Six lectures introductory to the philosophical writings of Cicero. / Levin, Thomas Woodhouse

SIX LECTUKES 



INTRODUCTORY TO 

THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 
OF CICERO, 



WITH 



SOME EXPLANATORY NOTES ON THE SUBJECT-MATTER 
OF THE ACADEMICA AND DE FINIBUS. 



BY 



T. W. LEVIN, M.A. 

ST CATHARINE S COLLEGE, 
INTER-COLLEGIATE LECTURER ON LOGIC AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Facile etiam absentibus nobis veritas Be ipsa defendet." 



__c$w 

CAMBRIDGE : 



DEIGHTON, BELL, AND CO. 

7 \^\ 

LONDON: BELL AND DALDY. 

1871. 



8 



Camimlige : 

PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. 
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 




O 



WITH THE HOPE THAT 

THE FOLLOWING LECTURES 

MAY TO SOME SLIGHT EXTENT 

AID IN REVIVING AN INTEREST IN SPECULATIVE SUBJECTS 
AMONG THE STUDENTS OF THIS UNIVERSITY, 

THE AUTHOR, 

BY PERMISSION, 

RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBES THEM 
TO THE 

REV. W. H. THOMPSON, D.D. 

MASTER OF TBINITT COLLEGE, CAMBEIDGE, 
AND LATE REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK. 



CAMBRIDGE, 
October, 1871. 



LECTURE I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 



"Non enim hominum interitu sententiae quoque occidunt: sed lucem 
auctoris fortasse desiderant." 



a. THE general object of these Lectures is to familiar 
ize you with the distinctive spirit which pervades and informs 
the later manifestations of Greek speculative opinion. The 
character we shall there find exhibited was undoubtedly 
impressed by Pyrrho the Eliensic philosopher, diffused by 
the writings of Timon the Phliasian, and adopted by the 
representative men of the later Academy. Yet, influential 
as the teaching of Pyrrho was, the real nature and tend 
ency of his doctrines have been strangely overlooked or 
misunderstood by most writers. To his figure has never 
yet been assigned its proper niche in the gallery of history. 
We shall therefore endeavour, if possible, to remedy this 
lack of just appreciation by making the aims and effects 
of Pyrrhonism one of the chief subjects of our enquiry. 
Another point we shall also consider is, the real extent to 
which the special doctrines of Pyrrho were entertained by 
the leaders of the so-called New Academy. This has always 
been a vexed question with historians, and one indeed which 

L. L. 1 



2 INTEOD UCTOR Y. [LECT. 

there is not much prospect of satisfactorily determining. 
Further, we shall attempt to present to you in as clear a 
light as possible, that problem which formed the centre 
of discussion between the Stoics and Academicians, and 
which is equally conspicuous in modern Metaphysics, namely, 
the nature and reality of the phenomena of perception. 
Some previous acquaintance with these subjects will, I hope, 
give the philosophical writings of Cicero a higher degree 
of interest for you than they have perchance hitherto pos 
sessed, since it is somewhat difficult for those not habitu 
ated to the atmosphere in which Cicero s characters think 
and speak, to follow their arguments or understand their 
allusions. 

It is our purpose then to examine a portion of the 
history of Greek Philosophy comprised within the last three 
centuries before the commencement of the Christian era 1 . 
This is a period which perhaps has not commanded either 
the attention of historians 2 , or the interest of students to 
the same degree as the age preceding, when Greek thought 
attained its highest development in the hands of Plato and 



1 We may consider the period before us to have commenced with Pyrrho, 
and closed with Cicero. The exact date of Pyrrho is uncertain, but he is 
known to have accompanied Alexander the Great on his Indian campaign. 
(Diogenes Laertius, ix. 61. 58.) 

2 Professor Maurice calls this period, "the lees of Greek philosophy," 
and favours it accordingly with a very brief notice. Moral and Metaphysical 
Philosophij, Part i. chap. vi. Liv. iv. sec. iv. Degerando remarks on the slight 
interest historians have taken in this part of Greek philosophy : " On est sur- 
pris de voir que la nouvelle Academic n ait pas obtenu en general des historiens 
toute 1 attention qu elle meritait. Brucker, qui a consacre un livre entier a 
la philosophic Antediluvienne, et de longs chapitres a des philosophes sans 
importance, accorde a peine quelques lignes a Philon et a Antiochus, quelque 
pages a Arce silas et a Carn^ade. On peut cependant consulter avec fruit 
VAcademique de Pierre de Valentia. Foucher: Histoire des Academiciens 
(Paris, 1690). De philosophid Academicd (Paris, 1792). On trouve dans les 
Memoires de VAcademle Royale de Berlin en 1748, une dissertation sur 
Clitomache, et dans ceux de I Academie des Inscriptions la dissertation de 






I.] INTRODUCTORY. 3 

Aristotle ; or as that succeeding, when the once brilliant flame 
of Athenian speculation flickered with the uncertain light of 
Alexandrian mysticism, before its final extinction in the 
obscurity of the dark ages. A careful consideration of the 
course of Greek thought during this period, may, I think, 
reveal to us many points of interest, which will render it 
worthy of minute investigation, which may discover for it 
a character of its own, too marked to be overlooked by the 
historian of the development of human opinion, and may 
show that it involves issues too important to be neglected 
by the critic of later systems of philosophy. Every event 
in general history should be viewed in connection with the 
circumstances which preceded and caused it, with those 
which accompanied and determined it, and with those which 
followed and resulted from it. So, in recording the succes 
sive phases of human opinion, which are the events in a his 
tory of philosophy, we must consider them with reference to 
preceding speculations, to those contemporaneous with them, 



Gautier de Sibert." Histoire comparee des Systemes de Philosophic," Tome 
in. p. 110 (note). To these works of the Academy we may add the 
following, which profess to treat directly of the Pyrrhonian philosophy : 
Dissert, de Philosophia Pyrrhonia (Jac. Arrhenii, Upsal, 1708); Dissert, de 
notione ac indole scepticismi, nominatim Pyrrhonismi (Jo. Gottl. Munch, 
Altdorf, 1796); Dissert, de Epoche Pyrrhonis (God. Ploucquet, Tiibingen, 
1758); Diss. Adumbratio quacstionis: an Pyrrhonis doctrina omnis tollatur 
virtus (Ch. Vit. Kindervater, Leipzig, 1789); Examen du Pyrrhonisme (M. 
Crousaz). This book is, however, more a consideration of the results than 
the principles of Pyrrhonism, and is in fact little more than an attack on M. 
Bayle. Bishop Huet s Traite philosophique de lafaiblesse de Vesprit humain 
is a good introduction to the subject, although it is encumbered with the 
false notion of perception through representative images prevalent among 
philosophers up to the age of Reid. Perhaps the fundamental problems of 
early scepticism are most clearly stated by Herbart, Einleitung in die Phi 
losophic, 59. 173. Sextus Empiricus, who lived about the middle of the 3rd 
century A. D M wrote a voluminous treatise on the doctrines of Pyrrho and 
the Sceptics generally. The best edition is the Fabrician. Histories of 
Greek Philosophy by Brandis, Zeller, Schwegler and Lewes, are most ac 
cessible to English students. 

12 



4 IN TROD UGTOR Y. [LECT. 

and to those of succeeding generations. Hence, adopting 
this method of procedure in the discussion before us, we shall 
first give a preliminary sketch introducing the principal ques 
tions which occupied the attention of the schools of philo 
sophers, the investigation of whose opinions is the object of 
the present course of Lectures. 

Next, we shall as far as possible from original sources give 
the substance of these opinions with their bearing on con 
temporary schools of thought, &&& finally, we shall endeavour 
by criticism and comparison to determine the value their 
decisions or speculations may have for the present generation 
of labourers in similar fields of enquiry. 

0. It is universally admitted that the great impulse 
Greek philosophy received from the teaching of Socrates 
was mainly owing to the method he introduced into the 
processes of speculation, and the ethical direction he gave to 
its aims. Before his advent, sages had thought and sceptics 
had doubted, but their thoughts had been as the wonder of 
infancy, the stirrings of that love of knowledge which Aris 
totle says is "a primary instinct of humanity;" for to them 
the great questions concerning man and the universe had 
first appeared in all their importance and mystery. "In- 
dagatio ipsa rerum turn maximarum, turn etiam occultissi- 
marum, habet oblectationem. Si vero aliquid occurret, quod 
verisimile videatur, humanissima completur animus volup- 
tate 1 ." The endeavour to discover the ultimate genesis of 
phenomena had already engaged the attention of the Ionian 
philosophers; the inability to reconcile the manifestations of 
these phenomena with the testimony of reason had given 
rise to the abstract idealism of the Eleatics ; the exclusive 
materialism of the former had resulted in the gloomy 
nihilism of Heraclitus, and the subtle dialectic of the 

1 Lucullus, 41. 



I.] INTRODUCTORY. 5 

latter in the flippant scepticism of the Sophists 1 . But al 
though the spontaneous activity of the human intellect had 
marked out distinct paths of speculation, the pre-Socratic age 
was distinguished by no definite method of conducting phi 
losophical enquiries. Moreover, there was wanting some 
motive principle which might sustain the speculative facul 
ties in investigations not directly connected with the com 
mon requirements of life. Thus philosophy soon came to be 
considered mere otiose and barren speculation ; and, falling as 
an instrument of power and venality into the hands of the 
Sophists, it was not surprising that its professors suffered 
under the disrepute Plato describes in the Sixth Book of 
the Republic 2 , and that the pursuit itself should be threat 
ened with extinction. 

At this crisis in the development of Greek thought, 
the genius of Socrates came to the aid of philosophy, and 
vindicated the higher energies of the human intellect by 
directing them into a worthy channel. Perceiving the bar 
renness and inutility of physical investigations, consisting 
as they did among the early thinkers in vain efforts to dis 
cover the causes and essences of things, he pronounced these 
setiological and ontological speculations beyond the range 
of the human faculties, and taught that of all the objects ^ 
of which man was conscious in the universe, he (man) him 
self was the most important subject of investigation (yvwdt, 
ceavrbv) . 

1 Gorgias Leontinus, sometime an adherent of the Eleatic school, was 
the author of a systematic treatise on scepticism thus described by Sextus 
Empiricus, " ev yap T$ Triypa<pofj.ei>(j} irepl TOV /J.T] oVros 97 irepl 0&rews rpta Kara 
rb etfs Ke<j>d\aia KaTaffKevdfa, ev i^ev Kal irpurov OTL ovdev fort, Seijrepov on el 
Kal tffTLV, d/cardXijTTTOj dvdpunry, rplrov on el Kal KaTaXrj-rrTOv, dXXa rot ye dve- 
oiffTov Kal dveppyvevTov ry 7rA.as." Adv. Math. vn. 65. 

2 " HpUTov fj.(v Tolvvv eKetvov TOV dav/jLa^ovra, on ol <pi\b<ro(f>oi ou Tifj,uvrai ev 
rats 7r6Xe<ri, StSaffict re ryv eluova Kal Tretpu irddeiv, OTL iro\i> av davfiaffrorepov 
JV, el enpuvro. A.\\d StSd^w, tyy. Kal on Tolvvv Td\T)drj Xeyeis, wj 

TOIS TroXXotj ol ImeiKto-Ta. TWV ev 0tXo<ro0t^." K.T.\ Eep. vi. 489. 



6 INTRODUCTORY. [LECT. 

The distinguishing feature then of all the philosophical 
enquiries which engaged the attention of the various schools 
founded by the followers of Socrates, was the endeavour to 
determine the relation and proper position of man with 
respect to the other objects in nature man as a creature 
susceptible of pleasure and pain, perpetually aroused by 
his connection with these objects, and endowed with a 
primary and irresistible instinct to obtain for himself that 
fulfilment of his susceptibilities which he denominates 
happiness. The nature of happiness, the possibility of its 
attainment, and the means to be employed for this end, 
we find were the foremost questions of discussion, and the 
bases of the leading systems of thought during the four 
centuries which immediately preceded the Christian era; 
constituting a common groundwork sufficient for the per 
petual antagonism of schools whose different solutions of 
the same problems were as opposed as those of the Cyre- 
naics, Stoics, and Pyrrhonists. "Nam omnis ratio vitse 
definitione summi boni continetur: de qua qui dissident, 
de omni ratione vitse dissident 1 ." But although ethic was 
. substituted for physic, as the object of intellectual acti 
vity we soon find that the very nature 2 of the questions 
constituting this science involved the necessity of more or 
less consideration of many of those branches of investi 
gation which had occupied the main place in the field of 
thought during the predominance of the so-called physi 
cal subjects of speculation. Socrates had already attempted 

1 Lucullus, 43. 

2 "Die Tugendlehre aber bedarf der Kenntniss des Menschen ; und sie wird 
um desto umher praktisch anwendbar, je mehr sie theils von der Erfahrung, 
theils von theoretischer Einsicht in die Natur des Menschen dasjenige in 
sich aufnimmt, was iiber die Verk nderlichkeit des Menschen zum bessern 
und zum schlechtern Aufschluss giebt. Daher ihre Abhangigkeit von der 
Psychologie, und mittelbar von der Metaphysik. " Herbart s Einleitung in 
die Philosophic, Seite 157. 



I.] INTRODUCTORY. 7 

to solve the great problem of happiness by identifying it 
with virtue, and virtue again he defined to be synony 
mous with knowledge. Man according to his doctrine 
would, if he were acquainted with the true science of life, 
i. e. if he foresaw distioctly the real consequences 1 of his 
actions, or the real effects of the causes perpetually influ 
encing him, necessarily only involve himself in the circum 
stances calculated to bring him the satisfaction of those 
desires implanted by nature. Hence, the true meaning of 
the maxim of Socrates " /cafcbs GKOOV ovSefc" no man 
would be willingly evil because no man could be willingly 
unhappy vice was the result of ignorance, as knowledge 
inevitably led to virtue knowledge then was indispen 
sable to a right practice of virtue, and virtue constituted 
the true happiness of man. We shall see that this notion 
of Socrates, viz. that evil was the result of intellectual 
not moral depravity, had a most powerful influence upon 
the subsequent development of Greek thought, and in fact 
forms the leading distinction between Christian and heathen 
ethical philosophy. Socrates imagined that by appealing 
to the universal and irresistible instinct of humanity to 
wards happiness, he would establish a permanent motive 
for the practice of virtue, and the pursuit of knowledge. 
No sooner, however, were his doctrines put to the test than 
the futility of this expectation was abundantly demon 
strated. 

y. On the one hand, it was maintained by the sensualists, 
or Hedonistic sect of moralists, that if, as seemed to be uni 
versally admitted, human knowledge was purely relative 
and subjective if, according to the apophthegm of Protago 
ras, "man was the measure of all things," then our sensa 
tions were the only objects of which we had absolute know- 

1 "Aom Se /cat 17 ^ireipta 97 irepl &ca0ra dvdpela rts eZiW oOev K&1 6 

elvai TTJV dvdpeiav." Aristotle, Eth. Nicom. in. 11. 6. 



8 INT HOD UCTOR Y. [LECT. 

ledge, and of which we could predicate certain existence 
(rd re iraQj], Kara\rj7rrd. "EXeyov ovv avrd, OUK d$ wv 
yiverai) 1 . Pleasure and pain 2 , consequently, were the only 
criteria of good and evil. The natural tendency of man to 
obtain the one and avoid the other, had been expressed by 
the institution of conventional canons of right and wrong. 
Justice was law, some said the law of the strongest, others 
the instinctive means of defence adopted by the weak ; and 
similarly with regard to the other virtues, they had no exist 
ence beyond that obtained from the sanction of law, tra 
dition, or custom. A good man therefore practised virtue in 
order to avoid censure or punishment. (MqSev re elvcu tyvcrei 
SIKCUOV, TI Ka\ov, fj alo-^pov" d\\d vd/j,w /cat, eOet. O pevroi, 
OTTovSeuos ovbev droTTOv Trpd^et Bid TO? eTTiKeipevas tyjfjLias KOI 
Sofa? 3 .) Here then was one result from the Socratic theory 
that virtue, knowledge and happiness were co-ordinate with 
each other. On the other hand, there was another sect 
among the disciples of Socrates headed by Antisthenes and 
Diogenes, who, starting from the same subjective idea of 
pleasure and pain, but instituting a more subtle analysis of 
the relation of those feelings to their causes, arrived at very 
opposite conclusions with respect to the attainment of hap 
piness. They perceived that pleasure was the equilibrium 
between the desires or affections of the human mind and the 
means provided by nature for their gratification, and that 
experience continually showed the inadequacy of the latter 
to meet the demands of the former. Consequently, said they, 
it is impossible, according to the present constitution of 

1 Diogenes Laertius, Lib. 11. cap. vm. 92. 

2 " Ao/cet 5 ai5To?s KO! rfros ef>8aifj.ovtas Sia^peiv. TefXos ^v yap elvai T-fjv 
KO.TO. fJ.tpos -f)^ovf]V fvdaifji,oviai> 5, TO &c TUV pepiicwv ydovw awr^a, afs <rvvapi0- 
povvrai Kal al Tra/x^x^K Tcu, Kal ai /iAXouo-at. ET>cu re rr\v /jLpiicr}i> 

5i avrrjv alperrfv rrjv 8* evdai/j,ovlav, ov 5t* af>Trji>, aXXtt Sid ras KO.TO. 
as." Diogenes Laertius, Lib. n. cap. viu. 87, 88. 

3 Diogenes Laertius, Lib. n. cap. vm. 93. 



I.] I NT ROD UCTOR Y. 9 

things, to expect satisfaction from the action of external 
causes. The only alternative was to moderate the cravings 
of humanity as much as possible in order to meet the paucity 
of means at hand for their fulfilment. Thus the Cynics 
hoped to live in proud independence of the circumstances 
around them, superior to pain, unallured by pleasure; and, as 
if to form the most marked antithesis possible to the follow 
ers of Aristippus, they, as Diogenes Laertius tells us, used to 
maintain that they owed no allegiance to any laws but those 
of virtue. (Kal TOV aofycv ov Kara rovs Ketftcvov? VOJJLOVS TTO- 
^iTeveaOai, d\\a Kara TOV TTJS aperrjs^.) The sentiments of 
both schools on this point were the natural corollaries from 
their respective systems. The Eudaimonists, finding the end 
of life in pleasure, were compelled to consider the individual 
as dependent, social, and interested in the welfare of the 
community of which he was a member. His canon of right 
and wrong, therefore, would be the laws to which society had 
agreed to submit; whereas the Cynic, isolated and self-suf 
ficient, was unwilling to confess himself amenable to any 
claims but those of what he considered his own higher nature. 
The one affirmed there was no virtue but that constituted 
by law, the other that there was no law but that constituted 
by virtue. It was perhaps in view of these conflicting 
conclusions respecting that which was the common object 
of both parties, viz. the attainment of happiness, that 
Pyrrho, the Eliensic philosopher, was induced to attempt on 
his own part the institution of an art of life. He probably 
compared the systems of the Cynics and Cyrenaics with the 
views of Socrates himself, a knowledge of whose opinions it 
is said was imparted to him by his fellow-townsman Phaedo 2 , 

1 Diogenes Laertius, Lib. vi. cap. i. v. 11. 

2 "Auch darf uns die Frage, auf welchem Wege er Kenntniss vom 
Sokrates erlangeii konnte, gar nicht in Verlegenheit setzen, wenn auch weder 
Dryson noch Klinomachus, chronologischer Schwierigkeiten wegen, seine 



10 INTRODUCTORY. [LECT. 

and the result of this comparison must have been soon to 
reveal to him that neither of these sects of philosophers had 
developed the Socratic notion of happiness in a way that 
would have been endorsed by Socrates himself. Some au 
thors have striven to point out traces of the Socratic doc 
trines in the teaching of Pyrrho, and we find Cicero refers 
to his school as one of those professing to be sprung from 
the Athenian sage (fuerunt etiam alia genera philosophorum, 
qui se omnes fere Socraticos esse dicebant; Eretriacorum, 
HerilKorum, Megaricorum, Pyrrhoniorum 1 .) It seems to us, 
however, that the Socratic influence is only so far discernible 
in the Pyrrhonian system as determining the subject about 
which it treated, viz. human happiness. But, as we have 
before observed, this question was the fundamental problem 
of all the post-Socratic schools of philosophy. Mr Grote re 
marks 2 upon this point: "Tennemann seeks to make out 
considerable analogy between Socrates and Pyrrho. But it 
seems to me that the analogy only goes thus far that both 
agreed in repudiating all speculations not ethical. But in 
regard to Ethics, the two differed materially. Socrates 
maintained that Ethics were matter of science, and the 
proper subject of study. Pyrrho, on the other hand, seems 
to have thought that speculation was just as useless, and 
science just as unattainable, upon Ethics, as upon Physics; 
that nothing was to be attended to except feelings, and 
nothing cultivated except good dispositions." Cannot there, 
then, be a science of feelings; and was it not exactly this 
which constituted the positive side of the Pyrrhonian sys 
tem? In truth Pyrrho, as he is represented to us by ancient 

Lehrer waren, da Phado aus derselben Stadt war, und daselbst anch eine 
Schule errichtet hatte." Tennemann s Geschichte der Philosophic, zweiter 
Band, Seite 171. 

1 De Oratore, in. 17. 

3 History of Greece, Vol. vm. note, p. 665. 



I.] INTROD UCTORY. 1 1 

writers, appears in two different, and by some thought in 
compatible characters, viz. Pyrrho the moralist, and Pyrrho 
the sceptic. By Cicero he is mentioned solely in the former 
light, as making virtue the single aim and object of his 
teaching. (Pyrrho qui virtute constituta, nihil omnino, 
quod appetendum sit, relinquat 1 .) And it is a singular fact 
that this author never once mentions Pyrrho in connection 
with the sceptical philosophy, not even in those fragments 
of his works which are especially devoted to the discussion 
of this subject 2 . Sextus Empiricus, on the other hand, to 
whose voluminous treatise we are mainly indebted for the 
information we possess concerning the spirit and tendency 
of the Pyrrhonian philosophy, emphatically proclaims Pyrrho 
as the author of the sceptical method, and he is by most 
modern writers recognised 3 , and certainly popularly known, 
as the father of scepticism. The question then arises, how 
far these two characters are reconcilable as belonging to 
the same individual; and we have endeavoured in the en 
suing chapter to show that in the blending of these appa 
rently discordant elements lies the whole originality of early 
Pyrrhonism. Scepticism was adopted by Pyrrho as an in 
strument for the attainment of virtue, and the only means of 
securing the greatest amount of happiness. Let us for a 
moment consider what may have been the steps by which he 
arrived at this conviction. 

8. It is often not difficult among the circumstances or 
conditions of life to which a great thinker has been sub 
ject, to detect some cause or other which had probably 
a determining influence upon the direction of his specu 
lations. If Antisthenes had been as wealthy as Aristip- 



1 De Finibus, iv. 16. 

2 Prior and post Academics. 

3 Cudworth s Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality, chap. 1, 2. 
527. 



1 2 INTRO D UCTORY. [LECT. 

pus, or Aristippus as poor as Antisthenes, would they 
ever have been celebrated as the respective founders of 
the Cynic and Cyrenaic sects of philosophers? Little is 
known of the life of Pyrrho, and that little is not calcu 
lated to throw much light upon the formation of his 
opinions. There is, however, one circumstance connected 
with him which we think may have been somewhat con 
ducive to the development of his peculiar views we mean 
his profession, that of an artist. Pyrrho we know derived 
his disbelief in all science from the uncertain character of 
sensible perception, and, as we shall find in the Seita rpoTroi, 
many of his arguments found upon the illusive nature of 
judgments concerning the magnitude and figure of ex 
ternal objects 1 . It is not improbable then that the atten 
tion of Pyrrho was especially directed to this subject by 
the frequent opportunity he had of observing in the prac 
tice of his art the various artificial effects that could be 
produced by a knowledge of the laws of perspective. 
Again, as a moralist, in the work of Sextus Empiricus 
there is nothing stated with such emphatic distinctness as 
the decided and uncompromising hostility which Pyrrhon- 



1 Even those who are least favorable to the Pyrrhonist doctrines admit 
that there is some force in their arguments based upon the discrepancy of 
visible perception. " On peut bien savoir par les sens qu un tel corps est 
plus grand qu un autre corps ; mais on ne saurait savoir avec certitude quelle 
est la grandeur veritable et naturelle de chaque corps ; et, pour comprendre 
cela, il n y a qu a conside rer que si tout le monde n avait jamais regarde 
les objets exterieurs qu avec des lunettes qui les grossissent, il est certain 
qu on ne se serait figure" les corps et toutes les mesures des corps, que selon 
la grandeur dans laquelle ils nous auraient 6t6 represented par ces lunettes : 
or, nos yeux memes sont des lunettes, et nous ne savons pas pre cisement 
s ils ne diminuent point ou n augmentent point les objets que nous voyons, 
et si les lunettes artificielles que nous croyons les diminuer ou les augmenter, 
ne les e tablissent point, au contraire, dans leur grandeur veritable ; et partant, 
on ne commit pas certainement la grandeur absolue et naturelle de chaque 
corps." Arnauld, La Logique de Port-Royal, p. 281. 



I.] INTRODUCTORY. 13 

ism bore to the voluptuous philosophy of the Cyrenaics 1 . 
May it not have been that this determined opposition to 
the idea of pleasure containing the essentials of happiness 
was in some part due to the observations he had made 
of the disastrous effects which attended its pursuit? for it 
was his art to depict the human countenance distorted 
by ungovernable passions. In truth, if man could have 
been brought to view life with the apathy Pyrrho so assi 
duously endeavoured to inculcate, there would have been 
few objects left for the employment of the limner s talent. 
To the writings of Democritus and Homer, which we are 
told were the favourite works of Pyrrho, we may undoubt 
edly attribute many of his speculative and moral con 
clusions. 

Democritus is said to have been the first of the mate 
rialist philosophers who, contrary to the natural beliefs of 
mankind, distinguished in the sensible qualities of things 
those which were real, permanent and objective, from those 
which were only apparent and relative, thus furnishing a 
plausible pretext for the paradoxes of the early Sceptics. 
The perusal of the Homeric poems describing the conflicts 
of cities and nations, had probably the same effect on the 
mind of Pyrrho as the study of the history of individuals 
revealed by the expression stamped upon their features. 
Reflecting on the strife and misery consequent on the in 
dulgence of love, anger and ambition, 

" Hunc amor, ira quidem communiter urit utrumque. 
Quidquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi, 
Seditione, dolis, scelere atque libidine et ira 
Iliacos iiitra muros peccatur et extra 2 ." 



avrfjs tTreiSr) eKeivr) JJL& TTJV rjSovrjv Kal rty \elav TTJS 
K\.VI\GIV T\OS elvai \4yei, ^u,et5 de r^v drapa^iav, 77 evavTiovrai rb /car e 
rAos Kal yap irapoijff rjs rrjs rj^ovijs Kal ^ Trapovffrjs, ra/Ja^aJ VTro/^ei 6 5ta/3e- 
fiaiovfj-evos rAoj elvai TT\V ydovfy." Hyp. I. 31. 215. 
2 Horatii Epistolarum, i. 2. 13 16. 



14 INTRODUCTORY. [LECT. 

he would naturally be. led to the conviction that of all 
the paths to happiness, the one making pleasure its sole 
end and aim was the least likely to lead to the expected 
goal, and that the truly wise and truly happy were alone 

" those who far aloof 

From envy, hate and pity, spite and scorn, 
Live the great life which all our greatest fain 
Would follow, center d in eternal calm." 

Some historians refer the sceptical and moral elements 
in the views of Pyrrho to the teaching of Bryson, son of 
Stilpo, the Megaric philosopher, but this hypothesis must 
be rejected on account of chronological difficulties. Others 
again have conjectured that Pyrrho derived many of his 
doctrines from the Gymnosophists, with whose institutions 
he is said to have become acquainted when he was in 
India with the expedition of Alexander. There is certainly 
a strong Oriental tinge in the idea of drapagla, or tran 
quillity, inculcated by Pyrrho as the summum bonum of 
existence. But as this notion was prominent in the system 
of the Cynics, and afterwards in that of the Stoics, there 
was no reason for supposing Pyrrho should have been in 
debted for it to foreign influences. Indeed the tendency 
to fatalism, which is the groundwork of all the apathetic 
schools of Greece, is essentially characteristic of Aryan 
thought. We do not, however, for this reason consider 
Greek philosophy any more than Greek language was 
directly derivative from eastern sources. As the many 
analogies between the forms of the Sanscrit and Greek 
languages only betray that both were originally from a 
common stock, so the parallelism of thought discernible in 
the Greek and Indian philosophies is an evidence certainly 
of consanguinity, but not necessarily of filiation. Those 
who read the treatise of Cicero on the subject of whether 
virtue be sufficient for a happy life, will find there sug- 



I.] INTRODUCTORY. 1 5 

gested a train of reflection similar to that which must 
have led Pyrrho to the adoption of his solution of the 
question. After having peremptorily dismissed the idea 
of pleasure as conducive to happiness, we may imagine his 
meditations to have concluded thus : Quod si est, qui 
vim fortunse, qui omnia humana, quse cuique accidere 
possunt, tolerabilia ducat, ex quo nee timor eum, nee 
angor attingat : idemque, si nihil concupiscat nulla effera- 
tur animi inani voluptate, quid est, cur is non beatus sit : 
et si hasc virtute efficiuntur quid est, cur virtus ipsa per 
se non efficiat beatos 1 ?" At this point the difficulty would 
have presented itself which must inevitably occur to any 
one possessing the slightest experience of human nature : 
How is it possible that the suppression of natural impulses 
can, at least in the process, be attended with happi 
ness? the very notion is self-contradictory. How can 
peace and tranquillity be present where there is a con 
tinual struggle? Virtue, if it must be practised at the 
cost of a perpetual conflict with nature, would be a harder 
taskmaster even than pleasure. Here then Pyrrho seems 
to have thought he had discovered a method of recon 
ciling the claims of our higher and lower nature. If the 
denial of desires was too painful to be consistent with 
the idea of happiness, were there no means, not of ex 
tinguishing the tumultuous cravings of nature, but of pre 
venting them from ever arising ? This object Pyrrho thought 
might be accomplished by the cultivation of a habit of 
doubt, namely, whether those qualities in objects a belief 
in the existence of which is the parent of desire, had any 
absolute, necessary, or permanent power. 

Such was the moral aim of the Pyrrhonian scepticism, 
which we will not discuss further at present, having made it 
the subject of the following lecture. 

1 Tusc. Disput. v. 6. 



1 6 INTRODUCTORY. [LECT. 

Before concluding these introductory remarks, however, 
on the doctrines of Pyrrho, we must advert to some difficul- 
ties meeting us in the historical development of our subject. 

e. In treating of the doctrines and influence of Pyrrho and 
the Pyrrhonists it is not easy to determine, from the historical 
remains extant, which are the views of Pyrrho himself which 
are due to the promulgators of his opinions and, above all, 
which are the individual conclusions of Sextus Empiricus his 
expounder. In comparing, therefore, the tenets of the Pyrrhon 
ists with those of the New Academicians, the question arises : 
How much of the accounts delivered to us by Sextus Empiri 
cus are we to regard as essentially typical of Pyrrhonism ? Pyr 
rho himself left.no writings, but his friend and pupil Timon 
of Phlius compiled his celebrated satirical poem (the Silli) with 
the object of enunciating the principles and aims of scepti 
cism 1 . This work, however, is unfortunately lost, but from 
the few fragments we find of it quoted by other authors we 
can gather what were the distinguishing characteristics of 
early Pyrrhonism. From these we infer that the intention 
of Pyrrho was mainly that which we have already indicated, 
viz. to construct an art of life on a basis of doubt 2 (ajropla) 
doubt was to lead to suspension of judgment (eVo^r)), and 
this again to tranquillity of mind (arapagla). Through the 
equilibrium of reasons (laoaQeveia} was engendered an equi 
librium of motives, and hence an absence of emotion and 
action. This form of Pyrrhonism, like most of the tentative 
systems of philosophy which sprang up on the death of 
Socrates, did not survive the introduction of the more scien 
tifically conceived schools of thought consequent upon the 
promulgation of the Aristotelian method. The sceptical por 
tion of Pyrrhonism was then adopted by Arcesilaus, and 

1 Diogenes Laertius, Lib. ix. cap. xi. 5. 

2 Praparat. Evang. xiv. 18 (758 A.). 5<? ye. /AOI^TTJS avrov Tt>wj> <j>r)<ri, 

evdcufji.ovr]<rtt>, K.T.\. 



i.] INTRODUCTORY. 17 

employed mainly, we think, as a weapon against the Stoical 
dogmatists by him, and afterwards by Carneades and the 
New Academicians. When the conflict between this latter 
sect and the Stoics had been terminated by the desertion of 
Antiochus to the Porch (or rather by the introduction of 
Stoical opinions into the Academy), Pyrrhonism is said to 
have been revived by ^Enesidemus and Agrippa. We do 
not think, however, that this second school of Pyrrhonism 
had much in common with the first, but was only a prolon 
gation of the Academic scepticism. That there was a dif 
ference, we admit, between the scepticism of ^Enesidemus, 
Agrippa, Menodotus, and that of the New Academy, but the 
distinction was this: Carneades only opposed his scepticism 
to the dogmatic pretensions of the Stoics, reserving at the 
same time the traditions of the older Academy concerning 
the possibility of a priori knowledge; whereas the Empirical 
sceptics whom Sextus Empiricus still denominated Pyrrhon- 
ists were absolute sceptics, because in denying the certainty of 
empirical knowledge they denied virtually the possibility of 
knowledge altogether. Carneades and the New Academicians 
carried their scepticism as a shield, the Pyrrhonists wore it 
as a garment. Yet we think there was less difference be 
tween the New Academy and the later Pyrrhonists than 
between the earlier and second school of Pyrrhonism. Sex 
tus Empiricus distinctly repudiates ^Enesidemus for mingling 
the dogmas of Heraclitus among the sceptical doctrines "oi 
Trepl TOV A.lwrjo i$r] fJiov eXeyov 6$bv elvai TT)V (T/ceTmKrjv a^w^v 
Trl TTJV r Hpafc\elTtov <tXocro</uaz>, SIOTI TrporjyeiTai, TOV ravav- 
Tia Trepl TO avrb vTrdp%et,v TO TavavTia Trepl TO avTO <f>aive- 
afiat, 1 ," then, after distinguishing clearly between the Hera- 
clitic and sceptical views, he adds : " CLTOTTOV &e l<rnv TO Tip 
ywyrjv o$bv elvai \eyeiv T^? alpeaew; Keivr)<$ y 
. aTOTrov apa TO TTJV crtceTTTiKrjV ayayyrjv eVl Trjv r Hpa- 

1 Hyp. i. 29. 210. 
L. L. 2 



1 8 INTRODUCTORY. [LECT. 

K\iTiov <$>i\oao<j)[av cSoi> elvai Xeyiv l ." ^Enesidemus is, 

however, still more emphatically separated from the older 

Pyrrhonism by his abandonment of the original object of the 

whole system, viz., the attainment of drapa^ia. Aristocles 

in Eusebius, quoting the words of Timon concerning the 

principles and aims of Pyrrho, says: "Tot? fJLevroi 

ovrco Treptecreo-Oai Tl/Awv (frycrl jrpurov /u-ey a^ao-iav, 

arapa&av Alvrfa-lBrjfjio^ Se ?;<W??i/ 2 ." Comparing this passage 

with the uncompromising disgust with which the idea of 

pleasure is viewed in the 1st book of the Hypoty poses, we 

should infer that ^Enesidemus can scarcely be reckoned a 

follower of Pyrrho. Tennemann seems to think that the 

later Pyrrhonists are distinguished from the earlier princi 

pally by having shifted their sceptical point of view, the 

former professing mere subjective doubt, whereas the latter 

had extended this doubt to the nature of the object: "Die 

Zusammenstellung der Widerspruche in den Systemen der 

Dogmatiker musste zum Beweise das Unvermogens der 

Objekte dienen, ihre Natur zu erkennen zu geben, und 

hieraus folgerten sie die Unverlassigkeit der Sinne und des 

Verstandes zur Erkenntniss der Wahrheit. Die neuern 

Skeptiker, durch die Gegengrunde der Dogmatiker veranlasst, 

welche den Skepticismus von der Seite vorziiglich augriffen, 

dass er selbst eine objective Behauptung enthalte, diese 

namlich, die Object e sind unvermogend, eine Erkenntniss 

zu begriinden, gaben mit grosser Einsicht diese auf, und 

blieben bei der Ansicht stehen, dass bis jetzt in keinem 

Stiicke etwas entschieden sey, und die widersprechenden 

Behauptungen den Verstand in eine Art von Gleichgewicht 

setzen, dass er weder bejahend noch verneinend zu entschei- 

den wat 3 ." 



1 Hyp. i. 29. 212. 

2 Preepar. Evang. Lib. xiv. 18. 758 B. 

3 Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophic. Zweiter Band, s. 186. 



I.J INTRODUCTORY. 19 

The information we possess as to the real opinions of 
Carneades is not much more direct than that concerning 
those of Pyrrho : in both cases it is but the echo, not the 
voice of the master we hear ; for Carneades, like Pyrrho, left 
no record of his own tenets. As Sextus Empiricus was the 
expounder of the Pyrrhonian method, so we may consider 
Cicero to have been the mouthpiece of Carneades, at least 
on the subject of metaphysics 011 points of morality Cicero L - 
professes entire disagreement with the New Academy. We 
have, however, among the philosophical writings of Cicero, 
but one really undertaking to discuss expressly the views 
of the later Academy on speculative subjects. This treatise, 
intended to present an account of the course of the pole 
mic between the New Academicians and the Stoics concern- *" 
ing the grounds of certitude of human knowledge, is one 
of the least satisfactory of the productions of this great 
author. No writer has ever better understood, or more 
distinctly stated, the requisites of a finished philosophical 
style, viz. to handle important points exhaustively, subor 
dinate ones tersely (grandia ornate, enucleate minora 
dicere 1 ) ; yet in the Lucullus this canon seems almost to 
have been reversed ; fundamental principles are scarcely 
approached, while assertions instead of arguments on either 
side are repeated with tedious iteration. The inadequacy 
of the treatment indeed to the exigencies of the subject 
did not escape the attention of Cicero himself; and, as he 
explains to us the circumstances 2 which occasioned it, there 

1 De Finibus, iv. 3. 

2 " Illam a.Kadr][j,iKr)v <r{jvra.^(.v totam ad Varronem traduximus. Primo fuit 
Catuli, Luculli, Hortensii: deinde, quia irapd TO irpe-rrov videbatur, quod erat 
liominibus nota, non ilia quidem diraidev<rla, sed in iis rebus drpi^ia, simul 
ac veni ad villam, eosdem illos sermones ad Catonem Brutumque transtuli." 
Ep. ad Alt. xiu. 16. " Hsec Academica, ut scis, cum Catulo, Lucullo, Hor- 
tensio, contuleram. Sane in personas non cadebant. Erant enim Xo7t- 
KUTepa, quam ut illi de iis somniasse umquam viderentur." Ep. 19. It would 
appear from these extracts that Cicero in his first edition adapted his method 

22 



20 INTRODUCTORY. [LECT. 

is no place for criticism. In fact, he recalled the work in 
question, and substituted for it another dissertation on the 
same subject (A cad. post). Of this there are but twelve 
sections extant, the last of which only introduces Arcesi- 
laus, and therefore just commences to expound the peculiar 
views of the New Academy. 

f. The relation of the New to the Old Academy must 
be mainly determined by the degree of sincerity with which 
the sceptical or negative arm of philosophy was employed by 
the former. If we are to believe the testimony of Sextus 
Empiricus, Arcesilaus was a sceptic to his adversaries, but 
a maintainer of the more positive part of the Platonic 
doctrines to his friends. " (fraalv on Kara /xev TO Trpo^ec- 
pov Tlvppwveios e(f>aiVTO elvai, Kara Se rrjv a\r}@eiav Boj- 
Kal CTree TWV eratpcov airbireipav ekajji^ave Bid 
el eixfrvws %ovcri TT/JO? TTJV avd\vyfyiv 
TCOV Tl\aro)VLKu>v Soyfidrayv, So|m avrbv dTropijTi/cbv elvai, 
76 eixfrvecri, rwv eraipwv ra HXdrwvos Trapey- 
As we have already remarked, we think it pro 
bable that the integrity of Platonism was preserved by Car- 
neades and Philo. How else can we interpret the position 
of the latter that we could know things per se, but not 
through the cataleptic phantasm 1 (o&ov jjuev eVl rw 
KpiTijpiq), Tovrecm, rfj KaTa\Tj7m/cfj ^avracna, 
elvai ra Trpdyfjuara, oaov Se eVl rfj fyvaei TWV 
avrwv Kard\r}7rra z ). It seems to us indeed that the real 
cause of hostility between the Stoics and Academicians was 
this very adherence by the latter to the views of Plato, 
in opposition to the empirical and materialist philosophy 

of treating the subject to the capacity of the assumed interlocutors ; hence, 
the constant lack of logical sequence discernible in the Lucullus, and the 
repetition of puerile and frivolous matter. There is no doubt, however, that 
the amended work was as perfect as the other was deficient even from the 
meagre but invaluable fragment which has survived. 

1 Hyp. i. 33. 234. 2 Hyp. i. 33. 235. 



I] IN TROD UCTOR Y. 21 

of the former. One of the first effects of the triumph 
of the Aristotelian philosophy had been to re-open the great 
question concerning the certainty of knowledge. Plato had 
proclaimed his ideal theory, as the only refuge from scep 
ticism, the only foundation of absolute truth; therefore, on 
the overthrow of this theory, the opinions of the Sceptics 
touching the relativity and consequent uncertainty of all 
things had become more and more prevalent. It was to 
stem this torrent of scepticism that Zeno and the Stoics, 
while maintaining the empirical nature of all our knowledge, 
endeavoured to derive a basis of certitude from those in 
tuitive perceptions of the real qualities of objects which 
they thought were to be found in the cataleptic phantasm. 
Thus the attention of philosophers was concentrated upon 
the psychological process, in which material objects of know 
ledge assumed the form of mental perceptions, and on the 
validity of the assent or instinctive belief (frvyKardOecris) 
afforded by the mind to the testimony of consciousness. It 
was the opposition of the Academy to the Stoics on this 
point which constituted the scepticism of the former a 
scepticism relative indeed only to the empiricism of the 
latter; and which, as we have seen, for this reason differed 
essentially from the scepticism of the Pyrrhonists. In this 
controversy, on the one hand, the question at issue was 
whether or not a realist theory of perception could be 
demonstrated to be true. That any theory of perception 
is demonstrable, especially by empiricism, involved a self- 
contradiction, because the facts of consciousness which were 
called as evidence could only be interpreted by the assump 
tion of the theory, and yet upon these facts alone could any 
theory be based. 

The New Academicians, on the other hand, still hold 
ing the ground formerly occupied by Plato that the 
mind in perception was conscious of nothing but its own 



22 INTRODUCTORY. [LECT. 

modifications, the mere shadows of external objects, showed 
irrefutably that all hope of escaping from mere subjective 
knowledge was impossible (nravTa elvai dKara\rj7rra) ; and 
so the contest continued, from Arcesilaus to Antiochus, 
without hope of any satisfactory termination. Each side, 
safe under the shelter of its own theory, eagerly watched 
for the weak place in that of its adversary 



ci\X v<f)L^avov KIJK\OIS, 
aiSypos e^oXiaddvoi /xdr?;* . 
ct 5 6/uL/JL inrepffxov ITVOS arepos fj.ddoi, 



and thus, without ever fairly grappling the problem, they 
left it as a legacy for later philosophers to attempt to 
solve. 

It may be gathered from these preliminary remarks, 
that the main subject which is to occupy our attention in 
the following Lectures, must be the consideration of the 
features and tendencies of ancient scepticism; for it is 
obvious, scepticism in one form or another was the essen 
tial characteristic of each of the three schools that of 
Pyrrho, of the New Academy, and of the later Pyrrhonists. 
We shall therefore conclude this introductory chapter with 
a few observations on this aspect of Greek philosophy. 

77. Scepticism is one of those words which, from the 
earliest date of their use, seem to convey a meaning different 
from their real signification. According to the etymology of 
the word, a sceptic was simply an enquirer, and we have 
the name a-fceim/cr) used always synonymously with &Tr]7iKr) 
by Sextus Empiricus. But through that habit of confusing 
cause with effect we so often see indicated in the use of 
words, o-KeTTTL/cr) was soon understood to mean solely diroprjTi/c^ 
or the art of doubting. Although, however, the Sceptics 

1 Phvcnisscc, line 1397. 



I.] INTRODUCTORY. 23 

professedly adhered to the literal meaning of the word as 
justly applied to themselves, few will hesitate to admit that 
the love of doubt is a more prominent feature throughout 
their system than the love of investigation. 

M. Cousin, synthetically deducing all the schools of phi 
losophy from a priori consideration of the instinctive tenden 
cies inherent in the human mind, determines scepticism to 
be an inevitable result from the opposing dogmatisms of 
sensualism and idealism, "le sensualisme, 1 idealisme, et le 
scepticisme." Such is the inevitable succession in the human 
mind, a like order of succession then we must expect to find 
in the history of the development of human thought ; and, 
according to the facts M. Cousin adduces, such seems to have 
been actually the case. But this theory is obviously only 
applicable to scepticism considered as a manifestation of the 
doubting, not the enquiring element in the mind. Every 
new system of thought must be sceptical in relation to the 
system it supplants, and the transition from one to the other 
necessarily supposes the exercise of that zetetic faculty which 
scepticism primarily implied. In this sense, therefore, scep 
ticism would be the alternate link in the successive phases 
of opinion, the motive or dynamical element in the intellec 
tual constitution of man continually urging him forward in 
his search after truth, a search which, although the attain 
ment of its object may be impossible, evokes the employment 
of his noblest powers. "Speculative truth (says Sir W. 
Hamilton) is subordinate to speculation itself, and its value 
is directly measured by the quantity of energy which it oc 
casions 1 " scepticism and true philosophy are thus identical. 

The moment a philosopher begins to dogmatize, he ceases 
to be a philosopher, for then he virtually admits his search 
after truth is at an end. Of course the dogmatic and philo- 

1 Sir W. Hamilton s Discussions (n. Essay). " Philosophy of Percep 
tion," p. 40. 



2 4 INT ROD VCTOR Y. [LECT. 

sophic tendencies in human nature will find expression: the 
former as the stable, conservative, practical; the latter as the 
moving, progressive, speculative. 

The due adjustment then of these apparently conflicting 
elements will constitute a healthy intellectual tone either in 
the individual or in what is termed the spirit of the age, 
which is but the common expression of an aggregate of indi 
viduals ; and the preponderance of the dogmatical or scepti 
cal tendencies is always indicative of an abnormal state in 
any period of the history of human thought. 

" The negative side of Grecian speculation stands quite as 
prominently marked, and occupies as large a measure of the 
intellectual force of their philosophers, as the positive side. 
It is not simply to arrive at a conclusion, sustained by a 
certain measure of plausible premise and then to proclaim 
it as an authoritative dogma, silencing or disparaging all 
objectors that Grecian speculation aspires. To unmask 
not only positive falsehood, but even affirmation without 
evidence, exaggerated confidence in what was only doubtful, 
and show of knowledge without the reality to look at a 
problem on all sides, and set forth .all the difficulties attend 
ing its solution to take account of deductions from the 
affirmative evidence, even in the case of conclusions accepted 
as true upon the balance all this will be found pervading 
the march of their greatest thinkers. As a condition of all 
progressive philosophy, it is not less essential that the grounds 
of negation should be freely exposed than the grounds of affir 
mation. We shall find the two going hand in hand, and the 
negative vein indeed the more impressive and characteristic 
of the two, from Zeno downwards in our history 1 ." It seems 
evident that scepticism always has been, and always must be 
necessary to the advancement of human thought: the paradox 
of one age may become an axiom in the next, a prejudice in 

1 History of Greece (Grote), chap. XLVII. p. 472. 



I.] INTRODUCTORY. 25 

the succeeding; and if there was no disposition to question, 
examine, and sift the grounds of opinion, intellect would 
stagnate, and the natural aspirations of man onwards and 
upwards would be blunted and impeded. Why then has the 
word "scepticism" such an obnoxious sound to the ears of most 
people, that the very enquiry into its character and history is 
looked upon with mistrust? It is for this reason, that, in the 
infancy of thought among the Greeks, and to a great degree 
in modern times, the limits arid functions of the different 
fields of activity of the human mind have never been pro 
perly or adequately defined. In Greece, philosophy, science 
and religion being alike treated as products of reason, the 
conclusions of one were considered applicable to the solution 
of problems properly belonging to the other two. Thus it 
was that the false methods of physical enquiry, which seemed 
to render the attainment of any positive science impossible, 
threw an unhealthy feeling of doubt and discouragement on 
speculative or philosophical pursuits, and subverted or clouded 
with uncertainty all the foundations of natural morality. 
When virtue and knowledge were considered identical, what 
wonder that to impugn the validity of the latter seemed to 
involve a questioning of the authority of the former. So in 
our own day the claims of philosophy, science and religion 
are held by many to be conflicting, and they who rely upon 
one are frequently led to discard the other. The man of 
science certain in his results, confident in his processes, despises 
the dreaming philosopher, who in his search after truth 
appears to neglect all that is substantial and practical; both, 
confident that the reason of man is potent to measure the 
mysteries of the universe, look upon faith, which is beyond 
the range of reason because it is above it, as the offspring of 
bigotry and superstition. In fact, however, the tendency of 
zetetic philosophy, which we think is all philosophy, is, as we 
shall endeavour in the following pages to show, to render 



26 INTRODUCTORY. [LECT. I. 

man more and more dependent upon faith, faith being the 
principle on which the validity of all the processes of reason 
must ultimately depend. Every new phase of speculative 
opinion must lead the thoughtful observer to the conviction 
that it is not given to the human intellect to unlock the 
secrets of the absolute man is not the measure of all things 
"areXe? ovbev ov&tvos //,e rpoiA" If philosophy has succeeded 
in convincing the proud reason of man of this fact, it surely 
has contributed something to the interests of religion if it 
points out to science her proper domain and limit, science 
cannot but admit herself on this account under great obliga 
tions to speculation. It is then with these objects in view 
that the historian of ancient thought should engage in his 
task; not treating opinions as the venerable ruins of bygone 
ages, but as the expressions of tendencies in the human mind, 
which, being constant in their operation, must perpetually 
recur as long as human nature remains the same; so that any 
judgment passed will be of as much importance as a contri 
bution to the study of modern as of ancient thought, and, by 
deciding for ever those questions the recurrence of which 
may be calculated on as isochronous perturbations, leave the 
attention of philosophers free to be concentrated on new 
fields of discovery and speculation. 

1 Plato, Rep. Lib. vi. 404. 



LECTURE II. 

ON THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC . 



TOUTO /J.OI, (3 Hvppuv, l/JLeiperai ^rop d.Kov<rai, 

IIws TTOT d.vT]p IT (Lyeis p^ffra fj,td r/<ri;xtas, 
Mow>s Iv dvdpwiroiffi 0eov rpbirov 



a. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS in his Hypotyposes asserts that 
the name of Pyrrho had been rightly associated with the 
sceptical philosophy, from the fact that he above all his 
predecessors had systematised and developed its peculiar 
opinions. " Kal Hvppwveios dirb TOV $aive<rdai ijptv TOV 
Tlvppwva o-w^aTLKwrepov /cal em<l>ave<rTepov T&V Trpb avrov 
jrpoff\ri\v0evai rfj aictyei, 1 " Let us now consider wherein 
consists the claim of Pyrrho to be recognised as the 
special founder of a new sect of philosophers. Scepticism, 
as a tendency of the human mind, must have been ante 
cedent to the earliest efforts of man towards philosophical 
research, for doubt is as much the parent as the offspring 
of enquiry 2 , and we find it appearing as a positive feature 
in one of the earliest manifestations of Greek speculation. 

1 Hyp. i. 3. 7. 

2 " Jeder tiichtigen Anf anger in der Philosophic 1st Skeptiker. Und um- 
gekehrt: jeder Skeptiker, als soldier, ist Anf singer." Herbart, Einleitung in 
die Philosophic, chap. iv. p. 62. 



28 THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. [LECT. 

Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the Eleatic 
school, had denied the possibility of attaining certain know 
ledge : 



Socrates had recommended doubt as the best prepara 
tion of the mind for humble enquiry: " 9 H ^wKpares, rjrcovov 
/nev 70)76, Trplv real avyyeveaOai aoi, on, crv oi&ev a\\o 
rj auro9 re ciTropels, KOI roi)? aXXoi ? Tnnet? ajropelv. Kal 
vvv, w? 7 e/Jbol Sotfet?, yorjrevei? ue Kal (^ap/judrre^, Kal 
(iT%vQ)s KareTrddeis, ware fiearbv diropias yeyovevai 2 ." Be 
sides, Heraclitus, Democritus, Protagoras, and the whole 
of the Hedonistic school of philosophers, had implicitly or 
explicitly based their views of the relation of man to 
external nature on a sceptical method. Pyrrho then can 
scarcely be said in this respect to have introduced any 
novel system into the processes of philosophical investi 
gation. Again, with regard to the avowed end of the 
Pyrrhonian doctrines, viz., the attainment of drapagia 3 , or 
a state of tranquil inaction as the summum bonum of a 
wise man 4 , Socrates himself to a great degree, and the 
sect of Cynic philosophers had inculcated a life of con 
templative virtue, as the proper end of a rational existence ; 
and therefore Pyrrho cannot lay claim to originality in 
introducing this ascetic aim as the ultimate object of his 
whole philosophy. In what, we may ask, then did the 

1 Hyp. ii. 4. 8. 

2 Meno. p. 80. 

" 6 rt 5 aroTrwraros elfJ.1 Kal TrotcD TOVS dvdpuirovs aTro/oetV." 

Thccetetus, 149 a. 

3 Cicero refers this notion of drapa^la to Democritus. "Democriti 
autem securitas, quas est animi tanquam tranquillitas, quam appellant e)- 
0vfj,lav, eo seperanda fuit ab hac disputatione quia ista animi tranquillitas ea 
ipsa est beata vita." De Fin. v. 8. Cf. Aristotle, Eth. NIC. n. 3. "At6 Kal 
bplfrvrai rots dperas diraOdas Tivas Kal ^pe^/as." 

4 "rb ptv fAifievbs 5et(T^at 6eioi> elvat, rb 5t cos IXaxicrruv eyyvrdru TOV 0eiov." 

Xen. Memor. i. 6. 



II.] THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. 29 

teaching of Pyrrho entitle him to the reputation of having 
founded a distinct school of philosophy? To this question 
we may reply : The distinguishing characteristic of Pyrrho s 
system was the employment of a sceptical method as an 
instrument for the attainment of virtue. Thus, in con 
formity with the tendency of the age, he attempted to 
unite speculative with practical philosophy ; and, as Aris- 
tippus had deduced an art of life from the principles of 
subjective materialism as Plato had endeavoured to found 
an ethical system on a basis of idealism so Pyrrho in his 
turn essayed to solve the great problem of happiness by 
the aid of scepticism. It is, therefore, this aspect of Pyr 
rhonism to which we shall first direct our attention ; con 
stituting, as we think it does, a manifestation of human 
thought novel amongst its contemporaries, and unique 
amongst subsequent phases of opinion. 

/3. Every desire in the human mind implies also a 
belief in the existence of its object 1 . " Quod si aliquid ali- 
quando acturus est, necesse est id ei verum, quod occurrit, 
videri." Lucullus, 8. This object is some quality or power 
in things to satisfy the appetite or feeling which has given 
rise to the desire. A belief in the existence of the object of 
desire, then, is a belief that the thing we desire is capable 
of producing an effect on us suitable to the feeling which 
prompted the desire. Hunger, for example, produces a de 
sire for food, and we desire food because we believe that 
there exists in it a power to satisfy the cravings of hunger. 
Now in whatever way we may define that state of mind 



1 " 77 re yap <f>t\apyvpta vir&Xtj^is <TTI TOV rb dpytiptov KO\&V etvat Kal 
5i Kal i) dKo\a<ria 6/iotws Kal r&\\a" Diog. L. vn. 110 sqq. 

" Quamobrem simul objecta species cujuspiam est, quod bonum videatur 
ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura." Tus. Dis. iv. 6. Kant s defini 
tion makes desire create its own object. " Begehrungsvermb gen ist das 
Vermogen durch seine Vorstellungen Ursache der Gegenstande dieser Vor- 
stellungen zu seyn." Einleitung in die Metaphysik der Sitten, i. p. 9. 



30 THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. [LECT. 

called belief, it is at any rate certain that such a state of 
mind is utterly opposed to, and incompatible with, that 
condition of consciousness we denominate doubt. Where 
there is doubt, there can at the same time be no belief. 
If belief, then, in the existence of the object of desire is a 
constitutive element of the desire itself, it is evident that 
any means employed to induce a state of doubt in the mind 
must have the effect of suppressing desire. Again, any 
determination of the mind to action, or act of volition, 
implies a previous presence of some desire or motive direct 
ing the will to some definite object 1 . It is true that every 
desire is not necessarily followed by action, but it is equally 
certain 1jiat every voluntary action must have been pre 
ceded by some desire. 

Here then we have the central notion of the Pyrrhonian 
system, viz. to collect conflicting evidence concerning the 
reality of external objects, or the qualities of external ob 
jects 2 . By this means a feeling of doubt (airopia] as to this 
reality is established in the mind, hence desire for the object 
is suppressed, and there being no incentive to effort, a state 
of inaction, or drapafta, ensues. " Alterum est, quod negatis 
actionem ullius rei posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem assensu 
suo comprobet. Primum enim videri oportet in quo sit etiam 
assensus. Dicunt enim Stoici, sensus ipsos assensu s esse: 
quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi. Tolli au- 
tern omnia, si visa tollantur 3 ." " For," says Sextus Empiricus 4 , 
"he who believes that anything is really (tfrvaet, 6 ) good 

1 " In all determinations of the mind that are of any importance, there 
must be something in the preceding state of the mind that disposes or 
inclines us to that determination." Keid, "On the Active Powers of Man," 
Essay n. (Hamilton s Reid). 

2 "E<m 5 i) (TKeirTiKT) SiW/us aVrt0eri/o? <f)aivo^vd}v re /ecu voov^tvuv, K.T.\. 
Hyp. i. 4. 8. 

3 Lucullus, 33. 4 Hyp. i. 12. 272930. 

5 On this meaning of the word 0tf<ret, see note on the Fabrician edition of 
Sextus Empiricus. (Hyp. i. 12. 27, note L, p. 18). It is there translated by 



II.] THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. 3 1 

or evil, is for ever being disturbed, and as long as those 
things he imagines good are not attained by him, he con 
siders himself the victim of real evils, and he pursues eagerly 
those things he thinks are really good. But the attain 
ment of them only leads him to further disquietude, because 
he is unreasonably and immoderately elated, and because 
dreading any change he strives his utmost to prevent these 
supposed benefits escaping him 1 . While on the contrary 
he who doubts concerning the reality of that which he 
considers good or evil, neither vehemently pursues, nor pre 
cipitately shuns anything, and therefore remains calm and 
tranquil 2 ." "Now," continues Sextus Empiricus, "the Sceptics 
at first hoped to attain tranquillity by demonstrating the 
discrepancy between things perceived through the senses and 
those apprehended by the intellect; failing in this, they 
suspended their judgment (eVe(7%oi/), and, as a necessary 
result, tranquillity followed this withholding of assent, as 
the shadow follows a body. Not that we mean to say a 
Sceptic is totally exempt from trouble; we admit he may 

the Latin adverb revera. It seems to mean really or by nature, or per se, or 
any word which implies objective existence. 

1 "Ye Powers, why did you man create 

With such insatiable desire? 
If you d endow him with no more estate 
You should have made him less aspire. 
But now our appetites you Vex and Cheat 
With reall Hunger, and Phantastic meat." 

Norris Miscellany. " The Complaint." 

2 Cf. "Partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis 
nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quatuor. Ex bonis libidinem et 
lastitiam, ut sit Isetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum. Ex malis 
metum et segritudinem nasci consent, metum futuris, segritudinem praasen- 
tibus. Quaa enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt segritudiiie in- 
stantia. Laatitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur : cum libido 
ad id, quod videtur bonum, illecta et iiinammata rapiatur : laetitia ut adepta 
jam aliquid concupitum, efferatur et gestiat. Natura enim omnes ea, quae 
bona videntur, sequuntur fugiuntque contraria." -Tusc. Disp. iv. 6. Cf. 
Aristotle, Eth. Nic. n. 3. 



32 THE PJRRHON1AN ETHIC. [LECT. 

suffer from thirst, cold, or any of the inevitable evils of life. 
But even under these circumstances, ordinary individuals 
are exposed to double suffering, both from the so-called 
evils themselves, and from believing them to be essentially 
evil. The Sceptic, dismissing the idea that there are any evils 
per se, endures them with fortitude. We say therefore that 
the aim of scepticism is inaction (arapagia) under possible 
(Sogaa-Toty circumstances; and moderate emotion (/jLerpio- 
iraOeiav) under actual (KarrjvayKacr/jLevois)" From these pas 
sages we are enabled to form some estimate of the scope 

O * 

and tendency of the Tyrrhenian teaching. Popularly stated, 
it was founded on the result of experience in common life ; 
viz. that any good is greater in the anticipation, than in 
the enjoyment ; and that evil is more in the dread, than in 
the suffering. In point of fact man, in virtue of the rational 
part of his nature, is more concerned with the future and 
possible, than with the present and actual. Hopes and 
fears are the levers of life, and the main incentives to all 
action. But on what are these hopes and fears grounded? 
Simply on our belief that the good and evil we see in things 
have an absolute and necessary existence. The poor man 
wishes to be rich. Why? Because he believes that the 
benefits to be derived from wealth are inherent in riches ; 
he does not see that the happiness they confer is dependent 
on the susceptibilities of the possessor, and contingent on 
the circumstances which attend their possession. Health 
and strength of body, the attachment of friends, the affec 
tions of domestic life, may insure to him a much greater 
degree of happiness than is enjoyed by the rich man, to 
whom perhaps these accessories are wanting. Sextus E. 
mentions a forcible example of the effect of imagination 
in inducing a belief in the absolute and necessary nature 
of evil, instancing as a fact that, when witnessing a surgical 
operation performed on a friend, the bystander is often more 



II.] THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. 33 

overcome by the pain he supposes is being suffered than the 
patient is from the actual infliction. " fl? pev yap av9pu>Tros 
alo-0r)Ti,Kcs Trda^et, ^r] rrpocrBo^d^aiv Se LTL TOVTO o Tracr^e/, 
Katcbv eo-Ti (frt crei, jjieTpioTraQel TO jap TrpocrSo^d^eLv TL TOLOVTO 
Xelpov eari /cal avrov rov iraayziV) o$9 evlore roi)? jjuev reyit- 
vo/mevovs fj aXXo TL TOLOVTO 7rdo"%ovTas (frepetv, rou? Se Trapea- 
Sia rrjv Trepl rou yivojuuevov $oj;av a5? (f>av\ov \eiiro^v- 
If then we admit that a life of tranquillity, of free 
dom from unrest and disquiet, should be the aim of a wise 
man, we cannot impugn the validity of the means the 
Pyrrhonists proposed for attaining that object. They cut at 
the root of all human hopes, fears, and desires, and left man 
in the possession solely of that consciousness of the present 
and actual which we suppose him to share with the brute 
creation. " Ergo hi, qui negant quidquam posse compre- 
hendi, haec ipsa eripiunt, vel instrumenta, vel ornamenta 
vitse: vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt funditus, 
ipsumque animal orbant animoV "Whether such a result, 
if it were possible, would be worthy the aspirations of an 
intelligent being we will leave for the present to the judg 
ment of the reader. Sextus E. gives a characteristic sum 
mary of the Tyrrhenian reasoning on this subject, the con- 
clusiveness of which seems at any rate not to have been 
doubted by him. u "Q9ev eiriKo^i^ofJueda OTI, el TO /ca/cov 

, KCLKOV 6<TTL Kal fyeVKTOV, r) 8e 7T C7TO i ^CTfc? TOU TClSe 

elvat, <u<m dyaOa TaSe 8e rcaxd, Tapa%d<; Troiel KCLKOV 
Kal (frevKTOv TO vTTOTidecrOai; Kal ireTroiOevai <f>av\ov TI 
T) dyaOcv w? vrpo? TTJV (pvcnv elvai s " 

1 Hyp. m. 24. 236. * Lucullus, 10. 

3 Hyp. in. 24. 238. The following reflections of M. Crousaz seem to 
embody the really common-sense view of the main aim of Pyrrhonism, viz. 
the attainment of tranquillity, and absence of all disquietude. "Le But dont 
les Sceptiques tiroient leur gloire renfermoit done une contradiction pal 
pable. L ignorance ou je suis sur la veorite ou sur la realite de ce qui paroit 
Bien, et de ce qui paroit Mai, m empeche d etre agite* de Ddsirs et de Craintes, 

L.L. 3 



34 THE PYMRHONIAN ETIIIC. [LECT. 

7. Of course we should not expect that a philosopher 
who considered the great end and aim of virtue to be the 
suppression of all incentives to action, would devote much 
attention to establishing any rules for the guidance of action. 
Pyrrho (and Aristo), says Cicero 1 , insisted that every thing 
was comprised in virtue alone, to such a degree as to de 
prive it of all power of making any selection of external 
circumstances : " Enim in una virtute sic omnia esse volu- 
erunt ; ut earn rerum selectione exspoliarent 2 ." Even a 
^Pyrrhonist, although he might be able to subdue all motives 
to voluntary action, could not always resist the force of ex 
ternal circumstances, obeying them, however, as they said, 
simply in order not to oppose, following them without any 
inclination or proclivity, as a boy does his master, " TO yap 
Xeyerai Sia^opa)?, TO Te (Mr) dvTirelveiv, aXX* aTrXcS? 
avev a<t>o$pa<; Trpocr/cXiWeo? real TrpocrTraOeia?, w? 6 
XeyeTcu TreiOeaOai, TO> TraiSaywya) 5 , K.T.\" Since then 
the Pyrrhonists admitted that they could not always remain 
inactive, they found it expedient to enunciate a standard 
of conduct according to which certain things were to be 
done, and certain others left undone. We say then, writes 
Sextus E. 4 , that the criterion of life according to the scep- 

et m affermit dans une tranquillity inebranlable. Voila mon but, disoient-ils. 
C est tout le contraire leur dira une personne qui raisonne de bonne foy : car 
ignorant si mon e tat present tournera a mon avantage, ou a mon malheur : 
ne connoissant aucun rnoien sur pour me rendre heureux, ni pour me garantir 
de misere, qu est ce qui me rassurera contra la Craiiite? Pour vivre au des- 
sus de la Craiiite, ce n est pas asses de savoir que le Mai pourroit n arriver 
pas. II faut que je sache du moins tres vraisemblement qu il n arrivera pas. 
II y a plus, car dans 1 Hypothese des Sceptiques, cette Proposition, Peut-etre 
qu il n arrivera pas du mal, est en elle-meme incertaine, et celle-ci, Peut-etre 
ni est il impossible de I e viter, n est pas moins croyable. Un homme est-il 
au-dessus de la Crainte, lorsque, par la situation ou la Philosophic a mis son 
esprit, cette Proposition, Peut-etre rfeviterai-je point les plus grands malheurs? 
est pour lui aussi vraisemblable qu aucune autre. II faut etre bien abruti, 
pour tenir contre cette Idee. Examen du Pyrrhonisme, Part n. Sec. 2, p. 67. 

1 De Fin. n. 13. 2 De Fin. iv. 16, et passim. 

a Htjp. i. 33. 230. * Hyp. i. 11. 212223-24. 



II.] THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. 35 

tical philosophy, is the apparent and actual (TO <f)cuv6/jLevoi>), 
as a perception of a representative image in the mind (vva- 
fjiei, rrjv (fravTacrtav avrov ovray /caXovvres). We live then, 
continues Sextus E., guided by the phenomenal manifesta 
tions around us (ro6? fyawofjiivois Trpoo-e^ovre^), and con 
sistently with the general order of nature (tcara TTJV puoTiierjv 
Tijprjo-iv 1 ). Now this consistency has reference to four regu 
lative principles : 

(1) Natural instinct (eV v(f)rjyijaeL ^ucrew? 2 ), according to 

which we think and feel naturally. 

(2) The impulse of appetite (dvd<y/cy >naQ^v\ by which 

hunger leads to food, thirst to drink. 

(3) The authority of laws and customs (ev Trapa&bcret, 

voficov re teal I0a)i ) ) by which we are led to ac 
knowledge that to live virtuously is good, to live 
viciously evil. 

(4) The inductions of experience (ev biSao-Kakia re-xvwv), 

by which we advance in those arts we have un 

dertaken to cultivate. 

It is difficult to conceive how any criterion of action 
x>uld have been derived from such principles as these. 
But in fact the most elevated systems of heathen morality, 
)r at any rate those of the Empiric schools, did not seek 
tny higher sources for rules of conduct. The *8ummum 
*onum was at best but a conception generalized from the 
esults of experience, i. e. common sense ; from the sugges- 
ions of appetite, i.e. the law of nature, the end of desire, as. 
"icero calls it, extremum expetendi 3 . But it was this very 

1 Hence the lines of Timon : 

" 77 yap tyuv tptu o> s /xot KaraQaLveTai elvcu, 



ws ij TOV deiov re <f>v<ri.$ Kai rdyadou aid 
e^ t5j/ ^cr6raros ytveTat dvdpi /3/os. " 

Sextus E., Adv. Math. xi. 20. 
2 Hyp t n, 23. 3 Lucullus, 9. 

32 



THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. 



[LECT. 



conception, or ( summum bonum, in which the distinction lay 
between the sceptical and dogmatical moralists ; for while the 
latter, from observations of the intentions of nature \ esta 
blished principles of action which might guide them to live 
in accordance with her laws, the former, rejecting the validity 
of such inductions, on the ground of the uncertainty of all 
things, would not admit any rule of life but such as could 
be immediately deduced from the circumstances of the 
present, and the exigencies of our natural appetites. 

Against the possibility of there being any absolute stand 
ard of good or evil the Pyrrhonists were most vehement in 
their attacks 2 . The greater part of the chapter on ethics 
in the work of Sextus E. is devoted to this subject, and 
the whole armoury of sceptical logic is ransacked for argu 
ments in support of their general assertion, viz. that if there 
were any absolute good or evil it would appear the same 
to all. We will extract a brief summary of the Pyrrhonian 
reasonings on this subject from the writings of Diogenes 
Laertius 3 . Pyrrho (says he) used to affirm that nothing was 
honourable or disgraceful, just or unjust ; and on the same 
principle he (Pyrrho) said there was no such thing as down 
right truth, but that man did everything in consequence ol 
custom or law. 

For that nothing was any more this than that. The sam< 
thing is just in the case of some people and unjust in that 
others. If there be any natural good, or any natural evil 
then it must be good to everyone, or evil to everyone, just 
snow is cold to everyone. But there is no such thing as onej 
general good or evil common to all beings. Therefore there 
is no such thing as natural good, or natural evil, for either 



1 "Cum omnium artium is finis esset, quid natura maxime quasreret, j 
idem statui debere de totius arte vitee." De Pin. iv. 8. 

2 Hyp. m. chap. 23. 

3 Diogenes Laertius, ix. 618390101. 



II.] THE PYREHONIAN ETHIC. 37 

one must pronounce everything good which is thought so by 
anyone whatever, or one must say that it does not follow 
that everything which is thought good is good. Now we 
cannot say. that everything which is thought good is good, 
since the same thing is thought good by one person (as for 
instance pleasure is thought good by Epicurus) and evil by 
another (as it is thought evil by Antisthenes) ; and on this 
principle the same thing will be both good and evil 1 . 

Again, we assert that it does not follow that everything 
which is thought good is good. Then we must distinguish 
between the different opinions, which it is not possible to do, 
by reason of the equality of the reasons adduced in support 
of each. It follows then that we cannot recognise anything 
as good by nature. Such are the logical consequences of an 
empirical ethology, where happiness is the criterion of life, 
and reason the arbiter of happiness. For can the purely 
subjective and apparent furnish any immutable principles of 
morality, unless the existence of some internal sense is 
admitted by which a natural distinction in things can be 
perceived ? Such an innate principle the adversaries of the 
Sceptics would not allow, hence the morality of Pyrrhonism, 
however low and unsatisfactory it may have been, was really 
only the inevitable result of the rejection of all a priori 
sources of knowledge. It may have been merely to support 
this conclusion that Pyrrho, and afterwards the New Acade 
micians, proclaimed the contingent and arbitrary nature of all 
distinction between right and wrong. The idea of laws in 

1 " The language about the good and the base is the ordinary language 
of sceptical despair. Such despair being compatible with the belief that 
anything is possible because nothing is true." Maurice, Moral and Meta 
physical Philosophy, Chap. vi. Div. 4, Sec. n. p. 212. 

"Dass er alien Unterschied von Gut und Bose, Gerecht und Ungerecht, 
gelaugnet und nur Sitte und Gesetz als Eichtschnur unsrer Handlungeii 
anerkannt habe, ist wohl als Folgerung aus seiner Behauptimg von der 
Unerkenubarkeit der Dinge zu betrachteii." Brandis, Geschichte der Ent- 
wickelungen der Griechischen Philosophic, Vol. u. p. 177. 



38 THE PYRRIIONIAN ETHIC. [LECT. II. 

the moral constitution of man, which modern philosophers 
have substituted for purely objective reasons in things, was 
not yet understood by the ancient Greek moralists. There 
seemed therefore no alternative between Platonism and Em 
piricism ; and since the latter was the prevailing tendency of 
the post-Aristotelian philosophy, its data were of course the 
groundwork of scepticism. We have now glanced at some of 
the main features of the Pyrrhonian ethic. As a basis for an 
art of life it was simply impossible. If we are to believe the 
anecdotes in Diogenes Laertius it would appear to have 
required all the care of Pyrrho s friends to prevent him being 
a victim of his own principles. 

But we do not imagine his doctrines had many votaries. 
Sextus Empiricus states 1 that the later Sceptics abandoned 
the idea of drapafya as the end of their philosophy, and 
Cicero tells us that in his day Pyrrhonism had long since 
fallen into oblivion, "Nam Pyrrho, Aristo, Herillus, jam diu 
abjecti 2 ." "Jam explosse ejectaBque sententise Pyrrhonis, 
etc. 3 " In our next Lecture we shall proceed to the considera 
tion of the purely sceptical side of the Pyrrhonian philosophy, 
constituting as it does by far the greater portion of the 
treatise of Sextus Empiricus. 



Hyp. i. 12. 30. 



2 De Fin. n. 11. 



3 De Fin. v. 8. 



LECTURE III. 



ON THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 



rots ptv ydp -rjSTj, rots 5 eV 
ret repirvd TriKpd yiyverai KafiffiS 0iXa." 



a. EVERY perception is a modification or change of 
our consciousness, an effect of the joint operation of some 
power in the external object causing the perception, and 
some degree of susceptibility in the mind of the perceiv 
ing subject. 1 Now, if the same object when brought alone 

1 We are not attributing here any special theory of cognition to the 
Sceptic. As we shall have frequent occasion to remark, scepticism is always 
founded on the dogmas of its adversaries. We have only attempted to catch 
the crude notion of perception which seemed to have been assumed by the 
sceptical philosophers, where the physical and metaphysical, logical and 
psychological points of view are interchanged and confused. As a proof of 
this compare the exposition of the same subject by a modern metaphysician. 
"Consciousness presents itself as the product of two factors, I and some 
thing. The problem of the unconditioned is, briefly stated, to reduce these 
two factors to one. For it is manifest that, so long as they remain two, we 
have no unconditioned, but a pair of conditioned existences. If the some 
thing of which I am conscious is a separate reality, having qualities and modes 
of action of its own, and thereby determining, or contributing to determine, 
the form which my consciousness of it may take, my consciousness is thereby 
conditioned, or partly dependent on something beyond itself. It is no matter, 
in this respect, whether the influence is direct or indirect whether, for 
instance, I see a material tree, or only the mental image of a tree. If the 



40 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [LECT. 

into connection with the perceiving subject always pro 
duced the same percept, we might argue that the sensi 
bility of the subject was constant, and that the percept 
was a measure, so to speak, of the power of the object. 
Again, if the object being brought not alone, but together 
with others, into connection with the percipient subject, 
produced the same percept, we should say that the power 
of the object was absolute, necessary, and independent of 
contingent circumstances; and still we might continue to 
assert that the percept was a measure, as it were, of the 
powder of the object. 

Now with regard to the phenomenon of perception as 
taking place momentarily in ourselves, experience tells us 
that neither of the hypotheses mentioned above is true. 
For the same object alone does not always produce the 
same percept, nor does it when accompanied by different 
circumstances. The inference therefore is that, 

1. The mental susceptibility varies in the subject, and 
therefore that the power of the object is manifested in the 
percept, not absolutely, but only relatively, 

2. That the power of the object is dependent upon cir 
cumstances extraneous to the percipient subject, and is there 
fore only manifested in the percept relatively to those cir 
cumstances. 

From these considerations the Sceptics argued that we 

nature of the thing in any degree determines the character of the image if 
the visible form of a tree is different from that of a house because the tree 
itself is different from the house, my consciousness is, however remotely, in 
fluenced by something different from itself, the ego by the non-ego. And on 
the other hand, if I, who am conscious, am a real being, distinct from the 
things of which I am conscious if the conscious mind has a constitution 
and laws of its own by which it acts, and if the mode of its consciousness is 
in any degree determined by those laws, the non-ego is so far conditioned by 
the ego ; the thing which I see is not seen absolutely, and per se, but in a 
form partly dependent upon the laws of my vision." Mansel, The Philo 
sophy of the Conditioned, pp. 46. 



III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 41 

could not predicate of any given object what percept it 
would produce in the mind, and conversely, from any per 
cept the object which had caused it. Now, as we have 
already seen, a belief in the capacity of known objects to 
produce constant effects is a necessary element of those 
states of mind we call hopes, fears, and desires, which are 
the antecedents of action. "Quare qui aut visum, aut as- 
sensum tollit, is omnem actionem tollit e vita 1 ." Again, a 
belief in our ability to recognize an object from our percep 
tion of its effect on the mind is what we call knowledge 2 , and 
the degree of certitude which this knowledge possesses is 
proportional to the degree of this belief. But it is obvious 
that the degree of confidence with which we can assign any 
absolute power or property to an object must depend upon 
the amount of faith we accord to the testimony of those 
perceptions by which we originally discriminated the exist 
ence of these qualities. Now what is the nature of this 
testimony, and how far are we justified in granting it our 
assent ? A, B, and (7, we will say, are about to form a judg 
ment on some quality of an object perceived by the sense of 
taste. A, judging by the testimony of his consciousness, pro 
nounces the object to be sweet, B perhaps says that it has 
no taste at all, and C that it is even bitter 3 . Now here 
are three conflicting decisions on the same fact ; how are 
we to tell which of them is true? Is there any absolute 
and permanent quality in the object causing our percep 
tion of sweetness ? Surely we could not say so, on such 
evidence ; appearances there may be. Three different ap 
pearances, says the Sceptic, and the existence of these I will 
believe ; but what am I to infer from the discrepancy of 

1 Lucullus, 12. 

2 "Knowledge implies three things: 1. Firm Belief; 2. Of what is true ; 
3. On sufficient grounds." Whately, Logic, Book iv. chap. 2, note 13. 

3 Cf. Lucretius, iv. 658: 

"hoc ubi quod suave est aliis, aliis fit amarum." 



42 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [LECT. 

their deliverances as to the real nature of the external object. 
Heraclitus answers that the same thing is both sweet and 
bitter. " /cal ol fiev ^KeTrrifcol (paiveaQai, \eyovo-i TO. evavTia 
Trepl TO at/To, ol Se Hpa/eXetrefcot CLTTO TOVTOV Kal eVt TO 
vTrdpxeiv avra /-terep^oi/rat V Democritus denied reality of 
existence to everything but space and atoms, declaring that 
all the other attributes of matter were but apparent and 
phenomenal. " airo yap TOV rot? ftev <y\vicv fyaivecrOai TO 
yu-eXt, rot? 8e Trucpov, TOV ArifjiotcpiTOV TU\o<yi%cr6ai (j)aat, 
TO fjLrjTe <y\v/cv avTo elvtti jJir)Te Tu/cpov 2 " Protagoras the 
Sophist declared his opinion on the limit of reality in the 
well-known aphorism, " TravTaov ^prj/j.aTayv elvai fieTpov TOV 
dvOpwTTov 3 " Meaning that we could affirm existence of 
nothing but our momentary sensations, a simple relation 
between subject and object, " TiOrjcri, TO, <fraiv6jj,6va e/cdaTa) 
/jiova, real OVTWS eladyet, TO 777309 rt 4 ." The Cyrenaics, extend 
ing this doctrine, maintained that they only properly per 
ceived those things which they felt by their inmost touch, 
such as pain or pleasure. "Quid Cyrenaei videntur? mi- 
nime contempti philosophi, qui negant esse quidquam, quod 
^ percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere, qua3 tactu 
intimo sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem : neque se, quo 
quid colore aut quo sono sit, scire, sed tantum sentire, affici 
se quodam modo 5 ." Thus we see, from the uncertainty at 
taching to the reports of sense, philosophers concluded that 
the real nature of things must be very different from that 



1 Hyp. i. 29210. 

2 HUP- I. 30. 213. " AWOKPITOS dt 6 rt pev dvaipel TO, <j>cuv6peva rats al<r0r)- 
i, Kal TOVTUV \tyei fj.rjS^v <t>ati>e(r0ai Kara a\Tj6dav aXXa p.ovov /caret 8oav 

dt ev rotj odfftv virdp^Lv rb drofjiovs elvai Kal Kevov vofjup yap 1 (ftyvi 
y\VKt> Kal vow iriKpov, vofi^ deppov, vo^ ^vxpov, v6fj,y Xporf, ^ e V & drofj-a Kal 
"Adv. Math. vn. 135. 

8 d\\w al<r0r}Tw otSevbs thai Qfoiv, d\Xa irdvra iraQt] rrjs al<r0jffCM 
^ ??s ylve<r0at rty (pavraaiav. /c.r.X." Theophr. de Sensu, 63. 

3 Hyp. i. 32, 216. 4 L L 216> 6 Lucullus, 24. 



III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM, 43 

which the common convictions of mankind ascribed to them. 
But still we observe that, although commencing by doubting 
that which the majority of mankind believe, many of the 
early thinkers ended by believing much that the majority 
of mankind would doubt. They in fact drew dogmatic con 
clusions from sceptical premises. 

/?. The Pyrrhonists did not fail to detect the incon 
sistency in the reasonings of their predecessors, and while 
proclaiming the untrustworthiness of all knowledge founded 
on the evidence of sense, declared that this very uncertainty 
rendered it impossible to posit any dogma concerning things 
beyond our immediate consciousness (TO, dSyXa). Thus they 
maintained a consistent attitude of doubt respecting every 
thing but the subjective phenomena revealed in perception. 
"TO, yap Kara fyavTaaiav Tradrjri/ca 1 d/3ov\r}Tco<; ?Jyu,a9 ayov- 
ra et? avjKardOea-iv ov/c dva,Tpe7ro/j,v, ravra Se eVrt ra 
(fraivofieva, orav Se ^Tw/nev el TOLOVTOV earn TO VTro/cei/jLe- 
vov, oTTolov fyaiveTai, TO fj,ev OTL fyalveTai SiSopev, &TOV- 
/jiev 8 ov Trepl TOV fyaivojjievov, d\\d Trepl eiceivov o X^erafc 
7T6/9t TOV fyaivofjievov. olov fatveTcu rjjuv <y\v/cdeiv TO fjie\t, 
TOVTO (Tvy^wpovfiev y\vica^6fi0a yap alaOrjTiKws. el Se 
/cat, >y\vfcv O-TW ocrov eVl TO) \6yrn, r)Tovjj,ev o ov/c ecrTi 
TO (fraivo/jLevov, d\\d Trepl TOV (^aivofjuevov Xeyo/Aevov*" From 
this passage it is apparent that the Pyrrhonists regarded 
our knowledge as extending no further than the perception 
of one term of a ratio, which afforded no evidence as to the 
nature of its correlative, Of course the maintenance of such 
a position as this, a position opposed to the natural con 
victions of humanity, would really depend upon the ability 
of its supporters to shake the common faith in the veracity 
of consciousness, by adducing a multitude of proofs as jus- 

1 For meaning of the word iradrjTiKos, see Hamilton s Reid, note D. (note 
on paragraph 6). 

3 Hyp. i. 10. 19, 20. 



44 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [LECT. 

tification of their own scepticism. Accordingly Pyrrho enun 
ciated the celebrated Be/ca rpoTroi, or TOTTOI, ten presumptions 
derived from a consideration of the circumstances under 
which our commerce with the objects of external nature 
takes place. From these reasons he argued that the relation 
between the object and subject is probably so variable and 
contingent, that from the subjective phenomena of our 
consciousness we can affirm nothing certain, either through 
the evidence of sense or the conclusions of reason. 

These considerations the Pyrrhonists verified by a mass 
of examples drawn from observation and experience, and they 
are therefore the facts upon the truth of which must mainly 
depend the validity of their whole method. We will briefly 
narrate these ten grounds, together with a few examples of 
each. They will afford the reader a glimpse of the kind of 
reasoning ancient philosophers did not think unworthy of 
advancing in support of their own views. 

1. The first ground of doubt is derived from a con 
sideration of the variety observable in the physical organisa 
tion of animals (irapa rrjv rwv fycov e%a\\a<yr)v l ). 

For according to the different constitutions of animals, 
their senses, or faculties of judging and perceiving, may be 
supposed to vary. 

In confirmation of this presumption instances are adduced 
where, when the organs of sight, taste, smell etc., have been 
abnormally deranged, the apprehensions which we derive 
through them appear to suffer alteration. For example, 
writes Sextus Empiricus, they who have the jaundice say 
that those things are yellow which appear white to us, and 
they whose eyes are bloodshot affirm them to be red. Now 
some animals have their eyes yellow, others bloodshot, 
others whitish, and others different colours. It is therefore 
probable that the conception of colour is different in the 

1 Hyp. i. 14. 36. 



III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 45 



case of these animals (et/co? ol^ai $La$opov avrols TTJV 

Xpco/jLcircov avriXri^iv ylyvea-Oai 1 ). Again, a concave mirror 

shews the object it reflects as smaller than reality, and one 

that is convex, as narrower, and more elongated ; and some 

reflect the head of the observer downwards, with his feet 

upwards. Now since the eyes of some animals protrude, 

while those of others are sunken, of others flat, it is pro 

bable that the images of external objects vary for this 

reason, and that dogs, fish, lions, men and grasshoppers do 

not see the same things as equal in size, or alike in form, 

but that the vision receives the object, and makes an image 

corresponding to the faculty of each, (oiav efcdo-rov Troiel 

TVTTWCTLV ^ Se^of^evTj TO (f)aivop,vov o^i? 2 ). Again, with the 

sense of taste when the tongue is parched and dry, as in 

fever, we seem to taste everything bitter and earthy. We 

experience this in consequence of the different degree of 

moisture pervading us ; and since some animals have a 

variety of tasting organs, and are full of different humours, 

they would naturally receive different impressions through 

the sense of taste. In fine, as the same food being adminis 

tered turns to a vein in one place, to an artery in another, 

to a bone here, a nerve there, and to each of the other parts 

of the body evinces a variety of capabilities according to 

the susceptibility of the parts which receive it ; as also water 

given to plants although of one and the same kind, in one 

place becomes bark, in another branches, in another fruit, 

now a fig, now an apple, etc. ; as the breath of a musician, 

although one and the same, when breathed into the flute is 

sometimes sharp, and sometimes deep ; and as the same 

touch of the hand on the lyre may produce both a shrill and 

a dull tone, so it is probable that external objects may be 

perceived differently according to the constitution of the 

percipient subject (et/co? KCU, ra eVrc? v 

* 1. I. 44. 2 I I. 49. 



46 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [LECT. 

OewpelcrOai Trapa rrjv $Ld<popov Karacr/cvt]v T&V ra? <j>avra- 
cr/a? VTTOjjievovTwv fcoajz/ 1 ). 

2. The second ground considers the variety in the consti 
tution of men (Trapa TT)Z/ TWV avOputTTtov Siafopdv*). Man, 
says Sextus Empiricus, has a twofold nature, sensuous and 
intellectual. In virtue of the former, as was shown in the 
case of animals, it is probable that differences of constitution 
would produce differences in the perception of the same ex 
ternal object, or qualities of an object. Again with regard to 
his mind the variety in desires and aversions has been the 
theme of poets in all ages 3 . Now, continues Sextus Empiri 
cus, since desire and aversion originate in pleasure and pain, 
and pleasure and pain depend upon sense and perception, 
inasmuch as one seeks and another avoids the same thing, it 
is easy to conclude that all are not affected in the same way 
by the same object. If they were they would all desire the 
same thing. But if the same things affect men differently 
according to their different susceptibilities we should con 
sider this sufficient ground for suspending our judgment. 
Each one is able to pronounce from his own point of view 
how an object appears to him, but no one can determine 
what is the real power or nature of anything (o TI pev /ca- 
(fralverat, TWV vTro/ceLfievcov, o5? Trpo? e/cdo-rrjv Siafyopav 
Xeyetj> qpwv Swapevtov TI Be eVrt Kara ^vvafjav w? 77/309 
rrjv tfrvcriv ov% oicov re OVTWV oTro^vaaQaif. 

3. The third occasion of doubt is found in the different 

1 1. 1- 55. 2 i i 36t 

3 6 nlv ydp Hlvdapos (fryai- 

" AeXXoTrdSwi yu,& TIV ev^paivoiffiv linrwv 

rlpta Kal (rrtyavoi, rovs 5 & iroXvxpvaois ^a\a>oi$ ptord 

r^Trerat 8 /cat rts tir ott/j. &\iov vai 60$ 

aws Staare^w^." Cf. Horace, lib. i. Ode 1. 
" 6 5 iroirjTr)s X^et 

d XXots yap T d\\oi(rtv avty tTrtre /oTrerat fyyois." Odyss. %. 228. 
Hyp. i. 14. 86. 

4 I I 87. 



III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 47 

functions of the organs of sense (irapa ra? $ia(j)6pov<i TOJV 
alo-0rjTi}pla)v KdTao-Kevas;) 1 . Each organ of sense seems to 
indicate to us a separate quality in the external object. An 
apple, for example, appears smooth to the touch, fragrant to 
the smell, sweet to the taste, and of a certain colour to the 
sight. But how do we know that it has really more than 
one quality, and that this apparent diversity is not due to 
the various capabilities of oar organs of sense? For, as we 
have previously remarked, the same breath produces different 
notes on the same instrument, and the same nourishment is 
differently appropriated according to the different parts of 
the body to which it is assimilated. Again, can we assert 
that these are the only qualities of an apple? Let us imagine, 
for instance, a man who from his birth has possessed but the 
sense of touch, of taste, and of smell. This man would not 
be able to conceive the existence of such qualities as affect 
the sense of sight and of hearing. It may happen, then, that 
having only five senses we are unable to detect qualities 
which may yet really be in the apple. Since then there is 
no absurdity in saying that the different qualities we think 
we may perceive in an apple are inherent in it, and many 
more besides perhaps, or, on the contrary, that there is in 
reality only one cause in the object which produces different 
effects according to the diversity in our organs of sense, we 
cannot state with certainty the nature of this apple. Now 
if external objects are incomprehensible through the senses 
we cannot assuredly judge of them by the reason ; therefore 
we ought to suspend our judgment (TWV ala-Qrjdetov jjblv TOI 
fir} KaraXa/uL^avovawv ra e/ero?, ovBe 77 ^lavoia ravra SvvaTai, 
ware KOI &ia TQVTOV rov \6yov rj frepl TOJV 



4. The fourth reason for doubt is found in the subjective 
circumstances under which objects are perceived (jrapa ra? 
1 1. I. 36. 2 I I. 99. 



48 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [LECT. 

ire/^TflW 1 ). The condition of the body or mind of the 
percipient subject has great effect in modifying the impres 
sions received from external objects. As has been already 
noticed, a person in sickness detects a different smell, taste, 
or colour in things from one in health ; strong mental emotions 
also are well known to influence the ideas we receive from 
objects 2 . Of course it is an obvious rejoinder to arguments 
drawn from this source, that the Sceptics have no right to 
bring the discrepancy of perceptions received in an abnormal 
state of the body or mind as evidence against the veracity of 
those we have in our natural state. To this, however, Sextus 
Empiricus replies, that for such an objection to be of any 
value we ought to have some good reason for supposing that 
the impressions we receive in health are more trustworthy 
reports of external qualities than those of sickness or deli 
rium. Now, continues Sextus Empiricus, he who considers 
the perceptions of a man in one state more trustworthy than 
those of a man in another, either makes this preference after 
proof and demonstration, or without proof and demonstration. 
In the latter case one would certainly not believe him, and 
in the former, one could scarcely afford him much more 
credit. * For if he is going to prove to us the veracity of his 
perceptions he must employ some criterion or standard of 
their truth (d <yap Kpivel ra? fyavraalas, Travrax; KpiTijpup 
Koweif. But he must also be convinced that the criterion 
itself is trustworthy, for if it is false it is of no value as a 
measure of truth. Now if he maintains this criterion to be 
reliable, he must either do so after proof and demonstration, 
or without proof and demonstration. If the former, he is not 
worthy of credit, if the latter, he must show that his proof 

1 1. 1. 36. 

2 " Ofos 5 Kal rr\v 6\}tiv etvai (palverai 

d(f> ov TotoSros yeyovev, olov 6-rjpLov. 
rb fj.T)8ev ddiiceiv Kal /caAoi)s Tj/iSj Trotet." I. I. 108. 
I. I. 114. 



III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 49 

and demonstration are conclusive. But here again he will 

require a criterion by which to measure the truth of his 

demonstration ; but the truth of this criterion will again 

require demonstration, and so on, "every criterion a demon 

stration," and "every demonstration a criterion." For neither 

is the demonstration true, but in virtue of the truth of the 

criterion, or the criterion, except in virtue of the truth of the 

demonstration. Thus, when we try to prove the truth of the 

demonstration by the truth of the criterion, and the truth of 

the criterion by the truth of the demonstration, we fall into the 

sophistical circle, which we call the diallel (xpjfe <yap del 

Kal rj aTToSetfys tcpiTrjpiov, wa PeftaiwOf), /cal TO KpLTijpiov 

aTTo&e/fefc)?, iva d\i]6e<; elvai Se^tf?}. Kal ovre diroBe^ 174179 

clvcu Svvarcu, ^} TrpovTrdpxovTos /cpirrjpiov aX^Qovs, oi/Ve 

Kpimjpiov dXijQes, /nrj vrpoTreTrurTeupevi)? 7-77? aTroSe/few?. KOI 

oi/rcix; e/jfrriirrovo tv et? TOV $>id\\r}\ov rpotrov TO Te /cpiTtjpiov 

/cal r] a7ro8etf9, ev d^OTepa evplafceTai amo-TO, 

yop njv OaTepov irforiv irepi^kvov 6yu,o/o>5 TO> XoiTroS 



5. The fifth ground refers to the difference in position, 
distance, and objective circumstances of things (irapa ra? 
0eVet? KOI TO. Siao-Trj/jLciTa Kal rou? TOTTOV^). Any change in 
the relations of objects to one another, or to us, with respect 
to distance, or position, effects a change in their appearance. 
A colonnade 3 seen by an observer at one extremity, seems to 
narrow towards the other, but when seen from the middle, 
the breadth appears equal throughout. Again, the same 
tower appears round at a distance, square when near 4 . The 
blade of an oar appears broken in the water. The colour of 
the neck of a dove seems to vary as it turns. The light of 

1 Hyp. I. I 116, 117. 2 L L 36> 

5 " Uniformitas gequalissimae porticus acuitur in fine, dum acies in con- 
cluso stipata illis tenuatur, quo et extenditur." Tertullian, De Anima, c. 17. 
4 " Quadratasque procul turris cum cernimus urbis, 

Propterea fit uti videautur saspe rotundae." Lucretius, iv. 353,4. 
L. L. 4 



50 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [LECT. 

a lamp is faint in the sun, brilliant in the shade. It may be 
urged of course that, of these manifestations, some are ac 
cording to the true nature of the object, others not; to which 
the Sceptic replies, that it must then be demonstrated in 
which position, distance, or situation the real object is re 
vealed, otherwise one is as good as another. This demon 
stration requires another demonstration to show that the 
result of the first is true, and so on, usque ad infinitum. 
Thus, although we may be able to say how an object appears 
to us in a certain position, or at a certain distance, we cannot 
assert what its absolute independent nature is (OTTOIOV ftev 
fyaiverai etcacrrov Kara TrjvBe rrjv Oeatv rj Kara roSe TO Sida-rrj- 
fjia TI ev TwSe, elirelv orco? ^vvafjievwv tf/jitov, oTrolov 5e Icrnv cu? 
Trjv fyvcriv aSvvaTovvT(0v aTrofyaiveeOcn, Sia rd Trpoeipr)- 



6. The sixth reason for doubting is founded on the com 
plexity of objects (irapa ra? eirifugta?*). We never can say 
any object is perceived alone simply and singly, but is always 
accompanied and modified by something extrinsic to itself, 
as air, light, moisture, cold, or heat. Thus, it is impossible 
to distinguish the real nature of anything, owing to the 
difficulty of separating it from contingent circumstances. 
The same body is heavy in the air, and light in the water. 
A tone sounds muffled and dull in a full room, which is 
clear and loud in a spacious apartment ; and other examples 
analogous. Hence, in consequence of this complexity, the 
senses do not receive faithfully the qualities of external 
objects, and the reason cannot judge of them because she 
relies on the reports of the senses, and they are deceived 
(ware Sia r9 eVt/uf/a? al alcr@r)<Ti<; ov/c avriX 
oTTola ?r/)o? cuepiftemv ra eWo? vTTOKei^eva icmv. a\X 
rj Sidvoia fidXiara JJLZV eVel al ofyyol avrrjs 



1 Hyp. i. 14. 37. 2 I. L 134. 3 L L 37> 



III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 51 

7. The seventh ground of scepticism is derived from a 
consideration of the different proportions and ingredients of 
matter in objects (jrapa ra$ TrocroTrjras Kal cr/cevaalas TGOV 
iTroKei/uevcov 1 .) It is observed by the chemist if he mixes 
his drugs in a certain proportion, the resulting compound 
may be a restorative to health and strength, whereas more 
or less of one of the ingredients may cause the dose to be 
baneful, or even destructive. Thus the difference a slight 
alteration in the component elements of a substance makes 
in its qualities or powers, shows that we can only have an 
obscure notion of the real constitution of objects (OI/TO)? 6 
/cara ra? 7ro<JoV??T<z9 KOI atcevaaias \6yo$ cruj^el TTJV TWV 

vtrapgw. SiOTrep et/coro)? av Kal ouro? 6 
ijfjids TTepiayoi, pur) Swafjuevov? 
Trepl rry? ^ucreo)? TWV e/crbs V 

8. The eighth cause of doubt founds on the relativity 
of all things (ano rov TT/OO? TI 3 ). This T/QOTTO? merely draws 
attention to, and places in a stronger light, the conclusions 
of the first seven. We have seen that the substance of the 
first four rpoTTot is, the impossibility of arriving at a know 
ledge of the absolute nature of objects, because, to be per 
ceived, implies a relation to a percipient subject. And again 
the fifth, sixth, and seventh rpoTroL show, that as we never 
perceive anything singly, our notions of objects must always 
involve their relation to those which are perceived with 
them, therefore we cannot imagine anything which is un 
conditioned, either with respect to ourselves or anything 
else (7r\rjv d\\" ovTO) Trapaa-rdvTwv r^wv on irdvra errl 
vrpo? , &$\6v eo-ri TO \OLTTOV OTI, OTTOWV earcv e/caarov TWV 

Kara Tr)v eavrov fyvcnv Kal el\iKpivfa \eyeiv ov 
oirolov fyaiverai ev ra> irpos TI aKo\ovdel 



TO 



42 



52 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [LECT. 

9. The ninth mode rests on the frequency or rarity of 
the apparition of objects (rrapa Ta9 o-we^efc r} airaviovs 



The effect of objects on us is much modified by the 
conditions of time under which they occur. The sun (says 
Sextus E.) is, per se, a more wonderful object than a comet, 
but because we see a comet seldom, and the sun daily, the 
apparition of the former so affects our imagination that we 
believe it the forerunner of some special event". Again, we 
value things which are rare, and view with indifference such 
as are easily attainable. If gold was as common as flint we 
should not covet it. Since then the same things appear 
precious or contemptible according as they are abundant or 
scarce, we conclude that we may be able to say how things 
appear to us when fettered with the conditions of time, but 
we cannot affirm what they are absolutely (eirel ovv rd avrd 
TT pay para Trapd ra? dwells rj cnravlovs TrepnrTweis ore 
/AW eKTr\.rjKTiKa rj ripta, ore e ov roiavra elvai SoKel, em- 
\ yt,&/jLe0a on OTTOLOV pei/ fyaiverai, TOVTCOV etccurrov perd 
o-vve%ovs 7re/M7rn(rea>s % cnravias, tcrw? Svvrjcro^eda \e<yew 
>/rtX&>9 Se OTTOLOV ecrnv etcavrov TU>V e/cro? viroKeifJb&v&v OUK 
eapev Bvvarol (frdcrKeiv 3 ). 

10. The tenth and last ground regards institutions, 
customs, laws, superstitious beliefs, and dogmatical opinions 
(rrapd T9 aycoya], teal rd Wrj, /ecu Toy? z/oyu,ou9, KCLI r9 



KOL 



An institution is a certain standard of conduct in life, 
founded on the judgment of one man (as Diogenes), of a 
nation (as the Lacedaemonians). A law is a decree imposed 

1 l. L 37. 

2 " Soils exortus, cursus, occasus nemo admiratur, propterea quod quotidie 
fiunt : at eclipses soils mirantur, quia raro accidunt : et soils eclipses majus j 
mirantur, quam lunae, quoniam liaB crebriores sunt." Cicero, ad Hercnnium, \ 
3. 22; Aristotle, Meteorolog., lib. i. c. 7; Seneca, Qiiast. 7. 28. 

a Hyp- l - li - 144 - 4 L L 37 



III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 53 

by the rulers of a state, the infraction of which involves 
the punishment of the transgressor. A custom is a con 
vention arrived at by the unanimous consent of many, the 
violation of which does not entail punishment. A super 
stitious belief is the approbation accorded to legends of 
doubtful authenticity. A dogmatical conception is a con 
clusion deduced by the reason from given premisses 1 . In 
reference to these definitions the Sceptics adduced the facts, 
that that which was legal in one country was illegal in 
another. Similarly, that customs, institutions, and opinions 
vary among nations, among classes in the same nation, 
among sects of philosophers, and even among individuals. 
Hence it was to be concluded that the nature of objects, 
as far as regards their value and importance, their capacity 
of producing pleasure and pain in short, all their effective 
qualities is dependent upon the existence, or non-existence, 
of these artificial and arbitrary institutions. Therefore, we 
may be able to pronounce judgment on the attributes of 
objects as they are in relation to the established opinions 
of an age or country, but we cannot say what they are 
absolutely or necessarily (TT\^V roa-avrr^ dvwfjiaXias jrpay- 
fjidTCDv KOI St,d TOVTOV TOV rpoirov BeiKvv/JLevrjs, OTTOLOV fiev 
eVrt TO vTTO/celjLievov Kara TTJV (frvcnv ou-y e^o/uuev \eyeiv, oirolov 
Be fyaiveTai TT/JO? TrjvSe rrjv dycoyrjv, rj irpo<$ TOvSe rov vofj-ov, 
77 Trpos r68e TO e $o? /cal TCOV a\\a)v efcaaTov. teal Sia TOVTOV 

OVV 7Tpl TTj? (j)V(7Ci)S TO,V 6/CT09 V7TOKifjLVCOV TTpajfJiaTCOV 7Te- 

dvdjKrj. OTUTCO fj,ev ovv Bid rwv Be/ca TpOTrcw KOTCL- 
el? Trjv eTrofflv 2 ). 
7. We have now given an outline of the ten argu 
ments by which the Pyrrhonists attempted to demonstrate 

1 There are three kinds of relativity indicated in the ten rpoirot: 

1st, The relation between object and subject; 
2nd, The relation between object and object; 
3rd, The relation between object and some pre-conceived maxim. 

2 I. I. 163. 



54 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [LECT. 

the impossibility of determining the nature of the thing from 
the appearance, of the cause from the effect, the $aivea0ai 
ov from the ^aiveaOai elvai. . 

These rpoiroi, are generally ascribed to Pyrrho himself, 
but by some authors to his admirer, Timon of Phlius. It 
is probable, however, that they are not the work of a single 
individual, but represent the accumulated reasonings of the 
Sceptics on the futility of sense-knowledge ; and were col 
lected by Sextus E., and inserted with regard to the follow 
ing order 1 . The first four refer to simple perceptions, the 
next five to complex notions, the last to conventional ideas. 
This arrangement appears to be the same alluded to by 
Cicero : " Dividunt enim in partes, et eas quidem magnas : 
primum in sensus : deinde in ea, quas ducuntur a sensibus, 
et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt 2 ." The 
first and fourth of the rpcTroi, found upon the varying sus 
ceptibility of the percipient. Supposing there were constant 
and permanent causes in objects, our knowledge of them 
could never transcend their effects. But, since the operation 
of the ego as a concause introduces an element into the 
effect, variable and dependent upon the constitution of 
each individual, it follows that our knowledge of external 
things can amount to no more than a mere subjective 

1 For the order in which the rponoi have been arranged by different 
writers, see Diogenes Laertius, ix. 87. 

2 Lucullus, 13. Compare also the threefold division of ideas in James 
Mill s Analysis of the Mind. " There are three classes of ideas, which we 
have occasion to name : 

1st, Simple ideas, the copies of single sensations ; 

2nd, Complex ideas, copied directly from sensations ; 

3rd, Complex ideas, derived indeed from the senses, but put together in 
arbitrary combinations. 

The i^o former maybe called sensible, the last mental ideas." Chap. 
IV. sec. i. p. 95. Aristoclus in Eus. Preep. Ev. speaks of the nine rpoiroi of 
JSnesidenras ; they were probably identical with the above, omitting the 
eighth, which is, in fact, only .the expression of the conclusions from the 
others. 



III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 55 

opinion or judgment. The ultra-materialist element ob 
servable in the theory of perception implied in these rpoTroi, 
is of course not to be considered a feature of scepticism. 
The Sceptics particularly avoided positing any doctrine re 
garding the processes of cognition (\eyofjuev KCL& olov orjTrore 
rpoTToV rj Kaff olov S-tjTTore rpcTTov (^aivofjievwv re teal voov- 
fjievwv, iva fj,rj ^ro JJLGV TTOO? (^aiverai TO, (^aivojjueva rj TTW? 
voetrai, ra voov/jieva, aX)C aTrXo)? ravra Xa//./3a^ft)/^e^ 1 ). 

The very nature of scepticism is to base its reasonings 
upon data furnished by positive and dogmatical systems of 
thought. Now the theory of knowledge upon which the 
Tyrrhenians proceeded was that of the Stoics. With them 
(the Stoics) mind was a mere material substance, a passive 
recipient of external impressions (ahXoiwcret,? 



No wonder then in the rpovrot we find the processes of 
perception not only compared to, but actually treated as 
analogous to, those of digestion. The mind is made to re 
ceive and assimilate its materials as the body its food, or as, 
the French Ideologists used to say, "the brain secretes thought 
as the liver secretes bile." We say then, in estimating the 
value of the sceptical arguments that we can only fairly 
consider them relatively to the data supplied by their op 
ponents. Granting then that a mental image is scarcely 
more than the resultant of chemical 2 or even mechanical 
action, let us consider whether the Sceptics really handled 
the phenomena of perception in an accurate or philosophic 
manner, and whether they really succeeded in establishing a 
good case against the trustworthiness of the senses. Take, 
for example, the argument of the jaundiced or bloodshot eye. 

1 Hyp. i. 4. 9. 

2 "Plurima autem in ilia tertia philosophise parte mutavit (sc. Zeno). In 
qua primum de sensibus ipsis quasdam dix^ggtova, quos junctos esse censuit 
e quadam quasi impulsione oblata ex^^^cu^t quam ille (pavraa-iaf, nos 
visum appellcmus." Ac. Pout. xi. 




5 6 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [LECT. 

It is a capital instance with the Pyrrhonists, and is urged in 
reference to one or other of the senses in each of the ten 
rpc-TTOL In what does really the act of perception consist? 
Is it the absolute modification of consciousness? Is it not 
rather an apprehension of a succession of modifications? 
Sensitive perception (says Galen) consists not in the passive 
affection of the organ, but in the discriminative recognition 

the dijudication of that affection by the active mind 

("Ecrrt Se aiaOrja-is ovrc aXXot&xm, d\\a SidyvawLS a\.\oiw- 
o-ew? 1 ). All the materialistic philosophers have concurred 
in this view. "To have no change of feeling is the same 
thing as to have no feeling at all. Sentire semper idem, 
et non sen tire, ad idem recidunt 2 ." The penser c est sentir 
school, indeed, denying any reflex operations to the mind, 
affirm that the knowledge of the change cannot be separ 
ated from the passive impression. "To have a different sen 
sation, and to know that it is different, are not two things, 
but one and the same thing 3 ." But still the essence of per 
ception is discrimination. Where there is no power of dis 
crimination there can be no perception properly so-called. 
Now the Pyrrhonists maintain that, because a white object 
appears yellow to a jaundiced eye, there is no credit to be 
placed in the reports of the senses. The fact is, to the jaun 
diced eye, not only white would appear yellow, but every 
other colour would be similarly modified 4 . Thus the discri 
minating faculty would be lost to the sense altogether, i.e. 



1 Galen, de Placit. Hipp, et Plat. LVII. co. 14, 16, 17. 

2 Hobbes, Elcm. Philos. P. iv. c. 25, 5. 

3 James Mill, On the Human Mind, Vol. II. Sect. n. 

4 " Lurida praeterea fiunt qusecumque tuentur 

Arquati, quia luroris de corpore eorum 
Semina multa fluunt simulacris obvia rerum, 
Multaque sunt oculis in eorum denique mixta 
Quae contage sua palloribus omnia pinjunt." 

Lucretius, iv. 332 6. 



III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 57 

there would be no perception through it. In point of fact 
people with blue eyes do not see everything blue, by virtue 
of the same dijudicative power. How few of those whose 
sense of hearing is otherwise acute are able to appreciate the 
distinctions of musical intervals. There must here be a 
defect, not in the sensorium but in the dijudicative faculty. 
Plato in the Thecetetus, when confuting the doctrine Ato-^- 
crt9 = ETTAOT?}/*^ shows that the knowledge we have of the 
objective and essential in things is obtained, not from any 
single perception, but from the judgments made by the mind 
through the comparison of several perceptions (dva\oy^o- 
fAevrj (fi tyvxfi) ev eavrf) ra ryeyovora real ra Trapovra Trpbs ra 
yueXXoyra 1 ). This kind of knowledge corresponds to the 
ideas of reflection of Locke, the categories of Kant, or the 
relative suggestions of Brown, and is the condition of that 
comparing, abstracting, or generalising process, which is the 
foundation of all science. Now it is a question how far the 
validity of positive predication is open to the attacks of 
scepticism, when such predication is the consequence of 
purely mental comparisons. Mr Grote observes on this point, 
after commenting on that part of the discussion in the Thece- 
tetus which we have just noticed: "In the train of reasoning 
here terminated, Plato had been combating the doctrine 
AfoQrja-i? = ETTIOT^/-^. In his sense of the word afo0rj<ns 
he had refuted the doctrine. But what about the other 
doctrine, which he declares to be a part of the same pro 
gramme Homo Mensura the Protagorean formula? That 
formula, so far from being refuted, is actually sustained and 
established by this train of reasoning. Plato has declared 
ovaia, aXyOeia, evavrLorijs, dyaOov, /ca/cov, etc. to be a distinct 
class of objects not perceived by sense. But he also tells us 
that they are apprehended by the mind through its own 
working, and that they are apprehended always in relation to 
1 Thcatetus, 186 c. 



58 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [LECT. 

each other. We thus see that they are just as much relative to 
the concipient mind, as the objects of sense are to the percipient 
and sentient mind. The subject is the correlative limit or 
measure (to use Protagorean phrases) of one as well as of the 
other. This confirms what I observed above, that the two 
doctrines, 1. Homo Mensura. 2. Aiad-rja-t^ = ETrto-r?//^ 
are completely distinct and independent, though Plato has 
chosen to implicate or identify them 1 ." Does then MrGrote 
mean to assert that the relation discerned by the comparison 
of ideas is, in the same sense, relative to the comparing 
subject as the ideas themselves, considered as the simple 
products of sensible perception ? surety it is not so. In the 
latter, the terms related may be each unknown, and the 
resulting perception is but their ratio. In the former, how 
ever, these ratios are at least known as the terms of the new 
ratio which the mind evolves by its judging faculty. In the 
relativity of sensible perceptions are involved the physical 
conditions upon which our intercourse with the external 
world depends but in mental judgments only the laws of 
thought or regulative principles of the understanding are 
operative. A sensible perception is a mere subjective acci 
dent, incapable of being expressed in language or made 
apprehensible to the consciousness of another, whereas 
mental conceptions are the contents of language and com 
mon to every one by whom the same language is spoken. 
Whether or not the Protagorean formula included any but 
mere external perceptions, it is at any rate certain that the 
ten rpoTTOL of the Pyrrhonists are only levelled against the 
products of sense, although they distinctly profess to be 
embodied by the Protagorean TT/OC? n (irakiv Se ol rpei? 
OVTOL ava<yovTai ei? TO irpos TI <w? elvau jevLKoorarov /JLCV TOP 
, eiSi/eovs Be TO 1)9 T^et?, vnro^e^Kora^ Se rov? 



1 Grote s Plato, Thesetetus, Chap. xxvi. p. 373, Note li. 

2 Hyp. i. 13. 39. 



III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 59 

We think 1 then that Plato was justified in identifying the 
Protagorean doctrine with that of knowledge being sensible 
perception, and that if this doctrine meant that each man is 
the measure of all things to himself, it never could have ex 
tended beyond that life of the individual which is made up 
of sense and memory. We nowhere find in ancient philoso 
phy the distinction between the conceptive and imaginative 
faculties articulately enunciated, although to establish this 
distinction was probably the chief aim of the Platonic Psy 
chology. The admission then of an idealistic theory of 
perception on the one hand, and the failure to distinguish 
clearly between the forms and materials of consciousness on 
the other, seem to have been the chief incentives to earlier 
Pyrrhonism. The Stoics, as we shall presently see, en 
deavoured to evade scepticism by substituting an ultra-realism 
for the idealism which prevailed to a greater or less degree 
among all the other sects of philosophers, and the adoption 
of Kantian principles, which clearly separate the thinking 
and imaginative faculties, preserves the modern Idealist 
from the paradoxes of the Sceptic. The burden then of 
meeting the Sceptical arguments rests with those who assert 
that the mind is only conscious of its own modifications, and 
that these modifications are but present or past sensations. 
In the third of the rpoTroi, seem to be suggested the germs 
of all those metaphysical theories respecting the relation 
between knowledge and existence, which, under one phrase 
or another, have occupied modern speculatists since the days 
of Descartes 2 . Into these questions it would be foreign to 

1 This opinion is at variance with that of the present standard au 
thorities on the subject Jowett, Grote, Dr Thompson. The discrepancy, I 
apprehend, arises from a difference in our point of view epistemological or 
ontological. 

2 The reader will find every theory of Perception which has ever been 
propounded, named and classified by Sir William Hamilton in Note c. to his* 
edition of Keid s Works. 



60 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [LECT. 

onr present purpose to enter, but we might remark that, to 
use a phrase common among philosophers of the present age, 
the problem involved is one which requires to be construed in 
telligibly to the mind, before it is worth while setting about 
the task of its solution. The two Tpoiroi, most difficult to bring 
into the focus of modern intelligence are, perhaps, the second 
arid tenth. In the second the feelings of pleasure and pain, 
which we rightly consider purely subjective 1 affections, are 
treated as being as much the immediate effects of external 
objective qualities in things, as the feeling of colour, heat, 
taste, etc. Thus, if A. and B. respectively like and dislike 
the same object, it is implied, that this discrepancy argues a 
difference in their perceptions of the same object, "TO e 
aipeiv TOU 7raprj\\a<yfj,evas cnro TWV VTTOKei/jievwv 
\ajj,/3di>eiv earl iJLrjvvnKov *" To explicate this, we 
must again remind the reader that the Sceptics often made 
use of weapons placed in their hands by their adversaries. 
The Stoics held the doctrine that pleasure and pain were 
the forms under which men were affected by external objects 
in accordance with a fixed law of Nature; that that which 
was conformable to nature must produce pleasure, that which 
was contrary to it pain. Admitting the existence of such a 
law, then, it was competent to the Sceptics to argue that, 
since the discrepancy in the tastes of men was too proverbial to 
be called in question, this variety must arise from the different 

1 Man nennt aber die Faliigkeit, Lust oder Unlust, bei einer Vorstellung 
zu haben, darum Gefuhl, well beides das bios Subjective im Verhaltnisse 
unserer Vorstellung, und gar keine Beziehung auf ein Object zum moglichen 
Erkenntnisse desselben (nicht einmal dem Erkenntnisse unseres Zustandes) 
entbalt ; da sonst selbst Empfinduiigen, ausser der Qualitat, die ihnen der 
Beschaffenheit des Subjects wegen anbangt (z. B. des Kothen, des Siissen 
u.s.w.), doch auch als Erkenntniss-stiicke auf ein Object bezogen werden, die 
Lust oder Unlust, aber (am Eothen und Stissen) schlechterdings nichts am 
Objecte, sondern lediglich Beziehung aufs Subject ausdruckt. "Kant s 
Einleitung in die Metaphysik der Sitten,-i. 

2 Hyp. i. U. 89. 



III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 6 1 

mental representations which different individuals receive 
from the same object. For, as that which was agreeable to 
one person was so necessarily, and by nature, and as nature 
was uniform, it was impossible it could be disagreeable to 
another, unless through presenting a different appearance. 
"Non potest animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommo- 
datum ad naturam appareat (Gra?ci id olitzlov appellant 1 ." 
A similar explanation may be given of the tenth rpoTros, in 
which is contained the rather startling argumentation, that 
the want of uniformity in the laws, customs, and institutions 
among nations is an evidence of our inability to discover the 
real qualities of objects. Plutarch, however, affords us some 
means of detecting the drift of the sceptical reasoning. 
""Qri pev yap alffOrjrd ecrrt rayada Kal rd Kana Kal TOVTOIS 
eyeiv ov yap JJLQVOV TO. TrdQr) earlv alarO^Ta <rvv TO<? 
>, olov Xt TTTj Kal <6/3o9 Kal TO, Trapajr Xrjo-ia, aXXa Kal 
K\o7rfj<? Kal fjLOL^ela^ Kal TGOV O/JLOLWV eo-nv alcrBeaOai, Kal 
Ka06\ov dtypoo-vwr)? Kal Se^X/a? Kal d\\a)v OVK o\iywv 
ov$e fjbovov %apds Kal evepyecriwv Kal a\\o)v TroXXojj^ 
crewv, d\\d <f>povr)<Ta)s Kal dvSpelas Kal rwv \OLTTWV 
From this passage it seems that the Stoics extended their 
theory about pleasure and pain to the apprehensions of good 
and evil, considering them to have arisen from sensible im 
pressions, which obtain their distinctions under a ruling 
principle in nature, viz. the summum bonum. The Pyr- 
rhonists therefore force their opponents into the dilemma, 
either of denying the existence of such an uniform law, or, 
from the fact of the conflicting ideas found to prevail about 
right and wrong, to be obliged to admit that perceptions 
could only be grounds of opinion, not of certainty. The 
Stoics, however, were at no loss to find an escape from the 

1 Lucullus, 12. 

2 Chrysipp. ap. Pint, de Stoic. Rep. 19. 



62 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [LECT. III. 

difficulties in which their own principles involved them. 
They endeavoured to discover a criterion of truth, as a means 
of distinguishing true from false perceptions. But the dis 
cussion of this point would bring us into the midst of the 
polemic between the Sceptics and the Stoical dogmatists, a 
sketch of which we will present in the ensuing Lecture. 



LECTURE IV. 

ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 



"Les homines cher client ce qu ils savent, et ne savent pas ce qu ils 
cherchent." 



a. THE Pyrrhonian philosophy had two developments, 
separated by a period of about 300 years. During the earlier 
period, Pyrrho himself promulgated his doctrines, which were 
not much more advanced than those we have discussed in the 
preceding Lecture. The moral element of his teaching, as we 
have already remarked, is scarcely discernible in any but the 
earliest form of the system. After the death of Timon of 
Phlius, friend and pupil of Pyrrho (who flourished about 
B.C. 272), little is known of Pyrrhonism, till it reappeared in 
a somewhat modified shape in the teachings of ^Enesidemus 
and Agrippa, about the beginning of the Christian era. This 
later manifestation of scepticism we shall consider afterwards. 
It is our purpose in the present Lecture to follow the fortunes 
of Greek philosophy during the interval which elapsed be 
tween the age of Pyrrho and that of ^Enesidemus. How 
ever great may have been the difference in the original 
views of Plato and Aristotle themselves, it seems that in 
the hands of their respective followers, viz. the Academics 
and Peripatetics, these were so far modified, that, according 



64 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [LECT. 

to Cicero, there ceased to be any perceptible difference be- 
tween them: " Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus dif- 
ferentes, re congruentes 1 ." Their united forces, however, 
were apparently of little avail in opposing the advance of 
scepticism, whose positions, established and fortified by Pyr- 
rho, were unassailable, either by the arguments of reason 
or the evidence of facts. 

In truth, the Sceptics had so opposed fyawoiieva to voov- 
jjueva, the reports of sense to the conclusions of reason, that 
their adversaries could hardly use one or the other, without 
laying themselves open to the possibility of being defeated 
with their own weapons. Did the dogmatists not say that 
truth originated in the senses, but that the power of judg 
ing of the truth was not in the senses ? The intellect, they 
asserted, was the judge of things, and alone worthy of 
belief, because it alone discerned that which was simple 
and uniform, and perceived its real character: "Quanquam 
oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse judicium veritatis in 
sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse judicem : solam 
censebant idoneam, cui crederetur; quia sola cerneret id, 
quod semper esset, simplex, et uniusmodi, et tale quale 
esset 2 ." But, replied the Sceptic, if the senses are fallacious, 
where are the materials of reason ? If they are true, what 
faith can be placed in the processes of the intellect ? " Ergo 
si, rebus comprehensis et perceptis nisa et progressa ratio 
hoc efficiet, nihil posse comprehendi : quid potest reperiri, 
quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis 3 ?" For have we not by 
those very processes proved, by a multitude of arguments, 
the falsity of the senses ? If reason and common sense bear 
opposite testimony, who is to believe either, whether in the 
simple judgments that accompany recognition, or the arti 
ficial generalisations of your scientific method ? el yap TOLOV- 

1 Lucullus, 5. 2 Ac. Post. 8. 3 LuculluB, 14. 



IV.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 65 

TO? d-jraretov earns 6 \cyos, ware KCU ra 



ov ^prj 

avrov ev rofc aBfaois wcrre pr) KCLTaKoXovOovvras avraj TT/JO- 
Trereveo-Oai 1 . 

Thus Scepticism, like a spectral enemy, eluded every 
method of refutation, and by its presence seemed to threaten 
the existence of all science and certitude. An attempt, 
however, was made (with what success we shall see) to 
weaken the influence of scepticism, by a new school of 
philosophy, founded by Zeno of Cittium, which, taking its 
name from the Portico (a-roa) at Athens, where their meet 
ings were originally held, became known to the world as 
the celebrated sect of the Stoics. This school, the rise of 
which may be regarded as a direct effect of Pyrrhonism, 
united in its doctrines the scientific method of the Peripa 
tetics, and the ascetic morality of the Cynics, with a theo 
logical pantheism 2 or hylozoism, and a psychological mate 
rialism peculiar to itself. Like Locke in the last century, 
Zeno thought that the best way of settling the controversies 
about the nature, extent, and certainty of human know 
ledge, was, to reconsider the whole subject ; investigate the 
origin of all the materials of thought ; and analyse, if possible, 
the operations of the mind in the acquisition and retention 
of its ideas and notions. We have seen that the favourite 
position of the Sceptics, and the one from which it was 
apparently the most difficult to dislodge them, was that of 
the co-operation in the production of ideas of the mind 

1 Hyp. i. 10, 20. 

2 " We do not deny it to be possible, but that some in all ages might 
have entertained such an atheistical conceit as this that the original of this 
whole mundane system was from one artificial, orderly, and methodical, but 
senseless nature, lodged in the matter : but we cannot trace the footsteps of 
this doctrine anywhere so much as among the Stoics, to which sect Seneca, 
who speaks so waveringly and uncertainly on this point (whether the world 
were an animal or a plant), belonged." Cudworth s Intellectual System, 
Vol. I. chap, in., xxvin. 

L. L, 5 



66 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [LECT. 

itself, whose varying susceptibility renders the action of 
external causes so uncertain, that our knowledge of them 
can only be said to amount to an opinion. It was in direct 
opposition to this notion that Zeno enunciated two princi 
ples, which form the starting-point and basis of his whole 
psychological system : viz. 1st, the complete passivity of the 
mind under the influence of external objects ; 2nd, the non-. 
existence of any mind whatever prior to its reception of 
such external impressions. All nature, according to the 
Stoics, was the manifestation of one primordial substance, 
of which both the mind or soul of man and the external 
universe were but different modifications. " Statuebat enim 
ignem esse ipsam naturam, quse quidque gigneret, et mentem 
atque sensus 1 ." The soul of man consisted of eight parts, 
of which the principal was TO rj^efjiovLKov or \6yicrfios, the 
governing or reasoning faculty, and from this the senses 
took their origin. " When a man was born (said the Stoics) 
the riye^oviKov fjuepos resembled a sheet of white paper (%ap- 
riov evepybv efc diroypa^rfv), and on this were to be stamped 
all the impressions received from external objects. The first 
characters it receives are those through the senses, for the 
mind having perceived anything, as, for example, a white 
object, bears away a remembrance of it when absent. After 
it has received and retained many like impressions, it is said 
to possess experience, for experience is a multitude of similar 
impressions (e^ireipia <ydp ecru TO rwv bfJLoe&wv ^>avra(nwv 
7r\rjdo^. Of these presentations some are produced natur 
ally (<f)vai,K,a><i) and undesignedly (ave-jnTe^y^TO)^, others we 
acquire through study and careful observation (Si r^erepas 
StSacr/caX/a? KOI eVi/^eXe/a?). The latter are called evvoiai, or 
scientific ideas, the former TrpoKr^w, or simple ideas. But 
reason (6 Xt/yo?), in virtue of which we are called rational 
beings (\oyucoi), is said to be developed in fourteen years 
1 Acad. Post. 11. 



IV.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 67 

from natural and accidental ideas (TrpoX^-v^ei?). A rational 
being has also the capacity of forming a concept (voTjfjia), or 
idea of the understanding ((fravrao-fjia Siavoias), and this 
faculty belongs to men and the gods alone 1 ." In the account 
given above of the Stoical psychology, we see the origin 
of the well-known doctrine, which was afterwards adopted 
by Locke 2 : " Nihil in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit 
in sensu." But the Stoics gave a much wider significa 
tion to this principle, for they not only meant to imply 
that there was nothing in the mind which had not entered 
through the senses, but that there could be nothing in the 
mind which was not founded upon something existing in 
the real and external universe. It was by this, indeed, they 
hoped to turn the principal argument of the Sceptics, viz. the 
inability of reason to correct the mistakes of the senses. 
The mind, according to the description given in this passage 
from Plutarch, is built up through the aggregation 3 of ideas 
from without, TrpoK^e^ (6 &e Xoyo?, /ca9 bv Trpoo-ayopevo- 
fieda Xoy/ftH, IK TWV TrpoKr^ewv o V[jL r ir\Tf]pova6aL Xeyerat). 
Reason, in fact, seems to have been considered by the Stoics 
as little more than memory or experience, and since it was ^ 
wholly composed of ideas whose archetypes were real and 
external objects, it followed that, being a storehouse of true 
impressions, a criterion might always be found in it, by 

1 Plutarch, da Plac. Ph. iv. 11. 

2 In regard to the passage (De An. L. in. c. 5) in which the intellect 
prior to experience is compared to a tablet on which nothing has actually 
been written, the context shows that the import of this simile is with 
Aristotle very different from what it is with the Stoics ; to whom, it may be 
noticed, and not, as is usually supposed, to the Stagirite, are we to refer the 
first enouncement of the brocard In Intellectu nihil est, quod non prius 
fuerit in Sensu. See Hamilton s Eeid. 

3 It is not to be supposed that the Koival tvvoiai., <pv<riKal TrpoX^^et?, of the 
Stoics, far less of the Epicureans, were more than generalisations a posteriori. 
Yet this is a mistake into which, among many others, even Lipsius and 
Leibnitz have fallen. Keid s Works (Hamilton), note A, page 774 (note). 

52 



68 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [LECT. 

which to test the validity of any new perception : " Quod 
autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum appella- 
bat ; et, si ita erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non 
posset, scientiam : sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat : ex qua 
exsisteret etiam opinio, qua3 esset imbecilla 1 ." The faculties 
of the mind, according to the Stoics, were simply sensation 
and memory, and these are the only powers allowed it by the 
modern Materialists. It is true, Plutarch speaks of a general 
notion or conception, ewor^d, but this, he adds emphatically, 
is of the genus ^avraa^a, i.e. it belonged to what we should 
call the imagination, and not the conceptive faculty 2 (e crrt 
Be vorjfjia (fravraafjia Siavoias \o<yiKov %coov TO jap (fravTaa-fta, 
eireiBav \oji/c f) TrpoaTrlTTTrj ^v^y, rore eworjfta Kakeirai,, ei\r]- 
<j6o? Tovvofjia irapa TOV vovv, SiOTrep ocra roi? aXXot? fcoot? Trpocr- 
TT/Trret, ravra (fravrdcr/jLara pbvov ecrriv, ocra Be Kal rot9 Geols 
KOL rot? r)iLiv 76, ravra Kal (fravracrfJtaTa Kara 76^0? Kal evvor)- 
jjLara /car eZSo?). This error, of classing general notions or 
conceptions with the mere sensible impressions of memory, 
an error which exposed Locke to so much ridicule from hos 
tile critics, was particularly guarded against by Aristotle, 
who expressly states: "The same affection happens in think 
ing of anything as in drawing it, for though we do not 
require any particular size in drawing a triangle, neverthe 
less we do draw it of some definite magnitude; and we think 
in the same manner, even if we do not think it of any parti 
cular magnitude, we place some magnitude before the eyes. 
If the thing itself is of an undefinable magnitude, we still 
imagine it of some definite magnitude 3 ." The only way of 

1 Acad. Post. 11. 

2 For the distinction between Imagination and Conception, see Mangel s 
Prolegomena Logica, ch. i. 

3 " <rv(j.palvi yap TO avro irddos ev r$ voeiv oTrep Kal h r(J3 Staypdfaiv 
tKei re yap ovOh n-poaxpu/jt.evoi T$ TO irocrov u>pi<jy.bQv elvai TO Tpiydvov, o/xojj 
ypd<f>ofj,et> upurptvov /cara TO TTOO-QV Kal 6 vouv &<ravTUS, KO.V /j,rj iroaov VOTJ, 

irpo 6fJ./J.aTUv iroaov, voel 5 ofy $ votrov av 5 17 0i (Tts $ TUV 



IV.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 69 

escape for the Materialist is in ultra-nominalism, which 
allows the concept no existence in thought. But how did 
the Stoics, by reducing the mind to sensations and the 
memory of sensations, hope to further their object, viz. the 
establishment of some certain basis on which to build the 
truths of science and morals? The real problem Scepticism 
offered for solution was this, When we compare objects for the 
sake of observing their resemblance or difference, how do we 
know that the resemblances or differences we think we per 
ceive are intrinsically in the objects, and do not arise from 
differences in the points of view under which we consider 
them, so that, in classifying or arranging, we are but clas 
sifying and arranging appearances, not things? It must 
be confessed the Stoics never met this question fairly. 
Ideas, they insisted, were the correlates of things, and he 
who discriminated ideas could discriminate things. " There 
is the greatest truth in the senses," says Antiochus, defend 
ing the Stoics, " if they are in sound and healthy order, and if 
everything is removed which could impede or hinder them 
so that there is not one of us who in each one of his senses 
requires a more acute judgment as to each sort of thing." 
But, replies the Sceptic, what does this judgment amount 
to ? You pronounce that an object is such and such, because 
the sensations you receive from it now are the same as, your 
memory tells you, you derived from it before. " So a skilled 
ear at the first note of a musical composition can say, that is 
the Antiope or the Andromache, when there are others, you 
admit, who have not even a suspicion of it V Of course then 
on this point the judgment of the musician and the non- 
musician would be different. The fact alone would verify 
the truth or falsity of each. Now, continues the Sceptic, 



ov 5e, TiOerat, /iev iroaov tapiff^vov^ voei 5 rj irovbv fiovov" Aristotle 
(ITepl Mi Tj/iTjs, ff.r.A.). 

1 Lucullus, 7 ; compare 27. 



70 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [LECT. 

the fact may verify the judgment, but I want a judgment 
which can pronounce a priori on the fact. To this the 
Stoic replied, that the impressions of memory were the 
ultimate tests of truth, for memory had once been sensa 
tion, and the reality of its impressions would stand on the 
same footing as that of present perceptions. So Antiochus 
urges, if eWoiat (notions) were false, or impressed from per 
ceptions of such a kind as not to be able to be distinguished 
from false ones, then I should like to know how we were to 
use them, and how we were to see what was consistent with 
each thing, and what was inconsistent with it ? Certainly 
no room is here left for memory, which alone contains not 
only philosophy, but the whole practice of life, and all the 
arts. For what memory can there be of what is false? or 
what does any one remember which he does not comprehend 
and hold in his mind? "Memoriaa quidem certe, qua3 non 
modo philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usum omnesque artes 
una maxime continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Qiue 
potest enim esse memoria falsorum, aut quid quisquam me- 
minit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet l ? " 

In this passage is revealed at once both the strength and 
the weakness of the Stoical system. The strength, inas 
much as it furnishes a groundwork of common sense, and 
the universal belief of mankind, on which to found sufficient 
certitude for the requirements of life : on the other hand, 
the real question of knowledge, in the philosophical sense 
of the word, was abandoned. Knowledge here meant only 
recognition, and the ability to discriminate rightly, instead of 
being that a priori idea, by which we could pronounce what 
anything is, from the knowledge of what it ought to be. The 
reader of the Thecetetus will readily discern the drift of this 
discussion; he will perceive that the knowledge which the 
Stoics professed to have of the external universe was limited 
1 Lucullus, 7. 



IV.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 71 

to that faculty of right judgment which Plato there shows 
to be an inadequate notion of cognition (Aenrerat roivvv 
TCL fyevbr) So^daai, eV rooSe, orav <yi<yvwo-/ccov ae KOI e6<$copov 
/cal e^MV ev e/celvw T) /crjpLvw Goairep SafCTv\ia)v a<pq)v d/ji<f>oiv 
Ta arj^eta, Sia ^a/cpov /cal pr) i/cava? bpwv a^w, 7rpo0v/ji7)0w, 
TO olicelov e/carepov ar^jjielov aTroftovs rfj oi/cela o-fyei, e yLt/3t/3acra9 
TrpoaapfJiCdai et9 TO eavrfc ^^09, iva fyevrjrai ava<yvwpi,a-i<>, 
elra TOVTWV aTTOTW^Gov /cal cccrTrep ol ep,7ra\LV viroBov/jievoi, 
^as TrpoaftdXa) rrjv e/carepov o fyiv 77/009 TO a\\OTpiov 
rj Kal, ola TCL Iv T0t9 KaTOTTTpois TTJS otyews iraOrj 
Sefta et9 dpiGTepd /jieTappeovarr]?, TavTOv TraOav Bia/ndpTCO 
TOT $rj o-v^jBalvei q TpoBo^la real TO tyevo r) ^o^afeti^) 1 . 

/3. The cardinal notion of the Stoics is contained in 
the last clause of the paragraph we have quoted from Lu- 
cullus, in the preceding section, "quod non animo compre- 
hendit." This comprehension (/azTaX??-^) , which we think 
we shall be able to show was little more than the " involun 
tary association" of the modern Materialists 2 , was defined by 
the Stoics as the instinctive discrimination of the mind between 
real and false impressions. " For," said they, " we ought 
not to give credit to everything which is perceived, but only 
to those perceptions which contain some especial mark of those 
things which appeared 3 ." Such a perception then was called 
the cataleptic phantasm ((fravTaaia KaraXi/jTrTUcrf), or compre 
hensible perception. As this cataleptic phantasm was the 
grand crux or bone of contention between the Stoics and 
New Academy, during a succession of generations, and as it 
illustrates the chief peculiarity of the dogmatic empiricism 
which was the only positive system of philosophy then pre 
valent in Greece, we shall endeavour to explicate its real 

1 Thccetetus, 193, b. c. 

2 The reader will remember Hume s notion of belief. The subject is clearly 
expounded in the chapter " On Belief " in the Analysis of the Human Mind, 
by James Mill (Vol. i. c. XL). 

3 Acad, Post. 11. 



72 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [LECT. 

meaning. Philosophers had discovered in man the faculty of 
abstracting in perception the phenomenal appearance from 
the objective reality. The Stoics were the first to attempt to 
bridge over this gulf between the object in thought and the 
object in nature, TO, r]^lv and ra (fivcret,. They maintained that 
this object of thought was co-extensive with the real object, 
that although with reference to the mind it was an image, or, 
as Chrysippus thought, a modification (aXXolcoais). still it 
covered, embraced, and comprehended the object, so that the 
perception was in fact intuitive, and our knowledge was not 
that of the mere subject-object, but of the object-object. $av- 
Taaia e TVTTCOO-IS eV ^v^f), TovTecmv aXXoicoai,?. ov <yap 
&e/CTeov TTJV TVTTWO-W, olovel TVTCOV crcfrpayLGrTrjpos eVel dvev- 
Se/CTOv ICTTL TroXXoi)? TZ/7roi>9 Kara TO avTO 7TpijLve(70aL VOLTCU 
Se <f)avTao-la 77 CLTTO VTrap%ovTO<? Kara TO VTrap^ov eVaTro/xe/Lta^y- 
KOI eva7roT6TV7ra)fjLevii /cal evaTrocr^pa^Lo-fjievr], oia ov/c av 
o aVo /JLT) vTrdp^ovTOs*. Besides this theory of the 
relation of knowledge to existence, the Stoics also thought 
that every object had by nature a distinctive or characteristic 
mark, so that there were not two objects, however similar in 
appearance, which really were identical on close inspection. 
"Omnia dicis sui generis esse; nihil esse idem, quod sit aliud. 
Stoicum est quidem, nee admodum incredibile; nullum esse 
pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius nullum gra- 
men 2 ." It is in connexion with these two notions that we 
must look for an explanation of the cataleptic phantasm. Since 
perception was an intuition of a real external object, and no 
two objects in nature were exactly alike, it was possible for a 

1 Diogenes Laertius, Lib. vn. cap. i. 50. 

Cf. " The external senses have a double province to make us feel, and 
to make us perceive. They furnish us with a variety of sensations some 
pleasant, others painful, and others indifferent ; at the same time, they give 
us a conception and an invincible belief of the existence of external objects." 
Beid, On the Int. Powers, Essay II. c. xvn. p. 318. 

2 Lucullus, 26. 



IV.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 73 

wise man to discern this mark or distinctive feature of objects, 
and, by storing it up in the memory, make it a criterion with 
which to compare other perceptions or observations 1 . Thus 
Epicurus, identifying irpoXrj^jr^ with KardXr]-^^, says it is a 



1 The student will find that the dispute between the Stoics and Acade 
micians was not really about objective ontological existence, but an enquiry 
into the nature of evidence as a ground of inference. The same point is 
elucidated by Mr Mill in his Logic, Book iv. ch. i. 2 : "In almost every act 
of our perceiving faculties, observation and inference are intimately blended. 
What we are said to observe is usually a compound result, of which one- 
tenth may be observation, and the remaining nine-tenths inference. I affirm, 
for example, that I hear a man s voice. This would pass, in common 
language, for a direct perception. All, however, which is really perception is 
that I hear a sound. That the sound is a voice, and that voice the voice of 
a man, are not perceptions, but inferences. I affirm, again, that I saw my 
brother at a certain hour this morning. If any proposition concerning a 
matter of fact would commonly be said to be known by the direct testimony 
of the senses, this surely would be so. The truth, however, is far otherwise. 
I only .saw a certain coloured surface ; or, rather, I had the kind of visual 
sensations which are usually produced by a coloured surface ; and from these 
as marks, known to be such by previous experience, I concluded I saw my 
brother. I might have had sensations precisely similar when my brother 
was not there. I might have seen some other person so nearly resembling 
him in appearance, as, at the distance, and with the degree of attention 
which I bestowed, to be mistaken for him. I might have been asleep, and 
have dreamed that I saw him, or in a state of nervous disorder which 
brought his image before me in a waking hallucination. In all these modes, 
many have been led to believe that they saw persons well known to them, 
who were dead, or far distant. If any of these suppositions had been true, 
the affirmation, that I saw my brother, would have been erroneous, but 
whatever was matter of direct perception, namely, the visual sensations, 
would have been real. The inference only would have been ill-grounded ; 
I should have ascribed those sensations to a wrong cause." 

The reasoning runs thus : such and such marks are marks of my brother, 
here are such and such marks, therefore here is my brother. But in the 
major proposition the induction does not preclude the possibility of a 
plurality of causes. Such and such marks may belong to other people 
besides my brother, hence the Stoical assumption, that everything had a 
distinctive mark. The reader will find the whole of the Lucullus turns upon 
the above passage from Mr Mill. The reason why the ontological and 
logical notions were confounded arose from the misapprehension as to the 
nature of the copula which was supposed to import real existence. 

See in the ensuing Lecture the account of the doctrine of probability of 
Carneades. 



74 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [LECT. 

right opinion, notion, or general idea in the mind, i.e. a re 

membrance of things which have often appeared externally 

( ETri/cou/309 e 6 c/>tA,6cro<o9 Xe yet TrpoXrjtyiv olovel 

r) b%av opOrjv, rj evvoiav, rj Ka0o\iKrjv vbrjonv e 

TOfT6(7Tt [jivrjiJLr)v rov TToXXa/a? e(t)0v fyavevTo<$ 1 }. It is pro 



bable that the cataleptic phantasm was really a complex 
idea 2 in memory, composed of a group of those marks or 
qualities which constitute the differentia of a species. Thus 
Zeno, comparing the steps of the process by which the mind 
acquires its furniture, to the open palm, the half-closed hand , 
the closed fist, and that again grasped by the other hand, 
illustrated the method of arriving at science or knowledge by 
observation, comparison, abstraction, and classification; but 
of course, if the mind could grasp single objects so as to re 
cognise them by their accidents, a fortiori it could acquire 
those complex conceptions through which we refer an indi 
vidual to its species. So the cataleptic phantasm seems to 
be, sometimes a single complex perception of an individual, 
and sometimes a more general notion. Cicero appears, how 
ever, to regard it always as the former, although the basis 
on which the validity of general notions was established. 
" Quodque natura quasi normam scientia? et principium sui 
dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimeren- 
tur; e quibus non principium solum, sed latiores quasdam, ad 
rationem inveniendam via? reperiuntur 3 ." 

y. We have before remarked that the passivity of the 
mind in perception was one of the most prominent features 
in the Stoical system. The assent (avy/cardOeo-L^ with which 
the mind accepted phenomena was involuntary, and it is not 

1 Suidas in irpoXy^is. 

2 Compare the description of a Conception in James Mill: "My concep 
tion of a horse is merely my taking together, in one, the simple ideas of the 
sensations which constitute my knowledge of a horse." Analysis of the 
Human Mind, Vol. I. chap. vi. p. 175. 

3 Acad. Post. 11. 



IV.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 75 

very easy to see in this respect how the Stoical notion of 
knowledge was so very different from that of opinion or 
simple judgment, between which extremes comprehension or 
KardXrj^Ls occupied the middle place. According to Gellius, 
assent was voluntary, and in this knowledge differed from 
opinion, the latter being involuntary and receiving no assent 
from the mind. "Visa animi, quas fyavraaias philosophi ap 
pellant, quibus mens hominis primastatim specie accidentis rei 
pellitur, non voluntatis sunt neque arbitraria, sed vi quadam 
sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitanda. Probationes autem, 
quas o-vy/caTaOeaeis vocant, quibus eadem visa noscuntur ac 
dijudicantur, voluntaria sunt fiuntque hominum arbitratuV 
On the other hand, Cicero, discussing the same subject, seems 
to leave the voluntariness of assent as very doubtful. "For 
as it is evident (says Lucullus) that one scale of a balance 
must be depressed when a weight is put in it, so the mind 
too must yield to what is evident; for just as it is impossible 
for any animal to forbear desiring what is manifestly suited 
to its nature, so it is equally impossible for it to withhold its 
assent to a manifest fact which is brought under its notice 2 ." 
To reconcile these conflicting statements we must have re 
course to the physical theory of the Stoics, which powerfully 
influenced the logic as well as the ethic of their whole system. 
They thought that "the whole universe being material, there 
was a reason immanent in everything, under the fixed and 
immutable laws of which all nature developed after its kind." 
But to avoid the fatalism which such a principle would 
involve, Chrysippus insisted on the doctrine of " auxiliary 
causes," or confatalism, by which, although the action of 



1 Gellius, xix. cap. i. It is probable that the act of inference was the 
voluntary part of the process of knowledge; simple judgment was involuntary; 
but inference involves the weighing of evidence, hence the simile above from 
Lucullus. See Note 17, from Mill s Logic. 

3 Lucullus, 12. 



76 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [LECT. 

nature was fixed, still, as every event was the resultant of 
compounded causes, so their concomitance as a condition of 
the coefficiency of each cause was contingent. For example, 
motion must ensue to a body on the application of a force. 
But the same force might communicate a motion of rota 
tion to one body, and a motion of translation to another. 
Thus (says Chrysippus) "a man who pushes a cylinder gives 
it a principle of motion, but not immediately that of revolu 
tion. So, an object strikes our sense and conveys its image 
to our soul, yet leaves us free to believe in it or not; as in 
the case of the cylinder which is set in motion from without, 
it will continue for the future to move according to its own 
proper force and nature." "Ut igitur, inquit, qui protrusit 
cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem 
non dedit: sic visum objectum imprimit illud quidem, et 
quasi signabit in animo suam speciem: sed assensio nostra 
erit in potestate : eaque quemadmodum in cylindro dictum 
est, extrinsecus pulsa, quod reliquum est suapte vi et natura 
movebitur V Still, this belief or assent of the mind was the 
result of the action of an immutable law, and therefore, as is 
the inevitable consequence of materialistic principles, the 
pure spontaneity of the mind is not admitted. It is true it 
acts according to its own nature, and so far as its action is a 
concause its determination is voluntary. What was this law 
under which the mind evolved its knowledge? Modern phi 
losophers would call it the law of "the association of ideas," 
the principle under which belief and knowledge are alike in 
voluntary. The first law, property, or faculty of the human 
mind brought into operation in earliest infancy is that of the 
association of ideas. To recollect, to imagine, to abstract, 
and to reason, according to the Hume, Brown, and Mill 
school of philosophy, are not active, but neuter verbs, imply 
ing a succession of mental states, determined by this fixed 

1 De Fato, 19. 



IV.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 77 

law of association and suggestion, of which the mind is the 
passive subject 1 . Ancient Philosophy, however, was not ripe 
for such an articulate enunciation of the views which they 
yet unconsciously foreshadowed, the complete systematization 
of which was reserved for the philosophers of the eighteenth 
century 2 . 

8. In the complete antithesis the Stoics intended 
their system to exhibit to the pernicious opinions of the 

1 Brown s celebrated analysis of the process of composition is a luminous 
illustration of this theory: " In the first place, to sit down to compose, is to 
have a general notion of some subject which we are about to treat, with the 
desire of developing it, and the expectation, or perhaps the confidence, that 
we shall be able to develop it more or less fully. The desire, like every 
other vivid feeling, has a degree of permanence which our vivid feelings only 
possess ; and, by its permanence, tends to keep the accompanying conception 
of the subject, which is the object of the desire, also permanent before us; 
and while it is thus permanent the usual spontaneous suggestions take 
place conception following conception, in rapid but relative series, and our 
judgment, all the time, approving and rejecting, according to those relations 
of fitness and unfitness to the subject, which it perceives in the parts of the 
train. Such I conceive to be a faithful picture of the state, or successive 
states of the mind, in the process of composition. It is not the exercise of a 
single power, but the development of various susceptibilities of desire of 
simple suggestion, by which conceptions rise after conceptions of judgment, 
or relative suggestion, by which a feeling of relative fitness or unfitness 
arises, on the contemplation of the conceptions that have thus spontaneously 
presented themselves. We think of some subject; the thought of this 
subject induces various conceptions related to it. We approve of some, as 
having a relation of fitness for our end, and disapprove of others, as unfit. 
We may term this complex state, or series of states, imagination, or fancy, 
and the term may be convenient for its brevity. But, in using it, we must 
not forget that the term, however brief and simple, is still the name of a 
state that is complex, or of a succession of certain states ; that the phenomena 
comprehended under it, being the same in nature, are not rendered, by this 
use of a mere word, different from those to which we have already given 
peculiar names, expressive of them as they exist separately; and that it is to 
the classes of these elementary phenomena, therefore, that we must refer the 
whole process of imagination in our philosophic analysis unless we exclude 
analysis altogether, and fill our mental vocabulary with as many names of 
powers as there are complex affections of the mind." Dr Brown s Lectures. 
Lecture XLII. page 271. 

8 Hamilton s Reid. See notes to chap. vi. On the Active Powers, page 616. 



78 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [LECT. IT. 

Pyrrhonists, not only did they maintain that all sceptical 
doubt was inconsistent with knowledge, but also that all 
reasonable belief was insufficient for a wise man. "Mihi 
porro non tarn certum est, esse aliquid, quod comprehendi 
possit, de quo jam nimium etiam diu dispute, quam sapien- 
tem nihil opinari, id est, nun quam assentire rei vel falsa?, vel 
incognita? 1 / was a sentiment the Stoics were never tired of 
reiterating. Ignorance, opinion, and belief, were, with them, 
convertible terms, which might suffice for the unthinking, 
uneducated, and superstitious vulgar; but certainty, know 
ledge, and assent, were alone conformable to the wisdom of 
the thoughtful philosophic sage. It was this arrogation of 
absolute certainty, this dogmatic assumption of unqualified 
conviction, which, probably, first aroused the opposition of 
the successors of Plato in the Academy to the Stoical doc 
trines. Men who had read and understood the purport of 
the ThecBtetus, and who had in that work seen every em 
pirical avenue to knowledge tested and found inadequate, 
whether it was sensation, judgment, or reason men who had 
inherited and secretly cherished the belief of their immortal 
founder in the existence of principles in the higher reason of 
man, through which they had cognition of things prior to and 
beyond experience these men would ill brook the usurpation 
of absolute knowledge, and certitude, by a set of philosophers 
who maintained that man was endowed with a soul which, 
previously to its contact with external phenomena, was devoid 
of every intellectual or moral attribute. It was probably, we 
say, such latent influences as these which tended to maintain 
that long hostility between the Stoics and later Academicians 
an hostility which, although ostensibly confined to contro 
versies respecting questions of apparently limited scope, yet 
involved problems of vital importance to the interests of 
moral and metaphysical truth. 

1 Lucullus, 18. 



LECTURE V. 

THE NEW ACADEMY. 

fj.7] ^dp rjv XpvcrtTTTros, OVK cl? yv eyw." 



a. "HISTORIANS," says Sextus, "generally distinguish 
three Academies. A first and principal, founded by Plato 
himself; a second or middle, commencing with Arcesilas; a 
third or new, under the presidency of Carneades." 

To these some writers add a fourth, under Philo and 
Charmidas, and even a fifth, that of Antiochus 1 . 

Cicero, however, seems to think, that if there ever was 
any divergence in the doctrines of the successors of Plato 
from the original method of their founder, it commenced 
with Arcesilas, who thus gave the distinguishing character to 
the New Academy: "Sed tamen ilia, quam exposui, vetus; 
hasc nova nominetur: quse usque ad Carneadem perducta, 
qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem ArcesilaB ratione per- 
mansit 2 ." Of the opinions of Arcesilas himself, however, we 
have not any very certain information; he appears to have 
appropriated so much of the scepticism of Pyrrho as was not 
inconsistent with the traditions of the Academy. But that 

1 Hyp. i. 33. 220. Eusebius, 14. 4. Prceparat. Evang. p. 726. 

2 Ac. Post. 12. De Fin. v. 3. 



80 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

by which he may be considered to have most especially de 
termined the attitude of the Academy towards the Stoical 
dogmatists, was the controversy he commenced respecting 
the cataleptic phantasm, upon the validity of which, as a 
basis of certitude in the acquisition of knowledge, depended 
the pretensions of empiricism. This controversy lasted for 
nearly 300 years 1 , according to the testimony of Cicero; and 
in fact has been, and for ever must be, the fundamental pro 
blem of metaphysics. If we have no knowledge prior to ex 
perience, what degree of certainty attached to the knowledge 
obtained from experience? what is the nature of that know 
ledge, and what its extent? After the lapse of so many cen 
turies these questions seem as far from a satisfactory solu 
tion as ever. Perhaps, however, as Professor Ferrier remarks, 
that ever-increasing tendency among speculatists towards 
"the great gulf-stream of idealism" had already set in, being 
either the natural reaction from the materialistic realism of 
the Stoics, or a less positive form of the Platonic system. 
Both these influences are discernible in the opinions of Arce- 
silas, Carneades, and Philo. Idealism, however, was most 
articulately expressed by Carneades; and it is the dogmatic 
enunciation of the impotency of human knowledge to tran 
scend the sphere of subjective reality, the d/car a\7]Trrov, or 
incomprehensibility of all things, as it was then termed, 
which marks his speculations as the commencement of a new 
era in metaphysical philosophy, and, from their coincidence 
with the tendencies of thought of the present age, renders 
their explication at once easier and more interesting. 

It is curious, indeed, to observe, how principles, the anti 
thesis of which was as decided in the theories of Chrysippus 
and Carneades as in the corresponding speculative systems 
of the present day, should have led to results almost the op 
posite to those we are accustomed to consider as inevitable 
1 Lucullus, 24, et passim. 



V THE NEW ACADEMY. 8 1 

consequences from their respective premises. In Stoicism 
we have united a psychological system of materialism which 
left the human soul little better than an ingenious mecha 
nism, a rigid morality whose precepts inculcated habits of 
fortitude and temperance, and a notion of causality which 
excluded all spontaneity from the voluntary effort, as well as 
from the cognitive process. On the other side, we have the 
absolute freedom of the active principle maintained by Car- 
neades, side by side with total scepticism as to the existence 
of any motive to virtue beyond utility, and a denial of all 
external and objective elements in the materials of conscious 
ness. But there is no doubt the Stoical doctrines, by reason 
of their scientific method, their elevated morality, and their 
accordance with the prevailing superstitions of the age, were 
much more popular among all who upheld the interests of 
religion and virtue, than the apparently lax scepticism of the 
New Academicians. 

/3. Carneades is certainly the representative man of 
the New Academy; and in his method and opinions we shall 
find the indications of that mighty change which was shortly 
to dislodge all the old-world notions so strenuously upheld 
and cherished by the Stoics: notions which, rooted in the 
pride of the reason of the learned, and in the traditional su 
perstitions of the vulgar, it seemed the mission of Carneades 
and the later Academicians systematically to oppose. In 
truth the Stoics may be considered to have combined in their 
system all that was positive in theology, morality, and specu 
lative science. Carneades, on the other hand, principally 
comes before us as embodying in his opinions the negation of 
every article of Stoicism ; and it is this aspect, therefore, of 
his doctrines that we shall proceed to examine. Carneades, 
like most of the later Academicians, left no writings of his 
own; we have to seek for his views in the works of his illus 
trious expounder Cicero, who himself was perhaps the noblest 

L.L. 



82 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

upholder of the New Academy, and in those of Sextus Em- 
piricus, whose scepticism perhaps leant more to that of Car- 
neades than to that of Pyrrho. It is easy to detect, even 
from the brief sketch we have given of the Stoical doctrines, 
that their main positions may be reduced to four coherent 
and dependent articles; and it is with reference to each of 
these that we shall consider the opposing opinions of Car- 
neades. 

1. Their physical theory of the universe, as the inalien 
able and immortal subject of a one primary law or cause, 
which as a regulative, and by the Stoics considered an intel 
ligent principle, determines and directs all the manifestations 
of nature. "Ait enim (sc. Chrysippus), vim divinam in ra- 
tione esse positam, et universae natura? animo atque mente : 
ipsumque mundum dicit esse, et ejus animi fusionem uni- 
versam 1 ." 

2. That, under this law, cause, or principle, the succes 
sions and changes of things are the immutable links in an 
eternal sequence of causation (eifjLapfjLevrf), the passive invo 
luntary agents of absolute necessity ("turn ejus ipsius princi- 
patum, qui in mente et ration e versetur, communemque 
rerum naturam, universa atque omnia continentem: turn 
fatalem vim, et necessitatem rerum futurarum) V 

3. That in the act of perception the mind or human 
subject is passively illuminated with a consciousness of its 
own existence, and that of the object causing the perception ; 
and that this consciousness or cataleptic phantasm imparts 
the conviction of its own reality, conformity, and indivi 
duality "si illud esset (sc. Kard\rj7mK^ <f>avTacria) sicut 
Zeno definiret, tale visum igitur irnpressum effictumque ex 

1 De Nat. Dear. i. 15. 

2 L 1. 15. "Hinc vobis exstitit primum ilia fatalis necessitas, quam 
duapv-tvyv dicitis ; ut, quidquid accidat, id ex seterna veritate, causarumque 
continuatioiie fluxisse dicatis." I. /. 20. 



V.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 83 

eo, uude esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non 
esset 1 ." 

4. That since knowledge is but the instinctive appre 
hension of the mind s obedience to the laws of its nature, it 
is not competent to a wise man to credit any authority or 
evidence short of this necessary assent which consciousness 
accords to the cataleptic phantasm (avrrj yop r^v $aai Kara- 
\r)tyiv KOI Kara\7)7rriKfjs (fravracrlas (Tv^KardOeaiv rjroi ev 
<70(f>o) rj ev (j)av\a) ryiverai. aXX* edi> re ev aofyw yevrjrai eiri^ 
crrrj/jir} eariV) edv re ev (pav\a), Sofa) 2 . 

y. To the first of these articles, embracing as it does 
the entire theology of the Stoics, Carneades opposed a mul 
titude of arguments, which Cicero, in his treatise De Natura 
Deorum, has put into the mouth of Cotta, who speaks against 
the Epicureans as well as the Stoics. For although Cicero 
does not expressly attribute all the negative opinions in this 
work to Carneades, yet it is evident, from the identity of 
style between the reasonings of Cotta and those ascribed 
by name to Carneades, that they are the utterances of one 
mind ; and especially from the exordium prefixed to the 
work we are led to the conclusion that they must have 
been eminently the sentiments of Carneades. " Contra quos 
(sc. Stoicos) Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret 
homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem 3 ." 

The first book of this work is devoted to a controversy 
between C. Velleius on behalf of the Epicureans against Q. 
Lucilius Balbus defending the Stoics. In the second book 
the latter takes up the argument, and expounds and defends 
the theology of the Stoics ; and in the third book Balbus 
is in turn attacked by Cotta as the representative of the 
New Academy. 

"My belief in the existence of the gods," says Cotta, 



1 Lucullus, 6. 2 Adv. Math. vn. 153. 

3 De Nat. Deor. i. 2. 



62 



84 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

" is based on the traditions of my ancestors ; but since you 
disregard authorities, and appeal to reason, permit me to 
measure my reason against yours ; for the proofs on which 
you found the existence of the gods tend only to render a 
proposition doubtful that in my opinion is not so." (" Affers 
haec omnia argumenta, cur dii sint : remque mea sententia 
minime dubiam, argumentando dubiam facis V) This passage 
is remarkable as evincing the tremendous strides scepticism 
must have made in subverting the natural tendency of man 
to trust in the conclusions of his reason. That which is 
solely upheld by reason, the same reason may confute ; but 
there is a belief not founded on demonstrative evidence 
which reason cannot touch. We see the traditional manner 
of the Old Academy preserved in the playful Socratic banter 
with which frequently the gravest subjects are handled ; and 
highly characteristic of the contempt in which the logic of 
the Stoics was held by Carneades and his followers is the 
ensuing passage : " All that you have so much enlarged 
upon in treating this subject," observes Cotta, "is that old, 
concise, and, as it seemed to you, acute syllogism of Zeno, 
Quod ratione utitur, melius est, quam id, quod ratione non 
utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius. Ratione igitur mundus 
utitur 2 ." By parity of reasoning Zeno could just as well 
prove that the world could read a book, for " that which can 
read is better than that which cannot ; nothing is better 
than the world, the world therefore can read. So arguing 
one might shew the world to be an orator, a mathematician, 
a musician, that it professes all sciences, and in short is a 
philosopher." This is a good specimen of the mode of fence 
so often adopted by Carneades, which Cicero elsewhere tells 
us was particularly obnoxious to Chrysippus, his Stoical 
adversary. " Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interro- 

1 De Nat. Dear. in. 4. 2 7. /. 9. 



V.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 85 

getur, verbi causa, tria, pauca sint, anne multa : aliquanto 
prius, quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere, id est, quod ab iis 
dicitur, ^trv^d^eiv. Per me vel stertas licet, inquit Carnea- 
des, non modo quiescas. Sed quid proficit? sequitur enim 
qui te ex somno excitet, et eodem modo interroget 1 ." If 
however the manner of Carneades was somewhat flippant, 
his arguments seem often to have been urged with great 
subtlety and acuteness. The reason or intelligence said to 
pervade nature by the Stoics, although considered by them 
an efficient, was really nothing more than a physical cause, 
the natura naturans of the Pantheist. When Gotta there 
fore distinguishes it from a natural cause, he apparently only 
means that the all-pervading law of the Stoics implies an 
unity, and in that sense a personality for the Deity, which 
the Academicians were not disposed to admit, although they 
allowed that the harmony and the regularity of the universe 
indicated the action of at least mechanical or perhaps chemi 
cal laws. " Itaque ilia mihi placebat oratio de convenientia, 
consensuque naturse, quam quasi cognatione continuatam 
conspirare dicebas. Illud non probabam, quod negabas id 
accidere potuisse, nisi ea uno divino spiritu contineretur. 
Ilia vero cohasret et permanet, naturae viribus, non deorum : 
estque in ea iste quasi consensus, quam av/miraOetav Graeci 
vocant. Sed ea, quo sua sponte major est, eo minus divina 
ratione existimanda est 2 ." In this however there is little 
more than a logical distinction. The natura naturata is but 
the passive subject, in which inheres the natura naturans, 
active in nothing but its logical antecedence 3 . Thus the 
broad distinction between the theological system of the 

1 Lucullus, 29. 2 De Nat. Deor. in. 11. 

3 " Stoici naturam dividunt in duas partes: unam, quteefficiat, alteram, 
quae se ad faciendum tractabilem praestet. In ilia prima esse vim faciendi, 
in hae materiam, nee alterum sine altero esse posse. Ita isti uno naturae 
nomine res diversissimas comprehenderunt, Deum et mundum, artificem et 
opus, dicuntque, alterum sine altero, nihil posse, tamquam natura sit Deus 



86 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

Epicureans and Academicians and that of the Stoics was, 
that while the latter conceived that passive matter could be 
endowed with a self-acting energy, the former saw that the 
forces and powers in nature were but attributes or properties 
of the material substance ; and therefore merely physical 
laws, and not intelligent or efficient causes. The great in 
centive to Pantheism in all ages has been the inability of the 
human mind to conceive & first cause ; & primary consequent 
which itself has had no antecedent. To avoid this the Pan 
theist devises the hypothesis of an eternal substance in which 
cause and effect are as it were synchronous. 

There was no universe without a God, and no God in 
dependent of the universe. The notion of the immortality 
and the infinity of the material universe was an assumption 
essentially involved in the Pantheistic system, since it was 
absurd to suppose that that, the duration of which had been 
unlimited in the past, could terminate in any period of the 
future ; and, as we have seen, this past eternity was the fun 
damental principle of the system. To demonstrate therefore 
the mortality, mutability, and finite nature of matter, would 
be to aim a fatal blow at the leading conception of the Pan 
theist. Cicero has preserved to us the argumentation of 
Carneades on the subject. The general scope of his reason 
ing seems to be that the attributes of a thing cannot be in 
their nature contrary to its essence ; and that matter, as 
manifested to us, is mutable, soluble, and finite, there/ore it 
is impossible to conceive it the inalienable seat of an immu 
table, immortal and infinite essence. 

" Si nullum corpus immortale sit, nullum esse corpus sem- 
pitemum. Corpus autem immortale nullum esse, ne indivi- 
duum quidem, nee quod dirimi, distrahive non possit. Cum- 

mundo permistus, Nam interdum sic confundmit, ut sit Deus ipsa mens 
mundi, et mundus corpus Dei." Lactantius, Divinar. Instit. lib. vn. cap. 3, 
p. 781. 



V.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 87 

que omne animal patibilem naturam habeat, nullum est 
eorum quod effugiat accipiendi aliquid extrinsecus, id est, 
quasi ferendi et patiendi necessitatem. Et, si omne animal 
mortale est, immortale nullum est. Ergo itidem si omne 
animal secari ac dividi potest, nullum est eorum individuum, 
nullum seternum. Atqui omne animal ad accipiendam vim 
externam, et ferendam paratum est. Mortale igitur omne 
animal, et dissolubile, et dividuum sit necesse est." (And 
again continues Carneades), " Si omnia, quae sunt, e quibus 
cuncta constant, mutabilia sunt; nullum corpus esse potest 
non mutabile. Mutabilia autem sunt ilia, ex quibus omnia 
constant, ut vobis videtur. Omne igitur corpus mutabile est. 
At si esset corpus aliquod immortale, non esset omne muta 
bile. Ita efficitur, ut omne corpus mortale sit Quod si 

ea intereant, ex quibus constet omne animal; nullum est 
animal sempiternum 1 ." In all the above we see the same 
idea preserved, viz. that of the passivity of matter as con 
trasted with the activity of intelligence, which the Stoics 
consistently confounded, both in the reason of man as an 
individual, and in that of the universe as a whole. In fact, 
between a passive, suffering, perishable subject, and an active, 
efficient agent there is an entire diameter of being, which 
seems to separate them even in conception as much as in 
reality. Bishop Butler uses similar arguments to prove the 
immortality of the soul as Carneades to demonstrate the 
mortality of the universe, both endeavouring to show that 
a thinking principle, as in its essence one and indivisible, can 
not be a function of that which is subject to perpetual flux 
and attrition. Carneades further indicates how the Pan 
theism of the Stoics leads to Polytheism, and hence to 
Fetishism. 

For with the vulgar, to whom the metaphysic of the 
system would be unintelligible, the deification of the uni- 
1 De Nat. Deor. in. 12. 



88 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

verse, by an easy transition, would be transferred to its 
parts; so, " There is a divinity presiding over every human 
affair, and every idle phantasm, every figment of the imagi 
nation, are Deities." (" Ergo etiam Spes, Moneta omniaque, 
quse cogitatione nobismet ipsis possumus fingere 1 .") But 
enough has been said to prove the decided hostility of Car- 
neades and the later Academicians to the theological doctrines 
of the Stoics, or, more properly, of the great mass of the hea 
then public. Ought Carneades then to be considered an 
atheist? Cicero denies that such a consequence would be 
consistent with any form of philosophy. "Hsec Carneades 
agebat ; non ut decs tolleret ; quid enim philosopho minus 
conveniens ? sed ut Stoicos nihil de diis explicare convince- 
ret 2 ." Perhaps the divinity of the Academicians was that 
" Unknown God" whom St Paul told the Athenians, that 
having ignorantly worshipped he now declared unto them, 
( Ez> avTG) jap ^wjjiev teal Kivov^Qa Kal ea/Jiev). 

8. The notion of a fatal necessity ordering and com 
pelling both the actions of men, and the changes in the 
external universe, seems to have been ingrained in the 
Greek mind. Every poet, every tragedian, finds in this 
instinct a ready fountain of sympathy with his narrations, 
representing man as the sport of a relentless destiny, whose 
decrees he unconsciously fulfils, and yet is punished for 
obeying. This idea then, although common to the vulgar, 
and inextricably bound up with the ancient theogony of 
Greece, was really the logical consequence of a philosophical 
Pantheism. For it is impossible to conceive of law inherent 
in passive matter apart from an immutable order of suc 
cession a chain every link of which is potentially involved 
in the primary principle. Such a result, however, when 
combined with psychological materialism, must evidently 

1 /. I 18. * LI. 17. 



V.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 89 

lead to the denial of all freedom of will to the human 
agent. 

This consequence, besides being opposed to the evidence 
of facts, would annihilate all moral responsibility, and there 
fore all distinctions between virtue and vice. 

Thus ensued ample materials for the controversial pro 
pensities of the Stoics and their contemporaries ; and their 
discussions, we are told, were dependent on three propo 
sitions, known among logicians as "the dominative argu 
ment" viz. 

1. Tlav < 7Tape\7]\v0o<; -oXry^e? avay/cawv elvai. 

2. AWO.T&) abvvaTOV fjurj a/co\ov0eiv. 

3. &VVCLTOV elvai o ovr eorriv aXyOes OVT earaL. 
From the acceptance of any two of these propositions 

followed logically the denial of the third; and so the question 
of necessity or freedom in the succession of human events 
was supposed to be decided. The second or middle of these 
propositions was the most important, and may be thus in 
terpreted : " All nature either acts in conformity to a fixed 
immutable law, or it does not ; and it is impossible to con 
ceive that the same law can be at one time fixed and at 
another time variable. Now if this axiom be admitted, and 
likewise the first, viz. that everything which has happened 
has occurred in conformity with a fixed law, it follows that 
the third and last proposition must be rejected, viz. that that 
which neither has occurred, nor will occur, yet might happen, 
for, if it did, it could only be fortuitously, but by the first 
proposition past events are admitted not to be fortuitous, 
therefore by the second no event can be fortuitous. Q.E.D." 
Here we have the doctrine of absolute necessity maintained 
by the Megaric school, and especially by its most illustrious 
representative, Diodorus Cronus. The Stoics Zeno and 
Cleanthes, it seems, admitted the second and third propo 
sitions, and therefore rejected the first; for/by admitting the 



9 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

third, they virtually allowed the fortuitousness of future 
events, and therefore, by the second, they were compelled 
to deny the necessity of the past, and thus abandoned the 
idea of fate altogether. Chrysippus, however, although a 
Stoic, attempted to cut the logical knot by which this argu 
ment was connected, for he refused to admit the validity of 
the second proposition, and thus was left to the alternative 
of allowing that the past was necessary, but that the future 
might be to a certain degree fortuitous. We have already 
explained, in the preceding chapter, by what process of rea 
soning Chrysippus arrived at this result, viz. by the adoption 
of the principle of confatalism, or auxiliary causes. This 
notion, which in substance was held by the Epicureans as 
well as by the Stoics, was perhaps more intelligibly, although 
quaintly, illustrated by the former. Cicero tells us that 
Epicurus, when he found, if his atoms were allowed to de 
scend by their own weight, our actions could not be in our 
power, because their motions would be certain and neces 
sary, invented an expedient which had escaped Democritus, 
to avoid necessity. He says, that when the atoms descend 
by their own weight, or gravity, they move a little obliquely: 
"Ait atomum, cum pondere et gravitate directo deorsum 
feratur, declinare paululum V Now, although in the con 
text to the above passage it appears that Cotta considered 
this argument so despicable, that he affirms Epicurus could 

1 De Nat. Deor. i. 25. 

" Illud in his quoque te rebus cognoscere avemus, 
corpora cum deorsum rectum per inane feruntur, 
ponderibus propriis incerto tempore ferme 
incertisque loci spatiis decellere paulum, 
tantum quod momen mutatum dicere possis. 
Quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum, 
Imbris uti guttfe, caderent per inane profundum, 
nee foret offensus natus nee plaga creata 
principiis: ita nil umquam natura creasset." 

Lucretius, n. 216224. 



V.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 91 

only have advanced it for the sake of affording his adver 
sary the gratification of an easy victory, yet it seems to us 
susceptible of explanation and application to the subject 
under discussion, although perhaps more appreciable to a 
mathematician than to a logician. The oblique direction 
of the atoms was a crude notion of a resultant force which 
might have an infinite number of pairs of components, which 
again might be compounded in an infinite number of ways, 
and therefore the successive changes in nature would appear 
fortuitous, although subject to the operation of immutable 
laws of force, whereas vertical resultants would, as it were, 
be susceptible of no reciprocal action, and therefore must 
continue to act in the direction of the force primarily im 
pressed on them 1 . The attempt of Chrysippus, as we have 
seen, to reconcile the idea of a fixed law in the order of 
things, with that of the spontaneity of the human agent, 
was founded on somewhat similar reasoning, viz. the co 
operation and coefficiency of causes. That this expedient 
did not fulfil the end desired, is logically and clearly de 
monstrated by Carneades, whose arguments Cicero has re 
corded in his treatise De Fato, one of the most elegant and 
luminous fragments of the great author s works. After relat 
ing the Stoical and Megaric logomachies on the subject of 
free will and necessity, " Carneades," he continues, "rejected 

1 "Denique si semper motus conectitur omnis 
et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo, 
nee declinando faciunt primordia motus 
principium quoddam quod fati fcedera rumpat, 
ex infinite ne causam causa sequatur, 
libera per terras unde haBC animantibus exstat, 
unde est base, inquam, fatis avolsa potestas 
per quam progredimur quo ducit quemqne voluntas, 
declinamus item motus nee tempore certo 
nee regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens? 
nam dubio procul bis rebus sua cuique voluntas 
principium dat et bine motus per membra rigantur." 

Lucretius, n. 251 262. 



92 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

these methods of reasoning, and considers their conclusions 
are adopted too hastily. He therefore pushed his argument 
in a plainer manner, and avoided these subtleties. ( If/ says 
he, everything happens by anterior causes, all these causes 
must be closely and compactly bound to each other by a 
natural connexion. Now if this is the case, necessity governs 
all things ; we are no longer free agents ; nothing is in our 
own power. But some things are in our own power ; but if 
all things happen by fate, then all things happen by anterior 
causes : therefore all that happens does not happen by fate. " 
Carneades thus shows that, an eternal concatenation of causes 
is incompatible with the idea of a free agency ; and that the 
Stoical doctrine on this point leaves the question unsolved. 

We find the real difficulty underlying all these conse 
quences about fate and necessity to have been the utter 
inability of the disputants to conceive anything as possible 
in existence which was impossible in thought. Thus the great 
crux in the question of free will was the inconceivability of 
an effect without any apparent cause. Whence proceeded 
that determination of the mind which we call the act of 
volition ? In conformity with the materialism of the Stoics 
. it must originate externally to the mind. But this was as 
illogical, or as little conformable to the idea of free will, as 
an independent effect was to the idea of causation. The 
only legitimate solution was to suppose the existence in man 
of an absolutely free, independent, and active principle, 
having no attribute in common with matter, and whose very 
essence was the power of originating motion. It was in sup 
port of this opinion that Carneades and the later Academi 
cians were most decidedly opposed to the Stoics. As we 
have already explained how the Epicureans attempted to 
parry the consequences of their own mechanical hypotheses, 
the following reasoning 1 of Carneades will be easily under- 

1 De Fato, xi. 



V.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 93 

stood : " Acutius Carneades, qui docebat, posse Epicureos 
suam causam sine hac commentitia declinatione defendere. 
Nam cum doceret esse posse quendam animi motum volun- 
tarium, id fait defendi melius, quam introducere declina- 
tionem, cujus praasertim causam reperire non possunt. Quo 
defenso, facile Chrysippo possent resistere. Cum enim con- 
cessissent, motum nullum esse sine causa, non concederent, 
omnia, qua3 fierent, fieri causis antecedentibus : voluntatis 
enim nostrse non esse causas externas, et antecedentes. Com- 
muni igitur consuetudine sermonis abutimur, cum ita dici- 
mus, velle aliquid quempiam aut nolle sine causa. Ita enim 
dicimus, sine causa, ut dicamus, sine externa et antecedenti 
causa, non sine aliqua. Motus enim voluntarius earn natu- 
ram in se ipse continet, ut sit in nostra potestate, nobisque 
pareat : nee id sine causa ejus enim rei causa, ipsa natura 
est." Here we have a clear and explicit statement of the 
nature of a free agent, and subsequent exposition has con 
tributed little to the illumination- of the subject. Those 
who maintain that the act must follow the strongest motive, 
and that that motive must be primarily extrinsic, do but 
echo the opinions of Chrysippus, while, on the other hand, 
the conclusions of those who uphold the pure spontaneity of 
the voluntary act apart from appetite or deliberation, were 
already articulately announced by Carneades and the later 
Academicians. It was indeed the radical and substantial 
difference of their views on this point that constitutes the 
irreconcileable divergence of the two schools. To recognise 
a self-acting determining principle in the individual man, 
was but to see the reflection of an analogous power in the 
universe ; and to him who was conscious of the presence of a 
spontaneous intelligent faculty in himself, it would not be 
illogical to conceive a Deity with similar attributes presiding 
over and originating the order of nature. We have seen 
that the theory of perception adopted by the Stoics was 



94 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

implicitly involved in, and naturally issued from, the passiv 
ity of the perceiving subject. Sir William Hamilton indeed 
makes Pantheism the corollary of that theory which admits 
the equipoise of the subject-object in the act of perception 1 . 
It seems, however, probable that at least in the case of the 
Stoics this order was reversed, and the notion of the com 
prehension of the object by the subject in perception was a 
necessary consequence from their Pantheistic principles. The 
fundamental idea indeed of Pantheism, viz. "that a cause 
cannot produce an effect unlike itself," seems naturally to 
suggest an intuitive theory of perception, where the repre 
sentative image or modification of consciousness exactly 
measures its external cause. 

e. Carneades, we shall see, as in theology and logic, 
propounded a diametrically opposite view concerning the 
nature and limits of human knowledge to that of the Stoics; 
substituting, for the ultra-objectivism of the latter, an equally 
uncompromising idealism, which allowed in the subjective 
object of perception nothing but a vicarious representation or 
indication of the external cause. The opinions of Carneades, 
in opposition to the cataleptic phantasm of the Stoics, have 
been preserved to us by Sextus Empiricus ; and as his ac 
count of them is brief, explicit, and comprehensive, we shall 
give a translation of those passages of his work, Contra Ma- 
thematicos, in which it is contained 2 : "But Carneades was 
opposed on the question of the criterion of knowledge to all 
preceding him. His first argument was of a more general 
nature, in which he showed that there is no absolute criterion 
of truth; neither reason, nor sensation, imagination, nor any 
thing else. But all these things, in short, deceive us. Se 
condly, he differed from preceding philosophers, inasmuch as 
he demonstrated, that even if there were this criterion it 

1 Reid s Works (Hamilton). Note A. 1. p. 749, i. " If the veracity," &c. 

2 Contra Mathematlcos, vn. 159 161. 



V.] THE SEW ACADEMY. 95 

could not exist apart from the act of consciousness. Now an 
animal differs from inanimate objects in having sensuous sus 
ceptibility, through which it becomes a percipient of itself 
and external objects. But as long as sensation is unaroused, 
dormant, and unaffected, neither is it sensation, nor is it a 
percipient of anything. But being excited and provoked in 
any way by the incidence of material objects, then it shows 
us external things. The criterion, therefore, must be sought 
in the act of consciousness (Iv a pa rat airo rfjs evepyelas ird- 
6ei). But the act must be indicative of the subject itself, 
and also of the subject-object (TOVTO Be TO Trado? avrov evbeuc- 
TLK.OV o(j)ei\L Tvy^avew KOI rov efjiTroirjaavTos avro <pcuvojjievov), 
which act then is inseparable from the image, object of 
thought, or subject-object (oirep iraOos earlv ov^ erepov rrjs 
<t>avTa<ria<;)" Into the above section 1 is condensed an entire 
theory of perception : a theory differing little from that of 
Reid, and Brown, and which Sir William Hamilton calls the 
theory of Cosmothetic Idealism, or Hypothetical Realism 2 . 
In it we have to remark four distinct assertions, by which 
this theory is mainly distinguished. 

1. The activity of the mind in perception is emphati 
cally announced, the awakening to consciousness being termed 
the TO airo T^? evepyetas 



1 Adv. Math. vii. 161. Some read evapyeias for tvepyetas. To do this 
would be to beg the whole question at issue. 

2 Eeid s Works (Hamilton). Note A. 1. p. 749, iv. "If the testimony 
of consciousness to our knowledge of an external world existing be rejected 
with the Idealist, but with the Eealist the existence of that world be affirmed, 
we have a scheme which, as it, by many various hypothesis, endeavours, on 
the one hand, not to give up the reality of an unknown material universe, 
and on the other, to explain the ideal illusion of its cognition, may be called 
the doctrine of Cosmothetic Idealism, Hypothetical Eealism, or Hypothetical 
Dualism." Sir W. Hamilton would not admit that Eeid and Brown held the 
same theory. Our limits forbid our entering upon the discussion of this 
point, which is exhaustively treated in Sir W. Hamilton s celebrated Essay 
on Perception. 



96 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

y 2. It is expressly denied that there can be any con 
sciousness apart from the conscious act 1 , 77 Se ye (u<r6rj<ri$ ani- 
vrjro? jjbevovGQ, /cal dTraOrjs KOI arpeTnos OVTG aia Orja fa earn* 
ovre avTL\r}TTTiKr) TIVOS. Aristotle had already anticipated 
this obvious and philosophical conclusion, from which, as we 
know, Reid, and some later French writers, have differed. 

\/ 3. Carneades recognises nothing in the mental image 
but a phenomenal representation of its cause, a mere effect 
in which we are conscious of nothing but the presence (VTTO- 
TTTwcriv) of the external object. But the object of thought is 
not the external object, but that which stands for it in the 
mind (rov e/jLTroirjaavTos avro (fxuvo/jLevou). 

^ 4. Is enunciated the observation that the act of percep 
tion is identical with the object of thought, oTrep irdOo^ earlv 
ov% erepov TTJS (frdVTacria?. 

Here then we see already detected that identity of the 
act and object of perception which Sir William Hamilton 
reiterates was never noticed before M. Crousaz, the whole 
credit of which he attributes to Reid 2 . But to return to 
Sextus Empiricus 3 : "Whence we may say that a mental pre 
sentation ((fravrao-la) is a sort of consciousness in an animal, 
making the animal aware of its own existence, and the exist 
ence of that which aroused it. As Antiochus remarks, 
* When we look at an object we are conscious somehow of 
vision, and feel the sense of vision to be in a different state 
to what it was before we looked at the object (7rpoa{B\tyav- 

T69 TLVi, $LClTl,0e/JI,e0d 7TO)? TTJV OlffLV, Kal OV% OUTft)? aVTYjV StCt- 



1 " Consciousness is not to be regarded as aught different from the mental 
modes or movements themselves. It is not to be viewed as an illuminated 
place, within which objects coming are presented to, and passing beyond are 
withdrawn from, observation ; nor is it to be considered as an observer the 
mental modes as phenomena observed." Eeid s Works (Hamilton). Note 
H. p. 932. Brown s Lecture on Consciousness. Hamilton s Essay on Per 
ception. 

3 Hamilton s Essay on Perception. 

8 Adv. Math. vn. 162. 



V.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 97 

Keipivriv la-^pfjiev GJ<? Trplv roD f3\tyai Sia/ceipevrjv et^o/Aei/). 
In fact, however, we are conscious of two things in this 
modification. 

1. The modification itself. 

2. The thing seen, or that which constructs the modifi 
cation; and similarly of the other senses. As light both 
shows itself, and everything around it, so the mental modifi 
cation being the originator of consciousness in an animal, as 
an illumination displays itself, and also the subject-object 
which caused it. But since it does not always report its ob 
ject according to truth, but often lies, and differs from the 
objects which caused it, like sorry messengers, it follows ne 
cessarily that, not every representation can afford a criterion, 
but only that which is true, if there be a true one. Again, no 
appearance is so true but that it might be false, and corre 
sponding to every one apparently true there may be a false 
one indistinguishable from it. The criterion, therefore, will 
not primd facie distinguish the true from the false 1 . But an 
appearance partaking of both the true and the false cannot 
be comprehensive (KaraXijTrTi/cij), and not being comprehen 
sive, cannot be a criterion. No phantasm being capable of 
deciding, neither can reason be a criterion; for the reports of 
sense are the materials of reason. For that which is judged 
of must first be brought before the reason, but nothing can 
appear to the reason without the intervention of the senses a . 
Neither then is there a criterion in reason, nor in sensation." 
It is impossible to understand the controversy about the eri- 



"irapa.\a.fiwv aX-rjde i /x&/ fyoiov ^eOSos, KaraX-rjirTiKfj 5 (pavraeriq. Ko.ro.- 
/ecu ayayuv els ras f<ras oi)/c eiaffev otire rb &\vjf)te elvai o#re rb 
s, 7) ov /ULO\\OV TO erepov TOV erepov, TJ fj,d\\ov aVo TOV iridavov." Nume- 
nius apud Eusebium, 14. 8. 

2 " Quid m a j ore fide porro quam sensus haberi 
debet? an ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit 
dicere eos contra, qure tota ab sensibus orta est ? 
qui nisi sunt veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis." 

Lucretius, iv. 482 485. 

L. L. 7 



9& THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

terion of truth, without having a distinct appreciation of the 
nature of the problem to be solved, although it is not evi 
dent, from the discussions recorded, that the exact nature of 
the question was ever perceived by either party of the dis 
putants. What then was this criterion of truth, or rather, 
what was truth? Truth seems to have meant the reality of 
the existence of the object of thought in perception: the 
agreement of the fyaivopevov with the inroiceifjievov, of the 
objectum quo with the objectum quod. Now it is evident in 
every representative theory of perception, where the object 
of thought only affords a mediate cognition of the object in 
existence, that the degree of this reality or truth can only be 
hypothetical. For, as the Sceptics continually urged, unless 
one could see the external object, independent of its represen 
tation in the mind, how is it possible to know that they are 
conformable to one another? How can you assert that the 
picture of Socrates is like him, unless you have seen Socrates 
himself? But who has ever transcended the sphere of con 
sciousness, who has ever seen things but as ideas in the 
mind? and if this comparison of the idea and the thing is 
impossible, where is the criterion of truth? By such reason 
ing Carneades denied the possibility of a criterion; but the 
fact was, the Stoics never asserted that in this sense there 
was any. For, as we have seen, their theory of perception, 
although partly representative, was analogous to that which 
we should now term immediate cognition, where the know 
ledge is of the thing itself, the objectum quod, and therefore 
involves the fact of its existence 1 . The very definition of the 
cataleptic phantasm implied its comprehension, or perfect 
representation of the object; and its fidelity was founded 
upon the logical conception of causation. The real supe 
riority of the opinions of Carneades over those of the Stoics 

1 Reid s Work*, Hamilton. Note B. 1. 1. p. 805. 



V-] THE NEW ACADEMY. 99 

with respect to the question of knowledge was, the consist 
ent maintenance by the former of an active principle in 
the mind, the real subject of cognition. The existence of 
such a principle of intelligence is implied in the passages 
quoted above from Sextus Empiricus, as in the expression 
TO a-TTo T>; evepyeias 7r#o?, indicating the fact that in per 
ception, although the mind may be passive in respect to the 
external causes of its modifications, yet that cognition or 
knowledge is an act implying the presence of an independent 
agent. This doctrine is, however, more explicitly announced, 
though apparently not very clearly understood, by Cicero, 
who, while controverting the doctrine of probabilities pro 
pounded by Carneades and the later Academicians, makes 
the following remark : " Simili in errore versantur, cum con- 
victi, ac vi veritatis coacti, perspicua a perceptis volunt dis- 
tinguere, et conantur ostendere, esse aliquid perspicui, verum 
illud quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen 
id percipi ac comprehendi posse 1 ." The distinction taken 
here between perspicua and percepta is radical and substan 
tial. Perspicua distinguishes the act of cognition from per 
cepta, mere passive impressions on the mind, but not neces 
sarily implying knowledge. A percept then, according to 
Carneades, was nothing but a modification of the mind de 
termined by some unknown external cause, and a perspect 
was the active recognition of this modification by the diano- 
etic faculty, a power in the mind which materialists have 
never admitted. The limits of human knowledge appear to 
have been thus determined by Carneades. The mind wa: 

1 Lncullus, 11. To understand this point fully we must refer the reader 
to the discussion on the subject in the Theatetius, p. 185 n. 2/t<hret ydp, 
diTOKpiait TTOTepa opdortpa, $ opupev, TOVTO dvai 6<p6a\fj.ovs, rj 01 ov dpu/mev, ical, 
V dKovoptv, wra, rj 01 ov aKovo^ev. 0EAI. At uv e/ra<rra al<rdav&fji0a, fyoiye 
So/cet, w Sto/c/jares, fj.a\\ov 77 ofs. SO. Aeii>bv yap TTOV, c3 7rat, d -rroXXat Tives ev 
W.v, ufftrep tv dovpeiois tTTTrots, alcrBrjcreis eyKad-rjitTai, a XXa /ATJ ets fjlav nvd Ideal , 
eire t/ vxV, ei re 5 Set /caXetf, irdv TO. raOra fyvrclvfi. y Sid TOVTWV olov opydvuv 
ai(r6a.i>6{j.eda. 6Va cuV0r?Ta, /c.r.X. 

72 



100 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

competent to weigh, compare and judge its own ideas, and 
detect their agreement or disagreement. But the external 
causes of those ideas he declared to be incomprehensible 
(aKaTdXrjTTTov), or imperceptible, still he left to man more 
than he took from him; for the Stoics, in giving man the 
faculty of the immediate cognition of external objects, at the 
same time deprived him of any agency in the process. But 
Carneades, although proclaiming that our ideas were only 
the indications, and not the resemblances of things, yet al 
lowed the subject the power of the free and deliberate com 
parison of them. The Stoics found in man a feeling of con 
viction, certainty or assent, which the mind accorded to the 
results of its own operations; but they made this belief or 
assent only an involuntary and necessary acquiescence in a 
scarcely more than mechanical law. Whereas Carneades, al 
though he maintained the uncertainty and inadequateness of 
our knowledge of the existence or relations of things beyond 
the sphere of consciousness, still allowed man the power of 
intelligently estimating the value of evidence and the degree 
of probability. 

f. This doctrine of probability which, as distinguished 
from certainty, produces belief as the latter knowledge, is by 
most writers considered as the eminent and essential charac 
teristic of the teaching of Carneades. But Cicero in com 
mencing the defence of his school against Lucullus asserts 
that sages had always admitted a degree of knowledge short 
of certainty. "Nemo, unquam, superiorum non modo ex- 
presserat, sed ne dixerat quidem, posse hominem nihil opi- 
nari: nee solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapientiV Still 
as the only and sufficient ground of action, the validity of 
probable evidence separates the school of Carneades most 
completely, in theory at least, from the contemporary dog 
matic, as well as sceptical sects of philosophers. In a con- 

1 Lucullus, 24. 



V.] THE NEW ACADEMY. IOI 

tinuation of the passages already quoted from Sextus Em- 
piricus we are enabled to gather the opinions of Carneades 
on the subject of probability 1 . " Carneades asserting these 
things against the other philosophers, demonstrated the im 
possibility of any criterion of truth, but when pressed for some 
criterion in the conduct of life, or the pursuit of happiness, 
was compelled to admit the virtual existence of such a rule, 
taking the simply probable perception, and that perception 
which, besides being probable, is disturbed by no doubt, but 
is evident and clear (KOL rrjv iriOavr)v apa /cal aTrepicnraaTov 
KOI &Let;a)Bevfj(,evr)v). What then is the difference between 
such perceptions we will briefly consider. A mental image 
or representation (77 ^avracrla) may be considered in relation 
either to the object it represents, or to the subject to whom it 
represents it, the object (TO <^avracrr6v) being something ex 
ternal to the mind, the subject (6 fyavrao-iovpevos) being man 2 . 
According to the relation of the image with its object, the 
perception is true or false. It is true whenever it is con 
formable to its object, and false when not. In relation to 
the subject the image appears to be either true or false. 
That perception which appears true is called by the Acade 
micians emphasis (e^ao-is), probability, or a probable percep 
tion. And that which does not appear true is called aire^a- 
0-^9, improbability, or the improbable perception. For neither 
that which is evidently false, nor that which, although true, 
does not appear so, is adapted to convince us. Now, that 
which appears true, and appears sufficiently clearly, is a cri 
terion according to the followers of Carneades. Since no 
phantasm comes singly, but one follows another in a sort of 
chain, there will be a second criterion, fhe probable and 
unopposed phantasm 3 . For when one distinguishes a man 

1 Adv. Math. vii. 166, 167, 168, 169, 173, 176. 

2 Cf. Philebus, 254. 255. "5oa, Sofrfrv, 5oafo/*eiw." 

3 "Probabilis visio et quze non impediatur." -Lucullus, 11. "Probabile 
neque ulla re impeditum." I. L 31. 



102 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

one necessarily perceives those things which belong to a man, 
as complexion, height, figure, &C. 1 , and those which environ 
him, as the air, sky, earth, &c. Whenever then none of these 
accessories induce us to doubt, but all are equally credible, 
we are naturally inclined to believe the evidence of our 
senses. Again, still more worthy of credit and probable in 
a higher degree is that complex perception, which, besides 
having all its parts consistent with each other, has each of 
those parts probable and trustworthy in itself. Such a per 
ception we shall next describe. For a second degree of 
probability we only require that each element of a complex 
conception shall be consistent with the whole, and that they 
all should appear true and not improbable. But in a pro 
bable conception of the third degree we examine each part 
separately somehow, as is done in the election of public 
functionaries, when the claims of each candidate are examin 
ed for the purpose of determining who is worthy to be a 
magistrate or ruler." These three degrees of probability are 
elsewhere illustrated by Sextus Empiricus thus 2 . They, the 
New Academicians, say that some perceptions are barely 
probable (inBavas), that others are probable, and after consi 
deration deserving of belief (yriOavas KOI Sie^oyftev/jLevas), and 
that a third sort are almost convincing (TriOavas Kal Trepiw- 
3euyLte^a? KOI ezrrepwrTracTOU?). As for example, to one sud 
denly entering a darkened chamber the appearance of a rope 
lying on the floor would suggest the idea of a snake 3 ; this 
would be a probable perception. Secondly, after a considera 
tion of the circumstances attending the phenomenon, such as 
this thing does not move, is of such a colour, &c., the rope 
stands revealed as far as a probable and plausible impression 

1 Lecture iv. page 73, note 1. 

2 Hyp. i. 33. 227. 

3 Kal OTO.V roivvv r<$ fikv Trapy a(ff6f]<Tis r&v <rr)fj.cluv, T$ Se pi), TO 8t rrjs 
dirovcrvjs alcrdrjO eus rfj irapovcrri Trpoffa.pfj.6ffr], iravrri ravrrj ^evoercu ij Stapota." 
Thfcetetus, 194, a. 



V.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 103 

goes (<f>alvTai <r%owtov Kara Tr)v (fravraalav rrjv nnOavrjv Kal 
TrepiwSevfjiev riv). As an instance of the third degree of pro 
bability, Hercules, it is said, brought back from Hades the 
dead Alcestis, and showed her to Admetus, and he recognised 
the image of Alcestis after accurate consideration, although, 
since he knew that she had died, his mind was not disposed 
to consent, but more inclined to be incredulous. This notion 
of probabilities was really an attempt on the part of Carneades 
to compromise between the absolute scepticism of the Pyr- 
rhonists, and the stolid dogmatism of the Stoics. Where 
there is no criterion or canon of truth, said the former, all 
our perceptions being only appearances and not facts are 
equally true or equally false. Our perceptions, the latter 
maintained, being cognitions of facts immediate and direct, 
carry with them their own evidence, and require no other 
criterion. Our perceptions, said Carneades, are appearances, 
not facts, but the evidence of facts ; and there is a faculty in 
the mind by which we are enabled to estimate the force of 
this evidence, and to yield to conviction when reason has 
been satisfied with the proofs. But, replies the Stoic, if you 
deny me the power of detecting the true from the false in my 
judgment of facts, by what standard or criterion can you 
pronounce that sufficient evidence has been obtained to make 
a perception probable or improbable? For why admit the 
ability of estimating the probable when you deny that of 
judging of the truth? "Quamobrem, sive tu probabilem 
visionem, sive probabilem et qua3 non impediatur, ut Carnea 
des volebat, sive aliud quid proferes, quod sequare: ad visum 
illud, de quo agimus, tibi erit revertendum (scilicet Kara- 
\rj7mfcrj cfravraorla 1 )" The question was really limited to 
that second solution in the Thesetetus, that time-honoured 
enquiry, What is knowledge? Knowledge is right judgment 
(op6b$ XOYO?), and so the dilemma which this question was 

1 Lucullus, 11. 



104 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

propounded to intensify, was not evaded by the probabilities 
of Carneades. To weigh evidence is the function of reason, 
but according to what idea shall that evidence be declared to 
, be sufficient or insufficient, conclusive or inconclusive? Hence 
j it has been maintained by some writers that Carneades 
taught esoterically the Platonic doctrines 1 . We should think, 
however, that it was not so much the Platonic idea that was 
preserved by Carneades, but merely that belief in, or reliance 
on, those original instincts of the intellect which constitutes 
the foundation of all reasoning. It seems indeed to require 
no a priori idea to enable the mind to determine that the 
corroborating evidence of a dozen independent witnesses 
approaches nearer to demonstration than the unsupported 
testimony of one. And that, although the veracity of each 
taken singly might be doubted, the chance that they would 
all unite in a falsehood would be less than the probability 
that they were reporting a truth. Our cognition of an ex 
ternal object is really the complex idea of it, of which each 
of its qualities, attributes, or accidents, is a component, and 
each is an independent witness, by which we may identify 
the object 2 . Nature has provided us with such testimony by 
allowing us to discern a separate quality in everything 
through each sense, making as it were a sort of natural and 
voluntary analysis of things. But, says the Sceptic, senses 
deceive ; they do not tell you of anything in the object you 
only perceive changes in your own consciousness perhaps so 
but at least these changes must have an external cause. 
When, then, many sensations are united in one object, their 
presence is cumulative evidence of the presence of the object 
which is their cause, and the greater the number of witnesses, 
the more convincing will be their corroborating testimony. 
Hence we can see the utility of increasing the number of the 

1 EusebiiTS Trap. Ev. xiv. 38. 

2 Aristotle, de Anima, lib. in. 1. 



V.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 105 

components of our complex perception of an object, by adding, 
to the natural analysis of the senses, the artificial analysis of 
experiment, by which we interrogate nature, and by the 
process of induction arrive at least, if not at a knowledge of 
the secrets of her combinations, at a high degree of probability. 
The reader will find the subject of probabilities treated from 
the common sense point of view, as the only possible, and at 
the same time perfectly adequate rule of action, by Cicero in 
Lucullus. "Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis sapiens inducitur, 
multa sequitur probabilia, non comprehensa neque percepta, 
neque assensa, sed similia veri, quae nisi probet, omnis vita 
tollatur. Quid enim ? conscendens navem sapiens num com- 
prehensum animo habet atque perceptum, se ex sententia 
navigaturum, &C. 1 " 

rj. We have, we trust, indicated with sufficient detail 
the opinions of Carneades on those four points with re 
spect to which the views of the New Academy seem most 
decidedly hostile to those of the Stoics. We have not indeed 
alluded to their views on the subject of morality, princi 
pally because it would be difficult to pronounce on this 
topic, which of the later Academicians we ought to con 
sider as representing the sentiments of this school. Cicero, 
who on every point of speculative philosophy seems to 
have adhered to the method, and approved perhaps of 
the teachings of Carneades, on questions of morality was 
diametrically opposed to the apparent views of Carneades 
and his followers : " Perturbatricem autem harum omnium 
rerum Academiam, hanc ab Arcesila et Carneade recentem, 
exoremus, ut sileat. Nam si invaserit in hsec, qua3 satis scite 
nobis instructa et composita videntur, nimias edet ruinas. 
Quam quidem ego placare cupio, submovere non audeo 2 ." 
It seems, however, most probable that the opinions expressed 

1 Lucullus, 31. 2 Cicero, de Legibus, i. 13. 



106 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. 

by Carneades on the instability of moral distinctions, in 
direct opposition to the absolute nature of the obligations 
of virtue maintained by the more positive schools of phi 
losophy, were only a manifestation of that general hostility 
which he constantly exhibited towards the Stoics. And 
there is no reason to suppose, that while attacking the 
immutability of the fundamental principles of morality 
putatively fixed by the order of nature, he did not secretly 
adhere to the traditions of the Older Academy, wherein 
Plato had propounded the existence of a good beyond and 
above nature, the manifestation of eternal laws and causes 1 . 
It would indeed have been utterly at variance with the 
spirit of the rest of his teaching for Carneades to have 
admitted the possibility of generalising certain and ulti 
mate principles of good and evil, from observations of the 
conformity or nonconformity of actions to the intentions of 
nature. Therefore, for those who would allow none but 
empirical sources of knowledge, he consistently maintained 
the subjective character of all human conceptions of right 

1 " Truth in the power, or faculty, is nothing else but a conformity of its 
conceptions or Ideas unto the natures and relations of things, which in God 
we may call an actual, steady, immoveable, eternal Ornniformity, as Plotinus 
calls the Divine Intellect, v iravra, which you have largely described by him. 
And this the Platonists truly call the Intellectual World, for here are the 
natures of all things pure and unmixed, purged from all those dregs, refined 
from all that dross and alloy which cleave unto them in their particular in 
stances. All inferior and sublunary things, not excluding Man himself, have 
their excrescences, and defects. Exorbitances or privations are moulded up 
in their very frames and constitutions. There is somewhat extraneous, hete 
rogeneous, and preternatural in all things here below, as they exist among 
us; but in that other world like the most purely fined gold, they shine in 
their native and proper glory. Here is the first goodness," the benign Parent 
of the whole Creation, with his numerous offspring, the infinite throng of 
Created Beings. Here is the fountain of Eternal Law, with all its streams 
and rivulets. Here is the Sun of uncreated glory surrounded with all his 
rays and beams. Here are the eternal indispensable Laws of Eight and 
Justice, the immediate and indemonstrable principles of truth and goodness." 
I)r Rust, A Discourse on Truth, Sect. xvm. 



V.] THE NE W A CA DEM Y. 107 

and wrong, and decided that prudence and utility were the 
only criteria of good and evil. With regard to the suc 
cessors of Carneades, Philo seems to have denied the 
validity of the cataleptic phantasm as a criterion of truth, 
but yet to have asserted that knowledge could attain to 
the nature of things : " ol Be Trepl <&i\a>vd fyaaiv, oaov 

fJ,6V eTrl TO) ^TCDLKQ) KpLT^pLO), TOVTk<JTl rf) KaTa\r]7TTLK^ 

(fravrao-La, d/carctXrjTrra elvcu ra TT pay para, ocrov e eVl rrj 
(pvcret, TOOV Trpayfjidrcov avrwv KaTaXijTrra 1 ." This statement 
favours the impression that Philo more emphatically sup 
ported the traditions of the Old Academy. We can only 
have cognition of things per se either by means of the 
cataleptic phantasm or through a priori ideas. The former 
source was explicitly rejected by Philo, he therefore must 
have reserved the latter. Antiochus, after having been a 
stanch upholder of the Academic method, seems to have 
finally compromised with the Stoics, and thus brought the 
long polemic between them and the Academy to a close : 
" 6 A^r/o^o? TYJV Sroaz> jj,err]yayev els TTJV AKabrj/jiiav, w? 
KOI elprjo-Qai eir CLVTW ort, ev A#a&?/uac fyCkoaofal TO, 

i/cd eTreSeiKvve yap on irapa Tl\a,TG)vi, Ketrai Ta TGOV 
Soy para*" The victory then would appear to 
have ultimately rested with the dogmatists. The judicium 
incogniti et cogniti the point about which the whole con 
troversy had eddied seems at last to have confounded 
and interchanged with the Platonic idea, and thus a 
ground of certainty was admitted as a principle of human 
knowledge. 

Still from the writings of Cicero we might infer that 
this positivism did not extend beyond the region of ethical 

1 Hyp. i. 235, chap. 33. 

2 Hyp. i. 33. 235. " Licetne per ipsum Antioclinm? Qui appellabatur 
Academicus: erat quiclem, si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus." 
Lucullus, 43. 



I08 THE NEW ACADEMY. [LECT. V. 

enquiries ; and in physical and metaphysical speculations 
a tendency to eclecticism is apparent, which is generally 
significant of a relapse into utter scepticism: " Horum 
aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur : nostro, ne quid 
maxime quid em probabile sit, occurrit. Ita sunt in pie- 
risque contrariarum rationum paria momenta V 1 

1 Lucullus, 40. 



LECTURE VI. 



IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM ANCIENT AND 
RECENT. 



"DiemenschlicheVernunft 1st so baulustig, dass sie mehrmalen schon 
den Thurm aufgelukrt, hernach aber wieder abgetragen hat, um zu sehen, 
wie das Fundament desselben wohl beschafifen seyn niochte." 



a. WE have now, we trust, dwelt sufficiently long on 
the details of our subject to enable you to form some notion 
of the spirit and method of ancient Scepticism, both as ex 
hibited in its extreme form by Pyrrho and his followers, as 
well as in its partial manifestation under the representatives 
of the New Academy. We shall proceed to take a general 
view of the doctrines of these two schools, for the purpose of 
comparing their opinions and influence, in conformity with 
the object of our lectures. The positions of Scepticism were 
reduced to five, by Agrippa, a later representative of Pyrrho 
nism, which have been preserved to us by Sextus Empiricus, 
as the TTcvre Tpo-rroi, 1 . In these are comprised all the argu 
ments the most advanced Sceptics have urged against the 
probative force of all evidence, hence, against the possibility 

1 Hyp. 1. 15. 164. 



110 IDEALISM AXD SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

of man s attaining by mediate or indirect means any certain 
knowledge whatever. The first argument is derived from the 
discrepancy of opinion (6 d-rro rfjs Siatycovtas) observable both 
amongst philosophers and the vulgar, in consequence of which 
inconsistency the Sceptic has no alternative but to suspend 
his judgment on all points. Secondly, every process of demon 
stration must be continued to infinity (6 CLTTO rrj? et? aireipov 
e/cTTTwcrew), for all evidence requires other evidence to attest 
its validity ; therefore proof would demand proof without end. 
The third is founded on the relativity of all our knowledge 
(o CLTTO rov Tr/oo? n). For we can only affirm that anything 
is such as it appears, either to ourselves or with respect to 
surrounding objects, but of its absolute and independent 
nature we can assert nothing. The fourth position is directed 
against the assumption of general indemonstrable principles 
(o ef inroOeorew), from which all reasoning must commence, or 
be reduced to an infinite regression. Fifth is the diallel (o 
&id\\r)\os rpoTTos) petitio principii the fallacy of circle 1 , or 
the method of showing that a proof which is employed to 
establish the truth of a proposition, can itself only be proved 
by the proposition in question: as for example, "if anyone 
should infer the authenticity of a certain history, from its 
recording such and such facts, the reality of which rests on 
the evidence of that history." The Sceptics had not much 
difficulty in proving that every imaginable case not an object 
of immediate cognition could be brought under one or other 
of these objections, therefore all demonstration was fallacious, 
all truth impossible of attainment; not because anything 
could be demonstrated to be false, but because there was no 
faculty in the human intellect which could decide on the 
validity of its own operations. Such was the length and 
breadth of absolute scepticism, as propounded by the Pyrrho- 

1 Whately s Logic. Of Fallacies, Book in. 13. 



VI] ANCIENT AND REGENT. JIT 

nists. Let us now offer a few remarks on their doctrines 
separately, before viewing them in connection with those of 
the other school of thinkers which stands at the head of our 
subject. 

/3. First, we will examine some erroneous opinions 
prevalent even among the more enlightened respecting the 
real nature and tendency of Ancient Scepticism. It is not 
uncommon to hear urged as a triumphant refutation of Pyr 
rhonism, that, as a system of thought, it is self-annihilating 
and logically impossible 1 . Yet that this is not so, will we 
think be obvious, directly we understand the limits which the 
most absolute Sceptics have never transcended. The line 
indeed at which all scepticism, ancient or modern, must cease, 
is exactly that at which every school of later psychological 
and metaphysical speculatists have commenced. " Descartes 
recherche quel est le point de depart fixe et certain sur lequel 
peut s appuyer la philosophic. II se trouve que la pense e 
peut tout mettre en question, tout, excepte elle-meme. En 
effet, quand on douterait de toutes choses, on pourrait au 
rnoins douter qu on doute or, douter c est penser: d ou il 
suit qu on ne peut douter qu on pense, et que la pensee ne 
peut se renier elle-meme, car elle ne le ferait qu avec elle. 
La est un cercle dont il est impossible a tout scepticisme de 
sortir; la est done le point de depart ferme et certain 
cherche par Descartes; et comme la pense e nous est donnee 
dans la conscience, voila la conscience prise comme le point 
de de part et le theatre de toute recherche philosophique 2 ." 
" The facts of consciousness as mere phenomena, facts of which 
we have immediate and direct cognition, and to admit which 

1 "No conclusion can be drawn from it, viz., the inconceivability of the 
absolute, in favour of universal scepticism; first, because universal scepti 
cism equally destroys itself, &c." Hansel s Hampton Lectures, Lecture n. 
p. 59. 

2 Cousin, (Euvrcs, Vol. i. Cours de Vhistoire de la philosophic. Onzieme 
Le^on. 



112 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

is merely to affirm the existence of consciousness itself, have 
never, and could never have been doubted, for doubt is itself 
a manifestation of consciousness 1 ." To doubt whether we 
doubt, would be as contradictory as to be conscious of being 
unconscious. Scepticism therefore has always allowed the 
subjective reality of our mental presentations, and so far does 
not differ from the more positive schools of metaphysicians. 
To attempt then to force the Pyrrhonist to self-destruction 
in maintaining his own method is not feasible, since the basis 
of his system is, precisely that consciousness on the evidence 
of which all truth must rest. If Scepticism is suicidal, every 
other system is likewise. Similarly, we find in Eusebius an 
attempted answer to scepticism quoted from a work of Aris- 
tocles founded upon the supposed inconsistency of the Pyrrho- 
nian method : " Evret TO LVVV (sc. ol tnceirTiKol) eV&n/s abiafyopa 
irdvra (baalv elvai, Kal Sia TOVTO /eeXeuoucrt ^mftevl TrpocrTiOecr- 
0cu, fjLrjSe Sogd&iv, elicoTeos av, olfiai, irvdoiro -m avrooV *Apd 
ye Sia/jLapTavovcnv ol Sicupepeiv avrd vojJii^ovTes, r} ov\ Tldvra)? 
yap, el jJblv d/jLapravovaiv, OVK opd&s v7ro\a/JL/3dvotev av. 
"tla-re avdyKTj \eyeiv aurot? elvai rwas rovs rd tyevSr) trepl 
OVTWV Sofafo^ra? avrol TOIVVV elev av ol rd\.r]6rj 
ovra) Se eii] av dXTjOes TL Kal tyevSos. Et 8 ov% apaprdvopev 
ol TroXXol, rd ovra SicufrepeLV olofjuevoi, rl TraOovres e 
GIV rjfj.lv, avrol yap ajjiaprdvoiev dv, dfyovvres f^rj 
avrd*." But this manner of confuting the followers of Pyrrho 
seems as little to meet the real point at issue as that of the 
Cynic philosopher 3 , who, when he heard the possibility of 
motion denied, got up and walked as a proof of its reality; 
whereas the apparent or phenomenal existence of motion had 
never been called in question. So when the Pyrrhonist 
maintained the indistinguishability (did$opa) of all things, 

1 Hamilton s Reid, Note A. 1. p. 744. 

2 Eusebius, Prap. Ev. xiv. 18. B. 

3 Hyp. m. 8. 66. 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 113 

it was only by the contradiction of appearances that his as 
sertion was corroborated. It was not then the existence of 
distinctions in appearances that the Sceptic denied, on the 
contrary, it was these distinctions which, although antitheti 
cal, were equipollent, and therefore prevented him from 
arriving at a decision. The words, ra -^evBrj irepl TWV ovrwv, 
seem to obscure the real question ; followed as they are by 
Sofabj>ra?, they imply a contradiction. There can be no 
opinion about realities, for realities are objects of knowledge, 
not of opinion. Opinion implies subjectivity, and by an 
ultimate law of consciousness contradiction in appearance 
forces upon us the conviction of our ignorance of the fact. 
But the avowed impossibility of comprehending the objective 
fact, imports no inability to distinguish appearances as mere 
phenomena of consciousness. So with the subsequent reason 
ing of Aristocles, it is assumed, that the assertion of every 
thing being unknown involves the notion of the existence of 
a faculty by which the known and the unknown can be 
distinguished, viz. the judicium incogniti et cogniti, or intel 
lectual conscience. Now it is precisely through the absence 
of such a faculty that scepticism justifies itself; and to say 
that nothing certain is known, simply means that there is no 
criterion by which we can judge, when we think we know, 
whether we know or not. 

This is the very essence of scepticism, when it insists upon 
our inability to attain certain knowledge of anything. Such 
ignorance does not refer to the object of knowledge, but to 
the subject knowing. In the same sense Professor Mansel 
says: "Contradiction, whatever may be its ultimate import, 
is in itself not a quality of things, but a mode in which they 
are viewed by the mind." So scepticism does not touch the 
incognitum et cognitum, but the judicium incogniti et cogniti. 
There is no assumption of knowledge in its absolute denial, 
because knowledge refers to its object or material; the denial 
L. L. 8 



1 14 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

to the knowledge itself, or the faculty of knowing. The em 
ployment of sceptical weapons, then, is not logically impossible; 
but can they be employed against all the operations of reason, 
with equal chance of success? Now, according to the admis 
sions of the Sceptics themselves, our ideas, as mere modes of 
consciousness, are intuitive facts; so must therefore be the 
conclusions which may be deduced from the comparison and 
judgment of those facts. Those ideas Locke calls the ideas 
of reflection, the archetypes of which are in the mind itself. 
Hence mathematical truths were not attacked by the Pyr- 
rhonists, except in so far as any reasoning on the reality of 
things was attempted to be deduced from them. All abstrac 
tions indeed, inasmuch as they are abstractions, are neces 
sarily phenomenal, subjective, and apparent. If then these 
form the only materials of our knowledge according to the 
idealist theory, Scepticism, after all, does but narrow the field 
of certain knowledge within the limits assigned to it by a 
large portion of modern thinkers. "Knowledge (says Locke) 
then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the 
.connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, 
of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this 
perception is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, 
though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come 
short of knowledge 1 ." 

The position of Scepticism is also often represented as 
untenable because it is supposed to invalidate the illative 
processes of the understanding, and therefore destroy itself, or 
render the attempt nugatory, because, to disprove anything, 
we must make use of proofs and inferences. Thus Sextus 
Empiricus reports the arguments of the Dogmatists on this 
point : "ot Be AoyfjiariKol TOVVCLVTIOV fcaTao-fcevd^ovres 
ort i jTOL aTToBeLfCTLKoi elcnv ol Kara rr;9 7roSe/eo) 

r) OVK aTToSeiKTi/coL ical el /j,ev OVK airobeiKTiKOi, ov Si/vav- 
1 Locke, Human Understanding, Book iv. chap. i. 1. 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 11 

TOLL ^IKVUVCLI OTL ov/c evnv ?/ aTTcSei^ el Se 

TTJV viToo Tao Lv T?^9 a7roSe/^ r 6O)9 IK 



But it must be remarked that the real inferential force of 
an argument was strangely overlooked by the Stoical logi 
cians, and therefore by the Sceptics, who invariably sought 
their opponents on their own ground. The truth of the hy 
pothetical proposition, which was the organ of demonstration 
among the logicians of that time, was considered to be de 
pendent on the truth or falsity of the propositions which 
formed the separate members, whereas, of course, the real 
probative power lies in the consequence 2 . This question, 
then, was obscured and confused by the antagonistic opinions 
of the Megaric and Stoical philosophers to such a degree, 
that the Sceptics had only too much occasion to throw doubt 
upon the whole process of demonstration. But it must be 
understood that it was only the artificial formula?, and not 
the natural operations of the ratiocinative faculty, which they 
seemed to impugn. Perception of the agreement or disagree 
ment of our ideas by the intervention of other ideas or 
media, being demonstrative 3 , was not and could not be de 
nied by the most extreme Sceptics; and when they oppose 
the conclusions of reason, as forming a sufficient ground for 
the rejection of both or the suspension of judgment, they do 
but obey that first principle of the reason by which we can 
not conceive it possible for the same thing to le and not to be. 

In the example Sextus Empiricus gives 4 of the apparent 
conflict of inferences, when to the conclusion that there must 
be a Providence from the order observable in nature it is op 
posed that the wicked are often prosperous, and the virtuous 

1 Hyp. ii. 13. 185. 

3 Elements of Logic, Whately, Book n. chap. iv. 3. 

3 Of. Locke, Human Understanding, Book iv. chap. iv. 7. 

4 Hyp. i. 13. 82. 

82 



Il6 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

in adversity, hence that an inference might be drawn the ex 
act opposite to the preceding, the real opposition is in the 
facts or premisses upon which the argument is based. It is 
therefore the inductive, and not the deductive process, which 
is here made a ground of doubt. And since induction, in as 
far as it means the observation and comparison of particulars 
without reference to the resulting generalization, is merely 
an operation of the judgment, scepticism cannot be said to 
attempt to subvert our belief in logical consequences. The 
judicium incogniti et cogniti in this case would be allowed 
as a subjective fact, proclaiming the inherent connexion of a 
conclusion with the premiss, in which the conclusion itself 
was originally involved. But how to establish the premiss, * 
in the first place, is the problem to which all synthetical 
reasoning is ultimately reduced ; and it is at this point that 
the five dilemmas of Agrippa, which constitute the principal 
momenta of scepticism, challenge the upholders of the ability 
of the human mind to comprehend and grasp the truth and 
reality of objective existence. 

<y. "Aristotle (says Professor Maurice) to a great ex 
tent proclaimed the search for wisdom to be at an end. 
He left the impression on the minds of his disciples, that the 
whole scheme of the universe could be brought under the 
forms of the human understanding." Could any conclusion 
be more fatal than this to the cause of the advancement of 
human knowledge? Could any announcement be more pro 
vocative of the latent scepticism to which the Greek mind 
had always, by its peculiar constitution, been rendered more 
or less prone? It needed no special enquiry, either into the 
possible objects of knowledge, or the capabilities of the hu 
man instruments of cognition, at once to perceive that, if 
knowledge imported the apprehension of whatever was stable, 
real, essential, and causative, the Dogmatist had not even 
yet attained the first condition of all science, viz. a con- 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 117 

sciousness of its own nescience. For how, urged the Sceptic, 
can he who imagines that his task is completed before it is 
even begun, expect to prosecute it with much advantage? 
If the province of the philosopher is but to verify a precon 
ception, where is there any field for discovery? "opa Se /AT) Kal 
vvv ol Aoy/juaTiKol fyjTrjo-ews aTrelpyovrcu ov yap rot? aryvoelv 
ra Trpdy^ara ? e ^et Trpo? TT\V <f>vai,v 6fjLO\oyov(7i TO fy)reiv ert 
TTpl avTwv dvafco\ov0ov, rot? S eV d/cpi/3es olofjuevoi? raina 
ol? //,> yap eVt irepas rfir) TrdpeaTiv r) r)T7)cns cw? 
, ol? Se TO Si o iraaa auvi(TTaT(U (qTWrn d/cfjirjv 
TO vo/jLi^ew w? ov% evprjicaaiv 1 ." It would seem, 
therefore, that the systematization and articulate enunciation 
of the principles of Scepticism synchronised with, if they did 
not result from, the introduction of a scientific method into 
the processes of investigation. Thus, those who believed in, 
and those who discredited the ability of the intellect to pe 
netrate the arcana of nature, were revealed to each other, 
and compelled to push their respective doctrines to lengths 
which equally menaced the existence of all philosophy. On 
the one hand the Stoics, the most dogmatic of the dogma 
tical schools after the age of Aristotle, pretended that, so far 
from admitting the incompetency of human reason to attain 
certainty of knowledge, all belief, or degree of assurance 
short of certitude, was unworthy of a wise man. On the 
other hand, the Pyrrhonist equally discarded belief, not as a 
degree of knowledge unworthy of a philosopher, but as un 
attainable by any one who could appreciate the force of evi 
dence. So the characteristic distinction of Pyrrhonism or 
Scepticism was, the declaration of the inability of man to 
attain that assurance of anything which is entitled belief, 
owing to the conflict of evidence or testimony on which belief 
could alone be grounded. As a consequence of the opposition, 
and equal cogency of the reasons urged in support of and 
1 Hyp. ii. 1. 11. 



li8 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM- [LECT. 

against any proposition, the mind, they said, not feeling itself 
determined in one direction more than in another, rested in a 
sort of equipoise or equilibrium, well known as the eVo%r), or 
suspension of judgment. This eVo^?} is so identified with, 
and so essentially the differential characteristic of ancient 
scepticism, that it may be interesting to consider under what 
conditions, either with reference to the object of knowledge, 
or the subject knowing, such a mode of consciousness is pos 
sible. The term eVe^w is thus explicated by Sextus Empi- 
ricus 1 . "The word eVe^o) is employed by us (viz. the Pyr- 
rhonians) in the following signification: I am unable to de 
clare what one should believe or not believe with respect to 
the objects of cognition (T&V TrpoKeifJievwv), meaning that 
things appear equal as to their credibility or incredibility. 
That they are equal we do not assert, only that they appear 
so subjectively and phenomenally when presented to us. 
The word cTrc^r) imports retention or negation of judgment, 
el prjrai airo rou zTre-^eaOai TTJV Siavoiav, because we abstain 
from affirming or denying anything, on account of the equi- 
pollence (IcrocrOevia} of evidence on which the proposition de 
pends 2 ." Thus the eVo^i) is a purely negative state of mind, 
equally removed from the attitude of belief or disbelief, yet 
somehow intermediate between the two. The avowed object 
of its adoption, as we have already seen, was to absent, as far 
as possible, all motive to action ; but the Sceptics continually 
asserted that this state of suspension was not by any means 
voluntary, but was forced upon them by the consideration of 
the relations in which man stood to the materials of his con 
sciousness. Thus the. tTro^rj appears as the centre of the 



1 Hyp. i. 22. 196. 

2 " A proposition, as we have said before, is a portion of discourse in 
which a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject." Mill s Logic, Book i. 
chap. iv. 1. "We say of a fact or statement, that it is proved, when we believe 
its truth by reason of some other fact or statement from which it is said 
l"^ follow." Mill s Lof/ic, Book n. chap. i. 1. 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 119 

Sceptical philosophy, as determining its special peculiarities 
both with respect to speculative and practical science. For, 
on the one hand, it marked the speculative negativism of 
philosophical despair, and, on the other, it purported to be 
the instrument for the attainment of that apathy which must 
result from the removal of all motivity. The Sceptics them 
selves generally asserted that, in suspending their judgment 
on matters of doubtful evidence, they only followed the 
example of Socrates, whose maieutic method of discussion 
seemed to encourage the notion that he considered it the 
part of a philosopher to collect the opinions of others without 
forming any of his own 1 . The retentiveness of Socrates, 
however, could only have extended to the enunciation of 
decided views; as far as the mental act or judgment went, 
it seems more probable that his method was the effect of 
clearly-defined sentiments, which he thought could be more 
effectually inculcated by this indirect manner of teaching. 
" II n est pas croyable que Socrate ait vecu sans venir a bout 
de se persuader aucune verite, car il a mieux aime* mourir 
que se resoudre a conserver sa vie par des voyes qui ne lui 
paroissoient point dans 1 ordre. Peut-on reconnoitre dans cette 
conduite le moindre caractere d un esprit flottant, et qui fait 
profession de ne pouvoir jamais distinguer surement le Vrai 
d avec le Faux, et le Juste d avec I lnjuste*?" The voluntari- 
ness or involuntariness of the state of mind which the erro^rj 
indicated would really depend upon whether the arguments 
reviewed in support of any proposition were adscititious or 
adventitious; and it is more consistent with that general pas 
sivity characteristic of Pyrrhonism that reasons, the equal co 
gency of which induced the eiro^rf, were not sought after, but 
were forced on the attention of the post- Aristotelian Sceptics. 
The entire work of Sextus Empiricus is an evidence of this. 

1 M. Crousaz, Examen du Pyrrhonismc, Sect. n. vi. p. 17. 

2 I. L p. 18. 



120 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

The array of opposing dogmas exhibited in his treatise, com 
prising as it does every shade of philosophical or unphiloso- 
phical opinion, conjecture or belief, leaves us little room to 
wonder how those, who were at once learned and unprejudiced, 
found it impossible to feel assurance on any subject whatever. 
In truth, the Sceptic did not make the objections, but the 
objections made the Sceptic. M. Crousaz complains of the 
Sceptics, that their constant aim and object is to stifle every 
question with a mass of conflicting testimonies. But in 
reality the quibbles and sophistical shuffles, with which the 
work of Sextus Empiricus abounds, are arguments drawn 
from the opposing systems then prevalent, which cannot be 
laid to the account of the Pyrrhonists, inasmuch as they only 
availed themselves of materials found ready to their hands. 
Thus it was that the first trope of Agrippa could be applied 
in every branch of philosophical enquiry. Perhaps then the 
tVo;^?} was the inevitable result of the dawn of science, when 
the shadows of poetical theogonies, supernatural agencies, 
and traditional superstitions, were beginning to disperse, but 
still obscured the paths to knowledge. 

8. There is no doubt that the eVo^?}, as a psychological 
phenomenon, was a result of the constitutional peculiarities 
of individuals, as well as of the circumstances of the age. To 
rest with the mind undetermined would argue either great 
indecision of character, or a restless hypercritical spirit, but 
certainly could not accompany a narrow or superficial under 
standing. The man who sees one idea to the exclusion of 
every other, or who reflects little, could not become a victim 
of the sceptical malady. It was quite natural then that the 
leaders of Pyrrhonism should have been men of great culture, 
and acute intellect; but for this very reason scepticism in its 
extreme form could never have been seriously maintained 
for any length of time. Accordingly we find it first tempered 
by Arcesilas, who maintained the epoch only in matters of 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 121 

speculative science ; and subsequently more substantially 
modified by Carneades, and the later Academicians, by whom 
the indifference-point of scepticism was past, in three marked 
particulars. These constitute the basis of the distinction 
between the ultra-scepticism of the older Pyrrhonists and the 
more qualified form in which it was retained by the New 
Academy. The epocha then may be considered in some 
respects as the line of demarcation between Pyrrho and 
Carneades; and where the infraction. of its reticence occurred 
the latter seems to have been considered by Sextus Empiri- 
cus to differ from the former. We have the main points of 
this distinction thus summed up in the Hypotyposes^. "The 
New Academicians differ from the Sceptics. 1. Inasmuch 
as they say all things are incomprehensible, for in this very 
affirmation, Trdvra elvai a/iardXijTrra, they assert something 
positively, whereas the Pyrrhonist does not despair of being 
able eventually perhaps to arrive at certainty, and the com 
prehension of things. 2. They differ from us more emphati 
cally in their judgment concerning the good and the evil. 
For the Academicians pronounce things to be good or evil, 
not in the same sense as we do, but with the conviction it is 
more probable they are one rather than the other; whereas 
in our assertions about the good and the evil, we have no 
such conviction, but merely speak doubtfully, being forced to 
decide provisionally by the exigencies of life : " ^/JLGOV dyaOov 
TL rj KCLKOV elvai \e<y6vra)v ovbev aerd TOV iriOavcv elvai 
vo/jLieiv o (frauev, aX\ aSoac7T&>9 etrofjievtov TW /3t<p, wa W 
dvevepyrjTot, wfiev" 3. We say that all our mental represen 
tations are equally trustworthy or untrustworthy, as materials 
for judgment. But they say some are probable, others impro 
bable, and that there are degrees of probability. " 709 re $av- 
Ta<7/a9 ??/xefc9 uev laas \eyo/j,ev elvai, Kara TTIG-TLV 
ocrov 7rl T 



Hyp. i. 33. 226. 



122 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

S< aTTLddvovs, Kal TWV inQav&v Se \ejovcn SLafopds" This 
comparison, together with the exposition of the Academic 
doctrines to be found in the concluding chapters of Lucullus, 
enable us to estimate the essential distinction between the 
Pyrrhonian and Academic scepticism. The groundwork of 
this distinction, which was evidently detected by Sextus Em- 
piricus himself, is, undoubtedly, the decision enunciated by 
the New Academicians concerning the relations of knowledge 
and objective reality. The fundamental problem of philoso 
phy, viz. to distinguish the thing from the appearance, the 
noumenon from the phenomenon, the fyalvecrOaL ov from the 
</> dive a 6 a i elvai, was abandoned as insoluble by the Acade 
micians for that is what we are to understand from the 
expression Trdvra clvai aKarakri ma and in declaring the 
insolubility of this metaphysical problem, they separated 
themselves from the Pyrrhonists, in infringing the epoch by 
the decision itself, but most especially in completely altering 
the position of man in relation to metaphysical truth. Pyrrho 
is reported by Timon to have placed the knowledge of objec 
tive reality as a point of primary importance to man, Seiv rov 
fjLe\\ovra evSaL/jiovrjo-eiv et? rpla ravra /3\67reiv Trp&rov fj^ev, 
OTTO la 7T(f)VK6 TO, TrpdyfjLdTa 1 . When then the New Acade 
micians declared that our knowledge did not, and never could 
extend beyond phenomena, they virtually enunciated that 
the phenomenal apparent universe contained all that was of 
any interest to man. This declaration is remarkable, and 
indicates the close of an era in the history of philosophy. It 
separates metaphysic from physic by declaring the incompre 
hensibility of the former it distinguishes speculative from 
practical knowledge, in that it resigns the hope of the former 
for ever. Here then we have the final decision of philosophy, 
confirming, however, only what Socrates had already an 
nounced, viz. that the enquiries into the ultimate causes, 
1 Praparat. Ei\ xiv. 18 (Eusebius). 



VI.] ANCIENT AND EEC E NT. 123 

essences, or substantial existence of things, were beyond the 
grasp of human faculties. It was in the lingering adherence 
to the old fields of enquiry that Pyrrhonism found its most 
powerful incentive. The end pursued being unattainable, it 
was not difficult to challenge all endeavours to reach it. The 
Academicians not only resigned the chase, but implied that 
the happiness of life was alone dependent upon the relative 
and the phenomenal. It is thus that we interpret the second 
distinction taken by Sextus Empiricus between the Pyr- 
rhonists and Academicians, viz. the positive decisions of 
the latter on the questions respecting the conduct of life. 
Man lives in a world of appearances, but on the relations of 
those appearances to himself arid to each other depends 
everything which to a heathen philosopher constitutes hap 
piness. Within this sphere then there is sufficient certitude 
upon which to ground principles of action. From observa 
tion and experience the good and the evil, or at any rate 
that which brought good and evil to man, could be deter 
mined; and it was absurd to maintain an attitude of suspense 
where the exigencies of life called for prompt decision. 
Hence arose that which has always been considered the dis 
tinguishing doctrine of the New Academy, namely that a 
belief founded on probable evidence was sufficient ground of 
action for a reasonable being. This theory of probability 
seems principally to have been intended to meet a sceptical 
difficulty which had arisen in consequence of the confusion 
amongst early thinkers of the notions of cognition and recog 
nition. The gist of this objection seems to have been how 
can you distinguish one thing from another when you do not 
know either of them ? It was to this quibble that the Aca 
demicians supplied the answer, that recognition only involved 
a comparison of appearances, and that these appearances 
might be taken as valid evidence in reference to each other. 
It was, indeed, not very philosophical of the Pyrrhonians to 



124 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM- [LECT. 

maintain that the mind had such a faculty of weighing evi 
dence as to be able to detect its equivalence exactly, and yet 
not to admit that it was sometimes inclined in one direction 
more than another. Where there is the power of discerning 
equipollence there must also be the ability to perceive pre 
ponderance. It was true that recognition did not involve 
the assurance of that certainty which the Stoics imagined 
they had found in the cataleptic phantasm. Man might 
mistake Geminus, or fail to recognise Gotta; still, if the 
number of marks by which an object could be distinguished 
was observed with sufficient care, the degree of probability 
there would be that our judgment was right might amount 
to a virtual certainty. So the Academicians argued with 
equal cogency against the Stoics, who denied that they ever 
believed, and the Pyrrhonists, who denied that they ever could 
believe, or rather that the inconsistent beliefs destroyed each 
other. In opposing the special dogmas of the Stoics there is 
no doubt that Carneades far outstepped the reticence of 
the Pyrrhonian epoch, as in discussing the question of the 
criterion of truth. Still, as Cicero tells us, they retained an 
attitude of suspense in every science the premisses of which 
were incapable, or seemed incapable, of being established on 
any but probable evidence. As we said before, then, in mat 
ters of speculation the early Pyrrhonists and New Acade 
micians may be said to have coincided in maintaining the 
eVo^r; ; but in the affairs of practical life the latter declared 
a reasonable probability to be sufficient ground for action. 

e. With regard to the later development of Pyrrhon 
ism, commenced by ^Enesidemus soon after the death of 
Cicero, Brandis makes the following remarks 1 : "But in what 
consists the essential distinction between the Pyrrhonian and 
Academic scepticism? This is not easy to determine. They 
both disputed the possibility of knowing the nature of things, 
1 Enticiclidunqcn dcr Gricchischcn PJiiL, p. 230. 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 125 

or of attaining any certitude whatever. They both allowed 
the facts of consciousness, and both aimed at the same end, 
viz. the enjoyment of a life undisturbed by knowledge, with 
its attendant hopes and fears, or by a useless struggle against 
the inevitable. But Carneades and the Academicians could 
not so far ignore the claims of science, as not to attempt a 
theory of probability ; whereas JEnesidemus and his successors, 
convinced of the impracticability of such a theory, did not, 
like Antiochus the Academician, on this account give them 
selves up to a dogmatic eclecticism, but, without deserting the 
sceptical attitude, endeavoured to meet the emergencies of 
life, by observing the teachings of experience, by obeying the 
dictates of nature, by respecting laws and customs, and by 
acquiring useful arts. Remembered impressions experience 
appeared to belong to the phenomenal, for the images in 
memory could not be called in question, inasmuch as they 
were reproductions of appearances ; especially as memory did 
not guarantee the causal dependence of events as necessary, 
but only suggested their possible recurrence in cases where 
absolute assurance was not required \ Similarly, the Sceptic 
might allow himself to be guided in his conduct by laws and 
customs, although he might neither approve of nor disallow 
them per se, and the inductions of experience he also ad 
mitted as a criterion of action. Opposition to established 
laws and customs, in fact, would have disturbed the tranquil 
lity of his life; and he had no objection to avail himself of 
the experience of others 2 . For the same reason he did not 
hesitate to recognise piety as conducive to a peaceful exist 
ence 3 . The Sceptic substituted empiricism for science 
which contented itself with meeting the requirements of life 
which did not seek to discover the reality or ultimate 
causes of things, but merely observed the connexion of phe- 

1 Adv. Math. vm. 291. 2 Hyp. IT. 256. 

3 Hyp. i. 24. 



126 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

nomena, in order to be able to predict the future from a re 
membrance of the past, by virtue of the notion of causation, 
the natural attribute of humanity, without, however, commit 
ting himself to any decision respecting the reason of the 
thing. Hence Sextus Empiricus, in his discussion on the so- 
called five sciences, directs all his attacks against their theo 
retical principles, without in the least denying their utility 
for the purposes of life; but thinks they ought to be solely 
confined to practical limits, still with the consciousness that 
this restriction could seldom be strictly observed. So the 
Pyrrhonian scepticism allied itself to that which was in every 
case probable, and only attacked the theoretical part of 
science 1 ." 

f. We thus see that, as far as practical results went, 
the Sceptical Empiricism of the Academy, of which the final 
chapters of the Lucullus give us such a distinct picture, was 
adopted and maintained by the later representatives of Pyr 
rhonism. This accounts for the fact that Sextus Empiricus, 
although upholding the doctrines of Pyrrho, was in practical 
science a follower of the Empirical method. The extreme 
or earlier Pyrrhonism, he tells us 2 , was only strictly adhered 
to by the so-called Methodists, who, with the Rationalists or 
Dogmatists and the Empirics, carried their respective phi 
losophical opinions into the only art to which scientific prin 
ciples were in those days applied, viz. that of Medicine. It 
is easy to see how well the Pyrrhonian or sceptical principles 
must have accorded with the circumstances of the times in 
which they were received. With the general collapse of the 
ancient national faith; with the universal corruption of mo 
rals; with a tyrannical government and a degenerate people; 
with just enough light in science to make darkness visible, 

1 Adv. Math. vii. 435. 

2 Hyp. i. 34. 236 241. Also, Note g, "Tria constat celebrari genera ac 
tres, veluti sectas medicorum," &c. 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 127 

what could better correspond than a philosophical system 
which considered all religions as equally true, or equally 
false; which held the distinctions of good and evil to have no 
higher sanction than the arbitrary caprice, or hereditary tend 
encies of nations and individuals; which inculcated submis 
sion to the inevitable as a more certain means of ensuring 
tranquillity and happiness than brave and manly resistance ; 
and which recognised in the human intellect no faculty of 
attaining to a knowledge of aught beyond the range of ob 
servation and experience ? Wherever the features of scepti 
cism are discernible they bear the stamp of despair, they 
indicate the close of a period in the world s history; they are 
the heralds of some mighty revolution in the moral, intel 
lectual, and political relations of man. Such a revolution, 
we know, was even then in progress; and, at the time when 
Sextus Empiricus wrote, must already have attracted the at 
tention of those who interested themselves in observing the 
varying phases of human development. It is then a ques 
tion of some interest, why a philosopher with such a range 
of information, as the expounder of the sceptical doctrines 
evidently possessed, should have omitted even a passing no 
tice of the Christian sect. It has, indeed, been supposed 
that he himself was a Christian, and the author of a book, 
mentioned by Eusebius, on the Resurrection 1 . Fabricius, it 
is true, does not seem to entertain this opinion; but, whether 
he was or was not a Christian himself, it is evident his si 
lence concerning the new faith could not have arisen through 
ignorance. Perhaps respect for the pure lives and precepts 
of the Christians prevented him including them in the cata 
logue of heathen sects, of whose doctrines and manners he 
has only to relate something obscene and ridiculous 2 . Per 
haps there was an element in scepticism favourable to Chris- 

1 De Sexto Empirico, Testimonia vii, 

2 Hyp. m. 24. 



128 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

tianity, opposing as they both did, without reserve or excep 
tion, every form of heathen superstition. Paley, indeed, 
says, sceptics are not generally tolerant of a new religion. 
We doubt, however, whether this remark is applicable to the 
Tyrrhenian method. The Tyrrhenians only professed to sus 
pend their judgment, declaring themselves perfectly willing 
to give their adherence to one opinion or another, the mo 
ment it could be made manifest to them that any given one 
was more worthy of credit than another. It is not probable, 
then, that a Pyrrhonian Sceptic would primd facie reject 
any new doctrine, but rather be inclined to entertain it: 
not perhaps with much sincerity, but at least as affording 
additional justification for witholding his assent to any opi 
nion whatever. Scepticism, under one form or another, was 
certainly the prevailing tone of Greek philosophy for three 
centuries before the commencement of the Christian era. 
We may be sure, then, that with the " increasing purpose, 
which through all ages runs," this tendency to invalidate all 
human attempts to attain the assurance of truth, was signi 
ficant of the disclosure of a new faculty, which could be ap 
pealed to through some other avenue than that of the reason. 
" We know (says St Austin) what rests upon reason; we be 
lieve what rests upon authority. But reason itself must rest 
at last upon authority; for the original data of reason do not 
rest on reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the 
authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, 
in rigid propriety, Beliefs or Trusts 1 ." Now it may seem at 
first sight paradoxical to assert that Pyrrhonism could in any 
way have been influential in guiding philosophers to the con 
viction that faith was the ultimate ground of reason ; yet we 
think we can show that such a conclusion might result not 
illogically from the Sceptical habit of viewing things. We 
can illustrate what we mean by considering the force of that 

1 Reid s Works (Hamilton), Note A. v. 2. 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 129 

favourite weapon in controversy employed by the Sceptics, 
which we have had occasion more than once to notice, viz. 
the diallel. Of this logical net (M. Bayle says) " Si les Pir- 
roniens s aretoient aux dix moyens de 1 Epoque, et s ils se 
bornaient a les employer contre la Fisique, on pouroit encore 
negocier avec eux: mais ils vont beaucoup plus loin; ils ont 
une sort d armes, qu ils nomment le Diallele, qu ils empoig- 
nent au premier besom, apres cela on ne sauroit faire ferme 
contr eux sur quoi que ce soit 1 ." M. Bayle evidently regards 
the diallel as an arm against which reason was helpless. To 
what then did it reduce the adversary against whom it was 
employed? For example, suppose one asserted that the tree 
he was contemplating was really an external object, a mode 
of matter, and not a mere idea, representation, or mode of his 
own mind. The Sceptic would reply, Unless you have ever 
apprehended a tree, apart from your idea of it, how can you 
tell whether you are now contemplating an object in reality, 
or only an idea in the mind? you can only know the truth of 
your idea by the knowledge of the object of which it is the 
idea; but you can only know this object by the assurance you 
have of the truth of your idea. Here then are two things so 
related that you can alone establish the first by the second, 
and the second again by the first; thus you argue in a circle. 
But one might ask the Sceptic, Do you, in shewing the re 
ciprocal dependence of the premise and conclusion of such an 
argument, make the belief of their actual existence absurd or 
impossible? It is clear that you do not; you merely fail to 
demonstrate either of them; you still leave it possible that 
they may be true; hence all you do is to throw me back on 
a principle of belief. The same consequence resulted from 
another of their logical meshes, viz. that of the proof regres 
sing to infinity; for it is clear that, in this case also, the 
object was to drive the opponent back to some fundamental 

1 Diction. Hist, et Crit. (3 edit. Tom. m. p. 1005). 
I, L. 9 



130 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

notion, or axiom, some instinctive belief. In fine, the scep 
tical method of arguing was, to force their adversary upon 
hypotheses ; and it was then that the chief and most signifi 
cant effect of their method of reasoning became apparent. 
The Sceptic did not refuse to admit first principles, incapa 
ble of demonstration ; but he demanded that these principles 
should be consistent with one another, and lead to results 
which were so. It was here that scepticism could never be 
met, because philosophers either refused to recognise these 
innate principles, a priori truths, or fundamental notions; or 
they had destroyed the credibility of them all by refusing to 
admit some. In the former case, the diallel and the infinite 
regression obtained an easy victory; and in the latter, the 
Sceptic would urge with unanswerable justice, / accept the 
testimony of natural evidence; but, since you make it lead 
to opposing conclusions, / still need a criterion of truth. The 
point, however, we here want to establish is, that the perti 
nacious logic of the Sceptics must have forced the attention 
of philosophers to the nature of belief, and so have prepared 
the way, in some measure, for the acceptance of truths the 
most important to man, but which were, at the same time, 
incapable of demonstrative proof. We have seen that in the 
Academy the attempt to compass the objective reality of 
things was formally abandoned ; but that belief, on probable 
evidence, was allowed as a practical principle in the affairs 
of life. Thus also in the scepticism of the Academy proof 
short of demonstrative was considered sufficient ground of 
action for a reasonable being. Hence, the influence of this 
school, as well as that of the Pyrrhonists, would be indirectly 
to accustom the philosophic mind to admit by faith that 
which could never become an object of knowledge. We 
should say then that the doctrines of Christianity probably 
found more adherents among the ranks of the sceptical than 
those of the dogmatic Empiricists. They, indeed, who held 



VI.] ANCIENT AND REGENT. 131 

by the long-established conviction of the ancient sages, that 
the objective and the absolute were within the range of the 
human intellect, and who therefore aspired to the construc 
tion of a rational theology, sought refuge from scepticism in 
the mysticism of Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists. Thus 
faith, or reason, were each evoked as resting-ground from 
scepticism, on the quicksands of which the human mind 
could never find any permanent or solid satisfaction. 

77. That the limits of knowledge prescribed by scepti 
cism do not hinder the free exercise of faith, has been dis 
tinctly enunciated by the most orthodox theologians of the 
present day. 

" Truth and falsehood are not properties of things in 
themselves, but of our conceptions, and are tested, not by 
the comparison of conceptions with things in themselves, but 
with things as they are given in some other relation. My 
conception of an object of sense is true, when it corresponds 
to the characteristics of the object as I perceive it ; but the 
perception itself is equally a relation, and equally implies 
the co-operation of human faculties. Truth in relation to no 
intelligence is a contradiction in terms : our highest concep 
tion of absolute truth is that of truth in relation to all 
intelligences. But of the consciousness of intelligences dif 
ferent from our own we have no knowledge, and can make 
no application. Truth, therefore, in relation to man, admits 
of no other test than the harmonious consent of all human 
faculties 1 ." There is not a statement in this passage which 
an ancient Sceptic would not have endorsed, and yet his 
very avowal of such opinions constituted his scepticism. For, 
allowing for the difference of language consequent upon the 
more philosophical distinctness of modern conceptions, what 
is there in this but an assertion that truth has for man 
no objective signification, but is limited to the relation of 

1 Hansel s Bampton Lectures, Lecture v. p. 149. 

Q 9 

*/ "^rf 



13 1 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT, 

appearances, or of a subjective notion to an equally subjec 
tive perception? Truth not of what is but of what appears 
to be; not of the fyaiveaOai ov, but of the fyaiveaQai iivai\ 
internal not external harmony. But still more striking is 
the accordance between ancient scepticism and modern 
orthodoxy in respect to the central notion of Pyrrhonism, 
viz. the relativity of all our knowledge ; the TO vrpo? ri ; the 
impossibility of separating subject and object even in thought. 
" A second characteristic of consciousness is, that it is only 
possible in the form of a relation. There must be a Subject, 
or person conscious, and an Object, or thing of which he is 
conscious. There can be no consciousness without the union 
of these two factors ; and, in that union, each exists only as 
it is related to the other. The subject is a subject, only in 
so far as it is conscious of an object : the object is an object, 
only in so far as it is apprehended by a subject: and the 
destruction of either is the destruction of consciousness it 
self 1 ." OTL Se KOL Trpo? TL eVrt iravra ra aloQryra Brj"\ov earl 
yap TTOO? rev? al(i6avQfjLevovs. a\\a KCLI 77^09 TL ecrrt ra 
voyra, TTpo? yap TOV voovvra Xeyerat 2 . Mansel even quotes 
Sextus Empiricus 3 in opposition to the German Absolutists, 
who seek to unite the subject and object as the only means 
of solving the logical difficulty of conceiving something out 
of relation to the thinking subject. The whole tenor, in 
fact, of Hansel s opinion coincides with that of ancient 
scepticism, much as the Oxford theologian might resent the 
imputation. In fact, both have the same end in view, to a 
certain extent, viz. the disparagement of the human reason ; 
but ancient philosophers knew no faculty of belief in man 
which was not placed either in sense or in intellect, con- 

1 Hansel s Bampton Lectures, Lecture in. p. 75. 

2 Hyp. i. 15. 175177. 

3 " "OXov d 6vros TOV KaTa\a/jipdvovTOS otolv ZTI frrrcu TO Ka.Ta\a^a.v{)^vov 
T&V 5 dXcryajrdrajv tcrrl rb elvcti ^v rbv KaraXayU./3a^ofra, w elvcu d TO ov tariv 
i] fcctTaX^is." Adv. Math. vn. 311. 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 132 

sequently the Pyrrhonist, in demonstrating the feebleness of 
reason, destroyed all hope of attaining assurance. The Scoto- 
Oxonians have, however, devoted all their energies to the 
task of showing that we have an organ of faith independent 
of reason. It is a question whether, by adopting this method 
of defending their cause, they have met with the success they 
might have, had they taken up a rather different position. 
Sir W. Hamilton makes belief a mode of consciousness, and 
as such it necessarily implies a knowledge of its object. 
Professor Mansel, applying the principles of Hamilton to the 
discomfiture of the German rationalist theologians, endeavours 
to separate belief and knowledge, after setting out with the 
assumption that such a separation was impossible. Of course 
such a contradiction at the root of an argument would en 
danger the acceptance of the best cause. We think that the 
fundamental error of Hamilton and Mansel lies : 

1st, in not distinguishing with sufficient clearness between 
the faculty and act of belief. 

2nd, in making belief identical with feeling. 
" I know it to be true, because I feel and cannot but 
feel" or "because I believe and cannot but believe, it so to 
be." And if farther interrogated, how I know or am assured 
that I thus feel, or thus believe, I can make no better answer 
than, in the one case, " because I believe that I feel" in the 
other, "because I feel that I believe 1 ." But surely this is 
not a complete account of the kind of assent the mind gives 
to its natural testimony. The very notion of an a priori 
truth seems to us to be that the prejudice to accept it must 
be potentially in the mind, independent of the act which 
constitutes a belief identical with feeling; and this faculty, 
as distinguished from the act of belief, might, and in fact does, 
exist in the mind apart from reason, and exerts its influence 
without consciousness. Such is the belief the mind has in 
1 Reid s Works (Hamilton). Note A. v. p. 760. 



134 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

the validity of its own processes, which constitutes indeed 
the complement of the ultimate laws of thought. Belief 
then as a faculty or potentiality we might admit to be 
exercised on objects which could not be embraced by reason, 
but not as an act or energy. A nervous dread of German 
rationalism seems to have driven Dr Mansel to a denial of 
any relation between God and the human reason what 
ever; a degree of scepticism which might be more dangerous 
to orthodoxy than Teutonic mysticism. 

6. But to return to ancient scepticism: there is another 
aspect of the Hamiltonian philosophy, bringing it into a re 
lation to early thought, which, as illustrative of our subject, 
demands some consideration. We have already noticed that 
a result of Pyrrhonism must have been to have forced philo 
sophy into the admission of some ultimate principles innate 
in the human mind, as the sources and highest credentials 
of all our knowledge. In fact, the exaggerated empiricism 
of the Stoics was more than anything conducive to the 
spread of sceptical principles. Such a result we have also 
seen in the scepticism of Hume, which, following the empi 
ricism of Locke, staggered the philosophical mind of Europe 
in the last century. The issue involved indeed in all the 
controversies between the ancient Dogmatists and Sceptics, 
but never explicitly stated, was forced into prominence by 
the subtle mind of Hume, when he shewed that the notion 
of causality, on which depends all our reasoning either moral, 
physical, or metaphysical, could not, on the hypothesis that 
the mind has no ideas but those derived from experience, be 
demonstrated to have any validity as a basis of argument. 
The dilemma into which he forced philosophers was really 
an example of the employment of the ancient diallel. No 
conviction is so universal, or so deeply seated in human 
intelligence, as that of the necessary connection between 
cause and effect, and no statement could consequently so tend 



VI] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 135 

to shake our faith in the testimony of consciousness as the 
announcement that this conviction was ill-grounded. " You 
say," said Hume " that we have no notions prior to experience, 
wherefore the idea of causation is only derived from ex 
perience, i.e. we trust to it because experience has always 
shown it to be worthy of confidence ; but whence could this 
confidence have arisen if we had had no antecedent notion 
that the experience of the past was a guarantee in our anti 
cipations of the future ? Thus you affirm that we believe in 
causation from experience, and then say that we believe in 
experience through the notion of causation; here is a diallel. 
The notion of causation is therefore no necessary law of con 
sciousness at all, but only the result of habit; and it is 
consequently no premiss to be assumed as fundamentally 
necessary ; hence the testimony of consciousness, proved falla 
cious in one of its most undoubted deliverances, is not to be 
relied upon in any other false in one, false in all l scepti 
cism could go no farther." The important bearing which the 
opinions of Hume had upon the interests of truth, subverting, 
as they appeared to do, the whole fabric of human know 
ledge, evoked the genius of Kant to undertake a searching 
investigation into the nature of our apprehensions of neces 
sary and universal truths. It is doubtful whether the results 
of his critique of these notions much tended to re-establish 
faith in their objective validity, or whether he did not rather 
separate the spheres of the noumenal and phenomenal more 
irretrievably than ever. Even the controversy on the origin 
of our notions of mathematical and logical necessity seems as 
far from a satisfactory termination as ever. Dr Whewell 
(remarks Mansel 2 ) in confounding the necessary laws under 
which all men think, with the contingent laws under which 
certain men think of certain things, seems to have given 

1 Hamilton s Discussions. Philosophy, of Perception, p. 95. 

2 Prolegomena Logica. Note A. 



136 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

some advantage to the empirical arguments of his antagonist 
Mr Mill. For Dr Whewell says of certain discoverers of 
physical laws : " So complete has been the victory of truth in 
most of these instances, that at present we can hardly imagine 
the struggle to have been necessary. The very essence 
of these triumphs is that they lead us to regard the views we 
reject as not only false, but inconceivable 1 ." Of course to 
this Mr Mill could instantly reply : The last proposition is 
precisely what I contend for ; and I ask no more, in order 
to overthrow the whole theory of its author on the nature of 
the evidence of axioms. For what is that theory ? That the 
truth of axioms cannot have been learnt from experience, 
because their falsity is inconceivable. But Dr Whewell him 
self says, that we are continually led, by the natural progress 
of thought, to regard as inconceivable what our forefathers 
not only conceived but believed, nay even (he might have 
added) were unable to conceive the reverse of 2 ." We have 
quoted a fragment of this discussion in support of the asser 
tion we just made, that the same questions which occupy 
modern thought were underlying the ancient antagonism of 
the Sceptics and Dogmatists. Thus we find Cicero (on behalf 
of the New Academy opposing the pretensions of Lucullus, 
who in the name of Antiochus is maintaining the claims to 
infallibility of the Stoics) noticing that tendency of the mind 
to assent unhesitatingly to certain propositions, continues : 
" Geometrae provideant (de persuadendi necessitate) qui se 
profitentur non persuadere, sed cogere : et qui omnia vobis, 
quse describunt, probant. Non quaero ex his ilia initia 
mathematicorum : quibus non concessis, digitum progredi 
non possunt. Punctum esse, quod magnitudinem nullam 
habeat. Extremitatem, et quasi libramentum, in quo nulla 
omnino crassitude sit : Lineam autem, longitudinem latitu- 

1 Phil Ind. Sc. ii. 174. 

2 Mill s Logic, Book u. v. p. 273. 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 137 

dine carentem. Haec cum vera esse concessero : si adigam 
jusjurandum, sapientemne prius, quam Archimedes eo in- 
spectante rationes omnes descripserit eas, quibus efficitur 
raultis partibus solem majorem esse quam terrain juraturum 
putas 1 ." In this passage the distinction between objective 
and subjective laws seems to have been unconsciously recog 
nised (if we may use the expression), and might warrant us 
in the conclusion that certain principles of reasoning were 
left unassailed by the Sceptics. It is true that Galen asserts. 
Carneades denied the truth of the maxim, things which are 
equal to the same are equal to one another : " 6 yovv Kap- 
Vd$r]<; ovSe rovro TO Travrcov evapyeo-Tarov crvy^opel TricrTeveiv, 
OTI ra rw avrcZ l<ra fJieyeOrj /cal a\Xr;\ot? Ida yiyveTai 2 " 

Brandis thinks 3 this refers to the application of the 
axiom to the prosecution of real knowledge owing to the un 
certainty of the senses. We are inclined to think, however, 
all that Carneades meant was, that such a truth was not a 
generalisation from experience ; and in this he probably was 
only maintaining the traditions of the Academy. The fact 
of the universal belief in such a proposition he certainly 
could not have challenged. Perhaps here again we have 
the scepticism of Hume anticipated. However uncertain we 
may be about the opinions of the New Academy respecting 
first principles, Sextus Empiricus, on behalf of the Pyrrho- 
nists, enunciates them continually, as the basis of all rea 
soning. Thus, arguing on the impossibility of demonstra 
tion, he urges that there is a class of truths indemonstrable, 
because they are self-evident: " TWV cvrcov iraa-i, ^aivoyikvwv 
eV to-??? eo-Tai aS/Sa/era 4 ." Just as Aristotle defines an axiom 






1 Lucullus, 36. 2 Galen, de Opt. Doctr. c. 2. p. 45. 

3 " Carneades scheint daraus die praktische Unanwendbarkeit des Satzes 
gefolgert zu haben, das zwei Grossen die einer dritten gleich, auch unter 
einander gleich seien." Brandis, Enwickclungen der Oriechischen Phil. p. 
187, Note 50. 

4 Adv. Math. i. 2. li. 



138 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

to be, " that, which he who would learn aught, must himself 
bring, and not receive from his instructor." And in the ex 
ordium to his work against logicians, Sextus Empiricus says, 
"9 elirep ev iravrl fiepei (f)t\ocro<pias ^rjrrjTeov e&rl 
TTpb Travrbs Set ra? /%9 KOL rou? T/DOTTOU? rrjs rovrov 
o~e&)9 eyziv TTKJTQV^ . 7rel TO, /JLCV evap<yrj 8ta Kpirrjpiov 
a\)ToOev "jvcopitpcrOai $o/cei, ra Se d S^Aa Sta trrj/Jfl&v Kal a,7ro- 
$eleti)v Kara TYJV dirb T&V evapywv nvTaftaviv egixyeveaOcu 1 " 
As we remarked before, Pyrrhonism never refused the admis 
sion of primary truths, but founded exclusively on their ap 
parent contradiction. The universal beliefs of mankind were 
undoubtedly criteria of truth to the Sceptic 2 ; and his very 
scepticism arose from his professed inability to discover such 
beliefs common to the human race. There are no truths, 
says he, moral or physical, because that which is true would 
appear so to all. Such is the reiteration of the Pyrrhonist : 
" That which is true would appear so to all, but nothing does 
appear so to all, therefore nothing is true." Scepticism, 
therefore, "en derniere analyse," really acknowledged a cri 
terion of truth, viz. " the common beliefs of mankind." Phi 
losophy had subverted these beliefs; and it was quite com 
petent then for the Sceptic to demand of philosophy a new 
criterion in place of the one she had disallowed. Such was 
the real attitude of scepticism in relation to dogmatic philo 
sophy, when stripped of the exaggerations of its own pro 
fessors, and the misrepresentations and misapprehensions of 
its adversaries. On this ground alone can scepticism be fairly 
met and confuted. It would be a task of much interest and 
of great importance to the cause of philosophy to investigate 
when and how the schism between philosophy and common 

1 Adv. Logicos, vii. 24. 25. 

8 Of. "6 ydp Tratri 5o/ce?, TOVT clvai <f>a^v. 6 3 avaipuv ratrrjif TTJV iricmv o:J 
jrdvv TTHTrbTepa ^oet." Aristotle, Eth. Nic. K. 2. 4. 

6 Tt/iwi fj.fj.apTvprjKv dir&v, dXXa TO <paii>6fj.ei>ov iravrl <r6evei, ov-rrep &v 
Adv. Logicos, vii. 30. 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 139 

sense first originated. Scepticism is not a natural product 
of the human mind, at least, as far as regards the testimony 
of consciousness. It is an universally admitted characteristic 
of children and barbarians, that they believe implicitly until 
their natural faith has been shaken by some extraneous 
cause; and the stronger the instinctive belief has been, the 
more difficult would it be to restore it when once impaired. 
It was on this account that the writings of Hume created 
such an effect on the minds of philosophers. In the infancy 
of Greek speculation such an advanced scepticism as that of 
Hume was hardly likely to have appeared. But there are 
beliefs common to the human race, and as unhesitatingly ac 
cepted by the natural mind as the belief in causation. To 
the undermining of these, Greek scepticism owed its origin. 
To illustrate our meaning we will quote the following pas 
sage from Eusebius : " It is worth while to enquire on what 
authority they (the Pyrrhonists) say, that everything is 
hidden (aSrj\a) ; for they ought to be able to determine the 
evident (TO Sf)\ov), then they would be competent to de 
clare what things are not evident. One ought to know the 
affirmative, before one can state the negative. If they do 
riot know what is evident, they will not know what is non- 
evident. Thus, when Enesidemus in his Hypotyposes insti 
tuted his nine rponroi, by which he tried to show that every 
thing is uncertain (aSr/Xtf), let us ask whether he did it 
knowing them or not. For he says that animals differ, and 
we ourselves, and cities, habits, customs, and laws; that our 
senses are weak, and that external circumstances hinder our 
knowledge, such as distance, size, and motion. That the 
young feel differently to the old, the waking to the sleeping, 
the healthy to the sick. That nothing we apprehend is ab 
solute or simple (aKpaifyves), that all things are relative and 
coniplex. I say he talks nonsense, for some one would in- 



140 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

stantly enquire, does he affirm these things knowing how far 
they are so, or not knowing it. If he did not know, how 
should we believe him ; but if he knew it, he would be a fool, 
inasmuch as he at the same time says that he knows these 
things, and yet declares that everything is hidden V In this 
argumentation, it would appear that the philosopher sought 
to force the Sceptic into a self-contradiction ; " how do you 
know everything is hidden, and yet know nothing ?" but, to 
this the Sceptic might reply, I should not have known that 
all things were hidden, unless your philosophy had suggested 
such a conclusion. "Democritus (says Sir W. Hamilton) 
was the first who enounced the observation, that the Sweet, 
the Bitter, the Cold, the Hot, the Coloured, &c. are wholly 
different, in their absolute nature, from the character in 
which they become manifested to us 2 ." Now, if this was the 
case, Democritus was the first who discovered to man a fa 
culty of separating the appearance from the thing, the appa 
rent from the real, the <$>aivea-6ai elvai from the ^aiveaOai oi>; 
and, in endowing man with this faculty, Democritus lent to 
him a real basis for the art of doubting; and we are not sur 
prised to read that it was the perusal of the works of Demo 
critus which first suggested to Pyrrho the notion of systema- 
tising scepticism into a method of philosophy. "Men are 
carried away by a natural instinct to repose faith in their 
senses. When they follow this blind and powerful instinct 
of nature, they always suppose the very images presented to 
the senses to be the external objects, and never entertain 
any suspicion that the one are nothing but representations of 
the other*" But once shake this faith, once demonstrate to 
man, that the testimony of his consciousness (than which 

1 Praparat. Ev. xiv. 18. 

* Eeid s Works. Hamilton. Note D. 1. 

a Hume, Phil. Works, Vol. iv. p. 177. 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 141 

nothing primd facie is more certain) is a fallacy and a delu 
sion, then you cannot deny to scepticism a valid and plau 
sible ground of argument. Philosophers are (as Hume states) 
thrown upon this dilemma: "Do you, he asks (firstly), fol 
low the instinct and propensities of nature in assenting to 
the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that 
the very perception, or sensible image, is the external object." 
(Thus secondly), "Do you disclaim this principle in order to 
embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are 
only representations of something external? You here depart 
from your natural propensities, and more obvious sentiments, 
and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never 
find any convincing argument from experience to prove that 
the perceptions are connected with any external objects." 
And we maintain that a careful examination of the principles 
of Pyrrhonism cannot but lead to the conviction, that it was 
on this false theory of perception, which, in one form or an 
other, seems to have been universally accepted by ancient 
thinkers, that scepticism grew and fattened. " Plato s theory 
of perception is that denoted by some modern writers as the 
( representative theory. Of things as they are in them 
selves the senses give us no knowledge: all that in sensation 
we are conscious of is a state of mind or feeling (nraOo^) ; the 
existence of self or the perceiving subject, and of a some 
thing external to self a perceived object are revealed to 
us, not by the senses, but by a higher faculty. The negative 
portion of this theory Plato holds in common with the Cy- 
renaics, with Protagoras, and with the later Academics and 
Sceptics. It was controverted by the Stoics, who maintained 
that the external world is the object of immediate conscious 
ness (KaraXrjTrrop). But all the remaining schools of anti 
quity, sceptical, dogmatic, and mystical, agree with Plato 
in denying that our sensations reveal to us anything beyond 
themselves. Thev are modifications of consciousness, feel- 



142 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

ings, states, permotiones intimce (as Cicero has it), and 
nothing more 1 ." 

This account of the opinions generally held by ancient 
thinkers on the degree of knowledge we have of the external 
universe leads us to assert that Greek scepticism was mainly 
determined by a mistaken view of the real object appre 
hended in perception. To whatever results an habitual 
methodical unbelief may have led, however deplorable they 
may have been, and subversive of all immutable principles 
of morality, still it is not through and on account of these 
results that scepticism is to be met and refuted; it is the 
principles, and not their consequences, that ought fairly to be 
attacked, and for these, as we think, we have shewn not 
scepticism but philosophy is responsible. Scepticism, both 
ancient and modern, has never and could never have been 
an independent manifestation of human opinion, but where- 
ever it has appeared it has been due to an erroneous method 
of philosophising. 

Sir William Hamilton detecting this, made it the 
principal end of his teaching to reconcile the conflicting 
judgments of philosophy and common sense, on this much 
vexed question of the nature of our perceptions, in order 
to remove the contradictions which Hume showed must in 
evitably arise from according belief to some of the deliver 
ances of consciousness and withholding it from others. Locke 
had articulately enunciated a distinction which he considered 

1 Dr Thompson s note to Butler s Lectures, Lecture vn. p. 96. Tenne- 
mann seenis to think that Pla o considered a knowledge of the subject to be 
involved in the act of perception: "Dassrait jeder VorstellungeinBewustsein 
verbunden ist, war ein Faktum, das sich jedem Beobachter von selbst auf- 
dringet; und es ware eine Art von Wunder, wenn sie dem Plato entgangen 
ware. Man findet zwar dieses Faktum in seiner Allgemeinheit und mit 
bestimmten Worten ausgedruckt nicht in seinen Schriften erwahnt, aber doch 
einzelne Bermerkungen und Aeusserungen, aus welchen so viel erhellet, dass 
es ihm nicht unbekannt geblieben war." Tennemann s Platonischen Philo- 
sophie, zweiter Band, Kap. 1. p. 13. 



VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 143 

must be taken between the primary and secondary qualities 
of external objects. Of the latter he asserted we only had 
a mediate and relative knowledge as the unknown causes of 
certain modifications of consciousness, or ideas, as he termed 
them ; that our apprehensions of colour, taste, and smell 
were but knowledge of changes in the percipient subject, 
ideas which resembled nothing external to the mind. Of 
primary qualities, such as extension, figure, solidity, &c. 
he maintained we had a distinct and quasi-immediate cog 
nition, or, what amounts to the same thing, that our ideas of 
them did resemble their cause in nature. It was not long 
after Locke had published his celebrated work, that Berkeley 
completed the idealism of Locke by demonstrating that the 
so-called primary qualities were no more the objects of 
immediate perception than the secondary. That in fact all 
we could assert of things apparently external was our act 
of perceiving them; their esse is percipi. Although this 
doctrine was carried by him, or rather carried him, to some 
very extravagant conclusions, there is no doubt that this 
placing of the primary and secondary qualities of bodies on 
the same footing, as phenomena of consciousness, was a 
conclusion of the last importance to the interests of phi 
losophy ; and if regarded from a right point of view, the most 
substantial bulwark against the encroachments of scepticism. 
Unfortunately, however, the idealistic tendency which phi 
losophy had received from the writings of Locke caused the 
opinions of Berkeley respecting the primary and secondary 
qualities of bodies to have an exactly opposite effect. Scepti 
cism in its subtlest form broke out, and, as we have already seen, 
Hume challenged philosophers on their ideal theory of percep-j^ 
tion to demonstrate logically, the existence of any external world 
at all. It was then that Reid attempted to meet scepticism by an 
appeal to the common sense or common beliefs of mankind, 
which, as an ultimate criterion of truth, he invoked against 



144 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LEOT. 

the assaults of the sceptic. For this purpose Reid, while for 
ever annihilating a capital error, vitiating up to his time all 
speculation (viz. the separation of the act from the object 
of perception), revived Locke s distinction between the pri 
mary and secondary qualities; maintaining that our know 
ledge of the former was intuitive an universal belief of 
mankind, and a sufficient proof of the existence of an ex 
ternal and extended universe. With regard to secondary 
qualities, however, he held to the opinion of philosophy, 
and at the same time appeared to hold it doubtful whether 
philosophers and the vulgar really differed concerning them. 
" We are now (says he) to consider the opinions both of the 
vulgar and of philosophers upon this subject. As to the 
former, it is not to be expected that they should make 
distinctions which have no connection with the common 
affairs of life; they do not, therefore, distinguish the pri 
mary from the secondary qualities, but speak of both as 
being equally qualities of the external object. Of the pri 
mary qualities they have a distinct notion, as they are im 
mediately and distinctly perceived by the senses; of the 
secondary, their notions, as I apprehend, are confused and 
indistinct, rather than erroneous. A secondary quality is 
the unknown cause or occasion of a well-known effect; and 
the same name is common to the cause and the effect. Now, 
to distinguish clearly the different ingredients of a complex 
notion, and at the same time the different meanings of an 
ambiguous word, is the work of a philosopher, and is not 
to be expected of the vulgar, when their occasions do not 
require it. I grant, therefore, that the notion the vulgar 
have of secondary qualities is indistinct and inaccurate. 
But there seems to be a contradiction between the vulgar 
and the philosopher upon this subject, and each charges the 
other with a gross absurdity. The vulgar say, that fire is 
hot, and snow cold, and sugar sweet ; and that to denv this 



VI] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 145 

is a gross absurdity, and contradicts the testimony of our 
senses. The philosopher says that heat, and cold, and 
sweetness are nothing but sensations in our minds, and it 
is absurd to conceive that these sensations are in the fire, 
or in the snow, or in the sugar. The philosopher says, 
there is no heat in the fire, meaning that the fire has not 
the sensation of heat. His meaning is just; and the vulgar 
will agree with him, as soon as they understand his meaning. 
But his language is improper; for there is really a quality 
in the fire, of which the proper name is heat ; and the name 
of heat is given to this quality, both by philosophers and 
by the vulgar, much more frequently than to the sensation 
of heat 1 ." Upon this account of the natural beliefs of man 
as to what they are actually conscious of in perception, Sir 
W. Hamilton grounds his doctrine of Natural Realism, which 
proclaims, that that which in the act of perception is pre 
sented to us as an external extended substance, is really the 
external extended substance, and not a mere representation 
of it a real mode of matter, and not a mere mode of mind ; 
and thus, he maintains, and only thus, is it possible to con 
trovert the sceptical dilemma by which philosophy is made 
to stultify itself by first wresting from man one of his most 
cherished and universal beliefs, and then appealing to the 
same belief as a certain evidence of the existence of external 
objects. Now the whole value of the service Sir W. Hamil 
ton has rendered to philosophy must evidently depend upon 
the fact whether or not the doctrine he upholds is one in 
accordance with the universal belief of mankind. For the 
object he professedly has in view is to shew that these 
beliefs are the ultimate criteria of truth ; and it is only in 
deserting them that philosophy has laid herself open to the 
attacks of Scepticism. Now, we reply, that, so far from the, 

1 On the Int. Powers, n. xvn. 241, 
L.L. W 



146 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM [LECT. 

testimony of consciousness revealing to us any distinction 
between the primary and secondary qualities of matter, 
the maintenance of this distinction would cause that very 
conflict which, as Sir W. Hamilton admits, is and always 
has been the prime cause of scepticism. 

The natural and universal belief of mankind is certainly 
>that, in the act of perception, one is conscious of an ego, and 
a non-ego of oneself as subject perceiving, and of a not- 
self as object perceived : and it is the changes in this object, 
as modes of matter, not modes of mind, which constitute 
for man the materials of his consciousness. He makes, 
however, no distinction between his apprehensions of colour, 
fragrance, figure, or solidity; all are alike to him qualities 
of the object, as Reid, in fact, in the first part of our quota 
tion admits. Heat, cold, and such subjective sensations, 
man apprehends not as modifications of his own mind, but 
as changes in his body. These changes are perceived as 
the effects from objects external to the body, which are 
causes ; and when we speak of the qualities of external 
objects, as heat in the fire, we regard them as the causes 
of changes in our own bodies, and they correspond to those 
powers or qualities which Locke calls the tertiary qualities, 
and James Mill the causes of the causes of our sensations. 
Sir William Hamilton admits that it is absurd to ask how 
the ego can be conscious of the non-ego, unless it can be 
shewn how it can be conscious of changes in itself. As far 
as the so-called primary qualities go, he would have us 
believe that we perceive changes in matter, or in the non-ego; 
but, with regard to the secondary, they are changes in the 
percipient mind. As we have said, the vulgar do not make 
this distinction, but regard all their perceptions as appre 
hensions of changes in matter. Sir W. Hamilton says, 
Common sense does not mean the opinion of the vulgar, but 
those ultimate principles of belief which are to be dis- 



VL] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 147 

criminated by the philosopher. Let us turn then from the 
opinions of the vulgar to those of philosophers. 

There are certain laws of thought which would prevent 
us logically from allowing any difference between primary 
and secondary qualities of matter. "All the secondary 
qualities may be generalized at one sweep into our mere 
knowledge of things. But the primary qualities which 
are usually restricted to extension and figure, and which 
constitute, it is said, the objective or real essence of things, 
and which are entirely independent of us into what shall 
they be generalized ? Into what but into this ? Into the 
knowledge of something which exists in things over and 
above our mere knowledge of things. It is plain enough 
that we cannot generalize them into pure objective exist 
ence in itself; we can only generalize them into a know 
ledge of pure objective existence. But such a knowledge, 
that is to say, a knowledge of somethiog existing in things, 
over and above our mere knowledge of them, is not one 
whit less our knowledge, and is not one whit more their 
existence, than the other more subjective knowledge desig 
nated by the word mere. Our knowledge of extension and 
figure is just as little these real qualities themselves as our 
affection of colour is objective colour itself, Just as little, 
we say, and just as much. You (we suppose ourselves 
addressing an imaginary antagonist), you hold that our 
knowledge of the secondary qualities is not these qualities 
themselves; but we ask you, Is then our knowledge of 
the primary qualities these qualities themselves ? This you 
will scarcely maintain, but perhaps you will say, Take away 
the affection of colour, and the colour no longer exists ; 
and we retort upon you, Take away the knowledge of ex 
tension, and the extension no longer exists. This you will 
peremptorily deny, and we deny it just as peremptorily ; 
but why do both of us deny it ? Just because both of us 

102 



148 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM. [LECT. VI. 

have surreptitiously restored the knowledge of extension 
in denying that extension itself would be annihilated. The 
knowledge of extension is extension, and extension is the 
knowledge of extension 1 ." 

Such are the arguments by which a distinguished meta 
physician of the present age has, as we think, irrefutably 
demonstrated the impossibility of separating the primary 
and secondary qualities of bodies in consciousness. We do 
not say we are prepared to subscribe to the ultra-idealism, 
or rather Berkley ism, which his philosophy implies ; but we 
maintain, that to distinguish our knowledge of the external 
universe into two kinds, is to endow man with a putative 
faculty which nature has not given him, by which he is 
induced to separate the apparent from the real, and thus 
institute a discrepancy in the testimony of consciousness, 
which, as Hamilton has laboured with so much earnestness 
to show, is the one and only means by which this testimony 
could be invalidated. Positivism and empiricism are at the 
present day the popular tendencies of thought. 

Induction is the only method of attaining knowledge; 
and d priori principles, on the existence of which the whole 
validity of induction depends, the ablest supporters of this 
method refuse to admit. It becomes then the duty of 
philosophers to unite in defence of such principles as the 
only barrier against scepticism. Let the instinctive beliefs 
of mankind, discriminated and interpreted, be accepted as 
the ultimate criteria of truth. But, above all, let philoso 
phers take care to maintain the integrity of their testi 
mony. The philosopher s infirmity is the sceptic s oppor 
tunity. 

1 Ferrier, Berkeley and Idealism, p. 317. 



APPENDIX A. 

NOTES FOR LECTURES ON CICERO S LUCULLUS. 
(TEXT, EDITION OF KLOTZ.) 



CHAP. I. 2. ariem ei memories quce turn primum profereba- 
tur\ The Sophists were probably the first who attempted to 
cultivate the memory by artificial means. Such proficiency was 
an indispensable accessory to rhetorical art, Aristotle has left 
us the best and most pregnant essay on memory (De Memoria), 
in. which the phenomenon is carefully analysed, the laws of the 
association of ideas indicated, and the nature of the mental image 
precisely defined. The notice of the faculty of memory in the 
exordium to this work is remarkably relevant, since it was really 
the only power the Stoics allowed to the mind. See Chapters vn. 
22, memoriae quidem, &c., x. 30, xxxm. 106. 

II. 4. Quum autem e philosophic ingenio scientiaque putaretur 
Antiochus, Philonis auditor excellere, &c.] See Lecture V. a, 

ibid. . 7. Sunt etiam qui negent, &c.] Cicero was evidently 

brought to the same opinion ultimately. Hence the recall of the 
first edition of this work. See Lecture I. p. 20, note 2. 

III. 7. Restat unum genus, <fcc.] The Dogmatists, i.e. the 
Stoics, Epicureans, and Peripatetics. These, with the Academi 
cians (Sceptics) divided between them the domain of Greek 
Philosophy during the three centuries preceding the Christian 
Era. 

Sextus Empiricus opens his review of the doctrines of the 
Sceptics with the following leading distinctions among philoso 
phers : They who seek for anything (says lie) must either have 



150 APPENDIX A. 

found it, or admit that it is not to be found, or, finally, uncertain 
whether it is to be found or not persevere still in the search. So 
it is with the questions of Philosophy. One sect say they have 
discovered the truth, a second that it is unattainable, and a third 
continue its pursuit. The first are the Dogmatists; the second, 
Carneades, Clitomachus, and the Academicians; the third, the 
Sceptics. In this description a distinction is made between the 
Academicians and Sceptics which is unreal ; or, rather, it applies. 

to the end and not to the method of Philosophy. ratio non 

probatur\ The proper translation of ratio is method, i.e. any road, 
way, or means to an end in the field of knowledge or philosophy 
the end is truth; the method or means to that end is evidence; 
hence method in its philosophical signification is the theory of 
evidence (logic) as understood by Mr Mill. The Dogmatists and 
Sceptics then differed concerning the theory of evidence or means 
of discovering truth. In this controversy the Academicians were 
certainly Sceptics. But the truth indicated in this passage from 
Sextus E. is what we understand now as metaphysical or ontolo- 
gical truth; that is, the reality of things per s&. This, the 
Academicians, anticipating the decision of Kant, resigned as un 
attainable. The Dogmatists, considering all truth to be bound 
up with the real nature and essence of things, confused metaphy. 
sical and physical enquiries, never distinctly separated until the 

present day. Nos autem] Cicero here proclaims himself as 

belonging to the school of the Academy. Only in metaphysical 
speculations, however, for in moral philosophy he must be classed 

with the Stoics. He was more properly an eclectic. eliciant 

et tamquam exprimwrtf] The cross-examining, maieutic method or 
dialectic of Socrates is here alluded, to. It was the characteristic 
manner of the Academy ta djscavev truth by questioning man, 
in whom, according to the philosophy of Socrates and Plato, the 
first principles of knowledge were latent, Socrates adopted a 
pseudo-inductive method for eliciting tl^ese principles; i.e. he 
endeavoured to eliminate conflicting opinions, 8o cu, from the 
genuine l-ma-rri^. It was Bacon who first announced the fertile 
observation that to arrive at knowledge it was necessary to ques 
tion nature, not man. 

IV. 10. Etsi heri, inquit] The nature of the preceding dis- 
Qiissjon is betrayed by the following references : vi. 18, jam enim 



NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. 151 

hoc pro <j>avTa<Tia verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus; xni. 

42, xvi. 49, xvin. 59, xxv. 79. non vinci me malim quam 

vincere] This is a Socratic adage, as in the Gorgias Socrates tells 
his interlocutor he would rather be refuted than himself refute. 

11. in ista philosophic^ That of the Academy. Clitomachus 

was the pupil and mouthpiece of Carneades, the third leader of 
the Academy j Philo was the fourth, Antiochus the fifth, who 
coalesced the opinions of the Academy with those of the Stoa; 
hence was in opposition to Carneades and Philo. The doctrines 
of the Academy were revived again by the later Pyrrhonists 

under ^Enesidemus. 1 2. contra suum doctorem] Thus Antiochus 

ranged himself in direct antagonism to Philo and Carneades. 

Ad Arcesilani] the second leader of the Academy. Thus the five 
chief men were Plato, Arcesilas, Carneades, Philo, and Antiochus. 

V. 13. me autem~\ Cicero the two interlocutors therefore 
are Cicero speaking as and for the Academy against Lucullus 
personating Antiochus, who had deserted the Academy for the 
Stoa; therefore is attacking the Academy with all the hos-tility 

of a renegade. veteres physicos] It is a common habit with the 

upholders of certain opinions to maintain that the same doctrines 
have been held by every one else. So the Sceptics tried to show 
that all former philosophers had been Sceptics likewise (cf. Diog. 
L. ix.). The Pre-Socratic philosophers were called physical 
because their enquiries were chiefly concerning Averts, or the real 
nature of things. They would now be called metaphysical or 

ontological speculatists. 15. Peripateticos et Academicos, nomi- 

nibus dijferentes, re congruentes~\ It has been a prevalent opinion 
that there were antithetical distinctions between Plato and 
Aristotle. Every man it is said is born either a Platonist or an 
Aristotelian. Sometimes Plato is considered an Idealist, Aristotle 
a Materialist. Plato is often held to have depended on a priori 
or intuitive principles of knowledge, whilst Aristotle was an 
Empiricist, or one who derived all knowledge a posteriori from 
experience. We have not space here to refute these erroneous 
views, but recommend the student to adopt the opinion expressed 
in the text, trusting to his own reading for confirmation of it. 

VI. 17. ullam rationem] We have said above i (m. 7) that 
ratio means method, and that method is the way to truth, i.e. 
evidence. How evidence is to be collected, estimated, verified 



152 APPENDIX A. 

and applied, is method. Now the Academicians challenged the 
validity of evidence altogether. "With what evidence, therefore, 
was it possible to meet them ? We may consider the subject- 
matter of the following discussion to be the evidentness of evidence. 
An illustration will place the dispute in a clear light. A witness 
gives his evidence in a court of justice ; it is manifest the value 
of his evidence must in a great measure depend upon his veracity. 
This can be attacked, and requires evidence to support it this 
second evidence may again have to be based on other evidence, 
and so ad infinitum. Now the Stoics maintained that there was 
a kind of evidence whose evidentness was in itself and shone as it 
were by its own light. Such evidence they called Kcn-aA^is 

(cognitio aut perceptio aut comprehensio, quam KardXytyiv illi 

vocaiit). For the origin of the term Kara^i/a?, see Ch. XLVII. 
145. Also Lect. IY. /?. The Academicians held that such self- 
evident evidence was impossible. The instance which is to be 
taken in the following treatise, and which in fact afforded a 
capital opportunity for each side to try the temper of their 
weapons, was the phenomena of external perception. Here the 
nature of evidence could be tested in its simplest, most general, 
and most important applications. The student must not be re 
pelled by the apparent puerility of many of the arguments ; the 
evidentness of evidence is one of the most momentous questions for 
man to decide upon, and, although human beings can get on very 
well with the unsupported evidence of their senses, yet the greatest 
philosophers of every age have made the theory of perception the 
basis of all psychological, logical and metaphysical enquiries. 

eosque, qui persuadere vellent aut evidentiam nos] The student 

must attend particularly to this passage, the meaning of which is 
that the Academicians would not admit the evidentness of any evi 
dence. It is therefore no use trying to convince them by persuasion, 
argument, or evidence, because the process would be interminable. 

sed tamen orationem nullam putabant illustriorem ipsa evi- 

dentia reperiri posse] Translate orationem, argument. 18. id 

enim volumus esse a/card A^m-ov] This doctrine of a/card A^Tr-rov or 
incomprehensibility simply denied the evidentness of any evidence 
whatever. The counter-doctrine was illustrated by Zeno the 
founder of the Stoics through the <ui/Tacria or visum, i.e. the 
change of consciousness in the individual through which as an 



NOTES ON TIIE LUCULLUS. 153 

effect, impresstim effictumque, any external object betrays its pre 
sence as causes. Now on what evidence do we say a white object 
is white ] surely, this is a case of self-evident evidence where belief 
is compelled. The sceptical reply to this instance we have dwelt 
upon with sufficient length in Lecture III. a. The whiteness in 
consciousness is only self-evident evidence of itself. Its cause or 
the external object may produce in another person a different 
consciousness or it may be excited by a nervous disorder (See 
Lect. IV. note 1, page 73). So far from being a capital instance 
of self-evident evidence it is merely a proof of the fallibility of 
every kind of evidence. 

There is an anacoluthon in the paragraph id enim volumus 

esse (iKardXrjTTTo^si illud esset, sicut Zeno dejiniret, tale visum 

jam enim hoc pro <ai/Ta<rx verbum satis hesternv sermone trivimus 

visum igitur impressum effictumque ex eo unde esset, quote 

esset non posset, ex eo, unde non esset. First, illud refers to aVard- 
A^Trrov, then is apposed by tale visum, then the sentence is broken 
and the visum afterwards described is a perception impressed on 
the mind by such a cause or external object as could not but 
produce it, i.e. the effect could only have but one cause; now the 
aKaTdXrjTTTov is the exact opposite of this. The anacoluthon may 
be avoided by omitting the non isi the sentence quale esse non 
posset; in this case it will not be the visum which is defined, but 

the ttKardX-^TTTov visum. Quo minime vidt, revolvitur] The 

vicious circle in which it is sought to involve Philo is, that if, as 
he said, all evidence rests on other evidence, upon what does he 
Philo rest the evidence of this assertion ? 

VII. 19. remo inflexo aut de collo columbai] See Lecture III. 
page 49 infra ch. xxx. Favourite illustration with the Sceptics 
of the fallibility of the senses. A stick in the water appears bent 
when it is really straight. 

" Law is God, say some ; no God at all, says the fool ; 
For all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool." 

Epicurus hoc viderit et alia multa\ Cf. xxv. 79; xxxn. 101. 
The Epicureans or Epicurus thought that perception was caused 
by an object throwing off a sort of filmy image of itself which 
impinged on the senses and was an exact representation of the 
object from which it proceeded. Thus in vision they held it 



154 APPENDIX A, 

absurd to say the sun or moon were any larger than they appeared 

to be. siet sani sunt] This is begging the question altogether; 

as Cicero s object is to upset the arguments of the Stoics main 
tained by Lucullus, he would naturally not establish them on too 
firm a basis. For an exposition of the entire subject, see Lectures 
III. and IV., especially the note from Mill s Logic, Lect. IV. 
page 73. Most of our judgments through the senses are not 
simple judgments; they are inferences, as the student will there 

see. Quod idem Jit in vocibus, &c.] See Bain, On the Senses 

and Intellect, Book n. ch. 2. The power of discriminating 
differences and detecting resemblances is the ultimate fact of 

consciousness, the basis of all intelligence. 20. Cyrenaici] The 

followers of Aristippus; they held that the distinctions of pleasure 
and pain were the only immediate judgments which did not 
involve an inference. This is pleasant to me is a judgment about 
that which philosophers term a subjective fact ; it cannot be gain- 
sayed, it requires no proof, and is therefore not an inference ; but 
the judgment this is white (21. illud est album, hoc dulce) is by 
no means on the same footing, i.e. if by this I mean some external 
object the permanent cause of a constant effect called whiteness, 
because the same object will often not produce the same effect. 
The ratiocination accompanying such a perception would be, what 
ever appears white is white, this object appears white, therefore we 
have the inference this object is white. Here the Sceptics attack 
the major premiss allowing only the minor ; see Sextus Empiricus, 
Hyp. i. 10, 19, 20, also Lect. III. /?. 

"We do not arraign the passive representations of conscious 
ness, ra Kara <avTacriW TraOrjTLKa. For they compel our assent 
involuntarily, inasmuch as they are phenomena. But, when we 
come to enquire whether the external object (TO VTTOK^^VOV) 
is such as it appears to be, we admit there is no question about 
the phenomenon, but about that which is inferred from the 
phenomenon, ircpl IKZLVOV o Aeyerat irept TOV ^ati/o/xeVov. For ex 
ample, honey tastes sweet; so much we allow, for we are 
conscious of the taste through a direct sensation, yAvKao/xe#a yap 
ala-OrjTLKus. But we doubt whether we are justified in passing the 
judgment this is sweet, 1 for that is not the phenomenon, but some 
thing asserted concerning the phenomenon, o OVK lo-rt TO ^OLLVO^- 
VQV, uAAtt Trepi TOV ^ati/o/xcVou Xtyo^tvov. 21. Animo jam hcec 



NOTES ON TEE LUCULLUS. 155 

tenemus compreJiensa, non sensibus] The meaning of this is, 
before we can recognise an object as white, we must have a clear 
idea of what whiteness is. This will apply equally to any judg 
ment even the most subjective we cannot say this is pleasure 
unless we have a general idea of pleasure already in the mind. 
Hence the formation of conceptions or general notions is always 
considered the first step in the acquisition of knowledge. Mr 
Mil], however, controverts this opinion (see Mill s Logic, i. ch. v.). 
Ille* deinceps equus est, ille canis. ] See note from Mill s 

Logic, Lect. IY. p. 73 and Lect. Y. 22. eiWas.] See Lecture 

IY. a, p. 66, &c. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, 

qui artem tractabit, multa perceperit ?] The Stoics derived all 
knowledge from experience. Now experience is a storing up in 
the memory of the distinguishing marks of objects by which we 
classify, recognise, and communicate our notions of them. But 
this group of marks is what we have termed the constant effect of 
a permanent cause as by the general name horse we mean a 
certain bundle of qualities, or attributes, common to a great many 
objects which we therefore call by one name. The Stoics argued 
we should be disabled from acquiring any kind of knowledge if 
we were led to doubt the validity of the signs or marks by which 
we grouped external objects. Practically they were right, theo 
retically wrong, and principally they failed in pointing out any 
reliable method of induction by which the connection of an effect 
with its cause, or the sign with the thing of which it was a sign, 
could be verified. One can hardly imagine the Stoics themselves 
neglected such an important process of verification, although even 
theoretical. Scepticism is proof against the most overwhelming evi 
dence. Sir G. C. Lewis would doubt, on seeing a man with a bullet 
in his heart, though otherwise completely intact, whether he was 
killed by this bullet (see Bain s Logic, YoL n. p. 60). As we have so 
often stated, the signs or marks of things we call their qualities are 
effects, from the presence of which we infer their cause. But from 
the presence of an effect we can never infer a cause with theoretical 
Certainty, unless we know a priori that no other cause could have 
produced the same effect. From the flower-beds being wet, we 
could not infer that it had rained in the night they may have 
been watered, or there might have been dew. In the same way 
the marks or qualities of a horse may be present to my conscious- 



156 APPENDIX A. 

ness, but unless I can assert a priori that nothing else could have 
in any case produced these marks I cannot be sure that a horse is 
present I may be dreaming my nerves may be out of order, &c. 
VIII. 23. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cog- 
niti, qucero unde nata sit aui quo modo ?] Since then our inward 
feelings and the perceptions we receive from our external senses 
are equally real, to argue from the former to life and conduct is as 
little liable to exception as to argue from the latter to absolute 
speculative truth. (Butler, Sermon n.) The whole moral system 
of the Stoics was a rigid deduction from principles j but these 
principles were empirically induced from observation and experi 
ence of the laws of nature. Hence, if the faculties by which man 
acquired his knowledge were wanting in veracity, the whole art of 
liie must fall to the ground, at least as a necessary, permanent, and 
natural standard of conduct, which the Stoics held it to be. The 
rules of life were, according to the Sceptics, founded on the laws 
of man. By the Dogmatists, on the laws of nature. By the one 
man was made the standard of good and evil, by the other nature. 
For example, justice with the Dogmatists would be the manifesta 
tion of the principle of harmony, order, and consistency, pervading 
all nature, while, with the Sceptics, it is but conformity to the 
arbitrary enactments of some individual or community. For an 
account of the ethical doctrine of the Stoics see De Finibus, 
Book in. ; Diogenes Laertius, vu. 84 ; Stobeeus, Ed. Eth. p. 90 sqq. ; 

Seneca, Epistle, 89. 14. tam graves leges] There is no better 

test of a man s belief than the amount he will endure for the sake 

of it. 24. Ipsa vero sapientia sapientice ?] The ultimate 

evidentness of some evidence is here appealed to. The final ground 
of wisdom or knowledge can no more be impugned than that of 
taste or relish, whence its name is derived the crux of Greek 
speculation was, how do you know, when you think you know, 
whether you know or not? The English word taste, expressing 
the science of the beautiful, is sufficiently analogous to enable us to 
comprehend the point of view of the Ancients regarding knowledge. 
Nothing seems so subjective, artificial, conventional, and arbitrary 
as the judgments of men concerning the beautiful in art or nature, 
yet there is an objective standard an ideal something, whither 
all opinions tend and converge. Philosophers have, in vain, 
endeavoured to resolve this into association, habit, custom; so 



NOTES ON TEE LUCULLUS. 157 

with our moral judgments, towards which this part of the discus 
sion evidently turns, constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, 
quum quid agere incipiat sequatur, &c. It was supposed by the 
Peripatetics that the process of action in the case of an animal 
could be analysed into the following syllogistic form : 

1. Major Premiss. Such and such an action is universally 

good. 

Minor Premiss. This will be an action of the kind. 
Conclusion. Performance of the action. 

See De Motu AnimaUum, vi. 2. Aristotle s Eth. Books vi. vn. 
initium = apx^j is the principle or major premiss, idque esse naturae 
accommodatum. The standard of good and evil must be deter 
mined by nature, that is, nature as Bishop Butler understands it, 
viz. as decided by the cool, calm, dispassionate judgment of an 

intelligent being. appetitio = opptj. There is another form of 

the practical syllogism : 

2. Major Premiss. Such and such an end is desirable. 
Minor Premiss. This step will conduce to the end. 
Conclusion. Taking of the step. 

With regard to these two forms Sir A. Grant observes (Essay iv. 
p. 214), "These two different ways of stating the practical syllo 
gism are, in reality, coincident; for, assuming that all action is 
for some end, the major premiss may be said always to contain 
the statement of an end (Eth. vi. xu. 10). And again, any 
particular act which is the application of a moral principle may 
be said to be the means necessary to the realization of the principle. 
Temperance is good, may be called either a general principle, 
qr an expression of a desire for the habit of temperance. To 
abstain now will be temperate, is an application of the principle, 
or again, it is the absolutely necessary means toward the attain 
ment of the habit. For it is absurd, as Aristotle tells us when 
one acts unjustly to talk of not wishing to be unjust, or when one 
acts intemperately of not wishing to be intemperate" (Eth. in. 
v. 13). We do not agree with Sir Alexander "in his opinion that 
these two forms are coincident ; in fact, neither does the first involve 
the second, nor the second imply the first, A man in concluding 



158 APPENDIX A. 

that such and such a course of action is good, does not necessarily 
desire it, and in desiring it he need not think about the good at 
least this is a question lying at the bottom of all moral controver 
sies. See Gorgias, 474 D. where Socrates is endeavouring to 
identify the base with the bad, i.e. the undesirable; and the right 

with the good or desirable 25. Illud autem, quod movet prius 

oportet videri eique credi] See Lecture II. (3, where we have 
attempted to explain how the Sceptics applied this principle. 

VIII. 26. si ista vera sunt] The scholar will know that 
ista must be translated, the arguments of my opponents, i.e. the 

counter-arguments to the preceding reasoning. Quwstio autem 

est appetitio cognitionis qucestionisque finis inventio] All desires 
are natural, i.e. have an end given and provided by nature. The 
Stoical argument will therefore be the desire of knowledge is 
natural, the appropriate end is discovery or truth, therefore 
truth is discoverable in opposition to the Sceptics or Acade 
micians who held truth to be aKaraXtjirrov. turn inventa dicun- 

tur\ The word invenio does not convey the idea intended as well 
as our English discover or German entdecken involuta implies 

an analytic process which invenio does not. Sic et initium 

quaerendi et exitus percipiendi, &c.] That which moves desire 
is also that which satisfies it, but that which moves the desire of 
knowledge is truth, therefore truth alone will satisfy it. 

IX. 27. quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit] Cf. De 
Fin. in. v. 18, A falsa autem assensione, &c.] The Stoics held that 
to entertain a falsehood was a direct violation of the laws of nature, 
which were the standard of all virtue; for an objective fact, i.e. a 
reality, was among the Greeks the notion expressed by the term 
<uo-i, and the antithesis of vo/x,o> the mere subjective appearance. 
Thus the pursuit of truth was the highest virtue with the Stoics, 
for it was the coming face to face with nature and nature s laws. 

28. Carneades acutius resistebat] See ch. vi. 18 supra. Qui 

enim negaret quidquam esse quod perciperetur\ Self-evident evi 
dence we have before stated was the goal of Greek Philosophy. 
The question is, does the assertion there is no self-evident evidence 
assume a perception of this very fact must there not be some 
light to make darkness visible? Carneades says No, the Stoics 
Yes. Whenever men disagree on first principles they are in 
volved in the same difficulty. Carneades assumed ignorance as 



NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. 159 

the natural condition of man, the Stoics knowledge. Then the 
Stoics called on Carneades to establish his position, while Carneades 
summoned the Stoics to prove theirs. decretum = So y/xa, an em 
pirical judgment, the very antithesis of cn-urnf/M? according to the 
Platonic doctrines, as our d posteriori knowledge is opposed to cb 

priori. judicium veri et finem bonorum] o-o^ta /cat 4>p6vrja-is, 

theoretical and practical wisdom. cognoscendi initium~\ First 

principles, such as axioms of geometry. extremum expetendil 

the objects of natural desire, which, being attained, are the natural 
causes of happiness, therefore the proper end of action for a wise 
man. The entire philosophy of the Stoics, with its aim, its method 
and its matter, is here compressed into a few lines. 

X. 30. Aliquantum a physicis] Ch. vn. describes the pro 
cess of acquiring knowledge. In this chapter more is intended 
but not executed ; it is little else than a repetition of vu. For 
the distinction between eVvoias and TrpoA^cis see Lecture IV. 

ipsa sensus esi\ The Stoics allowed the mind the faculty of 

memory at any rate in addition to mere sensuous sensibility. 
Memory involves perception of self and time, neither of which 
ideas have their source in the senses, but are necessary to the 
exercise of sense, for unless the mind had been endowed with a 
retentive faculty the impressions of sense would no more leave a 
consciousness of themselves than the fleeting shadows of summer- 
clouds cause the lake in which they are pictured to be mindful of 

their presence. Ccetera autem similitudinibus constituit] The 

process of forming general notions as described in most text-books 
on Logic. See Thomson s Laws of Thought, ch. 2 ; Hamilton s 
Lectures on Logic. On perceiving that many objects are alike, we 
form them into groups or classes, and their points of resemblance 

constitute the key of recognition. 31. quum ipsam per se 

amat turn etiam propter usum~\ Psychologists tell us that the 

senses have in the first instance a natural and spontaneous 
attraction to their objects, that infants are known instinctively to 
turn their eyes towards the window or fire, and are similarly 
fascinated by any intrusive sound if not so acute as to be painful 
to the membrane of the ear. Thus it seems the senses crave a 
sort of pabulum for their support and invigoration ; and this 
appears to be implied in the text. KaraX^^is is the natural light 
of the understanding self-evident evidence. Cicero translates it 



160 APPENDIX A. 

by comprehensio^ but seems to warn his hearers it is merely for 

want of a better word in the unphilosophical Latin tongue. 

quasi sensus alter os] So by means of a balance we can discrimi 
nate differences of weight with more accuracy than by mere 

muscular sense. ut virtutem efficiat] Knowledge of the laws 

of nature renders man able to obey them. Cf. De Fin. I. xix. 63. 
Morati melius erimus, cum didicerimus quid natura desideret. 

32. Quce in profundo veritatem] The school of extreme 

Sceptics is here dismissed as incurably illogical, inconsistent and 
impracticable. They were probably the Pyrrhonists and those of 
the New Academy who had adopted ths views of the Pyrrhonists 
with theoretical rigour. Henceforth the doctrines to be con 
sidered are those of Garneades, who endeavoured to erect a 
standard of probability between the extremes of dogmatical cer 
tainty and sceptical doubt. Inter incertum et id, quod percipi 

non possit, &c.] The mind is susceptible of degrees of belief 
according to the preponderance of testimony in one direction or 
another. So Carneades and the more rational of the New 
Academicians affirmed where demonstrative evidence was wanting 
there might still be sufficient to constitute a reasonable ground of 
probability. We shall see that the notion of the probable could 
not be theoretically supported, but Carneades was the first to 
maintain that probability was the only attainable rule of action. 
The difference between the unknown and the uncertain is not 
very precisely defined in this place, 

XI. 33. Si nihil interest, notam] To understand the 

Stoical argument let us suppose a traveller trusting to be guided 
to his destination by a beacon. If encountering an ignis fatuus 
he is unable to distinguish the illusive from the genuine mark. 
The real arbiter of his step would not be reason or evidence, but 
accident and chance. Such the Stoics thought would be the 
position of those who denied the self-evident character of evidence, 
quidquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modofalsum etiam possit 

videri sic reliqua visis. The reader will remember that in 

Ch. VI., the cataleptic phantasm was rendered by visum. 

probabilem et quce non impediatur] The probable judgment of 
Carneades was simply an inductive conclusion from the evidence 

of particulars as explained in Lect. Y. 34. perspicua a per- 

ceptis volunt distinyuere] I should conceive the distinction be- 



NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. l6l 

tween perspicua and percepta to be the former referring to the 
relation of things, the latter to their nature. Of one we have 
ample and accessible evidence, of the other we know nothing. 

Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliguid, &c.] 

Thus a black object is known relatively to a white with respect to 
its colour ; but of their absolute nature we can affirm nothing. 
From the Carneadean point of view a black object could not 
appear white because it would then be a white object. From the 
Stoical point of view, however, the colour would not be a mere 
relation of one object to another, but the determining objective 

quality, accident, mark or sign. 36. notum iis esse debebit 

insigne veri, <fec.] Here we are round again at the same point, 
how do we know when we think we know, whether we know or 
not ? Science with the ancients was a knowledge of causes, but 
the idea of cause was with them such that causes must for ever 
remain unperceived, because there was no faculty in man capable 
of apprehending them. . 

To an effect a multitude of causes may be assigned, and as long 
as they remain in the nebulous region of noumena it is impossible 
to apply the method of difference by which alone a real cause 
could be verified. 

XII. 37. o-vyKaratfeo-ii/, see Lect. IV. 37 38. Quae est 

in nostra sita potestate perspicuam non approbare] Assent = 

belief seems in one passage to be considered voluntary, in the other 
involuntary. 

It is certain that determination to action depends solely on 
our belief in the reality of the existence of the object of desire. 
So far then as determination to action is voluntary the assent or 
belief is voluntary, but, regarding consciousness as a passive 
recipient of external impressions, it is involuntary. We speak 
about weighing an opinion, or weighing evidence, in which expres 
sion there is obviously a mixture of the voluntary and in 
voluntary. We weigh the evidence, but the evidence influences 
us ponderibus impositis. Perhaps the meaning of a-vyKardOea-Ls is 
not simply belief, but belief in external existence, as it is said 

belief = perception. Qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur statini] 

Thus perception is used as in Reid s works, viz. the apprehension 

of the external cause of a change of consciousness. The measure 

of belief is the tendency to action. This was the cardinal maxim 

L. L. 11 



1 62 APPENDIX A. 

assumed by the Stoics. 39. Omninoque ante videri, &c.] See 

Lect. II. /3. 

XIII. 40. The cause of the plaintiffs (the Stoics) is now 
closed, but their counsel Lucullus = Antiochus proceeds to set 
forth the counter-arguments of the defendants (the Sceptics = New 
Academicians), whose mouth-piece was Carneades represented in 

this work by Cicero himself. Componunt igitur primum artem 

quandam, the science of succession and co-existence. Totidein 

verbis quot Sloici] See Lect. Y. e. 

The theory of perception of the Stoics and Academicians was 
substantially the same. It was on the value and import of 
evidence that they were so irreconcilably opposed. The theory of 
perception is never explicitly set forth in this work, but is 
assumed as the basis of controversy by both sides. We have 

indicated it with sufficient detail in Lectures IY. and Y. Quce ita 

videantur discerni non 2^ossini\ Compare with the four maxims 

given subsequently in this chapter, of which this passage is a con 
densation; but there appears something hopelessly obscure about 

it as here presented. 

41. Axiom 1. Quse visa falsa sint, ea percipi non posse. 

2. Inter quse alia ut non possint. 

3. Quse videantur eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa. 

4. Onrne visum... possit esse. 

1. Mental images which are false cannot be perceived. 

2. Of mental images among which there is no difference, it is 
impossible that some are of such a kind as to be perceived and 
others not. 

3. Of things which appear, some are true, some are false. 

4. Every mental image caused by a real object is of such a 
kind that it might have proceeded from an unreal one. 

Compare XXYI. where, however, the order in which these 
axioms are stated is somewhat different : 

1 in XIII. corresponds with 2 in XXYI. 

2 3 

3 1 

4 , 4 

The student had better consult XXYI. at once, the matter being 
identical though treated perhaps with more perspicuity. 



NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. 163 

We translate visum in every case here by mental image or 
representation, following the obvious meaning in Ch. vi. 18, 
reminding the reader, however, that the word image is only used 
figuratively, and that although visum seems to refer exclusively to 
the sense of sight, it is equally applicable to the representations of 
any other sense; there may be a visum of hearing, of taste, or of 
smell. We find no indication of the so-called muscular sense 
which plays so important a part in the doctrines of modern 
psychologists, and which has contributed more than any other to 
the elucidation of the subject of external perception. The 
question is, when are such mental images, being effects, signs, or 
marks of their causes, valid evidence of real external objects ? 
By axiom 1, if the mark or sign is false, i.e. has not proceeded 
from the object, it is of course no evidence at all, i.e. cannot be 
perceived. The Stoics argued that this reality was a qualitative 
mark of the mental image, so that a man could distinguish 
between a dream and an objective fact. Carneades, on the other 
hand, maintained that there was no such qualitative distinction, 
that it was not the connection between the sign arid the thing 
signified which influenced belief, but the relation of one sign to 

another; see Lect. V. e. 42. Dividunt enim in paries] This 

is the division observed in the Se/ca T/OOTTOI; see Lect. III. ft. A 
threefold relation, 1. Of object to organ of sense. 2. Object to 
object. 3. Object to the maxims of prejudice and tradition. 

XIY. 43. quod minime illi volunt] An attempt is here 
made to refute the Academicians by showing that they would 
invalidate an illative argument by an illative process. But the 
Sceptics never questioned the illative process, as we have shewn 
Lect. VI. ft. It is intuitive evidence they called in question. 

44. Maxime autem convincuntur, &c.] On holding a shell 

to the ear we fancy we perceive the distant murmur of the sea, 
but it is not the murmur of the sea ; nevertheless it is not any 
qualitative difference in the mental image (visum) qua mental 
image, which assures us of the falsity of the representation, but a 
comparison of circumstances, such as the sea is 500 miles off, &c., 
besides the simple mode of verification by method of difference, i.e. 
by removing the shell This is all the Academicians asserted. 
45. Opinionem a perspicuitate, &c.] Epicurus was what would 
now be called an ultra-realist materialist, or an intuitive realist, 

11 V 



164 APPENDIX A. 

He considered that we envisaged material objects immediately, that 
when we said the sun of a foot diameter there was really an 
external sun of a foot diameter objectively presented ; hence there 
was 110 inference, judgment or opinion, but a direct intuition, per- 
spicuitatas; see note from Mill s Logic, Lect. IV. p. 73. 

XV. 48. Ut non modo non internoscat omnino ?] The 

distinction between a false sensible impression and an erroneous 
judgment is here drawn between the thing distinguished and the 
faculty which distinguishes. With regard to the marks or sen 
suous modifications we have spoken above, Ch. xm. Sin 

autem sunt, <fec.] Carneades and the New Academicians could 
not maintain the doctrine of probability consistently without 
admitting that the modifications of consciousness were reliable 
marks of external objects. Granting this, the Stoics maintained 
that it was as competent for a wise man to arrive at certainty as 
probability. But although this argument was available against 
the ultra-Sceptics, who founded on the equipoise of evidence, it 
missed the Carneadeans, who regarded probability as the asymp 
tote to certainty always approaching, but never touching it. 

XVI. 49. Soritas] See infra Ch. xxix. 50. Si quid 

cui difficiliter possit \ Two things may be similar in every 

respect but one they are not therefore difficult to distinguish. 
And, even where marks are indiscernible, the objects are not 
identical as several shillings are indistinguishable but not identi 
cal. 51. Nam ab omnibus ejusdem modi visis, <fec.] This is 

exactly the reasoning advanced by Carneades ; see Lect. V. e. 

It is not any qualitative mark by which we recognize the 
reality of a mental mode, but simply by comparing it with juxta 
events. In respect to the illustrations from dreams, insanity, &c., 
it must be remarked that there is a wide difference between our 
judgments concerning dreams while dreaming and afterwards 
(xxvit. 88). In the first place, when dreaming we never 
question the reality of our perceptions; when we begin to do so it 
is a sure sign sleep is quitting us. When we dream that we 
dream it is near the awakening. In drunkenness or madness 
there is no doubt an overpowering intensity or heightening of the 
nervous state, which is a concomitant of the mental mode, while 
in dreams there is a corresponding enfeeble rnent. Thus in mad 
ness there is an irresistible determination to action; in. dreams, 



NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. 165 

I think, we are never powerfully moved, there is a lazy contem 
plation of a panorama, without surprise at its anomalies, without 
much interest in its vicissitudes. 

XVIII. 56. rerum singulas proprieties esse] See Lect. IV. 
If everything has a distinguishing mark then there is no danger 
of making a wrong inference from the possibility of a plurality of 
causes. On the other hand, as we have shewn above, if many 
external objects produce the same or an indistinguishable mental 
mode, there is no means of inferring, when such a mental mode 
is produced, which particular object has caused it. But the Stoics 
insist that each separate object has some distinguishing quality, 
appreciable at least to him who is sagacious and industrious 
enough to detect it; which, affecting a correspondingly distin 
guishable mode of consciousness, becomes a sign of its external 

cause. Of. 57. ii quum ovum, &c. 58. neque id est contra nos\ 

The id refers here to the proverb that one egg is like another; 
still, as was observed above, great similarity does not imply 
indiscernibility. The illustration of the hen and the egg is 
perhaps a travesty of the relation between cause and effect as 

understood by the ancients. 59. necessario nata est eVo^??] The 

nature of ciroxq has been sufficiently dwelt upon in Lect. VI. 
As we have already noticed above (xiv. 49), the doctrine of the 
77-0x77 is more illogical than that of probability; for if there is 
such a power of weighing evidence that exact eqnipollence is the 
result, there must be the ability to discern preponderance. Cicero 
seems not to have understood the real character of the tirox*), for 
he regards it apparently as an a priori determination to resist all 
evidence, and an obstinate refusal to entertain it; whereas it is 
manifest that the liro\^ was the deliberate suspension of judg 
ment after, not before, the witnesses on both sides had been heard. 
Arcesilas undoubtedly imported the Pyrrhonian form of scepti 
cism into the Academy. See Lect. Y. 

XIX. 62. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam sententiam minime 
liceat defendere] Beware lest you, in advocating the worthless- 
ness of all authority, cause your own opinion to be regarded with 
scant respect. 

XX. 66. Visa enim ista quum acriter...tamen~\ Translate visa, 
appearances. When appearances are strong my belief is enforced 
in the reality of their objects, although I would not admit that 



1 66 APPENDIX A. 

such reality is manifest. I may believe where I cannot prove. 

visis cedo] I yield to appearances. caver e ne capiatur, nefalla- 

tur videre] The former implies fallacies of deduction, or logical 
fallacies; the latter, fallacies of induction/ or extra-logical. 
Of. Whately s Logic, Chap. On Fallacies; Mill s Logic, Book v. 

XXI. 67. Ilanc conclusionem...secundum~\ The argument may 
be regarded as a Destructive-Hypothetical (see Whately s Logic). 

If A is B, C is D, but C is not D ; therefore A is not B. Or, 
categorically, Fig. 2, AEE. 

Fig. 2. A. All who believe form opinions. 

E. But the wise man is not one who forms an opinion. 
E. Therefore the wise man is not one who believes. 

Arcesilas, it is said, admitted the first and second premiss. The 
syllogism of Carneades would be 

A. All who believe or assent form opinions. 

E. The wise man sometimes believes. 

E. Therefore the wise man sometimes forms opinions. 

Thus, admitting the major premiss, All who believe form opinions, 
both Arcesilas and Carneades could maintain their point. The 

Stoics and Antiochus therefore denied this proposition. si ad- 

sensurus esset, etiam opinatururri\ To opine or form an opinion is 
to admit a proposition without evidence, or to admit an appear 
ance as a reality, or to admit the known as a mark or sign of the 
unknown without having any ground, or only an insufficient 
ground, for connecting one with the other. Perhaps an opinion 
is never without some foundation, either in the experience of him 
who holds it, or of others in whom he trusts. An inductive pro 
cess is the only one by which the connection between a sign and 
the thing signified can be established ; but the ancients seem to 
have had no method of verifying induction; they therefore either 
rushed into Dogmatism or lapsed into Scepticism. To say then 
that nothing could be perceived was equivalent to denying the 
possibility of establishing any general proposition, hence of per 
forming any ratiocinative process whatever, not because the validity 
of the process itself was impugned, but because the major premiss 

was infirm. 68. a me sumpsero et quod tu mihi das, &c.] If 

the ability to form general propositions be denied, then those who 



NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. 167 

believe in them must do so without sufficient evidence, i.e. such, 
belief is mere opinion. The major premiss then of the above 
syllogism will have to be granted, viz. 

All who believe or assent form opinions? 
The minor premiss every one grants, viz. 

* That the ivise man does not form opinions? 

The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable. It is the establishment 
of this major premiss, All who believe form opinions] grounded 
on the inability of man to affirm general propositions, that Cicero 

undertakes. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse per dpi: etenim- de eo 

omnis est controversial The question whether all assent or believe 
does involve the assumption of a general proposition, is fully 
argued by Mr Mill, Book n. ch. 3, where the possibility is dis 
cussed of assenting that A, B, or C is mortal, without having 
first virtually admitted the proposition, All men are mortal? If 
we admit Mr Mill s reasoning the proposition, { All who believe 
form opinions? would not demand attention, being obviously 
untrue; if, however, the necessity of affirming a particular through. 
a general be insisted upon, then there must be granted the ability 
to form general propositions, or the impotence of man to assent 
positively to anything. The student will do well to consult 
Mr Sidgwick s lucid exposition on this topic. See Contemporary 
Review, July, 1871, Article 9, Verification of Beliefs 

XXII. 70. hcec Academicorum est una sentential] viz. the 
incompetency of man to positive and general affirmation, assent, 

or belief. 71. quce a te, Luculle, dicta sunf\ The real business 

of the book here begins. Cicero expounds perspicuously and 
earnestly the doctrines of the New Academy as developed and 
determined by Carneades and Philo. The salient points of their 
system have been sufficiently indicated in Lectures V. and VI. 

XXIII. 72. Anaxagoras nivem nigram dixit esse] Water is 
black, snow is water, therefore snow is black. A flagrant fallacy, 
since there are two middle terms, snow is not water but frozen 
water. Sextus E. notices this sophism as an example of the 
discrepancy between the conclusions of reason and the perceptions 

of sense (Hyp. i. 13.) ostentationis aut qucestus, &c.] A view of 

the Sophists, much questioned at the present day, and especially 
by Grote the historian. 73. Quid loquar de Democrito ?] There 



1 68 APPENDIX A. 

is no doubt that Dernocritus/rs drew attention to the distinction 
between reality and appearance, by showing that many qualities 
of bodies could be only modifications of the percipient subject. 
Cicero s object seems to be, besides showing that the most renowned 
philosophers agree with him, to claim moderation in comparison 

with them. 74. Furere tibi Empedodes . . . dicere. Scire 

se niJiil se scire ] A portentous exception; for to know one s ignor 
ance is the highest knowledge, and as completely unattainable as 
any other knowledge (see post Acad. xn. 45). Arcesilas saw the 
scope of Socrates assertion. The admission of it, however, was 
the distinctive feature of the Pyrrhonist doctrine which Arcesilas 
had adopted. 

XXI Y. 75. Stilponem, Diodorum, AZexinum] Representa 
tives of the Megaric school ; one of the three minor sects which 
sprung up immediately among the hearers of Socrates, viz. the 
Cynics under Antisthenes, Cyrenaics under Aristippus, Me- 

garics under Euclid. 77. Quid ergo id esset] The student 

who wishes thoroughly to understand the controversy respecting 
the theory of perception and the bearing this controversy has 
upon the whole subject of certainty, knowledge, belief, assent and 
comprehension, will find its cradle in this passage. What things 
can be perceived? Of what things have we intuitive evidence 1 ? 
i.e. evidence which itself requires no evidence to establish its 
evidentness. The Stoics answered this cataleptic phantasm or 
visum; for definition of which, cf. Lect. IV., and what has been 
said above. 

XXV. 80. Quasi quceratur quid sit non quid videatur] The 
fact is, there is only one candle, the appearance that there are two. 
But the point is, what inference can be drawn from appearance 
with regard to fact; the appearance or mental image being ac 
cepted as a mark or sign of the reality. The Epicureans held 
that there was no a priori ground for discrediting the testimony of 
the senses. They must first be convicted of falsity before their 
evidence is doubted. The Sceptic then would point to the 
example just adduced, the Epicurean would reply that the error 
was in the inference not in the mark. But this could not be 
urged here, although it might be in the case of the broken oar; 
there the appearance was objectively correct, although the in 
ference was erroneous ; the mental image was a broken oar, so 



NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. 169 

would have been its representation on a camera obscura. In 
the case of the candle, however, the organ itself distorted the 

presentation. 81. Videsne navem illam ? Stare nobis vide- 

tur{\ In the phenomenon of motion is most clearly presented the 
problem discussed in this dialogue, and which is the foundation of 
all metaphysical enquiries, viz. the relation of appearance to 
reality the means of discerning one from the other and of 
inferring one from the other. For centuries it was supposed that 
the sun moved round the earth, and to every one the appearance 
(visum) is so. But the examination of other cases of motion 
shows that the appearance to us would be the same whether the 
sun moved round us or vre round the sun. 

This then is what is termed the subjective or phenomenal side ; 
the objective or actual being the reality or fact of the sun moving 
in space round the earth, or the earth round the sun. Whether 
the sun moved round the earth as one fact, or the earth round 
the sun as another, the visum would be identical. Here then was 
a visum, mark, sign, or appearance originating in what was true 
of such a kind that there might be a similar one originating in 
what was false. It was only by observing the inconsistency of 
this inference, with other facts of the same kind, that Copernicus 
was led to the conclusion that the sun, not the earth, was the 
centre of the planetary system. 

In this case, as Carneades would have insisted, there was no 
qualitative mark by which to discern the real from the apparent. 
It was only by comparison and estimation of evidence that a 
high degree of probability, or, as it is termed, a theory, has been 
arrived at. 

XXVI. 83. 1. esse aliquod visum falsum] For example, 
the appearance of the candle mentioned in the preceding chapter. 

Epicurus, as there stated, did not admit this axiom. 2. id per- 

cipi non posse] From a false appearance a true inference, i.e. 
knowledge or matter-of-fact could not be deduced. If the mark or 
sign is not the mark or sign we imagine it to be, how can a thing 
of which it is a mark or sign be rightly conceived? The correct 
meaning of percipere is to draw a true inference, i.e. a correct 

statement of a matter of fact. 3. Inter quce visa nihil in- 

tersit, &c.] Of course this is a self-evident axiom ; things which 
appear the same cannot be distinguished. 4. Nullum esse 



170 APPENDIX A. 

visum verum, &c.] This axiom is the great crux of contention. 
Cf. Ch. xni. 

Axiom 1 corresponds with 3 in XIII. 

2 1 

3 3 

4 4 

84. Incidebat in ejus modi visum, &c.] Here the mark is 
true, but the inference false. 

Such and such marks are those of my friend. 
This person has such marks. 
Therefore this person is my friend. 

So in Hudibras : 

"His notions fitted things so well, 
That which was which he could not tell." 

The error is in the major premiss which contains the general 
notion bundle of marks, or characteristics of my friend. 
Through inaccuracy of observation this notion or group of marks 
may be either so few, so indistinctly imagined or retained in the 
memory, that they will fit, agree, or conform to many individuals. 
The process is carefully analysed in the Thesetetus. Let us apply 
the four axioms to the example we gave in the preceding chapter 
of the heliocentric and geocentric hypotheses. Taking the 1st, 
the marks are true marks, the 2nd and 3rd will have no place, 
but the 4th conclusively demonstrates the untenability of the 
Stoical position. 

The apparent direction of a body is its real direction. 

This is its apparent direction. 

Therefore this is its real direction. 

Here again the major premiss is erroneous, but this could 
never have been discovered without extrinsic observation, which 
involves another inference, viz. that the case we are considering is 
analogous to other cases of motion besides other judgments and 
comparisons. 

XXVII. 88. turn, quum videbantur, &c.] See Ch. xvn. 51. 

XXVIII. 91. Dialecticam inventam esse dicitis, &c.] The 
word Dialectic has 3 significations. It refers to the conversational, 
cross-examining, eliminating method of Socrates. With Plato it 



NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. 171 

seems to signify the process of discovering objective truth, by the 
analysis of ideas. Lastly, it was used by the Stoics as synony 
mous with Logic as the science of reasoning, i.e. of the employ 
ment of the discursive faculty. Plus autem pollicebatur.~\ An 
cient Logic professed to be a real science, i.e. a means of 
discovering objective truth. The value of its pretensions is here 
most accurately estimated. Logic investigates the manner in 
which conceptions or ideas of the mind are related to one another. 
But the external facts upon which such conceptions are based are 
not amenable to the laws of thought, but the laws of nature. 
These laws of nature are the matter of which science is composed. 
The laws of thought which Logic examines concern only the forms 
in which this matter is moulded by the mind. We may, however, 
extend the province of Logic so as to make it investigate the 
general theory of evidence, and then taking the results of observa 
tion and experience as its material, it will be a real organon for 
the discovery of facts by establishing rules according to which the 
estimation and acquisition of evidence may be directed. 

XXIX. 92. Multa panca, magna parvd\ It must be ob 
served that the sorites sophism is only applicable to subjective 
and arbitrary conceptions such as are here indicated. For ex 
ample, there is no doubt whether a man is on this side of a 
boundary line or the other, though the barrier of separation may 
be indefinitely narrow; but in the case of such distinctions as 
few, many, broad or narrow, since the limits have no real 
objective existence they have no real defining power. Sir William 
Hamilton remarks, (Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxm. p. 464,) 
that the sorites "attempts, from the impossibility of assigning 
the limit of a relative notion, to show by continued interrogation 
the impossibility of its determination at all. There are certain 
notions which are only conceived as relative as proportional, and 
whose limits we cannot assign by the gradual addition or detrac 
tion of one determination. But there is no consequence in the 
proposition that, if a notion cannot be determined in this manner, 
it is incapable of all determination, and therefore absolutely incon 
ceivable and null." With regard to these observations of Sir 
W. Hamilton we think it is the arbitrariness and subjectivity not 
the relativity of a notion which renders the sorites applicable to it. 
A colour, for instance, is not a relative notion (at least not in the 



172 APPENDIX A. 

same sense as magnitude or degree), and yet the sorites might suc 
cessively present all the shades between white and black, and so 
argue black was white. The student must notice that the argu 
ment termed Sorites by modern logicians has no analogy to that 
indicated here, but is a chain of reasoning of the form A is B, B is 
C, C is D, <fec., therefore A is D. The mode of application of this 
kind of ratiocination, which is in fact the real type of all ratiocina 
tion, is admirably analysed and illustrated in Mr Mill s Logic, 
n. 5. The following is Sir W. Hamilton s historical review of 
this fallacy, "Sorites, though a word in not unfrequent employment 
by ancient authors, nowhere occurs- in any other logical meaning 
than that of a particular kind of sophism of which the Stoic 
Chrysippus was reputed the inventor (Persius, Sat. vi. 80). 2ojpd? 
you know in Greek means a heap or pile of any aggregated sub 
stances, as sand, wheat, &c. and sorites, literally a heajjer, was a 
name given to a certain captious argument, which obtained in 
Latin from Cicero the denomination of acervalis (De Div. n. 4). 
This sophism, as applied by Eubulides (who is even stated by 
Laertius to be the inventor of the sorites in general), took the 
name of </>aAa/cpos, calvus, the bald. It was asked, was a man 
bald who had so many thousand hairs 1 you answer, No : the 
antagonist goes on diminishing and diminishing the number, till 
you either admit that he who was not bald with a certain number 
of hairs, becomes bald when that complement is diminished by a 
single hair ; or you go on denying him to be bald, until his head 
be hypothetically denuded. Such was the quibble which obtained 
the name of Sorites, acervalis, climax, gradatio, &c. This, it is 
evident, has no real analogy with the form of reasoning now- 
known in logic under the name of Sorites. But when was the 
name perverted to this, its secondary signification 1 Of this I am 
confident, that the change was not older than the fifteenth 
century. It occurs in none of the logicians previous to that 
period" (Lect. xix. pp. 375, 6, 7). I cannot help thinking that 
the Differential method in Pure Mathematics had its origin in 

reasoning of this kind. 95. ars ista] The rules of Logic. 

utw/xa] For the history of this word see Hamilton s Reid, 

Note A, 5. Si te mentiri, dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris\ 

The words idque verum est contain the key of the fallacy. In a 
hypothetical syllogism it is not upon the fact asserted by a proposi- 



NOTES ON THE LUCVLLUS. 173 

tion that the argument rests, but upon the consequence of one 
proposition from another. Tims, If A is B, C is D, but A is , 
therefore, C is D. Such a conclusion would rest upon the ad 
mission of the assertion A is B, but not upon the fact of A being 
B. There is therefore no question of truth or falsehood in the 
argument, but only of admission. (See Whately s Logic, On 
Hypothetical; also Hamilton s Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxni. 
p. 466, On the Sophisma heterozeteseos.) 

XXX. 98. /Sin vitiose, minam Diogenes reddet] The allusion 
is to the story told by Aulus Gellius, LV. ch. 10, of Protagoras 
and Euathlus. 

XXXI. 99. Non comprehensa neque percepta...omnis vita 
tollatur] The doctrine of probability as held by Carneades in no 
way resembles the theory of chance elaborated by modern 
mathematicians (see Lect. Y. e). The probable judgment was 
based on observation, and is analogous to an inductive inference 
established by the method of agreement and the joint method of 
agreement and difference. In like manner Bishop Butler, in his 
Analogy, argues that a reasonable probability is a sufficient 
ground of action for a wise man. 

XXXII. 103. Academicis placere esse rerum...et cognitum 
possit esse] The philosophers of the Academy held that there are 
differences between things of such a kind that some appear pro 
bable and others the contrary. But this is not equivalent to 
saying that some of these can be perceived and others cannot, 
because many things which are false are probable, but nothing 

false can be perceived and known. veri et certi notam] The 

possibility of any qualitative mark of truth is denied by the 
Academicians; qualitative evidence, however, is admitted, so that 
any degree of probability may be attained, and this is considered 
sufficient ground of action. With regard to the ontological or 
substantial nature of things it would seem that the Stoics as well 
as the Academicians had renounced the pursuit, and were both in 
this respect Sceptics. It will be remembered that in the These- 
tetus the question was discussed whether cognition equalled right 
recognition. It was implied, though never demonstrated, that it 
involved something more. The Stoics, however, had entirely 
abandoned the metaphysical point of view, and, as we have indi 
cated elsewhere, we imagine that the Academicians had preserved 



174 APPENDIX A. 

the Platonic doctrine, and were indirectly defending it in sub 
verting the theory of recognition as advanced by the Stoics. 
XXXIII. 105. expedite, soluto, libero\ Cf. 7n6ava<; . . . 
KOL SicoSev//,eras . . . 7ri$ai/as /cat TrepteoSev/xevas /cat 
Hyp. i. 33. 227. to/men non possis ...defendere\ Of all these 
diverse appearances you could not say which is the permanent 
constant and natural quality of the sea with respect to colour. 

XXXVI. 116. In tris igitur partes, &c.] They, says Sextus 
E. (Adversus Logicos, vn. 3 17), who divide Philosophy into 
three parts are unanimous in distinguishing them as Logic, Ethic, 
and Physic. The Stoics compare Philosophy to a fruitful field, in 
which Physic resembles the tall trees, Ethic the fragrant fruit, 
Logic the strong wall. And others liken her to an egg; Etldc is 
the yolk, or embryo, Physic the white, or nourishment to the 
yolk, Logic the shell. 

XXXVII. 118. Princeps Tholes, &c.] With this catalogue 

of early Philosophers compare Aristotle, Met. i. Pythagorei 

ex numeris, &c.] The Pythagoreans did not, as is vulgarly sup 
posed, consider number the material cause of things. Number was 
with them the idea, form, or regulative principle, according to which 
the universe was constituted objectively, and construed by the mind 
subjectively. " vo/u/ca yap a Averts a TO> apt^uw /cat aye/xovtKa /cat 
StSacr/caXt/ca TW ctTropov/xevw Travros /cat dyi/oov/xevco Travrt, /c.T.A."(Stob. 

Eel. p. 8.) 119. earn sic ammo, &c.] That is, he will believe 

on evidence not demonstrative, for even the evidence of the senses 
is fallible with regard to objective existence. The presence of 
light is evidenced by a change of consciousness, but it would have 
to be proved that the objective fact of light could be the only 
cause of this change of consciousness before this evidence would 
be demonstrative. .For a notice of the Stoical Pantheism see 

De Nat. JDeor. Book n. Lect. V. ft. 120. inter deos Myrme- 

cides\ There must have been an idea of the Ant before its 

creation. 121. Docet omnia effecta esse natura] The student 

is recommended to read Cud worth s Intellectual System, Mos- 
heim s Edition. 

XXXIX. 122. Nee eo teamen aiunt empirici, &c.] Cf. Hyp. i. 
xxxiv. Note g. 123. Hiretas Syracusius . . .moveretur] In refer 
ence to this and the following chapters the student should con 
sult Whewell s History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. 



NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. 1 75 

Platonem in Timaeo] See Jowett s Dialogues of Plato; Sir G-. 
Lewis s Astronomy of the Ancients; Grote s Essay on the Timceus. 
Whether Plato understood the diurnal rotation of the earth or 
not seems to depend on the meaning we attach to the word 
etAAo/xeV^v, which may either signify " revolving," or compacted, 
as Mr Jowett calls it. 

XL. 125. out inane, &c.] This and the following are the 
theories of Democritus, adopted by Epicurus, and expounded in 
the poem of Lucretius, De Rerum Naturd. See also Theophras- 
tus, De Sensu, 63, Lect. III. p. 42. 

XLII. 129. Megaricorum fuit nobilis disciplina, &c.] The 
minor sects, springing directly from the teaching of Socrates, are 

here enumerated. Cf. Lecture I. p. 10. 131. Et vetus Acade- 

mia\ See Appendix B. Madvig s Excursus iv. 

XLV. 138. prima naturae] See Appendix B. Madvig s 
Excursus iv. Eor a fuller account of the moral doctrines Cicero 
here sketches the student must consult the De Finibus. 

XLYI. 142. id cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur] 
This is a definition, not a proposition. 



APPENDIX B. 



EXCURSUS IV. 

TRANSLATED from MADVIG S Edition of the De Finibus OF CICERO. 
On the Formula "Prima Naturae," and the Carneadean di 
vision of the opinions concerning the Chief good. De Finibus. 
Book ii. chap. 11., Book v. chap. 6, and elsewhere. 

1. CICERO in this work frequently introduces the formula prima 
naturae/ both by this particular name and by others differing 
slightly from it, but, as if the meaning were obvious and every 
where the same, he omits in any place to explain clearly and 
methodically the force of the expression or the nature of the thing. 
Not only to the attentive student, however, will certain obscurities 
and difficulties present themselves, but even Cicero himself appears, 
whilst he follows others incautiously, or adds somewhat of his 
own, to have comprehended this notion vaguely, and in places to 
have applied it unskilfully and without explanation such pas 
sages cannot be adequately understood or criticised. Many writers 
on the history of philosophy have either entirely omitted or but 
cursorily treated this matter, because in the philosophical treatises 
of the Greeks the subject is rarely discussed, and in the annals of 
diverse sects it only attained prominence in those later writings 
Cicero followed. Beier, one of the commentators on Cicero (De Off. 
in. 13) has collected at random the various forms of expression 
Cicero uses without distinguishing their signification. Elsewhere, 
in his seventh Excursus on De Off. Book i., he has so commented 
as there not even to have alluded to the difficulty in question less 
patent perhaps in this work of Cicero; and in some places, while 
following his author, he appears to have discussed the form of this 
doctrine among ancient philosophers inaccurately. The difficulty 



EXCURSUS IV. 177 

arises primarily from the fact that Carneades through his levity 
obscured a notion originally ill-defined by the Stoics among whom 
it arose; secondly, because Antiochus, on whom Cicero depends, 
imported it, with other Stoical theories, into the Academic and 
Peripatetic doctrines as reformed by himself; and the confusion is 
increased because Cicero, not content with a single and appropriate 
expression for one and the same thing, employs an unnecessary 
redundancy and variety of language, thereby confounding both in 
conception and expression those matters which even Antiochus 
had discriminated. 

2. Ta TTpwra Kara <wtv (the equivalent Greek form forprima 
naturce) is nowhere used by Aristotle, nor is this form of expres 
sion attributed to the leaders of the Old Academy by any author 
except Cicero. He following Antiochus assigns alike to Aristotle 
and Polenio definitions of the summum bonum of this kind, 
"honeste vivere, fruentem iis rebus, quas primas homini natura 
conciliet" (Acad. n. 131), or again, "virtute adhibita, imprimis a 
natura datis" (De Fin. n. 34; cf. iv. 15, where the word primorum 
is not added) ; again, " adipisci, quse essent prima natura qureque 
ipsa per se expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima" (Acad. J. 22), and in 
the 4th and 5th books of this work (De Fin.) he always credits 
those authors (Aristotle and Polemo) both with an idea of the 
thing and the employment of the expression. But although Cicero 
(v. 55) introduces Piso declaring that he had traced to their cradle 
all the ancient philosophers, especially the Peripatetics, I do not 
remember any expression of this kind in tho^e passages of Aris 
totle s works where he defines the notion of the good ; for (Magn. 
Moral, ii. 7) when he disputes concerning virtue, instituting a com 
parison between children and beasts, and investigates the laws of 
desire and aversion, he does not even use the contrasting forms 
TIDV Kara <ucriv or T<OI/ Trapa (frvcriv. The Stoics enquiring into the 
principles of action, estimation, and selection, argued that a certain 
primary appetition, primus appetitus, is apparent in every animal 
yearning towards that which nature herself had commended and 
made attractive to the creature. For thus Cicero renders what in 
Greek Chrysippus and others were wont to call OLKZLOW and 
oiKeiWiv. They said that this attraction promoted self-regard, 
and the maintenance by the animal of its own condition or consti 
tution. Hence, therefore, arose desire for those things conducive 
L. L. 12 



178 APPENDIX B. 

to self-preservation sought for by nature, and repugnance to 
contrary things which nature rejected because injurious to that 
condition. Those objects which they supposed to be thus desired 
by a primary impulse were not only declared to be Kara <j>vviv, and 
the opposites Trapa <mriv (Stob. Eel Eth. p. 134, 142, 250; Pint. 
adv. Stoic. 23, p. 1069 F., Clem. Alexandr. Strom. II. p. 179, Sylb.), 
but because they were the fir-st to move the appetite they were 
called ra Trpwra Kara ^>V(TLV (Plut. adv. Stoic. 26, p. 1071 A.; Luci- 
anum, Vit. Auct. 23; Geilium, XIL, 5, 7; Stobaeum, Eel. Eth. 
pp. 144, 148); Stoba3iis also uses the form ra. 7r/oo3ra Trapa <wiv, 
and p. 136, he designates those things Trporjyov^va Kara (fjvcrir, 
which he elsewhere terms Trpumx. Yarro in Latin, in his book 
on philosophy (apud August, de Civ. Dei, xix. 1 et 2), had called 
them primigenia and prima naturae; Cicero says that some 
natural objects are secundum naturam, and others contra (in 
many places, as in. 21 and 31, iv. 25, v. 72); again he terms 
them naturalia (in. 61), and more emphatically prima natu 
ralia (n. 34), but most frequently with Yarro, prima naturw 
(m. 30, iv. 41, 43, v. 21, 45), also prima secundum naturam 
(v. 18, 19, 45); in Book in. 61, prima natural secunda and 
contraria are conjoined (cf. Stob. p. 148). But he uses other terms 
and significations, such as the following : principia naturae, (in. 22, 
23), or principia naturalia (n. 35, HI. 17), initia natures (n. 38, 
in. 22), prima naturce conciliations (in the plural number, in. 
22); we find also prima appetitio naturalis (op/xvf, iv. 25, 26) ea, 
quae secundum naturam sunt, appetens (iv. 32). The same things 
are said Academ. I. 22, prima esse natura, where the ablative case 
is used, meaning that they occupy the first place by natural ap 
pointment; but in ii. 34 they are somewhat exceptionally called 
prima a natura data, which has no reference to the actual acqui 
sition of the things, but simply means that they are originally 
proposed and suggested by nature for acquisition ; thus they are 
termed, iv. 18, principia a natura data. Advancing from this form 
Cicero has more concisely written (11. 33) prima data esse natura, 
i.e. by the law of nature (cf. iv. 17), in the same meaning HI. 17, 
prima ascita esse natura, i.e. approved and selected for acquisition. 
3. But although the Stoics do not appear to have profoundly 
analysed this idea of natural attraction (prima conciliatio) so as to 
render evident what and how much it might comprise, they argued 



EXCURSUS IV. 179 

that in the course of time a light of reason having suddenly 
arisen, which in the infant had not been kindled, and the 
uniformity and propriety of nature having been experienced, a 
certain will to agree with a nature arose in which was present 
both virtue and perfection of reason. This will they separated 
emphatically from natural attraction, and declared that the jjgood 
sought after differed in kind from those objects primarily desired. 
Therefore although virtue is in the highest degree an accordance 
with nature (in. 21, 22 note to v. 34), nevertheless natural 
attraction not only does not contain any disposition towards 
virtue (for then virtue would be found in those natural objects of 
desire which corresponded to this attraction), but not even can 
the germs and beginnings of virtue be thought of in it, if the 
Stoics would be consistent with themselves. Natural objects are 
sought for as such, but he who strives after the beginnings of 
virtue, seeks virtue herself; hence virtue is at once separated. 
Natural objects of desire are by the Stoics comprehended in the 
class of things indifferent ran/ aSia<opa)f (Stob. pp. 142, 148), and 
Trpor/y/xeVa (p. 148). Therefore when Carueades instituted the 
acquisition of these primary objects of desire as the summum 
bonum there is said to be no addition made of virtue in any place 
(as is explained in note to iv. 15); and in the doctrine of the 
Peripatetics those things termed bona corporis et externa are called 
by Cicero himself (n. 34, 38), by Cato (in. 30), and in Book v. 21, 
prima natures. It does not appear, however, to have been accu 
rately defined by the Stoics what particular things were included 
in this expression of primorum; but the perception, strength, 
and health of the body and senses generally ranked first, as n. 34, 
v. 18; Stob. p. 114. Gellius includes under this term the 
pleasures only of the body, and the removal of physical pains. 
Cicero, n. 34, adds (ingenii motum) the things which in the system 
of the Peripatetics are called involuntary virtues ; the same are 
reckoned by Stobseus, p. 60, amongst the prima naturce, and 
possibly understood by the Stoics in their objects of primary 
appetition or simple preference, which they also called 
(Dio. L. vil. 107). Although Cicero (in. 17) places rds 
j/feis amongst the prima naturce, or so conjoins them that unless 
they are of the same class it would not appear why they are 
spoken of together, yet this y KaraA^^ts seems to be so peculiar to 

122 



l8o APPENDIX B. 

ripe reason, as scarcely to hold this position amongst the prima 
naturce. Because the Stoics were wont to look Tor the origin of 
notions in the perceptions of the senses, KaraA.?7i/a< was readily 
combined with the perfection of the senses, as in Stobseus (p. 148), 
vyteta KOI cu<T$??cr{,g, Ae yco Se rrjv KaraX^iv. I still more wonder 
that technical aptitudes (artes) are included by Cicero because 
they are totally adverse to the notion of primaries. 

Furthermore, when Cicero (v. 18) would attribute to the mind 
certain first principles as the sparks and seeds of virtue, he 
incautiously intermixes matter from a source of which I shall 
presently speak. 

Finally, the Stoics are to be commended because they did not 
admit of pleasure among those things craved after by the animal 
part of one s nature, but said that it was eTriyeVi/^/xa (aftergrowth), 
the subsequent affection of a creature feeling that it has attained the 
primary objects of desire (cf. note to in. 17). In their anxiety, 
however, to oppose Aristippus and Epicurus they scarcely allowed 
this secondary place to pleasure (et apo. mV), nor did they show 
how such a lower kind of pleasure was consistent with the nobler 
emotion experienced by a man through the consciousness of co 
operating by virtuous conduct with that higher nature of v hich 
he was a part ; hence they confused the subject and left a loop 
hole for error. 

4. Somewhat different from this idea of the primary objects 
of desire, if carefully considered, is that first constitution or in 
stitution of nature which in Books IV. (15 sqq.) and v. (24 sqq.) 
is explained by the system of Antiochus. This system, regarding 
the nature of man as a whole, whilst including the body, attaches 
much more importance to the mind and to the perfection of 
reason in the mind, i.e. virtue (iv. 17, 41 j v. 36, &c.), so that, 
although virtue may not be present at the first dawn of conscious 
ness it nevertheless springs from that constitution, and is desired 
in the same manner as other objects which are contained in it, 
claiming for itself, however, a far higher degree of consideration. 
But because the desire of preserving the body is the most marked 
instinct in the early life of an animal, it was incumbent on 
Antiochus to explain this in his constitution and connect it with 
his definition of the chief good; he therefore appropriates from 
the Stoics the appellation of prima naturce, and although they are 



EXCURSUS IV. 181 

goods of the body, they are at last joined by Antiochus to virtue 
(iv. 41, 43, 47). Therefore that which among the Stoics con 
stitutes the idea of natural attraction is not mentioned in a very 
great portion of the constitution of Antiochus. 

5. Cicero, following Antiochus, does not notice this dis 
crepancy, and argues through the whole of the fourth book as if 
it were altogether the same thing, and in his exordium actually 
states as much ( 15, "coiistitutio ilia prima naturae, a qua tu quo- 
que ordiebare"), then he continues to say afterwards that the Stoics 
and the Ancients (i.e. Antiochus) set out from the same principles. 
Hence the same name by which in Book in. 22 and 23 he had 
indicated prima naturce calling them principia naturce in the 
Fourth Book, he applies (perhaps more conveniently and ac 
curately) to that constitution of nature the notion of which he 
supposes Zeno to have derived from Polemo (42), and which he 
says must be modified by him if he wished to retain his own 
views of the summum bonum (34). To whom Zeno, if he had 
been present, would have answered so far rightly, that his idea of 
good was not derived from natural attraction. But in this Fourth 
Book, where Cicero follows Antiochus closely, he errs only in 
supposing that the Stoics attributed much more than they did to 
this notion of natural attraction. In the second Book, where 
Cicero refutes Epicurus in his own person, he lapses into still 
greater error. For, when endeavouring to avail himself of the 
Antiochian notion of original adaptation in order to convict 
Epicurus of inconsistency (inasmuch as he, Epicurus, had not 
arrived at a view of the summum bonum corresponding with that 
form of it which he had laid down), he imprudently substituted 
the narrow view of the primary objects of desire of the Stoics, 
together with their catalogue of them, instead of that general 
view of the constitution of man entertained by Antiochus, saying 
that the rest of the philosophers agreed with him, thereby falling 
into an inexplicable distortion. For after he (Cicero) said that in 
the opinion of Poleino and Aristotle the prima were the limbs, 
senses, disposition, perfection of the body, health, he adds that 
hence arose their doctrine that to live according to nature was the 
summum bonum, that is, to enjoy in a virtuous manner those 
objects of desire primarily indicated by nature, virtute aclhibita, 
frui primis a natura datis. Whereas what can be more obvious 



1 82 APPENDIX E. 

even to a casual observer than that the living according to nature 
could have been so defined that there need not have been the 
least reference, among these primary objects of desire, to that 
which is the chief point in his (Cicero s) explication of a life in 
conformity to nature (adkibitavirtute), whether the primary objects 
were these or far different ones ? Hence he joins Calipho and 
Diodorus to the ancients in the same commendation for con 
sistency, and appears to point them out as having held the same 
primaries; certainly he does not mention others, and yet they 
differ in the idea of the summum bonum. I have already explained 
in a note that Cicero seems to have said something concerning the 
prima of Aristippus, Hieronyrnus, and the Stoics, which he may 
have erased; but, whether he did or not, it is difficult to imagine 
what relation he supposed there was between the prima of the 
Stoics and a chief good founded on virtue alone; and it is the more 
to be wondered at, that a confusion so great as this should have 
overtaken Cicero, because, in that very division of the opinions 
concerning the chief good made by Carneades which Cicero 
employs after Antiochus, there was left some distinction among 
these notions. 

6. Carneades eulogized by Cicero for his remarkable pro 
ficiency in dialectic (in. 41), although he displayed sufficient skill 
in controverting the superficial doctrines of the Stoics concerning 
the theory of knowledge, was not possessed by any ardent desire of 
investigating the truth, and had such a dislike to the minute 
labour of discriminating the exact character of notions and opinions, 
that he affected to treat them with rhetorical levity and flippancy. 
Nevertheless he prepared the way for Antiochus, who subsequently 
deserting his sect, amalgamated the doctrines of the Peripatetics, 
Academicians and Stoics. Carneades then undertook an ex 
haustive enumeration of the opinions of dissentient philosophers 
concerning the chief gcod. This division, approved by Antiochus, 
Cicero explains in Book V. 16 and following chapters. For Car 
neades having laid down as a first principle that the art of life 
as well as other arts had some extrinsic end in view, and that 
such end ought to be consistent with, and adapted to nature, 
affirmed that the whole diversity of opinion was about primary 
appetition (de primo appetitu), and that on that point there 
were three doctrines; for some thought that pleasure was aimed 



EXCURSUS IV. 183 

at by it; others, freedom from pain; others, all natural objects 
of desire. In this exposition it appears, firstly, that the primary 
appetition occupies such a place, that in it the entire bias of 
human nature is contained, and from it every good springs. So 
far therefore it corresponds with that primary constitution 
set forth by Antiochus. Cicero also (17 and 19) designates it 
by the term normal incitements, primorum invitamentorum*, 
and natural motives, principioru/m naturalium. Further, it is 
manifest that this instinct is so defined as to be restricted entirely 
to self love and regard for the body, excluding all those things 
which subject a man to the law of reason and universal nature. 
From this point of view therefore this appetition or instinct re 
sembles the natural attraction (conciliatio) of the Stoics, whence 
also Carneades derived the prima naturae. Virtue is so far 
banished that those who would place her among natural goods 
find only a collateral admission. It is very extraordinary how 
Antiochus could have approved of this classification of Carneades, 
cancelling as it did its own conception of a primary constitution, 
in which the whole man and the perfection of reason are contained. 
The Stoics, indeed, were the last to allow that which Carneades 
laid down as a first principle, viz. that the art of life was deter 
mined by any extrinsic end, maintaining rather that it was wisdom 
entirely engrossed in itself (in. 24). Moreover, Carneades in his 
enumeration has most clumsily compared pleasure (i. e. as I have 
said the emotion of a man who has gained the object of his desire) 
with the prima naturae, that is, with the very objects desired, 
and has placed exemption from pain (the negative idea of pleasure) 
as a distinct member of the division; an error which soon gene 
rates other obscurities. 

Hence we have the following table of ends : 

A. To seek after 

1 . Pleasure. 

2. Freedom from pain. 

3. Natural objects of desire. 

B. To do all things 

1 . For the sake of pleasure, 

2. or exemption from pain, 

3. or natural objects of desire. 



184 APPENDIX B. 

7. From these premisses, Carneades, although he appears to 
be intending to find tricu summa bona, from the gratification of a 
threefold primary instinct, suddenly deduces an inference for which 
not the least ground or cause had been shewn, viz. that virtue is 
the doing all things for the sake of anyone of those three ends 
(see Table), whereof some said one was chiefly to be desired, and 
some another, even though a man might not gain the object of his 
desire. Consequently not only does he reach the idea of duty 
through that primary instinct, but, what is still more remarkable, 
although the notion of good had been evolved out of the gratifica 
tion of a natural desire, we are all at once confronted with some 
who place the chief good in virtue per se, when even natural desire 
has not been satisfied at all. It is manifest that this remarkable 
method of reasoning originated from the definition Antipater of 
Tarsus was in the habit of employing, when he said that virtue or 
the chief good, is TTO.V TO Ka$ CLVTOV TTOICIV Trpos TO Tvy^dvav ran/ 
TT/oor/yov/xeVwi/ Kara ^vcriv (see III. 22); and which definition I am 
inclined to suspect had been already laid down by Diogenes (v. 20). 
This definition, while it attempts to associate with the notion of 
virtue one of duty rudely constructed from the selection of rah/ 
Trpo^you/xeVcov, although it implies a contempt of utility for the sake 
of a higher law, greatly obscures the significance of virtue as 
understood by Zeno, and separates it from its true source, viz. 
the universal law of nature, to which it is voluntarily subject. 
From the rest of their system, however, it was apparent how virtue 
might be determined, and how it might contain good separated 
from the acquisition of utilities. Carneades both omits this por 
tion of the doctrine, and contrives two other virtues, viz. pleasure 
and exemption from pain, opining that in these any one may find 
a happy life. We are not surprised then that those two doctrines 
concerning the chief good so ineptly devised should have found 
no defender. 

8. Carneades also contended that, in addition to these simple 
notions concerning the chief good, there were three complex, made 
by combining the former in twos. The first that of the Academics 
and Peripatetics, the second that of Callipho, the third of Diodorus, 
and that there could not possibly be more if the nature of the 
subject were thoroughly examined. But if the original division 
of Carneades be correct, six compound notions should have been 



EXCURSUS IV. 185 

formed out of four simple ones (i.e. taking them two together); nor 
is it apparent why, if pleasure and freedom from pain were 
radically distinct t^oth from each other and the prima natures, 
either pleasure and exemption from pain, or each of them and 
prima naturce, may not have been properly combined. 

9. Moreover, Carneades, who had originated this division, 
did not the less persistently oppose it, inasmuch as he maintained 
that there was no dispute about facts between the Stoics and 
Peripatetics (in. 41), of whom one held the simple, the other 
the complex notion concerning the chief good, which is equivalent 
to annulling that whole division and neutralizing whatever truth 
it contained. Antiochus, however, approved both of this division 
and of this opinion respecting the Peripatetics and Stoics. 



EXCURSUS V. 

On the arrangement of the Subject-matter in the Third Book of 
the De Finibus, and on the division of Ethic among the Stoics. 

1. Although the Stoics themselves were wont to boast of the 
admirable arrangement and systematization of their doctrines, yet 
in every highly developed theory ideas are so linked together, that 
for their due consideration it is very necessary they should be set 
forth in regular order. We are therefore justified in enquiring 
whether Cicero in his exposition of the Stoical doctrines has 
followed the plan and sequence of matter adopted by this school 
itself; and this appears to be the more necessary because although 
we do not hesitate as to the general plan, we have expressed a 
doubt whether the arrangement of some few matters has been 
altogether satisfactorily executed; and even recently a learned man 
has attempted to discover some new principle of division of the 
Stoical Ethic, and to substantiate it from this very third book. 

2. In the first place, since the system of the Stoics after the 
age of Zeno (their chief legislator and preceptor) had been amplified 
and developed by the exigencies of controversy, and certain notions 
not a little modified, it is evident that we might expect to find 
a considerable variation between the original form of their doctrine 
and that which generally obtained after the time of Chrysippus. 
But it is not certain that Chrysippus himself, although he seems to 
have included every part, preserved a systematic arrangement of 
the whole code, inasmuch as he treated of the leading subjects 
separately, and not in one continuous discourse. Nevertheless the 
very nature and affinity of the tenets of the Stoics, and their 
method of deducing and treating them as from one source, seem to- 
have determined a certain sequence of the chief heads common to 
Chrysippus and those who succeeded him, especially since little 
care was taken to reduce ethic to first principles, or to connect it 



EXCURSUS V. 187 

at all closely or radically with theology and physic, both fruitful 
occasions of schism. Variety of order chiefly attaches to their 
treatment of individual virtues and actions. In Diogenes Laertius 
and Stobseus, as well as in Cicero, we have some indication of that 
sequence and arrangement of parts to which I am alluding, but, as 
might be anticipated in that class of writers, an indication not 
without obscurity. Diogenes (vn. 84) says, that ethic is divided 
by the Stoics eis re TOV irepl op/x^s KOL ci$ TOV irepl dyaOuv KOL Ka/cwv 

T07TOV KOL IS TOV TTpl TTdOwV KOL 7T6/5t dpTrj<S KOL TTCpt T\OV<S TTCpL T 

r^s Trpwrr;? aias KOI rwv Trpd&wv /cat Trepl ru>v KaOfjKOVTWv TrpoTpOTrwv 
T Kal aTroTpoTrwi/. It is evident at the first glance that in this 
enumeration cognate matters are disjoined, and the same things 
repeated as if they were different, because they had necessarily 
been discussed on separate occasions. For, how could the question 
of ends be dissociated from the discussion of good arid evil 1 

And it is manifest from the brief notice of Cicero ( 20) 
how very closely bound up with the question of intrinsic value 
(aias) is that concerning the primary appetition and natural 
attraction. These points were both touched upon as prefatory 
to the notion of the good, and subsequently more fully treated 
of when the distinction between things in relation to action and 
duty was discussed ( 50). The same may be said concerning the 
notion of virtue which, divided from the good and evil, is inter- 
placed between rot TrdOrj and TO reAos. Nor are at 7rpaeis and ret 
KaO-rJKovTa properly disjoined. Moreover, what I now say is con 
firmed by the next paragraph (85) of Diogenes himself in the 
explanation of this doctrine, where, although roughly treated, 
the incongruities to which I have referred are for the most part 
avoided. For, from the normal appetition (85) he proceeds to 
the chief good (87), and to virtue (90), in which the chief good 
lies; then the notions and divisions of good are set forth (94), and 
the virtues in which the chief good is are indicated (100). 

Then follows the technical distinction rwv aSia</>o p<ov (of things 
neither virtuous nor vicious, 104); next duty is explained (107). 
To this exposition of things pertaining to a well-regulated life is 
added a notice of the passions (rcov TraOiov, 110), with which are 
contrasted the lawful affections of the mind (% \apd rrj rjSovf)). 
Annexed is a description of a wise man and in what he differs 
from a fool (116), which, while containing multifarious precepts 



188 APPENDIX B. 

for tlie conduct of life, somewhat inopportunely includes the 
maxini that all faults are equal (120). The doctrine of the 
identity of all virtue is added (125), as well as ry irpoKOTrfj (127), 
growth, the perpetuity of virtue, and its all-sufficiency for happi 
ness, obviously belonging where the general nature of virtue was 
discussed. Still as these matters were frequently canvassed sepa 
rately, and in the person and example of a wise man the charac 
teristics of virtue and maxims for the conduct of life were set 
forth, I do not deny that Diogenes Laertius had some of the 
Stoics to countenance his arrangement. 

A misplaced expression of opinion, defending the law of 
nature against the Epicureans, belongs to those precepts of life 
to which I have referred. If we carefully compare with this 
order of Diogenes Laertius that observed by Cicero, we shall 
easily see that although some things are differently arranged, and 
some found in one which are omitted in the other (indeed the 
design of Cicero s work altogether excluded those special precepts 
for the conduct of life), there is yet that similarity in the con 
secution of chief points which I have above indicated, arising from 
the nature of the ideas involved. For from primary appetitioii 
Cicero advances to the good, and the end, and to the nature 
of virtue, then to the distinction of things indifferent (TWI/ aSicu^c- 
po>v), lastly, to duty by which the conduct of life is guided. StobaBus 
obscures to a much greater degree the continuity of the matters 
and opinions constituting the ethical system of the Stoics (Eel. 
Etli. p. 90 sqq.), and dwells upon subjects of which I shall merely 
mention the names; good and evil (90); the definitions and divi 
sions of the good (96); virtues (102); their end, the living ac 
cording to nature (108); the identity of virtues (112); the cha 
racter of the wise man (120); the division of goods (124); the 
end, to live consistently (132); ra aSia <opa (142); duty (158); 
desire (opfjirj, 160); passions (166); friendship (186); the cha 
racter of a wise man, and general precepts (188); the definition 
of KaTop0w/xa.Tos and a/xaprr; /aaros (192); equality of faults (198). 
It is plain that at the commencement the mention of appetite 
and natural attraction is omitted, whereas in the explanation of 
the end, and of the good, things intimately connected are separated 
and arranged apart. But here also, as with Cicero and Diogenes 
Laertius, duty is treated of immediately after rd cuW<opa. Passions, 



EXCURSUS V. 189 

in explaining which the idea of appetition is involved, are treated 
of after duty, as with Diogenes. 

3. Cicero, as I have already remarked, observes the same 
order as Diogenes Laertius. He has obscured it, however, either 
by his scholastic handling, or, a,s those who are well acquainted 
with this kind of Cicero s works will more probably think, he 
has derived it from that Greek writer whom he had elected as 
his guide when composing the book. And this is confirmed by 
the fact that Cicero himself in the person of Cato openly declares 
that the order of matter was suggested to him from elsewhere, 
33, and especially 50. But this author, if a single one, was not 
Chrysippus, as Peterseii thinks with Gorentz (Introduction, 
p. xxv.), although the discussion of Cato is deduced from a senti 
ment precisely analogous to that of Chrysippus in Diogenes 
Laertius, but was either Diogenes the Babylonian, or some one 
later than Diogenes who had made use of his work. 

For, both that exposition of Chrysippus of natural attraction, 
and other subjects in this book attributable to him, as those which 
are mentioned 27, 46, 61 and 73, together with those in which 
Cicero himself describes Chrysippus by name, 57 and 67, were 
communicated without doubt by him to others, as well as to his 
pupil Diogenes, whom Cicero himself in a former place joins to 
Chrysippus. But Cicero so follows Diogenes, even in a matter 
in which there was some divergence from the Stoics, that he 
seems to have chosen him as hi; authority (33), and he intrudes 
his opinion concerning the power of riches (49), too inopportunely 
for him to have done, unless he had had Diogenes book in his 
hand, and had extracted copiously from it. And that part of 
the discussion, in which is expounded the difference of opinion 
between the Stoics and Peripatetics (41 sqq.), although it con 
tains the maxims and opinions of all the Stoics, nevertheless 
seems to have been derived from some one else, who like Diogenes 
had lived contemporary with Carneades or after him. Nor is 
that to be overlooked, which is adverted to in 22, that 
Cicero speaks of a formula of the summum bonum, attributed to 
Antipater a disciple of Diogenes, which would not be inconsistent 
with Diogenes himself. As to his indication of Stoics later than 
Diogenes (57), he might very easily have added sentiments about 
glory and fame from Pansetius and Posidonius, with whose 



IpO APPENDIX B. 

writings he was extremely familiar, notwithstanding that in the 
more profound reasoning of this whole book he had Diogenes or 
some follower of Diogenes as his guide. 

But whether Cicero has followed Diogenes ov any one else, 
or one or more in the composition of this book, it appears that 
whencesoever he derived his material, he found the subject already 
treated in the manner of the later Stoics, as if the aim was to 
determine and to corroborate the same notions in many different 
ways, sometimes following the pervading spirit of the whole 
system, sometimes contending with arguments deduced in con 
formity with some special doctrine, whence it easily happened 
that the same things were often repeated, and cohering doctrines 
were in some measure sundered. That something of this kind had 
happened in the part of this book where the good and the virtuous 
and the end are defined, we have already intimated (25 and 34), and 
still more might be remarked. For, 26, 27, by a new mode of 
argumentation nothing is accomplished but what had been already 
demonstrated, and after it is here explained that virtue is the 
only good (36), it is reiterated that virtue must be sought for 
its own sake. Cicero, again, when extensively extracting the 
main heads of opinions from one or more Greek writers relating 
to the chief good and quality of things, seems in two places 
(35, 49) to have inadvertently retained something which may 
originally have been connected with another discussion, and to 
have placed it in his book, so that it does not appear to what 
it refers, or what it has to do with the matter. Finally, in the 
midst of the exposition ran/ a8ia<opon> (55), he suddenly introduces 
a division of goods, as if it belonged there, sequitur ilia divisio 
ut bonorum alia sint, &c., which it is evident ought to have been 
placed where he was speaking of the conception and definition 
of the good, as is the case in Stobaeus (p. 100) and Diogenes 
Laertius (vn. 96, sqq.). Either Cicero introduced it here, think 
ing of a similar enumeration TWI> Trporj-y^viav affixed to 56, or 
because in the Greek writer whom he followed he found it in this 
connection for the sake of comparison. 



CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY c. j. CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 

O 




3 w, o 

t$ U iJ tj 



O 



BINDING SECT. JUN 1 5 1971 



Levin, Thomas Woodhouse 

Six lectures introductor 
to the philosophical writ 
ings of Cicero 



PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE 
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET 

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY