

The mind judges beautiful 
things according to a law which it does not 
judge, and consequently it can be said that 
the equality, likeness, unity, proportion, 
harmonji and order, in the aesthetic object 
please but it cannot be said ultimately why 
the mind is pleased by these aesthetic 


constituents. The mind is iHurainated by 
sovereign equality, unity, order, etc. and 
objects appear so much the more perfect in 
so far as they approach or recede from the 
illuminative norms which in the last analysis 
are the ultimate grounds of the aesthetic 
judgment, the eternal and unchanging norms 
above the mind throu^^h which lovers of beauty 
judge beautiful objects. The variable mind 
judges the beauty of all things according to 
an invariable law and by this very fact the 
mind is superior to all that it judges but is 
inferior to the regulative ideas throtigh whidi 
it judges. All minds are submitted to this 
same law, model, these directive ideas, norms, 
or by whatever name it is called, which can be 
known more or less according to the strength 
of their illuminative presence to the mind and 
the degree in which the mind possesses them, 
but never is it granted to the mind to judge 


that by which it judges all thintjs and without 
which it could not jud^e in any manner whatso- 
ever. God Himself does not jud^^e this law but 
jud^jes everything throu^^h it, the Law of all 

the arts* and the Art of the all-powerful 

artist. Unchanging Truth and Primary '.Visdom. 

The spiritual man Identifies himself as far 

as possible with the law which directs his 

judgment, throxogh «*iich he judges everything 

without himself being judged. There can be 

a progressive advance in the seeing of the 

divine ideas by the purified eye of the soul. 

When the spiritual man comprehends with 

intelligence and loves perfectly that which 

is comprehended without error, he is with God 

Who is perfect unity, likeness, harmony, order, 

e-t«-. The pure soul, in proportion as it is 

united to God through love, will be flooded 

with intelligible light through which it sees, 

not by bodily vision but by the Intelligence 


which Is as it were its interior eye, the 
regulative ideas, the unchanging forme of 

things, and in contemplating them will taste 

great joy. This intelligible light is not 

manifest to the bodily eyes nor to the sight 
arrested by vain phantoms brought in by the 
eyes, but to the mind. The mind can say to 
all these images, it is not you that I seek 
nor do I judge throu^ you^ I condemn all 
that I find deformed in you and find agree- 
ment in the beauty that I encounter because 

that which directs in me blame and piraise 


surpasses all beauty on earth or in heaven. 

The human mind which judges all visible and 
audible things knows that it is worth more 
than all that it Juclges, but at the same time, 
recognizing its niutability by reason of its 
progrt ss and regress in the ways of wisdom, 
it finds above itself an iranutable truth to 
which it can attach itself. ^^ Through the 

-2 so- 

external beauty which it judges, the mind 
discovers v/ithin itself the Architect who 
resides within, and when the soul has intro- 
duced into itself rule, order, harmony and 
beauty it can dare to attempt the contemplation 
of God» V/hat purity there v)ill/|be in the soul 
tb^ what beauty, force, serenity, joy^ All 
that can be said is that man has been promised 
to see that Beauty through whose participation 
In varying degrees all beautiful thin^ have 

n 25 

beauty, the Source of all beauty and form. 
The contemplation of Supreme Beauty calls for 
the supernatural illumination of grace/ through 
which man is raised above the whole natural 
order and receives his deepest fruition. 

What is true of participated 
beauty is likewise true of truth if it is 
considered in its being aspect. If being is 
considered ontolo.-^ically it can be said that 
things are in so far as they are true< and all 
things which exist by virtue of the txnith 


essential to them participate in Tz*uth Itself, 

and have more or less being in the degree that 

they possess more or less truth. If all 

beings are true in so far as they have being 

how does it happen that we are led into error 

by them? Bodies do not deceive us either 

intentionally or unintentionally, and all 

things show the form which they have received 

according to their degrees of beauty. Bodies 

do not realize completely the lanity they seek 

to imitate, and so Impressed is this idea of 

unity in us that we approve of things which 

retain some traces of unity and reject those 

things so far removed troa it that their unity 

is destroyed. Falsity in creatures does not 

come from their imitating unity, but frcm the 

fact that they do not completely conform to 

perfect unity. Bven though objects do not 

realize completely the iinity which keeps them 

in being and truth, error comes not from the 


belngAbeauty they posses?, but from positing 
that which they are not, A body, for example, 
is a true body but a false unity. No body 
could exist if it did not have some unity 

impressed on it by Supreme Unity in the light 

of which all aesthetic objects are judged. 

If truth consists in seeing what is, and 

falsity in believing in that which is not, 

then the judgment will be true if objects are 

given what is their due according to the degree 

of being and beauty they possess. Error is 

in the judgment when it is of a part only and 
not of the whole object. Thus a man seeing an 
imperfect part and not the whole to whose beauty 
it contributes would err in his judgment by pro- 
nouncing the object ugly, or conversely in 
regarding a beautiful part of an ugly object he 

would err in &is judgment were he to pronounce 

the object as a whole beautiful. Error 

neither comes from things ^or from the senses 

which present^ them to the mind, but from the 


mlnd when it ne^^lects Truth Itself in its 
search of the true, preferrin^;^ as it were^ 

the work of art to the make r^ and mistaking 

the work for art itself. As self-subsistent 

likeness accounted for likeness-things^ so 

self-subsistent Ti-uth render all things true. 

Things are true in so far as they have being* 

and their being is proportioned to their 

likeness with Perfect Likeness, Equality, 

Unity, the Uni4ue model of all that is and 

differing in no way from the Supreme 

Principle, hence Absolute Truth, and the 

form of all that is true. 

Measure, form, and order are 

said to be bad when they are inferior to 

that which they should be, or when they are 

applied to objects where they do not agree, 

oriapplied inharmoniously. These may appear 

bad by comparison with more beautiful or more 

proportioned forms, or more ordered objects. 


In particular works? of art there should be 

an adequation between its own form and matter. 
Such a work of art fshould confoiro to the truth 
of its own nature, and the true jud^jment 
should express the measure in which this has 
been achieved. Each individual thing has 
its own idea or archetype in the Divine Mind, 
and the oughtness expressed in the judgment 
does not mean conformity to any ideal what- 
soever not in line with the being of the 
particular thing, but an oughtness which 
is in direct relation to the isness of the 
particular vtoik. 



Q,uoquo enim te veteris, vestigiis ciulbus- 
dam, quae operibus suis impress! t, 
loquitur tibi, et te in exteriora 
relabentem, ipsis exteriorum formis intro 
revocat; ut quidquid te delectat in 
corpore, et per corporeos illicit sensus, 
videas esse nuraerosum, et quaeras unde 
sit, et in teipsum redeas, atque intell«gas 
te id quod attirjf^is st.nsibus corporis, 
probare aut iraprobare non posse, nisi apud 
te habeas quasdara pulchritudinis leges, ad 
quas referas quaeque pulchra sentis 
exterius. De Liber Arbitrio,II,XVI,41; 
P.L. V.32, c.1263. 

Quaerens enim unde apjDrobarem pulchritudinem 
cojporum, sive coelest^m, sive terrestrium; 
et quid mihi praesto esset integre de 
mutabilibus judicanti et dicenti: Hoc ita 
esse debfet, illud non ita; hoo ergo 
quaerens unde judicarem, cura ita judicarem, 
inveneram incommutabilem et veram veritatis 
aetemitatem, supra mentem meam commutabilem. 
Confessiontim,VII,XVII,23; P.L. V.32, c.745. 

....sed rapiebar ad te decore tuo. . . .op.cit. 

The ascent of the soul through beauty ends 
in the mystical experience so beautifully 
described by Augustine in this chapter of 
the Confessions. For a good discussion of 
St. Augustine's mystical experience see 
Dom Abbot Butler, Western Mysticism, Ch.i 
p. and E.I. Watkin's The Mysticism of St. 
Augustine, ia A Monument to St. Augustine, 
pp. 105 ff. 


NOffES (Continued) 

Sed non noverunt viam, Verbtim tuum, per 
quod fecisti ea quae numerant, et ipsos 
:iui numerant, et sensura quo cernunt quae 
numerant, et raenten de qua numerant.... 
Gonfessionum V,HI,5; P.L. V.32, c,708. 




See Chapter I, pp. 2/ ; a-^so j.« */» zi.,p i'"?- 

SensilDle ju(?.snient is attributed to sight 
and hearing (De Ordine II, XI, 32, 34; XIV, 
39; De ^uantitate Anlmae XXXIII, 71; De 
Musica VI, 11,3; V,10; XII I, 38) and reason 
judges what Is perceived through the senses 
(De Mus., IV,X^/I,32; 34; V,I,1; VI, V, 6; 
VI, VII 1, 20). 

De Libero Arbitrio, II, VII, 16-19; II, XIV, 
38; P.L. V.32, col. 1249-1251; col. 1251-62. 

See Chapter :r,p^t-^-'- '^-'» -*.«<'. 5r, p 7,. 

At ista potontissima secernendi cito vidit 
quid inter sonum ©t id cujus signum esset, 
d'istaret, De Ordine, XIV, 39; P.L. v.32; c. 

Aliud ergo sensus, aliud per sensum: nam 
sensum raulcet pulcher motus; per sensum 
autem animum soliim pulchra in motu 
significatio. Hoc etlara in auribus 
facilius advertitur: nam quidauid jucunde 
sonat, illud llbet, atoue ipsvim audi turn 
Illicit; quod tiutem per eumden sonum bene 
signif icatur, nuntio quidem auriutn, sed ad 
solam laentem refertur. op.cit.34, o.lOll. 


NOTES (Continued) 

9 (. Cont'd) 

Some contemporary writers such as James 
Joycj, ejr'.pe.cially in his later "',Vork in 
Progress" appearing in "Transition", 
Gertrude Stein, etc., deliborattly seek 
this dissociation between the sound and 
meaning v:.-)lue of a word, and hj thus 
ridding words of their associations seek 
to obtain gr'^ater freedom and purity in 
their abstract plastic word patterns; 
hence the charge of the cult of the 
tinintelli,'xib].a brought against them. 
T.S. 31iot in his interesting essay on 
Swinburne in The Sacred Wood, London, 
1528, shows the defects of such a 
dissociation even in poetry. 


"En reallte, il n'y a pas choz Augustin 
de probleme de I'Umsetaung du sensible 
en intelligible; s*il ne I'a pas reeolu, 
c'est parcequ*il n*avait pas a le poser, 
et vouloir qu'il le resolve ce n'est pas 
combler une lac\Ane de sa doctrine, mais 
la transformer en une autre quo I'on prend 
par la meme la responsibilite de lui 
imposer.^' Gilson, Introduction a L'Etude 
de St. Augustin, p. 116. Boyer and others, 
as Gilson points out, have tried to impose 
this problem on St. Augustine and in this 
way have misunderstood his doctrine of 
illumination, see notes 1, 2, & 3, pp. 115- 
116 of this same work for the discussion 
of contrary interpretations. 


NOTES (Continued) 

^^ The sharpest line of cleavage, W. 

tt. T. Stace rightly notes isiCThe Mealing 
of Beauty, A Theory of Aesthetics, London 
1929,) divides different philosophex'S on 
whether or not and in what way thought 
enters into the aesthetic experience. 
After rejecting the claims of many 
intuit ions 1, aio:;ic&l, and irrational 
tendencies in aesthetics as unsatisfactory 
- and shov^ing that the appi^hi.nslon of beauty 
is cognitive in character, an apprehension 
accouprinied by emotion aroufieti in contem- 
plating the beautiful, 'fe« ^Jff 6 rs his own 
tlieory of empirical non-p<ircc<ptual concepts 
upon which he bases the validity of the 
aesthetic judgnoni. Unlike Stace for whom 
intuition excludes rationality, aesthetic 
contemplation for- Augustine, it will be 
seen, is both intuitive and intellectualist 
t*t thu Btone time. 



Hoc autom mtereot, Cj.uod ad cognos^endum 
satis est ut videamus ita ssna r.liquid 
vel iion ita: ad judicunduzn vero aadiraus 
aliquid quo significeraus posse es^ et 
aliter; velut cum dicimust Ita esse debet, 
aut, ita esse debuit, aut, ita esse debebit; 
ut in suis op&ribus artifices faciunt. De 
Vera Religione, XXXI, 58; P.L. Y.3A, o.l48. 

Ti\e universt-lity is not subjective as Kant 
taught in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, 
(EnA. trs.nslfr.tion by Meredith, Ik. I, Analytic 
of the Beautiful, Second Mibment, No. 8, pp. 
53, ff.) but objective. Furthermore it should 


NQTES (Continued) 

13a (Cont'd) 

be noted that alt/icufe^h no mention is 
made by Au^^ustine of the concept, for 
his doctrine of illi;imiiiation is con corned 
with another problem — not the formation of 
the concept but tha notes of ncccsbity and 
immutability of the judgment — this does 
not lesLion in any May the essential relation 
of bsauty to the intclliijence. The 
. intuition which explaixis the aesthetic 
judgment is intclloctual, and in this too 
we arc Tar r^'om the subjectivi^jE of 
Benedetto Croce*s aesthetic for whom the 
beautiful does not beloii^i to thii;^^^. 
(Aesthetic, Ene^. trans, by Douglas Ainslie, 
p. 159). 



See Chapter II, pp. ^7 the text on which 

Ihis is i:.asad is in the De Vara Rellgionej 
XXXII, 59; P.L. Y.34, C.148. 

Q,nod cix»3 itn esse coraijererit, interrogabo 
utrijim hanc ipsam unitatem, quam convinc- 
untur appetere, sumrae iripleant. , an longe 
infra jaceant, et earn quodammodo 
raentiantur c^uod si i ta est (m;m quls non 
admonitus videat, neque ullam speciem, 
neque ullum onnino e-jse corpus quod non 
habeat unitatis qualecuraque vestigium; 
neque quantumvis pulcherrimma cox-pus, cum 
intervallis locorum necensario aliud 
fllibi habeat, possfc assequi earn quam sequitur 
unitatem?): quare si hoc ita est, flagitabo 
ut respondeat j ubi videatiipse unitatem hanc, 
aut unde videat: "iiam si non vLderet, unde 


NOTES (Continued) 

14 (cont'd. ) 

oognosceret et quid imitaretur corporum 
species, et quid implere non posset? Nunc 
vero cum dicit corporibus. Vos quidem nisi 
aliqua unites contineret, nihil essetis, sed 
rursus si vos essetis ipsa unitas, corpora 
non essetis; recta illi dicitur. Undt illam 
nosti unitatem, secundum quam judicas corpora, 
quam nisi videris, judicare non posses quod 
earn non impleat: si autem his kA-s corporeis 
oculis^Avideres, non vere diceres, quanquam 
ejus vestigio teneantur, longe tamen ab ea 
distare? nam istis oculis corporeis non nisi 
corporalia vides: mente igitur earn videmus, 
Sed ubi videmus? Si hoc loco esset ubi 
corpus nostrum est, non earn videret qui hoc 
modo in Orient e de corporibus judicat. Non 
ergo ista continetur loco; et cum adest ubi- 
cumque judicanti, nusquam est per spatia 
locorum, et per pot en ti am nusquam non est. 
op. cit* n.60, C.149. 


Sed cum in omnibus artibus convenient ia 
placeat, qua una salva et pulchra sunt omnia; 
ipsa vero convenientia aequalitatem unitatem- 
que appetat, vel similitudine pariiim partium, 
vel gradatione disparium: quis est qui summam 
aequalitatem vel similitudinem in corporibus 
inveniat, audeatque dicere, cum diligenter 
consideraverit quodlibet corpus vere ac sim- 
pliciter unum esse; cxim omnia vel de specie 
in speciera, vel de loco in lociim transeundo 
rautentur, et partibus constent sua loca ob- 
tinentibus, per quae in spatia diversa divi- 
duntur? Porro ipsa vera aequalitas ac sim- 
ilitudo, atque ipsa vera et prima unitas, 
non oculis carneis, neque ullo tali sensu, 
sed mente intellecta conspicitur. Unde enim 


NOTES (Continued) 

16 (Cont'd.) 

qualiscumque in corporibus appeteretur 
aequalitas, aut unde convinceretur, longe 
plurimiun differe a perfecta, nisi ea quae 
perfecta est, mente videretur? si tamen 
quae facta non est, perfecta dicenda est. 
De Vera Religione, XXX, 65; P.L. V.34, 


Et cum omnia quae sensibiliter pulchra 
sunt, sive natura edita, sive artibus ela- 
borata, locis et temporibus sint pulchra, 
ut corpus et corporis motus; ilia aequalitas 
et unitas raenti tanti-uiimodo cognita, secundum 
quam de corpoi^a pulchritudine sensu inter- 
nuntio judicatur, nee loco tiimida est, nee 
instabilis tempore. Non enim recte dici 
potest secundum earn judieari rotundiim cant- 
hum, et non secundum earn rotundum vasculum; 
aut secundum earn rotuddum vasculum, et non 
secundum earn rotiondum denarium. Similiter 
in temporibus atque in motibus corporum, 
ridicule dicitur secundum eam judicare 
aequales annos, et non secundum eam aequales 
menses; aut secundum eam aequales dies. Sed 
sive per haec spatia, sive per horas, sive 
per breviora momenta conveni enter moveatur 
aliquid, eadem una et incommutabili aequali- 
tate judicatur. Quod si minora et majora 
spatia figurainim atque motionum secundum 
earadem legem parilitatis, vel similitudinis, 
vel congruentiae judicantur, ipsa lex major 
est his omnibus, sed potentia. Gaeterum 
spatio aut loci aut temporis, nee major nee 
minor: quia si major asset, non secundum 
totam judicaremus minora; si autem minor 
esset, non secundum eam judicaremus majora. 
Niinc vero cum secundum totam quadrature 



NOTES (Continued) 

16 (Cont'd.) 

legem judicetur et forum quadratum, et 
lapis quadra tus, et tabella et gemma 
quadrata; rursus secundum totam aequali- 
tatis legem judicentur convenire sibi motus 
pedum current is formicae, et secundum earn 
gradientis elephanti: quis eam dubitet 
locorura intervallis ac temporum, nee maj- 
orem esse, nee rainorein, cum potentia sup- 
eret omnia? Haec autem lex omnium artium 
cum sit sit omnino incomrautabilis, mens 
vero humana cui talem legem videre con- 
cessum est, mutabilitatem pati possit 
erroris, satis apparet supra mentem nostra 
esse legem, quae Veritas dicitur. De Vera 
Religione XXX, 56; P.L. V.34, c. 146-47. 


Item cum arcum pulchre ac aequabiliter in- 
tortum, quem vidi, verbi gratia, Carthagine, 
animo revolvo, res. quaedam menti nuntiata 
per oculos, meraor6aeque transfusa, imagin- 
arium conspectum facit. Sed aliud mente 
conspicio, secundum quod raihi opus illud 
placet; unde etiam, si displiceret, corri- 
gem. Itaque de istis secundiim illam judi- 
camus, et illam cernimus rational is mentis 

Ista vero aut praesentia sensu corporis 
tangimus, aut imagines absentium fixas in 
memoria recordamur, aut ex earura similitu- 
dine talia fingimus, qualia nos ipsi, si 
vellemus atque possumus, etiam opere raoli- 
remur: aliter figurantes animo imagines 
corporum, aut per corpus corpora videntes; 
aliter autem rationes artemque ineffabiliter 
pulchram taliiim figurarum super aciem mentis 
simplici intelligentia capientes. De Trini- 
tate, IX, VI, 11; P.L. V.42, c.967. 


NQTES (Continued) 



Nulla est enim pulchritudo corporal is, 
sive in statu corporis, sicut est fi^ra, 
sive in motu, sicut est cantilena, de qua 
non animus judicet. (^uod prof ec to non 
posset, nisi melior in illo esset haec 
species, sine tumore raolis, sine strepitu 
vocis, sine spatio vel loci vel temporis. 
Sed ibi quoque nisi rautabilis esset, non 
alius alio melius de specie sensibili 
judicaret: melius ingeniosior quam tardior, 
melius peritior quam imperitior, melius 
exercitatior quam minus exercitatus, et 
idem ipse unus cum proficit, melius utique 
posteaquam prius. Quod autem recipit magis 
et minus, sine dubitatione mutabile est. 
Unde ingeniosi et doctl et in his exerci- 
tati homines facile collagerunt, non esse 
in eis rebus primam speciem, ubi mutabilis 
esse convincitur. Cum igitur in eorum con- 
spectu 6t corpus et animus ma^is minusque 
speciosa assent, et si orani specie carere 
possent, omnino nulla essent, viderunt 
esse aliquid ubi prima esset et incommu- 
tabilis, et ideo nee comparabllis : atque 
ibi esse rerura principium rectissime credi- 
derunt, quod factum non esset, et ex quo 
facta cuncta essent. De Givitate Dei, 
VIII, VI; P.L. V.41, c. 231-32. 

Nam et cum reeolo Oarthaginis moenia quae 
vidi, et cum fingo Alexandriae quae non 
vidi, easdemque iraaginarias formas quasdam 
quibusdam praeferens, rationabiliter prae- 
fero; viget et claret desuper judicium 
veritatis, ac sui juris incorrupt issimis 
regulis fiiwum est: et si corporalium ima- 
ginum quasi quodara nubilo subtexitur, non 


NOTES (Continued) 

19 (Cont'd. ) 

taraen involvitur atque confunditur. De 
Trinitate, IX, VI, 10; P.L. V.42, c.966. 



Nee jam illud ambigendum est, inconmu- 
tabilem naturara, quae supra rationalem 
animam sit, Deum esse; et ibi esse primam 
vitam et priinara essentiam, ubi est prima 
sapientia. Nam haec est ilia incomrau- 
tabilis Veritas, quae lux omniuia artium 
recte dicitur, et ars omnipotens artificis. 
Itaque cum se anima sentlat nee corporum 
speciem motumque judicare secundum seipsam, 
simul opportet agnoscat praestare suam 
naturam ei naturae de qua judicat, praestare 
autem sibi earn naturam, secundum quam judi- 
cat, et de qua judicare nullo raodo potest. 
Possum enim dicere quare similia sibi ex 
utaque parte respondare membra cujusque 
corporis debeant; quia surama aqualitste 
delector, quam non oculis corporis, eed 
mentis contueor; qua propter tanto meliora 
esse judico quae oculis cerno, ouanto pro 
sua natura viciniora sunt iis quae aritno 
intelli.{p, Ouare autem ilia ita sint, 
nullus potest dicere: nee ita debere esse 
quisquam sobrie dixerit, quasi possint 
esse non ita. De Vera Religione, XXXI, 
57; P.L. V,34, c.147. 

Omnia enim quae appetunt unitatem, hanc 
habent regulam, vel forraam, vel exemplum, • 

V0l si quo alio verbo dici se sinit; 

spiritual is homo judicat omnia, ipso autem 
a neraine judicantur (I, Cor. ii, 15) id est 


NOTES (Continued) 

21 (Cont'd.) 

a nullo homine, sed a sola ipsa lege 
secundum quam judicat omnia; quoniam et 

illud verrisime dictum est 

Omnia ergo dicat, quia super omnia est, 
quando cum Deo est. Giim illo autem est, 
quando purissirae intelligit, et tota 

charitate, quod intelligit, diligit 

De Vera Religione, XXXI, 57; P.L. V.34, 


Anima vero negatur eas intueri posse, nisi 
rationalis, ea sui parte qua excellit, id 
est ipsa mente atque ratione, quasi quadam 
facie vel oculo suo interiore atque intelli- 
gibili. Et ea quidem ipsa rationalis anima 
non omnis et quaelibet, sed quae sancta et 
pura fuerit, haec asseritur illi visioni 
esse idonea: id ost, quae illvan ipsiim oculum 
quo videntur ista, sanum, ot sincei'um, et 
serenuiii, et similam his rebus quas videre 

intendit, habuerit, Sed anima 

rationalis inter eas res quae sunt a Deo 
conditae, omnia superat; et Deo proxima 
est, quando pura est; eique in quantum chari- 
tate cohaeserit, in tantum ab eo lumine illo 
intelligibili perfusa quodam modo et illus- 
trata cernit, non per corporeos oculos, sed 
per ipsius sui princlpale, quo excellit, id 
est per intelligentiam suajn, is tas ration es, 
quarum visione fit beatissii/ia. ^uas rationes, 
ut dictum est, sive ideas, sive formas, sive 
species, sive rationes licet vocare, et raultis 
conoeditur appelare quod libet, sed paucissi- 
mis videre quod vere est. De Biversis Quaesti- 
onibus LXXXIII, Q. XLI, 2; P.L. V.t), c. 30-31. 


NOTES (Continued) 


Quod his ooulis videri non potest; nee 
illis quibus phantasmata co/^itantur, per 
eosdem oculos animae irapacta; sed illis 
quibus ipsis phantasmatibus dicitur: Non 
estis vos quodVquaero, neque illud est is 
unde ego vos ordino; et quod mihi inter 
vos foedum occurrerit, iraprobo; quod 
pulchrum, approbo; cum pulchrius sit 
illud unde improbo et approbo: quare hoc 
ipsum magis approbo, et non solum vobis, 
ses illis omnibus corporibus unde vos 
hausi, antepono. De Vera Religione, 
XXXIX, 73; P.L. V.34, c.164. 




Mens enim humana de visibilibus judicans, 
potest agnoscere omnibus visibilibus se 
ipsam esse mellorem. "iuae tamen cum etiam 
se propter defectum profecturaque in sapi- 
entia fatetur esse, mutp.bilem invenit supra 
se esse incom^utabilem veritatem: atque ita 
adhaerens post ipsam, sicut dictum est, 
Adhaesit anima mea post te (Psal. LXXII, 9); 
beata efficitur, Intrinsfcits inveniens etiam 
omnium visibiliiim Creatorem atque Dominum. . . 
.... nisi ex eorum quae foris sunt pulchri- 
tudine, inveniatur artifex qui intus est, 
et prius in anina superiores, deinde in 
corpore inferiores pi^lchritudines opera tur. 
De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, 'i.XLV, 1; 
P.L. V.40, c. 28-29. 

Glim autem se composuerit et ordinaverit, ac 

concinnam pulchraraque reddlderit, audebit '''■^'''Z^"'^t^om'^> 

jam Deiim videre, atque ^Ipsumque Patrem Veri- "^Te rTm'^ 

tatis. Deus magne , qui erunt illi oculi.' 

quam sani, quam decori, quam valentes, quam 


NQTES (Continued) 

25 (Cont'd.) 

constantes, quam sereni, quam beatl.' , 

Nihil ampli)is dicam, nisi promitti nobis 
aspectuxn pulchritudinis, cujus imitatione 
pulchra cujus comparatione foe da sunt 
caetera. De Ordine , II, XIX, 51; P.L, 
V.32, 0.1019. 



Non ergo in hac pulchritudine quae ramus 
quod non accepit; quae ideo infiraa est, 
quia quod quaerimus, non accepit; et in eo 

quod accepit lauderaus Deum et unde 

speciem formamque accipiunt omnes locales 
tempo rale sque naturae. Ad quod videndum 
mundemus cor per fidem Domini nostri Jesu 

Christi Non enim eos oculos ad illud 

bonum cemendum praeparari oportet, quibus 
cernitur lux ista diffusa per locos, et 
non ubique Integra, sed aliam partem hie 
habens, et alibi aliam. Vfirum ilium as- 
pectum aciemque purgenus, qua cernitur, 
quantum in hac vita licet, quid sit justiom, 
quid pium, quae sit sapientiae pulchritudo: 
quae quis.iuis cemit, prf-jeponit longe omne 
localium spaticrum plenitudinl; et sentit, 
ut istc cemat, non per locorum spatia 
dif fundi aciera mentis suae, sed incorporea 
potentia stabiliri. Contra Epistolam Mani- 
chae, XIII, 48; P.L. V.42, c.206. 

D6 Immortalitate Aniraae, XII, 19; P.L. 
V.32. col. 1031. 



NOTES (Oontinued) 


Sed cul saltern illud raanifestum est, 
falsitatem esse, qua id putatur esse 
quod non est, intelliijit earn esse vcri- 
tatem quae ostendit id quod est. At si 
corpora in tantum fallunt, in quantum non 
impient illud untun quod convincuntur imi- 
tari, a quo Principio unura est quidquid est, 
ad cujus sirailitudinem quidquid nititur, 
naturaliter approbamus ; quia naturaliter 
improbamus quidquid aTajunitate discedit, 
atque in ejus dissimilitudinera tendit: 
datur intelligi esse aliquid, quod illius 
unius solius, a quo Principio unum est quid- 
quid aliquo modo unum est, ita simile sit 
ut hoc omnino impleat ac sit idipsum; et 
haec est Veritas et Verbum in Principio, 
et Verbum Daus apud Deum. Si enim falsitas 
ex lis est quae imitantur unum, non in 
quantum id imitantur, sed in quantum implere 
non possunt; ilia est Veritas quae id im- 
plere potuit, Gt id esse ^uod qu<i^ est illud; 
ipsa est quae illud ostendit sicut est: unde 
et Verbum ejus et Lux rectissiraa dicitur 
(Joan, 1, 9). Gaetera illius unius similia 
dici possunt in quantum sunt, in tantum enim 
et vera sunt: haec est autem ipsa ejus simi- 
litude, et idee Veritas. Ut anim veritate 
sunt vera, quae vera sunt; ita similitudine 
similia sunt, quaecumque similia sunt. Ut 
er^io Veritas forma vercrum est, ita simili- 
tudo forma similium est. l.uapropter vera 
quoniam in tantum vera sunt in quantiim sunt; 
in tantura autem sunt, in quantuva principalis 
uniu& similia 6unt: ea fowna est omnium quae 
sunt, quae est sum^iia similitudo Principii; 
et Veritas est, quia sine ulla dissimilitu- 
dine est. De Vera Rel., XIIXVL, 66; P.L. 
V.34, c. 151-52. 


NOTES (Continued) 




Non erQo sixnma quaeramus in infiiais, nee 
ipsis infimis inhaereamus. Judicenius ea, 
nee cum ipsis judicomur; id est» tantum 
fta, eis tribuamus, ciuantioiu species meretur 

extrema 3t si proptorea nos 

fall it rerun visibilliam pulchritudo, quia 
unitate continetur, et non |)mplet unitatem; 
intelligaraus si possxjmus, non ex eo quod 
est nos falli, sed ex eo quod non est. 
Onme quippe corpus verura corpus est, sed 
falsa unit as. Non enim sumrne un^oxa est, 
aut in tantum id imitatur ut impleat; et 
taRlen corpus ipsum esset, nisi utcumque 
unum esset. Porro utcumque unum esse non 
posset, nisi ab sunma unun est, id haberet. 
De Vera Rel., XXXIV, 63; P.L. V.34, c.l50. 
Haec enim phantasmata tumoris et volubili- 
tatis, constante'Ti unitatem vlderi non sin- 
unt.... op. cit. XXr/, 65; 3.151. 

Varum enim nostrum judioiom, sive de toto, 
sivQ de parte judioet, puichruia est: uni- 
voroo quippe niundo superfertur, nee ali^ui 
parti ejus, ia quantum veruiii judicamus, 
adhc*erGiiius. Srror autom noster parti ad- 
haerens ejus, ipse per se foetius est. De 
Vera Reliijione, ;:L, ?G; P.L. V.54, e.l56. 

Unde falsitas oritur, non rebus ipsis 
fallentibua, quae nihil aliud ostendunt 
sentient! quam spQcisrn suam, quam pro suae 
pulchrltudinis accGpoiimt gradu; neque 
ipsiG sensibuo fallentlbus, qui pro natura 
sui corporis affecti, non aliud quam suas 


YfOTFS (Continued) 

31 (Cont'd.) 

affectiones, praesidentl animo nuntiant; 
Bed peccata aniraas fallUnt, cum varum 
quaerunt» relicta et neglecta veritate. 
Nam quoniam opera magis quam artiflcem 
at.iue ipsam artem dilexerunt, hoc error e 
puniuntur, ut In operibue artificem artem- 
que conquirant; et cum invenire nequiverint 
(Deus enim non corporal Ibus sensibus sub- 
jacet, sed ipsi mentl supereminet ) , Ipsa 
opera existiment esse et artem et artificem. 
De Vera Religione, XXXVI, 67, P. I.. V.34, c. 



See note 28 of this chapter. 

De Natura Boni, XXIII; P.L. V.42, c.558, 
Of. note S§ of chapter II; -i- 



— oOo— 









Like the aesthetic judgment 
dealt with in the last chapter, art cannot 
be fully accounted for without the divine 
llluiaination in which, it will be shown, 
its perfection consists. The raind can be 
turned to the delightful contemplation of 
the divine ideas — and this is the state of 
wisdom proper— or it can tuiii to the world 
of sensible things and the order of action, 
but both the higher activity of contempla- 
tion and the activity subordinate to it 
are functions of the one mind in which the 
two are united as it were in a spiritual 
marriage. At the very core of cognitive 


activity a distinction is already found 
between knowledge for its own sake and know- 
led/^e for the sake of action. ??an can repose 
in the contemplation of the divine ideas or 
he can use this knowledge in view of some 
action or work to be made. In art, man tends 
to somethin^^ besides knowing for the sake of 
knowin^3, and how this takes place will be 
shown in the following investiijntion of the 
nature of art which^ starting from some ele- 
mentary considerations ^will be conducted 

TJuinerous materials are gathered 
together into a form and made into a house. 
The maker is worth wore than the thing made, 
and by the very fact that he is a maker, is of 
a hlijher nature^ for it would be absurd to pre- 
tend that works mnde are e iual to their makers. 
Thie swallow makes its nest^ and likewise the bee 
its honeycomb, and man is superior to them not 
as maker but because he is rational. If reason 


consists in observing hannonious propor- 
tions (and the very word ratio can mean 
either rejjson or proportion) are not right 
proportions found in that which is made by 
irrational creatures jand is not everything 
in their works exactly measured? birds and 
animals , in making, act with numbers, and man 
is superior to them not > acting with numbers^ 
but in knowing nurabers and all the configu- 
rations and forms which he can vary infinitely 
in the things he makes. But how explain the 
fact tiiat irrational beings can act with 
numbers without knoviing them. For that 
matter, many times man hliasalf acts with 
numbers unconsciously as in the movements 
he makes with iiis ton^jue against the teeth 
and pale tte in speaking and other such num- 
bered mfjvemcnts. Anijther example of this 
is the singer who although i.p^iorant of music, 


(obs6rves\by natural instinct and raemory»^rJ:vthm 


and melody in his singing. How, then, is 
the singer, who lacks a knowledt^e of music 
but acts ins tinctively^ superior and prefer- 
able to birds and animals? His superiority 
consists in his possessin,'^ self-consciousness 
which enables him to be aware of his acts, and 
aa a rational animal he is above creatures 
without reason. 

The nightingale whose song in 
the springtime is so harmonious and charming 
has no knowlod^^e of art, and like nightingales 
are those singers who ^guided by a !iind of 
instinct, sing with measure and cham yet have 
no knowledge of harmony, the scale of accented 
and unaccented soTJinds,^ Lil;ewise are those who 
without any truce of .knowledge take pleasure 
in hearing; these singers. Jo too, elephants, 
bears, and other aniraals execute cadenced move- 
ments to the soiAnd of music, and birds are 
intoxicated with tlieir own son^jSArendered so 


well by the attraction of pleasure. Like 
the birds in this respect are players of 
the flute, harp, or any other instrument 
who do not possess the iuiowlfcdije of their 
art but accomplish their effects no matter . 
how facile and acccxaplished the movements 
throu,jh raemory or clever imitation. Even 
thou,3h initations plays an important part 
in art, so much so that it is soraetines 
erroneously identified with it, tlie name 
of art cannot be ^^Iven to that wlalch is only 
an effect of imitation. Animals who have not 
the use of laniru^.c© ^2* reason are capable of 
imitation but cannot be said to liave art. 
Neither do the players of musical instruments 
possess art -jho ovjs thsir effects -co memory 
and imitation. Such players, consulting 
sanse only, reijuiate^ on the basis of the 
pleasures flattering the senses ;the material 
movements of their bodies to which they join 


a certain talent of imitation. Despite all 
the talent manifested by these virtuosi. they 
do not possess art unless they can see by the 
pure iijht of the intelli/,»ence the principles 
of art they make a show of interpretin;> Art 
depends on reason and cannot be confounded 
with imitation. Neither aniiuals who cannot 
proceed with reason yet are capable of imi- 
tation, nor the virtuosi lacking? in knowledge 
possess art whose ijenerativt pow«r is reason. 
Without reason there can be no art^and so 
much is art of the mind that in the seven 
Stages of the soul in its ascent to God art 
and reason are u&ed interohanijeably for the 
third stage in which reason invents archi- 
tecture, sculpture, painting?, poetry, tiusic, 
and all Vac other arts. Through the ima- 
gination has a considerable role in the 
en^^endering of a work of art by artists 
endowed with a rich sensibility, art as such 


Is primarily of the mind which leaves its 
visible impress upon the works in agreement 
with man's nature made to be joyfully con- 
templated. All the arts arise from reason 
whether it be those like architecture or 
sculpture whose object is the fashioning of 
permanent works, or those which today are 
not regarded as arts such as medicine, 
agriculture, or government which serve as 
InstruTients of the divine action, or those 

whose sole effect consists in action such 

as the dance, the race-track, and battles. 


No matter how various the arts they all 
depend on man's active intelligence, and 
so true is this that even a tight-rope 

walker has art if he has apprehended the 

principles of tight-rope walking. 

it is a matter of common 

observation that artisans are usually in- 

err.'int in their movements, v;hlle unskilled 


persons cannot succeed in carryings out 
these movements without oausini; lau^jhter, 
and this may be due not to a lack, of know- 
ledge but to a lack of practice and exercise. 
It is possible that a man Knowin^T the black- 
smith's craft in all its fulness yet at the 
same time lacking a well practiced hand may 
be capable of instructing; the most skilled 
artisaae and ijivin^^' then instructions sur- 
passing their intelli,j:enc9, and this would 
show that easse and ii^^htness of iiaad or 
oadenoed movements ixrc the reoult of habit 
ratlier than knowledi^e, for a better use of 
the iiands doet- not mean greater instruction 
or knowleotite of an nrt or cruft. Tl^-is 
obS6rvt.tion applies to the talent of the 
flute and harp players alTaded to already^ 
whose ability should be attributed to habit, 
daily practice and imitation rather than 
to know ledge. -^-^ Althou^jh bodily dexterity 


and suppleness nay be an extrinsic material 
condition, art as such is of the mind. The 
hand of the artist may fail, his instrument 
may have a flaw, or the matter which is being 
worked may be defective, but the defect in 
the result does not intrinsically affect 
art itself which is primarily of the intelli- 

The artisan, a carpenter for 

example, works his material with hatchet, 
saw, lathe, and polir.her so hb to make his 
work pleas iiii; by brin,:ine it to thr. per- 
fection of the rules of etrt. .'he artisan's 
art is in his mind whei-e it is noi-e beauti- 
ful than in the forms realised in the raat- 
eriuls, and wYuxi is realised exteriorly in 
the plearjinfi work is first set-n interiorly 
by the artistm in hie art.^^ Tlie maker of 
an arch first possesses tVie arch in his 
art accordinij to which he creates , and 


before passing; into matter where it exists 

visibly^ the work of art lives in the mind 

where it exists invisibly. Other arches 

can be made after its pattern when the ones 
already realized in matter crumble away and 
perish, for the arch eKistin^i in art or the 
mind does not cease to exist after a work 
has been achieved but remains in the living 
mind of the artist. Nor does living* art in 
the mind of the artist cease to exist when 
It is not actually exercised at a ^iven time, 
and so entirely is art of the mind that mind 
and art can be identified, and on this identi- 
fication is based one of the arguments for the 
immortality of the soul. If something is 
found to subsist in the soul which is immutable 
and presupposes life it will follow that the 
soul is immortal, for these propositions are so 
linked that one cannot be true without the other. 
Not to speak of other things, art can be found 


in the llvirii^ soul of the artist^ and this 

art, founded on the unchangeable relations 

of numbers^ is itself \inchan<jeable. ^Vhether 

art is defined as a collection of many reasons 

or is conceived as a single reason it follows 

none the less that art is unchangeable, and 

not only does art exist in the raind of the 

living artist even when it is not exercised, 

but it cannot be separated from the mind. If 

art were not in the living mind it would have 

to be either outside the raind, nowhere, or it 

would have to pass continually from one mind 

to another, but all these suppositions are 

untenable. Just as art cannot exist in a 

Hd- is 
lifeless bein^: so the soul has life/) united to 

reason. That which exists must exist some- 
where, and the unchangeable cannot cease to 
exist. Finally, if art were to pass from one 
soul to another by leaving one to reside in 
the other, it would follow that no one could 
transmit the knowledge of art without at the 


same time losin^j it, nor could art be re- 
ceived except on the condition that its 
transmittor lose it throufjh foryetfulness 

or death, but these conclusions would be 

absurd and false. 

Art which is founded on the 

unchanijeable relations of numbers is itself 

unchangeable, and the intellectual numbers 

contained in their art enables artists to 

develop the sensible numbers in time or 

space realized in their works. In a work 

of art, a poem for example, the syllables 

are heard one after another until the end 

Is reached, and in this way the form and 

beauty of the whole is achieved; but the 

art of creating verse is not subject to change ^ 

nor does its beauty have to develop successively. 

Art possesses simultaneously all its elements^ 

but this is not so of the verses composed by 

it which can only show the faint lineaments of 

the unchangeable beauty hidden in it. In the 


fu^jitlve verses, passinjj harmonies are born 
of endurln: harmonies, and passing niunbers 
realized sensibly are born of the durable 
numbers In the mind Initiated into art* The 
mind which is changeable cannot possess un- 
changeable art unless it were Illuminated 

from a source higher than itself. From 

what other source could the mind receive 
unchan<;eable principles if not from an 
eternal and unchanging being, the imnutable 
truth called with reason the Rule of all the 
arts and the Art of the all-powerful Artist, 
the Art of God. 

The mind , some times enlightened 
and sometimes ignorant, is certainly changeable, 
but the more enlightened it is sa-auteh the 
better is its judgment, and it is the more en- 
lightened in so far as it knows art better. 
Art is here taken in the strict sense and does 
not mean what popularly goes under that name, 
i.e. the memory of pleasing attempts crowned 


with success, nor does it mean the art 
tauijht by experience but that formed on 
reason. Indeed there is little value in 
knowing that cement holds stones itfrfrtexi to- 
gether more solidly than mud. The empirical 
knowledge that in building artistically cor- 
responding parts should be placed on each 

side and (i n the cent er) that which has no 
likenessiraore closely approaches reason and 
truth. It is of more importance to examine 
why sight is offended when two windows one 
larger and the other smaller are placed side 
by side especially if these could be of equal 
di aensions. Again, why is it that when one 
window is placed above the other the inequality 
is less shocking although the difference is 
Blii^t? Further, /vis there less concern about 
this inequality when there are only two windows 
whereas if there were three the eye would de- 
mand that they either be of equal dimensions 
or if unequal that the largest surpass the 


mlddle one as this latter svirpasses the 

smallest? Experience or habit does not 

furnish the answer to these questions^ for 

sensible harmonies or numbers never realize 

in the divisions of space or time perfect 

eciualityj likeness^ and unity, the simplest 

eaamination of the forms of bodies showing 

that it is impossible to find perfect pro- 

portion, or Jpiarmony. '..hen certain unchange- 
able truths of art are discovered either in 
reasonin<3 with ourselves or when interrogated 
by another these truths are found in the mind. 
Finding is not making or engendering, other- 
wise a changing mind would be creating un- 
changeable truths. V.hat indeed is more eter- 
nal than the relations of the circle or other 
unchangin,: truths of this kind. The SfcHje mind 
could not possess these universal and rational 
rules, these true relations and proportions of 
things^ if it were not illuminated from a source 
higher than itself, and like the aesthetic 


jud^ment art requires the divine illumina- 
tion. The mind subralttedAto the re^^ulative, 
archetypal forms in the divine mind in th e 
nog ^ic illtuainr.tion re^uires^ stil -1 further^ 
another light which will provide it with the 
rules of action. The mind must he illuminated 
in the order of action as well as in the order 
of knowintS, and the illumination of art is the 
IntCiiration of these two illiuainat ions which 
derive from one source but -are distini^uished 
from the xroint of view of the objects to which 
they apply. Before there can be action the 
mind must have kiiowledije, and so profound Is 
the identity of the essences of thin/js and the 
rules of action that rlt^ht action flows from 
true knowledge. As a being endowed with know- 
ledge, man receives a noetic illumination, and 
as a bein^: submitted to the necessity of action^ 
he receives still another illumination resting 
on the same metaphysical basis. Throu^jh this 
illumination the eternal natural law that all 


things be ordered is transcribed into his 

mind as it is imposed on the universe in 


general throiigh the physical illumination. 

The illumination in the order of action is the 
sufficient explanation for the necessary truths 
found within each mind^thou^^h not belonging 
exclusively to any one individual.^that equality 

should be maintained, the inferior should be 

submitted to the superior, and the unchanging 

rule |Which can be adapted to chan^jing and di- 
verse objects that everything be perfectly 
ordinated. The intersection or point of in- 
cidence of the two licjiits of the order of action 
and the noetic order is the illumination of art, 
and the mind enlightened by the combined lijhts 
of this two'^'old illximination is said to possess 
art. The necessary rules or laws which shine 
upon the intelligence are discovered and not 
created by the contingent raind, and this regu- 
lation of the intelligence carries with it an 

infallible rectitude. The infallibility of 


the illumination of art only pertains to the 
regulation of the mind by the unchanijin^ rules 
of the thin^^ to be made, and not to the artist 
who semetimes may even work against his art. 
The hand of the artist luay slip or the matter 
may be defective, but the moment the artist 
sees the rule and measure which he pronounces 
by a jud/jment of his intellect fitted to a 
given case there can be no error in his art. 

Considered in its strictest 
and most formal sense art consists in the 
rOijulation of the mind by the creative rules 
of the work to be made and these rules, far 
removed from the dictates of convention im- 
posed from without, are the necessary laws 
of art itself illuminating the mind from 
within. These regulative ideas, At the 
opposite pole from sterile academic rules, 
can only be taught by an interior teacher 
who illuminates the deepest recesses of the 
mindi The artist who submits his mind to 


these primary and eternal rules far from 
bein^ in servile bonda^^e enjoys true liber- 
ation in possessing them, and the mind more 
deeply penetrated by the illuminative rules 
possessee ari wore fully. The creative rules 
may be applied in many different ways each 
work of art hzivin^^ its own re<;uJ^. . and this 
eliminates the possibility of monotonous 
repetition of barren formulae such as may 
be in vogue in some particular school of art. 



Without the illiimination of 
th« artist's raind by the regulative ideas or 
archetypal forms, no beautiful work could be 
made, and works of art arenas it were^ material 
counterparts of the divine ideas in which the'v 


intelligibility og- % l. e divinc»e en- 
shrined. The work of art is the sensible 
realization in matter of the illumination seen 
more or less clearly by the mind and embodied 
more or less successfully in the objects in 
which it shines out visibly. The contemplation 
of beautiful works of art is not a frivolou^-s 
distraction nor the satisfaction of vain curi- 
osity, for while enjoyed in themselves^ beauti- 
ful objects arc so many run^^s upon which the 
soul ascends to self-subsistent Beauty. it 
is necessfiry to have recourse to sensible 
forms, and if one falls by bein^ too strongly 


attached to thom^the very place of the fall 


acts as a support for risini;. The mind ^ in 

its appreciation of particular works of beauty 
is led to a consideration of their makers and 
the rule by wliich they were made, and in this 
way can lount from the productions of art ^ in 
which beauty is partially realized^ to the 
fulness of Eeauty. Sounds, forras, and 
colours are first taken in theaselves, but 


they are also si^^ns which make known some- 
thing else, and the more the work is charged 
with significance the greater its possibilities 
for joy and beauty. David the musician-king 
who dearly loved music but nut with a vulgar 
delight ^signified great things in hie art by 

the rational and well ordered concord of 

diverse sounds in harmonious varib^y. Husic, 

one of the most favoured arts of St. Augustine^ 

signified for him the raovenents of the soul 

and the invisible world which acts in man. 

No work of art could come into 

existence without the divine illumination 


which proceeds from the Art of God , but 

althou^ all benefit by it many artists are 

not aware of the invisible li^^t without which 


no beautiful works could be created by them. 

Whether artists are conscious of it or not, all 
works of art derive from the illumination of 
art, and ultimately this means the collaboration 
of the artist Tfith Hod in creatin^^. The artist 
cannot create out of nothin^jness like God, but 
he continues wod's creation by realizing in 
matter the forms which he brir^s to completion. 
The artist does not copy God's Creation^ but 
finished and completes it. In the sense in 
which providence is a continued creation^ it 
can be said that the artist^ in fulfilling the 

forms of things and bringing them to completion^ 


resembles "od in His providential role. The 

artist does not copy nature^but restores things 
to their pristine splendour, and brin.^s them 
to the perfection they cannot attain in nature. 
Matter is as it \?ere redeemed by the form 


incarnated in lt_,and nature is transformed 
and lifted up to a hi^^er existence. Faith 
teaches of the resurrection of the body which 

will be {-glorified by the Supreme Artist ^ho 

will remove from it all defect and deformity, 

and meditation on such mysteries which can only 

te seen in the li^^ht of Faith but which shed 

much lirfht on the meaninfj of art^ will reveal 

many more resemblances between the artist's 

activity and the Art of God, but to .^et at 

the deepest meaning of art it is necessary 

to evoke the mystery of the Trinity. All men 

are made in tiie ijuage and liiceness of God^ 

^- - ^2a , 
but the artist continues the image in a 

special way, and in a certain manner, art may 

be said to be the hit^iest n;itural likeness of 

the activity of God. The human intelligence 

cannot li.ce (Jod be^iet another self, but through 

the illumination of art man can engender works 

in his own image which resemble God. .liether 

the artist is conscious of these resemblances 


or not, a work of art praises God Hho is the 
Principle of all form and splendour. If the 
work of art is true to its ovn nature and 
well nade according to its own purpose, i.e. 
when it POSSC5SS68 its own ri^^htness and ^jood- 
nessjthen by that^very fact it i^raises frod. 
Beauty and ^jraise ^jo to^^ether, and when beauti- 
ful works ceasG to praise God they arc con- 
demned to the petty praise of self. Beauti- 
ful works announce unconsciously the order and 
invisible beauty of which they are sijns, and 
not only the rorks of men but the whole of 
creation I which is God's work of art is never 

silent in its unceasing: praise of Uncreated 



All art depends on the natural 
illuininstion of art and whether the artist be 
pagan or heathen his work is of God if it is 
^ood art. The Gliristian artist , unlike those 
who are unaware of the source of the illumina- 
tion of art is one who turns consciously to 


the '.isdom which is the *rt of God, and seeks 

to have his mind penetrated by this invisible 

light. Such an artist will aspire to purify 

more and uore the regard of hie soul so as to 

have a clearer vision of the creative rules, 

and in turning to the thin*^ to be mod© he will 

attempt to make the li^^t of number, unity, 

form and order shine out as fully as the work 

permits* Just as God throu^^h Kis Vord or Art 

regulated and realizes all that He has made, 

80 the Christian artist through his art will 

regulate and realize the work to be made in 

its entirety. A Christian work of art cannot 

be made to order but must come fx*om an artist 

who loves God, and to him can be applied St. 

Awjustine's pithy expression "love God, and 

make what you will." ' The works of art 

coming from such an artist will be the sen- 
sible expression of man's love of God realized 
in the thing made. Falsity or illusion would 
be absent, and simplicity and purity of means 


would be the outetanding narks In worlca 
whloh are the nensible realization of uan'i 
love of God. The Christian ax'tist oon- 
teiupiatinti tno Art of God, the '.Vord Who is 
Suprome Beauty, will be helped in no being 
deceived by appearances which mi^jht hinder 
him fiOiu r&ootiniasin^ ueauty whei-ever it is 
to be found, for the '.'/ord made flesh was 
beautiful on earth as He is beautxful in 
heaven, beautiful in the woab of the Virgin 
where ne put on luan's nature without di- 
vesting Himself of Kia Divine nature, beauti- 
ful in all the stages of His life on earth 
however hidden ana huiabie, beautil"ul in His 
sufferlnj and i-'aasion, btuutiful in death and 
the sepulciu'6, and bet^utiful in His Resurrec- 
tion.''' "^-^ artist meditatiiiti on the God-man 
will not only realize order, harmony, rule, 
and beauty in his works^but uiil wish to in- 
troduoe those into hie ovn life," exid this 
leads to the consideration of the relations 
between art and morality* 



Divine illxjunination not only 
pr68cribes rules of uotion but further ^jlves 
uaxi the meane of puttin^^ th«a into practice 
by th«i illumination of the virtues which en- 
ables hiffl to conx'ortB to the unchangeable rules 
and litjhts of the virtues. The soul, of it- 
self having neither life nor virtue, is endowed 
with life by having the virtues conferred on 
it* and thou;;;h still reoainini; a soul when 
deprivea of its virtues it is as it were a 
dead soul. The virtues which give the soul 
life and beauty are drawn from a source hii^er 
than the soul* and the more closely it approaches 
this soiu'Cb the more li^t is given to it, the 
arther it recedes from it so much aarker is 

it. " ihb soul animates the body on which it 

confers beauty, ' form, uno oi^er, Dut this 

could not be done by the aoul unless it were 


aniraated In Its turn by God \7ho animates the 
eoul by ^Uvln^i it the virtues which constitute 

the beautjr of the Interior imxn, a beauty not 


dependent on mass or extension, Tne illu- 

mine, tion of Iht virtute It niuy be hlx.ted at 
indirectly in pursing offers sone interesting 
antiojlee e« the artist 't activity. Material 
works of art m\y be coneiderrd hv the extension 
of thi artlut'B body, ani' in thlc i^enee it may 
be ecld t)int the art let doer for hie material 
work of tirt what the loul dofip for itr body, 
and just as the body has fonn, ordbr, loid 
beauty because it pertiioipatos in the Ideas 
taroUfjh th« soul, so the work of art i^artiei- 
pateo lii the ideas throiA^ih tho artist by the 
illumiiiation of art which enalilcs him to 
confer forra, order, and btiauty on his materials. 
Tae latin word jy^s^yierives from the ■TreekOsV^^'^ 
which slt^;nifi(33 virtue, and In this eense 
virtue may be ce,ll0(?. the art of well-living. 
Virtue embraces all that laust be done, and 


its shortest definition la the order of love. 
To be virtuous, a man rauBt love with order 
love Itself by which he loves rightly all 
ttwt is to be loved. Love is perfectly 
ordered in the man who luiows how to estimate 
thin<^8 at their true value ^lovin^j what *iould 
be loved and not loving? what should not be 
loved. The less a thin,^ is lovable the less 
it is loved by the man whose soul is ordered 
by love, and the measure of his love increases 
or decreases according to the object which is 

more or lesc lovable but rests e lual with that 


which is eq.ually wortliy of love. Man may 

love four different kinds of objects: objects 
below hi;a, his own self, objects en the same 
plane with him, and those above him; but in 

all these there should bo an ade-iuution be- 

tw«en love and the worth of the object loved. 

Love Itnows how to use things and throu/Jh love 
man orders inferior thin/?s which are beautiful 
in their own ^renus and species^ to the superior. 


Man/\8ltuuted midway between the world of 
bodies lower than hiiaself and the Wreator 
of all corporeal things and hl8 own creator 
above himself usee things properly if he is 
faithful to the law of order, and^, choosing 
with discermoentv prefers more wortliy thin^js 
to less worthy, the spiritual to the material, 

the higher to the lower, and the eternal to 


the temporal. Perfect Justice indeed would 

consist in loving more that which is more 

worthy of love ^ and less^those things which 

are less worthy. 

On the basis of love the 
cardinal virtues are classified* Temperance 
is the love which tJlves itself entirely to 
that which is loved. Fortitude is a love 
whion bears all things easily for that which 
is loved. Justice is the love which serves 
the loved object only, and consequently domi- 
nates all the rest, nor could there be any 
justice if all things were equal and without 


dlfference, for justice Is observed In re- 
gard to unequal and unlike objects. Prudence 
la love in its wise discernment of that which 
is favourable or disturbin/;, a love judiciously 

discerning what can helps nan in reoching God 

or hinders him by turnin*^ him away. 

The virtues can be described 

from another point of view besides love. 

Temperance checks carnal deiiires, and in pre- 

ventin.^ them from dominating; man helps prepare 

the way for the aoquicition of art and wisdom. 

Prudence discerns jood and evil, and makes it 

possible to avoid eri-or in the choice of what 

must be clone or avoided. Justice attributes to 

each its due, and through it a kind of order is 

established in which the inferior is submitted 

to the superior, the body to the soul, and the 

soul to God; and fortitude helps in establishing 

this order. Justice ie also called equity 

which derives Its name from equality the virtue 

of which conf?i8tG In rendering to each whet 


properly belongs to it, and this certainly 
could not be done without the aid of dis- 

Prom this account of the 
virtues it cpn be seen how much the artist 
would b« aided by the illumination of art^ es- 
pecially so if it were hannoniously integrated 
with the other illuminations, but art must not 
be confused with morality. Art is concerned 
with maKing and its primary consideration is 
the 200d of the thing made. Morality on the 
other hand is conoemed with what is to be 
done or avoided by man so as to reach his 
last end. Art whose concern is with th« 
perfection of the thin/; made, works for the 
good of that tnin^; morality^ wnose interest 
is the perfection of the human being^worke for 
the i;oo& of the one mnkino, and if a conflict 
should arise between the two^the lesser good 
must b€ Bubordinated to the h|;gher. A work 
of art is ''ood if Its maker b^s made it as 


well as It ou,iht to ba mude in oonformity 
with the rules govox^irv; its ijaking, but it 
is man who makes, and his art nrust be in oon- 
fonaity^ not only with the end of the thin^ 
mado^but with hio own last snd, . rt whose 
domain is making objects to bo joyfully con- 
templated, is distinct from morality whose 
interest is not with tiie thin^j itself but its 
use; but the artist who not only makes but 
uses thin^^s inust use them so as to be able to 
arrive at the ultimate enjoyment of his last 

end, Man who both enjoys and uses objeots 

is placed midway between joy and use. 

"Riin^s enjoyed make man happy, and those 

used sustain him in his efforts towards happi- 

nessi'^'^ but thin^-s enjoyed ^quite apart from 

their value^may from another point of view be 

used for the attaixuaent of a hi^jher end, and 

should a conflict ariije between the two^ 

IhjfoUijh both should be lauintained^the inferior 

aaust hfi subordiuatad so the superior* The 


artist whose activity consists in brint^ing 
things to perTGOtlon may be ralsunderBtood 
at times by tha .'OorallBt *?ho la concerned 
srlth the use of thln^;6» but the artist can 
loolt for better understandintj to the con- 
templative who as God's work of art in that 
his very life is brou/j;ht to perfection throxigh 
union with Beauty^ knows that at a higher level 
there can be no contsradlctlon between art and 
morality, beaut}' and use. In attemptin/i to 
desifinate In creatures the attributes of each 
of the i^ersons of the Trinity, beauty may be 

attributed to the Imatje of the Eternal Father, 

and UBO to Ihe iloly Spirit, and the divine 

e^iuilibriuin between beauty and use should also 

be found in man, the lma^;e ol' tho Triune God Vfho 

is Unltyt Man upon whom is bestowed the yjift 

of rae.kin,; beautiful thintjs^were ha to ma^.e of 

his own life a work of art would strive to 

establish in himoelf rule, order, hermony, and 

beauty; and when this is acconpllshed he m^y 


hope to contemplate the Supreme Eeauty 
through which all beautiful thin^js have 
their befciuty. 



NOTES ;sSl chapter five 

De Trinltate, XII, 3, 3; P.L. V.42, c,999. 

in mente uniuscujusque hominis quaesi- 

vlmus quodam rationale conjugium conterapla- 
tionis et actionis, officiis per quae dam 
singula distributis, tamen in ut^oque mentis 

unitate servata Op. cit. XII, 12, 19; 

P.L. V.42, C.1008, and 21, c.1009. 
Gum igitur disseriraus de natura mentis hu- 
manae, se una quadam re disserimus, net; earn 
in haec ^uo quae ccmnnemoravl, nis' per officia 
geminamus. Op. Cit., XII, IV, 4; c.lOOO. 
What the violent disjunction of these two 
aspects of the one intellect can mean es- 
pecially in the realm of art may be seen in 
the vivid struggle depicted in some of Picasso's 
later paintings where the artist's operative in- 
telligence concerned with the ttiing-to-be-made 
despotically asserts its claim against its 
spiritual partner which it attempts to displace 
entirely. See the interesting essay on this 
point by Jacque de Monleon, Points de vue sur 
Picasso, in Esprit, Octobre, 1932, Paris, pp.l71ff. 

Ex multis rebus passim ante jaoentibus, deinde 
in unam formam congregatis unara facio domum. 
Melior ego, siquidem ego facio ilia fit: ideo 
melior quia facio; non dubium est inde me esse 
meliorem quam domus.est. Sed non inde sum 
melior hirundine, aut apicula; nam et ilia 
nidos affabre stiruit, et ilia favos; sed his 
melior, quia rationale animal sum. At si in 
ratis dimensionibus ratio est; nuraquidnam et 
aves quod fabricant, minus apte congruenterque 
dimensum est? Imo niimerosissimum est. Non ergo 
numerosa faciendo, sed numeros cognoscendo, 
melior sum. Ojaid. ergo? illae nescientes operari 


NOTES (Continued) 


numerosa poterant. Poterant pro fe etc. Unde 
id docetur? Ex eo c^uod nos quoque oertls 
dimensionibus lin^^ara dentibus et palato ac- 
commodaraus, ut ex ore littarae ac verba pro- 
rumpant, nee tamen co^itamus cum loquimur, quo 
motu oi'is id facere debeamus. Deinde quis bonus 
cantator, etiam si muslcae sit imperitus, non 
ipso sensu naturali el rhythmum et raelos percep- 
tum raemoria custodiat in canendo? quo quid fieri 
nuiaerosius potest? Hoc nescit indoctus, sed 
tamen facit operants natura. '^iuando autem melior, 
et pecoribus praeponendus? Quando novit quod 
facit. At nihil aliud me pecori praeponit, nisi 
quod rationale animal sum. Da Ordine, II, XIX, 
49; P.L. V.32, col. 1018. 

M. Responde igitur, utrum tibi videatur bene 
modular! vocem luscinia verna parte anni: nam 
et numerosus est et suavissimus ille cantus, et, 

nisi fallor, tempori congruit Die mihi 

9i*go» quaeso te; nonne tales tibi omnes vid- 
entur, qualis ilia luscinia est, qui sensu 
quodara ducti bene canunt, hoc est numerose id 
faciunt ac suaviter, quamvis interrogati de 
ipsis numeris, vel de intervallis acutarum 
graviumque vocum, respondere non possint... 
(^uAd? ii qui illos sine ista sclent ia libenter 
audiunt; cum videamus elephantos, ursos, alia- 
que nonnulla genera bestiarum ad cantus moveri, 
avesque ipsas delectari suis vocibus (non enim 
nulla extra proposito comiaodo tam impense id 
agerent sine quadam libidine); nonne pecoribus 

comparandi sunt Nam magni viri, etsi 

musicam nesciunt, aut congruere plebi voliint, 
quae non raultum a pecoribus distal, et cujus 
ingens est nuiuerus, quod mode^tissime ac pru- 
dentissime faciunt...... Sed quid tibi videtur? 


NOTES (Continued) 


qui vel tibiis canunt vel cithara, atque 
hujusmodi instrunentis, nunniuicinara possunt 
lusciniae comparuri? ^ 
D. Non. M. tiuid i^ritur distat^? P. Quod in 
istls artem q.uamdt,m esse video, in ilia vero 
solam naturam. U. Verisimile dicis; sed ars 
tibi videtur ista esse dicenda, etiamsi quadam 
imitatione id faciunt? D. Our non? Nam video 
tan turn valere in artibus imitationem, ut ea 
sublata, omnes pene periraantur. Praebent enim 
se maistri ad imitandum, et hoc Ipsum est quod 
vocant docere. M. Videtur tibi ars «J^ ratio 
esse quaedam, et ii qui arte utuntur, ratione 
uti: an alitor putas? D. Videtur. M. Quisquis 
igitur ratione uti non potest, arte non utitur. 

D, Et hoo ooncedo M. iuaesiverara ex te, 

utinim citharistas et tibicines, et hujusmodi 
aliud ,:enus hominura, artem di ceres habere, 
etiamsi id juoa in oanendo faciunt, imitatione 
assfccuti sunt. Dixisti esse artem, tantumque 
id valere affirmasti, ut omnes pene tibi artes 
periclitari vicerentur imitatione sublata. Ex 
quo jam colligi potest, omne^ qui imitando 
assequitur aliquid, arte uti, etiamsi forte 
non omnis qui arte utvlitur, imitando earn per- 
ceperit. At si omnis imitetio ars est, et ars 
omnis ratio; omnis imitatio ratio; ratione autem 
non utitur irrationale animal; no:^st igitur ars 
imitatio. De Musica, I, IV, 5; P.L. V.32, col. 

Granted this principle that art cannot be con- 
fused with imitation so clearly enunciated by- 
Augustine its application aay sometimes be quite 
surprising. If it were erroneously supposed, 
for example, that unlike music or architecture, 
painting and sculpture iraitnte nature then by 
that very fact tnese arts would be ranked much 
lower than the others. This will explain 


NOTES (Continued) 


Augustine's attitude towards some of the 
plastic arts which he did not estimate very 
highly because he conceived them as being 
imitative of nature, 'fnother Augustine 'd 
attitude towards painting and sjulpture was 
influenced by the belief that they had their 
origin in the worship ox the dead and^ vener- 
ation of demons (Contra Faustura, XXII, 17) 
can only be a conjecture, but it would help 
to explain why Augustine preferred nature to 
paintings or statues which he held to be 
imitative arts. Coming after llotinus who 
so brilliantly maintained tlriat art is not a 
copy of a copy but ascends to the principles 
on which nature is built up (Enn. V, VIII, I), 
Au/';ustine 's Sow estimate of some of the plastic 
arts is all the more surprising, but is in no 
way inconsistent with his affirmation that art 
as such in its purely formal line, cannot be 
confounded with imitation. Nature for Augus- 
tine was a copy of the ideas in God's mind, 
and art copies these ideas and not the copies 
in nature of these ideas. 

Ergo attollere in tertium gradum, qui jam est 
hominl proprius, et cogita memoriara non con- 
suetudine inolitarura, sed animadversione atque 
s ignis commendatamm ac retentarum rerum in- 
numerabilium, tot artes opificura, agrorxim 
cultus, exstructiones urbiura, variorum aedifi- 
ciorum ac molirainum miiltimoda miracula; in- 
ventiones tot signorum in litteris, in verbis, 
in gestu, in cujuscemodi sono, in picturis 
atque figment is; etc. De iuantitate Aniraae, 
XXXLII, 72; P,L. V.32, col. 1074-75. 


KOTES (Continued) 

(Cont'd.) ^^.o/vL 

It should be pointed out that wii-th what 
today would be called fine arts are in- 
cluded the liberal arts and crafts for the 
distinction between them did not come until 
much later. Nor for that matter is there 
a clear cut distinction between art as such 
which is primarily of the mind and "science" 
that is to say certain and true knowledge 
iis music is sometimes called art and at 
others "science" by St. Augustine in order 
to differentiate it from activities in which 
no true knowledge is req.uired. (Musica est 
Scientia bene raodulandi, De Mus. I, II, 2, 

AUi^stine devotes a whole letter (Epistolarum 
Glassis I, Vil; .\L. 7.33, col.6'1-71) to the 
imui^lnation and its relation to art. Images 
which always havo thQlr origin in sensation 
are of three kinds: those that are formed 
directly from sensations; those which derive 
from suppositions; and finally those which 
come from reflection. Poetical works, Augus- 
tine observes, are not imitations but works 
of the ijiia.^ination, a conception readied by 
hardly any ancient thinner besides Philostratus 
(Life of Apollonius of Tyre, VI, "'IX, trans. 
Gonybeare, Leob's 0.1.). Augustine's profound 
psychological observation on the role of the 
imagination in art should be related to his 
remarks in the Do Mueica (IV, 32) where he 
points out that memories are formed by motions, 
and from the memories foinned in this way are 
engendered the products of the imagination. 


NOTBS (Continued) 

See note 8 to chapter I. 

Artium etiara caeterarom, ^uibus aliquid 
fabrlcRtur, vel quod remaneat post operatl- 
onem artificis ab illos effectuin, sicut domus, 
et scamnum, et vas aliquod, at^ue alia hujusce- 
Eod; vsl ciu&e ininistcrium quoddara exhibent 
operantl Deo, sicut medicina, et agricultura, 
et gubernatio; vel quarum omnis effectus et 
actio, slout ealtationum et cursionuia et luc- 
taminurn: lu-rum ergo cunctarum artium de praeter- 
Itis experimenta faciunt otiaia fut'ifra oonjici; 
nam nullus earum art if ex membra movet in oper- 
and© » nls praeteritoruiii in«morlam cxun futuon,un 
ex&pectationc contexat. Dfa Doctrina Ciiristiana, 
II, XXX, 48; F.L. 7.34, c.57. 
Au,':,ustine riae other classifications of the 
various arts in the De Ordine, De Imnortalitate 
A-iimae , De "iuantitate .Uiimac , De Musioa, etc., 
depending on the different principles employed 
in each of the classifications but in all of 
them the oriiaacy of reason is insisted upon. 


Praeter enira artes bene vivendi et ad ixomortalem 
perveKjiendi felicitatem, r.uae virtutes vocantur. .. 
nonne humano ingenio tot tantaeque artes sunt 
inventae et exercitae, partlm necessariae, partim 
voluptariae, ut tam exccllens vie mentis at'-ue 
rationis, in his eti?Ti rebiis qut.s superfluas, imo 
et pariculosas perniciosasciue appetit, quantum 
bonum habeat in nstura, un<ie ista potuit vel in- 
vsnire, vel discern, vel exercera, tostetur? 
Vcstimentorum et aedificiorum ad opera quam 
mirabilia, quam stupenda, industria humana per- 
venerit; quae in fabricatione quorunque vasorum, 


NOTES (Continued) 

8 (Cont'd.) 

vel etiam statuarum et picturaruin varietate 
excogita:s;erit et impleverit, quae in thea- 
tric mirabilia spectantibut , audientibuB 
incredibilia facienda et exhibenda molita 

sit; ad delectundoa aniiuoH, c^uob 

eltfcutionis ornatus, quam diversorum carralnum 
copiain; ad muloeiidas auros, quot organa rausica, 
quos cantiltnae modos excogitaverit , etc., etc. 
D6 Civitate Dei, X:ai, }CXIV, 3} P.L. V.41, 
c, 789-90. 





A. Jam mihi videris etiam cvan in funo quisque 

ambul&t, ampliorera credere himc habere animam, 

quam eos quid id face re nequeunt. 

E. Hoc aliud est: quic enim hoc noii videat esse 


A. Cur, obsecro, artis? an quia didicit? Ita 

vero. De iuantitate yViiiraae, XVI, II, 32, 

P.L, V.32, col. 1053. 

D6 L-JuBica I, IV, 9; P.L. V.32, col. 1088. 

hominem artif icem- . .lignarium fabrum,.... 

tarn did liiTiiim caedere at (me tractare dolando, 
asciando, pla/iando, vel tornanCo, atque poli- 
endo quovieque ad artis re^julas perducfctur, 
quantum poteat, ct placeet artii'ioi £>uo. I4um- 
quid cr^o quie placet ei quoci fe it, ideo non 
moverat bonuia? i'j'Oisus novorat intue in animo, 
ubi ipsa pulciu'lor f>Bt, qiiaru ilia quae arte 
fabrioantui'. :";6d quou videt {<rtifbx intus in 
c.;rte, hoc forie probat in ope re, et hoc est 
peri'ectUKi quod artil'ici suo placet. Ce Genesi 
Contra Manich. , I, VIII, 13; P.L. V.34; c.179. 


NOTES (Continued) 


Faber facit arcam. Prlino in arte habot 
aroam. 3i enim non haberet non esset \inde 
fabricundo illam prox'eret. In arte invisi- 
biliter est, in opere visibiliter erit, 
Ti*act I in Svang. Joan. 


Quis enlrn, nt alia omittam, aut rationem 
numerorum mutabilem esse audeat dicere, aut 
artem quaiDlibet non ista ratione cons tare; aut 
artem non esse in artifice, etiam c\sa earn non 
exercet; aut ejus esse, nisi in animo; aut ubi 
vita non sit, esse posse; aut quod intrntabile 
est, esse aliquhndo non posse; aut aliud esse 
artem, aliud rationum? nuamvis enim ars una 
m'.ltprum ouasl ouidam coetus rationum esse 
dicatur, tenen ars etiaci una ratio aici veris- 
rime atoue intelli^;;! potest. Sod Give hoc, 
Bivo illud Pit, non minus ii.riutubilem artem 
esse confioitur; artem auteia non solun esse in 
animo artificis, »ed etiam auaquara eace nisi 
in animo iianifestum est, idqun iiiscparabiliter. 
Nam si ars ab animo tseparabiturr aut erit prae- 
terquam in aniDio , ^ aut nusquaui arit, uut de 
animo in aiiimuSn/Xranoibit. At ut cedes arti 
nulla Bine vita «st, ita nee vita cuni ratione 
uili nisi aniiaae. Plusquan porro esse quod est, 
vel quod iijimuxiabile eat a.n» 3SS6 aliiuando non 
potest. Si vero ars de animo in anlraum transit, 
in illo nansura desereuH iatuni; nemo artora 
docet nisi amittando, aut otiaia non nisi doc- 
eutis obiivioiie fit aiiquib peritus, sive morte. 
Quae si absurdissima et faxoissiiua sunt, sicuti 
sunt, immortalis est aniaiua haiuanus. Ds Immor- 
talitate Anirnae, 17, 5; P.L. 7.32, c. 1023-24. 


NOTES (Continued) 




An vero faber potest rationabillbus nuraeris 
qui sunt in arte ejus, sensuales na-nercs 
qui sunt in consuetudine ejus operari; et 
sensual ibus numeris progre^sores illos :;ui- 
bus membra in operando raovot, ad quos jam 
intervalla tempcrum pertiiieiit , et his rursus 
formas visibiies de ligno fabricari, locorum 
intervallis nvimerosas. . . . (De Musica, VI, 
XVII, 57; P.L. t.32, col. 1191,) 

Sic enim et versus In suo genare pulcher etit, 
quarnvis duae syllabae simul dici nullo modo 
possint. Kec enim secunda enuntiatur, nisi 
prima transieritj atque ita per ordinom per- 
venitur ad f inera, ut cum sola ultini^^ sonat, 
non secum sonantibus supcrioribus , fornam 
tamen et decus raetrloum cum praet ritis oon- 
tflxta perficiat. Nee ideo tamen urs ipsa 
qua versus fabricatur, sic toinporl obnoxia 
est, ut pulcnritudo ejus per menauras norarum 
di.^^eratur: sed simul liabet oimiia , 'luibus effl- 
cit versum non tiinul iiabentera omnia, sad 
posterioribus priora to^enteifi; propteraa tamen 
pulchrum, guia extrema vosti^^ia illius pulchri- 
tudlriis ostentat, quaji ooustanter at uo in- 
comnutabillter ars ipsa sustodit. De Vera 
Religion©, XXII, 42; F.I.. V.34, c,140. 

M. Si evi.o quaeramus artem istera rhythjnicam 
vel metricp.Di, qua utu.ntui-, -v-ui verrup faciunt, 
putacne habere alic.uos nuntros, secundum luos 
fsbrioant vei-busV I?. )uicunr,u6 iFt:i sunt nu- 
ineri, praeteriie tlbl vidontur cura vp-reibue, 
an iaanere? .... consent ifsndixrc est or^o, ab 
aliquibus manentibus nujieric praetereixntes 
aliquos fabricari?... J^iid? hancurtem nxim 


NOTSS (Continued) 

17 (Cont'd.) 

aliud putas q^uam affeetionem quamdam esse 

animl artlflcls? 

Age, nunc clic mihi utioim hi numerl de quibus 
sic quaeritur, conunutabiles esse tibi vlde- 
antur. D. Nuilo modo. M. Ergo aetemos esse 

non negas Unde ergo credendum est 

aniinae tribui quod neternum est et incomniu- 
tabile, nisi ab uno aeterno et incomi.wtabili 
Deo? De Musica, VI, XII, 35; t,L. V,32, 
col. 1182-83. 



Nam haec est ilia incomnutflbilis voritas, quae 
lux omnl'.im artlum racte ilcitur, at ars onml- 
potftntis art If is is « D© Vera Roligione, XXXI, 
57: P.Tj, V.^A, C.147. 

Of. Da Oivitata T33i, XI, XXI; P.J.. V.34, 0.334, 
"....^niai oparls r.pv)i*abp\ti'j sec-induin artera 
faoti, quae japlentiti Dal est." 

3Qd quia olv.nm est flam eygo? miAt.ibilQm, quando 
nunc perita, nunc imp«rita invenltur; tanto 
autoa) inellup judicr-t, quanto eHt perltior, et 
tanto est peritior qu?.nto aliiujuf.' ■artie vel 
uipolplinno v(;l snirientif^.e pnrtioeps est: ipslus 
art is notura quaerenda est. Neque ntino artera 
intfilliji volo, quae notatur exporiendo, sed 
(Luae ratiocinjindo indagatur, ^uid en.lm prae- 
cl?inin nrvlt, c;ui novit oa impenee. qu'e caloe 
et arrnp conf It , tonaciuG lapidcfj oohaerare, 
quam luto? aut qui tern ele*'unter aediflcat, ut 
quae plura sunt, paria pa^ribus rosporjcleant; 
que* 6 autem sln^nAla, mediaii loc^jun tenep.nt? quan- 
cuam iste sansus Jam sit rationi veritatiiue 
vicirxior. Sed certe quaerend\i"i est cur noe 
offendat, si duabus fenestrls non super invicem, 


NOTES (Continued) 

19 (Cont'd.) 

sed^juxta invicem locatis, una earum major 
minsrve sit, cum aequales esse potuerint: 
si vero super invicem fuerint, ambaeque 
dimidio quamvis impares, non ita offendat 
ilia inaequalitas; et cur non multum curemus, 
quanto sit una earum aut major aut minor, quia 
duae sunt. In tribus autem sensus ipse videtur 
expetere ut aut impares non sint, aut inter 
maximam et minimam ita sit media, ut tanto 
praecedat minorem, quanto a majore praec4ditur. 
Ita enim primo quasi natura ipsa consulitur 
quid probet. Ubi potissimum notandum est, 
quemadmodum quod solum inspectiim minus dis- 
plicuerit, in melioris comparatione respuatur. 
Ita reperltur nihil esse aliud artem vulgarem, 
nisi rerura expertarum placitanimque memoriam, 
usu quodam corporis atque operationis adjvincto: 
quo si careas, judicare de operibus possis, quod 
multo est excellentius, quamvis operari artifi- 
closa non posses. De Vera Religione, XXX, 54, 
P.L. V.34, C.146. 


Aequalitatem illam quam in sensibilibus numeris 
non reperiebamus certam et manentem, sed tamen 
adumbratam, et praetereuntem agnoscebamus, nus- 
quam profecto appeteret animus nisi alicuii nota 
asset: hoc autem alicubi non in spatiis locorum 
et temporxom; nam ilia tument, et ista praetereunt. 
Ubi ergo censes, responde, quaeso, si potest. Non 
enim in corporum formis putas, quas liquido ex- 
amine ae ),uales nunquam dicere audebis: aut in 
temporum intervallis, in quibus similiter utrum 
sit aliquid aliquanto quam oportet productius vel 
correptius quod sensum ^ugiat, ignoramus. Illam 
quippe aequalitatem quaero ubi esse aj^it'^ris, 
quam intuentes cupimus aequalia esse quaedam 
corpora vel corporum motus, et diligentius consi- 
derantes eis flidere non auderaus. De Musica, VI, 
XII, 34; P.L. V.32, col. 1181-82. 



NOTES (Continued) 



Sed cum vel nos ipsi nobiscum ratiocinantes, 
vel ab alio bene interrogati de quibusdam 
liberalibus artibus ea quae invenlmus, non 
alibi quam in animo nostro invenimus: neque 
id est invenire, quod facere aut gignere; 
alioquin aeteraa gigneret animus inventione 
temporali (nam aeterna saepe invenit; quid 
enim tarn aetemum quam circuli ratio, vel si 
quid aliud in hujuscemodi artibus, nee non 
fuisse aliquando, nee non fore comprehenditur?) : 
manifestum etiam est, immortalem esse animum 
humaniim, et omnes verss rationes in seeretis 
ejus esse, quamvis eas sive ignorantia sive 
oblivions, aut non habere, aut amisJsse vide- 
atur. De Immortal ite Animae, IV, %; P.L. 
V.32, col. 1024. ^ 

Ut igitur brevitur aeternae legis notionem, 

quae impressa nobis est, quantum valeo verbis 

explicem, ea est qua justum est ut omnia sint 

ordinatissima. De lib. arbit. , I, 6, 15; P.L. 

V.32, col. 1229. 


Hisce igitur motlbus animae cum ratio dominatur, 
ordinatus homo dicendus est. Non enim ordo 
rectus, aut ordo appel^ndus est omnino, ubi 
deteri'i'ibus meliora siibjiciiintur. De lib. 
arbit.', I, 8, 18; P.L. V.32, col. 1231. 


....quomodo ars non novit vitia; et tamen per 
artem cognita di judicantur. Enaratio in Psalmum, 
XXXIV, S. II, 2; P.L. V.36, col. 334. 


De Magistro, XII, 38; P.L. col. 1216. 


NOTES (Continued) 




Non enim frustra et insiniter intueri oportet 
pulchritudlnem coeli, ordinem siderum, can- 
dorem lucis, dieriim et noctiiim vicissitudines, 
lunae menstrua curricula, anni quadrifariam 
temperationem, quadripartitls elementis congru.- 
entem, tantam vim semlnxjun species numerosque 
gignentium, et omnia in suo genere modum pro- 
prium naturamque servantia. In quorum consi- 
deratione non vana et peritura curiosltas 
exercenda est, sed gradus ad immortal la et 
semper manentia faciendus. De Vera Rellgione, 
XXIX, 52; P.L. V.34, 0.145. 

Nam in quem locum qulsque ceciderit, ibl debet 
incumbere ut surgat. Ergo ipsls camallbus 
formis, qulbus detinemur, nitendum est, ad eas 
cognoscendas quas caro non nuntiat. Eas enim 
carnales voco, quae per carnem sentiri quei^^j^^g 
id est per oculos, per aures, caeterosquei^sensus. 
De Vera Rellgione, XXIV, 45; P.L. V.34, c.l41. 

Imo vero commemorati ab lis quae judicamus, 
Intueri quid sit secundum quod judicamus, et 
ab operibus artlum conversi ad legem artium, 
earn speciem mente contuebimur, cujus compara- 
tione foeda sunt quae ipslus benlgnitate sunt 
pulchra. De Vera Rellgione, LII, 101; P.L. 
V.34, C.167. 

Hinc se ilia ratio ad ipsarum rerum divlnarum 
beatissimam contemplationem rapere vojuit. Sed 
ne de alto caderet, quaesivit gradus, atque 
ipsa sibi viam per suas possessiones ordinemque 
molita est. Desiderabat enim pulchritudlnem, 
quam sola et simplex posset sine istis oculls 
intueri.... De Ordine, 11, Xiy, 39; P.L. V.32, 
col. 1013. 

Augustine treats of natural and artificial 
signs in the De Doctrlna Christiana II, I, 
II, III; P.L. V.34, col. 35-38. A thing may 


NOTES (Continued) 

27 (Cont'd.) 

be a sign signifying something besides it- 
self, but not all thin^^s are signs. By sign 
is understood that which not only presents 
itself to the senses but gives rise to 
something else, such as smoke revealing the 
existence of fire, the cry uttered by someone 
manifesting his emotion, etc., which ere all 
natural signs. Artificial signs are those 
by which living beings manifest their thoiights, 
feelings, and the different movements of their 
souls the end proposed being expression or 


Erlt autem David vlr in canticis erudltis, qui 
harmonlam muslcam non vulgari vuluptate, sed 
fiedli voluntate dllexerit; eaque Deo suo, qui 
verus est Deus, mystica rei magnae flguratione 
servierit. Dlversorum enim sonorum rationa- 
bilis moderatusque concentus concordi varletato 
compactam bene oi'dinatae civitatis insinuat 
unitatem. De Givltate Dei, XVII, XIV; P.L, 
V.41, c.547. 

A Christian should have a deep interest in art 
since divine truth has been given to him in 
the Psalms through the most beautifxil poetry 
that has ever been written. Augustine's En- 
arrationes in Psalmos shows his appreciation 
of this. 


De Diversis 'uaestlonibus LXXXIII, ^.LXXVIII; 
P.L. V.40, col. 89-90. 


Quam innumerabilia, varils artibus et opiflcils, 
in vestlbus, calceamentis, vaWts, et cujuscemodi 

s (■ 


yOTES (Continued) 

29b (Cont'd.) 

fabricatlonibus picturis etiam, diversis 

que figment is At ego, Deus meus, 

et decus raeum, etiam hinc dico tibi hymnum, 
et sacrifico laudem sacrificatorl meo; 
quonlam pulchra trajecta per animas in manus 
artiflciosas, ab ilia pulchritudine veniunt, 
quae super animas est, cui suspirat anima die 

.4£.Kt nocte. Sed pulchritudintun exterioruin oper- 
atores et secta tores inde tirahunt approbandi 
modura, non autem inde trahunt utendi modum. 
Et ibi est, et non vident eiAm, ut non eant 
longius, et fortitudinem suam ad te custo- 
diant. Confessionum, X, XXXIV, 53; P.L. 
V.32, 0.801. 


De Civitate Dei, XXII, XIX; P.L. V.41, c.780 ff. 


Cum autem initio fidei quae per dilectionem 
operatur, imbuta mens fuerit, tendit bene 
vivendo etiam ad speoiem pervenire, ubi est 
Sanctis et perfectis cordibus nota ineffabilis 
pulchritudo, cujus plena visio est summa feli- 
citas. Enchiridion Ad Laurentuium, V; P.L. 
V.40, col. 233. 


De Trinitate XIV, 12, 16; P.L. V.42, c. 1048-49. 

...ut manerem ad imaginem tuam. Gonf. VII, VII, 
II; P.L. V.32, col. 740. 


Ennarratio in Psalmum, XLIV, 9; P.L. V.36, c.500. 


NOTES (Continued) 


Non oessat nee tacet laude tuas universa 
creatura tua; nee spiritus omnis hominis 
per OS conversum ad te, nee animalia nee 
eorporalla pe^ os eonsiderantium ea; ut 
exsurgat in te a lasaitudine anima nostra, 
innitens eis eis quae fecisti, et transiens 
ad te qui fecisti haee mirabiliter: et ibi 
refeetio et vera fortitude. Conf. V, 1; 
P.L. V.32, eol. 705-6. 
Of. op. cit. X, ^I, 8; eol. 782. 
Gf. Ennaratio in Psalmum, GXLV, 5; P.L. 
V.37, C.1837; op. cit. CXLVIII, 15; C.1946; 
De Oivitate Dei, XXII, XXIV, 4; P.L. V.41, 
eol. 790-91, 


Dilige, et quod vis fao 

In Epist. Joan, ad Parthos, VII, 8; P.L. 

V.35, eol. 2033. 


Srie ""rill the eontemporary English artist has 
developed this as well as other ideas on Chris- 
tian art in a number of penetratin^-j essays 
gathered together recently in one volume called 
Art Nonsense And Other Essays, Cassel & Co., 
London, 1929, especially the essay Art And Love, 
pp.l92ff. A more concrete expression is given 
to these ideas in his Clothes, Jonathan Cape, 
London 1931. A renewed interest in Christian 
aesthetic principles has yielded an abundant 
harvest some of the better contributions to the 
subject being: 

Art Et Scolastique by Jacques Maritain, Paris, 
1920 and his Response "A Jean Gocteau, Paris, 
1926; ^aul S^laudel Letter to Alexander Cingria 


NOTES (Continued) 

36b (cont'd.) 

in Ways and Crossways by Paul Glaudel, 
translated by Fr. John O'Connor, London, 
1933, and iMi essay On Art, pp.l63ff, in this 
same volume; Stanislas Fumet, Le Prooes de L'Art, 
Paris, 1S29; Theoriees 1890-1910 by Maurice 
Denis the French painter, Paris, 1920 and Nou- 
velles Theories 191401921. 




Enaratio In Psalmum, XLIV, 3; P.L, V.36, c.495. 

Cui numerorum vim atque potentiam diligenter 
intuenti nimis indignum videbitur et nimis 
flendum, per suam scientiam versuin bene currere 
citharamque concinere, et suam vitam seque ipsam 
quae anima eat, devium iter sejui, et dominant e 
slbi libidine, cum turpissimo se vitiorum stre- 
pitu dissonare. De Ordine, II, XIX, 60; P.L. 
V.32, c. 1018-19. 

Cum autem se composuerit et ordinaverit, ac 
concinnam pulchramque reddiderit, audeblt jam 
Deum videre. ... op. cit, 51; col. 1019. 

De lib. arbit., II, 19| 62; P.L. Y.32, col. 
1268. Of. Contra Julianum Pelagianum, IV, 3, 
17; P.L. V.44, col. 745. Also Sermo 341, 7, 8' 
P.L. V.39, col. 1498. ' 

In Joan. Evang. , XIX, 5, 12; P.L. V.35, col. 


NOTES (Continued) 






Videte enlm quid est, fratres, in enima 
humana. Non habet ex se lurcen, non habet 
ex Be viros: totum autein ciuod pulchrua est 
in anima, virtu<i et sapientia est; sed nee 
sapit sibi, nee valet sibi, nee ipsa sibi 
lux est, nee ipsa sibi virtue est. Est 
quaedum origo fonsque virtutls, est quaedam 
radix sapientiae, est quaedam, ut ita dicam, 
si et hoc dicendum est, refiio incoinnutabilis 
veritstis; ah hac aiiima recedens tenebratur, 
ciccedens illuminatur. ISnaration in Psalmum, 
LVIII, 18| P.L. V.36, col. 704. 

De Imiaortalitate Animus, XV, 24; P.Ii. V,32, 

Epistolarum Classis II, CXX, IV, 20; P.L. 
V.33, col. 461-62. 

Ars quippe ipsa bene rectque Vivendi, virtus 
a veteribus definita est. Unde ab eo quod 
£jraecea'?'iTv^ dicitur virtus, nomen artis 
Latinos traduxisse putaverunt. De Givitate 
Dei, IV, XXI; P.L. v. 41, c.128. 

C^jun enim bona sit, at bene potest amari, et 
male; bene, scilicit ordine custodito; male, 

ordixie perturbato Nam et amor ipse 

ordinate amandus est, quo bene amatur quod 
amandum est, ut sit in nobis virtus qua vivltur 
bane. Unde mihi videtur, quod def initio brevis 

et vera virtutis^^ Ordo est amoris De 

Civitate Dei, XV, XXIIj P.L. V.41, c.467. 


NOTES (Continued) 


De Doctrlna Christiana, I, XXVII, 28; P.L. 

V.34, col. 29. 


op. cit. XXIII, 22; col. 27. Cf. 
Chaptter J 


In quadam qulppe medietate posita est, infra 
86 habens corporal em creaturam, supra se 
autem sui et corporis Creatorem. 

Sicut enim bona svint omnia quae creavit 

Deus, ab ipsa rationally creatura usque ad in- 
fimum corpus: ita bene agit in his anima rati- 
onalis, si ordinem servet, et distinguendo, ell- 
gendo, pendendo, subdat minora majoribus, cor- 
poral ia spiritualibus, inferiora superioribus, 

temporalia sempitemis Epistolarum Glassis 

III, CXL, II, 3, 4,; P.L. V.33, C. 539-40. 




Et haec est perfecta justitia, qua potius 
potior a, et minus minora diligimus. De Vera 
Religione, XLVIII, 93; P.L. V.34, c.164. 

De Moribus eccles. catholicae, I, 15, 25* 
P.L. V.32, col. 1332. 

De Civitate Dei, XIX, 4, 3; P.L. V.41, c. 628-29. 


op. cit. XIX, 4, 4; col. 629-30. 


NOTES (Continued) 


A. Q,uia nihil, ut arblt^or, diciraus esse 
justitiam nisi aequitatem; aequitas autem 
ab aequalitate quadam videtur appellata. 
Sed quae in hac virtute aequitas, nisi ut 
sua cuique tribuantur? Porro sua cuique, 
nisi quadam distinctions tribui non possunt. 
De Quantitate Animae, IX, 15; P.L. V.32, 
col. 1043. 

sua cuique distribuendo utique 

Justus est. Quae autem distributio dici 
potest, ubi distinctio nulla est? De Ordine, 
I, VII, 19; P.L. V,32, col.986. 


Quidam cum vellet brevissime singulanun in 
Trinitate personarum insinuare propria, 
Aeternitas, inquit, in Patre, species in 
Imagine, usus in ivlunere. Et quia non medi- 
ocris auctoritatis in tractatione Scriptuarum, 
et assertione fidei vir existit; Hilarius enim 
hoc in libris suis posuit (Lib. 2 de Trinitate); 
horxim verborum, id est, Patris, et Imaginis, 
et Muneris, aetemitatis, et speciei, et usus, 

• Imago enim si perfecte implet illud 

cujus imago est, ipsa coaequatur ei, non illud 
imagini suae. In qua imagine speciem nominavit, 
credo, propter pulchritudinem, ubi jam est tanta 
congruentia, et prima aequalitas, et prima simi- 
litude, nulla in re dissidens, et nullo modo 
inequalis, et nulla ex parte dissimilis, sed 
identifiem respondens ei cujus imago est. De 
Trinitate, VII, X, 11; P.L. V.42, c.931. 


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